Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 09:01:20PM +0200, privacy.at Anonymous Remailer wrote: > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: RIPEMD160 > > On Tue, 12 Jul 2005 20:58:13 -0500, you wrote: > > > > Dont implement this. I dont like CP, but once you start down the > > slippery slope, there's no going back. > > > > my $.02 > > Exactly my point! > > As a matter of fact, How about implementing something very much > the reverse? > > Make censorship of ANY kind as close to impossible as can be > managed. That has always been the intention. You will have read my mail explaining that what I suggested is impossible without an unacceptable security risk from keeping extra records? > The same goes for ANY kind of ability to trace back to the > insertion point or identify an author (excepting of course any > clues or slipups on the author / inserter's part, that's their > responsibility) > > and then make sure that freenet will work if the connections to > and from it are piped through an anonymizing proxy such as TOR. That is considerably more difficult. Sure you can find a public node and use that via Tor (which by the way is centralized and therefore vulnerable), but that's about the limit. You could hide an entire node behind a fake address provided by Tor or I2P, but this would make it extremely slow (and therefore not used by other nodes much, on any routing algorithm that takes performance into account). -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 08:58:13PM -0500, OverlordQ wrote: Dont implement this. I dont like CP, but once you start down the slippery slope, there's no going back. Why? Why is censorship by the (overwhelming) majority a bad thing? my $.02 Because it's all too subjective on what is 'acceptable content' and what isn't. If you want a network to trace people and what they insert, go ahead and do it, fork freenet. ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: RIPEMD160 On Tue, 12 Jul 2005 20:58:13 -0500, you wrote: > > Dont implement this. I dont like CP, but once you start down the > slippery slope, there's no going back. > > my $.02 Exactly my point! As a matter of fact, How about implementing something very much the reverse? Make censorship of ANY kind as close to impossible as can be managed. The same goes for ANY kind of ability to trace back to the insertion point or identify an author (excepting of course any clues or slipups on the author / inserter's part, that's their responsibility) and then make sure that freenet will work if the connections to and from it are piped through an anonymizing proxy such as TOR. - -- My gpg public key (0x92769D7E) can be found on my freesite: http://127.00.1:/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/mytwoce nts/23//m2ckey.html (you must be running freenet for this link to work) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.44 iD8DBQFC1VByz+9G5ZJ2nX4RA8HCAKDKkYNoGij+L8Y2ZWat32xjJ6wZaQCcDdRI VPG0KCQp7AXspf8JGdPgXuc= =QDzM -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 05:46:59PM +0100, Ian Clarke wrote: > On 13 Jul 2005, at 17:14, Matthew Toseland wrote: > >On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 04:27:31PM +0100, Ian Clarke wrote: > > > >>I'm not getting sucked into this, mainly because I share Matthew > >>Exon's position on this and he is doing a pretty good job of > >>defending it. Censorship by majority is just as bad as censorship by > >>your government, if not worse in many cases. > >> > >>Toad, if you lived in Iran just how far do you think you would get > >>sharing information about Christianity if you could be censored by > >>those around you? Is that the kind of Freenet we want to create? It > >>certainly isn't the kind of Freenet I have been working towards for > >>the last 6 or 7 years... > >> > > > >Then go to another darknet. > > The whole point of this is that there is only one darknet, a global > one where everyone is (indirectly) connected to everyone else, so > there is no "other" darknet. Given other social networks, e.g. PGP WoT, it's likely there will be fragmentary darknets. But certainly there will be one very big darknet that a lot of nodes are on. I can see that there are network effects that would make it helpful to have a single darknet. > > >Anyway there are technical issues preventing this, namely the need to > >keep records of inserts (which would obviously be very useful to > >attackers who can bust nodes). > > Good, although I would rather the discussion ended for the right > reason (ie. the idea is fundamentally contrary to Freenet's goals), > rather than a technicality. It's a pretty fundamental technicality. As far as goals go - maybe. I'll bounce you an interesting mail from Matt. > > Ian. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 13 Jul 2005, at 17:14, Matthew Toseland wrote: On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 04:27:31PM +0100, Ian Clarke wrote: I'm not getting sucked into this, mainly because I share Matthew Exon's position on this and he is doing a pretty good job of defending it. Censorship by majority is just as bad as censorship by your government, if not worse in many cases. Toad, if you lived in Iran just how far do you think you would get sharing information about Christianity if you could be censored by those around you? Is that the kind of Freenet we want to create? It certainly isn't the kind of Freenet I have been working towards for the last 6 or 7 years... Then go to another darknet. The whole point of this is that there is only one darknet, a global one where everyone is (indirectly) connected to everyone else, so there is no "other" darknet. Anyway there are technical issues preventing this, namely the need to keep records of inserts (which would obviously be very useful to attackers who can bust nodes). Good, although I would rather the discussion ended for the right reason (ie. the idea is fundamentally contrary to Freenet's goals), rather than a technicality. Ian. ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 04:27:31PM +0100, Ian Clarke wrote: > I'm not getting sucked into this, mainly because I share Matthew > Exon's position on this and he is doing a pretty good job of > defending it. Censorship by majority is just as bad as censorship by > your government, if not worse in many cases. > > Toad, if you lived in Iran just how far do you think you would get > sharing information about Christianity if you could be censored by > those around you? Is that the kind of Freenet we want to create? It > certainly isn't the kind of Freenet I have been working towards for > the last 6 or 7 years... Then go to another darknet. Anyway there are technical issues preventing this, namely the need to keep records of inserts (which would obviously be very useful to attackers who can bust nodes). > > Ian. > > On 13 Jul 2005, at 14:48, Matthew Exon wrote: > > >Matthew Toseland wrote: > > > >>On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 02:01:15PM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: > >> > > > > > >>>Why do I, or Chinese christians, care whether the content is > >>>being distributed openly or secretly? It's still being > >>>distributed, right? It's entirely possible that Al Qaeda are > >>>swapping jokes about the London Underground through my node right > >>>now. The fact that it's invisible to me doesn't make me any > >>>happier about it. > >>> > >>It would be distributed primarily on paedophile only darknets. And > >>although SOME might be distributed on the open-ish darknets, they > >>could > >>not be used for recruitment. It would be a MAJOR improvement on the > >>current situation. > >> > > > >So it's a reduction in the volume of bad stuff, not a complete > >solution. I can buy this argument, but I'm not sure it's going to > >convince very many people. You guess that you reduced the problem > >by 90%, but the problem was unmeasurable both before and after, so > >what can you really promise to these people? Only that you're > >pretty certain you haven't solved the problem completely. > > > > > >>>I thought you were trying to set it up so that porn can be traded > >>>as easily as now, but that I could still ensure that no porn > >>>passes through my node. So I'd have a clear conscience, without > >>>anyone being cut off from the data they want. In theory. In > >>>practice, it looks like it won't work out so neatly. > >>> > >>No, that would be pointless. > >>I want to set up a system whereby a darknet can have its own > >>standards > >>for content, which are determined democratically. If paedophiles > >>aren't > >>welcome, they have to go elsewhere. They may be able to set up > >>their own > >>network, but the main network wouldn't be helping them, and obviously > >>it'd be a smaller network (and not usable for recruiting). > >> > > > >OK. This is a philosophical disagreement. I'd go so far as to say > >I'd rather have the government censoring my communications than a > >simple majority of freenetters. At least with the government, mob > >rule is moderated somewhat by courts and constitutions. To really > >climb onto the soapbox for a bit, democracy is horribly overrated: > >the real source of freedom in our society is the humanist > >philosophical underpinnings of a legal system built from the > >experience of hundreds of years. Democracy is an important piece of > >the machine, without which it doesn't work very well, but democracy > >on its own isn't much better than nothing. I'm not ready to submit > >to the tyranny of the majority yet. > > > > > >>>As an aside, I wouldn't put too much faith in Chinese christians > >>>spending a lot of time worrying about child porn. I'm sure > >>>they're not in favour of it, but it's just not the hot-button > >>>issue that it is in the West. Porn in general, maybe, but > >>>probably not enough to stop them joining the students' porntastic > >>>darknet. > >>> > >>Well it's certainly a big deal in the West. And the future of > >>democracy > >>in the West is by no means assured. > >> > > > >Democracy isn't looking particularly healthy in the USA right now, > >but comparing it to China or Burma would be a gross exaggeration. > >If Americans struggling against oppression in the US are too > >worried about the possibility of child porn to use Freenet, > >frankly, screw 'em. They can use bittorrent. I'm less than > >convinced that those worries would stop Chinese christians or > >democracy activists, and they're a far bigger concern for me. > > > > > >>>Tibetans would be free to set up their own darknet within Tibet, > >>>but what's the point if they can't smuggle footage of human > >>>rights abuses out to Amnesty International? And the new darknet > >>>would be such a tempting target for the Chinese government; much > >>>more so than a million students who, at the end of the day, much > >>>of the government regards as pretty harmless. > >>> > >>So harmless that they murder
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
I'm not getting sucked into this, mainly because I share Matthew Exon's position on this and he is doing a pretty good job of defending it. Censorship by majority is just as bad as censorship by your government, if not worse in many cases. Toad, if you lived in Iran just how far do you think you would get sharing information about Christianity if you could be censored by those around you? Is that the kind of Freenet we want to create? It certainly isn't the kind of Freenet I have been working towards for the last 6 or 7 years... Ian. On 13 Jul 2005, at 14:48, Matthew Exon wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 02:01:15PM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: Why do I, or Chinese christians, care whether the content is being distributed openly or secretly? It's still being distributed, right? It's entirely possible that Al Qaeda are swapping jokes about the London Underground through my node right now. The fact that it's invisible to me doesn't make me any happier about it. It would be distributed primarily on paedophile only darknets. And although SOME might be distributed on the open-ish darknets, they could not be used for recruitment. It would be a MAJOR improvement on the current situation. So it's a reduction in the volume of bad stuff, not a complete solution. I can buy this argument, but I'm not sure it's going to convince very many people. You guess that you reduced the problem by 90%, but the problem was unmeasurable both before and after, so what can you really promise to these people? Only that you're pretty certain you haven't solved the problem completely. I thought you were trying to set it up so that porn can be traded as easily as now, but that I could still ensure that no porn passes through my node. So I'd have a clear conscience, without anyone being cut off from the data they want. In theory. In practice, it looks like it won't work out so neatly. No, that would be pointless. I want to set up a system whereby a darknet can have its own standards for content, which are determined democratically. If paedophiles aren't welcome, they have to go elsewhere. They may be able to set up their own network, but the main network wouldn't be helping them, and obviously it'd be a smaller network (and not usable for recruiting). OK. This is a philosophical disagreement. I'd go so far as to say I'd rather have the government censoring my communications than a simple majority of freenetters. At least with the government, mob rule is moderated somewhat by courts and constitutions. To really climb onto the soapbox for a bit, democracy is horribly overrated: the real source of freedom in our society is the humanist philosophical underpinnings of a legal system built from the experience of hundreds of years. Democracy is an important piece of the machine, without which it doesn't work very well, but democracy on its own isn't much better than nothing. I'm not ready to submit to the tyranny of the majority yet. As an aside, I wouldn't put too much faith in Chinese christians spending a lot of time worrying about child porn. I'm sure they're not in favour of it, but it's just not the hot-button issue that it is in the West. Porn in general, maybe, but probably not enough to stop them joining the students' porntastic darknet. Well it's certainly a big deal in the West. And the future of democracy in the West is by no means assured. Democracy isn't looking particularly healthy in the USA right now, but comparing it to China or Burma would be a gross exaggeration. If Americans struggling against oppression in the US are too worried about the possibility of child porn to use Freenet, frankly, screw 'em. They can use bittorrent. I'm less than convinced that those worries would stop Chinese christians or democracy activists, and they're a far bigger concern for me. Tibetans would be free to set up their own darknet within Tibet, but what's the point if they can't smuggle footage of human rights abuses out to Amnesty International? And the new darknet would be such a tempting target for the Chinese government; much more so than a million students who, at the end of the day, much of the government regards as pretty harmless. So harmless that they murdered 2000 of them in 1991. Obviously I don't want to get backed into the position of seeming to minimise the horror of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and I don't want arguments about that to get in the way of my arguments about the accessibility of Freenet. But there's no comparison between the level of oppression in the west and in the east of China today. And I stand by my comment that much of the government regards the pro-democracy movement as pretty harmless. The military doesn't, because they fear being locked up for what they did in 1991; but any move to round up studen
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 03:48:13PM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 02:01:15PM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: > > >>Why do I, or Chinese christians, care whether the content is being > >>distributed openly or secretly? It's still being distributed, right? > >>It's entirely possible that Al Qaeda are swapping jokes about the London > >>Underground through my node right now. The fact that it's invisible to > >>me doesn't make me any happier about it. > > > > > >It would be distributed primarily on paedophile only darknets. And > >although SOME might be distributed on the open-ish darknets, they could > >not be used for recruitment. It would be a MAJOR improvement on the > >current situation. > > So it's a reduction in the volume of bad stuff, not a complete solution. > I can buy this argument, but I'm not sure it's going to convince very > many people. You guess that you reduced the problem by 90%, but the > problem was unmeasurable both before and after, so what can you really > promise to these people? Only that you're pretty certain you haven't > solved the problem completely. Largely solved. You won't run into it on the web interface, even if you go looking for it. Nor can they use the open network as a meeting point by posting stuff on it. > > >>I thought you were trying to set it up so that porn can be traded as > >>easily as now, but that I could still ensure that no porn passes through > >>my node. So I'd have a clear conscience, without anyone being cut off > >>from the data they want. In theory. In practice, it looks like it > >>won't work out so neatly. > > > > > >No, that would be pointless. > > > >I want to set up a system whereby a darknet can have its own standards > >for content, which are determined democratically. If paedophiles aren't > >welcome, they have to go elsewhere. They may be able to set up their own > >network, but the main network wouldn't be helping them, and obviously > >it'd be a smaller network (and not usable for recruiting). > > OK. This is a philosophical disagreement. I'd go so far as to say I'd > rather have the government censoring my communications than a simple > majority of freenetters. At least with the government, mob rule is > moderated somewhat by courts and constitutions. To really climb onto > the soapbox for a bit, democracy is horribly overrated: the real source > of freedom in our society is the humanist philosophical underpinnings of > a legal system built from the experience of hundreds of years. > Democracy is an important piece of the machine, without which it doesn't > work very well, but democracy on its own isn't much better than nothing. > I'm not ready to submit to the tyranny of the majority yet. > > >>As an aside, I wouldn't put too much faith in Chinese christians > >>spending a lot of time worrying about child porn. I'm sure they're not > >>in favour of it, but it's just not the hot-button issue that it is in > >>the West. Porn in general, maybe, but probably not enough to stop them > >>joining the students' porntastic darknet. > > > > > >Well it's certainly a big deal in the West. And the future of democracy > >in the West is by no means assured. > > Democracy isn't looking particularly healthy in the USA right now, but > comparing it to China or Burma would be a gross exaggeration. If > Americans struggling against oppression in the US are too worried about > the possibility of child porn to use Freenet, frankly, screw 'em. They > can use bittorrent. I'm less than convinced that those worries would > stop Chinese christians or democracy activists, and they're a far bigger > concern for me. Why do Chinese christians not care about child porn, then? > > >>Tibetans would be free to set up their own darknet within Tibet, but > >>what's the point if they can't smuggle footage of human rights abuses > >>out to Amnesty International? And the new darknet would be such a > >>tempting target for the Chinese government; much more so than a million > >>students who, at the end of the day, much of the government regards as > >>pretty harmless. > > > > > >So harmless that they murdered 2000 of them in 1991. > > Obviously I don't want to get backed into the position of seeming to > minimise the horror of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and I don't want > arguments about that to get in the way of my arguments about the > accessibility of Freenet. But there's no comparison between the level > of oppression in the west and in the east of China today. And I stand > by my comment that much of the government regards the pro-democracy > movement as pretty harmless. The military doesn't, because they fear > being locked up for what they did in 1991; but any move to round up > students wholesale and throw away the key is going to be tough to get > through the Politburo as it stands now. More because the students > aren't the threat they were in 1
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 02:01:15PM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: Why do I, or Chinese christians, care whether the content is being distributed openly or secretly? It's still being distributed, right? It's entirely possible that Al Qaeda are swapping jokes about the London Underground through my node right now. The fact that it's invisible to me doesn't make me any happier about it. It would be distributed primarily on paedophile only darknets. And although SOME might be distributed on the open-ish darknets, they could not be used for recruitment. It would be a MAJOR improvement on the current situation. So it's a reduction in the volume of bad stuff, not a complete solution. I can buy this argument, but I'm not sure it's going to convince very many people. You guess that you reduced the problem by 90%, but the problem was unmeasurable both before and after, so what can you really promise to these people? Only that you're pretty certain you haven't solved the problem completely. I thought you were trying to set it up so that porn can be traded as easily as now, but that I could still ensure that no porn passes through my node. So I'd have a clear conscience, without anyone being cut off from the data they want. In theory. In practice, it looks like it won't work out so neatly. No, that would be pointless. I want to set up a system whereby a darknet can have its own standards for content, which are determined democratically. If paedophiles aren't welcome, they have to go elsewhere. They may be able to set up their own network, but the main network wouldn't be helping them, and obviously it'd be a smaller network (and not usable for recruiting). OK. This is a philosophical disagreement. I'd go so far as to say I'd rather have the government censoring my communications than a simple majority of freenetters. At least with the government, mob rule is moderated somewhat by courts and constitutions. To really climb onto the soapbox for a bit, democracy is horribly overrated: the real source of freedom in our society is the humanist philosophical underpinnings of a legal system built from the experience of hundreds of years. Democracy is an important piece of the machine, without which it doesn't work very well, but democracy on its own isn't much better than nothing. I'm not ready to submit to the tyranny of the majority yet. As an aside, I wouldn't put too much faith in Chinese christians spending a lot of time worrying about child porn. I'm sure they're not in favour of it, but it's just not the hot-button issue that it is in the West. Porn in general, maybe, but probably not enough to stop them joining the students' porntastic darknet. Well it's certainly a big deal in the West. And the future of democracy in the West is by no means assured. Democracy isn't looking particularly healthy in the USA right now, but comparing it to China or Burma would be a gross exaggeration. If Americans struggling against oppression in the US are too worried about the possibility of child porn to use Freenet, frankly, screw 'em. They can use bittorrent. I'm less than convinced that those worries would stop Chinese christians or democracy activists, and they're a far bigger concern for me. Tibetans would be free to set up their own darknet within Tibet, but what's the point if they can't smuggle footage of human rights abuses out to Amnesty International? And the new darknet would be such a tempting target for the Chinese government; much more so than a million students who, at the end of the day, much of the government regards as pretty harmless. So harmless that they murdered 2000 of them in 1991. Obviously I don't want to get backed into the position of seeming to minimise the horror of the Tiananmen Square massacre, and I don't want arguments about that to get in the way of my arguments about the accessibility of Freenet. But there's no comparison between the level of oppression in the west and in the east of China today. And I stand by my comment that much of the government regards the pro-democracy movement as pretty harmless. The military doesn't, because they fear being locked up for what they did in 1991; but any move to round up students wholesale and throw away the key is going to be tough to get through the Politburo as it stands now. More because the students aren't the threat they were in 1991 than because China has liberalised, unfortunately. Tibetan and Uyghur activists, on the other hand, are still considered very much a threat. Their need for a link to the rest of the world is more important than the problems democracy activists and christians have with Freenet, much as I sympathise with all of them. And they really are far more likely to be hunted down and disappeared, so their security has to be protected more carefully. To generalise: the weaker the minority the more important
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 02:01:15PM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: > > > >No, we're not. We know for example that child porn is not being *openly* > >distributed. And this is for a very broad definition of open. On IIP I > >knew a certain channel where you could obtain keys for such filth; on a > >network like the one proposed it would be easy to find it, and then > >complain about it. > > Why do I, or Chinese christians, care whether the content is being > distributed openly or secretly? It's still being distributed, right? > It's entirely possible that Al Qaeda are swapping jokes about the London > Underground through my node right now. The fact that it's invisible to > me doesn't make me any happier about it. It would be distributed primarily on paedophile only darknets. And although SOME might be distributed on the open-ish darknets, they could not be used for recruitment. It would be a MAJOR improvement on the current situation. > > >>Yes and no. The scenario I was thinking of is the agent provocateur. > >>Guy I meet down the pub offers to bring me into a darknet, but of course > >>he's actually a cop. If it's a general darknet without any particular > >>focus, no-one can know for sure that I set out to find dead chicken > >>porn. But if I specifically needed a dead chicken porn darknet, then > >>this would have come up somehow when I was talking to the cop, so it's > >>rather more serious. It still seems like trying to find dead chicken > >>porn is going to be far riskier with the censorship system in place than > >>without it. > > > > > >If you only have one connection onto the darknet, you're screwed in any > >case. Same applies if you got several connections all from him. > > But in an agent provocateur scenario, only one of my contacts has to be > a cop. If you're telling me I need to get several connections, that > only makes my chances of one of them being a sting operation so much higher. > > >>What I mean by discriminating against is, where does this lie on a > >>continuum from "has no effect on" to "making it more difficult" to > >>"making it impossible"? Ideally, it wouldn't be any harder to find > >>minority material than to find majority material. > > > > > >In which case the system would be ineffective, and there would be no > >point. > > Ah, in that case I think I've been misinterpreting your emails. You > talk about "would have to set up their own darknet" as if that's no big > deal. That is, you're not forbidding content, just moving it around. > But if your goal really is to stop people distributing the stuff, that's > different. And no, when it comes to the particular minority material I > want to distribute (my explosive and controversial revelations that the > planet Jupiter is actually made of frogs), I don't want anyone censoring > me, not even a majority of Freenet users. > > I thought you were trying to set it up so that porn can be traded as > easily as now, but that I could still ensure that no porn passes through > my node. So I'd have a clear conscience, without anyone being cut off > from the data they want. In theory. In practice, it looks like it > won't work out so neatly. No, that would be pointless. I want to set up a system whereby a darknet can have its own standards for content, which are determined democratically. If paedophiles aren't welcome, they have to go elsewhere. They may be able to set up their own network, but the main network wouldn't be helping them, and obviously it'd be a smaller network (and not usable for recruiting). > > >>So the question is, how do we ensure that the Tibetan activists can > >>participate on Freenet without unnecessary fear of reprisal? Does the > >>censorship system put them at risk? I still don't know if it does or > >>not, but I certainly don't have a lot of faith in the view of the > >>majority, even the Freenet majority. > > > > > >Well, what is the alternative? Most of the pro-democracy people, and > >almost all of the oppressed churches, not able to use Freenet at all, > >because of the knowledge that their PCs will carry child porn if they > >do, and their objection to it along with most of the rest of humanity. > > The alternative is for pro-democracy students to have to make a choice > as to whether democracy is or is not more important than the integrity > of the Chinese nation. I believe many students would decide that > democracy is indeed more important. This would in turn mean that the > Tibetans can communicate with the rest of the world. Of course, these > are long-haired yobbo students. For christian priests it might come out > differently. > > It's a balancing act for all of us. Here, I'm giving a higher priority > to a small number of Tibetan bhuddists than a large number of Han > christians, but of course that's just one corner of the planet, and it's > not as if I live anywhere near the place. I don't think there's a > simple answer. We'
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: I meant primarily human bandwidth. It is more hassle to have two nodes, especially as you need people to connect to, and different voting rules. Ah. Yes, that's true. But getting access to the nice darknet should be pretty easy in comparison to getting access to the nasty darknet. I still find it hard to imagine someone only using the nasty one. It'd happen, but I don't think it would generate enough harmless traffic to camouflage the bad stuff. Fair enough. Am I right that plausible deniability for the nasty darknet is pretty much blown? Is this a big problem? I'm not sure that it is a big problem. It bothers me somewhat. Just for the record. OK, Al Qaeda just decided to do precisely that. So now I, as a nice darknet participant, have to live with the knowledge that I'm helping Al Qaeda plan their terrorist attacks. We're back where we started aren't we? No, we're not. We know for example that child porn is not being *openly* distributed. And this is for a very broad definition of open. On IIP I knew a certain channel where you could obtain keys for such filth; on a network like the one proposed it would be easy to find it, and then complain about it. Why do I, or Chinese christians, care whether the content is being distributed openly or secretly? It's still being distributed, right? It's entirely possible that Al Qaeda are swapping jokes about the London Underground through my node right now. The fact that it's invisible to me doesn't make me any happier about it. Yes and no. The scenario I was thinking of is the agent provocateur. Guy I meet down the pub offers to bring me into a darknet, but of course he's actually a cop. If it's a general darknet without any particular focus, no-one can know for sure that I set out to find dead chicken porn. But if I specifically needed a dead chicken porn darknet, then this would have come up somehow when I was talking to the cop, so it's rather more serious. It still seems like trying to find dead chicken porn is going to be far riskier with the censorship system in place than without it. If you only have one connection onto the darknet, you're screwed in any case. Same applies if you got several connections all from him. But in an agent provocateur scenario, only one of my contacts has to be a cop. If you're telling me I need to get several connections, that only makes my chances of one of them being a sting operation so much higher. What I mean by discriminating against is, where does this lie on a continuum from "has no effect on" to "making it more difficult" to "making it impossible"? Ideally, it wouldn't be any harder to find minority material than to find majority material. In which case the system would be ineffective, and there would be no point. Ah, in that case I think I've been misinterpreting your emails. You talk about "would have to set up their own darknet" as if that's no big deal. That is, you're not forbidding content, just moving it around. But if your goal really is to stop people distributing the stuff, that's different. And no, when it comes to the particular minority material I want to distribute (my explosive and controversial revelations that the planet Jupiter is actually made of frogs), I don't want anyone censoring me, not even a majority of Freenet users. I thought you were trying to set it up so that porn can be traded as easily as now, but that I could still ensure that no porn passes through my node. So I'd have a clear conscience, without anyone being cut off from the data they want. In theory. In practice, it looks like it won't work out so neatly. So the question is, how do we ensure that the Tibetan activists can participate on Freenet without unnecessary fear of reprisal? Does the censorship system put them at risk? I still don't know if it does or not, but I certainly don't have a lot of faith in the view of the majority, even the Freenet majority. Well, what is the alternative? Most of the pro-democracy people, and almost all of the oppressed churches, not able to use Freenet at all, because of the knowledge that their PCs will carry child porn if they do, and their objection to it along with most of the rest of humanity. The alternative is for pro-democracy students to have to make a choice as to whether democracy is or is not more important than the integrity of the Chinese nation. I believe many students would decide that democracy is indeed more important. This would in turn mean that the Tibetans can communicate with the rest of the world. Of course, these are long-haired yobbo students. For christian priests it might come out differently. It's a balancing act for all of us. Here, I'm giving a higher priority to a small number of Tibetan bhuddists than a large number of Han christians, but of course that's just one corner of the planet, and it's not as if I live anywhere near th
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 08:58:13PM -0500, OverlordQ wrote: > Dont implement this. I dont like CP, but once you start down the > slippery slope, there's no going back. Why? Why is censorship by the (overwhelming) majority a bad thing? > > my $.02 -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 08:21:10AM +0200, Tarapia Tapioco wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: RIPEMD160 > > On Tue, 12 Jul 2005 22:59:13 -0400, you wrote: > > > > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > /me renames Freenet PornNet. ;) > > >=20 > > > I have friends who rsync their porn. But I can see your point. Is this > > > an issue only for porn? What class of material is subject to this > > > consideration? Personally I avoid material that could be used to > > > blackmail me, traceable or not. > > > > And I have friends who watch porn in coed groups. I think they're > > weird, but then they probably say the same about my ex-poultry :) > > > > Other classes of material: anything that could be seen as incitement > > to revolt probably counts. The difference between rebels that history > > approves of vs condemns appears to be decided after the fact. Having > > Freenet be relevant to revolutions would be damaged by this, right?=20 > > And it seems entirely reasonable for me to want to anonymize my > > revolutionary plots by mixing them up with other people's searches for > > deceased fowls. > > > > Writings about drug use also come to mind, though these seem to be > > relatively accepted on the public internet. That probably isn't as > > true in, say, much of Asia, though. > > > > >=20 > > > Your privacy against local nodes is only an issue if your content is > > > voted down. > > > > If you're not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to fear. > > The problem with THAT kind of thinking is that over the course > of history, it has gotten a lot of people needlessly killed. > Don't forget the perfectly well meaning people who thought they > were being "Good German Citizens" by turning in Jews and those > who sympathized with and helped them. The poster was criticising me. He didn't mean what you seem to be reacting to. > > PLEASE! Keep Freenet Anonymous! > > Keep Freenet FREE! > > Keep Freenet UN-detectable and UN-Traceable Right now freenet is detectable. It's not especially traceable though. > > Perhaps next time it won't be Jews, maybe it will be some > perfectly reasonable person who just happens to have a > "Politically Incorrect" opinion, politics or religion. > > Mark my words, someday there WILL be another Dachau! The > question is, Will we sit by and be 'Good German Citizens', or > will we act in some way to help whoever's lined up at the ovens > next time? The ghost of Bergen Belsen looms on the horizon and > the blood of ten million Russian citizens almost all innocent > bystanders waits to see how we will handle OUR turn. > > May we Honor their sacrifice. How does this relate to my suggestion? -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 12:04:19PM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 10:33:59AM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: > > >>Now, eventually everyone's going to behave the same way. Everyone will > >>figure out that there's just no point posting star trek episodes to the > >>nasty darknet, since they'll always be more easily available on the nice > >>darknet. Result: the nasty darknet will have nothing but dead chicken > >>porn. There's no reason to post anything else there, and no-one will > >>ever download anything else from it. > > > > > >It is quite possible to manually migrate content between darknets (without > >being the content author, and without disrupting the linkage). > > Sure. But why would I do that? The only reason would be if I believed > that lots of people who aren't on the nice darknet would want to see it. > You're right that some people wouldn't participate in both networks > because of bandwidth constraints, but I can't help feeling that this > would be a fairly small number. There's no hard lower limit on how much > bandwidth you need, especially with the new version; so no matter how > little you have you can always share it. I meant primarily human bandwidth. It is more hassle to have two nodes, especially as you need people to connect to, and different voting rules. > > >>My question is: how secure is the nasty darknet now? It seems that much > >>of the security or plausible deniability of freenet stems from having a > >>good quantity of legitimate content alongside the punishable content. > >>But now the nasty darknet is 100% dead chicken porn. If the authorities > >>can demonstrate that I participated in that particular darknet at all, > >>I'm screwed. > > > >Hmmm. Plausible deniability, yes. Security, no. > > Fair enough. Am I right that plausible deniability for the nasty > darknet is pretty much blown? Is this a big problem? I'm not sure that it is a big problem. > > >>(Sure, I know that you're assuming freenet is illegal; but there's > >>illegal and then there's illegal. An Al Qaeda darknet will have a lot > >>more resources thrown at it, and a lot more rules bent, in order to > >>uncover all the participants than, say, an MP3 sharing network.) > > > > > >Al Qaeda could use the main darknet, and make sure nobody found their > >content. That is if they used freenet at all. This option is open to any > >sufficiently closed group, of course, but they are vulnerable to a > >disgruntled member (or a mistake). > > OK, Al Qaeda just decided to do precisely that. So now I, as a nice > darknet participant, have to live with the knowledge that I'm helping Al > Qaeda plan their terrorist attacks. We're back where we started aren't we? No, we're not. We know for example that child porn is not being *openly* distributed. And this is for a very broad definition of open. On IIP I knew a certain channel where you could obtain keys for such filth; on a network like the one proposed it would be easy to find it, and then complain about it. > > In other words, for the censorship system to make a difference, there > has to be an incentive not to *hide* content on darknets that don't want > it. It's not enough to just punish the posting of open content. No. Open publishing is an issue. And the more people that use a given block of content the more likely it is that we will hear of it. And Freenet is surely used by paedophiles to contact other paedophiles they were not yet in contact with, and even to entice people in. Some openness is essential for these people, if only for recruiting purposes. This is not the case for Al Qaeda, however, if the police came to us with absolute proof, we _could_ give them the poster, on a network that allowed IP addresses to be broadcast as an extreme sanction (but most networks probably wouldn't allow this as it is dangerous to the network itself). > > >>So it seems to me that any dead chicken porn fetishist reading this > >>discussion should be totally opposed, because it would leave him more > >>exposed. And the whole point of Freenet is to be there for persecuted > >>minorities, right? > > > > > >A small darknet may actually be safer in terms of its likelihood of > >exposure. If the state randomly searches people's computers, obviously > >you're in trouble no matter what. > > Yes and no. The scenario I was thinking of is the agent provocateur. > Guy I meet down the pub offers to bring me into a darknet, but of course > he's actually a cop. If it's a general darknet without any particular > focus, no-one can know for sure that I set out to find dead chicken > porn. But if I specifically needed a dead chicken porn darknet, then > this would have come up somehow when I was talking to the cop, so it's > rather more serious. It still seems like trying to find dead chicken > porn is going to be far riskier with the censorship system in place than > without it. If yo
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 10:33:59AM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: Now, eventually everyone's going to behave the same way. Everyone will figure out that there's just no point posting star trek episodes to the nasty darknet, since they'll always be more easily available on the nice darknet. Result: the nasty darknet will have nothing but dead chicken porn. There's no reason to post anything else there, and no-one will ever download anything else from it. It is quite possible to manually migrate content between darknets (without being the content author, and without disrupting the linkage). Sure. But why would I do that? The only reason would be if I believed that lots of people who aren't on the nice darknet would want to see it. You're right that some people wouldn't participate in both networks because of bandwidth constraints, but I can't help feeling that this would be a fairly small number. There's no hard lower limit on how much bandwidth you need, especially with the new version; so no matter how little you have you can always share it. My question is: how secure is the nasty darknet now? It seems that much of the security or plausible deniability of freenet stems from having a good quantity of legitimate content alongside the punishable content. But now the nasty darknet is 100% dead chicken porn. If the authorities can demonstrate that I participated in that particular darknet at all, I'm screwed. Hmmm. Plausible deniability, yes. Security, no. Fair enough. Am I right that plausible deniability for the nasty darknet is pretty much blown? Is this a big problem? (Sure, I know that you're assuming freenet is illegal; but there's illegal and then there's illegal. An Al Qaeda darknet will have a lot more resources thrown at it, and a lot more rules bent, in order to uncover all the participants than, say, an MP3 sharing network.) Al Qaeda could use the main darknet, and make sure nobody found their content. That is if they used freenet at all. This option is open to any sufficiently closed group, of course, but they are vulnerable to a disgruntled member (or a mistake). OK, Al Qaeda just decided to do precisely that. So now I, as a nice darknet participant, have to live with the knowledge that I'm helping Al Qaeda plan their terrorist attacks. We're back where we started aren't we? In other words, for the censorship system to make a difference, there has to be an incentive not to *hide* content on darknets that don't want it. It's not enough to just punish the posting of open content. So it seems to me that any dead chicken porn fetishist reading this discussion should be totally opposed, because it would leave him more exposed. And the whole point of Freenet is to be there for persecuted minorities, right? A small darknet may actually be safer in terms of its likelihood of exposure. If the state randomly searches people's computers, obviously you're in trouble no matter what. Yes and no. The scenario I was thinking of is the agent provocateur. Guy I meet down the pub offers to bring me into a darknet, but of course he's actually a cop. If it's a general darknet without any particular focus, no-one can know for sure that I set out to find dead chicken porn. But if I specifically needed a dead chicken porn darknet, then this would have come up somehow when I was talking to the cop, so it's rather more serious. It still seems like trying to find dead chicken porn is going to be far riskier with the censorship system in place than without it. Depends what you mean by discriminating against, I suppose. Minorities who the majority vehemently opposes would have to form their own darknets. When they try to join with the main darknets, they'd be expelled en bloc. What I mean by discriminating against is, where does this lie on a continuum from "has no effect on" to "making it more difficult" to "making it impossible"? Ideally, it wouldn't be any harder to find minority material than to find majority material. I doubt that even a censorable freenet would ever be so mainstream that what is mistakenly illegal in real life is always voted down - but if it is we can always build an alternative community. For purposes of this discussion, I think it's worth each of us assuming that we belong to the minority, not the majority. The majority really isn't the interesting bit of Freenet. To be specific: China. China has a pro-democracy movement. It might be illegal, but it's very popular, and very widespread, especially in the technology-rich East. Any Freenet community that gets built up in China is likely to be based around pro-democracy Han Chinese students and all their computers. Due to the great firewall of China, a strongly connected Chinese darknet would form, weakly connected to the rest of the world. (The firewall can't stop Freenet, but it sure as hell slows everything to a cra
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Evan Daniel wrote: It sounds to me like this has potential to enforce groupthink through network value effects. Please elaborate... The central large network is against some content. The fact that it is larger makes it much more valuable as a network. Therefore I am inclined to act in such a way as to stay on the big network. That means participating in and reinforcing any existing groupthink, right? And that positive feedback loop means there will be groupthink and that it will probably be strong and evident. In fact, I think this would go even further: the network would inevitably split not into "x not allowed"/"x allowed" darknets, but effectively into "x not allowed"/"ONLY x allowed" darknets. My reasoning: As Toad said, you can participate on more than one darknet simultaneously. If you can do that, why would you ever limit yourself to just one tiny darknet of dead chicken lovers? Of course you're going to be on both. So I'm on two darknets now; the nice darknet with no dead chicken fetishism and the nasty darknet where dead chicken fetishism is allowed. The nice darknet is 100 times bigger than the nasty darknet. If I want to download star trek episodes where do I go? The nice darknet; it'll be way faster. If I want to download dead chicken porn, I go to the nasty darknet. A little complicated, but overall I'm happy. Now, eventually everyone's going to behave the same way. Everyone will figure out that there's just no point posting star trek episodes to the nasty darknet, since they'll always be more easily available on the nice darknet. Result: the nasty darknet will have nothing but dead chicken porn. There's no reason to post anything else there, and no-one will ever download anything else from it. My question is: how secure is the nasty darknet now? It seems that much of the security or plausible deniability of freenet stems from having a good quantity of legitimate content alongside the punishable content. But now the nasty darknet is 100% dead chicken porn. If the authorities can demonstrate that I participated in that particular darknet at all, I'm screwed. (Sure, I know that you're assuming freenet is illegal; but there's illegal and then there's illegal. An Al Qaeda darknet will have a lot more resources thrown at it, and a lot more rules bent, in order to uncover all the participants than, say, an MP3 sharing network.) So it seems to me that any dead chicken porn fetishist reading this discussion should be totally opposed, because it would leave him more exposed. And the whole point of Freenet is to be there for persecuted minorities, right? I should say though, I think Toad is doing the right thing by thinking about this. He's absolutely right that many people who could and should benefit from Freenet will be turned off by the thought of who else they're helping. In fact, these are precisely the people (Tibetan independance activists, Burmese pro-democracy supporters, Iranian secularists) who deserve Freenet more than people who just swap MP3s or porn. If local censorship can be implemented without discriminating against minority opinions, I think it's worth pursuing. But I must admit I'd be rather more satisfied if the answer turned out to be "no, it's not possible after all; we're just going to have to learn to get along as one big disfunctional family". ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: RIPEMD160 On Tue, 12 Jul 2005 22:59:13 -0400, you wrote: > > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > /me renames Freenet PornNet. ;) > >=20 > > I have friends who rsync their porn. But I can see your point. Is this > > an issue only for porn? What class of material is subject to this > > consideration? Personally I avoid material that could be used to > > blackmail me, traceable or not. > > And I have friends who watch porn in coed groups. I think they're > weird, but then they probably say the same about my ex-poultry :) > > Other classes of material: anything that could be seen as incitement > to revolt probably counts. The difference between rebels that history > approves of vs condemns appears to be decided after the fact. Having > Freenet be relevant to revolutions would be damaged by this, right?=20 > And it seems entirely reasonable for me to want to anonymize my > revolutionary plots by mixing them up with other people's searches for > deceased fowls. > > Writings about drug use also come to mind, though these seem to be > relatively accepted on the public internet. That probably isn't as > true in, say, much of Asia, though. > > >=20 > > Your privacy against local nodes is only an issue if your content is > > voted down. > > If you're not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to fear. The problem with THAT kind of thinking is that over the course of history, it has gotten a lot of people needlessly killed. Don't forget the perfectly well meaning people who thought they were being "Good German Citizens" by turning in Jews and those who sympathized with and helped them. PLEASE! Keep Freenet Anonymous! Keep Freenet FREE! Keep Freenet UN-detectable and UN-Traceable Perhaps next time it won't be Jews, maybe it will be some perfectly reasonable person who just happens to have a "Politically Incorrect" opinion, politics or religion. Mark my words, someday there WILL be another Dachau! The question is, Will we sit by and be 'Good German Citizens', or will we act in some way to help whoever's lined up at the ovens next time? The ghost of Bergen Belsen looms on the horizon and the blood of ten million Russian citizens almost all innocent bystanders waits to see how we will handle OUR turn. May we Honor their sacrifice. - -- My gpg public key (0x92769D7E) can be found on my freesite: http://127.00.1:/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/mytwoce nts/23//m2ckey.html (you must be running freenet for this link to work) -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (MingW32) - GPGshell v3.44 iD8DBQFC1Jdfz+9G5ZJ2nX4RA+hwAKD3U8xRk0/qBOmHEZnLJ5bOnELCfgCeI60V avudAucJHLR2A2RlXrGH79Q= =Vym7 -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Dont implement this. I dont like CP, but once you start down the slippery slope, there's no going back. my $.02 ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Wed, Jul 13, 2005 at 10:33:59AM +0200, Matthew Exon wrote: > Evan Daniel wrote: > > >>>It sounds to me like this has potential > >>>to enforce groupthink through network value effects. > >> > >>Please elaborate... > > > > > >The central large network is against some content. The fact that it > >is larger makes it much more valuable as a network. Therefore I am > >inclined to act in such a way as to stay on the big network. That > >means participating in and reinforcing any existing groupthink, right? > > And that positive feedback loop means there will be groupthink and > >that it will probably be strong and evident. > > In fact, I think this would go even further: the network would > inevitably split not into "x not allowed"/"x allowed" darknets, but > effectively into "x not allowed"/"ONLY x allowed" darknets. Hrrm. > > My reasoning: > > As Toad said, you can participate on more than one darknet > simultaneously. If you can do that, why would you ever limit yourself > to just one tiny darknet of dead chicken lovers? Of course you're going > to be on both. So I'm on two darknets now; the nice darknet with no > dead chicken fetishism and the nasty darknet where dead chicken > fetishism is allowed. The nice darknet is 100 times bigger than the > nasty darknet. If I want to download star trek episodes where do I go? > The nice darknet; it'll be way faster. If I want to download dead > chicken porn, I go to the nasty darknet. A little complicated, but > overall I'm happy. Okay, this is reasonably rational. Except that many people would only be on one darknet, because of the bandwidth (human and computer) involved. > > Now, eventually everyone's going to behave the same way. Everyone will > figure out that there's just no point posting star trek episodes to the > nasty darknet, since they'll always be more easily available on the nice > darknet. Result: the nasty darknet will have nothing but dead chicken > porn. There's no reason to post anything else there, and no-one will > ever download anything else from it. It is quite possible to manually migrate content between darknets (without being the content author, and without disrupting the linkage). > > My question is: how secure is the nasty darknet now? It seems that much > of the security or plausible deniability of freenet stems from having a > good quantity of legitimate content alongside the punishable content. > But now the nasty darknet is 100% dead chicken porn. If the authorities > can demonstrate that I participated in that particular darknet at all, > I'm screwed. Hmmm. Plausible deniability, yes. Security, no. > > (Sure, I know that you're assuming freenet is illegal; but there's > illegal and then there's illegal. An Al Qaeda darknet will have a lot > more resources thrown at it, and a lot more rules bent, in order to > uncover all the participants than, say, an MP3 sharing network.) Al Qaeda could use the main darknet, and make sure nobody found their content. That is if they used freenet at all. This option is open to any sufficiently closed group, of course, but they are vulnerable to a disgruntled member (or a mistake). > So it seems to me that any dead chicken porn fetishist reading this > discussion should be totally opposed, because it would leave him more > exposed. And the whole point of Freenet is to be there for persecuted > minorities, right? A small darknet may actually be safer in terms of its likelihood of exposure. If the state randomly searches people's computers, obviously you're in trouble no matter what. > > I should say though, I think Toad is doing the right thing by thinking > about this. He's absolutely right that many people who could and should > benefit from Freenet will be turned off by the thought of who else > they're helping. In fact, these are precisely the people (Tibetan > independance activists, Burmese pro-democracy supporters, Iranian > secularists) And Chinese religious minorities, and more. > who deserve Freenet more than people who just swap MP3s or > porn. Yes, and right now most of them can't use it in a clear conscience because they are not either sufficiently cynical or sufficiently libertarian. > > If local censorship can be implemented without discriminating against > minority opinions, I think it's worth pursuing. Depends what you mean by discriminating against, I suppose. Minorities who the majority vehemently opposes would have to form their own darknets. When they try to join with the main darknets, they'd be expelled en bloc. I doubt that even a censorable freenet would ever be so mainstream that what is mistakenly illegal in real life is always voted down - but if it is we can always build an alternative community. > But I must admit I'd be > rather more satisfied if the answer turned out to be "no, it's not > possible after all; we're just going to have to learn to get along as > one big disfunctional family". One
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 11:10:08PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > When you say "part of more than one darknet," are you referring to > > > separate clusters within one large network, or entirely divorced > > > networks? > > > > Divorced networks. > > So, does that mean I have to run separate nodes, and participate in > different sets of groupthink manually? Isn't that asking a *lot*? > > Also, suppose I decline to vote on a particular item (or decline to > vote in general)? Does my node participate in the correlation attack? Your node will normally participate if the vote around that node is successful. Your vote is only one that your node would consider. Since votes are public, the network can determine whether your node is doing what it is supposed to be doing. This is "cost of doing business". You can refuse, but that would likely result in your node's expulsion. > If so, why on earth would I want it doing that? If not, don't you > need to get rather high involvement? Do I take the blame for the > objectionable content too in that case? If so, that seems likely to > produce truly rabid groupthink. If not, it seems unlikely to work. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > > > > > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > > > > > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > > > > > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > > > > > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > > > > > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > > > > > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > > > > > exacerbate the chilling effects? > > > > > > > > If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make > > > > you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet > > > > architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of > > > > themselves. > > > > > > If I'm running an illegal freenet node, that means I'm willing to risk > > > the chance of being prosecuted for one count of whatever crime they > > > make it. It doesn't mean I'm also willing to risk prosecution for 238 > > > counts of knowingly allowing my computer to transmit child porn. As > > > best I can tell, the law is reasonably tolerant of "I did everything I > > > could reasonably be expected to do" as a defense. If the network is > > > such that I can't easily do anything about child porn, and there's no > > > evidence I personally looked at or posted it, then I'm at least > > > somewhat optimistic about avoiding prosecution. If I actively failed > > > > Really? If there is primary legislation making it a crime to run a node, > > that will presumably make it far easier to convict you of related crimes.. > > Why should it? In many cases the legal system is more sane than that. > If I'm pulled over for speeding, that doesn't make it much easier for > them to find the body in the trunk. And if it turns out I'm driving a > stolen car, and the body was in there without my knowledge, they're > likely to have to find additional evidence to accuse me of murder > instead of just grand theft auto. How is this legally different? > (I'm sure there's something illegal about being in possession of the > body, but I'd be really surprised if you could convict for murder on > just that without showing eg motive). Well, if you accidentally kill someone during a robbery, you'll usually go down for murder in most states; that's all I was thinking of. > > Evan -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:59:13PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > /me renames Freenet PornNet. ;) > > > > I have friends who rsync their porn. But I can see your point. Is this > > an issue only for porn? What class of material is subject to this > > consideration? Personally I avoid material that could be used to > > blackmail me, traceable or not. > > And I have friends who watch porn in coed groups. I think they're > weird, but then they probably say the same about my ex-poultry :) Co-ed groups? > Other classes of material: anything that could be seen as incitement > to revolt probably counts. The difference between rebels that history > approves of vs condemns appears to be decided after the fact. Having > Freenet be relevant to revolutions would be damaged by this, right? So if you are trying to start a revolution, and the network as a whole disapproves, you don't want that fact to be revealed to your "friends". > And it seems entirely reasonable for me to want to anonymize my > revolutionary plots by mixing them up with other people's searches for > deceased fowls. > > Writings about drug use also come to mind, though these seem to be > relatively accepted on the public internet. That probably isn't as > true in, say, much of Asia, though. > > > > > Your privacy against local nodes is only an issue if your content is > > voted down. > > If you're not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to fear. Hah. > > Evan Daniel -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > When you say "part of more than one darknet," are you referring to > > separate clusters within one large network, or entirely divorced > > networks? > > Divorced networks. So, does that mean I have to run separate nodes, and participate in different sets of groupthink manually? Isn't that asking a *lot*? Also, suppose I decline to vote on a particular item (or decline to vote in general)? Does my node participate in the correlation attack? If so, why on earth would I want it doing that? If not, don't you need to get rather high involvement? Do I take the blame for the objectionable content too in that case? If so, that seems likely to produce truly rabid groupthink. If not, it seems unlikely to work. > > > > > > > > > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > > > > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > > > > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > > > > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > > > > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > > > > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > > > > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > > > > exacerbate the chilling effects? > > > > > > If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make > > > you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet > > > architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of > > > themselves. > > > > If I'm running an illegal freenet node, that means I'm willing to risk > > the chance of being prosecuted for one count of whatever crime they > > make it. It doesn't mean I'm also willing to risk prosecution for 238 > > counts of knowingly allowing my computer to transmit child porn. As > > best I can tell, the law is reasonably tolerant of "I did everything I > > could reasonably be expected to do" as a defense. If the network is > > such that I can't easily do anything about child porn, and there's no > > evidence I personally looked at or posted it, then I'm at least > > somewhat optimistic about avoiding prosecution. If I actively failed > > Really? If there is primary legislation making it a crime to run a node, > that will presumably make it far easier to convict you of related crimes.. Why should it? In many cases the legal system is more sane than that. If I'm pulled over for speeding, that doesn't make it much easier for them to find the body in the trunk. And if it turns out I'm driving a stolen car, and the body was in there without my knowledge, they're likely to have to find additional evidence to accuse me of murder instead of just grand theft auto. How is this legally different? (I'm sure there's something illegal about being in possession of the body, but I'd be really surprised if you could convict for murder on just that without showing eg motive). Evan ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > /me renames Freenet PornNet. ;) > > I have friends who rsync their porn. But I can see your point. Is this > an issue only for porn? What class of material is subject to this > consideration? Personally I avoid material that could be used to > blackmail me, traceable or not. And I have friends who watch porn in coed groups. I think they're weird, but then they probably say the same about my ex-poultry :) Other classes of material: anything that could be seen as incitement to revolt probably counts. The difference between rebels that history approves of vs condemns appears to be decided after the fact. Having Freenet be relevant to revolutions would be damaged by this, right? And it seems entirely reasonable for me to want to anonymize my revolutionary plots by mixing them up with other people's searches for deceased fowls. Writings about drug use also come to mind, though these seem to be relatively accepted on the public internet. That probably isn't as true in, say, much of Asia, though. > > Your privacy against local nodes is only an issue if your content is > voted down. If you're not doing anything wrong, you have nothing to fear. Evan Daniel ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:19:21PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the varrious possible roles in this scheme? Hmm, I'm not sure exactly what you mean... you suggesting a detailed hypothetical? Yes if we are going to seriously consider this, we should try to describe it as accurately as possible: A posts content offensive to B under SSK "A's site" A's peers are A1, A2, A3. After Pre-mix A is known as Z and has connections with Z1, Z2, Z3. B sees it *somehow* and does not like it. B's peers are B1, B2, B3. After Pre-mix B is known as Y and has connections with Y1, Y2, Y3. "A's site" was inserted through "()" represents tunnel: (A1, A3, L7) Z1, H5, R6, L4, S2, S1 "A's site" is known to be stored on: S1 who has peers: S2, S3, S4 B's request path was "()" represents tunnel: (B2) Y1, H2, R4, S3, S1 Given that: Some nodes are offended by everything. Some nodes are offended by nothing. Some nodes never bother to check. Some nodes are unattended. Can you give the ensuing operations on the network, describing each hop and what is involved? Then can we try to make a formulas for: bandwidth consumed, hops required, number of people viewing A's site, how many replicas of the content are made in this process, the amount of storage required, the upper bound of using this as a DNS mechanism, the effectiveness of using this as a "goatse troll" style attack on the network, the upper bound on the effectiveness of using this with colluding cancer nodes to find the identity of: A, B, and S, and when it is all said and done the probability that A's site will actually be brought down? ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 03:19:21PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, > >as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node > >would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them > >(including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected > >nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to > >be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would > >probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some > >extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective > >is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is > >part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them > >(either all connections or premix connections). > > > > > I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion > given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be > local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, > was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the > varrious possible roles in this scheme? Hmm, I'm not sure exactly what you mean... you suggesting a detailed hypothetical? -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 02:41:54PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the problem? Suppose 5% of people want to talk about something 50% find it offencive and 45% don't care? Odds are not every person in that 5% is connected to everyone else in that 5% without going through someone in the 50%! And even if they can through those in the 45%, this clearly implies the network cannot split. So how will routing work for each of these three groups? The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). I was assuming that there would be enough vairation in local oppinion given that the groups are connected by aquantinces that there would be local pockets of variation of oppinion. However what I was getting at, was could go through a real usecase that takes into account all the varrious possible roles in this scheme? ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 02:41:54PM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > >On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > > > > > >>Matthew Toseland wrote: > >> > >>>Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the > >>>expected result is that the minority would sever links with the > >>>invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority > >>>would oppose the motion. > >>> > >>And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, > >>how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't > >>trust most people.) > >> > >Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a > >contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the > >problem? > > > > > Suppose 5% of people want to talk about something 50% find it offencive > and 45% don't care? Odds are not every person in that 5% is connected to > everyone else in that 5% without going through someone in the 50%! And > even if they can through those in the 45%, this clearly implies the > network cannot split. So how will routing work for each of these three > groups? The network can't split. 50% isn't enough. You'd need a supermajority, as I have explained - AT EACH NODE. It's not a global vote. Each node would need 2/3rds of its connections to vote, and would need them (including a biased score from the first layer of indirectly connected nodes) to vote yes at say 2/3rds (supermajority depends on sanctions to be taken, but 2/3rds sounds reasonable to trace the author). We would probably have a large number of blocks to trace, so we could to some extent work around uncooperative bits of the network, but the objective is to find the node that posted the data, or the sub-network that it is part of. We can then either warn them, or sever connections with them (either all connections or premix connections). -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the problem? Suppose 5% of people want to talk about something 50% find it offencive and 45% don't care? Odds are not every person in that 5% is connected to everyone else in that 5% without going through someone in the 50%! And even if they can through those in the 45%, this clearly implies the network cannot split. So how will routing work for each of these three groups? ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 05:22:14PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > > > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > > > > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > > > > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > > > > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > > > > network splits into the two groups. > > > > > > Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority > > > keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with > > > many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an > > > "alternate" network? > > > > Yes... sometimes. Hopefully the subnetworks would already be connected > > when they join up - look at the PGP/GPG web of trust model; you get > > fragments, and the fragments tend to connect with one another. > > Maybe. PGP et al seem to have easier ways of path folding available > than a darknet would -- I don't normally object to identifying myself > and verifying keys with someone I only know marginally, but I do to > exchanging freenet contact info, particularly when people's online > freenet personas are divorced from their node operating personas. I > have no way to learn anything at all about the node operator from > within freenet, without risking my anonymity as a node operator. Certainly... Within the fragment there should already be a functional darknet, but enlarging it could be a problem. > > > > > > If that minority wishes to repair their network, > > > then they have to find each other through other, presumably more > > > vulnerable, channels, right? > > > > Probably, if they didn't have any existing connections. > > > > > It sounds to me like this has potential > > > to enforce groupthink through network value effects. > > > > Please elaborate... > > The central large network is against some content. The fact that it > is larger makes it much more valuable as a network. Therefore I am > inclined to act in such a way as to stay on the big network. That > means participating in and reinforcing any existing groupthink, right? > And that positive feedback loop means there will be groupthink and > that it will probably be strong and evident. Thank you for making that explicit. That's worth thinking about. > > > > > > > Also, there is a chilling effect even without outing nodes, right? > > > Suppose I find freenet valuable as a source of semi-acceptable > > > content, but am also considering "marginally" acceptable content. > > > Wouldn't I be tempted to self-censor out of fear of losing my good > > > connectivity? It seems to me that self-censorship to stay within > > > *percieved* limits is potentially even more limiting than those same > > > limits actually are. > > > > That may be a point. There's no reason you can't be part of more than > > one darknet, but certainly nodes would self-censor to avoid having > > enforcement procedures taken against them. > > When you say "part of more than one darknet," are you referring to > separate clusters within one large network, or entirely divorced > networks? Divorced networks. > > > > > > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > > > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > > > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > > > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > > > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > > > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > > > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > > > exacerbate the chilling effects? > > > > If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make > > you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet > > architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of > > themselves. > > If I'm running an illegal freenet node, that means I'm willing to risk > the chance of being prosecuted for one count of whatever crime they > make it. It doesn't mean I'm also willing to risk prosecution for 238 > counts of knowingly allowing my computer to transmit child porn. As > best I can tell, the law is reasonably tolerant of "I did everything I > could reasonably be expected to do" as a defense. If the network is > such that I can't easily do anything about child porn, and there's no > evidence I personally looked at or posted it, then I'm at least > somewhat optimistic about avoiding prosecution. If I actively failed Really? If there is primary legislation making it a crime to run a node, that will presumably make it far easier to convict you of related crimes.. > to vote against it through nor
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > > > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > > > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > > > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > > > network splits into the two groups. > > > > Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority > > keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with > > many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an > > "alternate" network? > > Yes... sometimes. Hopefully the subnetworks would already be connected > when they join up - look at the PGP/GPG web of trust model; you get > fragments, and the fragments tend to connect with one another. Maybe. PGP et al seem to have easier ways of path folding available than a darknet would -- I don't normally object to identifying myself and verifying keys with someone I only know marginally, but I do to exchanging freenet contact info, particularly when people's online freenet personas are divorced from their node operating personas. I have no way to learn anything at all about the node operator from within freenet, without risking my anonymity as a node operator. > > > If that minority wishes to repair their network, > > then they have to find each other through other, presumably more > > vulnerable, channels, right? > > Probably, if they didn't have any existing connections. > > > It sounds to me like this has potential > > to enforce groupthink through network value effects. > > Please elaborate... The central large network is against some content. The fact that it is larger makes it much more valuable as a network. Therefore I am inclined to act in such a way as to stay on the big network. That means participating in and reinforcing any existing groupthink, right? And that positive feedback loop means there will be groupthink and that it will probably be strong and evident. > > > > Also, there is a chilling effect even without outing nodes, right? > > Suppose I find freenet valuable as a source of semi-acceptable > > content, but am also considering "marginally" acceptable content. > > Wouldn't I be tempted to self-censor out of fear of losing my good > > connectivity? It seems to me that self-censorship to stay within > > *percieved* limits is potentially even more limiting than those same > > limits actually are. > > That may be a point. There's no reason you can't be part of more than > one darknet, but certainly nodes would self-censor to avoid having > enforcement procedures taken against them. When you say "part of more than one darknet," are you referring to separate clusters within one large network, or entirely divorced networks? > > > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > > exacerbate the chilling effects? > > If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make > you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet > architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of > themselves. If I'm running an illegal freenet node, that means I'm willing to risk the chance of being prosecuted for one count of whatever crime they make it. It doesn't mean I'm also willing to risk prosecution for 238 counts of knowingly allowing my computer to transmit child porn. As best I can tell, the law is reasonably tolerant of "I did everything I could reasonably be expected to do" as a defense. If the network is such that I can't easily do anything about child porn, and there's no evidence I personally looked at or posted it, then I'm at least somewhat optimistic about avoiding prosecution. If I actively failed to vote against it through normal software features, then I'm a lot less optimistic. > > > > I must say, I would be hesitant to use a censorship-enabled freenet. > > Small communities with the ability to censor can be very oppressive, > > and it seems entirely reasonable for me to want privacy from the same > > friends I am connected to, even though I mostly trust them. > > Well, you trust them enough to connect to them despite the fact that > Freenet is illegal in itself (in the given scenario). Beyond that, your > anonymity would only be blown (to them, not to others), if you posted > something objectionable
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > > network splits into the two groups. > > Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority > keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with > many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an Why would the subgroups be so small? It is likely that the larger network is built of medium sized darknets that have linked up... > "alternate" network? If that minority wishes to repair their network, > then they have to find each other through other, presumably more > vulnerable, channels, right? It sounds to me like this has potential > to enforce groupthink through network value effects. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 10:33:03AM -0700, Tom Kaitchuck wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > > >Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the > >expected result is that the minority would sever links with the > >invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority > >would oppose the motion. > > > > > And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, > how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't > trust most people.) Ummm, they'd still have their own connections, which make up a contiguous darknet built from knowing each other personally. What's the problem? -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:49:37PM -0400, Evan Daniel wrote: > On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > > network splits into the two groups. > > Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority > keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with > many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an > "alternate" network? Yes... sometimes. Hopefully the subnetworks would already be connected when they join up - look at the PGP/GPG web of trust model; you get fragments, and the fragments tend to connect with one another. > If that minority wishes to repair their network, > then they have to find each other through other, presumably more > vulnerable, channels, right? Probably, if they didn't have any existing connections. > It sounds to me like this has potential > to enforce groupthink through network value effects. Please elaborate... > > Also, there is a chilling effect even without outing nodes, right? > Suppose I find freenet valuable as a source of semi-acceptable > content, but am also considering "marginally" acceptable content. > Wouldn't I be tempted to self-censor out of fear of losing my good > connectivity? It seems to me that self-censorship to stay within > *percieved* limits is potentially even more limiting than those same > limits actually are. That may be a point. There's no reason you can't be part of more than one darknet, but certainly nodes would self-censor to avoid having enforcement procedures taken against them. > > And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal > things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on > libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking > for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself > liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a > convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to > create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus > exacerbate the chilling effects? If we don't provide such a mechanism, they will still find a way to make you liable for crimes conducted involving your node. The whole darknet architecture assumes nodes will eventually be illegal in and of themselves. > > I must say, I would be hesitant to use a censorship-enabled freenet. > Small communities with the ability to censor can be very oppressive, > and it seems entirely reasonable for me to want privacy from the same > friends I am connected to, even though I mostly trust them. Well, you trust them enough to connect to them despite the fact that Freenet is illegal in itself (in the given scenario). Beyond that, your anonymity would only be blown (to them, not to others), if you posted something objectionable and it could be traced back... > > Evan -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On 7/12/05, Matthew Toseland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are > not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node > deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some > influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the > network splits into the two groups. Doesn't this mean that in the normal course of events, the majority keeps the main contiguous network, while the minority ends up with many tiny islands (potentially only 1-2 nodes) instead of an "alternate" network? If that minority wishes to repair their network, then they have to find each other through other, presumably more vulnerable, channels, right? It sounds to me like this has potential to enforce groupthink through network value effects. Also, there is a chilling effect even without outing nodes, right? Suppose I find freenet valuable as a source of semi-acceptable content, but am also considering "marginally" acceptable content. Wouldn't I be tempted to self-censor out of fear of losing my good connectivity? It seems to me that self-censorship to stay within *percieved* limits is potentially even more limiting than those same limits actually are. And finally, let's suppose I use freenet for a variety of non-illegal things, and don't partake in local votes to censor content at all (on libertarian grounds). In the event the govt seizes my node looking for (nonexistent) illegal activities, aren't I likely to find myself liable for failing to vote correctly, since the network has provided a convenient method to do so? And isn't this threat also likely to create more negative voting than would otherwise occur, and thus exacerbate the chilling effects? I must say, I would be hesitant to use a censorship-enabled freenet. Small communities with the ability to censor can be very oppressive, and it seems entirely reasonable for me to want privacy from the same friends I am connected to, even though I mostly trust them. Evan ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: [freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:06:35PM -0400, Ken Snider wrote: Matthew Toseland wrote: - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of "groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no means to be. Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). Yes, but this community is a global one, and any belief that there is a "consensus" of morality in the global community is shortsighted and doomed to failure, *especially* because these communities overlap for other reasons, and as such, are likely to have overlapping trust relationships as well. You don't think there is a 95%+ consensus in the west on child porn being bad? No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. Yes, but your assumption suggests that the *majority* of Freenetters are good, like-minded individuals. The recent "Brazillian invasion" stories about Orkut are proof positive IMHO that a "darknet" (in the sense that it's invitation-only) can and has been overtaken by parties who do not share the viewpoints of the creators. Have you considered the possibility that, through co-ordinated effort, freenet gets inundated with people that *support* the very kinds of things you want to censor? Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. And go where? It is a darknet, they don't know each other personally, how can they connect? (especially given that they know they shouldn't trust most people.) ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Tue, Jul 12, 2005 at 12:06:35PM -0400, Ken Snider wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > >>- Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this > >>quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of > >>"groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to > >>quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely > >>unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in > >>those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined > >>by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for > >>the "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will > >>have no means to be. > > > >Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some > >level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although > >there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). > > Yes, but this community is a global one, and any belief that there is a > "consensus" of morality in the global community is shortsighted and doomed > to failure, *especially* because these communities overlap for other > reasons, and as such, are likely to have overlapping trust relationships as > well. You don't think there is a 95%+ consensus in the west on child porn being bad? > > >No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me > >are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. > > Yes, but your assumption suggests that the *majority* of Freenetters are > good, like-minded individuals. The recent "Brazillian invasion" stories > about Orkut are proof positive IMHO that a "darknet" (in the sense that > it's invitation-only) can and has been overtaken by parties who do not > share the viewpoints of the creators. Have you considered the possibility > that, through co-ordinated effort, freenet gets inundated with people that > *support* the very kinds of things you want to censor? Well, if the invaders start censoring stuff posted by the minority, the expected result is that the minority would sever links with the invaders - as a normal part of an upheld complaint, because the minority would oppose the motion. > > >I can't honestly see why any sane informed human being who isn't a > >scientologist wouldn't support the dissemination of the OT documents. > > You can't perhaps, but that doesn't mean that your viewpoints are a global > majority, either. > > Let me give you another example - what if the government of a large western > state became corrupt, and the "liberal" folk wanted to blow the whistle, > but the majority supporters of said government wanted to keep it covered > up? Would it not be trivially easy to do so if said majority was *also* a > majority in freenet? This would _ONLY_ happen if the network was not a darknet. If people will always vote for the government in the face of the facts, it is normally because they know they're likely to get beaten up if they don't. Which is based on the assumption that the government knows about their nodes and will punish them if they vote incorrectly. > > In fact, would that not apply in the general sense? That the majority views > would trump minority views anywhere on freenet, regardless of whether the > viewpoint was the "correct" one? If the majority is wrong, it will disaffiliate from the minority. We are not talking about global voting here, we are talking about each node deciding on the basis of adjacent, trusted nodes. Yes there is some influence as far as majorities go, but the likely scenario is that the network splits into the two groups. > > It would appear to me that voting can *only* work if you believe, without > exception, that the majority population is right 100% of the time. All you > have to do is look back to Germany during the WW to see that the majority > of a population *can* be convinced that morally reprehensible items are in > fact not so. > > >Sounds a fairly elitist argument. But lets say you're right. Why would > >people who would vote for political speech they disagree with to be > >censored even join the network? > > Because you're discounting people who may want to join the network for the > *express purpose* of censoring it. > > --Ken. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of "groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no means to be. Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). Yes, but this community is a global one, and any belief that there is a "consensus" of morality in the global community is shortsighted and doomed to failure, *especially* because these communities overlap for other reasons, and as such, are likely to have overlapping trust relationships as well. No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. Yes, but your assumption suggests that the *majority* of Freenetters are good, like-minded individuals. The recent "Brazillian invasion" stories about Orkut are proof positive IMHO that a "darknet" (in the sense that it's invitation-only) can and has been overtaken by parties who do not share the viewpoints of the creators. Have you considered the possibility that, through co-ordinated effort, freenet gets inundated with people that *support* the very kinds of things you want to censor? I can't honestly see why any sane informed human being who isn't a scientologist wouldn't support the dissemination of the OT documents. You can't perhaps, but that doesn't mean that your viewpoints are a global majority, either. Let me give you another example - what if the government of a large western state became corrupt, and the "liberal" folk wanted to blow the whistle, but the majority supporters of said government wanted to keep it covered up? Would it not be trivially easy to do so if said majority was *also* a majority in freenet? In fact, would that not apply in the general sense? That the majority views would trump minority views anywhere on freenet, regardless of whether the viewpoint was the "correct" one? It would appear to me that voting can *only* work if you believe, without exception, that the majority population is right 100% of the time. All you have to do is look back to Germany during the WW to see that the majority of a population *can* be convinced that morally reprehensible items are in fact not so. Sounds a fairly elitist argument. But lets say you're right. Why would people who would vote for political speech they disagree with to be censored even join the network? Because you're discounting people who may want to join the network for the *express purpose* of censoring it. --Ken. ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
Matthew Toseland wrote: Here's a really whacky idea I came up with on the train back from Strasbourg (please read the whole email before flaming me): *snip voting idea* not only do I think this won't work for philosophical reasons, but I think it underlines one of the most fundamental *weaknesses* of the Darknet. Let me explain: - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of "groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined by numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no means to be. Now, take this a step further. Lets assume for a moment a trust system similar to PGP, where a number of existing nodes/Toad's choices/known-good-nodes/etc become the "base" for the darknet - it's assumed that you will need to somehow gain the trust of these core people to join the darknet itself, which means, at some point, you'll be gaining the approval of the "person" behind the node, in some way. Now, in a global community where in some parts of the world things like same-sex marriage are a done deal, and in others it's a crime worthy of execution, for example, how do you propose to ensure you have an acceptable cross-section of "minds" behind the darknet? It's seems inevitable to me that the "prevailing winds" of the collective morals of this core group will go a long way to creating the prevailing moral authority for darknet, even *without* a voting system in place - since you're not likely to "trust" individuals with differing views from your own in most cases, and unless this "trust" mechanism is somehow disconnected from people (which would mean that a nefarious party would need only complete these machine requirements to enter the darknet, so is likely not to be the case). Now, add voting to the mix. Allow this set of "prevailing morals" to be *enforced* within freenet. This about guarantees, given the likely nature of trust, that the aggregate "morality" of the founding Darknet nodes would be preserved within freenet itself, since these founding nodes would have, through overt act or merely by likelihood-of-association, chosen like-minded trustees, who would vote as they do. You don't have to go to extremes like child-porn to see where this kind of thing could have real-world consequences. Just take a few minutes and look at the US mass media, even in the "land of the free" people are deeply, deeply divided over issues far more benign, some of which on religious grounds, some on moral, some on traditional grounds, some due to reasons I have not even personally considered. Do you honestly believe that your "trust-based" system will truly encompass even that diverse a set of thinkers, in one country, let alone the rest of the world, especially in cases where people may be far more polarized on certain topics? I see large cultural voting-bloc-type situations that, largely, will maintain the status quo. But that's the thing - the "status quo" is exactly, IMO, what the freenet should NOT be. You *want* the radical, free-thinking underbelly of the world to have somewhere to go where they can dissimate information that *may be* morally objectionable to large swaths of the populous, even the populous of freenet (think religious or cultural or political here - Tibet, scientology, women's rights, etc). What good will freenet be if someone who thinks "against" the prevailing beliefs of a region (but is otherwise "moral", for whatever that term can mean in this context) is simply "Voted down" by those within their own culture that may not agree? I think the voting would lead to almost a "constitutional" form of "group-morals" that may or may not actually *be* altruistic - I think you'd find human nature would lead to large groups of people voting down information objectionable to *them* on cultural or religious grounds, that, in the broader sense, should not be. I think this will be a darknet-wide problem in and of itself, mind you, but voting will likely make the problem all the more extreme. -- Ken Snider ___ chat mailing list chat@freenetproject.org Archived: http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general Unsubscribe at http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/chat Or mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[freenet-chat] Re: [Tech] Crazy idea: How trust in darknets enables secure democratic censorship
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 11:52:30AM -0400, Ken Snider wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >Here's a really whacky idea I came up with on the train back from > >Strasbourg (please read the whole email before flaming me): > > *snip voting idea* > > not only do I think this won't work for philosophical reasons, but I think > it underlines one of the most fundamental *weaknesses* of the Darknet. Let > me explain: > > - Firstly, One of the first things that came to mind when you began this > quest to determine "trust", was that it creates a very real chance of > "groupthink" within freenet. Why? Because, while it is difficult to > quantify when the method to *determine* this trust is still largely > unknown, the reality is, there will likely be some "like-mindedness" in > those who *are* determined as "trustworthy" - this is further underlined by > numerous comments that the non-dark-freenet would still be there for the > "masses" - the implication is they won't be trusted and likely will have no > means to be. Okay, and this is a bad thing because...? Communities usually have some level of shared values (and there will not just be one darknet although there is likely to be one large one and some smaller ones). > > Now, take this a step further. Lets assume for a moment a trust system > similar to PGP, where a number of existing nodes/Toad's > choices/known-good-nodes/etc become the "base" for the darknet - it's > assumed that you will need to somehow gain the trust of these core people > to join the darknet itself, which means, at some point, you'll be gaining > the approval of the "person" behind the node, in some way. > > Now, in a global community where in some parts of the world things like > same-sex marriage are a done deal, and in others it's a crime worthy of > execution, for example, how do you propose to ensure you have an acceptable > cross-section of "minds" behind the darknet? It's seems inevitable to me > that the "prevailing winds" of the collective morals of this core group > will go a long way to creating the prevailing moral authority for darknet, > even *without* a voting system in place - since you're not likely to > "trust" individuals with differing views from your own in most cases, and > unless this "trust" mechanism is somehow disconnected from people (which > would mean that a nefarious party would need only complete these machine > requirements to enter the darknet, so is likely not to be the case). Hmm. I'm not sure I follow. What is the threat here? > > Now, add voting to the mix. Allow this set of "prevailing morals" to be > *enforced* within freenet. This about guarantees, given the likely nature > of trust, that the aggregate "morality" of the founding Darknet nodes would > be preserved within freenet itself, since these founding nodes would have, > through overt act or merely by likelihood-of-association, chosen > like-minded trustees, who would vote as they do. No, not the founders, the community as a whole. Only a few hops from me are people I vehemently disagree with on most issues. > > You don't have to go to extremes like child-porn to see where this kind of > thing could have real-world consequences. Just take a few minutes and look > at the US mass media, even in the "land of the free" people are deeply, > deeply divided over issues far more benign, some of which on religious > grounds, some on moral, some on traditional grounds, some due to reasons I > have not even personally considered. Do you honestly believe that your > "trust-based" system will truly encompass even that diverse a set of > thinkers, in one country, let alone the rest of the world, especially in > cases where people may be far more polarized on certain topics? > > I see large cultural voting-bloc-type situations that, largely, will > maintain the status quo. But that's the thing - the "status quo" is > exactly, IMO, what the freenet should NOT be. You *want* the radical, > free-thinking underbelly of the world to have somewhere to go where they > can dissimate information that *may be* morally objectionable to large > swaths of the populous, even the populous of freenet (think religious or > cultural or political here - Tibet, scientology, women's rights, etc). What I can't honestly see why any sane informed human being who isn't a scientologist wouldn't support the dissemination of the OT documents. > good will freenet be if someone who thinks "against" the prevailing beliefs > of a region (but is otherwise "moral", for whatever that term can mean in > this context) is simply "Voted down" by those within their own culture that > may not agree? Sounds a fairly elitist argument. But lets say you're right. Why would people who would vote for political speech they disagree with to be censored even join the network? > > I think the voting would lead to almost a "constitutional" form of > "group-morals" that may or may not actually *be* altruis
