On 19 Jan 2017, at 18:27, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 1/19/2017 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Using God in the sense of whatever is needed to have a reality, and maybe just that reality, helps to keep in mind that Primitive- Matter existence needs an act of faith. Nobody can prove its exoistence, and a materialist assumes that such a Primitive Matter is at the origin of all other realities (biologicl, psychological, etc.). It is your theology, apparently.

You're beating on your straw man. Nobody tries to prove the existence of matter - it's an hypothesis used to explain the world. It's defined ostensively.

That is not the "matter" we are talking about. Ostensive definitions works also in multi-user sharable video games. The matter you are talking about is the matter of the physicists, who will, in its own field, be neutral on the primary or not aspect of that matter. Physicalism/materialism is a metaphysical assumption, not a physical one. I am talking on primary matter, not the indexically ostensive reality we assume beyond the appearances. The question is: is there a physical universe, we agree that there is a physical reality well described by the observers. We were doing metaphysics/theology here, not physics. It becomes math with the computationalist hypothesis, and the appearance of matter is a very special sort of universal number persistent and sharable hallucinations (say). As they are token precise we can test that physics with the usual observations to see if that fits (and that fits 'till now).



Whatever is the basic ontology of a theory of everything can be nominated "primitive" - adding "matter" or "computation" or just "stuff" doesn't add anything except confusion.

We don't need to elude the metaphysical question.

The problem, for the monist, is to explain the appearances, the possible laws, from the less assumptions possible, and without hiding realities, phenomenal or not, under the rug.

A theory of everything is a theory which unifies all domains of sciences, and beyond, that is the relation between science and truth based on the limitations of machines, formalisms and other finitely describable things with respect to everything, notably the infinite, which exists, or not.






For our topic, you need to explain how that God-Matter succeeds in selecting some computation(s) among all computations.

You don't need to explain that if you don't assume all computations exist.

I'm afraid there is not much choice in the matter.

You miss the creative bomb of the 20th century. If you believe in "there is no biggest prime number", you have to believe in all computations. If you can survive a physical digital functional substitution at some finite level of substitution, you need some amount of magic to influence your first person indetermination on (2^aleph_0) computational histories (on machine's computations + Oracles) realized in a tiny part of the arithmetical reality, which is assumed already by anyone believing in *any* theory rich enough to define or represent a universal number, be it physical or not.

I just translate the mind body problem in arithmetic (using computationalism), and then it happens that the universal machine has already the propositional solution (G1, G1*, S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*, and their differences with the same minus the "1", for the qualia).

Astonishingly, it works, at least for the quanta. I doubt such a simple and transparent approach will continue to work, as improvement in the dialog with the numbers will no doubt progress. The theology of machines is something rather simple, compared to their psychology. Biology and embryology are conceptually solved by Kleene's second recursion theorem, and generalizations and exploitations by John Case and his students, who have extended the work of Putnam, Gold, and others on the theoretical learning theory, notably. Like in theology, many results are limitations and no-go theorems.

I think you miss the discovery of purely mathematical, even arithmetical Turing universal relations. Just for the beauty of it, I copy again below a system of diophantine relations which defines a Turing universal system.

Bruno

Only bad faith fears reason.
Only bad reasons fear faith.

The Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich-Jones Polynomial equations:

We have that X is in W_Nu, that is phi_Nu(X) is defined, that is the number/machine Nu stops on input data X, if and only if the following system of polynomial equations ha a solution. It is short, and one degree is very high (5^60), but we can diminish the degree to 4, easily, by introducing a lot of other variables though. We can also limit the syetm to one equation. From this you can conceive that once you believe that 2+2=4 independently of you, then such a system polynomial equation has or not solution, but this encoded the entire universal dovetailing, including the non computable redundancy.

Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y

ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2

Qu = B^(5^60)

La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5

Th +  2Z = B^5

L = U + TTh

E = Y + MTh

N = Q^16

R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
         + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)

P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2

(P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2

4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2

K = R + 1 + HP - H

A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2

C = 2R + 1 Ph

D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga

D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1

F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1

(D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1


*you* emerges from the first person view on all solutions of that equations. The physical reality is given by the competition of infinitely many universal numbers operating below your substitution level. The bio-psychological reality the same, with finitely many universal systems operating above your substitution level.

The goal is not doing a new physics. The goal is in applying reason in metaphysics, and with the computationalist hypothesis, this is almost ... metamathematics (an "old" name of mathematical logic).

Bruno




Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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