Jon, Gary I suggest that while signs point to the Light or whatever universal name we use to refer to the Cause, Creator, Force, etc.that it is this source that makes semiotics the realization that it is -- in other words the basis of Peirce's statement that all thought is in signs. I see semiotics as the basis for a co-creation understanding. I am not objecting to these posts, merely suggesting that it may not be in the nature of thought alone that the unfathomable Reality can be be ir is perceived. It is in the nature of the so-called subjective realm. These terms are inadequate because there is ultimately no division between truthful science and truthful metaphysics, heart and mind, heaven and earth. Etc.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 5:56 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, list, > > This is, in my opinion, a most impressive semeiotic argument (really, an > extended *argumentation* in Peirce's sense) for the Reality of God. This > is to say that it would seem to me to be an explication of Peirce's (and, I > assume, your) religious views as they relate to his sign theory, > representing a kind of outline of a *Peircean semeiotic theology (*of > course Peirce himself sometimes argued *contra* the theologians). It > brings together, at least as far as I can tell, *the most salient > passages *in Peirce relating to that argument in a forceful logical tour > de force. I have read many papers and several books on Peirce's religious > views, but I have found them all significantly wanting in some respects. > So, I'm eagerly anticipating studying your argumentation to see how it > holds up upon examination. > > For now, my only very, very slight 'adjustment' to your post would be to > make your four summary points, three, since they obviously constitute a > syllogism. So: > > - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself. > - The entire Universe is a Sign. > - Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than > itself; and this we call God. > > I can imagine that you'll get all sorts of push back from this deductive > argument, for example, from those who consider themselves panentheists. But > the response to that *sort *of difference of opinion is simply that what > you're arguing for is *Peirce's view of the matter*, one which sees God > as the Creator of the Three Universes; and how this is clearly intimately > tied up with his theory of signs. > > As for purely logical issues that may arise upon examination of your > deductive argument, you'll have to take these as they come, I suppose. And > some will surely argue that such a deductive argument can only be of so > much value since, as they might see it, faith in God is not essentially a > logical matter. But for those philosophers and semioticians who already > hold a Creator view of God, the argument surely offers considerable support. > > I have only read your argument twice so far, and have not yet seen any > logical flaws; of course others may. However, the very clarity of your > argumentation makes me wonder anew about my own view of this matter. I > have, perhaps, once again begun to reflect on my own tendencies toward > panentheism. I had previously thought that my religious views were quite > close to Peirce's. But since I find your argument as following logically > and naturally from Peirce's semeiotic, the intra-personal tension it's > creating--between theism and panentheism--can only be of value to me in the > long run. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690* > > > On Sat, Feb 2, 2019 at 4:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> List: >> >> One of Peirce's last published articles was "A Neglected Argument for the >> Reality of God," and he made his theism--idiosyncratic though it >> was--unmistakably clear in its very first sentence. >> >> CSP: The word "God," so capitalized (as we Americans say), is *the >> *definable >> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator >> of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908) >> >> >> The "Neglected Argument" itself is a *retroductive *one, resulting in a >> *plausible >> *explanatory hypothesis, rather than a conclusion that follows *necessarily >> *from "definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908). >> However, I would like to offer a *deductive *"argumentation" of the >> latter nature, in accordance with representative statements from Peirce's >> other late writings. >> >> The *major premise* is that every Sign is determined by an Object other >> than itself. >> >> CSP: The object is something external to and independent of the sign >> which determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself ... (R 145; >> 1905) >> >> >> CSP: ... [a sign] must be determined to correspond, according to some >> principle, and by some species of causation, with something else, called >> its Object. (R 283:109; 1905) >> >> >> CSP: A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so determined >> (i.e., specialized, *bestimmt*) by something *other than itself*, called >> its Object ... (CP 8.177, EP 2:492; 1909) >> >> CSP: I start by defining what I mean by a Sign. It is something >> determined by something else, its Object ... (EP 2:500; 1909) >> >> >> Anticipating the outcome, one might expect instead the assertion that >> every Sign requires an *utterer*; but Peirce explicitly denied this, >> even while just as explicitly acknowledging God as Creator. >> >> CSP: But why argue, when signs without utterers are often employed? I >> mean such signs as symptoms of disease, signs of the weather, groups of >> experiences serving as premisses, etc. (EP 2:403; 1907) >> >> CSP: But it appears to me that all symptoms of disease, signs of >> weather, etc., have no utterer. For I do not think we can properly say that >> God *utters *any sign when He is the Creator of all things. (CP 8.185, >> EP 2:496; 1909) >> >> >> Instead, Peirce identified "the essential ingredient of the utterer" as >> precisely "the Object of the sign" (EP 2:404-407; 1907). As for the >> "otherness" requirement, while we can say that every Object is a Sign of >> itself, this is true only in a *degenerate *sense; i.e., it is trivially >> an *Icon *and *Index *of itself, but the fundamental aspect of >> *representation >> *or (more generally) *mediation* is completely absent. A *genuine >> triadic *relation is always among three *distinct *correlates and cannot >> be reduced to their *dyadic *relations--including the likewise >> degenerate one of *identity*. >> >> CSP: A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a >> genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be >> capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the >> same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same >> Object. The triadic relation is *genuine*, that is, its three members >> are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of >> dyadic relations. (EP 2:272-273; 1903) >> >> >> CSP: There are, however, *degenerate *dyadic relations ... Namely, they >> are individual relations of identity, such as the relation of *A* to *A*. >> (EP 2:306; 1904) >> >> >> The *minor premise* is that the entire Universe is a Sign. >> >> CSP: ... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... an >> argument ... a great work of art, a great poem ... (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; >> 1903) >> >> CSP: The entelechy of the Universe of being, then ... will be that >> Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. (EP 2:304; 1904) >> >> CSP: There is a science of semeiotics ... and one of its theorems ... is >> that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system >> constitutes one sign ... (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904) >> >> CSP: ... the entire universe--not merely the universe of existents, but >> all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the >> universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth"--that all >> this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of >> signs. (CP 5.448n1, EP 2:394; 1906) >> >> >> There is no contradiction in understanding the entire >> Universe--encompassing all three Universes of Experience (CP 6.455, EP >> 2:435; 1908)--*both *as a Sign (singular) *and *as composed of Signs >> (plural). *Any *complex of connected Signs is also *itself *a Sign, and >> the Universe may be conceived as a *semiosic continuum* whose material >> parts are its constituent Signs. >> >> CSP: Whatever is continuous has *material parts* ... The *material >> parts* of a thing or other object, *W*, that is composed of such parts, >> are whatever things are, firstly, each and every one of them, other than >> *W*; secondly are all of some one internal nature ... thirdly, form >> together a collection of objects in which no one occurs twice over and, >> fourthly, are such that the Being of each of them together with the modes >> of connexion between all subcollections of them, constitute the being of >> *W*. (CP 6.174; 1906) >> >> >> The *conclusion *is that the entire Universe is determined by an Object >> other than itself. But what sort of Object would this have to be? It >> obviously could not be anything *within *any of the three Universes of >> Experience--i.e., it would have to be something *transcendent*, and >> hence non-spatial and non-temporal, yet nevertheless *Real*. >> >> CSP: That is *real *which has such and such characters, whether anybody >> thinks it to have those characters or not. (CP 5.430; 1905) >> >> >> CSP: To say that a thing is *Real *is merely to say that such >> predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of >> whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. >> (EP 2:456-457; 1911) >> >> >> Moreover, it would have to be something that *affects *the entire >> Universe, but is not *affected by* the Universe at all--i.e., something >> *impassible*. >> >> CSP: In a word, whether physically, rationally, or otherwise, directly >> or indirectly, its Object, as agent, acts upon the sign, as patient. (R >> 283:109; 1905) >> >> >> CSP: In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, >> its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the >> Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. (EP 2:544n22; 1906). >> >> CSP: But by the Object Itself, or the Real Object, we mean the Object >> insofar as it is not modified by being represented. (R 793:14; 1906) >> >> >> Such attributes are among those included in standard philosophical >> definitions of what Peirce called "*the *definable proper name." But >> what does it mean for a Sign to be *determined *by its Object? It is >> simply being *made more determinate*. >> >> CSP: A subject is *determinate *in respect to any character which >> inheres in it or is (universally and affirmatively) predicated of it, as >> well as in respect to the negative of such character, these being the very >> same respect. In all other respects it is *indeterminate*. (CP 5.447, EP >> 2:350; 1905) >> >> >> What does this entail about the *origins *of the Universe as a Sign? >> >> CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in >> the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... just nothing >> at all. Not determinately nothing ... Utter indetermination. But a symbol >> alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the >> absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of >> things can alone be understood. (EP 2:322; 1904) >> >> >> Again, the entire Universe is a *semiosic continuum*, "something whose >> possibilities of determination no multitude of individuals can exhaust" (CP >> 6.170; 1902). In fact, I suggest that it is what Peirce had in mind as >> "the perfect sign." >> >> CSP: The perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its object, >> from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which >> bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but >> which had lain dormant. (EP 2:545n25; 1906) >> >> >> After all, "The creation of the universe ... is going on today and never >> will be done ..." (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903). How, then, is the >> Universe being made more determinate by its Object? >> >> CSP: The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of >> the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living >> intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as >> of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection >> of being. (CP 6.341; c. 1909) >> >> >> To summarize in the fashion of the famous Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas ... >> >> - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself. >> - The entire Universe is a Sign. >> - Therefore, the entire Universe is determined by an Object other >> than itself. >> - And this we call God. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
