On Fri, Jul 23, 2010 at 14:00, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundg...@telia.com> wrote: >> I'm not sure I understand entirely; so the system uses a digital >> signature, but would you know if it uses secure messaging too? > > They do not use SM. If they did somebody would reverse engineer > the software and claim "victory" or something like that :-)
Er, right, been there… 0:-) > SM was probably designed for usage in certified terminals so that the card > wouldn't do anything interesting except in such a device. Which is the idea in CWA 14890-1, as far as I can tell, paragraph 8.2: the card holder decides whether the environment is trusted or not, and if it is, the path is already trusted, without a need for secure messaging. The examples of untrusted environments are limited to signing application and SSCD being in different physical locations, or biometrics. >> Do I infer correctly that the system uses secure messaging, but >> client-side software is limited to relaying encoded APDUs that are >> generated/decoded by the server-side application? > > You mean SKS/KeyGen2? > > Yes, the client software is a semi-trusted proxy that does the heavy > lifting including XML encoding/decoding, networking, and GUI but it is > still a fully E2ES (End To End Secured) solution with user PIN setting > as the only exception. If the proxy does not relay properly the > system will abort in one of the ends (SKS or issuer). > It is like Global Platform's SCP80 on steroid's. I was thinking of the Swedish system, but you answered me by telling me it doesn't use SM. Besides, I started looking at KeyGen2 yesterday, so the clarification is welcome :) Thanks! -- Emanuele _______________________________________________ opensc-devel mailing list opensc-devel@lists.opensc-project.org http://www.opensc-project.org/mailman/listinfo/opensc-devel
