First I think it's important to clarify that despite what responses to the
clustering proposal might seem to indicate, I'm not trying to replace the
way that Freenet topologies are constructed, merely to augment it with an
additional way so that you can choose which one is right for your
situation.
> This proposal is broken. Who gets to be the gateway and why do your
> concerns not apply to it?
I should point out before I respond to this that there are 3 ways to use
Freenet.
1) public node (like we have now)
2) private network (no gateway, doesn't affect the public network at all)
3) gatewayed private network
So there are more options than just using a gatewayed private network.
But the answer to the question is that the person running the gateway is
whoever feels like it. The concerns don't apply because either the gateway
operator doesn't care or is "taking one for the team". If you want to have
access to the public network, someone has to be a gateway (or else you run
a public node, which puts you at the same risk). If they get shut down
then everyone else is still safe. Somebody else has to be the gateway
then. It's better for the gateway to get busted than for everyone to get
busted. If no one wants to be a gateway then that means that no one wants
to be a public node at all. So then you have to go for a fully private
network. Too bad.
Someone having to be the gateway is better than the alternative which is
that you can't run a node at all.
> How do people find a significant number of
> nodes through out-of-band means where there is no likelyhood that an
> unauthorised person could obtain one of those node addresses?
This does not make my proposal broken. This is just an indication that
trust is a problematic part of life. Just because it's hard to find people
you trust and it's hard to know if you can really trust them does not mean
that you should just everyone. If you can't find enough trusted nodes then
you can decide Do I want to risk running a public node? When you get
trusted addresses you have to think Could They obtain these addresses,
too? Is it worth the risk? It's better than the alternative, which is to
trust everyone equally without any sort of judgement call on their
trustability or else not run a node.
> Think about
> someone downloading Freenet for the first time and getting a message "All
> you need to do is find someone already running a Freenet node who knows
> for a fact that you are not a government agent, and who you know for a
> fact not to be a government agent". Most people would find this task
> nearly impossible.
The message should be "All you need to do is find someone that you think
isn't a government agent and who thinks you're not a government agent. Or
else you can just connect to some random people and hope they're not
government agents, take your pick."
The message now should say "Click OK to connect to some random
people. Cross your fingers because any one of them might be a government
agent."
> > Nobody was afraid to use Napster! This is entirely different! There was no
> > threat when using Napster.
>
> There was the prospect of a threat - which is exactly the case with
> Freenet in the US with the DMCA.
Almost everyone I know uses Napster and none of them ever felt
threatened. I think this is a very weak comparison.
> > Or I could add 10-20 lines of code to Freenet.
>
> And achieve nothing.
Time to substantiate your claims again! Whee!
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