Gary R I use the term ‘mode’ because Perice uses it to describe the categories - see 8.328 wherefore example, he describes ..Firstness is the mode of being’..etc.
I us the term ’nodal sites since other Peircean scholars also use the term - and also, because I use the Peircean analytic frame within information research - which uses this term to refer to sites of information generation.. which is exactly what is going on within the three correlates/relations. [Note- your diagram didn’t come through]. No- the Interpretant is NOT a Legisign. That term refers only to the Representamen, which is either a Qualisign, Sinsign or Legisign depending on whether it is in the mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns The Interpretant is only in a mode of 3ns in ONE of the ten classes - the Argument Symbolic Legisign. Of course the Legisign Involves ‘law’ or habits. Where are you suggesting that I suggest that a Legisign doesn’t involve 3ns? I disagree with your outline of the three categories. > 1ns: the quality or possibility of the sign in itself, independent of > anything else. > 2ns: the dyadic relationship between the sign and its object. > 3ns: the mediation by an interpretant whereby the sign and object are > connected through a general or law-like meaning Firstness can be found within any one of the three correlates/relations….and not just of the mediating representamen/sign. See, for example, the Rhematic Iconic Sinsign, where the represetnamen is in a mode of 2ns, and the object and interpretant are both in modes of 1ns. And Secondness is not just bdeetweeen the sign/represetnamen and the object - but can also be between the Representamen and the Interpretant..etc. And thirdness is not a mediation-by-an interpretant…Mediation is carried out by the Represetnamen - and need not be operative within a mode of 3ns. See for example, A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign - where the Intnerpretant is in a mode of 1ns, and the Represeetnamen is in a mode of 2ns. As for the rest of your comments - they are basic Peirce. Edwina > On Oct 28, 2024, at 8:09 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Helmut, Edwina, List, > > Edwina wrote: Take a look at the ten classes of signs [ . . .] You will find > that the Interpretant can and often is - in a mode of Firstness. Or > secondness. It is only ONCE in a mode of Thirdness and that is in a full > Argument [ argument symbolic legisign]. Just because it is the third ’nodal > site’ in the triadic process does NOT mean that it is, modally, in the mode > of Thirdness! > > As we have in the past, I tend to see matters somewhat differently than > Edwina in this matter since I see a kind of interpenetration of the > categories in Peirce's Classification of Signs. > > But first, I have never understood why she uses the expressions 'mode' and > 'nodal sites' in consideration of the diagram below, nor what her terminology > means outside of her own project. Peirce certainly doesn't use 'mode' and > 'nodal site' in discussing this diagram (which he does in detail). I > personally think that Edwina's terminology complicates and even muddles an > understanding of the grammatical branch of semeiotic, especially for those > new to Peirce studies. > > > Diagram found in Peirce's manuscript (MS 540: 17) for his 1903 Syllabus. > > Edwina is certainly correct that the Interpretant can be a Legisign, in fact > it is in six places. But to suggest that a Legisign (consider just the > prefix, legi-, meaning 'pertaining to law') doesn't involve 3ns is, in my > view, mistaken. But more on the complexity of categorial relations in the 10 > Signs Classification. > > As I think all agree, the 1903 Classification of Signs divides Signs > accordinging to the categories, all 'boxes' in the classification arranged > bottom to top are grounded in 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. These serve as a way to > understand the nature of signs through three distinct layers of meaning: > 1ns: the quality or possibility of the sign in itself, independent of > anything else. > 2ns: the dyadic relationship between the sign and its object. > 3ns: the mediation by an interpretant whereby the sign and object are > connected through a general or law-like meaning > However, they are 'read' by Peirce involutionally from the Interpretent , > through the relation to the Object, to the Sign itself (as in the diagram). > > One sees that the three Signs on the upper right corner of the diagram are > all Symbols. Now all Symbols inherently express 3ns. A symbol is defined as a > sign that operates through a convention, law, or habit, all closely > associated with 3ns.. This means that symbols depend on interpretative rules > or conventional agreements. The word "grapefruit" is a symbol because its > meaning depends on shared linguistic understanding. Now 'pampelmousse' is the > word-symbol for 'grapefruit' in French, but unless you are familiar with that > language, 'pampelmousse' will be meaningless to you. The same is true of the > kind of Symbol which is a Dicent Sign, usually, a Proposition (excerpt, for > example, in biosemiotics), typically involving several Symbols (3ns) and > other Legisigns (3ns). > > Now it is true that the Symbol is only one of the three ways that a sign can > be in relation to its Object: a Sign can relate to its Object by resemblance > (Icon), by a physical relation (Index), or -- and this is the point -- by > law/convention (Symbol). Lawfulness in semeiotic is an expression of 3ns (as > are Representation). > > Further, in the diagram above one can see that in itself (as a Sign) a Sign > may be a Legisign, and as mentioned above, there are 6 signs of this type. > Now, again, a Legisign represents a general type or law (again, the very > prefix, 'legi-' gives it away). It is any Sign that functions through a rule, > habit, or convention, rather than as a unique, individual occurrence. Here's > that famous Peirce example I mentioned above of a Legisign. > > [A legisign] is of the nature of a general type. . .. Every legisign > signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a > Replica of it. Thus, the word "the" will usually occur from fifteen to > twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same > word, the same legisign. > > Now all the above follows from each class of signs in the 10-adic > Classification necessarily involving a complex of triadic relations -- and > not only the categoriality of Sign/Object/Interpretant. In short, the > Classification involves these 9.(3 x3) each with a categorial association -- > in various combinations (I won't get into how they are combined into the 10 > classes now as it's now directly pertinent). > > This is why a 'Symbol' or a 'Legisign' -- both being clear expressions of 3ns > -- can appear in the 10 Classes as they do. In sum: 3ns is not limited to the > Argument because the 3 categories deeply interpenetrate in the > Classification; but nowhere more so than in living semiosis. > > Best, > > Gary R > > On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 6:13 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Helmut >> >> Of course the categories refer to composition!! That’s why they are ‘modes >> of being’! They refer to the modes of composition of the informational >> content of that site [ the mode of composition of the information held >> within the Object or Representamen or Interpretnat]. Is the informational >> content in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns? And then…you can ‘classify’ the >> triad…but the real issue is understanding how informational processes work. >> And after all- semiosis is about ‘information’.. >> >> So- the Interpretant- whether it functions within three types [ Immediate, >> Dynamic and Final] does not mean that they are in the mode of Thirdness!. >> Think about it. If the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness - then, this >> means that the Object and the Representamen would also have to be in the >> mode of Thirdness - since information moves, in the semiosic process, from >> the DO via the mediating Representamen, to the Interpretants. You can’t >> have an Object in a mode of 2ns, for example, producing an Interpretant in a >> mode of Thirdness. >> >> As for your outline of god - I won’t get into that since, my view is that >> the notion of ‘god’ is a belief and outside of scientific analysis. You can >> hold to it as a belief via authority, tenacity, a priori - but not >> scientifically. >> >> Edwina >> >> >>> On Oct 28, 2024, at 5:25 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> Edwina, List, >>> >>> we have had this question many times. My view is, that the categories >>> (because they are categories, so they apply to all logic) don´t only count >>> for classification, but for composition too. The ten classes of signs are a >>> classification of compositions, whose (categorial compositional) parts are >>> always the sign, its object- and its interpretant relation, and of this >>> composition, in the first order, ten classes are possible. "The object", >>> which in fact is the sign-object-relation (no object without a sign, even >>> not the spatial outside part), is again functionally (not spatially) >>> composed of the immediate and the dynamical object, and the interpretant in >>> the same way has three parts. Am I the only one, who sees it like this?? >>> >>> In the same way, I´d say, about the difference between reality and >>> existence: There are two kinds of reality, a firstness-one, and a >>> thirdness-one. Existence is secondness. If you have the thirdness variety >>> of reality, this includes excistence, and if you have the firstness-variety >>> of reality, existence includes it. Logic or/and God is the thirdness >>> variety of reality, so it includes some existence. Not the existence of the >>> world, which is primary secondness, but a secondness of thirdness, the >>> existence-aspect of God´s, secondness of thirdness. Whatever this might be. >>> So God exists, somehow. Phew-Peircean theology is special, maybe, but it >>> may bring together theism and panentheism in a way, both can be regarded >>> for not false. >>> >>> Best regards, Helmut >>> >>> >>> 28. Oktober 2024 um 21:39 Uhr >>> "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> wrote: >>> Helmut - I’ll only comment on your last sentence. You wrote: >>> >>> The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant (secondness of >>> thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I got it right, >>> cannot reach the commens dictionary). >>> >>> This is incorrect. It is not valid that the Interpretant is in a ‘mode of >>> thirdness’; that the DI is in a mode of 3-2… >>> Take a look at the ten classes of signs [ 2.227—] You will find that the >>> Interpretant can and often is - in a mode of Firstness. Or secondness. It >>> is only ONCE in a mode of Thirdness and that is in a full Argument [ >>> argument symbolic legisign]. Just because it is the third ’nodal site’ in >>> the triadic process does NOT mean that it is, modally, in the mode of >>> Thirdness! >>> Take a look at the other nine classes of signs -!! >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Oct 28, 2024, at 4:07 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Supplement: Er, when I think about it, I guess, that in "If A then B", or >>> let´s say, in "If W, then G" ("W" being the world, and "G" being God), it >>> might be so, that "W" exists, but "G" merely has to be real? For example: >>> Logic is real, but does not exist, because it doesn´t materially or >>> energetically interact, in a role of secondness. It is thirdness. >>> Nevertheless, without logic, nothing existing would be there, nothing would >>> work. Jon the evangelist said, that God is logic. So far, I abstractly >>> understand that, but only by following the rules of this argumental figure. >>> Really I don´t understand it, because, if existing things interact, and >>> real things don´t, if they don´t exist too, I don´t see, that thirdness >>> doesn´t interact, and therefore exists. It makes things happen, isn´t that >>> interaction? And with Peirce, a thirdness always includes a first-, and a >>> secondness: The interpretant (3ns) includes the dynamic interpretant >>> (secondness of thirdness), the medisense includes association (same, if I >>> got it right, cannot reach the commens dictionary). >>> >>> >>> Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, >>> >>> I see, that possibility is a difficult matter, because there are different >>> kinds of it´s. About necessity I now can only imagine two kinds, depending >>> for what something is necessary: Something that exists, or something that >>> not necessarily does. Isn´t it so (I strongly but reluctantly suspect, that >>> it is not), that "B is necessary for A" means "If A then B"? or "No A >>> without B", in EG: "(A(B))" ? Whether B exists or not, depends on whether A >>> exists or not. Now, regarding "Ens necessitans": What for is God necessary? >>> For the world, which exists, then God too exists. Or for logic, which >>> doesn´t exist, but is real, then God too is at least real, but does not >>> necessarily exist. Or do EGs, as they are "existential graphs", and >>> nonmodal logic in general too, only count for existing things, but not for >>> merely real things? I would find that funny, because it would mean, that >>> you cannot substitute "A" with what you like, e.g.: "A = reality of A". I >>> find it quite commonsentic and obvious, that it would be allowed to say: >>> "The possibility of A exists", or the necessity. But in logic it is >>> forbidden?? >>> >>> Best regards, Helmut >>> >>> >>> 28. Oktober 2024 um 01:13 Uhr >>> "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Jerry - >>> >>> My view is that one can come to different conclusions using modal logic. >>> >>> 1] For example, the Anselm-Hartshorne argument for god is: >>> ’There’s a necessary being is logically possible [ with logically possible >>> as the predicate or description of the necessary being] ] >>> Therefore, there’s a necessary being’. [because it’s possible is a >>> description of its nature]. >>> >>> But - we could also easily conclude: therefore, ’there’s no necessary being >>> is also logically possible’. >>> >>> Or - ’There’s a necessary being is logically necessary >>> 2] …but- this doesn’t make this necessary being to be ‘god’. It could be a … >>> >>> Because one asserts >>> 3] ‘ God is a necessary being’ - one can conclude that therefore, God is >>> actual. ' >>> But the problem with this is that a logical argument, whether possible or >>> necessary, doesn’t prove that something is actual or existential . That >>> is - the question has to be on whether the ’necessary’ also implies’ the >>> actual’. [ Anselm’s ontological says that the two are merged; others >>> disagree - ie they reject that ’the existence of an idea moves into the >>> actual existence of a ’thing’. >>> >>> Necessity and possibility arguments are complex! >>> >>> >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Oct 27, 2024, at 6:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> Jerry, List: >>> >>> I explained the quoted statement in the remainder of the same paragraph. >>> >>> JAS: In logic, possibility and necessity are not predicates any more than >>> existence/actuality. Instead, they are modalities, which is why axioms must >>> be added to classical logic to incorporate them, one of which is called >>> T--if a proposition is necessarily true, then it is actually true. In the >>> Gamma part of Existential Graphs, anything within a solid cut within a >>> broken cut is asserted to be possibly true, while anything within a broken >>> cut within a solid cut is asserted to be necessarily true. However, when >>> Peirce ultimately abandoned cuts altogether in favor of shading, he needed >>> a new notation for such graphs--"I shall now have to add a Delta part in >>> order to deal with modals" (R 500:3, 1911). Unfortunately, he never spelled >>> out what he had in mind, but my newly published paper describes a plausible >>> candidate (https://doi.org/10.2979/csp.00026). >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>> On Sun, Oct 27, 2024 at 2:17 PM Jerry LR Chandler >>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> List, Jon: >>>> On Oct 26, 2024, at 7:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> In logic, possibility and necessity are not predicates any more than >>>> existence/actuality. >>>> ??? >>>> Why? >>>> What forms of logic are you referring to? >>>> Which grammar of which logic informs your assertion? >>>> How is it plausible that this assertion is meaningful? >>>> >>>> [This statement directly contradicts chemical, biochemical and biological >>>> equilibrium processes as was well described by A. N. Whitehead.] >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> Jerry >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >>> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at >>> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while >>> to repair / update all the links! >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . >>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE >>> of the message and nothing in the body. 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More at >>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned >>> by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and >>> Ben Udell. >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while >> to repair / update all the links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE >> of the message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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