On Wednesday, 20 July 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 7/18/2016 11:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>> wrote: > >> >> >> On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au >> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>> wrote: >> >>> On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>>> The problems arise because each copy has memories of being the >>>>> original and, because of the phenomenon of first person experience, feels >>>>> that he is the one true copy persisting through time >>>>> >>>> >>>> How would it feel any different if he weren't? He doesn't know and >>>> neither does anyone else. So it's really meaningless to say he feels he's >>>> the one true copy. He's just relying on his previous prejudice that he was >>>> unique. >>>> >>> >>> Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one nonetheless. I can be >>> radically sceptical about the existence of the world and other minds, but >>> still go about life as if it matters. >>> >>> >>> But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has been said about >>> Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that Descartes cannot conclude that he is >>> thinking, he can only conclude that thinking is going on. >>> >> >> From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a thought at >> this moment, not that there is an entity that has a stream of thoughts. >> >> >> Thoughts are not "at a moment". They have temporal extent and hence can >> have continuity. >> > > It seems that thoughts can be divided up arbitrarily. This is more easily > shown by considering a digital computer. A computation can be paused, > saved, and restarted, and if there are observers in the computed > environment there is no way for them to know that this has happened. > > > First, that assumes single computer running on a clock that keeps all the > changes synchronized so there is a each clock cycle "the state". No at all > like a brain in which there is a distributed process. Second, it's not > even clear that it's possible for a single clocked computer. When you stop > a computation there are registers to be saved and cleared; and when you > restart it these have to be reinitialized. On theory that awareness is a > kind of computation, how do we know that a computer instantiated AI would > not be aware of this in some sense. When you have a concussion you don't > have memory of what went just before the event, although there's no reason > to suppose you weren't aware of it at the time. You are aware that you > have a gap in memory, that you have been unconscious. > It would be very strange if a computer instantiated AI would be aware of a pause in the computation, since that would imply a decoupling between the AI's consciousness and the computation - like a dualist version of computationalism. > Even if a minimum duration is needed it might still be broken up > arbitrarily. For example, if 500 ms is needed to generate an experience the > computation could branch at the 200 ms point giving two different > experiences, or there could be two overlapping experiences from 0 ms to 500 > ms and from 100 ms to 600 ms. If you don't allow such overlap, and there > are only discrete 500 ms experiences, it is still possible to replace talk > of observer-(infinitesimal)-moments with observer-half-seconds. > > > I not only allow overlap, I think it is essential to how a brain operates, > and that's why there are no discrete thoughts. Thoughts can form a > continuum because they overlap. > > The entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the set of related >> thoughts. >> >> >> That's begging the question and assuming the physical is not >> fundamental. It depends on whether you look for something that is >> epistemologically primary or something that is ontologically primary. >> > > The argument so far has mostly been about the concrete copying of brains. > >> These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing a physical >> substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a convenient method of producing >> thoughts with the right sort of relationship to each other, >> >> >> "Producing" is a funny word to use. Are you assuming there is a >> "someone" who produces the thoughts - even though the "someone" is emergent >> from the thoughts? The physical world is partly an inference and partly a >> mode of thought hardwired by evolution. >> > > In the first instance, I assume that the physical brain goes > clickety-clack, and as a result thoughts are produced. In order for the > thoughts to be strung together to form a stream of consciousness they must > bear a particular relationship to each other. Being produced by the same > brain is the familiar way this relationship is ensured, which is why a > stream of consciousness is usually associated with a particular body. > Technology can disrupt this process if brains can be physically copied or > uploaded to computers. > > > Not without breaking the string of thoughts. Of course we don't think > this is essential, we've experienced periods of unconsciousness, but that's > because we can rely on the continuity of bodies and spacetime location. > This is why I think Bruno's argument that you can instantiate consciousness > without a physical world fails. The physical and mental are inextricably > entwined. > There would be a discontinuity if you go into the teleporter in one city and get out in another, but there is also a discontinuity if you fall asleep on the train. The continuity of consciousness can remain intact despite an awareness of discontinuity. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
