On 7/20/2016 6:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On Wednesday, 20 July 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:



    On 7/18/2016 11:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


    On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
    <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>> wrote:



        On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


        On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett
        <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
        <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>>
        wrote:

            On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
            On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker
            <meeke...@verizon.net
            <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>>
            wrote:



                On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

                    The problems arise because each copy has
                    memories of being the original and, because of
                    the phenomenon of first person experience,
                    feels that he is the one true copy persisting
                    through time


                How would it feel any different if he weren't?  He
                doesn't know and neither does anyone else.  So it's
                really meaningless to say he feels he's the one
                true copy.  He's just relying on his previous
                prejudice that he was unique.


            Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one
            nonetheless. I can be radically sceptical about the
            existence of the world and other minds, but still go
            about life as if it matters.

            But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has
            been said about Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that
            Descartes cannot conclude that he is thinking, he can
            only conclude that thinking is going on.


        From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a
        thought at this moment, not that there is an entity that has
        a stream of thoughts.

        Thoughts are not "at a moment".  They have temporal extent
        and hence can have continuity.


    It seems that thoughts can be divided up arbitrarily. This is
    more easily shown by considering a digital computer. A
    computation can be paused, saved, and restarted, and if there are
    observers in the computed environment there is no way for them to
    know that this has happened.

    First, that assumes single computer running on a clock that keeps
    all the changes synchronized so there is a each clock cycle "the
    state".  No at all like a brain in which there is a distributed
    process.  Second, it's not even clear that it's possible for a
    single clocked computer.  When you stop a computation there are
    registers to be saved and cleared; and when you restart it these
    have to be reinitialized.  On theory that awareness is a kind of
    computation, how do we know that a computer instantiated AI would
    not be aware of this in some sense.  When you have a concussion
    you don't have memory of what went just before the event, although
there's no reason to suppose you weren't aware of it at the time. You are aware that you have a gap in memory, that you have been
    unconscious.


It would be very strange if a computer instantiated AI would be aware of a pause in the computation, since that would imply a decoupling between the AI's consciousness and the computation - like a dualist version of computationalism.

If I programmed an AI, say for a Mars rover, I would certainly make sure that it recorded every power loss and reboot.

    Even if a minimum duration is needed it might still be broken up
    arbitrarily. For example, if 500 ms is needed to generate an
    experience the computation could branch at the 200 ms point
    giving two different experiences, or there could be two
    overlapping experiences from 0 ms to 500 ms and from 100 ms to
    600 ms. If you don't allow such overlap, and there are only
    discrete 500 ms experiences, it is still possible to replace talk
    of observer-(infinitesimal)-moments with observer-half-seconds.

    I not only allow overlap, I think it is essential to how a brain
    operates, and that's why there are no discrete thoughts.  Thoughts
    can form a continuum because they overlap.

        The entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the
        set of related thoughts.

        That's begging the question and assuming the physical is not
        fundamental.  It depends on whether you look for something
        that is epistemologically primary or something that is
        ontologically primary.

    The argument so far has mostly been about the concrete copying of
    brains.

        These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing
        a physical substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a
        convenient method of producing thoughts with the right sort
        of relationship to each other,

        "Producing" is a funny word to use.  Are you assuming there
        is a "someone" who produces the thoughts - even though the
        "someone" is emergent from the thoughts?  The physical world
        is partly an inference and partly a mode of thought hardwired
        by evolution.

    In the first instance, I assume that the physical brain goes
    clickety-clack, and as a result thoughts are produced. In order
    for the thoughts to be strung together to form a stream of
    consciousness they must bear a particular relationship to each
    other. Being produced by the same brain is the familiar way this
    relationship is ensured, which is why a stream of consciousness
    is usually associated with a particular body. Technology can
    disrupt this process if brains can be physically copied or
    uploaded to computers.

    Not without breaking the string of thoughts.  Of course we don't
    think this is essential, we've experienced periods of
    unconsciousness, but that's because we can rely on the continuity
    of bodies and spacetime location.  This is why I think Bruno's
    argument that you can instantiate consciousness without a physical
    world fails.  The physical and mental are inextricably entwined.


There would be a discontinuity if you go into the teleporter in one city and get out in another, but there is also a discontinuity if you fall asleep on the train. The continuity of consciousness can remain intact despite an awareness of discontinuity.

Only by equivocating on "continuity" in mid sentence. Or are you saying one has a false awareness of a discontinuity that isn't there?

Brent

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