Clark, List: CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I think you’re talking about.
Right, but a legisign/type can only have a Dynamic Object that is collective; it cannot represent a Possible or Existent, only a Necessitant. CG: ... the object could be any sort of object (firstness, secondness, thirdness). Only for a qualisign/mark, according to Peirce's rule of determination (as I call it). Again, a legisign/type (3ns) can only represent a collective object (3ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 11:54 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Jan 24, 2017, at 10:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is > general have an object that is *not *general? > > Just a guess but I suspect the issue here is how one identifies a sign. > That is what makes a general sign be labeled as general. This is really > just a semantic issue. > > This confusion is why I don’t tend to use the phrase “general sign” as > it’s not obvious what is general. For a legisign the sign consists of a > general idea and that’s what I think you’re talking about. (Correct me if > I’m wrong) > > To your other point regarding determination, the sign can be indeterminate > in terms of how it represents the object but the object could be any sort > of object (firstness, secondness, thirdness). In all cases the sign would > still be indeterminate. So I might signify a several elements of > firstnesses. What objects is indeterminate and thus general even though the > objects are not general. > > The nominalist view is that all general signs must ultimately refer to > individual objects rather than real structures. Peirce allows the real > structure to be the object independent of these other individual objects. > But for Peirce we must be able to signify both kinds of objects. > > Of course Peirce’s notion of continuity entails that any sign can itself > be broken up into further signs. So all this depends upon the type of > analysis one is conducting. >
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