List: One of Peirce's last published articles was "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," and he made his theism--idiosyncratic though it was--unmistakably clear in its very first sentence.
CSP: The word "God," so capitalized (as we Americans say), is *the *definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908) The "Neglected Argument" itself is a *retroductive *one, resulting in a *plausible *explanatory hypothesis, rather than a conclusion that follows *necessarily *from "definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908). However, I would like to offer a *deductive *"argumentation" of the latter nature, in accordance with representative statements from Peirce's other late writings. The *major premise* is that every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself. CSP: The object is something external to and independent of the sign which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself ... (R 145; 1905) CSP: ... [a sign] must be determined to correspond, according to some principle, and by some species of causation, with something else, called its Object. (R 283:109; 1905) CSP: A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined (i.e., specialized, *bestimmt*) by something *other than itself*, called its Object ... (CP 8.177, EP 2:492; 1909) CSP: I start by defining what I mean by a Sign. It is something determined by something else, its Object ... (EP 2:500; 1909) Anticipating the outcome, one might expect instead the assertion that every Sign requires an *utterer*; but Peirce explicitly denied this, even while just as explicitly acknowledging God as Creator. CSP: But why argue, when signs without utterers are often employed? I mean such signs as symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of experiences serving as premisses, etc. (EP 2:403; 1907) CSP: But it appears to me that all symptoms of disease, signs of weather, etc., have no utterer. For I do not think we can properly say that God *utters *any sign when He is the Creator of all things. (CP 8.185, EP 2:496; 1909) Instead, Peirce identified "the essential ingredient of the utterer" as precisely "the Object of the sign" (EP 2:404-407; 1907). As for the "otherness" requirement, while we can say that every Object is a Sign of itself, this is true only in a *degenerate *sense; i.e., it is trivially an *Icon *and *Index *of itself, but the fundamental aspect of *representation *or (more generally) *mediation* is completely absent. A *genuine triadic *relation is always among three *distinct *correlates and cannot be reduced to their *dyadic *relations--including the likewise degenerate one of *identity*. CSP: A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is *genuine*, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. (EP 2:272-273; 1903) CSP: There are, however, *degenerate *dyadic relations ... Namely, they are individual relations of identity, such as the relation of *A* to *A*. (EP 2:306; 1904) The *minor premise* is that the entire Universe is a Sign. CSP: ... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... an argument ... a great work of art, a great poem ... (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903) CSP: The entelechy of the Universe of being, then ... will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. (EP 2:304; 1904) CSP: There is a science of semeiotics ... and one of its theorems ... is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign ... (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904) CSP: ... the entire universe--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth"--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n1, EP 2:394; 1906) There is no contradiction in understanding the entire Universe--encompassing all three Universes of Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908)--*both *as a Sign (singular) *and *as composed of Signs (plural). *Any *complex of connected Signs is also *itself *a Sign, and the Universe may be conceived as a *semiosic continuum* whose material parts are its constituent Signs. CSP: Whatever is continuous has *material parts* ... The *material parts* of a thing or other object, *W*, that is composed of such parts, are whatever things are, firstly, each and every one of them, other than *W*; secondly are all of some one internal nature ... thirdly, form together a collection of objects in which no one occurs twice over and, fourthly, are such that the Being of each of them together with the modes of connexion between all subcollections of them, constitute the being of *W*. (CP 6.174; 1906) The *conclusion *is that the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself. But what sort of Object would this have to be? It obviously could not be anything *within *any of the three Universes of Experience--i.e., it would have to be something *transcendent*, and hence non-spatial and non-temporal, yet nevertheless *Real*. CSP: That is *real *which has such and such characters, whether anybody thinks it to have those characters or not. (CP 5.430; 1905) CSP: To say that a thing is *Real *is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. (EP 2:456-457; 1911) Moreover, it would have to be something that *affects *the entire Universe, but is not *affected by* the Universe at all--i.e., something *impassible*. CSP: In a word, whether physically, rationally, or otherwise, directly or indirectly, its Object, as agent, acts upon the sign, as patient. (R 283:109; 1905) CSP: In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. (EP 2:544n22; 1906). CSP: But by the Object Itself, or the Real Object, we mean the Object insofar as it is not modified by being represented. (R 793:14; 1906) Such attributes are among those included in standard philosophical definitions of what Peirce called "*the *definable proper name." But what does it mean for a Sign to be *determined *by its Object? It is simply being *made more determinate*. CSP: A subject is *determinate *in respect to any character which inheres in it or is (universally and affirmatively) predicated of it, as well as in respect to the negative of such character, these being the very same respect. In all other respects it is *indeterminate*. (CP 5.447, EP 2:350; 1905) What does this entail about the *origins *of the Universe as a Sign? CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... just nothing at all. Not determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of things can alone be understood. (EP 2:322; 1904) Again, the entire Universe is a *semiosic continuum*, "something whose possibilities of determination no multitude of individuals can exhaust" (CP 6.170; 1902). In fact, I suggest that it is what Peirce had in mind as "the perfect sign." CSP: The perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant. (EP 2:545n25; 1906) After all, "The creation of the universe ... is going on today and never will be done ..." (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903). How, then, is the Universe being made more determinate by its Object? CSP: The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of being. (CP 6.341; c. 1909) To summarize in the fashion of the famous Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas ... - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself. - The entire Universe is a Sign. - Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself. - And this we call God. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
