On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 12:43 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >>>> > >>>> >> >>>> >>>> You need to stay with the referent of the word "I" >>> >>> >>> >> >>> I agree, so when describing the latest variation on the thought >>> experiment why not simply do away with personal pronouns like "I" and use >>> the referent instead? >>> >> >> > >> Because that's impossible. >> > > I agree, in talking about the future in a world with duplicating machines > it's impossible to express Bruno's ideas without using "I", a personal > pronoun that in this context has no referent, in other words a personal > pronoun that means absolutely positively nothing, zero, zilch, nada, goose > egg. I > n other words bruno's ideas are not wrong, they're gibberish. > > > Whether post-duplication-machine or post-many-worlds-duplication, "I" refers to the person having a subjective experience. Post duplication, we both agree that the persons diverge in either scenario. So there are two first-person experiences, but we can refer to *THE* first-person experience of either person: i.e., what it's like to be Moscow Man or Washington Man. What it's like to see the dead cat or the live cat. "I" see a dead cat. "I" see that I am in Washington. > > >> There is something it is like to go through a duplicator, and what it's >> like to be duplicated in a duplicator vs a many-worlds thought experiment >> is going to be the same because computationally speaking, those scenarios >> are equivalent. >> > > You keep saying that but give no reasons to think they are equivalent, I > keep saying they are not equivalent but unlike you I give very detailed > reasons why they are not equivalent. > > If you disagree with my reasons then tell me why, but don't just keep > saying they're equivalent. > The reasons you are giving why they are not equivalent only bear on the third-person perspective: the description of the bodies, and how we can refer to them. The reasons I am giving why they are equivalent bear on the first-person perspective: the conscious experience of the person going through the many-worlds or single-world duplication. I have been pretty clear on why they are equivalent... consciousness supervenes on physical brains (assuming computationalism), the physical brains are duplicated in both scenarios, and they diverge post-duplication (eventually, if you insist). >From *THE* first-person perspective of either duplicated person, those scenarios are equivalent. Since first-person is what is relevant to Step 3, my explanation of why they are equivalent is what matters, not your third-person explanation of why they are not. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
