Helmut, List: There are indeed various kinds of modality--alethic, deontic, doxastic, dynamic, epistemic, temporal, etc.--each with its corresponding kinds of possibility and necessity since "possibly" is equivalent to "not necessarily not" and "necessarily" is equivalent to "not possibly not." Anselm's ontological argument demonstrates that the reality of God as "that than which nothing greater can be thought" is conceivable, i.e., *logically *possible. The longstanding debate is then whether this is sufficient to establish that the reality of God is also *metaphysically *possible, from which it would follow that the reality of God is metaphysically necessary by virtue of the *nominal *definition of God as *Ens necessarium*--in Peirce's words, "that which would Really be in every possible state of things whatever" (R 339:[295r], 1908).
As I have discussed previously, this amounts to a conditional proposition--if God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real. Leibniz recognized that in order to have a *real *definition of God, it must be shown that God *is *possibly real, from which it would follow that God is necessarily real; and in accordance with the uncontroversial modal axiom T, it would then follow that God is *actually *real. Leibniz's initial strategy, also adopted centuries later by Gödel, was to demonstrate that maximally possessing every positive attribute--conceiving God as *Ens perfectissimum*, a perfect being--is not self-contradictory. However, this again only establishes that the reality of God is *logically *possible, not *metaphysically *possible. Leibniz ultimately relied on the principle of sufficient reason to formulate a *cosmological *argument for the latter, echoed centuries later by Peirce. CSP: To explain anything is to show it to be a necessary consequence. To say that the total real is a consequence of utter nothing without substance or appearance is absurd. The only alternative is to suppose a necessary something whose mode of being transcends reality. (R 288:91[178], 1905) The reality of God is not only possible, but necessary to explain "the co-reality of the three universes" (R 339:[293r]) because otherwise, it would have to be considered an inexplicable brute fact, which a scholastic realist can never accept--"It is one of the peculiarities of nominalism that it is continually supposing things to be absolutely inexplicable. That blocks the road of inquiry" (CP 1.170, c. 1897). However, it is a mistake to conceive God as 3ns; instead, God transcends *all three* categories and their corresponding universes. As I said on Saturday, God's mode of being is utterly unique--the three universes encompass "all the phenomena there are," but God is *not *a phenomenon; rather, God is "the Principle of all Phenomena ... the author and creator of all that could ever be observed of Ideas, Occurrences, or *Logoi*" (R 339:[295r]). Again, when discussing existence vs. reality, it is important to be clear about whether we have in mind *logical *existence (being within the universe of discourse) or *metaphysical *existence (reacting with other things in the environment). Existential Graphs are *logically *existential, such that they can be used to reason about members of *any *of the three universes--as well as God, the One being that transcends them. This includes not only the *real*, whatever is as it is regardless of what any individual or finite group thinks about it, but also the *fictive*, whatever is as it is solely because an individual or finite group thinks about it that way. Hamlet does not "exist" as the Prince of Denmark in the *actual *world, only in the imagined world of Shakespeare's play, but it is a real fact in the actual world that Hamlet "exists" as the Prince of Denmark in that fictional world. I recognize that some of this is repetitive from my previous posts, but I hope that it is helpful by showing how some of the different pieces fit together. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 4:33 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > In the same way, I´d say, about the difference between reality and > existence: There are two kinds of reality, a firstness-one, and a > thirdness-one. Existence is secondness. If you have the thirdness variety > of reality, this includes excistence, and if you have the firstness-variety > of reality, existence includes it. Logic or/and God is the thirdness > variety of reality, so it includes some existence. Not the existence of the > world, which is primary secondness, but a secondness of thirdness, the > existence-aspect of God´s, secondness of thirdness. Whatever this might be. > So God exists, somehow. Phew-Peircean theology is special, maybe, but it > may bring together theism and panentheism in a way, both can be regarded > for not false. > > Best regards, Helmut > > On Oct 28, 2024, at 4:07 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Supplement: Er, when I think about it, I guess, that in "If A then B", or > let´s say, in "If W, then G" ("W" being the world, and "G" being God), it > might be so, that "W" exists, but "G" merely has to be real? For example: > Logic is real, but does not exist, because it doesn´t materially or > energetically interact, in a role of secondness. It is thirdness. > Nevertheless, without logic, nothing existing would be there, nothing would > work. Jon the evangelist said, that God is logic. So far, I abstractly > understand that, but only by following the rules of this argumental figure. > Really I don´t understand it, because, if existing things interact, and > real things don´t, if they don´t exist too, I don´t see, that thirdness > doesn´t interact, and therefore exists. It makes things happen, isn´t that > interaction? And with Peirce, a thirdness always includes a first-, and a > secondness: The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant > (secondness of thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I > got it right, cannot reach the commens dictionary). > Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, > > I see, that possibility is a difficult matter, because there are different > kinds of it´s. About necessity I now can only imagine two kinds, depending > for what something is necessary: Something that exists, or something that > not necessarily does. Isn´t it so (I strongly but reluctantly suspect, that > it is not), that "B is necessary for A" means "If A then B"? or "No A > without B", in EG: "(A(B))" ? Whether B exists or not, depends on whether A > exists or not. Now, regarding "Ens necessitans": What for is God necessary? > For the world, which exists, then God too exists. Or for logic, which > doesn´t exist, but is real, then God too is at least real, but does not > necessarily exist. Or do EGs, as they are "existential graphs", and > nonmodal logic in general too, only count for existing things, but not for > merely real things? I would find that funny, because it would mean, that > you cannot substitute "A" with what you like, e.g.: "A = reality of A". I > find it quite commonsentic and obvious, that it would be allowed to say: > "The possibility of A exists", or the necessity. But in logic it is > forbidden?? > > Best regards, Helmut > >
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