Am Samstag, 17. Oktober 2015, 02:33:00 schrieb salutarydiacritica...@ruggedinbox.com: > How did Freenet solve this? If a bad node can connect to you on Opennet, > they can do traffic analysis on your requests. With no guard nodes an > attacker can connect to everyone in short time. You can add node pinning > and tunnels but that's a lot of work.
The first answer to that is “via darknet”. The second is: Freenet does not need interactive connections to external data. In tor you get all packages for a connection from a single source. In Freenet the request goes to dozens to hundreds of machines who all only serve a tiny part of the file. The very concept of Tor — interactive access to the regular web — prevents them from doing anything which provides real anonymity. Adding padding might improve that a bit, but it won’t solve the problem — even though Tor operates at a massive scale compared to Freenet, so it’s vastly easier to “hide in the forest”. The difference is architectural: Tor provides communication channels and might implement a storage layer on top. Freenet provides a storage layer and implements communication on top. This architectural difference allows Freenet to provide much higher security than tor (on Opennet in theory, and practically on Darknet), and it prevents us from ever providing sub-second round-trip-times. Best wishes, Arne PS: Sorry for the rather harsh tone of this mail. I’m a bit aggravated by Matthews doomsaying and didn’t yet manage to shed that feeling. -- singing a part of the history of free software: - http://infinite-hands.draketo.de
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