On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
I didn't say there was. I said */youse-self/* sees
Moscow and Washington. "Youse-self" is second person
/plural/.
Brent
Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it,
if you accept frequency interpretation of probability as you
should also for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.
But does it have a clear answer?
The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's
straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the
world splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are
equi-probable). But what if there are two possibilities and
one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world split
into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the
same, can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And
what if there are two possibilities, but one of them is very
unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand chance. Does the world then
split into 1001 worlds? And what if the probability of one
event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. But
if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens
infinitely many times and there is no natural measure of
probability.
Brent
Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/
<http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/>
"The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the
quantum state, whether you like it or not. The next question
would be, do multiple-world superpositions of the form written
[above] ever actually come into being? And the answer again is:
*yes, automatically*, without any additional assumptions."
But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and
how does probability come into it? Do we have to just assign
probabilities to branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead
of deriving it)? And what about continuous processes like
detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat box? Is a continuum of
worlds produced corresponding to the different times the decay
might occur?
Brent
Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of
all types should be removed from physics.
So there would be no "continuum of worlds". The way I think about it
(without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just
think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo
program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual
infinity of them.
That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule. If
you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings
(probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC
program.
Brent
(God plays Monte Carlo.)
@philipthrift
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