List: As a brief supplement to Gary's helpful remarks, I just want to note that Helmut was correctly referring to the fact that there are three interpretant *correlates *in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomy, not the "mode" of the dyadic sign-interpretant *relation *in his1903 taxonomy. Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating identifies the sign as its 1st correlate (genuine only), the object as its 2nd correlate (genuine/dynamical and degenerate/immediate), and the interpretant as its 3rd correlate (genuine/final, degenerate/dynamical, and doubly degenerate/immediate). There are then trichotomies for all six of these correlates and their four external relations, resulting in 66 sign classes instead of only ten.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 7:18 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, Edwina, List, > > Edwina wrote: Take a look at the ten classes of signs [ . . .] You will > find that the Interpretant can and often is - in a mode of Firstness. Or > secondness. It is only ONCE in a mode of Thirdness and that is in a full > Argument [ argument symbolic legisign]. Just because it is the third > ’nodal site’ in the triadic process does NOT mean that it is, modally, in > the mode of Thirdness! > > As we have in the past, I tend to see matters somewhat differently than > Edwina in this matter since I see a kind of interpenetration of the > categories in Peirce's Classification of Signs. > > But first, I have never understood why she uses the expressions 'mode' and > 'nodal sites' in consideration of the diagram below, nor what her > terminology means outside of her own project. Peirce certainly doesn't use > 'mode' and 'nodal site' in discussing this diagram (which he does in > detail). I personally think that Edwina's terminology complicates and even > muddles an understanding of the grammatical branch of semeiotic, > especially for those new to Peirce studies. > > [image: image.png] > Diagram found in Peirce's manuscript (MS 540: 17) for his 1903 Syllabus. > > Edwina is certainly correct that the Interpretant can be a Legisign, in > fact it is in six places. But to suggest that a Legisign (consider just the > prefix, legi-, meaning 'pertaining to law') doesn't involve 3ns is, in my > view, mistaken. But more on the complexity of categorial relations in the > 10 Signs Classification. > > As I think all agree, the 1903 Classification of Signs divides Signs > accordinging to the categories, all 'boxes' in the classification arranged > bottom to top are grounded in 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. These serve as a way to > understand the nature of signs through three distinct layers of meaning: > > 1. 1ns: the quality or possibility of the sign in itself, independent > of anything else. > 2. 2ns: the dyadic relationship between the sign and its object. > 3. 3ns: the mediation by an interpretant whereby the sign and object > are connected through a general or law-like meaning > > However, they are 'read' by Peirce involutionally from the Interpretent , > through the relation to the Object, to the Sign itself (as in the diagram). > > One sees that the three Signs on the upper right corner of the diagram are > all Symbols. Now *all Symbols inherently express 3ns**. A* symbol is > defined as a sign that operates through a *convention, law, or habit, all > closely associated with 3ns*.. This means that symbols depend on > interpretative rules or conventional agreements. The word "grapefruit" is a > symbol because its meaning depends on shared linguistic understanding. Now > 'pampelmousse' is the word-symbol for 'grapefruit' in French, but unless > you are familiar with that language, 'pampelmousse' will be meaningless to > you. The same is true of the kind of Symbol which is a Dicent Sign, > usually, a Proposition (excerpt, for example, in biosemiotics), typically > involving several Symbols (3ns) and other Legisigns (3ns). > > Now it is true that the Symbol is only one of the three ways that a sign > can be in relation to its Object: a Sign can relate to its Object by > resemblance (Icon), by a physical relation (Index), or -- and this is the > point -- *by law/convention (Symbol).* Lawfulness in semeiotic is an > expression of 3ns (as are Representation). > > Further, in the diagram above one can see that *in itself *(as a Sign) *a > Sign may be a Legisign*, and as mentioned above, there are 6 signs of > this type. Now, again, a Legisign represents a general type or law (again, > the very prefix, 'legi-' gives it away). It is any Sign that functions > through a rule, habit, or convention, rather than as a unique, individual > occurrence. Here's that famous Peirce example I mentioned above of a > Legisign. > > [A legisign] *is of the nature of a general type*. . .. Every legisign > signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a > Replica of it. Thus, the word "the" will usually occur from fifteen to > twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the > same word, the same legisign. > > > Now all the above follows from each class of signs in the 10-adic > Classification necessarily involving a *complex of triadic relations -- *and > not > only the categoriality of Sign/Object/Interpretant. In short, > the Classification involves these 9.(3 x3) *each with a categorial > association -- *in various combinations (I won't get into how they are > combined into the 10 classes now as it's now directly pertinent). > [image: image.png] > This is why a 'Symbol' or a 'Legisign' -- both being clear expressions of > 3ns -- can appear in the 10 Classes as they do. In sum: 3ns is not limited > to the Argument because the 3 categories deeply interpenetrate in the > Classification; but nowhere more so than in living semiosis. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 6:13 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Helmut >> >> Of course the categories refer to composition!! That’s why they are >> ‘modes of being’! They refer to the modes of composition of the >> informational content of that site [ the mode of composition of the >> information held within the Object or Representamen or Interpretnat]. Is >> the informational content in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns? And then…you can >> ‘classify’ the triad…but the real issue is understanding how informational >> processes work. And after all- semiosis is about ‘information’.. >> >> So- the Interpretant- whether it functions within three types [ >> Immediate, Dynamic and Final] does not mean that they are in the mode of >> Thirdness!. Think about it. If the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - >> then, this means that the Object and the Representamen would also *have* >> to be in the mode of Thirdness - since information moves, in the semiosic >> process, from the DO via the mediating Representamen, to the >> Interpretants. You can’t have an Object in a mode of 2ns, for example, >> producing an Interpretant in a mode of Thirdness. >> >> As for your outline of god - I won’t get into that since, my view is that >> the notion of ‘god’ is a belief and outside of scientific analysis. You can >> hold to it as a belief via authority, tenacity, a priori - but not >> scientifically. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Oct 28, 2024, at 5:25 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Edwina, List, >> >> we have had this question many times. My view is, that the categories >> (because they are categories, so they apply to all logic) don´t only count >> for classification, but for composition too. The ten classes of signs are a >> classification of compositions, whose (categorial compositional) parts are >> always the sign, its object- and its interpretant relation, and of this >> composition, in the first order, ten classes are possible. "The object", >> which in fact is the sign-object-relation (no object without a sign, even >> not the *spatial* outside part), is again *functionally* (not spatially) >> composed of the immediate and the dynamical object, and the interpretant in >> the same way has three parts. Am I the only one, who sees it like this?? >> >> In the same way, I´d say, about the difference between reality and >> existence: There are two kinds of reality, a firstness-one, and a >> thirdness-one. Existence is secondness. If you have the thirdness variety >> of reality, this includes excistence, and if you have the firstness-variety >> of reality, existence includes it. Logic or/and God is the thirdness >> variety of reality, so it includes some existence. Not the existence of the >> world, which is primary secondness, but a secondness of thirdness, the >> existence-aspect of God´s, secondness of thirdness. Whatever this might be. >> So God exists, somehow. Phew-Peircean theology is special, maybe, but it >> may bring together theism and panentheism in a way, both can be regarded >> for not false. >> >> Best regards, Helmut >> 28. Oktober 2024 um 21:39 Uhr >> "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> >> *wrote:* >> Helmut - I’ll only comment on your last sentence. You wrote: >> >> The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant (secondness of >> thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I got it right, >> cannot reach the commens dictionary). >> >> This is incorrect. It is not valid that the Interpretant is in a ‘mode of >> thirdness’; that the DI is in a mode of 3-2… >> Take a look at the ten classes of signs [ 2.227—] You will find that the >> Interpretant can and often is - in a mode of Firstness. Or secondness. It >> is only ONCE in a mode of Thirdness and that is in a full Argument [ >> argument symbolic legisign]. Just because it is the third ’nodal site’ in >> the triadic process does NOT mean that it is, modally, in the mode of >> Thirdness! >> Take a look at the other nine classes of signs -!! >> >> Edwina >> >> On Oct 28, 2024, at 4:07 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Supplement: Er, when I think about it, I guess, that in "If A then B", or >> let´s say, in "If W, then G" ("W" being the world, and "G" being God), it >> might be so, that "W" exists, but "G" merely has to be real? For example: >> Logic is real, but does not exist, because it doesn´t materially or >> energetically interact, in a role of secondness. It is thirdness. >> Nevertheless, without logic, nothing existing would be there, nothing would >> work. Jon the evangelist said, that God is logic. So far, I abstractly >> understand that, but only by following the rules of this argumental figure. >> Really I don´t understand it, because, if existing things interact, and >> real things don´t, if they don´t exist too, I don´t see, that thirdness >> doesn´t interact, and therefore exists. It makes things happen, isn´t that >> interaction? And with Peirce, a thirdness always includes a first-, and a >> secondness: The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant >> (secondness of thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I >> got it right, cannot reach the commens dictionary). >> Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, >> I see, that possibility is a difficult matter, because there are >> different kinds of it´s. About necessity I now can only imagine two kinds, >> depending for what something is necessary: Something that exists, or >> something that not necessarily does. Isn´t it so (I strongly but >> reluctantly suspect, that it is not), that "B is necessary for A" means "If >> A then B"? or "No A without B", in EG: "(A(B))" ? Whether B exists or not, >> depends on whether A exists or not. Now, regarding "Ens necessitans": What >> for is God necessary? For the world, which exists, then God too exists. Or >> for logic, which doesn´t exist, but is real, then God too is at least real, >> but does not necessarily exist. Or do EGs, as they are "existential >> graphs", and nonmodal logic in general too, only count for existing things, >> but not for merely real things? I would find that funny, because it would >> mean, that you cannot substitute "A" with what you like, e.g.: "A = reality >> of A". I find it quite commonsentic and obvious, that it would be allowed >> to say: "The possibility of A exists", or the necessity. But in logic it is >> forbidden?? >> >> Best regards, Helmut >> >>
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