Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
Yeah and a chicken is a dog.
Le 29 oct. 2013 03:41, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :
So matter is just maya-illusion.
That is really religion- right?
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:
2013/10/28 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you
can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.
Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are the machine
that computes because they are enumerable. It derives everything else. In
particular the Metaverse machine derives the universe big bang and the
universe CY machine. I cannot say what derives the Metaverse machine
Bruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in
arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's
belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the
machines' dream which cohere enough (to be short).
If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to
percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.
Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outside of
comp?
No, matter is an appearance hence the use of machine's belief in
matter. There is no primary matter (assuming comp).
That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derived physical
realities. If it does not do that, what good is it?
Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomes
elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's point of
view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universal system
chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc.
Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement that comp
cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion.
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:
On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno Marchal
viahttp://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=enanswer=1311182ctx=mail
googlegroups.com
4:53 AM (2 hours ago)
to everything-list
On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:
It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse.
How?
Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi-Yau
compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonic variation of
the fine structure constant across the visible universe.
The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can
derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics.
It seems also that you believe in a computable universe, but that
cannot be the case if our
(generalized) brain is computable.
Richard: That does not make sense.
If my brain is Turing emulable, and if I am in some state S, whatever
will happen to me is determined by *all* computations going through the
state S (or equivalent). Our first person indeterminacy domain is an
infinite and non computable set of computations. The indeterminacy domain
is not computable because we cannot recognize our 1p in 3p-computations
(like the one done by the UD).
Please take a look at the detailed explanation in the sane04 paper. You
need only the first seven steps of the UDA, which does not presuppose any
special knowledge.
It gives to any fundamental physics some non computable features. Keep
in mind that the computable is somehow strictly included in the provable
(by universal machine) strictly included in truth.
Computable is Turing equivalent with sigma_1 provable, but arithmetical
truth is given by the union of all sigma_i, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... (this
needs a bit of theoretical computer science).
Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic, but
we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's belief in
matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the machines'
dream which cohere enough (to be short).
If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to
percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong.
By the UDA, and classical logic, you get the physical certainty, by the
true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (the UD-accessible states), which are
provable (true in all consistent extensions) and consistent (such
accessible consistent extensions have to exist). That's basically, for all
p sigma_1 (= ExP(x) for some P decidable arithmetical formula)
beweisbar('p') ~beweisbar('~p') p. The operator for that, let us write
it [], provides a quantum logic, by the application of []p. This
gives a quantization of arithmetic due to the fact, introspectively
deducible by all universal machines, that we cannot really know who we are
and which computations and universal numbers sustain us. Below our
substitution level, things *have* to become a bit fuzzy, non clonable, non
computable, indeterminate.
In fact this answers a question asked by Wheeler, and on which Gödel
said only that the question
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:20, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: I read, somewhere, Professor Marchal, that it was the spindle cells in the brain that pushed the smarter creatures on this planet into high gear, so to speak, not so much glial, unless we are describing the same thing, primates, whales, dolphins, have spindle cells, and why this makes a difference I don't know. For no rational reason, my limbic system is urging me (?) to include in this email, the first stanza from Hyperactive, by Thomas Dolby. It adds nothing to this discussion, yet here it is, because it seems somehow, fitting. Spindle neurons seems to be special highways to me. Glial cells seems to play some role in chronic pain. Anyway, this bears on the substitution level, which we cannot know. The pioneer of immortality will bet on artificial mechanism which they can afford, and will not survive without some defects. At the tender age of three I was hooked to a machine Just to keep my mouth from spouting junk Must have took me for a fool When they chucked me out of school 'Cause the teacher knew I had the funk :) Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Oct 28, 2013 1:53 pm Subject: Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain On 28 Oct 2013, at 16:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-10-neuroscientists-mini-neural-brain.html Dendrites, the branch-like projections of neurons, were once thought to be passive wiring in the brain. But now researchers at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill have shown that these dendrites do more than relay information from one neuron to the next. They actively process information, multiplying the brain's computing power. Suddenly, it's as if the processing power of the brain is much greater than we had originally thought, said Spencer Smith, PhD, an assistant professor in the UNC School of Medicine. His team's findings, published October 27 in the journal Nature, could change the way scientists think about long-standing scientific models of how neural circuitry functions in the brain, while also helping researchers better understand neurological disorders. Imagine you're reverse engineering a piece of alien technology, and what you thought was simple wiring turns out to be transistors that compute information, Smith said. That's what this finding is like. The implications are exciting to think about. Axons are where neurons conventionally generate electrical spikes, but many of the same molecules that support axonal spikes are also present in the dendrites. Previous research using dissected brain tissue had demonstrated that dendrites can use those molecules to generate electrical spikes themselves, but it was unclear whether normal brain activity involved those dendritic spikes. For example, could dendritic spikes be involved in how we see? The answer, Smith's team found, is yes. Dendrites effectively act as mini-neural computers, actively processing neuronal input signals themselves. Directly demonstrating this required a series of intricate experiments that took years and spanned two continents, beginning in senior author Michael Hausser's lab at University College London, and being completed after Smith and Ikuko Smith, PhD, DVM, set up their own lab at the University of North Carolina. They used patch-clamp electrophysiology to attach a microscopic glass pipette electrode, filled with a physiological solution, to a neuronal dendrite in the brain of a mouse. The idea was to directly listen in on the electrical signaling process. Attaching the pipette to a dendrite is tremendously technically challenging, Smith said. You can't approach the dendrite from any direction. And you can't see the dendrite. So you have to do this blind. It's like fishing if all you can see is the electrical trace of a fish. And you can't use bait. You just go for it and see if you can hit a dendrite, he said. Most of the time you can't. Once the pipette was attached to a dendrite, Smith's team took electrical recordings from individual dendrites within the brains of anesthetized and awake mice. As the mice viewed visual stimuli on a computer screen, the researchers saw an unusual pattern of electrical signals – bursts of spikes – in the dendrite. Smith's team then found that the dendritic spikes occurred selectively, depending on the visual stimulus, indicating that the dendrites processed information about what the animal was seeing. To provide visual evidence of their finding, Smith's team filled neurons with calcium dye, which provided an optical readout of spiking. This revealed that dendrites fired spikes while other parts of the neuron did not, meaning that the spikes were the result of local processing within the dendrites.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote: What do you call ANY PHYSICS? is there a God given marvel (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable PHYSICS? I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic. Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense contradict such deterministic law. That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed contradicts a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into sense: Laws, Forces, Fields, Wavefunctions, Probability...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re- constellation. Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me. I consider it the explanation of certain phenomena (mostly with the help of math) at the level of knowledge AT such time of explanation. It was different in 2500 BC, in 1000 AD, last year and today. It is the explanation of figments we develop upon recognizing VIEWS of phenomena partially absorbed/understood as parts of a PHYSICAL World. It all is adjusted to and within our limited capabilities of mind (consciousness???) OK. But we can agree on theories locally and evolve. The discovery of the universal machine, which includes us (in some precisable sense) makes possible to study the limited, but also unlimited and capable of self-transformation, of those machines. Just because they are unlimited doesn't make them capable of self- transformation. Arithmetic truths may be mind-bogglingly complex, but they are quite generic and aesthetically predictable. True beauty, whether in the form of a supermodel or an art masterpiece, introduces an experience which is literally unimaginable before it appears. It is not self-transformation, but revelation of simple, iconic presentations which relate to nothing but their own brand of pleasure, and to the history of all beauty and pleasure. It has not exterior truth which it mediates for, as we have proved with commercials. Any celebrity can be signify a product that has nothing to do with their lives. Beauty can be a code or tag for whatever we attach to it - it has no fixed mathematical affiliation. My feeling is that you have a limited view on mathematics. You miss that quality and first person notion can be handled, accepting some definition. You seem to believe that there can be no third person account of an axiomatic of the first person notion. That's a category error. Math must be 3p, but can talk about 1p, and even seems to imply it, as the arithmetical 1p hypostases should illustrate. Bruno Craig You cannot invoke our ignorance to criticize a theory as that would impose an ignorance-of-the-gap, and prevent progress. Science does not exist. What exist is a scientific attitude, and this is mainly the application of the right to be wrong, and the art to accept it and move on. That's why scientists try to be precise, so that we have a chance to see how wrong they were. François Englert is a real scientist, in that sense, as he was sincerely disappointed by the LARC confirmation of the Standard model showing the Higgs Englert Brout boson. We learn nothing when we are shown true. Bruno On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 12:43 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 October 2013 07:33, John Mikes jam...@gmail.com wrote: Allegedly Stathis wrote: If consciousness supervenes on neurochemistry then the brain will be different if the conscious state is different. Demonstrating that there is a change in consciousness without a change in the brain, or a change in the brain not explained by the physics, would be evidence of supernatural processes. I would not call it 'supernatural', rather: beyond our presently known/knowable. Are you so sure that (your?) neurochemistry is all we can have? The demonstration you refer to would only show that our view is partial and whatever we call consciousness is something different from what's going on indeed. Explained by physics? I consider physix the ingenious explanation of the figments we perceive - at the level of such explanatory thinking. It changed from time-period to time-period and is likely to change further in the future. Agnostically yours John Mikes It would be supernatural not if it were inconsistent with known physics, but with any physics. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information. I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is ourself. Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level is lower than some thought. Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to machines, when those person develop *some* true belief. So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self- referential means, like quarks. relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. Bruno Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
On 28 Oct 2013, at 20:33, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics. Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are the machine that computes because they are enumerable. I am not sure I found a proof of this in your papers. You might elaborate. being enumerable entails capable of being computed, not necessarily capable of (universal) computing (only very special enumerable set can universally compute (the so-called creative set, discovered by Emil Post). It derives everything else. In particular the Metaverse machine derives the universe big bang and the universe CY machine. I cannot say what derives the Metaverse machine Bruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the machines' dream which cohere enough (to be short). If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong. Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outside of comp? That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derived physical realities. If it does not do that, what good is it? I think Quentin answered this. Comp makes the beliefs (by relative- number/machines) in matter derivable from arithmetic. There is no matter per se. Stable matter comes from the first plural coherence of some type of dreams. NUMBER == Machines' dreams === Matter appearances and physical laws. Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc. Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement that comp cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion. Comp explains where the hallucination of matter comes from, and should explain why it is persistent. But there is no matter in the ontology. Matter becomes an epistemological/psychological/theological notion. The poet said it: life is but a dream. But it is not necessarily a solipsist one. It can and should be a sort of multi-user video game. I don't believe in ontological primitive matter, but I have almost no doubts about the existence of Richard Ruquist. With comp infinitely many Richard Ruquist's mind states are defined through infinitely many number relations. Bruno On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com 4:53 AM (2 hours ago) to everything-list On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse. How? Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi- Yau compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonic variation of the fine structure constant across the visible universe. The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics. It seems also that you believe in a computable universe, but that cannot be the case if our (generalized) brain is computable. Richard: That does not make sense. If my brain is Turing emulable, and if I am in some state S, whatever will happen to me is determined by *all* computations going through the state S (or equivalent). Our first person indeterminacy domain is an infinite and non computable set of computations. The indeterminacy domain is not computable because we cannot recognize our 1p in 3p-computations (like the one done by the UD). Please take a look at the detailed explanation in the sane04 paper. You need only the first seven steps of the UDA, which does not presuppose any special knowledge. It gives to any fundamental physics some non computable features. Keep in mind that the computable is somehow strictly included in the provable (by universal machine) strictly included in truth. Computable is Turing equivalent with sigma_1 provable, but arithmetical truth is given by the union of all sigma_i, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... (this needs a bit of theoretical computer science). Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the machines' dream which cohere enough (to be short). If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong. By the UDA, and classical logic, you get the physical certainty, by the true sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (the
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
On 29 Oct 2013, at 03:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: So matter is just maya-illusion. Yes. That's the result. UDA shows that if we can survive with a digital brain, by virtue of its infomation handling power (and not some magic), then matter is only appearance in the mind of some (relative) numbers. That's the key point. That is really religion- right? Hmm... The tone used here makes me suspecting that you are using religion in some pejorative sense. But yes it is theology. I insist on this almost at the start: comp is the belief in a form of technological reincarnation, and as such, cannot be justified rationally. We have to bet.. But we can do that bet from evidences (nature exploits replacement all the times, the known laws are all Turing emulable, etc.). It means also that if a scientist says science as shown that we are machine, that scientist is a pseudo-scientist, or a pseudo-priest, or some con who want steal your money. Comp is yes doctor, and it entails the right to say No, doctor. Comp makes number theology the most fundamental science unifying all the others. Indeed. Of course today's theology has not yet come back to the academy, and institutionalized theologies are politicized and used to control people. We are still in an era where we tolerated authoritative arguments in religion (and other human sciences), where actually it is the place where such arguments are the most wrong possible. The enlightenment period was half-enlightenment. All sciences go through, except the most fundamental one: theology. Theology has been scientific only with the Greeks, Chinese and Indian. In Occident it is still a taboo. I like to say: bad faith fears reason, bad reason fears faith. Bruno On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/28 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics. Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are the machine that computes because they are enumerable. It derives everything else. In particular the Metaverse machine derives the universe big bang and the universe CY machine. I cannot say what derives the Metaverse machine Bruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the machines' dream which cohere enough (to be short). If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong. Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outside of comp? No, matter is an appearance hence the use of machine's belief in matter. There is no primary matter (assuming comp). That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derived physical realities. If it does not do that, what good is it? Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc. Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement that comp cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion. On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno Marchal via googlegroups.com 4:53 AM (2 hours ago) to everything-list On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse. How? Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi- Yau compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonic variation of the fine structure constant across the visible universe. The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics. It seems also that you believe in a computable universe, but that cannot be the case if our (generalized) brain is computable. Richard: That does not make sense. If my brain is Turing emulable, and if I am in some state S, whatever will happen to me is determined by *all* computations going through the state S (or equivalent). Our first person indeterminacy domain is an infinite and non computable set of computations. The indeterminacy domain is not computable because we cannot recognize our 1p in 3p-computations (like the one done by the UD). Please take a look at the detailed explanation in the sane04 paper. You need only the first seven steps of the UDA, which does not presuppose any special knowledge. It gives to any fundamental physics some non computable features. Keep in mind that the computable is somehow strictly included in
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
*Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. * Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi fridge's food. 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information. I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is ourself. Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level is lower than some thought. Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to machines, when those person develop *some* true belief. So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. Bruno Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi fridge's food. You can't just mix two unrelated philosophical concepts that happen to share the same string of characters and call it an argument. 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information. I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is ourself. Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level is lower than some thought. Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to machines, when those person develop *some* true belief. So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. Bruno Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Step 3
On 29 Oct 2013, at 02:13, chris peck wrote: Hi Jason Right but when you refer to the experience or chris peck's experiences, that is speaking in the third person. It should make no difference to your argument at all. That makes the difference, because the prediction concerned the future first person experience. In fact Bruno's step 3 is written in the third person too. All science is 3p. Even when the subject-matter is the 1p. Comp makes that possible. You're confusing how the set up is described with what is actually thought by the protagonists. In fact let me use a paragraph from Bruno's step 3 replacing the issues under debate, that way there can be no confusion about the fact that I not mistaking a 1-p view for a 3-p view any more than he is. Bruno's version (and take special note of the use of third person descriptions): Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty. This is remarkable because from a third person point of view the experiment is completely deterministic, and indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the time by advocates of determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being indeed completely 3-deterministic, entails a strong form of indeterminacy[10], bearing on the possible consistent extensions, when they are observed by the first person, as both diaries can witness. This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” Before proceeding the experiencer is in a state of maximal ignorance. Corrected version: [Given] OK. the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he [can] predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable [certainty]. This is [unremarkable] Of course remarkable/unremarkable is a bit subjective. But what is remarkable is that a pure third person deterministic reality explained a strong form of indeterminacy, by logic and arithmetic alone, without invoking QM. Everett does that too, but needs to postulate QM. Here we postulate mechanism only. because from a third person point of view the experiment is completely deterministic, and indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the time by advocates of determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being indeed completely 3-deterministic, entails a strong form of [determinacy], No. Of indeterminacy. Unless you can provide an algorithm of prediction. bearing on the [certain] consistent extensions, when they are observed by the first person, [regardless of what] both diaries can witness. This is what I [shouldn't] call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. [Regardless] that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of 100% to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” [because] Before proceeding the experiencer is in a state of maximal [knowledge]. The prediction I will be in Moscow cannot be 100%, as the guy reconstituted in Washington will understand. Both the guy in M and in W knows that 100% has to be excluded. According to your usage, how is the meaning of subjective certainty different from just certainty? They are identical. Bruno argues that if everyone is certain or uncertain of something then this certainty become 'objective' in some sense. I never did that. You misunderstood the point. I just explained that some uncertainty about 1p can be communicated in a 3p way. It is the fact that they are necessarily uncertain which makes them objective. Comp and Everett provides examples. Its an irrelevant point he makes but nevertheless it is wrong. Its a confusion between solipsism and subjectivism. certainty and uncertainty are predicates applicable only to subjects. 'I's. And no matter how many people hold a belief or are certain or uncertain of something those certainties / uncertainties are only ever subjective. The uncertainty in lottery are objective, computable, and people makes money on them. Boltzmann statistics are objective, obeys laws. You are confusing the fact that we do have a subjective uncertainty related to them, but the roots of the uncertainty can be mathematical, logical, physical, etc. After the duplication there are two experiencers. --[notice the third person description you're employing here!] Each is
Leibniz's platonism and the false problem of reductionism in mind and quantum theory
Leibniz's platonism and the false problem of reductionism In physics and psychology we have two enigmas if materialism rules, those of spontaneous mental intentions (so that there is no free will) and also that of spontaneous (probabililistic) events such as we find in statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics. But under Leibniz's platonism, these dilemmas vanish. Reductionism is the view that all mental processes can be reduced or explained by brain mechanisms. But true intentions, where physical actions are initiated by the mind, not the brain, obviously fail this test, so it is a puzzle swept under the rug by the cult of materialism. Free will also then disappears and creation is enigmatic. Leibniz's platonism is the inverse view in which all observed or possible brain functions are controlled by mind, so that reductionism vanishes as a problem and the will, with possibly some limitations, is free to create. All causes in Leibniz's world are thoughts. Similarly, if there is no need Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
Bruno, I do not use religion in a pejorative sense. Actually I am a Hindu. (At least I was until I got kicked out of the Muktananda Ashram) And so I am religiously in agreement with physical reality being an illusion. However, I am also a physicist and my string cosmology goes against my religion. As a physicist I am an Aristotelian, but not one who discounts the supernatural. So I am pleased to finally understand why I cannot understand you. And I must say that I appreciate your polite and truthful responses esp compared to Quentins and a chicken is a dog sham response. Richard PS: I originally said that the CY manifolds were numerable meaning that they can be numbered. Is that incorrect usage? On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 03:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: So matter is just maya-illusion. Yes. That's the result. UDA shows that if we can survive with a digital brain, by virtue of its infomation handling power (and not some magic), then matter is only appearance in the mind of some (relative) numbers. That's the key point. That is really religion- right? Hmm... The tone used here makes me suspecting that you are using religion in some pejorative sense. But yes it is theology. I insist on this almost at the start: comp is the belief in a form of technological reincarnation, and as such, cannot be justified rationally. We have to bet.. But we can do that bet from evidences (nature exploits replacement all the times, the known laws are all Turing emulable, etc.). It means also that if a scientist says science as shown that we are machine, that scientist is a pseudo-scientist, or a pseudo-priest, or some con who want steal your money. Comp is yes doctor, and it entails the right to say No, doctor. Comp makes number theology the most fundamental science unifying all the others. Indeed. Of course today's theology has not yet come back to the academy, and institutionalized theologies are politicized and used to control people. We are still in an era where we tolerated authoritative arguments in religion (and other human sciences), where actually it is the place where such arguments are the most wrong possible. The enlightenment period was half-enlightenment. All sciences go through, except the most fundamental one: theology. Theology has been scientific only with the Greeks, Chinese and Indian. In Occident it is still a taboo. I like to say: bad faith fears reason, bad reason fears faith. Bruno On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: 2013/10/28 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics. Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are the machine that computes because they are enumerable. It derives everything else. In particular the Metaverse machine derives the universe big bang and the universe CY machine. I cannot say what derives the Metaverse machine Bruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the machines' dream which cohere enough (to be short). If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong. Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outside of comp? No, matter is an appearance hence the use of machine's belief in matter. There is no primary matter (assuming comp). That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derived physical realities. If it does not do that, what good is it? Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc. Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement that comp cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion. On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno Marchal viahttp://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=enanswer=1311182ctx=mail googlegroups.com 4:53 AM (2 hours ago) to everything-list On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse. How? Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi-Yau compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonic variation of the fine structure constant across the visible universe. The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics. It seems also that you believe in a
Re: Leibniz's platonism and the false problem of reductionism in mind and quantum theory
Roger, Having just learned a thing or two from Bruno, it strikes me that Leibniz monads are Aristotelian rather than Platonic just like my string cosmology. Richard On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 6:40 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Leibniz's platonism and the false problem of reductionism In physics and psychology we have two enigmas if materialism rules, those of spontaneous mental intentions (so that there is no free will) and also that of spontaneous (probabililistic) events such as we find in statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics. But under Leibniz's platonism, these dilemmas vanish. Reductionism is the view that all mental processes can be reduced or explained by brain mechanisms. But true intentions, where physical actions are initiated by the mind, not the brain, obviously fail this test, so it is a puzzle swept under the rug by the cult of materialism. Free will also then disappears and creation is enigmatic. Leibniz's platonism is the inverse view in which all observed or possible brain functions are controlled by mind, so that reductionism vanishes as a problem and the will, with possibly some limitations, is free to create. All causes in Leibniz's world are thoughts. Similarly, if there is no need Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...
2013/10/29 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno, I do not use religion in a pejorative sense. Actually I am a Hindu. (At least I was until I got kicked out of the Muktananda Ashram) And so I am religiously in agreement with physical reality being an illusion. However, I am also a physicist and my string cosmology goes against my religion. As a physicist I am an Aristotelian, but not one who discounts the supernatural. So I am pleased to finally understand why I cannot understand you. And I must say that I appreciate your polite and truthful responses esp compared to Quentins and a chicken is a dog sham response. Because the way you said it was pejorative... secondly I do not condone the use of the term religion for that. Religion is composed of dogma... this is not. Quentin Richard PS: I originally said that the CY manifolds were numerable meaning that they can be numbered. Is that incorrect usage? On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 03:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: So matter is just maya-illusion. Yes. That's the result. UDA shows that if we can survive with a digital brain, by virtue of its infomation handling power (and not some magic), then matter is only appearance in the mind of some (relative) numbers. That's the key point. That is really religion- right? Hmm... The tone used here makes me suspecting that you are using religion in some pejorative sense. But yes it is theology. I insist on this almost at the start: comp is the belief in a form of technological reincarnation, and as such, cannot be justified rationally. We have to bet.. But we can do that bet from evidences (nature exploits replacement all the times, the known laws are all Turing emulable, etc.). It means also that if a scientist says science as shown that we are machine, that scientist is a pseudo-scientist, or a pseudo-priest, or some con who want steal your money. Comp is yes doctor, and it entails the right to say No, doctor. Comp makes number theology the most fundamental science unifying all the others. Indeed. Of course today's theology has not yet come back to the academy, and institutionalized theologies are politicized and used to control people. We are still in an era where we tolerated authoritative arguments in religion (and other human sciences), where actually it is the place where such arguments are the most wrong possible. The enlightenment period was half-enlightenment. All sciences go through, except the most fundamental one: theology. Theology has been scientific only with the Greeks, Chinese and Indian. In Occident it is still a taboo. I like to say: bad faith fears reason, bad reason fears faith. Bruno On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: 2013/10/28 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Bruno: The fact that something is enumerable does not entail that you can derive it from PA, nor that it is a necessary part of physics. Richard: You got it backwards. The CY Compact manifolds are the machine that computes because they are enumerable. It derives everything else. In particular the Metaverse machine derives the universe big bang and the universe CY machine. I cannot say what derives the Metaverse machine Bruno: Note that we cannot derive the existence of matter in arithmetic, but we can, and with comp we must (by UDA) derive the machine's belief in matter. machines lives in arithmetic, but matter lives in the machines' dream which cohere enough (to be short). If it happens that the machines dream do *not* cohere enough to percolate into physical realities, then comp is wrong. Richard: Is this an admission that physical realities exist outside of comp? No, matter is an appearance hence the use of machine's belief in matter. There is no primary matter (assuming comp). That's what it sounds like. And I thought that comp derived physical realities. If it does not do that, what good is it? Bruno: Assuming comp, elementary machine's theology and physics becomes elementary arithmetic, relativized by the universal machine's point of view. It makes physics invariant for the choice of the universal system chosen to describe the phi_i, the W_i, etc. Richard: Here you seem to contradict you previous statement that comp cannot derive matter. Please forgive my confusion. On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:18 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 12:31, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno Marchal viahttp://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=enanswer=1311182ctx=mail googlegroups.com 4:53 AM (2 hours ago) to everything-list On 27 Oct 2013, at 23:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is derived from PA both the universes and the Metaverse. How? Richard: I say how in the abstract of the second paper. The Calabi-Yau compact manifolds are numerable based on observed monotonic variation of the
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
I know a single concept of people I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I manage (either philosophical or not) Have they rights? 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi fridge's food. You can't just mix two unrelated philosophical concepts that happen to share the same string of characters and call it an argument. 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information. I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is ourself. Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level is lower than some thought. Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to machines, when those person develop *some* true belief. So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. Bruno Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:08:16 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information. I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is ourself. Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level is lower than some thought. Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to machines, when those person develop *some* true belief. So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. How do you know? From the article, dendrites seem to be doing what (we think that) a neuron does. relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. What do they emerge into, given they lack sensory abilities? Craig Bruno Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I know a single concept of people I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I manage (either philosophical or not) Have they rights? This is a very good question which, in fact, serves well to illustrate how the concept of people is difficult and fluid. Past issues: - Are other races people, do they have right? Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. Current issues: - Are animals people to some degree? Do they have rights? Many modern societies say yes, and consider some mistreatments of animals to be a crime; - Are corporations people? American law says yes, and that they have rights like free speech; Future issues: - Are aliens people? Should they have equal rights? Does that depend on their level of civilisational development? If yes, where to draw the line? - Are robots people? - Are computer emulations of the minds of dead people people? Crazy issues: - Are spirits and demons people? Islamic law says yes. Of course Nietzsche himself had this to say: Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman -- a rope over an abyss... What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under... So it doesn't sound that he was convinced that personhood was so clear cut either. Note that in the original German the mensch Übermensch has a meaning closer to person then man. So I actually made a mistake, Nietzsche's concept seems compatible with Bruno's and maybe they wouldn't disagree to much on this. Also wikipedia, for what it's worth: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person Telmo. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi fridge's food. You can't just mix two unrelated philosophical concepts that happen to share the same string of characters and call it an argument. 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information. I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is ourself. Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level is lower than some thought. Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to machines, when those person develop *some* true belief. So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. Bruno Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:05:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote: What do you call ANY PHYSICS? is there a God given marvel (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable PHYSICS? I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic. Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense contradict such deterministic law. That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed contradicts a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into sense: Laws, Forces, Fields, Wavefunctions, Probability...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re-constellation. Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me. Not at all. What we have now is a force-of-the-gap, field-of-the-gap, etc. I am merging all of the empty bubbles and finding that none could be anything more or less than sense. I consider it the explanation of certain phenomena (mostly with the help of math) at the level of knowledge AT such time of explanation. It was different in 2500 BC, in 1000 AD, last year and today. It is the explanation of figments we develop upon recognizing VIEWS of phenomena partially absorbed/understood as parts of a PHYSICAL World. It all is adjusted to and within our limited capabilities of mind (consciousness???) OK. But we can agree on theories locally and evolve. The discovery of the universal machine, which includes us (in some precisable sense) makes possible to study the limited, but also unlimited and capable of self-transformation, of those machines. Just because they are unlimited doesn't make them capable of self-transformation. Arithmetic truths may be mind-bogglingly complex, but they are quite generic and aesthetically predictable. True beauty, whether in the form of a supermodel or an art masterpiece, introduces an experience which is literally unimaginable before it appears. It is not self-transformation, but revelation of simple, iconic presentations which relate to nothing but their own brand of pleasure, and to the history of all beauty and pleasure. It has not exterior truth which it mediates for, as we have proved with commercials. Any celebrity can be signify a product that has nothing to do with their lives. Beauty can be a code or tag for whatever we attach to it - it has no fixed mathematical affiliation. My feeling is that you have a limited view on mathematics. True, but that may be what is required. If you want to understand what it all is, and don't have the math to fall back on, then you have to think more deeply about the question. We need a limited view of mathematics. Computers are much better at it. You miss that quality and first person notion can be handled, accepting some definition. No, I think that you miss that they cannot be handled by any definition, because all definitions are already first person qualities. They are perspectives on perspectives - sense making of sense making. You seem to believe that there can be no third person account of an axiomatic of the first person notion. Right. Why would third person need an account of anything when first person is already the only accountant? That's a category error. Math must be 3p, but can talk about 1p, and even seems to imply it, as the arithmetical 1p hypostases should illustrate. I think that's an illusion. Math's version of 1p is an empty light socket with a bulb drawn around it. All references to 1p come from our minds - our generosity in sharing our awareness in whatever we look at that seems to have a face, or does something that seems to require knowing. In the proper light, all of these empty promises and paste jewels will be exposed as the pathetic fallacy...a trompe 'loeil that is as spectacular as any could ever be. Craig Bruno Craig You cannot invoke our ignorance to criticize a theory as that would impose an ignorance-of-the-gap, and prevent progress. Science does not exist. What exist is a scientific attitude, and this is mainly the application of the right to be wrong, and the art to accept it and move on. That's why scientists try to be precise, so that we have a chance to see how wrong they were. François Englert is a real scientist, in that sense, as he was sincerely disappointed by the LARC confirmation of the Standard model showing the Higgs Englert Brout boson. We learn nothing when we are shown true. Bruno On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 12:43 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.comwrote: On 28 October 2013 07:33, John Mikes jam...@gmail.com wrote: Allegedly Stathis
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
The problem with modernity is precisely the confusion and madness (and I may say lack of intellectual strenght) of this fluidity, ever depending on audiences and personal interest that makes today amoebas to have rights ... and tomorrow morning we can massacrate people because at last, they are like amoebas. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I know a single concept of people I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I manage (either philosophical or not) Have they rights? This is a very good question which, in fact, serves well to illustrate how the concept of people is difficult and fluid. Past issues: - Are other races people, do they have right? Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. Current issues: - Are animals people to some degree? Do they have rights? Many modern societies say yes, and consider some mistreatments of animals to be a crime; - Are corporations people? American law says yes, and that they have rights like free speech; Future issues: - Are aliens people? Should they have equal rights? Does that depend on their level of civilisational development? If yes, where to draw the line? - Are robots people? - Are computer emulations of the minds of dead people people? Crazy issues: - Are spirits and demons people? Islamic law says yes. Of course Nietzsche himself had this to say: Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman -- a rope over an abyss... What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under... So it doesn't sound that he was convinced that personhood was so clear cut either. Note that in the original German the mensch Übermensch has a meaning closer to person then man. So I actually made a mistake, Nietzsche's concept seems compatible with Bruno's and maybe they wouldn't disagree to much on this. Also wikipedia, for what it's worth: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person Telmo. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi fridge's food. You can't just mix two unrelated philosophical concepts that happen to share the same string of characters and call it an argument. 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information. I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is ourself. Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level is lower than some thought. Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to machines, when those person develop *some* true belief. So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. Bruno Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:05:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote: What do you call ANY PHYSICS? is there a God given marvel (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable PHYSICS? I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic. Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense contradict such deterministic law. That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed contradicts a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into sense: Laws, Forces, Fields, Wavefunctions, Probability...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re- constellation. Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me. Not at all. What we have now is a force-of-the-gap, field-of-the- gap, etc. No. This has been solved. Indeed, so precisely that it is only a question of solving diophantine equation to compare the physics of machine and the physics we infer from observation. Primary matter is a matter-of-the-gap, OK. But not the matter as described by the introspective machine. Not the matter (because that actually is concretely sensed), but forces, fields, and laws because they are magical ideas that appear out of nowhere and do things without any tangible presence. It's just haunted space. That the haunting of the space can be precisely mapped and deconstructed mathematically does not give it the power to change matter. What has been overlooked is the possibility that matter is an appearance within experience, of experience which has alienated itself - followed different histories in parallel or phase-shift. I am merging all of the empty bubbles and finding that none could be anything more or less than sense. This cannot satisfy me, as I am looking to some understanding of what is sense, where does it come from, why does it provide non justifiable feature like consciousness, etc. There is no understanding needed to what sense is - it is the most self-evident phenomena possible as it is self-evidence period, full stop. All that is, is because it has been made evident within some sensory context. There is nothing there to be evident except for this relativity of presence shared with the contents and contexts of eternity. Justification is nothing but a sense of comparison among subordinate sense experience. You are looking for something that you have already found but won't accept it. I am showing you *all of this* is sense, and you are responding that you are looking for something *else*. If you accept the premise however (yes, doctor of primordial identity pansensitivity) then you must accept that it is ontologically impossible that there could be anything *else*, by definition. Unlike Comp, it does not assert the supremacy of arithmetic truth, but then add in dreaming numbers, resurrection by mechanical incantation, duplicated persons, machines emulating other machines which think they aren't machines (even though Comp prohibits any possibility of what else there would be besides machines.). Comp may mistake self referential logic for a self, but I don't. I have no problem a sentence that we read as this sentence is lying as a trivial syntactic contradiction rather than a profound puzzle that reveals the ontology of consciousness. To start from sense is like to start from God. This answers nothing (even if there is a God). It is to start before God, and before arithmetic, truth, and even before 'starting'. Your are still vastly underestimating the hubris that I intend. Sense = the Absolute, means that there has never been anything else, and there can never be anything else. On the contrary, comp explains 100% of matter, and 99,9% of sense, but explain 100% of why it remains 0.01% of a necessary non comprehensible aspect of the inside first person view. The entire universe fits in the 0,1% of sense that comp fails to find. Everything else is a reflection of that sense. Comp is inside out. Anyway, the solution is testable, so you should be happy that we might refute comp. Comp may be testable (using consciousness) but consciousness is not testable using comp. Craig I consider it the explanation of certain phenomena (mostly with the help of math) at the level of knowledge AT such time of explanation. It was different in 2500 BC, in 1000 AD, last year and today. It
Re: Step 3
Chris, Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details): Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end. It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds? Jason On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 3:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 02:13, chris peck wrote: Hi Jason * Right but when you refer to the experience or chris peck's experiences, that is speaking in the third person.* It should make no difference to your argument at all. That makes the difference, because the prediction concerned the future first person experience. In fact Bruno's step 3 is written in the third person too. All science is 3p. Even when the subject-matter is the 1p. Comp makes that possible. You're confusing how the set up is described with what is actually thought by the protagonists. In fact let me use a paragraph from Bruno's step 3 replacing the issues under debate, that way there can be no confusion about the fact that I not mistaking a 1-p view for a 3-p view any more than he is. * Bruno's version (and take special note of the use of third person descriptions):* *Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty. This is remarkable because from a third person point of view the experiment is completely deterministic, and indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the time by advocates of determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being indeed completely 3-deterministic, entails a strong form of indeterminacy[10], bearing on the possible consistent extensions, when they are observed by the first person, as both diaries can witness. This is what I call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. Giving that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of ½ to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” Before proceeding the experiencer is in a state of maximal ignorance.* * Corrected version:* *[Given] * OK. *the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he [can] predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to an unavoidable [certainty]. This is [unremarkable] * Of course remarkable/unremarkable is a bit subjective. But what is remarkable is that a pure third person deterministic reality explained a strong form of indeterminacy, by logic and arithmetic alone, without invoking QM. Everett does that too, but needs to postulate QM. Here we postulate mechanism only. *because from a third person point of view the experiment is completely deterministic, and indeed the mechanist doctrine is defended most of the time by advocates of determinism. But we see here that mechanism, by being indeed completely 3-deterministic, entails a strong form of [determinacy], * No. Of indeterminacy. Unless you can provide an algorithm of prediction. *bearing on the [certain] consistent extensions, when they are observed by the first person, [regardless of what] both diaries can witness. This is what I [shouldn't] call the first person comp indeterminacy, or just 1-indeterminacy. [Regardless] that Moscow and Washington are permutable without any noticeable changes for the experiencer, it is reasonable to ascribe a probability of 100% to the event “I will be in Moscow (resp. Washington).” [because] Before proceeding the experiencer is in a state of maximal [knowledge].* The prediction I will be in Moscow cannot be 100%, as the guy reconstituted in Washington will understand. Both the guy in M and in W knows that 100% has to be excluded. * According to your usage, how is the meaning of subjective certainty different from just certainty?* They are identical. Bruno argues that if everyone is certain or uncertain of
Re: Universe from Pixels?
I wonder if we used a photon multiplier that looked like Mickey Mouse and then discovered that photons looked like Mickey Mouse if it would occur to anyone that some of our assumptions might have been premature. On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:03:39 AM UTC-4, spudb...@aol.com wrote: Here is a link, which makes things seem very, curious, if true. http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2013/10/our-universe-is-made-up-of-indivisible-building-blocks-like-tiny-atoms.html#more -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
I´m not atacking you. I simply I like to talk with people, and for this purpose is necessary to share a clear definition of concepts. However, Telmo, If you don´t think so, then of course I´m attacking your position. But not for much time because even attacking with words becomes impossible with people that defend that lousy point of view. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: The problem with modernity is precisely the confusion and madness (and I may say lack of intellectual strenght) of this fluidity, ever depending on audiences and personal interest that makes today amoebas to have rights ... and tomorrow morning we can massacrate people because at last, they are like amoebas. Talk about a slippery slope... You seem to believe that things would be better given some past state of clear-headed rationality -- I would like you to identify the pre-modernity time period you allude to. A few practical questions then: - Should I be allowed to torture dogs for fun? That a question that has nothing to do with the question of either if a dog or an amoeba is a person. The fallacy of changing the conversation in a way that you climb a hill of moral superiority and then shoth down wth an unrelated moral question is not good, to say the least, and I´m not interested in to continue in this way. I say so from the beginning. By the way, I´m not being moral in my previous response. I was just consequentialist: Relativism , lack of clear concepts ends up in imposibility of civilized discussion and the only remaining language is violence. So let´s try to keep concepts clear. That is the whole point of my thesis. What do you think about that? - Should we try to prevent the extinctions of amoebas if the situation arose? - A Harvard scientist has been proposing the idea of finding a surrogate mother for a Neanderthal baby. If he succeeds, what's you clear-cut answer for the personhood status and rights of this creature? People that complain about the intellectual mushiness of modernity seem to forget that progress comes with new questions. Telmo. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I know a single concept of people I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I manage (either philosophical or not) Have they rights? This is a very good question which, in fact, serves well to illustrate how the concept of people is difficult and fluid. Past issues: - Are other races people, do they have right? Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. Current issues: - Are animals people to some degree? Do they have rights? Many modern societies say yes, and consider some mistreatments of animals to be a crime; - Are corporations people? American law says yes, and that they have rights like free speech; Future issues: - Are aliens people? Should they have equal rights? Does that depend on their level of civilisational development? If yes, where to draw the line? - Are robots people? - Are computer emulations of the minds of dead people people? Crazy issues: - Are spirits and demons people? Islamic law says yes. Of course Nietzsche himself had this to say: Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman -- a rope over an abyss... What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under... So it doesn't sound that he was convinced that personhood was so clear cut either. Note that in the original German the mensch Übermensch has a meaning closer to person then man. So I actually made a mistake, Nietzsche's concept seems compatible with Bruno's and maybe they wouldn't disagree to much on this. Also wikipedia, for what it's worth: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person Telmo. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi fridge's food. You can't just mix two unrelated philosophical concepts that happen to share the same string of characters and call it an argument. 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from
RE: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
Glial cells may also play a critical role in memory formation: http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/27913/title/Glial-cell s-aid-memory-formation/ From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2013 12:01 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:20, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: I read, somewhere, Professor Marchal, that it was the spindle cells in the brain that pushed the smarter creatures on this planet into high gear, so to speak, not so much glial, unless we are describing the same thing, primates, whales, dolphins, have spindle cells, and why this makes a difference I don't know. For no rational reason, my limbic system is urging me (?) to include in this email, the first stanza from Hyperactive, by Thomas Dolby. It adds nothing to this discussion, yet here it is, because it seems somehow, fitting. Spindle neurons seems to be special highways to me. Glial cells seems to play some role in chronic pain. Anyway, this bears on the substitution level, which we cannot know. The pioneer of immortality will bet on artificial mechanism which they can afford, and will not survive without some defects. At the tender age of three I was hooked to a machine Just to keep my mouth from spouting junk Must have took me for a fool When they chucked me out of school 'Cause the teacher knew I had the funk :) Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Oct 28, 2013 1:53 pm Subject: Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain On 28 Oct 2013, at 16:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-10-neuroscientists-mini-neural-brain.html Dendrites, the branch-like projections of neurons, were once thought to be passive wiring in the brain. But now researchers at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill have shown that these dendrites do more than relay information from one neuron to the next. They actively process information, multiplying the brain's computing power. Suddenly, it's as if the processing power of the brain is much greater than we had originally thought, said Spencer Smith, PhD, an assistant professor in the UNC School of Medicine. His team's findings, published October 27 in the journal Nature, could change the way scientists think about long-standing scientific models of how neural circuitry functions in the brain, while also helping researchers better understand neurological disorders. Imagine you're reverse engineering a piece of alien technology, and what you thought was simple wiring turns out to be transistors that compute information, Smith said. That's what this finding is like. The implications are exciting to think about. Axons are where neurons conventionally generate electrical spikes, but many of the same molecules that support axonal spikes are also present in the dendrites. Previous research using dissected brain tissue had demonstrated that dendrites can use those molecules to generate electrical spikes themselves, but it was unclear whether normal brain activity involved those dendritic spikes. For example, could dendritic spikes be involved in how we see? The answer, Smith's team found, is yes. Dendrites effectively act as mini-neural computers, actively processing neuronal input signals themselves. Directly demonstrating this required a series of intricate experiments that took years and spanned two continents, beginning in senior author Michael Hausser's lab at University College London, and being completed after Smith and Ikuko Smith, PhD, DVM, set up their own lab at the University of North Carolina. They used patch-clamp electrophysiology to attach a microscopic glass pipette electrode, filled with a physiological solution, to a neuronal dendrite in the brain of a mouse. The idea was to directly listen in on the electrical signaling process. Attaching the pipette to a dendrite is tremendously technically challenging, Smith said. You can't approach the dendrite from any direction. And you can't see the dendrite. So you have to do this blind. It's like fishing if all you can see is the electrical trace of a fish. And you can't use bait. You just go for it and see if you can hit a dendrite, he said. Most of the time you can't. Once the pipette was attached to a dendrite, Smith's team took electrical recordings from individual dendrites within the brains of anesthetized and awake mice. As the mice viewed visual stimuli on a computer screen, the researchers saw an unusual pattern of electrical signals - bursts of spikes - in the dendrite. Smith's team then found that the dendritic spikes occurred selectively, depending on the visual stimulus, indicating that the dendrites processed
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 4:30 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I´m not atacking you. I simply I like to talk with people, and for this purpose is necessary to share a clear definition of concepts. However, Telmo, If you don´t think so, then of course I´m attacking your position. But not for much time because even attacking with words becomes impossible with people that defend that lousy point of view. Hey Alberto, I never assumed you were attacking me personally nor did I meant to attack you personally. I agree, we're just discussing ideas. These discussion get heated but it's like a marital arts dojo -- we fight in a spirit of friendship (I hope). I've had many lousy ideas in my life and I'm sure I'll have much more. I would prefer if you gave me something more concrete than lousy, though. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:35 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: The problem with modernity is precisely the confusion and madness (and I may say lack of intellectual strenght) of this fluidity, ever depending on audiences and personal interest that makes today amoebas to have rights ... and tomorrow morning we can massacrate people because at last, they are like amoebas. Talk about a slippery slope... You seem to believe that things would be better given some past state of clear-headed rationality -- I would like you to identify the pre-modernity time period you allude to. A few practical questions then: - Should I be allowed to torture dogs for fun? That a question that has nothing to do with the question of either if a dog or an amoeba is a person. The fallacy of changing the conversation in a way that you climb a hill of moral superiority and then shoth down wth an unrelated moral question is not good, to say the least, and I´m not interested in to continue in this way. I say so from the beginning. Hum, but you were the one bringing moral conundrums to the table with the if we agree that amoeba are people, then genocide. I mentioned rights before as an illustration on how the definition of personhood in society is fluid, because such discussion usually show up in the context of rights. I don't assume that you agree with torturing dogs nor that you are indifferent to the extinction of entire biological species. I am merely trying to confront you with extreme cases, not demonstrate moral superiority. I do think that we only tend to assign rights to entities to which we assign some degree of personhood. I assign some degree of personhood to my cat. He his quite vindictive, for example. Also notice that when people have pets they tend to refer to them with personal pronouns and not it. By the way, I´m not being moral in my previous response. I was just consequentialist: Relativism , lack of clear concepts ends up in imposibility of civilized discussion and the only remaining language is violence. I understand your point, but I don't think it's this simple. For example, the previous Pope argued against moral relativism for the purpose of defending positions that I consider violent. So let´s try to keep concepts clear. That is the whole point of my thesis. What do you think about that? I agree, but I think that more clarity can only be achieved by examination. - Should we try to prevent the extinctions of amoebas if the situation arose? - A Harvard scientist has been proposing the idea of finding a surrogate mother for a Neanderthal baby. If he succeeds, what's you clear-cut answer for the personhood status and rights of this creature? People that complain about the intellectual mushiness of modernity seem to forget that progress comes with new questions. Telmo. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I know a single concept of people I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I manage (either philosophical or not) Have they rights? This is a very good question which, in fact, serves well to illustrate how the concept of people is difficult and fluid. Past issues: - Are other races people, do they have right? Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. Current issues: - Are animals people to some degree? Do they have rights? Many modern societies say yes, and consider some mistreatments of animals to be a crime; - Are corporations people? American law says yes, and that they have rights like free speech; Future issues: - Are aliens people? Should they have equal rights? Does that depend on their level of civilisational development? If yes, where to draw the line? - Are robots people? - Are computer emulations of the minds of dead people people? Crazy issues: - Are spirits and demons
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
What are the 8 hypostases? I've seen this referred to a few other times on this list and have never really known what it refers to. thanks dan On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:30:26 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:08:16 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information. I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell. Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to cooperate in what is ourself. Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level is lower than some thought. Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of person associated to machines, when those person develop *some* true belief. So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and numbers? Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self- referential means, like quarks. How do you know? From the article, dendrites seem to be doing what (we think that) a neuron does. We can' know. An why would not a dendrite be a puppet manipulated by neurons. My hand might have a more complex behavior than a dendrite, yet I do not consider my hand as a person. relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive abilities. What do they emerge into, Into person, or people. given they lack sensory abilities? Like molecules or elementary particles and waves. The person, including the sensory abilities, is what emerge. To be more correct, the person is just the universal person, already in Platonia, described by the 8 hypostases, and which quickly believes itself to be a particular person when forgetting where she comes from. The sensory abilities are well described by the universal person canonically associated to the universal machine, in his Bp Dt p discourse, notably. The waves, the molecules, eventually the number relations particularize, or incarnate, the person in different context, but they don't create the person, nor produce consciousness. (I assume comp, of course). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Universe from Pixels?
If true - ESA experimental measurements of the polarization of ranges of gamma rays (over a range of energies) from very distant gamma ray bursts that have travelled across billions of light years of spacetime to reach earth. Their experiments determined that spacetime does not have a granular structure, which would have had a measurable effect on the polarization of these distant gamma rays, down to a level of 10^-48 m (which is exceedingly small)) trillions of times smaller than the Planck scale. Spacetime does not appear to be granular - at least down to these incredibly small scales. These results have lead me to question any hypothesis that seems to depend on spacetime having a discreet granular structure. From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of spudboy...@aol.com Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2013 7:04 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Universe from Pixels? Here is a link, which makes things seem very, curious, if true. http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2013/10/our-universe-is-made-up-of-indi visible-building-blocks-like-tiny-atoms.html#more -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Universe from Pixels?
It is true that when big bang conditions are established in the three highest energy accelerators (including the LHC), what is observed is a quark-gluon plasma which is described as a perfect fluid or BEC (Bose-Einstein Condensate). But other astronomical observations have determined that space or spacetime is smooth to 10^-5 Planck lengths in Fermi telescope experimants, or as previously discussed on this list, 10^-13 Planck lengths. Therefore the idea that space contains pixels as in Loop Quantum Gravity has been falsified experimentally. Perhaps the fact that all particles in the quark-gluon plasma are entangled keeps the resulting spacetime smooth, unlike water cooling into ice. Richard On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 11:21 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I wonder if we used a photon multiplier that looked like Mickey Mouse and then discovered that photons looked like Mickey Mouse if it would occur to anyone that some of our assumptions might have been premature. On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:03:39 AM UTC-4, spudb...@aol.com wrote: Here is a link, which makes things seem very, curious, if true. http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_**weblog/2013/10/our-universe-** is-made-up-of-indivisible-**building-blocks-like-tiny-**atoms.html#morehttp://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2013/10/our-universe-is-made-up-of-indivisible-building-blocks-like-tiny-atoms.html#more -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:22, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I know a single concept of people I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I manage (either philosophical or not) Have they rights? This is a very good question which, in fact, serves well to illustrate how the concept of people is difficult and fluid. I would define a person any entity which behaves in a way which makes me think there is some first person view. Protozoa and perhaps even bacteria, gives me already that felling. I would say that a person is any entity which makes love and reproduce, like most bacteria. Past issues: - Are other races people, do they have right? I guess bacteria benefits from some natural bacteria right, but nature is known to be cruel in that respect. probably a good thing, because the universe would be quickly full of amoeba is they all manage to survive all their duplications ... Of course bacteria does not need human right in the usual sense of the expression. Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. That's a very recent idea, indeed. Current issues: - Are animals people to some degree? With my definition above, they are people. We just don't notice, except children. Of course you can call that a pathetic fallacy. It is still better to attribute too much personhood than to few, ethically. Do they have rights? Many modern societies say yes, and consider some mistreatments of animals to be a crime; All persons deserve respect, even when we eat them. - Are corporations people? American law says yes, and that they have rights like free speech; In my opinion, this is not in the interest of the human individual and it is a threat to the human right. But it is in the interest of some possible multi-humans higher level being. Future issues: - Are aliens people? I would say by definition, unless you call a meteor an alien. Should they have equal rights? Does Alien have the right to eat us? (in case they find us tasty) Does that depend on their level of civilisational development? If yes, where to draw the line? - Are robots people? If they run the right self-referentially correct loop. This is something the humans will do with caution, as you get quickly machines fighting for social security and rights. - Are computer emulations of the minds of dead people people? That's the comp assumption. Crazy issues: - Are spirits and demons people? Islamic law says yes. Is it so crazy? After all some non Turing emulable arithmetical relations are Löbian too. Second order arithmetic is not Turing emulable, and is Löbian, with a divine provability predicate (to use Boolos terming!). Normally, they have even the same fundamental physics. Arithmetic is full of lives, dreams, but there is still place for spirit and daemon. Now, if mathematicians can be said to communicate with them, it is not in any sense compatible with giving them right. They might have possible role in making those right even possible, like arithmetical truth (which is itself such entities, despite not being Löbian at all) makes person and relative realties possible. Of course Nietzsche himself had this to say: Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman -- a rope over an abyss... What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under... So it doesn't sound that he was convinced that personhood was so clear cut either. Note that in the original German the mensch Übermensch has a meaning closer to person then man. So I actually made a mistake, Nietzsche's concept seems compatible with Bruno's and maybe they wouldn't disagree to much on this. Yes. To be sure, I don't like the idea of Übermensch. At least we know there is no Übermachine. There is just a universal baby god (the universal person/machine) which lost himself in the infinite and infinitely tricky garden provided by his Mom Goddess (Arithmetical truth). Bruno Also wikipedia, for what it's worth: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person Telmo. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self- referential means, like quarks. Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi fridge's food. You can't just mix two unrelated philosophical concepts that happen to share the same string of characters and call it an argument. 2013/10/29 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
To add to this point, the main property of spindle cells (being very long and thereby able to connect disjoint regions) might simply be necessary in larger brains (not necessarily more intelligent brains), but since there is a correlation between large brains and more intelligent brains, and so we find a correlation between intelligent brains and spindle cells. Jason On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:20, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: I read, somewhere, Professor Marchal, that it was the spindle cells in the brain that pushed the smarter creatures on this planet into high gear, so to speak, not so much glial, unless we are describing the same thing, primates, whales, dolphins, have spindle cells, and why this makes a difference I don't know. For no rational reason, my limbic system is urging me (?) to include in this email, the first stanza from Hyperactive, by Thomas Dolby. It adds nothing to this discussion, yet here it is, because it seems somehow, fitting. Spindle neurons seems to be special highways to me. Glial cells seems to play some role in chronic pain. Anyway, this bears on the substitution level, which we cannot know. The pioneer of immortality will bet on artificial mechanism which they can afford, and will not survive without some defects. At the tender age of three I was hooked to a machine Just to keep my mouth from spouting junk Must have took me for a fool When they chucked me out of school 'Cause the teacher knew I had the funk :) Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Oct 28, 2013 1:53 pm Subject: Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain On 28 Oct 2013, at 16:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-10-neuroscientists-mini-neural-brain.html Dendrites, the branch-like projections of neurons, were once thought to be passive wiring in the brain. But now researchers at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill have shown that these dendrites do more than relay information from one neuron to the next. They actively process information, multiplying the brain's computing power. Suddenly, it's as if the processing power of the brain is much greater than we had originally thought, said Spencer Smith, PhD, an assistant professor in the UNC School of Medicine. His team's findings, published October 27 in the journal Nature, could change the way scientists think about long-standing scientific models of how neural circuitry functions in the brain, while also helping researchers better understand neurological disorders. Imagine you're reverse engineering a piece of alien technology, and what you thought was simple wiring turns out to be transistors that compute information, Smith said. That's what this finding is like. The implications are exciting to think about. Axons are where neurons conventionally generate electrical spikes, but many of the same molecules that support axonal spikes are also present in the dendrites. Previous research using dissected brain tissue had demonstrated that dendrites can use those molecules to generate electrical spikes themselves, but it was unclear whether normal brain activity involved those dendritic spikes. For example, could dendritic spikes be involved in how we see? The answer, Smith's team found, is yes. Dendrites effectively act as mini-neural computers, actively processing neuronal input signals themselves. Directly demonstrating this required a series of intricate experiments that took years and spanned two continents, beginning in senior author Michael Hausser's lab at University College London, and being completed after Smith and Ikuko Smith, PhD, DVM, set up their own lab at the University of North Carolina. They used patch-clamp electrophysiology to attach a microscopic glass pipette electrode, filled with a physiological solution, to a neuronal dendrite in the brain of a mouse. The idea was to directly listen in on the electrical signaling process. Attaching the pipette to a dendrite is tremendously technically challenging, Smith said. You can't approach the dendrite from any direction. And you can't see the dendrite. So you have to do this blind. It's like fishing if all you can see is the electrical trace of a fish. And you can't use bait. You just go for it and see if you can hit a dendrite, he said. Most of the time you can't. Once the pipette was attached to a dendrite, Smith's team took electrical recordings from individual dendrites within the brains of anesthetized and awake mice. As the mice viewed visual stimuli on a computer screen, the researchers saw an unusual pattern of electrical signals – bursts of spikes – in the dendrite. Smith's team then found that the dendritic spikes occurred selectively, depending on the visual
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On 29 Oct 2013, at 16:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:05:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote: What do you call ANY PHYSICS? is there a God given marvel (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable PHYSICS? I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic. Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense contradict such deterministic law. That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed contradicts a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into sense: Laws, Forces, Fields, Wavefunctions, Probability...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re- constellation. Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me. Not at all. What we have now is a force-of-the-gap, field-of-the- gap, etc. No. This has been solved. Indeed, so precisely that it is only a question of solving diophantine equation to compare the physics of machine and the physics we infer from observation. Primary matter is a matter-of-the-gap, OK. But not the matter as described by the introspective machine. Not the matter (because that actually is concretely sensed), You might be dreaming. but forces, fields, and laws because they are magical ideas that appear out of nowhere and do things without any tangible presence. It's just haunted space. That the haunting of the space can be precisely mapped and deconstructed mathematically does not give it the power to change matter. What has been overlooked is the possibility that matter is an appearance within experience, of experience which has alienated itself - followed different histories in parallel or phase-shift. I am merging all of the empty bubbles and finding that none could be anything more or less than sense. This cannot satisfy me, as I am looking to some understanding of what is sense, where does it come from, why does it provide non justifiable feature like consciousness, etc. There is no understanding needed to what sense is - it is the most self-evident phenomena possible as it is self-evidence period, full stop. Yes, you are right. But it is not evident in any communicable way, if only because it escapes definition. So we can't use it to do a theory of 1p. It is an important data, and its immediacy and obviousness is certainly a clue. Then, if you do the math, you can intellectually understand why machines looking inward describes something which looks very much like that. All that is, is because it has been made evident within some sensory context. You bet. It is OK. There is nothing there to be evident except for this relativity of presence shared with the contents and contexts of eternity. Justification is nothing but a sense of comparison among subordinate sense experience. You are looking for something that you have already found but won't accept it. I found it in my head, and I show that all universal machine looking in their head can find something quite similar. You are just insulting the machine, by what looks like prejudice, as you admit not trying to study them. I am showing you *all of this* is sense, and you are responding that you are looking for something *else*. Not really. I want to understand the origin of sense. If you accept the premise however (yes, doctor of primordial identity pansensitivity) then you must accept that it is ontologically impossible that there could be anything *else*, by definition. I want my proof to be mechanically checkable. I play the game of science, you don't. I have no problem with that, except when you draw negative conclusion. Humans are used to make negative prose on possible others. To make prose and get negative proposition is, with all my naive frankness, bad philosophy. Jewish, Black, Indians, Women, Gay, Marijuana smokers, are often victims of that type of philosophy. Unlike Comp, it does not assert the supremacy of arithmetic truth, but then add in dreaming numbers, resurrection by mechanical incantation, duplicated persons, machines emulating other machines which think they aren't machines (even though Comp prohibits any possibility of what else there would be besides machines.). Not at all. Arithmetical Truth is full of gods, and daemons, which are non-machines. Comp is a vaccine against the reductionism of the finite, and the infinite. To understand comp is to understand the abyssalness of the mindscape. Comp prohibits nothing, not even 0=1,
Re: Universe from Pixels?
On 29 Oct 2013, at 17:12, Chris de Morsella wrote: If true – ESA experimental measurements of the polarization of ranges of gamma rays (over a range of energies) from very distant gamma ray bursts that have travelled across billions of light years of spacetime to reach earth. Their experiments determined that spacetime does not have a granular structure, which would have had a measurable effect on the polarization of these distant gamma rays, down to a level of 10^-48 m (which is exceedingly small)) trillions of times smaller than the Planck scale. Spacetime does not appear to be granular – at least down to these incredibly small scales. These results have lead me to question any hypothesis that seems to depend on spacetime having a discreet granular structure. Do you know if those are the results considered as refuting loop gravity? In fact, I find intuitive that a quantized gravitation lead to a quantization of space-time curvature, and itself, but comp seems to fit better with continuous space time, as it multitplies the comp- histories in a very smooth way. In the universal dovetailing, the winner universal subdovetailers on the programs defined on some rich ring structure, might be the winner, but of course that remains to be shown. Those questions are very hard. Bruno From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of spudboy...@aol.com Sent: Tuesday, October 29, 2013 7:04 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Universe from Pixels? Here is a link, which makes things seem very, curious, if true. http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2013/10/our-universe-is-made-up-of-indivisible-building-blocks-like-tiny-atoms.html#more -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: If John Clark was lying and Bruno has not changed his mind and you is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki. It is correct from 3rd POV, Yes. not from 1st POV... Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, and every experiment ever performed has only produced half the amount of information needed to disprove it. True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: If John Clark was lying and Bruno has not changed his mind and you is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki. It is correct from 3rd POV, Yes. not from 1st POV... Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? That I don't die. Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. He did not... So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. That has *always* been the definition. It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. He never did. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, No *each you* sees only *one* result. and every experiment ever performed has only produced half the amount of information needed to disprove it. The only question ask is the probability you see moscow (resp. washington) likewise in MWI the question ask is the probality you see spin up... Answering 100% is simply false from 1st POV as can be seen by lookint at the diary. True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet. We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only of step 3 and always have been. Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2013/10/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: If John Clark was lying and Bruno has not changed his mind and you is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki. It is correct from 3rd POV, Yes. not from 1st POV... Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? That I don't die. Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. He did not... So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. That has *always* been the definition. It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. He never did. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, No *each you* sees only *one* result. and every experiment ever performed has only produced half the amount of information needed to disprove it. The only question ask is the probability you see moscow (resp. washington) likewise in MWI the question ask is the probality you see spin up... Answering 100% is simply false from 1st POV as can be seen by looking at the diary. True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet. We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only point of step 3 and always has been. Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On 29 Oct 2013, at 17:07, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
What are the 8 hypostases? I've seen this referred to a few other
times on this list and have never really known what it refers to.
It is eight intensional variants of Gödel's arithmetical predicate,
that all self-referentially correct machines (rich enough, believing
or using the induction axioms, Löbian, ...) inherits from
incompleteness.
They are all equivalent, in the sense that they access to exactly the
same part of arithmetical truth, but they obeys quite different logic,
and those logics provides meta-definition of the points of view.
I have used them also to offer a toy arithmetical interpretation of
Plotinus' theology, so here there are, B is the modal box representing
beweisbar, and D is ~B~(and can be read consistent).
The three primary hypostases:
p (the ONE, arithmetical truth)
Bp (the Intellect, or Intelligible) Gödel's beweisbart('p'), the 3p
self)
Bp p (the knower, the Soul, the 1p self)
The two matters
Bp Dt (the Intelligible Matter)
Bp Dt p (the Sensible Matter)
Three of them split, by the Solovay G/G* splitting, so that for them
the true logic differs from the justfifiable logic (useful for qualia,
and other qualitative aspects available to the machine).
This gives the 8 (main) hypostases.
They are explained in the second part of the sane04 paper, perhaps
with other terms,
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
and also in my Plotinus paper (here is the PDF):
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf
Ask any question. You need some familiarity with incompleteness, but
those modal logics really sum up a large part of the incompleteness
consequences, for machines and many other entities.
UDA, and the comp hypothesis is translated in arithmetic by
restricting p to the sigma_1 sentence. This replace truth with sigma_1
truth. That makes The soul, the intelligible and the sensible matter
obeying a quantum-like logic. The soul by itself obeys an intuitionist
logic, and a quantum intuitionist logic for the sensible matter.
Bruno
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:30:26 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:08:16 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:53:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I refer you to my rare posts where I suggest that the level is the
molecular level, and should include the glial cells, which in my
opinion (from diverse reading) handle to information.
I also defend the idea that an amoeba, by being unicellular, can be
seen as a cell being simultaneously a digestive cell, a muscular
cells, a liver cell, a kidney cell, a bone cell, and a brain cell.
Amoebas are not completely stupid and deserve respects, and so are
any each of our own cells, despite those cells in multicellular
organism have lost a bit of their freedom and universality to
cooperate in what is ourself.
Again, the bold quote illustrates comp, and the fact that the level
is lower than some thought.
Also with comp, consciousness is NOT a product of the mind. that's
still too much an aristotelian way to express the identity
thesis. Consciousness is not physical, it is the mental state of
person associated to machines, when those person develop *some*
true belief.
So if dendrites and molecules are people, why not quarks and
numbers?
Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-
referential means, like quarks.
How do you know? From the article, dendrites seem to be doing what
(we think that) a neuron does.
We can' know. An why would not a dendrite be a puppet manipulated by
neurons.
My hand might have a more complex behavior than a dendrite, yet I do
not consider my hand as a person.
relative numbers does not lack them, but as 3p pure notion, are not
people, but people can emerge from them and their cognitive
abilities.
What do they emerge into,
Into person, or people.
given they lack sensory abilities?
Like molecules or elementary particles and waves.
The person, including the sensory abilities, is what emerge. To be
more correct, the person is just the universal person, already in
Platonia, described by the 8 hypostases, and which quickly believes
itself to be a particular person when forgetting where she comes from.
The sensory abilities are well described by the universal person
canonically associated to the universal machine, in his Bp Dt p
discourse, notably.
The waves, the molecules, eventually the number relations
particularize, or incarnate, the person in different context, but they
don't create the person, nor produce consciousness. (I assume comp, of
course).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 1:01:25 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 16:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:05:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote: What do you call ANY PHYSICS? is there a God given marvel (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable PHYSICS? I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic. Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense contradict such deterministic law. That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed contradicts a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into sense: Laws, Forces, Fields, Wavefunctions, Probability...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re- constellation. Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me. Not at all. What we have now is a force-of-the-gap, field-of-the- gap, etc. No. This has been solved. Indeed, so precisely that it is only a question of solving diophantine equation to compare the physics of machine and the physics we infer from observation. Primary matter is a matter-of-the-gap, OK. But not the matter as described by the introspective machine. Not the matter (because that actually is concretely sensed), You might be dreaming. Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter. but forces, fields, and laws because they are magical ideas that appear out of nowhere and do things without any tangible presence. It's just haunted space. That the haunting of the space can be precisely mapped and deconstructed mathematically does not give it the power to change matter. What has been overlooked is the possibility that matter is an appearance within experience, of experience which has alienated itself - followed different histories in parallel or phase-shift. I am merging all of the empty bubbles and finding that none could be anything more or less than sense. This cannot satisfy me, as I am looking to some understanding of what is sense, where does it come from, why does it provide non justifiable feature like consciousness, etc. There is no understanding needed to what sense is - it is the most self-evident phenomena possible as it is self-evidence period, full stop. Yes, you are right. But it is not evident in any communicable way, if only because it escapes definition. Communicability would be redundant though. Sense has no reason to communicate since any receiver would not be able to communicate unless it could already sense. So we can't use it to do a theory of 1p. The theory of 1p is easy, you just have to imagine the opposite of 3p. It is an important data, and its immediacy and obviousness is certainly a clue. Then, if you do the math, you can intellectually understand why machines looking inward describes something which looks very much like that. I think it would look the same if the machines weren't looking inward at all. The same vending machine can sell cigarettes, candy bars, live ostrich eggs, or just empty space. It doesn't impress me that it doesn't know what the things that it sells are or where they come from. All that is, is because it has been made evident within some sensory context. You bet. It is OK. Sure, but the other bet, that there can be some kind of existence outside of sense, then brings in the implausibility of sense and the necessity for a homunculus regress between sensory and (hypothetical) nonsensory phenomena. There is nothing there to be evident except for this relativity of presence shared with the contents and contexts of eternity. Justification is nothing but a sense of comparison among subordinate sense experience. You are looking for something that you have already found but won't accept it. I found it in my head, and I show that all universal machine looking in their head can find something quite similar. ? Everything can find sense. You are just insulting the machine, by what looks like prejudice, as you admit not trying to study them. To me that's just pointing to the pet rock and saying 'you're hurting his feelings. You should study geology.' I am showing you *all of this* is sense, and you
Re: Step 3
On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Chris, Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details): Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end. It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds? I don't see that as any different. The problem is still what is the referent of the AI. As John Clark points out the AI is ambiguous when there are duplicates. Sometimes Bruno talks about the universal person who is merely embodied as particular persons. So on that view it would be right to say *the* universal person sees Washington and Moscow. But then that's contrary to identifying a person by their memories. My view is that a person is just a useful model, when there is no duplication - and that's true whether the duplication is via Everett or Bruno's teleporter. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Universe from Pixels?
On 10/29/2013 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 17:12, Chris de Morsella wrote: If true – ESA experimental measurements of the polarization of ranges of gamma rays (over a range of energies) from very distant gamma ray bursts that have travelled across billions of light years of spacetime to reach earth. Their experiments determined that spacetime does not have a granular structure, which would have had a measurable effect on the polarization of these distant gamma rays, down to a level of 10^-48 m (which is exceedingly small)) trillions of times smaller than the Planck scale. Spacetime does not appear to be granular – at least down to these incredibly small scales. These results have lead me to question any hypothesis that seems to depend on spacetime having a discreet granular structure. Do you know if those are the results considered as refuting loop gravity? I think so. The paper's at arXiv:1109.5191v2. I don't recognize the 1e-48m. The paper places a limit on the granularity of 525 Planck masses, which is inversely proportional to length, so it's shorter than 1/525 Planck lengths. Brent In fact, I find intuitive that a quantized gravitation lead to a quantization of space-time curvature, and itself, but comp seems to fit better with continuous space time, as it multitplies the comp-histories in a very smooth way. In the universal dovetailing, the winner universal subdovetailers on the programs defined on some rich ring structure, might be the winner, but of course that remains to be shown. Those questions are very hard. Bruno *From:*everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com]*On Behalf Of*spudboy...@aol.com mailto:spudboy...@aol.com *Sent:*Tuesday, October 29, 2013 7:04 AM *To:*everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:*Universe from Pixels? Here is a link, which makes things seem very, curious, if true. http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2013/10/our-universe-is-made-up-of-indivisible-building-blocks-like-tiny-atoms.html#more -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email toeverything-l...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visithttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email toeverything-l...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visithttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3614/6772 - Release Date: 10/22/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Step 3
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:06 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Chris, Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details): Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end. It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds? I don't see that as any different. It is similar, but it never hurts to look at the same problem from different angles. What is a little more evident in this case is that of the 256 possible memories of the AI about to meet its doom, none contain the memory of seeing all 256 possibilities, an in fact, the majority of them see the ball change color back and forth at random. Only 2 see it stay all red or all blue for the last 8 seconds. None of them can predict from the view inside the simulation, whether the ball will stay the same color or change after the next fork occurs. The problem is still what is the referent of the AI. As John Clark points out the AI is ambiguous when there are duplicates. Personal identity is less of an issue in this case, because it concerns the AI or anything/anyone else inside the simulation who might also be viewing the ball. In this way, it is slightly more analogous to MWI since it is the environment which is duplicated, not just the person, and so the apparent random changing of the ball color is also something that can be agreed upon by the group of observers within the simulation. Sometimes Bruno talks about the universal person who is merely embodied as particular persons. So on that view it would be right to say *the* universal person sees Washington and Moscom. But not at the same time or as an integrated experience, so the appearance of randomness still arises from the first person perspective(s). But then that's contrary to identifying a person by their memories. My view is that a person is just a useful model, when there is no duplication - and that's true whether the duplication is via Everett or Bruno's teleporter. What model should be used in a world with duplication, fission machines, mind uploading, split brains, biological clones, amnesia, etc.? Or does personhood no longer make sense at all in the face of such situations? Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one psychological or physiological continuity can be successful. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Step 3
I suggested doing this on FOAR (I used HAL from 2001). It simply makes it easier to visualise if you forget about biological creatures. Assuming comp, an AI is exactly equivalent to a human person, so anything you can do to an AI could be done (in theory) to a human by a teleporter, or to a human by MWI style splitting. What should the AI expect to see? It should expect to see the ball turn red and remain red. There are *copies *of it which see the ball go blue at various points... However this answer doesn't assume comp. According to comp it doesn't know what it will see, or to be more exact it knows that it will see all combinations, but by that time it will no longer be an it but a them. Technically - in this case - we know which ones are the copies and which ones aren't - however comp says that the AI will experience becoming many AIs, with varied experiences. In any case, although one copy is the original, that doesn't really help, because an AI, by its nature, is probably being constantly swapped into different parts of computer memory (or stored on disc), parts of it are being copied, other parts erased, and so on. Comp says none of this matters - that its experiences are at a fundamental level exactly like ours. So. What's wrong with this picture, if anything? On 30 October 2013 09:41, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:06 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Chris, Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details): Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end. It is 11:59 in the simulation, what can the AI expect to see during the next 1 minute and 8 seconds? I don't see that as any different. It is similar, but it never hurts to look at the same problem from different angles. What is a little more evident in this case is that of the 256 possible memories of the AI about to meet its doom, none contain the memory of seeing all 256 possibilities, an in fact, the majority of them see the ball change color back and forth at random. Only 2 see it stay all red or all blue for the last 8 seconds. None of them can predict from the view inside the simulation, whether the ball will stay the same color or change after the next fork occurs. The problem is still what is the referent of the AI. As John Clark points out the AI is ambiguous when there are duplicates. Personal identity is less of an issue in this case, because it concerns the AI or anything/anyone else inside the simulation who might also be viewing the ball. In this way, it is slightly more analogous to MWI since it is the environment which is duplicated, not just the person, and so the apparent random changing of the ball color is also something that can be agreed upon by the group of observers within the simulation. Sometimes Bruno talks about the universal person who is merely embodied as particular persons. So on that view it would be right to say *the* universal person sees Washington and Moscom. But not at the same time or as an integrated experience, so the appearance of randomness still arises from the first person perspective(s). But then that's contrary to identifying a person by their memories. My view is that a person is just a useful model, when there is no duplication - and that's true whether the duplication is via Everett or Bruno's teleporter. What model should be used in a world with duplication, fission machines, mind uploading, split brains, biological clones, amnesia, etc.? Or does personhood no longer make sense at all in the face of such situations? Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one psychological or physiological continuity can be successful. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
Is there life on Mars?
Doesn't look too promising so far. Where are all the tripods and canals? http://mashable.com/2013/10/29/mars-flyover-video/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 2:11:56 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2013, at 17:07, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
What are the 8 hypostases? I've seen this referred to a few other times on
this list and have never really known what it refers to.
It is eight intensional variants of Gödel's arithmetical predicate, that
all self-referentially correct machines (rich enough, believing or using
the induction axioms, Löbian, ...) inherits from incompleteness.
They are all equivalent, in the sense that they access to exactly the same
part of arithmetical truth, but they obeys quite different logic, and those
logics provides meta-definition of the points of view.
I have used them also to offer a toy arithmetical interpretation of
Plotinus' theology, so here there are, B is the modal box representing
beweisbar, and D is ~B~(and can be read consistent).
The three primary hypostases:
p (the ONE, arithmetical truth)
Bp (the Intellect, or Intelligible) Gödel's beweisbart('p'), the 3p self)
Bp p (the knower, the Soul, the 1p self)
My view inverts this, where
S = primordial pansensitivity or Sense (the primordial trans-cardinal
pre-tendency)
M = Motive or projection of Tensed Sense
H = Entropy or alienation of Sense (S/*M)
Q = Qualia (unique aesthetic presence, 1p, local experience, alienated
Sense)
q = quanta (measurement, rules, laws, arithmetic truth, 3p, generic
non-perspective, sense of alienation)
From the interaction of these, I get:
m = Matter (alienated Qualia)
E = Energy (alienated Motive)
K = Significance (recapitulation of Sense, collapse of Entropy)
t = time (quantized Significance)
d = space (quantized Entropy)
g = gravity (anti-Motive of Entropy)
This is a lattice view that is slightly different to emphasize the
separation of the Absolute from sense as well. This separation is more for
linguistic clarity, since sense and the Absolute are the same ultimately.
http://31.media.tumblr.com/fb43e825fda19a996095b7d355983fe7/tumblr_msm9l6YMyI1qeenqko1_500.jpg
Craig
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Re: Leibniz's platonism and the false problem of reductionism in mind and quantum theory
Reductionism is the view that all mental processes can be reduced or explained by brain mechanisms. I thought it was the view that phenomena can be explained by simpler phenomena (until such time as you hit bottom) ? On 30 October 2013 00:09, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Roger, Having just learned a thing or two from Bruno, it strikes me that Leibniz monads are Aristotelian rather than Platonic just like my string cosmology. Richard On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 6:40 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Leibniz's platonism and the false problem of reductionism In physics and psychology we have two enigmas if materialism rules, those of spontaneous mental intentions (so that there is no free will) and also that of spontaneous (probabililistic) events such as we find in statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics. But under Leibniz's platonism, these dilemmas vanish. Reductionism is the view that all mental processes can be reduced or explained by brain mechanisms. But true intentions, where physical actions are initiated by the mind, not the brain, obviously fail this test, so it is a puzzle swept under the rug by the cult of materialism. Free will also then disappears and creation is enigmatic. Leibniz's platonism is the inverse view in which all observed or possible brain functions are controlled by mind, so that reductionism vanishes as a problem and the will, with possibly some limitations, is free to create. All causes in Leibniz's world are thoughts. Similarly, if there is no need Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000] See my Leibniz site at http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On 30 October 2013 07:15, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter. Goo goo goo joob! Sorry, but that does sound like a surreal 60s lyric, though it could maybe do with a bit of poeticisation to really work. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On 30 October 2013 07:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/29/2013 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. That's a very recent idea, indeed. It's so recent that it's well into the future. There are large parts of the Earth where equal rights for women do not exist and are considered wrong and even wicked. True. And of course children do not have full rights anywhere and I don't expect that to change. I'm not sure if you consider this a bad thing, but if so, it's fair to argue that at least in some cases this is for their own good. For example, my children are provided for by their parents, and therefore don't have the rights that would come if they were equal providers in the household. They are birds in a gilded cage. E.g. they don't have the right to carry out actions (like trombone practice) when these would interfere with work that brings in money for their upkeep. Toddlers don't have the right to run into a busy road, or to play with electrical equipment; my children don't have the right to take time off school whenever they like, this is in order to ensure they are properly educated, which is a right they should have but don't always want. Nor do they have the right to only eat unhealthy food, which would cause them problems later in life. They don't have the right to stay out all night, except at a friend's house, because that would be unsafe. And so on. They do have a right to be provided for by their parents, and not to be exploited. They are 12 and 15, and will gradually acquire all the above-mentioned rights as they get older. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 5:27 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:22, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: I know a single concept of people I wonder what´s the new concept of people, different from the one I manage (either philosophical or not) Have they rights? This is a very good question which, in fact, serves well to illustrate how the concept of people is difficult and fluid. I would define a person any entity which behaves in a way which makes me think there is some first person view. Protozoa and perhaps even bacteria, gives me already that felling. I would say that a person is any entity which makes love and reproduce, like most bacteria. Past issues: - Are other races people, do they have right? I guess bacteria benefits from some natural bacteria right, but nature is known to be cruel in that respect. probably a good thing, because the universe would be quickly full of amoeba is they all manage to survive all their duplications ... Of course bacteria does not need human right in the usual sense of the expression. Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. That's a very recent idea, indeed. Current issues: - Are animals people to some degree? With my definition above, they are people. We just don't notice, except children. Of course you can call that a pathetic fallacy. It is still better to attribute too much personhood than to few, ethically. Do they have rights? Many modern societies say yes, and consider some mistreatments of animals to be a crime; All persons deserve respect, even when we eat them. - Are corporations people? American law says yes, and that they have rights like free speech; In my opinion, this is not in the interest of the human individual and it is a threat to the human right. But it is in the interest of some possible multi-humans higher level being. Future issues: - Are aliens people? I would say by definition, unless you call a meteor an alien. Should they have equal rights? Does Alien have the right to eat us? (in case they find us tasty) Does that depend on their level of civilisational development? If yes, where to draw the line? - Are robots people? If they run the right self-referentially correct loop. This is something the humans will do with caution, as you get quickly machines fighting for social security and rights. - Are computer emulations of the minds of dead people people? That's the comp assumption. Crazy issues: - Are spirits and demons people? Islamic law says yes. Is it so crazy? After all some non Turing emulable arithmetical relations are Löbian too. Second order arithmetic is not Turing emulable, and is Löbian, with a divine provability predicate (to use Boolos terming!). Normally, they have even the same fundamental physics. Arithmetic is full of lives, dreams, but there is still place for spirit and daemon. Now, if mathematicians can be said to communicate with them, it is not in any sense compatible with giving them right. They might have possible role in making those right even possible, like arithmetical truth (which is itself such entities, despite not being Löbian at all) makes person and relative realties possible. Of course Nietzsche himself had this to say: Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman -- a rope over an abyss... What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what can be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under... So it doesn't sound that he was convinced that personhood was so clear cut either. Note that in the original German the mensch Übermensch has a meaning closer to person then man. So I actually made a mistake, Nietzsche's concept seems compatible with Bruno's and maybe they wouldn't disagree to much on this. Yes. To be sure, I don't like the idea of Übermensch. At least we know there is no Übermachine. There is just a universal baby god (the universal person/machine) But this is how I see the concept of Übermensch. The idea got horribly distorted by subsequent political events. The ideal of Übermensch is a human that transcends the illusion and becomes aware of it's true (1p) nature. I also see it as close to Buddhist ideas. Telmo. which lost himself in the infinite and infinitely tricky garden provided by his Mom Goddess (Arithmetical truth). Bruno Also wikipedia, for what it's worth: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person Telmo. 2013/10/29 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 9:25 AM, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Cells are people, perhaps. Dendrites and molecules lack self-referential means, like quarks. Then cows are Nietzchian superpeople. That disqualifies half of mi
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On 30 October 2013 13:24, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 6:52:12 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 07:15, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter. Goo goo goo joob! Sorry, but that does sound like a surreal 60s lyric, though it could maybe do with a bit of poeticisation to really work. Laugh if you must, but if you were in a dreaming coma and never wake up, your matter would be as real to you as anything every could be to anyone. If you can define matter in terms other than what has been detected by our minds using our body's sense, and/or an instrument's sense, then you might have cause to doubt me, but nobody has any other definition available to them. Well I did apologise. Anyway I agree with your reply - if you'd said that in the first place, it wouldn't have sounded like gobbledegook. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
That article is very interesting and show how little we know and worst of all, how little we realize how little we know, by the way. 2013/10/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com http://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-10-neuroscientists-mini-neural-brain.html Dendrites, the branch-like projections of neurons, were once thought to be passive wiring in the brain. But now researchers at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill have shown that these dendrites do more than relay information from one neuron to the next. They actively process information, multiplying the brain's computing power. Suddenly, it's as if the processing power of the brain is much greater than we had originally thought, said Spencer Smith, PhD, an assistant professor in the UNC School of Medicine. His team's findings, published October 27 in the journal Nature, could change the way scientists think about long-standing scientific models of how neural circuitry functions in the brain, while also helping researchers better understand neurological disorders. Imagine you're reverse engineering a piece of alien technology, and what you thought was simple wiring turns out to be transistors that compute information, Smith said. That's what this finding is like. The implications are exciting to think about. Axons are where neurons conventionally generate electrical spikes, but many of the same molecules that support axonal spikes are also present in the dendrites. Previous research using dissected brain tissue had demonstrated that dendrites can use those molecules to generate electrical spikes themselves, but it was unclear whether normal brain activity involved those dendritic spikes. For example, could dendritic spikes be involved in how we see? The answer, Smith's team found, is yes. Dendrites effectively act as mini-neural computers, actively processing neuronal input signals themselves. Directly demonstrating this required a series of intricate experiments that took years and spanned two continents, beginning in senior author Michael Hausser's lab at University College London, and being completed after Smith and Ikuko Smith, PhD, DVM, set up their own lab at the University of North Carolina. They used patch-clamp electrophysiology to attach a microscopic glass pipette electrode, filled with a physiological solution, to a neuronal dendrite in the brain of a mouse. The idea was to directly listen in on the electrical signaling process. Attaching the pipette to a dendrite is tremendously technically challenging, Smith said. You can't approach the dendrite from any direction. And you can't see the dendrite. So you have to do this blind. It's like fishing if all you can see is the electrical trace of a fish. And you can't use bait. You just go for it and see if you can hit a dendrite, he said. Most of the time you can't. Once the pipette was attached to a dendrite, Smith's team took electrical recordings from individual dendrites within the brains of anesthetized and awake mice. As the mice viewed visual stimuli on a computer screen, the researchers saw an unusual pattern of electrical signals – bursts of spikes – in the dendrite. Smith's team then found that the dendritic spikes occurred selectively, depending on the visual stimulus, indicating that the dendrites processed information about what the animal was seeing. To provide visual evidence of their finding, Smith's team filled neurons with calcium dye, which provided an optical readout of spiking. This revealed that dendrites fired spikes while other parts of the neuron did not, meaning that the spikes were the result of local processing within the dendrites. Study co-author Tiago Branco, PhD, created a biophysical, mathematical model of neurons and found that known mechanisms could support the dendritic spiking recorded electrically, further validating the interpretation of the data. All the data pointed to the same conclusion, Smith said. The dendrites are not passive integrators of sensory-driven input; they seem to be a computational unit as well. His team plans to explore what this newly discovered dendritic role may play in brain circuitry and particularly in conditions like Timothy syndrome, in which the integration of dendritic signals may go awry. *This revealed that dendrites fired spikes while other parts of the neuron did not, meaning that the spikes were the result of local processing within the dendrites.* Yep, looks like neurons have a nervous system of their own now. Still think that consciousness is a product of the brain? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On 30 October 2013 00:37, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Physics is what happens in the natural world due to natural processes. That sentence should win some kind of prize for containing the most logical fallacies. I suppose you could say causes outside of the physical universe, such as God or top-down causation by consciousness, are part of nature and part of physics, but most people would not use these words this way. From my view, there is no public physical universe that is not also private physical experience. There is no unseen light, no unheard sound, to unfelt bodies. To me, outside the physical universe means only a dream or imagination, where what is felt is uncoupled from public effect. While we dream, our body remains present in its inertial frame of animal experience, but it has no perspective of its own. People's words are outdated. We have played out a hand that was picked centuries ago by dead geniuses. Since then we have not had a chance to pause and reassess what the strange new ideas of Einstein and Heisenberg really mean when we look at the implications of them from the absolute perspective. We have been playing with gigantic machines to study the fantastically distant and tiny, but no matter how far we go, it increasingly doesn't make sense when compared with our own experience, and it increasingly doesn't make sense itself. Multisense Realism is a way to acknowledge that this has become a wild goose chase, and posits that if we start over from scratch, it becomes more sensible to see relativity as identical to perceived awareness, and all physical forces naturally fall out of that awareness as elaboration of sensory motive inertia. Two different feelers sharing the same feeling are entangled. They are not particles but if a third feeler will feel a particulate stimulation from them. Space and time might be created here, by the disentanglement - the indifference and entropy which extends out in response to the significance of making a difference with sense interaction. Craig Consciousness is not externally detectable. If it were, we would not be having these discussions: instead, we would wave the Consciousness Detector over the computer and read out the result. So if consciousness has top-down causal efficacy, that would mean an undetectable force caused matter to move. In experiments, that would look like a magical or supernatural effect. If you don't like the words magical or supernatural then use different words, but no such strange effects have been observed. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On 10/29/2013 4:02 PM, LizR wrote: On 30 October 2013 07:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/29/2013 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. That's a very recent idea, indeed. It's so recent that it's well into the future. There are large parts of the Earth where equal rights for women do not exist and are considered wrong and even wicked. True. And of course children do not have full rights anywhere and I don't expect that to change. I'm not sure if you consider this a bad thing, but if so, it's fair to argue that at least in some cases this is for their own good. For example, my children are provided for by their parents, and therefore don't have the rights that would come if they were equal providers in the household. They are birds in a gilded cage. E.g. they don't have the right to carry out actions (like trombone practice) when these would interfere with work that brings in money for their upkeep. Toddlers don't have the right to run into a busy road, or to play with electrical equipment; my children don't have the right to take time off school whenever they like, this is in order to ensure they are properly educated, which is a right they should have but don't always want. Nor do they have the right to only eat unhealthy food, which would cause them problems later in life. They don't have the right to stay out all night, except at a friend's house, because that would be unsafe. And so on. They do have a right to be provided for by their parents, and not to be exploited. They are 12 and 15, and will gradually acquire all the above-mentioned rights as they get older. That was my point. Children are definitely persons if anyone is - but that's not a reason to bestow all kinds of rights on them. Rights are social constructs. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On 30 October 2013 14:22, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/29/2013 4:02 PM, LizR wrote: On 30 October 2013 07:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/29/2013 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Depressingly, until the middle of the XX century there was no general consensus that all human beings are people with equal rights. That's a very recent idea, indeed. It's so recent that it's well into the future. There are large parts of the Earth where equal rights for women do not exist and are considered wrong and even wicked. True. And of course children do not have full rights anywhere and I don't expect that to change. I'm not sure if you consider this a bad thing, but if so, it's fair to argue that at least in some cases this is for their own good. For example, my children are provided for by their parents, and therefore don't have the rights that would come if they were equal providers in the household. They are birds in a gilded cage. E.g. they don't have the right to carry out actions (like trombone practice) when these would interfere with work that brings in money for their upkeep. Toddlers don't have the right to run into a busy road, or to play with electrical equipment; my children don't have the right to take time off school whenever they like, this is in order to ensure they are properly educated, which is a right they should have but don't always want. Nor do they have the right to only eat unhealthy food, which would cause them problems later in life. They don't have the right to stay out all night, except at a friend's house, because that would be unsafe. And so on. They do have a right to be provided for by their parents, and not to be exploited. They are 12 and 15, and will gradually acquire all the above-mentioned rights as they get older. That was my point. Children are definitely persons if anyone is - but that's not a reason to bestow all kinds of rights on them. Rights are social constructs. Agreed on both points. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 8:40:52 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 13:24, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 6:52:12 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 07:15, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter. Goo goo goo joob! Sorry, but that does sound like a surreal 60s lyric, though it could maybe do with a bit of poeticisation to really work. Laugh if you must, but if you were in a dreaming coma and never wake up, your matter would be as real to you as anything every could be to anyone. If you can define matter in terms other than what has been detected by our minds using our body's sense, and/or an instrument's sense, then you might have cause to doubt me, but nobody has any other definition available to them. Well I did apologise. Anyway I agree with your reply - if you'd said that in the first place, it wouldn't have sounded like gobbledegook. It's no problem, I don't mind if people think it sounds ridiculous (I can often see it that way too if I read it again a couple days) I just have had so many thousands of hours of conversation with people which are like 70% complaints about how I write or what right I have to say anything, 25% being told warmed over versions of freshman year science class, and maybe 5% actually talking about whether this model I'm talking about might actually work. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On 30 October 2013 14:26, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 8:40:52 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 13:24, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 6:52:12 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 07:15, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter. Goo goo goo joob! Sorry, but that does sound like a surreal 60s lyric, though it could maybe do with a bit of poeticisation to really work. Laugh if you must, but if you were in a dreaming coma and never wake up, your matter would be as real to you as anything every could be to anyone. If you can define matter in terms other than what has been detected by our minds using our body's sense, and/or an instrument's sense, then you might have cause to doubt me, but nobody has any other definition available to them. Well I did apologise. Anyway I agree with your reply - if you'd said that in the first place, it wouldn't have sounded like gobbledegook. It's no problem, I don't mind if people think it sounds ridiculous (I can often see it that way too if I read it again a couple days) I just have had so many thousands of hours of conversation with people which are like 70% complaints about how I write or what right I have to say anything, 25% being told warmed over versions of freshman year science class, and maybe 5% actually talking about whether this model I'm talking about might actually work. I'd be happy to join the 5% if I could understand it. Since I've managed to understand comp up to the MGA that should be a possibility. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 9:08:53 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On 30 October 2013 00:37, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Physics is what happens in the natural world due to natural processes. That sentence should win some kind of prize for containing the most logical fallacies. I suppose you could say causes outside of the physical universe, such as God or top-down causation by consciousness, are part of nature and part of physics, but most people would not use these words this way. From my view, there is no public physical universe that is not also private physical experience. There is no unseen light, no unheard sound, to unfelt bodies. To me, outside the physical universe means only a dream or imagination, where what is felt is uncoupled from public effect. While we dream, our body remains present in its inertial frame of animal experience, but it has no perspective of its own. People's words are outdated. We have played out a hand that was picked centuries ago by dead geniuses. Since then we have not had a chance to pause and reassess what the strange new ideas of Einstein and Heisenberg really mean when we look at the implications of them from the absolute perspective. We have been playing with gigantic machines to study the fantastically distant and tiny, but no matter how far we go, it increasingly doesn't make sense when compared with our own experience, and it increasingly doesn't make sense itself. Multisense Realism is a way to acknowledge that this has become a wild goose chase, and posits that if we start over from scratch, it becomes more sensible to see relativity as identical to perceived awareness, and all physical forces naturally fall out of that awareness as elaboration of sensory motive inertia. Two different feelers sharing the same feeling are entangled. They are not particles but if a third feeler will feel a particulate stimulation from them. Space and time might be created here, by the disentanglement - the indifference and entropy which extends out in response to the significance of making a difference with sense interaction. Craig Consciousness is not externally detectable. Externality is not detectable outside of consciousness. Which would make perfect sense if physics supervenes on consciousness (really sense). If it were, we would not be having these discussions: instead, we would wave the Consciousness Detector over the computer and read out the result. So if consciousness has top-down causal efficacy, that would mean an undetectable force caused matter to move. No, it would mean nothing of the sort. Every force is detectable only through consciousness. There is no force outside of consciousness, no charge or field. All of it is feeling and somewhat intentional effect. No matter how many times I say it, how many metaphors I use, you will never be able to see that the director of a movie need not be present within the movie projector to cause the movie to occur. Your view of the universe has no room for you to exist in it. It has no discernment between life and death, person or object. You would need a massive brain event to interrupt your left hemisphere long enough to guess that there is a whole other half of the universe that you are missing. In experiments, that would look like a magical or supernatural effect. If you don't like the words magical or supernatural then use different words, but no such strange effects have been observed. Every effect that can ever be observed is a strange effect. You aren't getting that sense is Absolute. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 9:29:21 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 14:26, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 8:40:52 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 13:24, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 6:52:12 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 07:15, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter. Goo goo goo joob! Sorry, but that does sound like a surreal 60s lyric, though it could maybe do with a bit of poeticisation to really work. Laugh if you must, but if you were in a dreaming coma and never wake up, your matter would be as real to you as anything every could be to anyone. If you can define matter in terms other than what has been detected by our minds using our body's sense, and/or an instrument's sense, then you might have cause to doubt me, but nobody has any other definition available to them. Well I did apologise. Anyway I agree with your reply - if you'd said that in the first place, it wouldn't have sounded like gobbledegook. It's no problem, I don't mind if people think it sounds ridiculous (I can often see it that way too if I read it again a couple days) I just have had so many thousands of hours of conversation with people which are like 70% complaints about how I write or what right I have to say anything, 25% being told warmed over versions of freshman year science class, and maybe 5% actually talking about whether this model I'm talking about might actually work. I'd be happy to join the 5% if I could understand it. Since I've managed to understand comp up to the MGA that should be a possibility. Sure, it seems like you are picking up on it so far. I'm always available for questions. The main thing is to go to the very root assumptions of Western cosmology and flip them. Instead of a universe from nothing, I start from everything and then move inward through masking. Sense is subtractive, like the spectrum is from white light. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neuroscientists discover new 'mini-neural computer' in the brain
On 10/29/2013 4:17 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: But this is how I see the concept of Übermensch. The idea got horribly distorted by subsequent political events. The ideal of Übermensch is a human that transcends the illusion and becomes aware of it's true (1p) nature. I also see it as close to Buddhist ideas. I certainly agree that Nietzsche's Ubermensch has been horribly distorted. Although anybody who is claimed as a philosophical ancestor by the Nazis and Ayn Rand must have been doing something wrong. :-) But the Buddhist idea is to withdraw from the world. Nietzsche's idea is to engage it, amor fati. The will to power is the creative drive. To create art. To create oneself. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On 10/29/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote: On 30 October 2013 13:24, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 6:52:12 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 07:15, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter. Goo goo goo joob! Sorry, but that does sound like a surreal 60s lyric, though it could maybe do with a bit of poeticisation to really work. Laugh if you must, but if you were in a dreaming coma and never wake up, your matter would be as real to you as anything every could be to anyone. If you can define matter in terms other than what has been detected by our minds using our body's sense, and/or an instrument's sense, then you might have cause to doubt me, but nobody has any other definition available to them. There is another definition and is in fact the one we use. Matter is the stuff we agree about with other people as having certain properties of duration and location. Of course if you're a solipist you're on you're own. Brent Well I did apologise. Anyway I agree with your reply - if you'd said that in the first place, it wouldn't have sounded like gobbledegook. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3615/6790 - Release Date: 10/29/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
Bruno, Craig and Learned discussion partners: it is hard even to read-in into the endless back-and-forth you exude. At least for me - pretending that I still retain may subjectivity (don't misunderstand: I deny anything 'objective' if not adjusted by our own sub). We are not capable of even following the infinite complexity of which we got little morsels to chew on. Now I have a question: What would you call *- S E N S E -* ? Craig: *the Absolute*. We cannot know anything 'absolute', only a humanly adjusted shadow of it. Bruno states that the *arithmetic* 'truth' *can* (or rather *could?*) express the absolute - but never showed - even tried how to DO IT. Not even hinted to a method HOW to attempt it. ( Comp? or using many-many numbers???) *In your brain*??? WHO is there pretending to be the SELF (I) ? whatever is in our brain (matter, physiological energy, motion and connectivity) has been accounted for in reductionist sciences - no *'sense'* sowed up. If we detect 'something like that', it is self-referential* thinking* and changes from era to era (maybe only in days). No 1st person. We just think of it. And *feel so*. And: talk about it. So: what are we talking about? John M On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 16:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:05:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote: What do you call ANY PHYSICS? is there a God given marvel (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable PHYSICS? I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic. Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense contradict such deterministic law. That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed contradicts a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into sense: Laws, Forces, Fields, Wavefunctions, Probability...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re- constellation. Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me. Not at all. What we have now is a force-of-the-gap, field-of-the- gap, etc. No. This has been solved. Indeed, so precisely that it is only a question of solving diophantine equation to compare the physics of machine and the physics we infer from observation. Primary matter is a matter-of-the-gap, OK. But not the matter as described by the introspective machine. Not the matter (because that actually is concretely sensed), You might be dreaming. but forces, fields, and laws because they are magical ideas that appear out of nowhere and do things without any tangible presence. It's just haunted space. That the haunting of the space can be precisely mapped and deconstructed mathematically does not give it the power to change matter. What has been overlooked is the possibility that matter is an appearance within experience, of experience which has alienated itself - followed different histories in parallel or phase-shift. I am merging all of the empty bubbles and finding that none could be anything more or less than sense. This cannot satisfy me, as I am looking to some understanding of what is sense, where does it come from, why does it provide non justifiable feature like consciousness, etc. There is no understanding needed to what sense is - it is the most self-evident phenomena possible as it is self-evidence period, full stop. Yes, you are right. But it is not evident in any communicable way, if only because it escapes definition. So we can't use it to do a theory of 1p. It is an important data, and its immediacy and obviousness is certainly a clue. Then, if you do the math, you can intellectually understand why machines looking inward describes something which looks very much like that. All that is, is because it has been made evident within some sensory context. You bet. It is OK. There is nothing there to be evident except for this relativity of presence shared with the contents and contexts of eternity. Justification is nothing but a sense of comparison among subordinate sense experience. You are looking for something that you have already found but won't accept it. I found it in my head, and I show that all universal machine looking in their head can find something quite similar. You are just insulting the machine, by what looks like prejudice, as you admit not trying to study them. I am showing you *all of this* is sense, and you are responding that you are
RE: Step 3
Hi Jason (again) in your response to Brent: Personally I believe no theory that aims to attach persons to one psychological or physiological continuity can be successful. ok, but in Bruno's step 3 it is taken as axiomatic that you survive in both branches because there is a continuity of psychological phenomena like memory. this is the 'yes doctor' axiom. Being an axiom Bruno doesn't need to defend it. We are obliged to assume it. That said, taking issue with it is tantamount to admitting that we do not survive the teleportation, in which case the probability of me seeing Moscow or Washington is 0. There is a concept of the observer moment. A discrete snippet of experience and the UD is churning these out willy nilly in a digital form. Or maybe they're all just there in an infinite plenitude of blah. Now the observer moments can be in any old order. A moment from tomorrow can be churned out before a moment from yesterday. Identity emerges as a trace of coherent memory. There is no need for an inherent order between the elements so long as there is some means of coherently connecting the observer moments. In this scheme the order is implicit in the notion of coherent memory.To use an analogy from IT , I suspect its the difference between sorting an array of shuffled digital cards or just keeping track of pointers to cards in an array when shuffling. Like wise physics emerges in this coherent trace. For example, in one observer moment a pen is dropped. Whats next? An observer moment where the pen goes down? One where it goes up? One where it goes right or left? All these moments are catered for in the infinite plenitude. So physics, here the law of gravity, becomes an investigation into a psychologically consistent trace of pen moments. All those where the pen keeps going down in my trace. Its going to be tricky to keep track of traces because they criss-cross. That is, all moments in some sense are coherent with one another. The pen down one vertical voxel is a consistent with moments where the pen is at any of the voxel neighbors, up down, left right, back forward. Taking different velocities into account it doesn't even have to be a neighboring voxel. Where is velocity anyway? Is it between the moments? Within the moments. A problem here I think. Anyway, the point is that continuity between moments seems to me to be a big, big deal in this scenario. So, if you are of the view that continuity isn't even sufficient to maintain identity then I wonder to what degree you really are on the same page as Bruno. best regards. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: Step 3 Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 02:18:43 + Hi Jason You're presenting the exact same situation in a different context in the hope that it will clarify the issues for me, I suppose. My response is exactly the same for your new version as it is for the original. The same as it is for Bruno's example in which the duplications involved explode to cover every possible permutation of pixel combinations that could occur over a 90 minute period on a telly. Perhaps a better tack might be to accept that I understand the issues under debate, and address the arguments that I offer directly rather than claim 'misunderstanding' etc. How can uncertainty arise in a subject who believes he knows all the relevent facts? How does a prediction of 50/50 not contravene the axiom that I survive anihilation and duplication into two (any number of) branches? regards. Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 10:12:55 +1300 Subject: Re: Step 3 From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com I suggested doing this on FOAR (I used HAL from 2001). It simply makes it easier to visualise if you forget about biological creatures. Assuming comp, an AI is exactly equivalent to a human person, so anything you can do to an AI could be done (in theory) to a human by a teleporter, or to a human by MWI style splitting. What should the AI expect to see? It should expect to see the ball turn red and remain red. There are copies of it which see the ball go blue at various points... However this answer doesn't assume comp. According to comp it doesn't know what it will see, or to be more exact it knows that it will see all combinations, but by that time it will no longer be an it but a them. Technically - in this case - we know which ones are the copies and which ones aren't - however comp says that the AI will experience becoming many AIs, with varied experiences. In any case, although one copy is the original, that doesn't really help, because an AI, by its nature, is probably being constantly swapped into different parts of computer memory (or stored on disc), parts of it are being copied, other parts erased, and so on. Comp says none of this matters - that its experiences are at a fundamental level exactly like ours. So. What's wrong with this picture, if anything? On
RE: Douglas Hofstadter Article
-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Telmo Menezes Sent: Monday, October 28, 2013 2:32 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 10:49 PM, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote: -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Telmo Menezes Sent: Friday, October 25, 2013 2:38 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 10:30 PM, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote: -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Friday, October 25, 2013 10:46 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Douglas Hofstadter Article On 10/25/2013 3:24 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: My high-level objection is very simple: chess was an excuse to pursue AI. In an era of much lower computational power, people figured that for a computer to beat a GM at chess, some meaningful AI would have to be developed along the way. I don' thing that Deep Blue is what they had in mind. IBM cheated in a way. I do think that Deep Blue is an accomplishment, but not_the_ accomplishment we hoped for. Tree search and alpha-beta pruning have very general application so I have no doubt they are among the many techniques that human brains use. Also having a very extensive 'book' memory is something humans use. But the memorized games and position evaluation are both very specific to chess and are hard to duplicate in general problem solving. So I think chess programs did contribute a little to AI. The Mars Rover probably uses decision tree searches sometimes. Agreed. Some manner (e.g. algorithm) of pruning the uninteresting branches -- as they are discovered -- from dynamic sets of interest is fundamental in order to achieve scalability. Without being able to throw stuff out as stuff comes in -- via the senses (and meta interactions with the internal state of mind -- such as memories) -- an being will rather quickly gum up in information overload and memory exhaustion. Without pruning; growth grows geometrically out of control. There is pretty good evidence -- from what I have read about current neural science -- that the brain is indeed, throwing away a large portion of raw sensory data during the process of reifying these streams into the smooth internal construct or model of reality that we in fact experience. In other words our model -- what we see, what we hear, taste, smell, feel, orient [a distinct inner ear organ] (and perhaps other senses -- such as the sense of the directional flow of time perhaps as well)... in any case this construct, which is what we perceive as real contains (and is constructed from) only a fraction of the original stream of raw sensorial data. In fact in some cases the brain can be tricked into editing actual real sense supplied visual reality for example literally out of the picture -- as has experimentally been demonstrated. We do not experience the real world; we experience the model of it, our brains have supplied us with, and that model, while in most cases is pretty well reflective of actual sensorial streams, it crucially depends on the mind's internal state and its pre-conscious operations... on all the pruning and editing that is going on in the buffer zone between when the brain begins working on our in-coming reality perception stream and when we -- the observer -- self-perceive our current stream of being. It also seems clear that the brain is pruning as well by drilling down and focusing in on very specific and micro-structure oriented tasks such as visual edge detection (which is a critical part of interpreting visual data) for example. If some dynamic neural micro-structure decides it has recognizes a visual edge, in this example, it probably fires some synchronized signal as expeditiously as it can, up the chain of dynamically forming and inter-acting neural-decision-nets, grabbing the next bucket in an endless stream needing immediate attention. I would argue that nervous systems that were not adept at throwing stuff out as soon as its information value decayed, long ago became a part of the food supply of long ago ancestor life forms with nervous systems that were better at throwing stuff out, as soon as it was no longer needed. I would argue there is a clear evolutionary pressure for optimizing environmental response through efficient (yet also high fidelity) pruning algorithms in order to be able to maximize neural efficiency and speed up sense perception (the reification that we perceive unfolding before us) This is also a factor in speed of operation, and in survival a
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 9:57:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 10/29/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote: On 30 October 2013 13:24, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 6:52:12 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 30 October 2013 07:15, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Matter is concrete sense that extends to the inertial frame of the body. Get rid of your body, and your dream is matter. Goo goo goo joob! Sorry, but that does sound like a surreal 60s lyric, though it could maybe do with a bit of poeticisation to really work. Laugh if you must, but if you were in a dreaming coma and never wake up, your matter would be as real to you as anything every could be to anyone. If you can define matter in terms other than what has been detected by our minds using our body's sense, and/or an instrument's sense, then you might have cause to doubt me, but nobody has any other definition available to them. There is another definition and is in fact the one we use. Matter is the stuff we agree about with other people as having certain properties of duration and location. Of course if you're a solipist you're on you're own. What is stuff? I would say that stuff is what has been detected by our minds using our body's sense, and/or an instrument's sense, is it not? We agree about lots of things having properties of duration and location. A headache for example. Brent Well I did apologise. Anyway I agree with your reply - if you'd said that in the first place, it wouldn't have sounded like gobbledegook. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3615/6790 - Release Date: 10/29/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Neural activity in the brain is harder to disrupt when we are aware of it
On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:17:40 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Bruno, Craig and Learned discussion partners: it is hard even to read-in into the endless back-and-forth you exude. At least for me - pretending that I still retain may subjectivity (don't misunderstand: I deny anything 'objective' if not adjusted by our own sub). We are not capable of even following the infinite complexity of which we got little morsels to chew on. Now I have a question: What would you call *- S E N S E -* ? Experience. To receive from and participate in anything other than nothing. To discern between difference and indifference and to make a difference that can be discerned. Craig: *the Absolute*. We cannot know anything 'absolute', only a humanly adjusted shadow of it. In one sense I agree - in another, being able to make that statement would be equally impossible under the same logic. We cannot know that we cannot know. The fact that we can 'know' anything, and that knowledge is locally certain but absolutely uncertain also gives us some insight. If sense is the Absolute, then it's presence is universal, and this would help explain the paradoxical nature of epistemology...it is relative in an absolute sense, and absolute in a relative sense, or even absoluteness *as* relative sense. Bruno states that the *arithmetic* 'truth' *can* (or rather *could?*) express the absolute - but never showed - even tried how to DO IT. Not even hinted to a method HOW to attempt it. ( Comp? or using many-many numbers???) *In your brain*??? WHO is there pretending to be the SELF (I) ? whatever is in our brain (matter, physiological energy, motion and connectivity) has been accounted for in reductionist sciences - no *'sense'* sowed up. If we detect 'something like that', it is self-referential* thinking* and changes from era to era (maybe only in days). No 1st person. We just think of it. And *feel so*. And: talk about it. So: what are we talking about? Yes, it is hard to get around that little problem of who or how would matter and energy pretend to be bound together as a person, when doing so would require that they are already aware of each other. It's circular reasoning...the pile of puppet parts that pretends to be fooled into acting like the puppet that it never was. Craig John M On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 1:01 PM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 16:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 10:56:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2013, at 14:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 29, 2013 3:05:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 19:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 28, 2013 1:38:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2013, at 15:12, John Mikes wrote: What do you call ANY PHYSICS? is there a God given marvel (like any other religious miracle to believe in) callable PHYSICS? I think Stathis was referring to any third person describable lawful laws, not relying to actual infinities or magic. Craig want to add some primary sense, and make that sense contradict such deterministic law. That would be silly. Nothing that I have ever proposed contradicts a single scientific observation, by definition. I am not adding anything, I am absorbing all disembodied pseudo-substances into sense: Laws, Forces, Fields, Wavefunctions, Probability...all of that invisible voodoo is gone. It's all primordial pansensitivity experiencing its own alienation and re- constellation. Looks like a sense-of-the-gap to me. Not at all. What we have now is a force-of-the-gap, field-of-the- gap, etc. No. This has been solved. Indeed, so precisely that it is only a question of solving diophantine equation to compare the physics of machine and the physics we infer from observation. Primary matter is a matter-of-the-gap, OK. But not the matter as described by the introspective machine. Not the matter (because that actually is concretely sensed), You might be dreaming. but forces, fields, and laws because they are magical ideas that appear out of nowhere and do things without any tangible presence. It's just haunted space. That the haunting of the space can be precisely mapped and deconstructed mathematically does not give it the power to change matter. What has been overlooked is the possibility that matter is an appearance within experience, of experience which has alienated itself - followed different histories in parallel or phase-shift. I am merging all of the empty bubbles and finding that none could be anything more or less than sense. This cannot satisfy me, as I am looking to some understanding of what is sense, where does it come from, why does it provide non justifiable feature like consciousness, etc. There is no understanding needed to what sense is - it is the
If human beings are nothing more than matter, why are you conscious as yourself?
A Quora answer to the following question. Nothing new for me here probably, but It's maybe organized in a more concise way. Philosophy: If human beings are nothing more than matter, why are you conscious as yourself?http://www.quora.com/Philosophy/If-human-beings-are-nothing-more-than-matter-why-are-you-conscious-as-yourself The implication of materialism is that we are in essence wet robots, without free will, just chemical reactions. But if this is true and we are conscious, then does it logically follow that all chemical reactions have consciousness to some degree? If the human mind is just an extremely advanced computer, then at what point does consciousness occur? We don’t know that chemical reactions are unconscious, but if they were, then it makes sense that the entire universe would also be unconscious. It is very tricky to examine the issue of consciousness and to draw parallels within common experience without unintentionally smuggling in our own expectations from consciousness itself. This is the Petito principii or circular reasoning which derails most fair considerations of consciousness before they even begin in earnest. Unlike a clock which is made up of gears, or a particular sized pile of hay, the addition of consciousness has no conceivable consequence to the physical function of a body. While we can observe a haystack burst into flames because it has grown too hot, we cannot look at the behavior of a human body see any special difference from the behavior of any other physical body. There is complexity, but complexity alone need not point to anything beyond an adjacency of simple parts and isolated chains of effects. Just as no degree of complication within a clock’s mechanism would suddenly turn into a Shakespearean sonnet, the assumption of universal substitution is not necessarily appropriate for all phenomena, and for consciousness in particular. To get a color image, for instance, we need to print in colored dots, not black and white. Color TV programs cannot be broadcast over a monochrome display without losing their color. Unlike chemical or mechanical transformation, the nature of awareness is not implicated in the shuffling of material particles from one place or another. Any natural force can be used to do that. We have no scientific reason to insist that conscious participation and aesthetic appreciation is derived from some simpler functioning of complex systems. To the contrary, ‘complexity’, and ‘system’ can only make sense in the context of a window of perception and attention. Without some teleological intent to see one part as part of a whole, and to compare remembered events with current perceptions, there is no such thing as ‘function’ at all. There are several important points wrapped up in this question, which I will try to sum up. *1. The failure to consider consciousness metaphysically.* This is the most important and most intractable issue, for three reasons: - because it is difficult for anyone to try to put their mind outside of mind. It’s annoying, and winds up feeling foolish and disoriented. - because it is difficult in particular for the very people who need most to get past the difficulty. I have found that most people who are good with logic and scientific reasoning are not necessarily capable of doing what others can. The skillset appears to be neurological, like handedness or gender orientation. - because those who do have difficulty with thinking this way are often not used to intellectual challenges that escape their grasp, their reaction is so defensive that they react with intolerance. It’s not their fault, but it cannot be cured it seems. Some people cannot see 3-D Magic Eye art. Some cannot program their way out of a paper bag. In this case it is the ability to consider consciousness from a prospective rather than a retrospective view which can prove so inaccessible to so many people, that frothing at the mouth and babbling about unicorns, magic, and the supernatural is considered a reasonable and scientific, skeptical response. Of course, it is none of those things, but it takes a lot of patience and courage to be able to recognize one’s own prejudices, especially when we are used to being the ones telling others about their biases. *2. The taboo against metaphysics, panpsychism, and transrationality* Long after Einstein, Gödel, and Heisenberg shattered the Humpty Dumpty certainties of classical math and physics, we are still trying to piece him back together. Regardless of how much we learn about the strange properties of matter, time, energy, biology, and neurology, there are a huge number of very intelligent people who are convinced that we will only know the truth about the universe when it all looks like a vast deterministic mechanism. The compulsion to reduce awareness to passive mathematical or
Re: Step 3
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 3:12 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I suggested doing this on FOAR (I used HAL from 2001). It simply makes it easier to visualise if you forget about biological creatures. Assuming comp, an AI is exactly equivalent to a human person, so anything you can do to an AI could be done (in theory) to a human by a teleporter, or to a human by MWI style splitting. What should the AI expect to see? It should expect to see the ball turn red and remain red. Should it expect (expect as in place a high probability on) that? Only 1 of the 256 actually see that happen. It is far more likely to see an incompressible pattern. There are *copies *of it which see the ball go blue at various points... However this answer doesn't assume comp. The existence of a conscious AI implicitly assumes comp (at least for some types of observers, you could still like Craig argue that computers cannot support *your* experience, only some limited class of experience). According to comp it doesn't know what it will see, or to be more exact it knows that it will see all combinations, but by that time it will no longer be an it but a them. Technically - in this case - we know which ones are the copies and which ones aren't - however comp says that the AI will experience becoming many AIs, with varied experiences. I think we can all agree on this (LizR, Bruno, Clark, Chris, myself, etc.): *If* the AI (or all of them) went through two tests, test A, and test B A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times *Then *the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. === If you agree with this, that is sufficient to reach the main point of step 3, which is the two tests are subjectively indistinguishable. Expecting the ball to change color at random (test B), and being iteratively duplicated and seeing all possibilities in different instances (test A), are absolutely indistinguishable from any point of view that exists inside the simulation. No one inside the simulation can determine whether test A was happening, or whether test B was happening. It is a very simple point, and I don't think anyone here would argue that an observer within the simulation could distinguish between the two cases. If you happen to disagree that an entity within the simulation could distinguish between test A or test B (that is to say, that they could guess whether test A or test B was happening with greater than a 50% probability) then please state how that can be done. Otherwise, you understand the point of step 3 sufficiently to move on and there is no more need to argue about pronouns, personal identity, which you you happen to be, etc. If anyone does not provide an argument for how the AI, or AIs, (or any observer or entity) within the simulation could distinguish these cases, and continues to argue about pronouns, personal identity, etc., then I think the only conclusion that remains is that such a person has little or no interest in advancing their own or anyone else's understanding and is simply being a troll. The point is crystal clear and indisputable in this situation, it doesn't matter how the AI is programmed: there is no way for any entity in the simulation to distinguish between an inherently random process (test B) from a wholly deterministic one (test A). If you think you know a way, then please tell us how. If you see no way, then you accept step 3, which is that the appearance of subjective indeterminacy can arise in an objectively deterministic processes. (Note the above is not aimed at any person in particular. If anyone can show where the reasoning is wrong, please do so.) In any case, although one copy is the original, that doesn't really help, because an AI, by its nature, is probably being constantly swapped into different parts of computer memory (or stored on disc), parts of it are being copied, other parts erased, and so on. Comp says none of this matters - that its experiences are at a fundamental level exactly like ours. So. What's wrong with this picture, if anything? What do you mean by one copy is the original? How can you distinguish an original from a copy? Jason On 30 October 2013 09:41, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:06 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/29/2013 8:19 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Chris, Perhaps it is simpler to think about first person indeterminacy like this (it requires some familiaraity with programming, but I will try to elaborate those details): Imagine there is a conscious AI inside a
