> On 22 Jul 2019, at 01:06, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> I didn't say there was. I said youse-self sees Moscow and Washington. >>> "Youse-self" is second person plural. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept >>> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's >>> clear and meaningful. >> >> But does it have a clear answer? >> >> The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if >> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we >> implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two >> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world split >> into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, can they >> really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two >> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand >> chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the >> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. >> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely >> many times and there is no natural measure of probability. >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer. >> >> >> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/ >> >> <http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/> >> >> >> "The potential for multiple worlds is always there in the quantum state, >> whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world >> superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? >> And the answer again is: yes, automatically, without any additional >> assumptions." > > But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does > probability come into it? Do we have to just assign probabilities to > branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)? And what > about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat > box? Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different times > the decay might occur? > > Brent > > > Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all > types should be removed from physics.
Like computationalism forbid the axiom of infinity for the basic ontology. Recently I have realised that even the induction axiom have to be removed. There are only part of the observers’ code, and yes, the phenomenology needs the axiom induction, and the axiom of infinity, etc. > > So there would be no "continuum of worlds”. That is because Tegmark remains physicalist, and still believe in physical world. Here mechanism differs; there is a continuum of parallel histories, and we might need ZF + Large-cardinal to do its mathematic. > The way I think about it (without getting into the formality of computable > analysis) is to just think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum > Monte Carlo program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an > actual infinity of them. Yes, you need that to keep an ontological reality, but this will entail a continuum of zombies in the arithmetical reality, and eventually you will need to say “No” to the doctor, or to claim that CT is false (which you did), so no problem. You are working in a non-mechanist theory. It is coherent with ontological matter, and holy water … Bruno > > > (God plays Monte Carlo.) > > @philipthrift > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6E074D91-0314-499B-9CF7-36B6571337D6%40ulb.ac.be.
