On 06 Apr 2015, at 01:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Monday, April 6, 2015, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 05 Apr 2015, at 00:01, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sunday, April 5, 2015, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 04 Apr 2015, at 00:03, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Saturday, April 4, 2015, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Imagine the iterated duplication, the average history in the
diaries obtained contained histories like W (I was unable to
predit that), W again!
Bruno Marchal keeps making the exact same error over and over and
over again. Whatever is in the diary that the Washington Man is
carrying is totally irrelevant because it was not written by the
Washington Man he's just carrying it, the diary was written by the
Helsinki Man. And Bruno Marchal just can't kick that personal
pronoun addiction. For the 123rd time WHO THE HELL IS "I"?
"I" is a single entity travelling through time in the forward
direction. If you have duplication you realise this is an
illusion. However, brains are strongly wired up to persist in this
illusion, and the result is that if you are teleported to two
places it will seem to you that you are teleported to just one
with probability 1/2. The original and the copy know it's not
objectively true, but they can't help the feeling.
Yes, and then, as they assume comp, they have a simple theory
explaining why it has to be like that: they have been duplicated.
( w v m) has been realized in all extensions, and (w & m) is
falsified in all extensions.
Everything here can be made pure third person, so ... even a p-
zombie "grasps" this :)
BTW, I think your argument in your other post might eliminate "yes
doctor" from comp. The unprovable part would rely entirely in
Church's thesis. That would be nice and you make me think so.
Yes, that's what I think. Those who believe (like Searle) that CT
is true and every 3P function of the brain can be replicated but
don't believe in comp are inconsistent.
Agreed. Of course you still need to say "yes" to the doctor, but the
trust will rely on the level, and well, on the fact that the patient
of that doctor seems to pass the "non-zombie-Turing" test, which
proves nothing, but we have nothing else as far as truth is concerned.
There is for completeness another possibility, which is that a type
of dualism is true. Your body is a zombie and your mind exists in a
spiritual realm, but the two happily run in parallel.
Like in computationalism, if you agree with the MGA conclusion, but
with one big nuance: there is no body. So no zombie a fortiori. Only
appearance of bodies, and they are pointers on the thinker, not the
thinker itself.
In this case if there was a partial brain replacement your body
would continue saying everything is normal but your mind might
notice a difference and the parallelism would stop from that point.
Cochlear implant patients might be experiencing this now: their
minds are frantically trying to communicate to the world that they
are just as deaf as before, but they have frustratingly lost the
ability to control their bodies, which are telling people that they
can hear.
Similar thing can happen with the corpus callosus when sectioned.
The dominant brain keep control of the body, and acts and talk like
if nothing happened, when some suspect that the non dominant brain
might support a person or personal experience, who know feels like
losing control, except indirectly through the limbic system.
But those are not partial zombiness, it is more dissociative state,
like with salvia, and ketamine or high dose of lsd, or shrooms.
You don't comment below, I guess you have no problem with "a movie
does not support the conscious experience of the boolean program in
real time". That would again leads to partial zombie, or lead to
ascribe a token precise experience to an empty movie. OK?
I agree that if comp is true then consciousness cannot supervene on
physical activity, for the reasons in the MGA thread.
OK. Thanks for making this clear.
The only way out of this conclusion is to deny comp, which means to
deny CT.
I guess you are too quick. We can still deny comp, without denying CT,
for example by pretending that no copy will get the right behavior, or
even that the copy will be dead, and cannot be made moving at all,
perhaps because we believe in some magical God which would not allow
it, or whatever, or that all copies will be mentally impaired, etc. It
is only in the case where the copies behave the same as the original,
and claim they have no change in qualia, that comp is follows from CT
with the "no-partial-zombie" argument.
This does not imply CT is false, as the "magical soul", or the
"primitive matter", or the "infinitely low subst level (actually
infinite)", used to make someone saying "no" to the doctor, might not
add any new computability power, only that it would be needed to
remain alive and have the relevant behavior.
I guess you agree with this remark, as we were in the context of
copies having the right behavior and pretending to survive perfectly.
Obviously, a believer in CT, and not in comp, needs some amount of
magic, and perhaps we can derive comp from CT, if, like in the MGA, we
can show that indeed we need to add something magical. I have to
think more on this, as I might be quick again.
Hmm... A model could be given with having an infinite low substitution
level. When using a digital brain, people would survive ... for some
period of time, and then problems would add up, due to truncation
error, decimals incorrect, etc. The brain would be a truly infinite
machine, but without giving the person new computability power. It
seems to me right now.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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