Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 20:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
> > > On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > I didn't say there was. I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington. >> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*. >> >> Brent >> > > Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept > frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's > clear and meaningful. > > > But does it have a clear answer? > > The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if > there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we > implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two > possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world > split into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, > can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two > possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand > chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the > probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. > But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely > many times and there is no natural measure of probability. > > Brent > Well there is always an infinity of worlds at each split but the density of every possible results should conform to the partition. Either probabilities have no meaning in the mwi and duplication experiment or they do, but you can't says as JC holds that they're meaningful in the MWI case and not in the duplication experiment because you could meet your doppelganger... That makes no sense. Quentin > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3574adc1-ee06-84a1-e29d-f8cc73c48be5%40verizon.net > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3574adc1-ee06-84a1-e29d-f8cc73c48be5%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kApmZ4wDCc_J5i6gAFOetPs9mUK6Jg_Jpz6PiTzsyTBxOw%40mail.gmail.com.
