Re: Holiday Exercise
On 6/08/2016 2:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The difficulty is with your assumption that differentiation into two persons is inevitable. It is not an assumption. With the protocol and the hypothesis, the diaries have differentiated. Diaries are not people. The first person are approximated/associated by their personal diaries. I am not defined by any diary I might keep -- that is merely an irrelevant adjunct. Everett use a similar theory of mind, and indeed most account of the QM-without-collapse use digital mechanism, more or less implicitly. Accusations of bad faith are not required. Sorry for the accusation of bad faith, but I hope now we can move on step 4. I mean, come back to the original definition of first person discourse. The notion of first person and third person have been defined since long, and you were persisting in talking like if it could be possible that the first person experience does not bifurcate, differentiate. When we comp we admit that the only way to know is asked the copies or consulted their opinions and experiences, and then simple elementary logic shows that they all differentiate. I suggested doing the experiment and determining the answer empirically. Logic can only tell us what follows from certain premises, and your premises do not entail differentiation in the described circumstances. We admit P=1 in the simple teleportation case, then the differentiation is a simple consequence that the robot in W sees W, believes he is in W, and as it is in W, he knows that he is in W (with the antic notion of knowledge: true belief). The same for the robot in M. They are both right, they have just differentiated. They both confirmed "W v M", and refute "W & M", as, by computationalism, the W-machine has been made independent from the M-machine. Again, you merely assume differentiation, you do not prove its necessity. The W-machine has no first person clue if the M-machine even exist, and vice versa. (Or you bring telepathy, etc.). I don't need telepathy to unify the various streams of my consciousness -- to know that I am the person driving the car, talking to my wife, etc, at a given moment. Neither is telepathy need if one person is in two places at once. You can't invalidate a reasoning by changing, in the reasoning, the definition which have been given in the reasoning.The differentiation are obvious. In the n-iterated case, the differentiations are given by the 2^n sequences of W and M. You continue to assume what you are required to prove. Keep well in mind that I am not arguing for or against computationalism. I assume it, and study the consequences. There is little sense in studying the consequences of an inconsistent theory: you have to defend computationalism against the charge that it is not well-established. Later, I can explain that the "P=1" of 'UDA step one' belongs to the machine's G*\G type of true but non- justifiable proposition, which can explain the uneasiness. "P=1" requires a strong axiom, and indeed both CT and YD are strong axioms in "cognitive science/computer science/theology". So derive the necessity of differentiation from these axioms. Bruce Computationalism could be the most insane theology except for all the others. I don't know if comp is true or not, but I am pretty sure that IF digital mechanism is true, then the "correct theology" will be more close to Plato than to Aristotle -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 6/08/2016 12:58 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote He writes in the diaries what he sees: it is just a matter of the protocol whether he writes the name of the city in which each diary is located in that particular diary, or if he writes in both diaries what he sees in total, in which case he writes W in both diaries. It need be no different from my seeing one thing with my right eye and writing that down with my right hand, and seeing something different with my left eye and writing that down with my left hand, or writing down both things with both hands. (This is not a split-brain experiment.) All the things that you bring up could easily happen without any differentiation into two separate consciousnesses. You might find the non-locality of the unified experience a little surprising, but that is only because you are not used to the concept of non-locality. I say again, even though it seems obvious to you that the differentiation must occur, It is just trivial, by the definition of first person experience. That is not a suitable answer -- there is only one person experiencing both cities. If you were right, and using the definition I provided at the start, we would have a situation where a guy is in Moscow, and write in his diary "Washington". But then he did not survive sanely, and if that is the case, P get ≠ from 1 at step 1. Your phrasing of this is wrong. There is no such thing as "a guy in Moscow" -- there is a guy who is in both places simultaneously. If there are diaries in both W and M, and one person writing in these diaries, it is not inconsistent to write W in the M diary and vice versa -- maybe not what was intended, but since it is just one person writing in diaries, what is written is not incorrect. that is just a failure of imagination on your part. Try to put yourself in the situation in which some of the many strands of your conscious thoughts relate to bodies in different cities. There is no logical impossibility in this. You seem to accept that a single mind can be associated with more that one body: "We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the physical universe and later in arithmetic." (quoted from your comment above.) Hold on to this notion, and consider the possibility that there is no differentiation into separate conscious persons in such a case (the 1p is singular -- there is only ever just one person). I love the idea, but it is not relevant for the problem of prediction. There is no problem of prediction -- there is only a question as to whether differentiation necessarily occurs. And I am not sure it makes sense, even legally. Why should it make sense legally? Legal systems were not drawn up to take account of person duplicating machines. If the W-man commits a murder in W, with your bizarre theory, we can put the M man in prison. Your non-locality assumption is a bit frightening. Some will say, we are all that type of human, but not this type, etc. If you consider the W-man and the M-man as the same person, then, all living creature on this earth is the same person, and 'to eat' becomes equivalent with 'to be eaten'. Such bizarre consequences do not follow from what I have said -- not all people are the result of digital duplication experiments. Why not eventually, but this has no relevance at all in the reasoning, where we assume digital mechanism, so that the M and W man would not be aware of their existence in a protocol where they would not known the protocol. That doesn't matter -- they would know that they were one person, experiencing two cities at once. And the duplications gives a simple distinction between the 1p and 3p, and we can see, in very simple simulation, that all copies feels 1p-separate from the others, in the protocol described. You have still not proved this, or given any cogent reason as to why it should be the case. You suffer from what, in the philosophy of science, is known as the problem of unconsidered alternatives. You simply have not considered non-differentiation as a relevant possibility in your theory/model. Now that this alternative has been raised, you have to give reasons against it, or revise your original thesis. I hope you understand well that we assume computationalism, with an open mind that the theory might lead to a contradiction, in which case we would learn a lot. But up to now, we get only (quantum?) weirdness. You are very keen to assume computationalism, i.e., that your theory is at least internally consistent. But I have raised a relevant consideration that counts against the coherence of your theory. You have not yet given any substantial argument for your assumption that differentiation into separate persons is inevitable in the circumstances described -- lots of assertions, but no arguments.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchalwrote: >>> >>>> >>> Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous >>> as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. >> >> >> > >>> >> >>> >>> So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. >>> >> >> >> >> >> The >> guy in Helsinki >> ? >> NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question is not about duplication" >> > > > > The question 2 was not about duplication, > If duplication was not involved then why on god's green earth were you talking about the goddamn* HELSINKI MAN*?! > > > but the question 1 was, and you said that P("drinking coffee") was equal > to one. > P can always be equal to 1, it depends on what P means, and if P has no meaning, if for example too many unspecified personal pronouns are used, then P has no value at all, not even zero. In the first case BOTH the Moscow man and the Washington man got the coffee so the identity of the mysterious Mr. You does not need to be specified and so P had both a meaning and a value. If one gets the coffee and one does not what is the probability (P) that " *YOU*" will get the coffee? Is it 1? No. Is it 1/2? No. Is it 0? No, P has no value at all because P is gibberish. John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Computationalism
On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 12:36 PM, Bruno Marchalwrote: > > Keep well in mind that I am not arguing for or against computationalism. I > assume it, and study the consequences. No, y ou're assuming at the very start that Computationalism is false and then going on from there. Computationalism means that every subjective experience about you can be duplicated by computations made with a physical system. Not almost everything, EVERYTHING. But then you say: "*Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of view, with or **without computationalism**.*" Computationalism says intelligent behavior can be duplicated by computations performed by a physical system, and Darwin's Theory demands that consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence, so your statement contradicts both the meaning of Computationalism and Evolution. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 8/5/2016 4:23 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the physical universe and later in arithmetic. You seem to accept my point -- there is still only one mind even after different data are fed to the copies: one mind in two bodies in this case (a one-many relationship). Which is empirically supported by neurological studies that indicate the brain consists of "modules" each of which has "a mind of it's own." If we think about engineering an autonomous being it becomes obvious that this is a good architecture. Decision making should be hierarchical with only a few requiring system-wide consideration. With RF communication this autonomous being could easily "be"in both Moscow and Washington. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 8/5/2016 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker> wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A single, infinite universe is an example of a multiverse theory, since there will be infinite copies of everything and every possible variation of everything, including your brain and your mind. That implicitly assumes a digital universe, yet the theory that suggests it, quantum mechanics, is based on continua; which is why I don't take "the multiverse" too seriously. It appears that our brains are finite state machines. Each neuron can either be "on" or "off", there are a finite number of neurons, so a finite number of possible brain states, and a finite number of possible mental states. This is analogous to a digital computer: Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that spacially separated regions cannot be synchronous. Even if neurons were only ON or OFF, which they aren't, they have frequency modulation, they are not synchronous. Synchronous digital machine can emulate asynchronous digital machine, and that is all what is needed for the reasoning. True, but only going to a level far below a "state of consciousness" so that in this finer level of emulation there are no longer identifiable states of consciousness. Rather "states" are coming into being and fading away, with various overlaps. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 05 Aug 2016, at 14:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote: However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit. Clearly, by the YD assumption, both states are survivor states from the original conscious state, but are not the same consciousness because of the single bit difference. By that reasoning, no consciousness survives through time. Not at all! Both conscious states survive through time by assumption (YD). Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again. No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single consciousness through time. We get different input data all the time but we do not differentiate according to that data. I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data is input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should lead the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into two. In normal life we get inputs from many sources simultaneously -- we see complex scenes, smell the air, feel impacts on our body, and hear many sounds from the environment. None of this leads our consciousness to disintegrate. Indeed, our evolutionary experience has made us adept at coping with these multifarious inputs and sorting through them very efficiently to concentrate on what is most important, while keeping other inputs at an appropriate level in our minds. I have previously mentioned our ability to multitask in complex ways: while I am driving my car, I am aware of the car, the road, other traffic and so on; while, at the same time, I can be talking to my wife; thinking about what to cook for dinner; and reflecting on philosophical issues that are important to me. And this is by no means an exhaustive list of our ability to multitask -- to run many separate conscious modules within the one unified consciousness. Given that this experience is common to us all, it is not in the least bit difficult to think that the adding of yet another stream of inputs via a separate body will not change the basic structure of our consciousness -- we will just take this additional data and process in the way we already process multiple data inputs and streams of consciousness. This would seem, indeed, to be the default understanding of the consequences of person duplication. One would have to add some further constraints in order for it to be clear that the separate bodies would necessarily have differentiated conscious streams. No such additional constraints are currently in evidence. Not empirically proven constraints, but current physics strongly suggests that the duplicates would almost immediately, in the decoherence time for a brain, differentiate; i.e. the consciousness is not separate from the physics. It's only "not in evidence" if your trying to derive the physics from the consciousness. Of course, that is what I was trying to get people to see: the additional constraint that is necessary for differentiation is essentially a mind-brain identity thesis. Not really. To get differentiation, you need only different memories or different first person report, not different brain. The differentiation we are talking about is into two separate persons who do not share a consciousness. You need the differentiation before you get two first person reports: one consciousness could store several different memories. What you say is very weird. If there is no differentiation of the first person experience, then how could the diary in W contains W, and the diary in M contains M. I explained that in the previous post. It is not in the least mysterious -- no different from seeing different things with each eye and recording what is seen with different hands. Ther emight be twoexperiences, but that does not need two persons. You lost me with your last post, as they seem to conflict immediatey with step 1 and "step 0", the definition of (weak) computationalism used in the UD Argument. I don't see any conflict with ordinary teleportation, with or without a delay. There is no duplication in those cases, so ordinary considerations apply. Of course, if there is a delay that the teletransported person has no way of knowing about, then he will not know about that delay -- so what? I presume by "step 0" you mean YD + CT. There is no problem with these assumptions; it is just that you
Re: Holiday Exercise
On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 4:17 PM, Bruno Marchalwrote: > > On 05 Aug 2016, at 15:01, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >>> On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that the Helsinki guy (a believer in computationalism) will believe that he can expect, in Helsinki, with probability, or credibility, or plausibility ONE (resp maximal) to have some hot drink after pushing the button in Helsinki? >>> >>> As I said, the H-guy can expect to drink two cups of coffee. >>> >> >> Once again, some amplification of the this answer is perhaps in order. I >> cannot answer your question with a Yes/No as you wish because the question >> is basically dishonest -- of the form of "Have you stopped beating your >> wife yet?". The question contains an implicit assumption that the >> differentiation takes place. >> > > > Not at all. Question 1 is neutral on this, but if you prefer I split > question 1 into two different questions. > > Question 1a. > The H-guy is told that the coffee is offered *in* the reconstitution > boxes, and that it has the same taste. Put it differently, we ensure that > the differentiation has not yet occurred. > And the question 1a is the same, assuming he is a coffee addict, and that > he wants drink coffee as soon as possible, should he worried, knowing the > protocol telling the coffee is offered, or can he argue that he is not > worried, and that if comp is true and everything go well, P("drinking > coffee") = 1? > > Question 1b > Same question, but now, the coffee is offered after the opening of the > doors. > > > > > > Since it is this differentiation that is in question, the question is >> disingenuous: it can only be answered as I have done above. >> > > Oh nice! The Helsinki guy, as a coffee addict, is very please you tell him > that he will drink two cups of coffee. > If this kind of connection can be made, then you play right into the hands of the people who accuse you or your work to be "anything goes". And I say this because I believe your work has some merit to it, when you're not trying to shove it down people's throat a la "WHAT IS YOUR THEOLOGY?" in setting of a public list. The kind of pushiness of late, tactics of flooding the list with posts where you set discussion forcibly, and explicitly demanding your questions to be answered seem to paint a picture where you abandon your own convictions: modesty, avoidance of blasphemy, use of linguistic games where only you can set the frame, argument from authority etc. I liked the old Bruno from 2015 better who didn't need to resort to these things to make a point. Particularly the cheap way of trying to ensnare people into discussing your research interests. So obvious and so out of character, it makes one wonder as to your general welfare. Play nice, folks! Take care of yourselves. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 05 Aug 2016, at 13:23, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 6:12 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses automatically differentiate when receiving different inputs. It is not an assumption. Of course it is an assumption. You have not derived it from anything previously in evidence. See my answer to Brent. It is just obvious that the first person experience differentiated when it get different experience, leading to different memories. We *assume* computationalism. How coud the diaries not differentiate? What you say does not make any sense. I have been at pains to argue (in several different ways) that the differentiation of consciousness is not automatic. It is very easy to conceive of a situation in which a single consciousness continues in two bodies, with the streams of consciousness arising from both easily identifiable, but still unified in the consciousness of a single person. (I copy below my recent argument for this in a post replying to Russell.) So the differentiation you require is not necessary or automatic -- it has to be justified separately because it is not "just obvious". Your recent expansion of the argument of step 3 in discussions with John Clark does not alter the situation in any way -- you still just assert that the differentiation takes place on the receipt of different input data. I had thought that the argument for such differentiation of consciousness in different physical bodies was a consequence of some mind-brain identity thesis. But I am no longer sure that even that is sufficient -- the differentiation clearly requires separate bodies/brains (separate input data streams), but separate bodies are not sufficient for differentiation, as I have shown. That was shown and explained before and is not contested here. I thought I was contesting it. Please read the posts. That is why I introduce a painting in question 2. That still just gives differentiation on different data inputs -- it changes nothing. But let us first see if you agree with question 1. Do you agree that if the H-guy is told that a hot drink will be offered to both reconstitution in W and in M, he is entitled to expect a hot drink with probability one (assuming computationalisme and the default hypothesis) I do not assume computationalism, I am questioning its validity. Do you agree that P(X) = 1 in Helsinki, if X will occur in both city? I think that it is entirely possible that the H-guy will, after the duplication, experience drinking two coffees. What is required is a much stronger additional assumption, namely an association between minds and brains such that a mind can occupy only one brain. Not at all. We can say that one mind occupy both brain in the WM- duplication , before the opening of the door, assuming the reconstitution box identical. The mind brain identity fails right at step 3. Mind-brain identity need not fail: what fails in my interpretation of duplication is the one-to-one correspondence of one mind with one body. One need something stronger that mind-brain identity to justify the differentiation on different data inputs because we can have one-many and many-one mind-body relationships. We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the physical universe and later in arithmetic. You seem to accept my point -- there is still only one mind even after different data are fed to the copies: one mind in two bodies in this case (a one-many relationship). (Whether a single brain can host only one mind is a separate matter, involving one's attitude to the results of split brain studies and the psychological issues surrounding multiple personalities/minds.) In other words, the differentiation assumption is an additional assumption that does not appear to follow from either physicalism or YD+CT. It follows from very elementary computer science, and in our case, it follows necessarily, as the 1p is identified, in this setting with the content of the personal diary, which obviously differentiate on the self-localization result made by the reconstitutions. I think the diaries are just confusing you. The copy in M can write M in the diary in Moscow, and the copy in W write W in the diary in Washington. That is not necessarily different from me writing M in one diary with my left hand while writing W in a separate diary with my right hand. No differentiation into two separate persons is necessary in either case. There is no "self-localization" if there is only ever one consciousness -- the person
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 05 Aug 2016, at 15:01, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that the Helsinki guy (a believer in computationalism) will believe that he can expect, in Helsinki, with probability, or credibility, or plausibility ONE (resp maximal) to have some hot drink after pushing the button in Helsinki? As I said, the H-guy can expect to drink two cups of coffee. Once again, some amplification of the this answer is perhaps in order. I cannot answer your question with a Yes/No as you wish because the question is basically dishonest -- of the form of "Have you stopped beating your wife yet?". The question contains an implicit assumption that the differentiation takes place. Not at all. Question 1 is neutral on this, but if you prefer I split question 1 into two different questions. Question 1a. The H-guy is told that the coffee is offered *in* the reconstitution boxes, and that it has the same taste. Put it differently, we ensure that the differentiation has not yet occurred. And the question 1a is the same, assuming he is a coffee addict, and that he wants drink coffee as soon as possible, should he worried, knowing the protocol telling the coffee is offered, or can he argue that he is not worried, and that if comp is true and everything go well, P("drinking coffee") = 1? Question 1b Same question, but now, the coffee is offered after the opening of the doors. Since it is this differentiation that is in question, the question is disingenuous: it can only be answered as I have done above. Oh nice! The Helsinki guy, as a coffee addict, is very please you tell him that he will drink two cups of coffee. Now, I hope, you agree that 'drinking two cups of coffee' entails 'drinking coffee', and in this case, the Helsinki addicted guy has less reason to worry about lacking coffee. You do answer P("drinking coffee") = 1. So, just to be clear, and a bit more general: do you agree with the Principle 1: Principle 1: if a first person event x is guarantied to happen to *all* its immediate (transportation-like) copies, then, before the copy the person can expect x to happen with the same probability it would have if there was only one copy. OK? (We *assume computationalism. We have agreed already that it entails P(x) = 1 if x is guarantied to be presented to the guy with the artificial brain, or to the teleported (classically) person. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 5/08/2016 10:11 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that the Helsinki guy (a believer in computationalism) will believe that he can expect, in Helsinki, with probability, or credibility, or plausibility ONE (resp maximal) to have some hot drink after pushing the button in Helsinki? As I said, the H-guy can expect to drink two cups of coffee. Once again, some amplification of the this answer is perhaps in order. I cannot answer your question with a Yes/No as you wish because the question is basically dishonest -- of the form of "Have you stopped beating your wife yet?". The question contains an implicit assumption that the differentiation takes place. Since it is this differentiation that is in question, the question is disingenuous: it can only be answered as I have done above. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire
This bet is akin to believing that there are super civilizations in the galaxy, but we don't know they exist. Could be, but, meh! -Original Message- From: John ClarkTo: everything-list Sent: Thu, Aug 4, 2016 2:02 pm Subject: Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire A few years ago on this list I made a modest proposal, it's a low tech way to test the Many World's interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and as a bonus it'll make you rich too. First you buy one Powerball lottery ticket, the drawing of the winning number is on Saturday at 11pm, now make a simple machine that will pull the trigger on a 44 magnum revolver aimed at your head at exactly 11:00:01pm UNLESS yours is the winning ticket. Your subjective experience can only be that at 11:00:01pm despite 80 million to one odds stacked against you a miracle occurs and the gun does not go off and you're rich beyond the dreams of avarice. Of course for every universe you're rich in there are 80 million in which your friends watch your head explode, but that's a minor point, your consciousness no longer exists in any of those worlds so you never have to see the mess, it's their problem not yours. Actually I like Many Worlds and think it may very well be right, but I wouldn't bet my life on it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 5/08/2016 9:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote: However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit. Clearly, by the YD assumption, both states are survivor states from the original conscious state, but are not the same consciousness because of the single bit difference. By that reasoning, no consciousness survives through time. Not at all! Both conscious states survive through time by assumption (YD). Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again. No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single consciousness through time. We get different input data all the time but we do not differentiate according to that data. I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data is input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should lead the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into two. In normal life we get inputs from many sources simultaneously -- we see complex scenes, smell the air, feel impacts on our body, and hear many sounds from the environment. None of this leads our consciousness to disintegrate. Indeed, our evolutionary experience has made us adept at coping with these multifarious inputs and sorting through them very efficiently to concentrate on what is most important, while keeping other inputs at an appropriate level in our minds. I have previously mentioned our ability to multitask in complex ways: while I am driving my car, I am aware of the car, the road, other traffic and so on; while, at the same time, I can be talking to my wife; thinking about what to cook for dinner; and reflecting on philosophical issues that are important to me. And this is by no means an exhaustive list of our ability to multitask -- to run many separate conscious modules within the one unified consciousness. Given that this experience is common to us all, it is not in the least bit difficult to think that the adding of yet another stream of inputs via a separate body will not change the basic structure of our consciousness -- we will just take this additional data and process in the way we already process multiple data inputs and streams of consciousness. This would seem, indeed, to be the default understanding of the consequences of person duplication. One would have to add some further constraints in order for it to be clear that the separate bodies would necessarily have differentiated conscious streams. No such additional constraints are currently in evidence. Not empirically proven constraints, but current physics strongly suggests that the duplicates would almost immediately, in the decoherence time for a brain, differentiate; i.e. the consciousness is not separate from the physics. It's only "not in evidence" if your trying to derive the physics from the consciousness. Of course, that is what I was trying to get people to see: the additional constraint that is necessary for differentiation is essentially a mind-brain identity thesis. Not really. To get differentiation, you need only different memories or different first person report, not different brain. The differentiation we are talking about is into two separate persons who do not share a consciousness. You need the differentiation before you get two first person reports: one consciousness could store several different memories. What you say is very weird. If there is no differentiation of the first person experience, then how could the diary in W contains W, and the diary in M contains M. I explained that in the previous post. It is not in the least mysterious -- no different from seeing different things with each eye and recording what is seen with different hands. Ther emight be twoexperiences, but that does not need two persons. You lost me with your last post, as they seem to conflict immediatey with step 1 and "step 0", the definition of (weak) computationalism used in the UD Argument. I don't see any conflict with ordinary teleportation, with or without a delay. There is no duplication in those cases, so ordinary considerations apply. Of course, if there is a delay that the teletransported person has no way of knowing about, then he will not know about that delay -- so what? I presume by "step 0" you mean YD + CT. There is no problem with these assumptions; it is just that you appear not to be able to prove the differentiation at step 3 from these assumptions. And my suspicion is that
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 05 Aug 2016, at 00:31, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 1:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 2:51 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 6:00 pm, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 04:27:21PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/08/2016 12:01 pm, Russell Standish wrote: However, we are being asked to consider two conscious states where the conscious state differs by at least one bit - the W/M bit. Clearly, by the YD assumption, both states are survivor states from the original conscious state, but are not the same consciousness because of the single bit difference. By that reasoning, no consciousness survives through time. Not at all! Both conscious states survive through time by assumption (YD). Methinks you are unnecessarily assuming transitivity again. No, I was just referring to the continuation of a single consciousness through time. We get different input data all the time but we do not differentiate according to that data. I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data is input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should lead the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into two. In normal life we get inputs from many sources simultaneously -- we see complex scenes, smell the air, feel impacts on our body, and hear many sounds from the environment. None of this leads our consciousness to disintegrate. Indeed, our evolutionary experience has made us adept at coping with these multifarious inputs and sorting through them very efficiently to concentrate on what is most important, while keeping other inputs at an appropriate level in our minds. I have previously mentioned our ability to multitask in complex ways: while I am driving my car, I am aware of the car, the road, other traffic and so on; while, at the same time, I can be talking to my wife; thinking about what to cook for dinner; and reflecting on philosophical issues that are important to me. And this is by no means an exhaustive list of our ability to multitask -- to run many separate conscious modules within the one unified consciousness. Given that this experience is common to us all, it is not in the least bit difficult to think that the adding of yet another stream of inputs via a separate body will not change the basic structure of our consciousness -- we will just take this additional data and process in the way we already process multiple data inputs and streams of consciousness. This would seem, indeed, to be the default understanding of the consequences of person duplication. One would have to add some further constraints in order for it to be clear that the separate bodies would necessarily have differentiated conscious streams. No such additional constraints are currently in evidence. Not empirically proven constraints, but current physics strongly suggests that the duplicates would almost immediately, in the decoherence time for a brain, differentiate; i.e. the consciousness is not separate from the physics. It's only "not in evidence" if your trying to derive the physics from the consciousness. Of course, that is what I was trying to get people to see: the additional constraint that is necessary for differentiation is essentially a mind-brain identity thesis. Not really. To get differentiation, you need only different memories or different first person report, not different brain. What you say is very weird. If there is no differentiation of the first person experience, then how could the diary in W contains W, and the diary in M contains M. You lost me with your last post, as they seem to conflict immediatey with step 1 and "step 0", the definition of (weak) computationalism used in the UD Argument. And my suspicion is that the mind-brain identity thesis plays havoc with the rest of Bruno's argument. The identity thesis is refuted in the computationalist frame. That might be a problem for materialist, which will need at that stage to assume a small physical universe without UD running in it forever, and without too much Boltzmann Brain, a move which is shown to not work later. Just tell me if you are OK with question 1. The Helsinki guy is told that BOTH copies will have a hot drink after the reconstitutions, in both Moscow and Washington. Do you agree that the Helsinki guy (a believer in computationalism) will believe that he can expect, in Helsinki, with probability, or credibility, or plausibility ONE (resp maximal) to have some hot drink after pushing the button in Helsinki? We need to decompose step 3 in sub-steps, so that we can see if there is a real disagreement, and in that case where and which one, or if it is just pseudo-philosophy or bad
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 5/08/2016 6:12 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses automatically differentiate when receiving different inputs. It is not an assumption. Of course it is an assumption. You have not derived it from anything previously in evidence. See my answer to Brent. It is just obvious that the first person experience differentiated when it get different experience, leading to different memories. We *assume* computationalism. How coud the diaries not differentiate? What you say does not make any sense. I have been at pains to argue (in several different ways) that the differentiation of consciousness is not automatic. It is very easy to conceive of a situation in which a single consciousness continues in two bodies, with the streams of consciousness arising from both easily identifiable, but still unified in the consciousness of a single person. (I copy below my recent argument for this in a post replying to Russell.) So the differentiation you require is not necessary or automatic -- it has to be justified separately because it is not "just obvious". Your recent expansion of the argument of step 3 in discussions with John Clark does not alter the situation in any way -- you still just assert that the differentiation takes place on the receipt of different input data. I had thought that the argument for such differentiation of consciousness in different physical bodies was a consequence of some mind-brain identity thesis. But I am no longer sure that even that is sufficient -- the differentiation clearly requires separate bodies/brains (separate input data streams), but separate bodies are not sufficient for differentiation, as I have shown. That was shown and explained before and is not contested here. I thought I was contesting it. Please read the posts. That is why I introduce a painting in question 2. That still just gives differentiation on different data inputs -- it changes nothing. But let us first see if you agree with question 1. Do you agree that if the H-guy is told that a hot drink will be offered to both reconstitution in W and in M, he is entitled to expect a hot drink with probability one (assuming computationalisme and the default hypothesis) I do not assume computationalism, I am questioning its validity. Do you agree that P(X) = 1 in Helsinki, if X will occur in both city? I think that it is entirely possible that the H-guy will, after the duplication, experience drinking two coffees. What is required is a much stronger additional assumption, namely an association between minds and brains such that a mind can occupy only one brain. Not at all. We can say that one mind occupy both brain in the WM-duplication , before the opening of the door, assuming the reconstitution box identical. The mind brain identity fails right at step 3. Mind-brain identity need not fail: what fails in my interpretation of duplication is the one-to-one correspondence of one mind with one body. One need something stronger that mind-brain identity to justify the differentiation on different data inputs because we can have one-many and many-one mind-body relationships. We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the physical universe and later in arithmetic. You seem to accept my point -- there is still only one mind even after different data are fed to the copies: one mind in two bodies in this case (a one-many relationship). (Whether a single brain can host only one mind is a separate matter, involving one's attitude to the results of split brain studies and the psychological issues surrounding multiple personalities/minds.) In other words, the differentiation assumption is an additional assumption that does not appear to follow from either physicalism or YD+CT. It follows from very elementary computer science, and in our case, it follows necessarily, as the 1p is identified, in this setting with the content of the personal diary, which obviously differentiate on the self-localization result made by the reconstitutions. I think the diaries are just confusing you. The copy in M can write M in the diary in Moscow, and the copy in W write W in the diary in Washington. That is not necessarily different from me writing M in one diary with my left hand while writing W in a separate diary with my right hand. No differentiation into two separate persons is necessary in either case. There is no "self-localization" if there is only ever one consciousness -- the person experiences both W and M simultaneously. As I have further pointed out, one cannot just make this an
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meekerwrote: On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A single, infinite universe is an example of a multiverse theory, since there will be infinite copies of everything and every possible variation of everything, including your brain and your mind. That implicitly assumes a digital universe, yet the theory that suggests it, quantum mechanics, is based on continua; which is why I don't take "the multiverse" too seriously. It appears that our brains are finite state machines. Each neuron can either be "on" or "off", there are a finite number of neurons, so a finite number of possible brain states, and a finite number of possible mental states. This is analogous to a digital computer: Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be digitized so that its registers run synchronously. Otherwise "the state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light means that spacially separated regions cannot be synchronous. Even if neurons were only ON or OFF, which they aren't, they have frequency modulation, they are not synchronous. Synchronous digital machine can emulate asynchronous digital machine, and that is all what is needed for the reasoning. Bruno even if you postulate that electric circuit variables are continuous, transistors can only be on or off. If the number of possible mental states is finite, then in an infinite universe, whether continuous or discrete, mental states will repeat. We live in an orderly world with consistent physical laws. It seems to me that you are suggesting that if everything possible existed then we would not live in such an orderly world, Unless the worlds were separated in some way, which current physical theories provide - but which is not explicable if you divorce conscious thoughts from physics. The worlds are physically separated - there can be no communication between separate worlds in the multiverse and none between sufficiently widely separated copies of subsets of the world in an infinite single universe. But the separate copies are connected insofar as they share memories and sense of identity, even if there is no causal connection between them. Of course "copy" implies a shared past in which there was an "original", they have a cause in common. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Holiday Exercise
On 05 Aug 2016, at 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 5/08/2016 3:41 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 4/08/2016 1:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Aug 2016, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: You use the assumption that the duplicated consciousnesses automatically differentiate when receiving different inputs. It is not an assumption. Of course it is an assumption. You have not derived it from anything previously in evidence. See my answer to Brent. It is just obvious that the first person experience differentiated when it get different experience, leading to different memories. We *assume* computationalism. How coud the diaries not differentiate? What you say does not make any sense. I have been at pains to argue (in several different ways) that the differentiation of consciousness is not automatic. It is very easy to conceive of a situation in which a single consciousness continues in two bodies, with the streams of consciousness arising from both easily identifiable, but still unified in the consciousness of a single person. (I copy below my recent argument for this in a post replying to Russell.) So the differentiation you require is not necessary or automatic -- it has to be justified separately because it is not "just obvious". Your recent expansion of the argument of step 3 in discussions with John Clark does not alter the situation in any way -- you still just assert that the differentiation takes place on the receipt of different input data. I had thought that the argument for such differentiation of consciousness in different physical bodies was a consequence of some mind-brain identity thesis. But I am no longer sure that even that is sufficient -- the differentiation clearly requires separate bodies/brains (separate input data streams), but separate bodies are not sufficient for differentiation, as I have shown. That was shown and explained before and is not contested here. Please read the posts. That is why I introduce a painting in question 2. But let us first see if you agree with question 1. Do you agree that if the H-guy is told that a hot drink will be offered to both reconstitution in W and in M, he is entitled to expect a hot drink with probability one (assuming computationalisme and the default hypothesis) Do you agree that P(X) = 1 in Helsinki, if X will occur in both city? What is required is a much stronger additional assumption, namely an association between minds and brains such that a mind can occupy only one brain. Not at all. We can say that one mind occupy both brain in the WM- duplication , before the opening of the door, assuming the reconstitution box identical. The mind brain identity fails right at step 3. We can associate a mind to a body, but the mind itself (the 1p) can be (and must be) associated with many different bodies, in the physical universe and later in arithmetic. (Whether a single brain can host only one mind is a separate matter, involving one's attitude to the results of split brain studies and the psychological issues surrounding multiple personalities/minds.) In other words, the differentiation assumption is an additional assumption that does not appear to follow from either physicalism or YD+CT. It follows from very elementary computer science, and in our case, it follows necessarily, as the 1p is identified, in this setting with the content of the personal diary, which obviously differentiate on the self-localization result made by the reconstitutions. As I have further pointed out, one cannot just make this an additional assumption to YD+CT because it is clearly an empirical matter: until we have a working person duplicator, we cannot know whether differentiation is automatic or not. Science is, after all, empirical, not just a matter of definitions. Once you agree with P(Mars) = 1 in a simple classical teleportation experience (step 1), then how could the diary not differentiate when the reconstituted guy write the result of the self-localization? No empirical test needs to be done, as the differentiation is obvious: one copy experiences the city of Moscow, as his diary confirms, and the other experiences the city of Washington, as his diaries confirms too. If they did not differentiate, what would they write in the diary? Bruno Bruce Here is part of my discussion with Russell: [BK]I could perhaps expand on that response. On duplication, two identical consciousnesses are created, and by the identity of indiscernibles, they form just a single consciousness. Then data is input. It seems to me that there is no reason why this should lead the initial consciousness to differentiate, or split into two. In normal life we get inputs from many sources simultaneously -- we see complex scenes, smell the air, feel impacts on our body, and hear many sounds
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchalwrote: > The question is not about duplication. OK. And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. > So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. The guy in Helsinki? NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question is not about duplication" but the guy in Helsinki is just about to walk into a YOU duplicating machine, so John Clark will not assign any probability of any sort about the one and only one thing that will happen to "YOU". It's just plain dumb. Nope, question one was about duplication. Only question 2 was not. You ndid say that P("drinking coffee") = 1 for the helsinki guy. Just to be sure, I quote your answer to question one: On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > both copies will have a cup of coffee after the reconstitution. Are you OK that P("experience of drinking coffee") = 1? Yes, and in this case it doesn't matter if Bruno Marchal says P is the probability John Clark will drink the coffee or says P is the probability "you" will drink the coffee, there is no ambiguity either way. However if the Moscow man got the coffee but the Washington man did not then there would be a 100% probability that John Clark will get the coffee and also a 100% probability that John Clark will not get the coffee, just as I would assign a 100% probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be red and I would also assign a 100% probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be green. Like I just said: QED, unless you explicitly change your mind on question 1. But then say it, and we come back to question 1. Bruno > Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the other reconstitution box. Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "YOU" have been duplicated by a YOU duplicating machine what is the probability that "YOU" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal think that substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make things less ambiguous? > The key point here, is that we don't tell you which reconstitution box contains which painting. [...] Why is that the key point? Suppose we change the experiment and this time before the experiment we tell "YOU" which box contains which painting, we tell "YOU" that the red box on the left contains the Van Gogh and the blue box on the right contains the Monet , and we tell "YOU" that after "YOU" are duplicated by the YOU duplicating machine "YOU" will be in both boxes. Does that information help in the slightest way in determining what one and only one painting "YOU" will see after "YOU" are duplicated? It's just plain dumb. > P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door") P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be? To find out that value we need to ask "YOU" what "YOU" saw after "YOU" walked into the YOU duplicating machine and opened one and only one door. But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki man as he's no longer around, oh I know, we ask "YOU". > OK? No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get. > Can we move to step 4? Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing "YOU" refers to in a world with "YOU" duplicating machines. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchalwrote: > The question is not about duplication. OK. And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. > So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. The guy in Helsinki? NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question is not about duplication" The question 2 was not about duplication, but the question 1 was, and you said that P("drinking coffee") was equal to one. You already contradict your recent post where you said that question 1, which was clearly about duplication, admit a positive answer. QED. Bruno but the guy in Helsinki is just about to walk into a YOU duplicating machine, so John Clark will not assign any probability of any sort about the one and only one thing that will happen to "YOU". It's just plain dumb. > Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the other reconstitution box. Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "YOU" have been duplicated by a YOU duplicating machine what is the probability that "YOU" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal think that substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make things less ambiguous? > The key point here, is that we don't tell you which reconstitution box contains which painting. [...] Why is that the key point? Suppose we change the experiment and this time before the experiment we tell "YOU" which box contains which painting, we tell "YOU" that the red box on the left contains the Van Gogh and the blue box on the right contains the Monet , and we tell "YOU" that after "YOU" are duplicated by the YOU duplicating machine "YOU" will be in both boxes. Does that information help in the slightest way in determining what one and only one painting "YOU" will see after "YOU" are duplicated? It's just plain dumb. > P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door") P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be? To find out that value we need to ask "YOU" what "YOU" saw after "YOU" walked into the YOU duplicating machine and opened one and only one door. But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki man as he's no longer around, oh I know, we ask "YOU". > OK? No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get. > Can we move to step 4? Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing "YOU" refers to in a world with "YOU" duplicating machines. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.