On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > >> On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>>> The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the original >>>> and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels that he is >>>> the one true copy persisting through time >>>> >>> >>> How would it feel any different if he weren't? He doesn't know and >>> neither does anyone else. So it's really meaningless to say he feels he's >>> the one true copy. He's just relying on his previous prejudice that he was >>> unique. >>> >> >> Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one nonetheless. I can be >> radically sceptical about the existence of the world and other minds, but >> still go about life as if it matters. >> >> >> But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has been said about >> Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that Descartes cannot conclude that he is >> thinking, he can only conclude that thinking is going on. >> > > From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a thought at > this moment, not that there is an entity that has a stream of thoughts. > > > Thoughts are not "at a moment". They have temporal extent and hence can > have continuity. >
It seems that thoughts can be divided up arbitrarily. This is more easily shown by considering a digital computer. A computation can be paused, saved, and restarted, and if there are observers in the computed environment there is no way for them to know that this has happened. Even if a minimum duration is needed it might still be broken up arbitrarily. For example, if 500 ms is needed to generate an experience the computation could branch at the 200 ms point giving two different experiences, or there could be two overlapping experiences from 0 ms to 500 ms and from 100 ms to 600 ms. If you don't allow such overlap, and there are only discrete 500 ms experiences, it is still possible to replace talk of observer-(infinitesimal)-moments with observer-half-seconds. > The entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the set of related > thoughts. > > > That's begging the question and assuming the physical is not fundamental. > It depends on whether you look for something that is epistemologically > primary or something that is ontologically primary. > The argument so far has mostly been about the concrete copying of brains. > These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing a physical > substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a convenient method of producing > thoughts with the right sort of relationship to each other, > > > "Producing" is a funny word to use. Are you assuming there is a "someone" > who produces the thoughts - even though the "someone" is emergent from the > thoughts? The physical world is partly an inference and partly a mode of > thought hardwired by evolution. > In the first instance, I assume that the physical brain goes clickety-clack, and as a result thoughts are produced. In order for the thoughts to be strung together to form a stream of consciousness they must bear a particular relationship to each other. Being produced by the same brain is the familiar way this relationship is ensured, which is why a stream of consciousness is usually associated with a particular body. Technology can disrupt this process if brains can be physically copied or uploaded to computers. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
