Gary, List: Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and the actual" ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet. For that would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8) John also proposed the following generalization. JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere] would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel. However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being observed is the [mark] itself--we need a *different* word for the embodiment of the [mark], such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if "mark" is the right word for the embodiment, then we need a *different* word for the form itself. Moreover, as I have already explained at length ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00096.html), Peirce explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as "a 'general,'" thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are an existential graph and the word "camel," both of which he unambiguously classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles. Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead. JAS: Any [observable] form which, if it were [embodied anywhere] would be [a token] is called a [*type*]. If it actually be so [embodied], it would be incorrect to say that the [type] *itself* is [embodied]. For that would be an impossibility, since the [*type*] itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "[would]-be", i.e. something which [would] be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. After all, Peirce *defines* a necessitant "type" as "a definitely significant Form" and provides *different* words for its existent embodiments, namely, "tokens" that are "instances" of the type (CP 4.537, 1906). Hence, the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no relevance whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 5:50 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > John, Jon, Helmut, List, > > JFS: > 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. > 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. > > Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would > understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider > the following two sentences: > > 1. A hump is a tone of a camel. > 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant. > > > Compare this to: > > GR: > 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in > the orchestra. > 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. > > "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would > understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider > the following two sentences:" > > 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in > the orchestra. > 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. > > Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon: ". . . a mark is an actual > material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself *"an > actual material sign." > > To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my > words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to > 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind." > > That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a > camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples of > synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which is > the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant. > > JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it > emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word > 'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( ____ > token type)." > > There is no "profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word > 'tone' here" and your claiming -- rather *insisting* -- that there *is* > only weakens your argument for the use of 'mark' in the trichotomy being > discussed. > > Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion > needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean > terminological matters -- itself "has no redeeming social or academic > value whatsoever." And certainly it is not a collegial stance to take on > Peirce-L. "Get rid of it." > > Best, > > Gary >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
