Clark, List: Correcting my earlier post ...
CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I think you’re talking about. Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant. CG: ... the object could be any sort of object (firstness, secondness, thirdness). Only for a qualisign/mark, according to Peirce's rule of determination (as I call it). Again, a legisign/type (sign 3ns) can only be a collective (object 3ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 11:54 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >> >> On Jan 24, 2017, at 10:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is >> general have an object that is *not *general? >> >> Just a guess but I suspect the issue here is how one identifies a sign. >> That is what makes a general sign be labeled as general. This is really >> just a semantic issue. >> >> This confusion is why I don’t tend to use the phrase “general sign” as >> it’s not obvious what is general. For a legisign the sign consists of a >> general idea and that’s what I think you’re talking about. (Correct me if >> I’m wrong) >> >> To your other point regarding determination, the sign can be >> indeterminate in terms of how it represents the object but the object could >> be any sort of object (firstness, secondness, thirdness). In all cases the >> sign would still be indeterminate. So I might signify a several elements of >> firstnesses. What objects is indeterminate and thus general even though the >> objects are not general. >> >> The nominalist view is that all general signs must ultimately refer to >> individual objects rather than real structures. Peirce allows the real >> structure to be the object independent of these other individual objects. >> But for Peirce we must be able to signify both kinds of objects. >> >> Of course Peirce’s notion of continuity entails that any sign can itself >> be broken up into further signs. So all this depends upon the type of >> analysis one is conducting. >> >
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