On 7/18/2016 11:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The problems arise because each copy has memories of
being the original and, because of the phenomenon of
first person experience, feels that he is the one
true copy persisting through time
How would it feel any different if he weren't? He
doesn't know and neither does anyone else. So it's
really meaningless to say he feels he's the one true
copy. He's just relying on his previous prejudice that
he was unique.
Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one nonetheless. I
can be radically sceptical about the existence of the world
and other minds, but still go about life as if it matters.
But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has been
said about Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that Descartes cannot
conclude that he is thinking, he can only conclude that
thinking is going on.
From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a
thought at this moment, not that there is an entity that has a
stream of thoughts.
Thoughts are not "at a moment". They have temporal extent and
hence can have continuity.
It seems that thoughts can be divided up arbitrarily. This is more
easily shown by considering a digital computer. A computation can be
paused, saved, and restarted, and if there are observers in the
computed environment there is no way for them to know that this has
happened.
First, that assumes single computer running on a clock that keeps all
the changes synchronized so there is a each clock cycle "the state". No
at all like a brain in which there is a distributed process. Second,
it's not even clear that it's possible for a single clocked computer.
When you stop a computation there are registers to be saved and cleared;
and when you restart it these have to be reinitialized. On theory that
awareness is a kind of computation, how do we know that a computer
instantiated AI would not be aware of this in some sense. When you have
a concussion you don't have memory of what went just before the event,
although there's no reason to suppose you weren't aware of it at the
time. You are aware that you have a gap in memory, that you have been
unconscious.
Even if a minimum duration is needed it might still be broken up
arbitrarily. For example, if 500 ms is needed to generate an
experience the computation could branch at the 200 ms point giving two
different experiences, or there could be two overlapping experiences
from 0 ms to 500 ms and from 100 ms to 600 ms. If you don't allow such
overlap, and there are only discrete 500 ms experiences, it is still
possible to replace talk of observer-(infinitesimal)-moments with
observer-half-seconds.
I not only allow overlap, I think it is essential to how a brain
operates, and that's why there are no discrete thoughts. Thoughts can
form a continuum because they overlap.
The entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the set of
related thoughts.
That's begging the question and assuming the physical is not
fundamental. It depends on whether you look for something that is
epistemologically primary or something that is ontologically primary.
The argument so far has mostly been about the concrete copying of brains.
These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing a
physical substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a convenient
method of producing thoughts with the right sort of relationship
to each other,
"Producing" is a funny word to use. Are you assuming there is a
"someone" who produces the thoughts - even though the "someone" is
emergent from the thoughts? The physical world is partly an
inference and partly a mode of thought hardwired by evolution.
In the first instance, I assume that the physical brain goes
clickety-clack, and as a result thoughts are produced. In order for
the thoughts to be strung together to form a stream of consciousness
they must bear a particular relationship to each other. Being produced
by the same brain is the familiar way this relationship is ensured,
which is why a stream of consciousness is usually associated with a
particular body. Technology can disrupt this process if brains can be
physically copied or uploaded to computers.
Not without breaking the string of thoughts. Of course we don't think
this is essential, we've experienced periods of unconsciousness, but
that's because we can rely on the continuity of bodies and spacetime
location. This is why I think Bruno's argument that you can instantiate
consciousness without a physical world fails. The physical and mental
are inextricably entwined.
Brent
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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