On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> I didn't say there was. I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and >>> Washington. "Youse-self" is second person *plural*. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept >> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's >> clear and meaningful. >> >> >> But does it have a clear answer? >> >> The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's straightforward if >> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we >> implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two >> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other? Does the world >> split into three, two of which are the same? If two worlds are the same, >> can they really be two. Aren't they just one? And what if there are two >> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand >> chance. Does the world then split into 1001 worlds? And what if the >> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds. >> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely >> many times and there is no natural measure of probability. >> >> Brent >> > > > > Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer. > > > > http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/ > > > "The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum > state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do > multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually > come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without > any additional assumptions." > > > But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does > probability come into it? Do we have to just assign probabilities to > branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)? And > what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's > cat box? Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different > times the decay might occur? > > Brent >
Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all types should be removed from physics. So there would be no "continuum of worlds". The way I think about it (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of them. (God plays Monte Carlo.) @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com.
