Quite, Clark. On our naturalistic metaphysics in Every Thing Must Go, which 
takes both Peircean prope-positivism (based on the Pragmatic Maxim) and modern 
physics seriously, basically 2nd-ness is structural, and the law-like aspects 
are thirdness, not mental. The world that exists is nothing more, 
fundamentally, than structure. This view is sometimes called “structural 
realism”. Sung has produced another gross misrepresentation of not only the 
Peircean view, but of the concepts Peirce uses. It is annoying to have ones own 
views ruled out by an error like that (though some of our reviewers have done 
something similar).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Monday, 30 November 2015 8:10 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations


On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji 
<s...@rci.rutgers.edu<mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu>> wrote:


                                          f                              g
              Real Rose  ----------------> Rose  -----------> Mental Rose
              (Firstness)                  (Secondness)              (Thirdness)
     [World of Structures]         [Physical World]          [Mental World]
                     |                                                          
              ^
                     |                                                          
              |
                     |____________________________________|
                                                       h

Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the world of raw 
experience, ideas or possibility, secondness the world of reactions, brute 
force & actuality and thirdness the world of signs, connections and power (not 
necessarily mental unless one is careful what one means by that). So depending 
upon what one means by structure you’d have that in the third universe.

Again though one has to be careful with terminology and Peirce’s shifts around 
a bit over time.
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