On 7/20/2016 6:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, 20 July 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 7/18/2016 11:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 19 July 2016 at 04:00, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>> wrote:
On 7/18/2016 2:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 July 2016 at 17:10, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','bhkell...@optusnet.com.au');>>
wrote:
On 18/07/2016 5:00 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 July 2016 at 15:42, Brent Meeker
<meeke...@verizon.net
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>>
wrote:
On 7/17/2016 10:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The problems arise because each copy has
memories of being the original and, because of
the phenomenon of first person experience,
feels that he is the one true copy persisting
through time
How would it feel any different if he weren't? He
doesn't know and neither does anyone else. So it's
really meaningless to say he feels he's the one
true copy. He's just relying on his previous
prejudice that he was unique.
Yes - it's a prejudice, but an important one
nonetheless. I can be radically sceptical about the
existence of the world and other minds, but still go
about life as if it matters.
But do the pronouns "I and you" have a referrent? It has
been said about Descates' 'cogito ergo sum' that
Descartes cannot conclude that he is thinking, he can
only conclude that thinking is going on.
From the fact that I think, it follows only that there is a
thought at this moment, not that there is an entity that has
a stream of thoughts.
Thoughts are not "at a moment". They have temporal extent
and hence can have continuity.
It seems that thoughts can be divided up arbitrarily. This is
more easily shown by considering a digital computer. A
computation can be paused, saved, and restarted, and if there are
observers in the computed environment there is no way for them to
know that this has happened.
First, that assumes single computer running on a clock that keeps
all the changes synchronized so there is a each clock cycle "the
state". No at all like a brain in which there is a distributed
process. Second, it's not even clear that it's possible for a
single clocked computer. When you stop a computation there are
registers to be saved and cleared; and when you restart it these
have to be reinitialized. On theory that awareness is a kind of
computation, how do we know that a computer instantiated AI would
not be aware of this in some sense. When you have a concussion
you don't have memory of what went just before the event, although
there's no reason to suppose you weren't aware of it at the time.
You are aware that you have a gap in memory, that you have been
unconscious.
It would be very strange if a computer instantiated AI would be aware
of a pause in the computation, since that would imply a decoupling
between the AI's consciousness and the computation - like a dualist
version of computationalism.
If I programmed an AI, say for a Mars rover, I would certainly make sure
that it recorded every power loss and reboot.
Even if a minimum duration is needed it might still be broken up
arbitrarily. For example, if 500 ms is needed to generate an
experience the computation could branch at the 200 ms point
giving two different experiences, or there could be two
overlapping experiences from 0 ms to 500 ms and from 100 ms to
600 ms. If you don't allow such overlap, and there are only
discrete 500 ms experiences, it is still possible to replace talk
of observer-(infinitesimal)-moments with observer-half-seconds.
I not only allow overlap, I think it is essential to how a brain
operates, and that's why there are no discrete thoughts. Thoughts
can form a continuum because they overlap.
The entity, the "I", is not fundamental but emergent, the
set of related thoughts.
That's begging the question and assuming the physical is not
fundamental. It depends on whether you look for something
that is epistemologically primary or something that is
ontologically primary.
The argument so far has mostly been about the concrete copying of
brains.
These thoughts are not necessarily connected through sharing
a physical substrate. Sharing a physical substrate is a
convenient method of producing thoughts with the right sort
of relationship to each other,
"Producing" is a funny word to use. Are you assuming there
is a "someone" who produces the thoughts - even though the
"someone" is emergent from the thoughts? The physical world
is partly an inference and partly a mode of thought hardwired
by evolution.
In the first instance, I assume that the physical brain goes
clickety-clack, and as a result thoughts are produced. In order
for the thoughts to be strung together to form a stream of
consciousness they must bear a particular relationship to each
other. Being produced by the same brain is the familiar way this
relationship is ensured, which is why a stream of consciousness
is usually associated with a particular body. Technology can
disrupt this process if brains can be physically copied or
uploaded to computers.
Not without breaking the string of thoughts. Of course we don't
think this is essential, we've experienced periods of
unconsciousness, but that's because we can rely on the continuity
of bodies and spacetime location. This is why I think Bruno's
argument that you can instantiate consciousness without a physical
world fails. The physical and mental are inextricably entwined.
There would be a discontinuity if you go into the teleporter in one
city and get out in another, but there is also a discontinuity if you
fall asleep on the train. The continuity of consciousness can remain
intact despite an awareness of discontinuity.
Only by equivocating on "continuity" in mid sentence. Or are you saying
one has a false awareness of a discontinuity that isn't there?
Brent
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