> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I > think you’re talking about. > > Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent an > object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant.
Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned about building up signs out of subsigns. My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics. That is there’s an element of equivocation in play. If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist debate doesn’t matter as much as some think) I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later. Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
