On Saturday, July 4, 2020 at 2:06:53 PM UTC-4, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 4, 2020 at 12:52 PM mark.arnott1--- via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> 
> 
> As part of this, you should re-evaluate certificate pinning. As one of the
> authors of that specification, and indeed, my co-authors on the
> specification agree, certificate pinning does more harm than good, for
> precisely this reason.
> 
I agree that certificate pinning is a bad practice, but it is not a decision 
that I made or that I can reverse quickly.  It will take time to convince 
several different actors that this needs to change.

> I realize you're new here, and so I encourage you to read
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Policy_Participants for context about the
> nature of participation.

Thank you for helping me understand who the participants in this discussion are 
and what roles they fill.

> I'm very familiar with the implications of applying these rules, both
> personally and professionally. This is why policies such as
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Responding_To_An_Incident#Revocation exist.
> This is where such information is shared, gathered, and considered, as
> provided by the CA. It is up to the CA to demonstrate the balance of
> equities, but also to ensure that going forward, they actually adhere to
> the rules they agreed to as a condition of trust. Simply throwing out
> agreements and contractual obligations when it's inconvenient,
> *especially *when
> these were scenarios contemplated when they were written and CAs
> acknowledged they would take steps to ensure they're followed, isn't a
> fair, equitable, or secure system.

I think that the lack of fairness comes from the fact that the CA/B forum only 
represents the view points of two interests - the CAs and the Browser vendors.  
Who represents the interests of industries and end users?  Nobody.


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