Jeff, list,
It's VERY late on the East Coast, so I'll keep this quite brief for now: a
single question.
In what sense can phenomenology be said to draw "from both mathematics and
from logic"?
Certainly from the standpoint of
> Peirce's '
> classification of the sciences' phenomenology can be seen to draw from
> mathematics, especially from the simplest mathematics. the logic of
> mathematics (
> involving
> the understanding t
> hat
> there are monads, dyads, triads,
> a kind of valency principle relating these,
> a reduction principle,
> discrete, pseudo-continuous and
> continuous structures,
> etc.)
In addition
. phenomenology can, as can all sciences, draw upon a logica utens. But,
except for its providing 'examples' and the like ('the like' including
logical lessons learned from it's formal study), again. from the standpoint
of the classification of the sciences, can phenomenology really be said to
draw from formal logic, logica docens? If so, how?
Best,
Gary
R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 1:02 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
> Hi Gary R., List,
>
> My aim was to draw on points that are developed in the context of the
> logical theory for the sake of understanding how he might be using the
> terms "firstness, secondness, thirdness" in the phenomenological theory.
> For my part, I take the aim of developing phenomenology as its own branch
> of philosophical inquiry quite seriously. As such, I said "in the first
> instance" because that is how--historically speaking-- Peirce arrived at
> these notions. He started from the side of a philosophical logic and was
> examining the ways that various predicates can stand in different kinds of
> relations. On my reading of the development of his account of the
> categories, Peirce was working at the level of phenomenology, logic and
> metaphysics from the very start (e.g. in the Lowell Lectures and in New
> List). Slowly, he gained a sense of the importance of separating more
> clearly between the goals guiding each kind of inquiry along with the
> methods that we should use in developing the respective accounts of the
> phenomenological, logical and metaphysical categories.
>
> When he finally decided to make phenomenology a major branch of
> philosophical inquiry in its own right, he made it clear that phenomenology
> draws from both mathematics and from logic. When we are drawing from
> mathematics, it appears that were developing the account of the categories
> "from the inside." That is, we are looking at examples of formal
> conceptions in math--such as that of generating a number series or
> generating a line by moving a particle--and then we are drawing on these
> conceptions for clarifying the formal elements that are part of common
> experience concerning positive matters. When we are coming at
> phenomenology from the other direction and drawing from logic theory, we
> are asking: what elements in experience are necessary for the very
> possibility of having signs that are significant and for drawing inferences
> that are valid? We then ask--are these formal elements really found in our
> common experience? If so, let us learn to see them more clearly in their
> many guises.
>
> Let me add a bit more. One reason we need a phenomenological theory is
> that, for Peirce, as for other logicians of his generation, the science of
> logic should be based on observations. All of the observations are drawn
> from our ordinary experience--including especially the phenomena associated
> with self-control and the phenomena involved in evaluating arguments as
> valid or invalid. As such, we need to develop an account of the basic
> elements that are an essential part of all of the phenomena we might
> observe. The account of the formal and material elements is designed to
> put us in a better position to analyze the phenomena we observe for the
> sake of seeing more clearly what is necessary, when it comes to forming
> hypotheses, to make sense of the phenomena that are calling out for
> explanation. Before drawing such inferences, we need to correct for
> observational errors.
>
> So, to offer an example, Augustus De Morgan, makes the following point in
> Formal Logic, or, The Calculus of inference, necessary and probable. The
> question he is trying to answer in this chapter on probability is: how
> much confidence can we place in testimony provided by a number of
> witnesses? Here is what he says about the fit between his theory and the
> phenomena that are part of our common experience:
>
> The student of this subject is always struck by the frequency of the
> problems in which the science confirms an ordinary notion of common life,
> or is confirmed by it, according to his state of mind with respect to the
> whole doctrine. It is impossible to say that we a theory made to explain
> common phenomena, and hence affording no reason for surprise that it does
> explain them. The first principles are too few and two (sic) simple, the
> train of deductions ends in conclusions too remote. I believe hundreds of
> cases might be cited in which the results of this theory are found already
> established by the common sense of mankind: in many of them, the
> mathematical sciences were not powerful enough to give the modes of
> calculation, when the principles of the theory were first digested.
>
> The conclusion we can draw from De Morgan's remark is, I think, quite
> clear. In the absence of a clear account of the phenomena we observe as
> part of our common experience, the selection of the best logical theory
> will be underdetermined. What is more, we need to be careful not to draw
> on the same phenomena we relied on in forming our hypotheses when we are
> testing those hypotheses. So, let's make sure we have an adequate
> theoretical account of the the phenomena that are serving as the data for
> our theoretical inquiries.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeff Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> NAU
> (o) 523-8354
> ________________________________________
> From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 7:43 PM
> To: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories
>
> Jeff wrote:
>
> If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an
> abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the
> first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what
> is first? In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red
> thing, and not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of
> relationship that obtains when the predicate is considered separately from
> the things that might stand in that relationship.
>
> From the standpoint of logic, I would tend to fully agree with you. But
> from that of phenomenology, I have some reservations. There *are* in fact
> red things, and blue things, and snow may indeed appear much more blue than
> white in a given situation of light and shade. And there are, in addition,
> possible firstnesses which even modal logics can't really quite handle in
> reality.
>
> This is to suggest that firstness, logically speaking, *is*, as you say,
> an abstraction, but that the "first instance" is *not* a logical
> abstraction, but a phenomenon. and even, for the sake of argument, a mere
> possible phenomenon.
>
> So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the
> thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is
> first, y--is second and z--is third. By pealing the things that x, x and z
> might stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the
> relationships of firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in
> themselves. Here, I am following Peirce's explanations of how we should
> talk about relatives, relations and relationships.
>
> Again, I would tend to agree with you--and Peirce--when one considers the
> categories strictly from the standpoint of logic.
>
> Btw. Joe Ransdell and I tended to disagree on this matter. He would, I
> think, be siding with you in this matter, in a sense suggesting that logic
> as semiotic was 'sufficient', not quite imagining that phaneroscopy could
> really be a scientific discipline--at least, not much of one.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
> [Gary Richmond]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>
>
> On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 9:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
> Gary F., Gary R., List,
>
> If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an
> abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the
> first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what
> is first? In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red
> thing, and not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of
> relationship that obtains when the predicate is considered separately from
> the things that might stand in that relationship.
>
> So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the
> thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is
> first, y--is second and z--is third. By pealing the things that x, x and z
> might stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the
> relationships of firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in
> themselves. Here, I am following Peirce's explanations of how we should
> talk about relatives, relations and relationships.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeff Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> NAU
> (o) 523-8354
> ________________________________________
> From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:
> gary.richm...@gmail.com>]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 4:07 PM
> To: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories
>
> Matt wrote;
>
> My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific
> instantiations of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness.
> This is similar to how I use 'a general' as a specific instantiation of
> generality. Perhaps we all should follow this standard. Saying "category
> the Third" just seems like bad grammar. Same with saying "a Thirdness."
>
> I'm not sure that I fully agree. Sometimes Peirceans like to speak of,
> say, Thirdness, as a category, or in some other way which does not
> represent an "instantiation" of a category (I'm not even sure what
> "instantiation" means exactly in regard to 1ns and 3ns especially).
>
> Also, since except for certain types of analysis, the categories are all
> three present in any genuine tricategorial relation, "instantiation" seems
> a problematic expression. Perhaps I'm missing your meaning, however.
>
> I agree with you that saying "category the Third" is just (Peirce's) bad
> grammar. I don't know anyone else who uses that expression today. And I
> would also say that "a Thirdness" is not only bad grammar, but probably
> altogether meaningless.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> [Gary Richmond]
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> C 745
> 718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>
>
> On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 6:11 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com<mailto:
> mattfau...@gmail.com><mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com<mailto:
> mattfau...@gmail.com>>> wrote:
> My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific
> instantiations of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness.
> This is similar to how I use 'a general' as a specific instantiation of
> generality. Perhaps we all should follow this standard. Saying "category
> the Third" just seems like bad grammar. Same with saying "a Thirdness."
>
> Matt
>
> On 10/28/15 5:49 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
> Gary, list,
>
> Thanks for your contribution to the discussion of this question which,
> however, seems to focus on Peirce's writings on categories prior to the
> 20th century.
>
> At the moment my sense (and that's pretty much all it is, while I do think
> that at least a mini-research project is in order) is that as he
> approaches, then enters, the 20th century that Peirce uses the -ness suffix
> more and more, especially in introducing his tricategoriality into a
> discussion. Once that's been done, the context makes it clear what is first
> (i.e, 1ns), etc. in the ensuing discussion.
>
> So, in a word, I think he sees that employing the -ness helps disambiguate
> its use in any given context, especially in introducing his no doubt
> strange, to some even today, notion of three phenomenological categories.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
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