Auke, list:
The physical or actual existential form of a spoken versus written
word does differ - but, does the cognitive Interpretant differ?
A Legisign to my understanding refers to the mediative
sign/representamen functioning in a mode of Thirdness.
Now, Thirdness is indeed a generality, a law, and, if that mediation
is also interacting with other nodes in non-general modal categories,
then, we could say that a Type-Token existence is in evidence. For
example, as in a a Rhematic Indexical Legisign, a Dicent Indexical
Legisgn, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign, a Rhematic Symbolic Legisign.
But wouldn't both the written and spoken forms of this word, even
though they materially differ, be interpreted in a similar way?
Edwina
On Thu 09/08/18 6:14 AM , "Auke van Breemen" a.bree...@chello.nl
sent:
Edwina, List,
As an example of growth in complexity in networked connections.
I have been pondering the question whether the legisign of the
spoken and written forms are of one or of two types. We can observe
that the tokens of the spoken forms differ from the written ones. So
they do depend on different tokens. My hunch is that from the point
of view of the symbolic relation of the sign with its object it is
the same lagisign but from the point of view of the apprehension of
the sign they differ. Thus we have two varieties of legisign. The
first stemming from a token (pattern recognition?) the second
stemming from habits of interpretation, symbols (imputed).
Auke van Breemen
Van: Edwina Taborsky
Verzonden: donderdag 9 augustus 2018 3:40
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing
Gary R, JAS, list
1] I question the claim that "The Type is not dependent on its
Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a
diamond is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is
the nature of a Real "would-be."
My view is that the Type - which I understand as a general, as laws,
is most certainly dependent on being articulated as a Token, for
generals do not exist except as articulated within/as the particular.
And it is the experiences of the particular instantiation that can
affect the Types and enable adaptation and evolution of the
general/laws.since, as we know, growth and increasing complexity is
'the rule' [can't remember section..]
"I do not mean any existing individual object, but a type, a
general, which does not exist but governs existents, to which
individuals conform" 8.313.
That is - I think the relation between the law/general and the
instantiation is intimate and interactive [there's that terrible word
again!].
2] Symbols grow' - which to me, means that they become more complex
in their laws and their networked connections with other Signs. But I
will also suggest that symbols must have the capacity to implode as
well!
Edwina
On Wed 08/08/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[1] sent:
Gary R., List:
GR: ... imagining that the word 'the' was once first spoken (or
written, but more likely I think, spoken), what was the type that
that first spoken "the" was token of, where does one locate its
reality?
Where does one "locate" the Reality of any general Type? Every
Instance of the word "the"--first, last, and each one in between--is
a Replica of the same Sign. The Type is not dependent on its
Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a
diamond is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is
the nature of a Real "would-be."
GR: Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon which they are
rooted?
What does it mean in this context to say that "symbols grow"? In
order for them to get "larger," we must have a way to "measure" their
size. Conveniently, Peirce provided one with the concept of
Information as "area"--the product of a Sign's Logical Breadth and
Depth. I am reminded again of Eco's comment that I quoted last
week--" from interpretant to interpretant, the sign is more and more
determined both in its breadth and in its depth." In other words,
although every Sign (as a general) is indeterminate to some degree,
it can "grow"--i.e., approach (however distantly) the ideal state of
Substantial Information--by becoming more determinate.
CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there
was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ...
Not determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol
alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the
absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the
beginning of things can alone be understood. What logically follows?
...
A symbol is essentially a purpose, that is to say, is a
representation that seeks to make itself definite, or seeks to
produce an interpretant more definite than itself ...
... the interpretant aims at the object more than at the original
replica and may be truer and fuller than the latter. The very
entelechy of being lies in being representable ... A symbol is an
embryonic reality endowed with power of growth into the very truth,
the very entelechy of reality. (EP 2:322-324; 1904)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon AS, Gary f,
Jon wrote:
JAS: I am currently adopting the specific point of view that all
Signs are Types and seeing how far I can get with that interpretative
hypothesis.
I am tending to find myself more and more disposed toward your line
of thinking, Jon, especially as articulated in your last several
posts.
However, some questions remain for me. For example, imagining that
the word 'the' was once first spoken (or written, but more likely I
think, spoken), what was the type that that first spoken "the" was
token of, where does one locate its reality?
Despite this and a few other reservations which I'll comment on
below, I found your argument refuting Gary f's examples of what he
saw as signs which were not types rather convincing. As you
summarized your position near the end of your post:
JS: No one ever actually speaks, writes, hears, reads, or thinks a
word (the Sign itself); we only actually speak, write, hear, read,
and think Instances thereof. . . . when we do [such things], we
usually say that we speak, write, hear, read, or think the word/Sign
(not the Instance). This is the problematic inconsistency, in my
view--not so much a criticism of Peirce as of our everyday colloquial
usage of such terminology. I am basically advocating greater
precision in logical/semeiotic inquiry by carefully distinguishing
(individual) Instances of Signs from (general) Signs themselves
(emphasis added).
This may be leaping a bit ahead, but the thought occurred to me that
if all Signs are legislative types which are expressed (i.e., find
their being) as existential tokens (with attached qualitative
tones), and if "The entire universe is perfused, if it is not
composed exclusively of signs" ( "The Basis of Pragmaticism,"
footnote, CP 5.448, 1906), then the deepest and, as it were, most
necessary Reality being, shall we say, universal legislative types
(3ns), this Reality would seem to find its being in that Mind which
underlies existential reality, manifests.
As I noted, however, some questions remain for me regarding this
view, perhaps the most important relating to the nature and purpose
of semiotic evolution. Yes, symbols grow, but what is the soil upon
which they are rooted?
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other
signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of
the nature of likenesses and symbols. . . . So it is only out of
symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de symbolo (What
Is a Sign?, 1894)
This quotation now strikes me as perhaps more akin to Hegelian
dialectical "evolution", than to Peirce's involution where indices
and indexes are always-already involved in symbols. But on the other
hand, Peirce wrote that, for example, biological evolution begins
with "sporting" with 1ns (see, "A Guess at the Riddle." Admittedly
both this and "What Is a Sign?" were written earlier than the late
semeiotic material we've been reflecting on. Anyhow, this is just to
point to the kinds of questions that have been coming to mind in
light of your "interpretive hypothesis" that all signs are types.
Enough for now. Suffice it to say that I am finding this a most
interesting and valuable inquiry.
Best,
Gary R
PS You were correct about the two proof-reading errors you found in
my post of yesterday. I hurriedly threw it together just before a
medical appointment with scarcely time to read it over once.
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690
Links:
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