Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> LizR wrote:
>>>
 On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett >>> > wrote:

 Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
 philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
 by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
 discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
 an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
 metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.

 Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the
 reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of
 unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)

>>>
>>> And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much an
>>> unevidenced metaphysical assumption.
>>>
>>
>> But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it, his
>> theory in outline is:
>>
>> 1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
>> 2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
>> 3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
>> 4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that
>> correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
>> 5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by
>> computed relations between the computed physics and our computed thoughts.
>> 6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so
>> realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the
>> multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds which he
>> hopes to show have "low measure".
>>
>
> I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of his
> theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list. But that
> aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even if all of this
> goes through? I do not think it explains consciousness. It seems to stem
> from the idea that consciousness is a certain type of computation (that can
> be emulated in a universal Turing machine, or general purpose computer.)
> This is then developed as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that the
> physical world and our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about that world,
> are also certain types of computations.
>
> But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the
> alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and arguing
> that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of brains, and that
> mathematics is an inference from our physical experiences. Consciousness
> supervenes on computations? What sort of computation? Why on this sort and
> not any other sort? Similar questions arise in the physicalist account of
> course, but proposing a new theory that does not answer any of the
> questions posed by the original theory does not seem like an advance to me.
> At least physicalism has evolutionary arguments open to it as an
> explanation of consciousness
>
> The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical world
> directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some abstract
> computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be given any meaning.)
> If you take the degree of agreement with observation as the measure of
> success of a theory, then physicalism wins hands down. Bruno's theory does
> not currently produce any real physics at all.
>
> The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is merely
> a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem open to
> philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions seem
> self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to move beneath
> me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these reasons.
>

Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the brain is
Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's reasoning in the
UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a primary physical world.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruce Kellett]

meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.

Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the 
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of 
unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much 
an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it, his 
theory in outline is:


1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that 
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by 
computed relations between the computed physics and our computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so 
realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the 
multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds which 
he hopes to show have "low measure".


I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of his 
theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list. But 
that aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even if all of 
this goes through? I do not think it explains consciousness. It seems to 
stem from the idea that consciousness is a certain type of computation 
(that can be emulated in a universal Turing machine, or general purpose 
computer.) This is then developed as a form of idealism (2 above) to 
argue that the physical world and our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs 
about that world, are also certain types of computations.


But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the 
alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and arguing 
that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of brains, and 
that mathematics is an inference from our physical experiences. 
Consciousness supervenes on computations? What sort of computation? Why 
on this sort and not any other sort? Similar questions arise in the 
physicalist account of course, but proposing a new theory that does not 
answer any of the questions posed by the original theory does not seem 
like an advance to me. At least physicalism has evolutionary arguments 
open to it as an explanation of consciousness


The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical world 
directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some abstract 
computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be given any 
meaning.) If you take the degree of agreement with observation as the 
measure of success of a theory, then physicalism wins hands down. 
Bruno's theory does not currently produce any real physics at all.


The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is 
merely a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem open 
to philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions seem 
self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to move 
beneath me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these reasons.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 16 Apr 2015, at 06:34, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> LizR wrote:
>>
>>> On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>>
>>> LizR wrote:
>>>
>>> On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark >>  >> >> wrote:
>>>
>>> Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
>>> Bruno
>>> had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
>>> uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3
>>> is only a small
>>> step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
>>> consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
>>> duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
>>> duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
>>> what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
>>>
>>>
>>> You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
>>> case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
>>> and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
>>> if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
>>>
>>> That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the copy
>>> sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will I be
>>> transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect, might not make
>>> the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through either way.
>>>
>>
>> No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree that
>> they were the same person.
>>
>>  Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
>>> worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
>>>
>>> I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ?
>>> This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which according
>>> to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains).
>>>
>>
>> In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated made
>> that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.
>
>
> Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The
> respect/civility in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so
> for years. It's not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to see how
> often he can get away with airing personal issues clothed in sincerity of
> intellectual debate.
>
> This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm sitting.
> I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to address say Telmo's
> request for clarification in Bruno's use of phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or
> pedagogical demonstrations on "the* work* arithmetic existentially 
> *actualizes/gets
> done*", clarification on Russell's use of "robust", physicalist theories
> that don't eliminate consciousness etc.
>
>
> Good and interesting questions indeed.
>
> I, of course would be delighted if people try to really grasp the phi_i,
> the G/G* distinction, and the subtle but key point of the fact that the
> arithmetical reality simulates computations, as opposed to merely generates
> descriptions of them.
>
> I am bit buzy right now.  Feel free to tell me which one of those point
> seems to you the more interesting, or funky.
>

Funkiest would be "arithmetical reality simulates computations" aka free
lunch :)

But I've picked up and guess that people seem to miss use of "phi_i" or
"Sigma 1 sentences" and such terms.

So, you thought you could offer me a hand and... I take the arm and more: 1
of those point = 3 + infinite possibility of "other such terms". PGC-
Zombie hunting armchair ninja of numbers.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[LizR]

On 17 April 2015 at 04:54, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  meekerdb  wrote:
>
>
>> > If the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric
>>
>
> Even if the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric  events
> would still not be time symmetrical if the initial condition was a state of
> minimum entropy because then any change in that state would lead to a
> increase in entropy, and the arrow of time would be born.
>

Yes you also have to consider global boundary conditions.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[meekerdb]

On 4/16/2015 9:54 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> If the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric


Even if the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric  events would still not 
be time symmetrical if the initial condition was a state of minimum entropy because then 
any change in that state would lead to a increase in entropy, and the arrow of time 
would be born.


In a deterministic, time-symmetric system  there is no information loss with evolution 
either to the past or future. So the entropy is zero and stays zero - unless you choose 
some incomplete/approximate specification of the initial condition.  But of course that 
won't be a state of minimum entropy because the minimum was zero.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[meekerdb]

On 4/16/2015 6:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 13:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical sophistication. 
Computationalism is based on the idea that human consciousness is Turing emulable,
This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some point you might 
understand that this is not really the case. Comp assumes only that we can survive ith 
a digital brain, in the quasi-operational meaning of the "yes doctor" scenario. 
Consciousness is a first person notion, and that is not Turing emulable per se, in 
fact that is not even definable in any 3p term. That is part of the difficulty of the 
concept.


In COMP(2013) you write:
"The digital mechanist thesis (or computationalism, or just "comp") is then equivalent 
to the hypothesis that there is a level of description of that part of reality in which 
"my" consciousness remains invariant through a functional digital emulation of that 
generalized brain at that particular level."


I think this is saying that human consciousness is Turing emulable.


Only by using an identity thesis, which later will need to be abandonned. My 
consciousness is in Platonia, out of time and space, and might rely on infinities of 
computations. What the brain does  consists in making it possible for that consciousness 
to manifest itself.


That seems problematic.  What is a consciousness conscious of when it is not manifesting 
itself?  To whom does it manifest itself when it is manifest?  ISTM it's only manifest to 
itself - which on your theory wouldn't require a brain.


Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

[meekerdb]

On 4/16/2015 2:12 AM, LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 14:23, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


LizR wrote:

In Bruno's "COMP 2013" paper he says
 The notion of the first person, or the conscious knower, admits the
simplest possible definition: it is provided by access to basic
memories. Consciousness, despite its non-definability, facilitates
the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have used
digital machines instead.

Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by 
step 3.
Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the contents 
of
memories. Whether one "really" survives being teleported, or falling 
asleep and
waking up the next day, isn't relevant. "Moscow man" is just the guy who
remembers being Helsinki man, then finding himself in Moscow (for 
example).
Hence Helsinki man can't predict any first person experience, only what 
will
happen from a 3p view. Or if he didn't know duplication was involved, 
he would
assume that he had a 50-50 chance of ending up in M or W.


But this is a rather self-serving definition -- designed to fit in with the
conclusion he wants to draw. We are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty
dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary, everyday meaning.


In what way is it self-serving? It seems quite reasonable to say that a person is their 
memories, at least in a lot of important senses (Brent says it quite often, and he isn't 
a huge fan of comp).


As a side issue, I think it's the same - or similar - to the definition that was used by 
Everett? I haven't read his paper for a while but I seem to remember he used something 
like this, after all, what else can you really use apart from memory if you want to 
study how identity will persist over time within a given theory of physics? (For 
contrast, consider amnesia cases or the guy in "Memento").


That's an interesting question (although Bruno always says it's not relevant to his 
argument).  Having a coherent, narrative memory seems like an obvious desideratum.  But as 
you point out the guy in "Memento" stays the same person even though he can't form new 
long-term memories.  So another possibility is what we would call in AI "running the same 
program".  This seems to be what is captured by "counter-factual correctness".  Of course 
any human-level AI will learn and so there will be divergence; but in a sense one could 
say two instances a program instantiated the same "person" with different memories.  It 
would correspond to having the same character and predilections.  For example we might 
build several intelligent Mars Rovers that are landed in different places.  They would 
start with the same AI and memories (as installed at JPL) but as they learned and adapted 
they would diverge.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[meekerdb]

On 4/16/2015 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as having been duplicated 
in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.


How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?


By associating it with different token of the machinery implementing it.



Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different spacetime location 
can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set of thoughts?


No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?


I'm not sure what 3-1 view means, but if you mean in the sense of running on two different 
machines then I agree.  That means duplication of consciousness/computation depends on 
distinguishability of the physical substrate with no distinction in the 
consciousness/computation.  But is that the duplication envisioned in the M-W thought 
experiment?


I find I'm confused about that.  In our quantum-mechanical world it is impossible to 
duplicate something in an unknown state.  One could duplicate a human being in the rough 
classical sense of structure at the molecular composition level, but not the molecular 
states.  Such duplicates would be similar as I'm similar to myself of yesterday - but they 
would instantly diverge in thoughts, even without seeing Moscow or Washington.  Yet it 
seems Bruno's argument is based on deterministic computation and requires the duplication 
and subsequent thoughts to be duplicates at a deterministic classcial level so that the 
M-man and W-man on diverge in thought when they see different things in their respective 
cities.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[meekerdb]

On 4/16/2015 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 05:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

   LizR wrote:
   On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> >> wrote:
   Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
   Bruno
   had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
   uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only 
a small
   step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
   consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
   duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
   duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
   what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
   You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
   case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
   and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
   if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the copy sitting in the 
chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will I be transported to Moscow or 
Washington?" and hence, I suspect, might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise 
the argument goes through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree that they were the 
same person.



   Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
   worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ? This is a 
classical result, assuming classical computation (which according to Max Tegmark is a 
reasonable assumption for brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated made that he 
accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3. Step 3 is basically to introduce the idea 
of FPI, and hence form a link with the MWI of quantum mechanics. This may not always 
have been made explicit, but the intention is clear.


It is not made at all. people who criticize UDA always criticize what they add 
themselves to the reasoning. This is not valid. People who does that criticize only 
themselves, not the argument presented.



Step 3 does not succeed in this because the inference to FPI depends on a flawed 
concept of personal identity.



Step 3 leads to the FPI, and to see what happens next, there is step 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
Then the translation in arithmetic show how to already extract the logic of the 
observable so that we might refute a form of comp (based on comp + the classical theory 
of knowledge). That main point there is that incompleteness refutes Socrates argument 
against the Theaetetus, 


Which argument do you refer to?  Theaetetus puts forward several theories of knowledge 
which Socrates attempts to refute.


Brent

and we can almost directly retrieve the Parmenides-Plotinus "theology" in the discourse 
of the introspecting universal (Löbian) machine.


Bruno




Bruce

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[meekerdb]

On 4/16/2015 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:52, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb > wrote:


On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou" mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> a écrit :

> Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
> that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
> logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to 
see
that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things 
about
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical
commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and 
the
reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is 
true
consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

Quentin


In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.  Not just, 
an
instrospective "well everybody knows what it is".


Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some level. Is that enough 
to be a propositional definition?


I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether computational process 
means a physical process or an abstract one.  If you take "computational process" to be 
the abstract process "in Platonia" then it would not be duplicable;


?

The UD "copied" the "abstract" process an infinity of times. It might appear in

phi_567_(29)^45, phi_567_(29)^46, phi_567_(29)^47, phi_567_(29)^48, phi_567_(29)^49, phi_567_(29)^50, 
... and in


phi_8999704_(0)^89,   phi_8999704_(0)^90,  phi_8999704_(0)^91,  phi_8999704_(0)^92, 
 phi_8999704_(0)^93,


I don't understand your notation here.  Does phi_i(x) refer to the ith function in some 
list of all functions?  And does the exponent refer to repeated iteration: phi_i(x)^n+1 := 
phi_i(phi_i(x)^n)?








every copy would just be a token of the same process.  I think that's what 
Bruno means.


The consciousness will be the same, but it is multiplied (in some 3-1 sense) in UD* 
(sigma_1 truth).


Are you saying that identity of indiscernibles doesn't apply to these 
computations?

Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[meekerdb]

On 4/16/2015 1:03 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> >> wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is 
only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are incompatible. Can you 
formulate a protocol where the copies sit down for a chat and arrive at a contradiction 
of the UDA's conclusion?


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and Washington man. You 
could have the two reconstructions in the same room and label them as machine-A man and 
machine-B man and let them interact immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, 
because the conclusion does not depend on the copies having a chat or not. It would 
just make the argument harder to follow.


No, the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as the original. It is 
that illusion that is hard to maintain if they have a chat and realize that they are 
different people. The real issue is personal identity through time, and in the case of 
ties for closest follower, as in this case, it fits better with the notions of personal 
identity to say that the copies are both new persons -- inheriting a lot from the 
original of course, but the original single person has not become two of the *same* person.


It just seems like a semantic problem to me.  We use "same" in two different senses.  I'm 
the same-1 person I was yesterday, but I'm not identical, same-2, with that person.  So 
the M-man and W-man are the same-1 person as the H-man, but they are not the same-2 as 
each other.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[meekerdb]

On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.


Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the reverse, people who 
argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of unexamined metaphysical assumptions 
(like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much an unevidenced 
metaphysical assumption.


But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it, his theory 
in outline is:

1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that correspond to 
intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by computed relations 
between the computed physics and our computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so realizes the model 1-5 
in all possible ways and this produces the multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely 
many other worlds which he hopes to show have "low measure".


Brent


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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015 at 10:23 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> We are entering the realm of the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no
> longer have their ordinary, everyday meaning.


Yes. According to Bruno the words "atheist" and "Christian" mean almost the
same thing with atheism being just a very minor variation of Christianity.
And the word "God" means a unintelligent non-conscious amorphous impersonal
blob that doesn't answer prayers and in fact doesn't do much of anything at
all, nevertheless according to Bruno "God" exists and is very important for
reasons never made clear. And "free will" means... well it means noise
shaped air as near as I can tell.

  John K Clark

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[John Clark]

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>> the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as the
> original.
>


>> No one assume that.
>


> John Clark assumes this,


Of course I assume it, it's the only logical conclusion and I assume that
logic is more likely to find the truth than illogic, although Quinton has
publicly stated other ideas on that subject.


> > I have locally assume it too, but only to refute Clark argument. That
> might explain your confusion,


But it doesn't explain my confusion, do you agree that both copies are
equally the same person as the original or do you not?

  John K Clark


>

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[John Clark]

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  meekerdb  wrote:


> > If the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric
>

Even if the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric  events
would still not be time symmetrical if the initial condition was a state of
minimum entropy because then any change in that state would lead to a
increase in entropy, and the arrow of time would be born.


> > From a Copenhagen perspective QM prevents us from ever having complete
> information
>

And from a Many Worlds perspective too.  Copenhagen says the information
just does not exist and Many Worlds says the information exists but we can
never have access to it even in theory. Either way we will never have the
information and because it makes no operational difference who is right
explains why so many physicists are uninterested in the Copenhagen / Many
Worlds debate.

  John K Clark

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 04:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:

In Bruno's "COMP 2013" paper he says
   The notion of the first person, or the conscious knower,  
admits the

  simplest possible definition: it is provided by access to basic
  memories. Consciousness, despite its non-definability,  
facilitates
  the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have  
used

  digital machines instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant  
by step 3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity  
beyond the contents of memories. Whether one "really" survives  
being teleported, or falling asleep and waking up the next day,  
isn't relevant. "Moscow man" is just the guy who remembers being  
Helsinki man, then finding himself in Moscow (for example). Hence  
Helsinki man can't predict any first person experience, only what  
will happen from a 3p view. Or if he didn't know duplication was  
involved, he would assume that he had a 50-50 chance of ending up  
in M or W.


But this is a rather self-serving definition -- designed to fit in  
with the conclusion he wants to draw. We are entering the realm of  
the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their  
ordinary, everyday meaning.
In science, all popular terms are redefined. This is just  
clarification. You could attack Einstein and say that he refines  
terms to suit his conclusion. You can pretend that those mad people  
who pretend that the earth is round have just redefined the meaning  
of earth. It is a universal critics bearing on the whole of science.


At some point you need to relate the terms of your theories to the  
real everyday world. If your theory relies on some particular  
definition of personal identity, then you have to show that this  
definition means that your are talking about real, ordinary,  
everyday people. If your terms do not relate, then your theory has  
no content.


Sure. Can you tell me specifically where you have a problem with?





Einstein, through his theories, changed our understanding of the  
nature of space and time. But he did this in terms of common, well  
understood concepts such as clocks and measuring rods. If he had  
redefined the basic concept of measurement, then people would  
certainly have asked him what he was talking about. Science does not  
work by definition. Sometimes technical terms are required, and  
these need to be defined, but unless such terms are ultimately  
related to standard concepts, then there is no evidence that the  
theory has anything to do with the real world. In science, of  
course, the ultimate test is always observation -- a successful  
theory has to accord with observation, when it is usually the case  
that technical terms are of secondary importance. The abstract  
theory of today is taught in high school in a few years time.


No problem. That is why I use diaries to axiomatize a part of the  
meaining of the first and third person notion used in the reasoning. I  
have never had any problem with this, except John Calrk, who shows  
that he understand, but that he will not read step 4 anyway.


What is is that is unclear?






You must take the definition given, and study the proof, that's  
all. if not, you are the one using argument of popularity which are  
authoritative argument, and are non valid.


No, it is not an argument from authority. That is an unreasonable  
accusation. What I am requiring is that the terms you use, like the  
concept of personal identity, are related to the meaning such terms  
have in the real world.


tell me specifically what you don't understand. Study the work, step  
by step/ be careful with the post. In some post I talk to people  
having already grasped UDA1-7, in other even with people having a good  
idea of Step 8, etc.


Avoid patronizing and avoid ad hominem remark. Focus on the subject.

Also, it is better to avoid an ontological commitment, and use only  
the assumption used in the reasoning.



If you are not talking about real people, then it is difficult to  
see any merit in the theory.


That's a total obvious remark which insinuate that I might not do  
that. Please, make specific remark. At which step of the UDA do you  
have a problem? I have still no clue.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 13:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical  
sophistication. Computationalism is based on the idea that human  
consciousness is Turing emulable,
This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some point  
you might understand that this is not really the case. Comp assumes  
only that we can survive ith a digital brain, in the quasi- 
operational meaning of the "yes doctor" scenario. Consciousness is  
a first person notion, and that is not Turing emulable per se, in  
fact that is not even definable in any 3p term. That is part of the  
difficulty of the concept.


In COMP(2013) you write:
"The digital mechanist thesis (or computationalism, or just "comp")  
is then equivalent to the hypothesis that there is a level of  
description of that part of reality in which "my" consciousness  
remains invariant through a functional digital emulation of that  
generalized brain at that particular level."


I think this is saying that human consciousness is Turing emulable.


Only by using an identity thesis, which later will need to be  
abandonned. My consciousness is in Platonia, out of time and space,  
and might rely on infinities of computations. What the brain does   
consists in making it possible for that consciousness to manifest  
itself.


Saying that consciousness is Turing emulable is only a way to sum up  
the idea, but taken too much literally, it will create a problem later.




A consequence of this is, of course, that we can survive in a  
digital brain: "...I can survive, in the usual clinical sense, with  
an artificial digital (generalized) brain."


I think you are just shuffling words when you then say that  
consciousness is not Turing emulable per se.


Read further. You don't act like someone trying to understand, but  
like someone wanting to not understand.








which just says that human-like AI is possible on a sufficiently  
sophisticated computer. But,as Bruno says, consciousness is not  
duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, what another's  
consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate or  
not.

OK.


My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI  
will diverge so rapidly from the original once it is installed and  
run on another computer that there is no sense in which it is ever  
the 'same' consciousness.

That will not work on a virtual AI, which are purely deterministic.


But the copies are in different environments, even in virtual worlds.


In virtual worlds, we can make the environment identical, for some  
times.






That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a  
person, my consciousness changes from moment to moment with  
changing thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain the same  
person. Can two spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the  
same person? I don't think so, even if they stem from the same  
digital copy at some point. M-man and W-man are different persons,  
and neither is the unique closest continuer of H-man, so it is not  
that H-man is uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.
That is equivalent with saying that you would not die if teleported  
from here to 2 mm away, but would die from teleportation from here  
to mars, so you reject step 2.


I don't know what you are talking about. The distance of the  
teleportation is not an issue. If you take the closest continuer  
notion of personal identity, then the being reconstructed from the  
teleported AI program corresponding to me will be my unique closest  
continuer. This remains true even if there is a time delay of  
centuries before the reconstruction. The only requirement is that  
there is no closer continuer of my person, and no closer predecessor  
of the new reconstruction than the original me.


If you continue this to step 5, where you take the copy and install  
that in a new body without destroying the original, then there is a  
unique continuer -- the continuing body and mind. The copy is a new  
person. Similarly, if you reconstruct now a copy of me taken a year  
ago, that copy bears even less relation to the /me/ of now than one  
reconstructed from a recent copy.


Closer continuer theory makes sense of these permutations. The only  
stipulation is that in the case of ties for closest continuer,  
totally new persons are created. Using shared memories as your only  
criterion for personhood leads to many difficulties.


So in step 4, where a delay of reconstitution is introduced in Moscow,  
you say that the probability is higher to be the person reconstituted  
in W than in Moscow?







This does not make sense with computationalism, as the brain would  
notice a difference that a computer could not notice by  
construction, unless you add releveant but non Turing emulable  
magical properties in the wires.


I don't see this at all. We are talking ab

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 11:55, LizR wrote:


On 15 April 2015 at 19:58, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

Bruno, I can go back as far as 2008 for such discussions with John  
Clark in my gmail archives about step 3... it's useless to continue  
to answer him (at least on your work, and surely on anything else),  
he will never accept anything, and will never go beyond that point,  
he doesn't want to have a genuine discussion... it will go back in  
circle again, he will mock your acronyms, he will say, he doesn't  
know what step 1,2 are, he will do biased comparisons, he will say  
it's stupid, or false or stupid again etc etc etc... you give him  
hours of your live that he doesn't deserve...


Jeez, I had no idea. I'd have given up long ago if I was him...


... and it started a long time before on the FOR list.  I suggested to  
John to continue the discussion on the everything-list.

I should have avoided that proposition, perhaps.

The problem is that when you don't debunk lies and rhetorical hand  
waving, they can stay for a very long time. The lies started in 1973.  
The price LE MONDE made them spreading since 1998.


A part of the academical world does not appreciate I have witnessed  
the existence of moral harassment in university. But those who gave me  
the price in Paris insisted that  I describe this in a book, as they  
knew it is a real big problem in many social and professional circles.
Things have progressed, as now moral harassment is legally punishable,  
and some people have won trial in my country.


In most academies, like in the church, such moral and sexual  
harassment remains taboo, and frequent.



Bruno






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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 10:03, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:

   LizR wrote:
   On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> >> wrote:
   Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

   Bruno
   had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
   uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
   step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

   consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
   duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
   duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
   what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
   You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
   case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
   and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

   if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are  
incompatible. Can you formulate a protocol where the copies sit  
down for a chat and arrive at a contradiction of the UDA's  
conclusion?

Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
   worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and  
Washington man. You could have the two reconstructions in the same  
room and label them as machine-A man and machine-B man and let them  
interact immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, because  
the conclusion does not depend on the copies having a chat or not.  
It would just make the argument harder to follow.


No, the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as  
the original.


No one assume that.

John Clark assumes this, and in that case, I have locally assume it  
too, but only to refute Clark argument. That might explain your  
confusion, but it is better to stick to the original proof, instead of  
speculating from local answer to local refutation.


We assume only that the (generalized) brain is Turing emulable at some  
level such that consciousness remains invariant.


Bruno


It is that illusion that is hard to maintain if they have a chat and  
realize that they are different people. The real issue is personal  
identity through time, and in the case of ties for closest follower,  
as in this case, it fits better with the notions of personal  
identity to say that the copies are both new persons -- inheriting a  
lot from the original of course, but the original single person has  
not become two of the *same* person.







Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 06:34, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
>> wrote:


LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> >> wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will  
I be transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect,  
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes  
through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree  
that they were the same person.


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation  
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for  
brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated  
made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.


Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The respect/ 
civility in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so  
for years. It's not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to  
see how often he can get away with airing personal issues clothed in  
sincerity of intellectual debate.


This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm  
sitting. I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to  
address say Telmo's request for clarification in Bruno's use of  
phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or pedagogical demonstrations on "the  
work arithmetic existentially actualizes/gets done", clarification  
on Russell's use of "robust", physicalist theories that don't  
eliminate consciousness etc.


Good and interesting questions indeed.

I, of course would be delighted if people try to really grasp the  
phi_i, the G/G* distinction, and the subtle but key point of the fact  
that the arithmetical reality simulates computations, as opposed to  
merely generates descriptions of them.


I am bit buzy right now.  Feel free to tell me which one of those  
point seems to you the more interesting, or funky.


My problem is that the difficulties reside here in the logic-branch-of- 
math, not really in my work, and attempt to dig in the math on a forum  
is difficult.


Bruno




I enjoy when the list gets funky in such direction, and even though  
I am invested in environmental sector professionally, perhaps some  
of the climate change stuff is a bit out of topic. This as pure  
opinion. Nobody gets two cents from me as I'd be poor if  
consistent ;-) PGC




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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

[Bruce Kellett]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 04:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:

In Bruno's "COMP 2013" paper he says
The notion of the first person, or the conscious knower, admits the
   simplest possible definition: it is provided by access to basic
   memories. Consciousness, despite its non-definability, facilitates
   the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have used
   digital machines instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by 
step 3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the 
contents of memories. Whether one "really" survives being teleported, 
or falling asleep and waking up the next day, isn't relevant. "Moscow 
man" is just the guy who remembers being Helsinki man, then finding 
himself in Moscow (for example). Hence Helsinki man can't predict any 
first person experience, only what will happen from a 3p view. Or if 
he didn't know duplication was involved, he would assume that he had 
a 50-50 chance of ending up in M or W.


But this is a rather self-serving definition -- designed to fit in 
with the conclusion he wants to draw. We are entering the realm of the 
Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary, 
everyday meaning.


In science, all popular terms are redefined. This is just clarification. 
You could attack Einstein and say that he refines terms to suit his 
conclusion. You can pretend that those mad people who pretend that the 
earth is round have just redefined the meaning of earth. It is a 
universal critics bearing on the whole of science.


At some point you need to relate the terms of your theories to the real 
everyday world. If your theory relies on some particular definition of 
personal identity, then you have to show that this definition means that 
your are talking about real, ordinary, everyday people. If your terms do 
not relate, then your theory has no content.


Einstein, through his theories, changed our understanding of the nature 
of space and time. But he did this in terms of common, well understood 
concepts such as clocks and measuring rods. If he had redefined the 
basic concept of measurement, then people would certainly have asked him 
what he was talking about. Science does not work by definition. 
Sometimes technical terms are required, and these need to be defined, 
but unless such terms are ultimately related to standard concepts, then 
there is no evidence that the theory has anything to do with the real 
world. In science, of course, the ultimate test is always observation -- 
a successful theory has to accord with observation, when it is usually 
the case that technical terms are of secondary importance. The abstract 
theory of today is taught in high school in a few years time.



You must take the definition given, and study the proof, that's all. if 
not, you are the one using argument of popularity which are 
authoritative argument, and are non valid.


No, it is not an argument from authority. That is an unreasonable 
accusation. What I am requiring is that the terms you use, like the 
concept of personal identity, are related to the meaning such terms have 
in the real world. If you are not talking about real people, then it is 
difficult to see any merit in the theory.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruce Kellett]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical 
sophistication. Computationalism is based on the idea that human 
consciousness is Turing emulable,


This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some point you 
might understand that this is not really the case. Comp assumes only 
that we can survive ith a digital brain, in the quasi-operational 
meaning of the "yes doctor" scenario. Consciousness is a first person 
notion, and that is not Turing emulable per se, in fact that is not even 
definable in any 3p term. That is part of the difficulty of the concept.


In COMP(2013) you write:
"The digital mechanist thesis (or computationalism, or just "comp") is 
then equivalent to the hypothesis that there is a level of description 
of that part of reality in which "my" consciousness remains invariant 
through a functional digital emulation of that generalized brain at that 
particular level."


I think this is saying that human consciousness is Turing emulable. A 
consequence of this is, of course, that we can survive in a digital 
brain: "...I can survive, in the usual clinical sense, with an 
artificial digital (generalized) brain."


I think you are just shuffling words when you then say that 
consciousness is not Turing emulable per se.



which just says that human-like AI is possible on a sufficiently 
sophisticated computer. But,as Bruno says, consciousness is not 
duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, what another's 
consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate or not.


OK.


My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI will 
diverge so rapidly from the original once it is installed and run on 
another computer that there is no sense in which it is ever the 'same' 
consciousness.


That will not work on a virtual AI, which are purely deterministic.


But the copies are in different environments, even in virtual worlds.


That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person, my 
consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing thoughts and 
external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two spatially 
distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I don't think so, 
even if they stem from the same digital copy at some point. M-man and 
W-man are different persons, and neither is the unique closest 
continuer of H-man, so it is not that H-man is uncertain of his future 
-- he doesn't have one.


That is equivalent with saying that you would not die if teleported from 
here to 2 mm away, but would die from teleportation from here to mars, 
so you reject step 2.


I don't know what you are talking about. The distance of the 
teleportation is not an issue. If you take the closest continuer notion 
of personal identity, then the being reconstructed from the teleported 
AI program corresponding to me will be my unique closest continuer. This 
remains true even if there is a time delay of centuries before the 
reconstruction. The only requirement is that there is no closer 
continuer of my person, and no closer predecessor of the new 
reconstruction than the original me.


If you continue this to step 5, where you take the copy and install that 
in a new body without destroying the original, then there is a unique 
continuer -- the continuing body and mind. The copy is a new person. 
Similarly, if you reconstruct now a copy of me taken a year ago, that 
copy bears even less relation to the /me/ of now than one reconstructed 
from a recent copy.


Closer continuer theory makes sense of these permutations. The only 
stipulation is that in the case of ties for closest continuer, totally 
new persons are created. Using shared memories as your only criterion 
for personhood leads to many difficulties.


This does not make sense with computationalism, as 
the brain would notice a difference that a computer could not notice by 
construction, unless you add releveant but non Turing emulable magical 
properties in the wires.


I don't see this at all. We are talking about emulating people, which 
includes sense data inputs from an external world with which the person 
can interact. This can be a physical world or a virtual world, but such 
a world is required for your talk about consciousness to make sense. 
Remember, you assured me that there was no sensory deprivation involved 
in any of this. External worlds tend to have calendars, clocks, and 
geography -- we can readily tell if we have been transported through 
space and/or time.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thursday, April 16, 2015, LizR  wrote:

> On 15 April 2015 at 19:58, Quentin Anciaux  > wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno, I can go back as far as 2008 for such discussions with John Clark
>> in my gmail archives about step 3... it's useless to continue to answer him
>> (at least on your work, and surely on anything else), he will never accept
>> anything, and will never go beyond that point, he doesn't want to have a
>> genuine discussion... it will go back in circle again, he will mock your
>> acronyms, he will say, he doesn't know what step 1,2 are, he will do biased
>> comparisons, he will say it's stupid, or false or stupid again etc etc
>> etc... you give him hours of your live that he doesn't deserve...
>>
>> Jeez, I had no idea. I'd have given up long ago if I was him...
>

There's something about participants in lists like this: they tend to have
a far, far greater tolerance for debating the same thing over and over.
It's a bit like gamblers - they may know rationally they probably won't
win, but they do it anyway.


-- 
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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[LizR]

On 15 April 2015 at 19:58, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>
> Bruno, I can go back as far as 2008 for such discussions with John Clark
> in my gmail archives about step 3... it's useless to continue to answer him
> (at least on your work, and surely on anything else), he will never accept
> anything, and will never go beyond that point, he doesn't want to have a
> genuine discussion... it will go back in circle again, he will mock your
> acronyms, he will say, he doesn't know what step 1,2 are, he will do biased
> comparisons, he will say it's stupid, or false or stupid again etc etc
> etc... you give him hours of your live that he doesn't deserve...
>
> Jeez, I had no idea. I'd have given up long ago if I was him...

>
>

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Telmo Menezes]

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 10:03 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>> LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark >  > >> wrote:
>>
>> Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
>> Bruno
>> had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
>> uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3
>> is only a small
>> step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
>> consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
>> duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
>> duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
>> what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
>>
>>
>> You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
>> case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
>> and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
>> if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
>>
>> The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are incompatible.
>> Can you formulate a protocol where the copies sit down for a chat and
>> arrive at a contradiction of the UDA's conclusion?
>>  Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
>> worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
>>
>> It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and
>> Washington man. You could have the two reconstructions in the same room and
>> label them as machine-A man and machine-B man and let them interact
>> immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, because the conclusion does
>> not depend on the copies having a chat or not. It would just make the
>> argument harder to follow.
>>
>
> No, the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as the
> original. It is that illusion that is hard to maintain if they have a chat
> and realize that they are different people.


The argument is that the two copies share the same personal diary
pre-duplication, nothing more. A chat will only confirm this.


> The real issue is personal identity through time, and in the case of ties
> for closest follower, as in this case, it fits better with the notions of
> personal identity to say that the copies are both new persons -- inheriting
> a lot from the original of course,


I think it's important to avoid mushiness. The copies inherit *everything*
from the original because we assume comp (the hypothesis that there is some
level of substitution at which a mind can be replaced with an equivalent
computation). The moment immediately after the duplication the copies start
diverging -- it is not longer the same computation. But they will share all
memories before the duplication event.


> but the original single person has not become two of the *same* person.


This is never claimed.

Telmo.


>
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: For Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Apr 2015, at 13:56, Kim Jones wrote:





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Thanks Kim.

Bruno





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"I'm not saying there aren't a lot of dangerous people out there. I  
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Re: For Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 00:33, Kim Jones wrote:



Getting back to this Bruno quote that Liz threw in:



On 15 Apr 2015, at 7:05 pm, LizR  wrote:

"This makes quanta into a particular case of qualia, being somehow  
sharable, and making physical reality a first person plural reality"


So what would happen if everyone died in some cataclysm, except  
for one person?


Is the belief that nothing would change for that person apart from  
the perception of solitude as the last being on Earth being mooted  
meant to falsify or shed doubt on the comp notion of quanta being  
"sharable qualia"?


Wouldn't it be more likely to support the notion given that you  
would almost certainly go bonkers rather quickly but be unable any  
longer to be sure. I imagine that certain other aspects of reality  
might well cease to exist (in one's perception, but that might be  
all there is). Whether they actually cease to exist or only cease to  
exist for one brings us back to "who is deluded and about what are  
they supposed to be deluded?"



Sharable means (or will mean, according to the context) sharable among  
all Löbian numbers. It is in arithmetic, where we are immune to any  
cataclysm. We share this with all universal numbers, which like prime  
numbers, cannot be touched by earthly events, but of course, universal  
numbers can be deluded on many things, except their consciousness.


Bruno






Kim


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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

[LizR]

On 16 April 2015 at 14:23, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> In Bruno's "COMP 2013" paper he says
>>  The notion of the first person, or the conscious knower, admits the
>> simplest possible definition: it is provided by access to basic
>> memories. Consciousness, despite its non-definability, facilitates
>> the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have used
>> digital machines instead.
>>
>> Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by step
>> 3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond the contents
>> of memories. Whether one "really" survives being teleported, or falling
>> asleep and waking up the next day, isn't relevant. "Moscow man" is just the
>> guy who remembers being Helsinki man, then finding himself in Moscow (for
>> example). Hence Helsinki man can't predict any first person experience,
>> only what will happen from a 3p view. Or if he didn't know duplication was
>> involved, he would assume that he had a 50-50 chance of ending up in M or W.
>>
>
> But this is a rather self-serving definition -- designed to fit in with
> the conclusion he wants to draw. We are entering the realm of the
> Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary, everyday
> meaning.
>

In what way is it self-serving? It seems quite reasonable to say that a
person is their memories, at least in a lot of important senses (Brent says
it quite often, and he isn't a huge fan of comp).

As a side issue, I think it's the same - or similar - to the definition
that was used by Everett? I haven't read his paper for a while but I seem
to remember he used something like this, after all, what else can you
really use apart from memory if you want to study how identity will persist
over time within a given theory of physics? (For contrast, consider amnesia
cases or the guy in "Memento").

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Re: For Bruce

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 00:17, Kim Jones wrote:



On 16 Apr 2015, at 6:12 am, Quentin Anciaux   
wrote:


For all you know what you believe is logical is not and you're  
deluded.


Quentin


I daresay, yes.

So, for me this suggests the following questions:

Why bother discussing anything?

How can we ever really have "firm ground under our feet" in  
addressing these issues?


Who gets to say who is deluded and who isn't?

Amongst other things...



We need only to find the point where we agree, and reason from that.  
In science we start from axioms/theories, and in logic, we make  
precise also the inference rules, in a way which avoid any  
metaphysical baggage. We can do this in all domain of inquiry, be it  
theology, metaphysics, etc. Today, it is just no well seen in the  
human and religious science, because it is the place where the humans  
still prefer the old "the boss is right" principle. That leas to  
catastrophes, and i hope people learns, but of course the learning is  
slow. nature has made us adult, before child. But we stay child  
longer, like if evolution got he key point, and we learn much faster  
than insect, for example.


Bruno




Kim



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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 04:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:

In Bruno's "COMP 2013" paper he says
The notion of the first person, or the conscious knower, admits  
the

   simplest possible definition: it is provided by access to basic
   memories. Consciousness, despite its non-definability, facilitates
   the train of reasoning in humans; but we justifiably might have  
used

   digital machines instead.
Given this, in my opinion there is no problem with what is meant by  
step 3. Bruno makes no attempt to define personal identity beyond  
the contents of memories. Whether one "really" survives being  
teleported, or falling asleep and waking up the next day, isn't  
relevant. "Moscow man" is just the guy who remembers being Helsinki  
man, then finding himself in Moscow (for example). Hence Helsinki  
man can't predict any first person experience, only what will  
happen from a 3p view. Or if he didn't know duplication was  
involved, he would assume that he had a 50-50 chance of ending up  
in M or W.


But this is a rather self-serving definition -- designed to fit in  
with the conclusion he wants to draw. We are entering the realm of  
the Humpty-Dumpty dictionary -- words no longer have their ordinary,  
everyday meaning.


In science, all popular terms are redefined. This is just  
clarification. You could attack Einstein and say that he refines terms  
to suit his conclusion. You can pretend that those mad people who  
pretend that the earth is round have just redefined the meaning of  
earth. It is a universal critics bearing on the whole of science.


You must take the definition given, and study the proof, that's all.  
if not, you are the one using argument of popularity which are  
authoritative argument, and are non valid.


Bruno



Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:52, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb  wrote:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou"   
a écrit :


> Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow  
copying, but

> that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
> logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph  
that consciousness could not be copied would be  
selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say  
consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about  
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a  
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you  
assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm  
saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is  
obviously duplicatable.


Quentin
In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it  
is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.   
Not just, an instrospective "well everybody knows what it is".


Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some  
level. Is that enough to be a propositional definition?


I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether  
computational process means a physical process or an abstract one.   
If you take "computational process" to be the abstract process "in  
Platonia" then it would not be duplicable;


?

The UD "copied" the "abstract" process an infinity of times. It might  
appear in


phi_567_(29)^45, phi_567_(29)^46, phi_567_(29)^47, phi_567_(29)^48,  
phi_567_(29)^49, phi_567_(29)^50, ... and in


phi_8999704_(0)^89,   phi_8999704_(0)^90,  phi_8999704_(0)^91,   
phi_8999704_(0)^92,  phi_8999704_(0)^93,





every copy would just be a token of the same process.  I think  
that's what Bruno means.


The consciousness will be the same, but it is multiplied (in some 3-1  
sense) in UD* (sigma_1 truth).


Bruno


But I think Stathis is thinking of a copy of an AI, not just a  
particular computation by that AI.


Brent



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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 08:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
   Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding  
by

   philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
   by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
   discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
   an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
   metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.
Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the  
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis  
of unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much  
an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


Are you doing this on purpose?

The fact that primary materialism is epistemologically contradictory  
is the *result* of the UD Argument (UDA).

It is not an assumption. It is what the whole UDA reasoning is for.

You assume a primary physical universe. You have to explain how  
primary matter makes it possible for a machine to distinguish a  
physical computation from an arithmetical one, and this without  
abandoning comp, to make your point.


Bruno








Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 05:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

   LizR wrote:
   On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> >> wrote:
   Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

   Bruno
   had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
   uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
   step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

   consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
   duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
   duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
   what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
   You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
   case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
   and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

   if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will  
I be transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect,  
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument  
goes through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree  
that they were the same person.



   Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
   worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation  
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for  
brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated  
made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3. Step 3 is  
basically to introduce the idea of FPI, and hence form a link with  
the MWI of quantum mechanics. This may not always have been made  
explicit, but the intention is clear.


It is not made at all. people who criticize UDA always criticize what  
they add themselves to the reasoning. This is not valid. People who  
does that criticize only themselves, not the argument presented.



Step 3 does not succeed in this because the inference to FPI depends  
on a flawed concept of personal identity.



Step 3 leads to the FPI, and to see what happens next, there is step  
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Then the translation in arithmetic show how to  
already extract the logic of the observable so that we might refute a  
form of comp (based on comp + the classical theory of knowledge). That  
main point there is that incompleteness refutes Socrates argument  
against the Theaetetus, and we can almost directly retrieve the  
Parmenides-Plotinus "theology" in the discourse of the introspecting  
universal (Löbian) machine.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Apr 2015, at 09:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2015-04-15 9:35 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal :

On 15 Apr 2015, at 00:15, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Apr 14, 2015  Telmo Menezes  wrote:

> I predict that I will win 1 million dollar by tomorrow. I know my  
prediction is correct because this will happen in one of the  
branches of the multiverse. Do you agree with this statement?


No I do not agree because matter duplicating machines do not exist  
yet so if I check tomorrow the laws of physics will allow me to  
find only one chunk of matter that fits the description of Mr. I  
(that is a chunk of matter that behaves in a  Telmomenezesian way),  
and that particular chunk of matter does not appear to have a  
million dollars. However if the prediction was "tomorrow Telmo  
Menezes will win a million dollars" then I would agree, provided of  
course that the Many Worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is  
true.


> You are trying to play a game that is absurd, which is to deny  
the first person view.


That is ridiculous, only a fool would deny the first person view  
and John Clark is not a fool. Mr.I can always look to the past and  
see one unique linear sequence of Mr.I's leading up to him, and Mr.  
I can remember being every one of them. But things are very  
different looking to the future, nothing is unique and far from  
being linear things could hardly be more parallel with a  
astronomical and possibly infinite number of branching, and Mr. I  
can't remember being any of them. And that is why the sense of  
first person identity has nothing to do with our expectations of  
the future but is only a function of our memories of the past.


Unfortunately, prediction and probabilities concerns the future.





> You use your crusade against pronouns

If Telmo Menezes thinks that any objection in the use of personal  
pronouns in thought experiments designed to illuminate the  
fundamental nature of personal identity


No, we agree on the personal identity before asking the prediction  
question. The duplication experiement is not designed to illuminate  
the nature of personal identity, which is made clear beforehand,  
with the 1p and 3p diaries.


You often says this, and never reply to the fact that this has been  
debunked.




is absurd then call John Clark's bluff and simply stop using them;  
then if Telmo Menezes can still express ideas on this subject  
clearly and without circularity it would prove that John Clark's  
concern that people who used such pronouns were implicitly stating  
what they were trying to prove were indeed absurd.


You say that you accept the notion of first person, but what telmo  
meant is that you stop using it in the WM-prediction, where you  
agree that you will be in the two places in the 3p view, with unique  
1p, so the P = 1/2 is just obvious. It is not deep: to this why it  
will be deep, you need to move on step 4, step 5, etc.







>> Monty Hall knows that when the Helsinki Man in the sealed box in  
Moscow opens the door and sees Moscow the Moscow Man will be born  
from the ashes of the Helsinki Man,


>The Helsinki Man in the sealed box in Moscow knows that too. He  
was fully informed of the protocol of the experiment.


OK but it doesn't matter if he knows the protocol of the experiment  
or not, regardless of where he is until The Helsinki Man sees  
Moscow or Moscow the Helsinki Man will remain The Helsinki Man. So  
who will become the Moscow Man?  The one who sees Moscow will  
become the Moscow Man.


Yes, but that is the H-man too, with the 3-1 view. Nothing is  
ambiguous, once we understand and APPLY the 1/3 distinction. That is  
what you never seem to do.





Oh well, the good thing about tautologies is that they're always  
true.


 >>> Verb tenses also become problematic if you introduce time  
machines.


>> Douglas Adams had something to say about this in The Hitchhikers  
Guide to the Galaxy:


> Yes, I love it too. Doesn't it worry you a bit that your  
grammatical argument is so similar to one found in an absurdist  
work of fiction?


No because if time machines actually existed then it wouldn't be  
absurd at all, the English language really would need a major  
overhaul in the way it uses verb tenses. And if matter duplicating  
machines existed the English language really would need a major  
overhaul about the way it uses personal pronouns. The only  
difference is that if the laws of physics are what we think they  
are then time machines are NOT possible, but if the laws of physics  
are what we think they are then matter duplicating machines ARE  
possible.


> Show me how to do it. Describe quantum uncertainty according to  
the MWI without personal pronouns. I know you will be able to do it  
because:

a) you like the MWI
b) you hate personal pronouns

CASE #1

Telmo Menezes shoots one photon at 2 slits with a photographic  
plate behind the slits. As the photon approaches the slits the  
entire universe s

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 04:43, LizR wrote:

On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett   
wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:


Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of  
uncertainty
That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in  
a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday  
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be  
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter  
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to what  
looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the  
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance  
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion  
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.


That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will  
I be transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect,  
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes  
through either way.


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different  
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.


I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation  
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for  
brains).


Good remark, but apparently Bruce did not hear it.

Bruno






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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:53, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:

   Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
   had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of  
uncertainty  That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a  
small step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be  
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter  
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to what  
looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the  
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance  
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion  
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different  
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.


I did not even knew the existence of the MWI when I got the idea 40  
years ago, when trying to figure out what it is like to be an amoeba.


You would have studied the reasoning up to step seven, you would  
understand the non relevance of your point.


Bruno



Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:50, Bruce Kellett wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a  
person, my consciousness changes from moment to moment with  
changing thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain the same  
person. Can two spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the  
same person? I don't think so, even if they stem from the same  
digital copy at some point. M-man and W-man are different persons,  
and neither is the unique closest continuer of H-man, so it is not  
that H-man is uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.


This differs from MWI in that, in MWI, the continuers are in  
different worlds.

Right. Like AI's in separate but identical worlds.


Don't you then run into the problem of the identity of  
indiscernibles? The programs may be run on different computers in  
our world, and thus discernible, but from inside the program there  
is only one consciousness. Just the same as if you ran the program  
at different times on the same computer. Same inputs --> same  
outputs. Not different from the point of view of the simulation.



Good. But that applies also in the computation emulated by the sigma_1  
truth, which is not physical.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Apr 2015, at 21:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2015-04-15 20:51 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :
On 4/14/2015 11:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-04-15 4:53 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :
On 4/14/2015 12:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a
married bachelor.

Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God.  
God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your  
prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a  
logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify  
anything*.


That makes no sense.  Even theologians can't bring themselves to  
say that God can do something self-contradictory.  Suppose God did  
Y=(X and not-X), what would Y consist of?


I don't know we as human cannot do it... But I don't see why not,  
and that's false that theologians (at least some) never say that  
god can't do self-contradictory thing... have you never heard "god  
is not bound to logic"


Yes, from people who don't know what logic is.

So logic is above God... that's not the common believe in God...


Only in some popularization of the idea of God. Augustin, St-Thomas,  
and most theologian since agree that truth and logic is above God,  
although they would say this differently. Al Gazhali did the same for  
Islam, and Jean-Paul II repeated this recently.


I don't think you will find one theologian believing the contrary. But  
I agree that the religious institution, like the health institutation  
are inconsistent, and indeed are blaspheming, using their own notion  
of blasphem, and that is what happen when a religion, or even a  
science or an art (like health) is put in the hand of politics (be it  
by force like with Islam and christianismm, or by financial lobbying  
(and propaganda) with politics.



what about what you think is logical is in fact illogical because  
God made you so that you can transcend that... If God is all, and  
transcend everything then logic is nothing. I don't believe in God  
be it bound or not to logic.


For the greek, God is by definition the reality at the origin of your  
conscience. The idea to use fairy tales does not come from theologian,  
but from dishonest politicians, which use the notion as a mean of  
power and violence. It is the opposite of religion, as defined  
originally.





But an unthinkable all powerfull thing that cant transcend  
everything can surely do anything, and be bound and not bound and  
whatever to logic as anything.


For the greeks God has no power. It is the explanation that we search.  
The debate God/Not-God is a fake debate among aristotelian to hide the  
real question: PrimaryUniverse/Not-primary-Universe.


Bruno





and for example, god could create two universe, one where he  
destroys the earth, one where he does not...


But that's not a logical contradiction.

It would be in a one world view where it happens and it does not.

It's making two things and destroying one of them.  A contradiction  
would be for him to both create the Earth and not create the Earth.   
I'm afraid you're one of those theologians who doesn't know what  
logic is.


(but that something we human could comprehend). I *don't* believe  
in god, but I can imagine such a being with no limit in power if it  
existed, and that could transcend *everything*, after all he's god !.


Really?  You can imagine a being who can do Y where X=fly and Y=(X  
and not-X)?  I don't think so.


I cannot image it does it, I can image a being who transcend  
anything and I could not comprehend and so it's meaningless for me  
to ascribe anything on it.






Logical contradiction is a matter of language; it can't refer  
because it has no meaning.


If there is a god, meaning comes from god, not from the language or  
from you. god transcend reality.


Nonsense.

You don't believe in God, I don't too, so yes it's nonsense... I  
starting to thing you can't read what I'm saying... Some conception  
of god is a thing who transcend everything, if the reality is an  
emanation of that thing, so is your language, so is your thoughts,  
so is your ability to comprehend the reality, so is your ability to  
comprehend that thing who transcend everything... I understand you  
don't believe in such god... **I DON'T TOO** **I'M NOT STATING HERE  
WHAT I BELIEVE**


Language is words we make up

Not in a reality who would be an emanation of an all transcending  
"being", word like you like everything else even what is not, would  
be from that god.


and so we give them what ever meaning they have.  A contradiction is  
a relation between two propositions.  You can't have a contradiction  
without language.





A miracle is ordinarily understood as an occurrence which is  
*nomologically* impossible.


A miracle is understood as a miracle, it could be anything not  
possible without it... like *magic*.


Not possible means nomologically impossible; not self-contradictory.

No, not possible, i

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But the question of the number of person is a different  
discussion. If you agree that the W-guy, who stays in W and  
marries a girl in W, is the same person as the guy in M, who  
marries a woman in M, are the same person ... as the H-guy, the, I  
claim, we are already all the same person, despite different lives  
and consciousness.
But then you're just mucking up the meaning of "the same person",  
giving it a special metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to  
common usage.


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical  
sophistication. Computationalism is based on the idea that human  
consciousness is Turing emulable,


This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some point you  
might understand that this is not really the case. Comp assumes only  
that we can survive ith a digital brain, in the quasi-operational  
meaning of the "yes doctor" scenario. Consciousness is a first person  
notion, and that is not Turing emulable per se, in fact that is not  
even definable in any 3p term. That is part of the difficulty of the  
concept.




which just says that human-like AI is possible on a sufficiently  
sophisticated computer. But,as Bruno says, consciousness is not  
duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, what another's  
consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate or not.


OK.


My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI will  
diverge so rapidly from the original once it is installed and run on  
another computer that there is no sense in which it is ever the  
'same' consciousness.


That will not work on a virtual AI, which are purely deterministic.



That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person,  
my consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing  
thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two  
spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I don't  
think so, even if they stem from the same digital copy at some  
point. M-man and W-man are different persons, and neither is the  
unique closest continuer of H-man, so it is not that H-man is  
uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.


That is equivalent with saying that you would not die if teleported  
from here to 2 mm away, but would die from teleportation from here to  
mars, so you reject step 2. This does not make sense with  
computationalism, as the brain would notice a difference that a  
computer could not notice by construction, unless you add releveant  
but non Turing emulable magical properties in the wires.






This differs from MWI


UDA is not about the MWI. It is just that in list of people supposed  
to accept the MWI, the MWI can be used to illustrate a special case of  
self-multiplication.


Bruno



in that, in MWI, the continuers are in different worlds. In each  
world there is a unique closest continuer and the ambiguity doesn't  
arise. Worlds, by definition, don't interfere.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Apr 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Apr 2015, at 01:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:


It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated,  
would you be prepared to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill?
It can be shown that, indeed, "killing" someone with comp is  
equivalent with an amnesia. Dying is forgetting or refreshing  
memories.
If you decide to kill a copy, you have to cautiously agree (with  
yourself) on the procedure (and who will be killed) before the  
duplication. After the duplication, it is preferable to treat the  
copy as a new person, for all practical and ethical purposes.


I think there are even stronger reasons for treating copies as new  
persons. In practical terms, if it came to ethical and legal  
matters, the law is currently no able to recognize the existence  
of two separate bodies as the same person. And physically, I think  
the divergence necessitated by different physical bodies in  
different spatial locations is going to lead to significant  
divergence sufficiently rapidly for the concept of 'the same  
person' to cease to be applicable after an extremely short time.  
The effects of simple thermal noise would be sufficient for the  
'persons' to decohere within milliseconds.


No problem with this.

I think that the discussion between Stathis and Quentin relies on a  
confusion between the 3-1 views and the 1-views. We cannot  
duplicate the 1-views (= the 1-1-views = the 1-1-1-views): we feel  
always unique. But in the 3-1 view we can ascribe the same  
consciousness to (identical) exemplars, and this can play a rôle in  
the measure problem, although this needs some later differentiation  
and the rule Y = II. In practice, "thermal noise" will indeed  
"decohere" the consciousness very quickly. I use quote as we are  
not in the quantum setting here, but it is (here) the same thing.


But the question of the number of person is a different discussion.  
If you agree that the W-guy, who stays in W and marries a girl in  
W, is the same person as the guy in M, who marries a woman in M,  
are the same person ... as the H-guy, the, I claim, we are already  
all the same person, despite different lives and consciousness.


But then you're just mucking up the meaning of "the same person",  
giving it a special metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to common  
usage.


I just said that IF you take the M and W man as being the same person,  
then we are all the same person. Nothing more. Personal identity is  
not in my topics here. I am interested in that topic, but I avoid it  
in the whole work, as it is difficult, and the result are quite  
counter-intuitive. Fortunately we don't need them at all to get the  
fact that if comp is true, physics has to emerge from addition and  
multiplication, without adding anything.


Bruno





Brent

Here there is a matter of almost conventional decision, to relate  
or not individuality to personal identity. With comp and AUDA, we  
can say we are all the "universal baby" describes by the 8  
arithmetical hypostases, so we are the same person, put in (quite)  
different context (the genes, the culture, ...). We are all the  
same amoeba, in that case. If Aliens exist, we are them too.


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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Apr 2015, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Apr 2015, at 05:12, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou"  
 a écrit :


> Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow  
copying, but

> that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
> logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper  
paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be  
selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say  
consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about  
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a  
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you  
assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm  
saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is  
obviously duplicatable.


Quentin
In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether  
it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of  
it.  Not just, an instrospective "well everybody knows what it is".



It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to  
Stathis ?




No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're  
using.  Are you supposing that two streams of thought which are  
identical would constitute two different consciousness'es?


In the 1-view (or 1-1-view, ...) : the answer is "no".


I agree.



In the 3--1 view, we can say yes, as we can see the diverging  
conditions, like knowing that each duplicated H-man will diverge  
once opening their reconstitution box.


But in that case we've duplicated the "machinery of consciousness",  
e.g. the AI program that instaniated the consciousness.  It can  
bethe same program which is now running in two different  
machines and is diverging because of spacetime and environmental  
differences.


Right. Like it can be different programs in the UD, but doing the same  
relevant activity with respect to my personal experience, and it can  
diverge, or not.







So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as  
having been duplicated in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.


How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?


By associating it with different token of the machinery implementing it.



Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different  
spacetime location can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set  
of thoughts?


No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?

Bruno




Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[LizR]

On 16 April 2015 at 18:16, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>> Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
>> philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
>> by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
>> discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
>> an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
>> metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.
>>
>>
>> Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the reverse,
>> people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of unexamined
>> metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)
>>
>
> And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much an
> unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


Of course it would be, but no one is assuming that.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Bruce Kellett]

Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> >> wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty 
That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small

step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are incompatible. 
Can you formulate a protocol where the copies sit down for a chat and 
arrive at a contradiction of the UDA's conclusion?
 
Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different

worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and 
Washington man. You could have the two reconstructions in the same room 
and label them as machine-A man and machine-B man and let them interact 
immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, because the conclusion 
does not depend on the copies having a chat or not. It would just make 
the argument harder to follow.


No, the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as the 
original. It is that illusion that is hard to maintain if they have a 
chat and realize that they are different people. The real issue is 
personal identity through time, and in the case of ties for closest 
follower, as in this case, it fits better with the notions of personal 
identity to say that the copies are both new persons -- inheriting a lot 
from the original of course, but the original single person has not 
become two of the *same* person.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Telmo Menezes]

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark > johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
>> had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
>> uncertainty
>> That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in a
>> logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday consciousness is the
>> result of computation, then it can be duplicated (in principle - if you
>> have a problem with matter duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that
>> this leads to what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
>>
>
> You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the case --
> the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance and don't
> further interact. You might come to a different conclusion if you let the
> copies sit down together and have a chat.
>

The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are incompatible.
Can you formulate a protocol where the copies sit down for a chat and
arrive at a contradiction of the UDA's conclusion?


> Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different worlds
> idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.


It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and
Washington man. You could have the two reconstructions in the same room and
label them as machine-A man and machine-B man and let them interact
immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, because the conclusion does
not depend on the copies having a chat or not. It would just make the
argument harder to follow.


>
>
> Bruce
>
>
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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

[Telmo Menezes]

>
> My problem with any view based on entropy is that entropy doesn't appear
 to be fundamental to physics; it is the statistically likely result when
 objects are put in a certain configuration and allowed to evolve randomly.

>>>
>> There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's
>> entropy, which is a measure of information content and not just a
>> statistical effect. Once in the realm of digital physics, it becomes
>> questionable if physical entropy and information entropy are separate
>> things.
>>
>
> Yes, and there is also black hole entropy. It's POSSIBLE that Boltzmann
> stumbled on something fundamental via a route that doesn't lead via
> fundamental physics (B's entropy is only apparent to macroscopic beings) I
> don't know if the jury has come down in favour of entropy being in some way
> fundamental to the universe, but it's certainly possible. (Though not the
> thermodynamic sort.)
>

I find that this "fundamental physics" business begs the question. It
assumes that particles and forces are fundamental and then works from
there. Interestingly, particles themselves can only be observed in the
macro world by way of statistical measures (I believe, please correct me if
I'm wrong). Here I agree with John. Labelling particles as fundamental and
mechanisms like "there are more ways to be complicated than simple" as
non-fundamental seems arbitrary.


>
>>
>>> However the laws of physics are (mainly) time-symmetric, with the
>>> definite exception of neutral kaon decay and the possible exception of
>>> wave-function collapse, and an ordered state could evolve to become more
>>> disordered towards the past (although that would make the past appear the
>>> future for any beings created within that ordered state). Yet we never see
>>> that happening, and there is an elephant in the cosmic room, namely the
>>> expansion of the universe, which (istm) must always proceed in the
>>> direction of the AOT.
>>>
>>
>> What if the AOT is a purely 1p phenomena?
>>
>
> Well, it's clearly a 3p phenomenon in that we all agree that things age
> etc. But it's perhaps purely a "macroscopic creature phenomenon"
>

Ok, this is what I meant. I was going for a multiverse-3p, not just the
"all the things we can agree on"-3p.


>
>>> Hence the appeal to boundary conditions. If something forces the
>>> universe to have zero (or very low) radius at one time extremity but not at
>>> the other, this asymmetry could be sufficient to drive the arrow of time in
>>> a particular direction.
>>>
>>> I've (as it were) expanded on this idea before, however, so I won't go
>>> on at length about it again.
>>>
>>
>> I'll search the archives when I have a bit of time.
>>
>
> Briefly, the boundary condition on the universe appears to be that it has
> a big bang at one time extremity (or something like one) but not a
> corresponding crunch at the other. This alone means that the density of the
> contents of the universe is constrained to decrease globally along the time
> axis as you move away from the BB, and my contention is that this is
> probably enough to create an AOT even with the laws of physics operating -
> by assumption - time-symmetrically, when you look at the various processes
> that result from a decrease in density (and temperature, effectively, since
> particles tend to move until they reach a patch of the background fluid
> which is moving at their speed). Such outcomes include the formation of
> nuclei, atoms, and eventually gravitationally bound states like galactic
> clusters etc.
>

Thanks Liz. Yes, I think this makes a lot of sense. I would point out that
you are talking about entropy, even though you don't call it by name.

Telmo.


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