Right now Freenet discovers other clients on opennet by way of seed
nodes. Hypothetically you can run the nodes as hidden services and embed
the addresses in Freenet clients. Clients generate their own hidden
address keys and build routing tables from them.
No distributed system on I2P or Tor comes close to Freenet features.
WoT, library, the plugin ecosystem and Opennet bring a lot of value
compared to other systems. Opennet is a big part of Freenet's attraction
and you shouldn't tear it out. The tunneling idea sounds great and it
should get priority. Maybe you should discuss it with the Tor developers
and see if they can help.
PS what NSA documents mention contractors attacking Freenet?
@Ian
Freenet has many selling points besides anonymity as I said. I'm
surprised you don't see that.
Tor is not easily blocked by China and people connect from behind the
Great Firewall everyday. They've been making all kinds of advancements
in bridge technology and obfuscated protocols to bypass DPI. They have
ways to distribute bridges and software packages that get around
censorship of their website. Infrastructure for your users potentially.
@Arne
I am a Freenet user. I care about Freenet and want it to be popular with
people facing most dangerous threats.
Tor is adding inter-relay adaptive padding soon to stop timing attacks.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-September/009485.html
How did Freenet solve this? If a bad node can connect to you on Opennet,
they can do traffic analysis on your requests. With no guard nodes an
attacker can connect to everyone in short time. You can add node pinning
and tunnels but that's a lot of work.
On 2015-10-16 17:11, Matthew Toseland wrote:
On 16/10/15 00:38, salutarydiacritica...@ruggedinbox.com wrote:
Step back and take a deep breath. I'm not telling you to shutdown your
website and foundation and host your project on Tor' s site.
I'm questioning if the overhead of designing and maintaining yet
another anonymity protocol makes sense given Freenet's current
situation. You can concentrate on polishing Freenet UX and storage
algorithms instead and leave the anonymity to Tor. Its an intensive
process coming up with something that stands up against serious
enemies. Tor gets most of the academic community's attention improving
against attacks all the time. You get this for free by switching to
their protocol for transport.
Not every developer that designed their app to communicate over Tor or
a socks proxy, stuck their software with theirs. It's a more sensible
decision than everyone rolling a custom anonymous protocol every time
they wanted such services. Just like crypto, its better to go with a
standard cipher checked the most by researchers than writing your own.
Again I'm not criticizing your effort but your wiki page on attacks
against Freenet does not inspire confidence in your target audience of
investigate journalists and whistleblowers.
Using Tor as an initial layer on Freenet would improve the security of
opennet slightly but would need a way to discover nodes. Plus it would
be *slightly* slower. In any case Freenet's focus in terms of improving
security is / should be, on darknet - which has nothing to do with Tor.
There are distributed storage and chat systems built on top of I2P, and
possibly Tor. I don't think they're very popular - people want
Facebook,
but with some warm fuzzy feeling attached (without any real security
and
still using Javascript). People who really do need to publish
anonymously still need a wide audience.
We're not proposing to implement a tunnel scheme in Freenet in the near
future. It's been discussed, and it makes sense eventually (because the
threat model and use case is different to Tor, we can use different,
safer algorithms, using social trust and high latency for inserts), but
it's not a high priority right now.
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