On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 11:28 AM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 6:21 PM, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > >>>> >> >>>> >>>> Do you take the same position with regard to many-worlds style >>>> splitting experiments? >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >>> No. >>> >>> Everett's Many Worlds >>> contains no ambiguity but Bruno's thought experiment >>> has nothing but ambiguity >>> . >>> In Many Worlds the word "you" causes no problems, if duplicating >>> chambers haven't been invented yet then "you" is the only chunk of matter >>> that the laws of physics allow John Clark to observe that are arranged in a >>> Terren >>> s >>> uydam >>> ian way. There is no ambiguity, everything is clear as a bell. B >>> ut in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of >>> the duplicating machine >>> who looks like >>> Terren Suydam >>> >>> and a >>> n >>> identical looking man standing to the left of the duplicating machine >>> and they both >>> passionately >>> insist that they are >>> Terren Suydam >>> and both >>> have a equal right to use the grand title "you". >>> >> >> > >> I'm not sure there's a difference there that makes a difference. >> > > In one case the meaning of the question "what will *you* see" is > guaranteed to be perfectly clear by the very laws of physics, in the other > case the question is complete gibberish. And that's a difference that > makes no difference?! > In either case, it's not perfectly clear, and it's not complete gibberish either. In many worlds, the question of who 'you' are as the world bifurcates in nearly infinite ways is anything but clear, and subject to the same concerns that are raised in single-world duplication experiments. The fact that you only experience a single path through this maze of quantum bifurcations only illustrates the point that a single-world duplication would feel the same way. Either way, what you're hung up on is the resolvability of a word in a language, a referent. This is an epistemological concern, nothing more. Imagine that you are duplicated, and in Moscow, there is a dead cat in the duplication chamber you appear in, and in Washington there is a live cat in there. Epistemologically, this is identical to the Schrodinger cat experiment (or can be made so with more precision). In either case there's difficulties with the word 'you', but not the word 'I', whose referent is the experiencing self. The difficulty resolving 'you' has no bearing on *what it's like to be someone pre-duplication and post-duplication. * 'I' will expect to find myself with either a dead cat or a live cat. 'I' will expect to find myself in Moscow or Washington, whether it's many-worlds or single-world duplication, with 1/2 probabilities. > >> > >> The only difference is that in the Many Worlds scenario, the two Terren >> Suydams have no possibility of interacting. >> > > And in one case the laws of physics ensure that a third party > experimenter can only interact with one Terren Suydam, and in the other > case a third party experimenter can interact with an unlimited number of > Terren > Suydams; and thus in one case the word "you" has a meaning and in one case > it does not. > The 3rd-party experimenter, and the referent of the word 'you', represents the third-person perspective (ignoring the nuances around the differences between the second person and the third person, grammatically speaking). The key to understanding step 3 and the first-person-indeterminacy is, well, the first-person. > > >> > >> Otherwise, everything else is the same. >> > > Other than that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play? > > lol, but see above > > >> > >> I don't see what problem the possibility for interaction, or not, poses >> on the question of "which continuation will I find myself in and with what >> probability?" >> > > If duplicating chambers are used then the above is not a question at all, > it's just a sequence of unrelated words with a question mark at the end. To > become meaningful it would have to be changed to > "which continuation will Terren Suydam > find > Terren Suydam > in and with and in what probability?" And the answer would be " > Terren Suydam > will find > Terren Suydam > > in both continuations with 100% probability because > Terren Suydam > has been duplicated". > > Once again you're going back to the third-person perspective. You've acknowledged earlier in this thread that there are different first-person perspectives that diverge post-duplication. The focus needs to be there if you want to make any claims about refuting step 3. You need to stay with the referent of the word "I", or one's experiences of oneself, one's consciousness, one's actual experience of going through the duplicator or many-worlds experiment. > >> >>> Another difference is that Bruno and Everett are trying to explain >>> different things. Everett's Many Worlds Theory is trying to make >>> predictions and explain why they are probabilistic, and in that he was >>> successful. In contrast Bruno wants to cast insight on the nature of >>> consciousness, but predictions have nothing to do with the sense of >>> personal identity, not good predictions, not bad predictions, and not >>> probabilistic predictions. So Everett accomplished what he set out to do >>> but Bruno did not. >>> >> >> > >> Bruno's not talking about first-person-indeterminacy (FPI) as a means to >> explain personal identity. It's a key part of the explanation that >> computationalism implies that physics is not fundamental. >> > > First-person-indeterminacy is just another way of saying that the > Moscow Man will turn out to be the man who sees Moscow. Bruno thinks this > fact signifies great profundity, but for me not so much. > You leave out so much by insisting on taking the third-person perspective. > > >> The point is that understanding the role of consciousness in Bruno's >> argument depends on understanding the FPI. >> > > No problem, the idea is so shallow there is very little there that needs > understanding. > You're missing out by refusing to open your mind. I doubt you care about that particular dangling carrot, but what you should care about is being able to justify your claim to refuting step 3. Until you start taking the first-person perspective seriously, your justifications amount to a swing and a miss. > > >> > >> Given you accept the use of pronouns in the many worlds duplication, the >> problem must lie in the differences between those two scenarios. >> > > Exactly. > > So far the only thing you've articulated as a difference between those scenarios is the referent of a word in a language, a difference that disappears when you adopt the first-person perspective. Terren > John K Clark > > > > >> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
