Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 25 Oct 2011, at 22:40, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. So does the OM I'm referring to. But then why are you saying that they are countable? Does that still make is a 3 OM? Why would it? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. This is above my level of understanding at present. Hopefully, there will be some quiet time soon to study this, as it sounds interesting! If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. It is the set of all infinite binary strings (isomorphic to [0,1) ). It is described in my book. Equation (2.1) of my book (which is a variant of Ray Solomonoff's beautiful formula http://world.std.com/~rjs/index.html) gives a value of precisely zero for the information content of this set. I do still think the universal dovetailer trace, UD*, is equivalent to this set, How? UD* structure relies on computer science, and give a non random countable sets, or strings. The set of binary strings is the set of reals, and it appears in UD*, but only from a first person views, with the real playing the role of oracles. Exactly! But they are not the output of any computations? UD* has no random part. The randomness is in the mind of the observers due to the first person indterminacy, that is due to the invariance of the delay introduced by the UD by its dovetailing. but part of this thread is to understand why you might think otherwise. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. Not even if the reference machine is the observer erself? What do you mean by the reference machine? What is an observer? How would S-L distribution be applied to the first person expectancy? The S-L distribution relies upon a universal machine for its definition, called the reference machine. But that is not the observer. Observer is exactly what you and I mean by it. ? The person with subjective experience, attaching meaning to experiential data. In the comp case, this is given by Bp p, that is the true-belief of a machine, or by the personal diary (in UDA, it is enough). I have no idea what you mean by meaning in this context. The observer map o is a map from data to meaning, the former being strings of some alphabet (eg binary), the latter being a countable set - can be modelled by the whole numbers N. I don't understand this. The S-L distribution arises naturally if you ask the question: What is the probability of a given meaning being attached to the data by an observer if the data strings were distributed uniformly ? I think it probably still arises if
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 26 Oct 2011, at 05:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/25/2011 4:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. So does the OM I'm referring to. Does that still make is a 3 OM? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. This is above my level of understanding at present. Hopefully, there will be some quiet time soon to study this, as it sounds interesting! Hi Russell and Bruno,, I recommend that you read Steve Vickers' Topology Via Logic first. I would not have discovered, and take seriously, the material hypostases without it, I think. I give him full credit in my publications. Abramski played some role too. Very nice book, but still quite abstract. I have already commented Pratt at large. The other reason to use the self-reference logics is that it distinguish automatically the quanta (sharable, communicable at least in a first person plural way) from the qualia (not sharable, purely individual), all this by the Gödel-Löb-Solovay proof/truth splitting of the modal logics. Yes - that is interesting, but is true of any modal logic (apart from S4Grz, it would appear). But how do you obtain the mutual orthogonality of observables on a quantum logic? We must address the relationship between orthocomplete lattices and Boolean algebras at some point! The ortholattice are the gluing of Boolean algebraic dreams of universal machines (the boolean algebra describing their consistent histories). It gives the differentiation/fuse structure of the local and partial boolean algebras. But dually the ortholattices can be internalized as structured subsets in Boolean algebra, or by Kripkean semantics. An apparent conspiracy of nature prevent such duality to be algebraically interesting, in the quantum case. I guess we have to live with this. In the digital case, it is an open problem. It makes interesting to solve the digital case, just to see if such conspiracy of nature is a physical law or a geographical misfortune. This can be translated mechanically into a set of arithmetical problem, but those are *very* complex (that's the weakness of the interview of the universal machine on such question). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/26/2011 12:44 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Oct 2011, at 05:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/25/2011 4:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. So does the OM I'm referring to. Does that still make is a 3 OM? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. This is above my level of understanding at present. Hopefully, there will be some quiet time soon to study this, as it sounds interesting! Hi Russell and Bruno,, I recommend that you read Steve Vickers' Topology Via Logic first. I would not have discovered, and take seriously, the material hypostases without it, I think. I give him full credit in my publications. Abramski played some role too. Very nice book, but still quite abstract. I have already commented Pratt at large. The other reason to use the self-reference logics is that it distinguish automatically the quanta (sharable, communicable at least in a first person plural way) from the qualia (not sharable, purely individual), all this by the Gödel-Löb-Solovay proof/truth splitting of the modal logics. Yes - that is interesting, but is true of any modal logic (apart from S4Grz, it would appear). But how do you obtain the mutual orthogonality of observables on a quantum logic? We must address the relationship between orthocomplete lattices and Boolean algebras at some point! The ortholattice are the gluing of Boolean algebraic dreams of universal machines (the boolean algebra describing their consistent histories). It gives the differentiation/fuse structure of the local and partial boolean algebras. But dually the ortholattices can be internalized as structured subsets in Boolean algebra, or by Kripkean semantics. An apparent conspiracy of nature prevent such duality to be algebraically interesting, in the quantum case. I guess we have to live with this. In the digital case, it is an open problem. It makes interesting to solve the digital case, just to see if such conspiracy of nature is a physical law or a geographical misfortune. This can be translated mechanically into a set of arithmetical problem, but those are *very* complex (that's the weakness of the interview of the universal machine on such question). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hi Bruno, From what I can tell so far, ortholattices have Boolean algebras in an orthogonal relationship, similar to the independent unit vectors in a linear vector space. Does non-distributivity follow from this? I can see the relation they have to Kripkean semantics but do cannot act as contractuals. I am still studying. Have you written any new papers covering more detail of the material hypostases? I was unable to find your detailed discussion of Pratt's duality in the List archive... Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. So does the OM I'm referring to. Does that still make is a 3 OM? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. This is above my level of understanding at present. Hopefully, there will be some quiet time soon to study this, as it sounds interesting! If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. It is the set of all infinite binary strings (isomorphic to [0,1) ). It is described in my book. Equation (2.1) of my book (which is a variant of Ray Solomonoff's beautiful formula http://world.std.com/~rjs/index.html) gives a value of precisely zero for the information content of this set. I do still think the universal dovetailer trace, UD*, is equivalent to this set, How? UD* structure relies on computer science, and give a non random countable sets, or strings. The set of binary strings is the set of reals, and it appears in UD*, but only from a first person views, with the real playing the role of oracles. Exactly! but part of this thread is to understand why you might think otherwise. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. Not even if the reference machine is the observer erself? What do you mean by the reference machine? What is an observer? How would S-L distribution be applied to the first person expectancy? The S-L distribution relies upon a universal machine for its definition, called the reference machine. Observer is exactly what you and I mean by it. The person with subjective experience, attaching meaning to experiential data. The observer map o is a map from data to meaning, the former being strings of some alphabet (eg binary), the latter being a countable set - can be modelled by the whole numbers N. The S-L distribution arises naturally if you ask the question: What is the probability of a given meaning being attached to the data by an observer if the data strings were distributed uniformly I think it probably still arises if the data strings were distributed in other ways a priori - eg being the output of a universal machine acting as an oracle, for instance. But I haven't sat down to work out what the limits are to this. Presumably some priori distributions will affect the final result. This would seem to be applying S-L theory to the first person description. How will you avoid huge programs accessing your current states. It might work if we were able to justify why little programs multiply much more observer's state than huge programs, but I doubt S-L could explain this. Any idea? You don't avoid huge programs
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/25/2011 4:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. So does the OM I'm referring to. Does that still make is a 3 OM? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. This is above my level of understanding at present. Hopefully, there will be some quiet time soon to study this, as it sounds interesting! Hi Russell and Bruno,, I recommend that you read Steve Vickers' Topology Via Logic first. Pratt's ideas are a bit more abstract. If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. It is the set of all infinite binary strings (isomorphic to [0,1) ). It is described in my book. Equation (2.1) of my book (which is a variant of Ray Solomonoff's beautiful formula http://world.std.com/~rjs/index.html) gives a value of precisely zero for the information content of this set. I do still think the universal dovetailer trace, UD*, is equivalent to this set, How? UD* structure relies on computer science, and give a non random countable sets, or strings. The set of binary strings is the set of reals, and it appears in UD*, but only from a first person views, with the real playing the role of oracles. Exactly! but part of this thread is to understand why you might think otherwise. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. Not even if the reference machine is the observer erself? What do you mean by the reference machine? What is an observer? How would S-L distribution be applied to the first person expectancy? The S-L distribution relies upon a universal machine for its definition, called the reference machine. Observer is exactly what you and I mean by it. The person with subjective experience, attaching meaning to experiential data. The observer map o is a map from data to meaning, the former being strings of some alphabet (eg binary), the latter being a countable set - can be modelled by the whole numbers N. The S-L distribution arises naturally if you ask the question: What is the probability of a given meaning being attached to the data by an observer if the data strings were distributed uniformly I think it probably still arises if the data strings were distributed in other ways a priori - eg being the output of a universal machine acting as an oracle, for instance. But I haven't sat down to work out what the limits are to this. Presumably some priori distributions will affect the final result. Why does the distribution have to exist a priori? What if it obtains from interactions of many machines? Looking at just one UTM wil never show this. This would seem to be applying S-L theory to the first person description. How will you
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. The 3-OM. But the first person indeterminacy depends on all the (infinite) computations going through all possible intermediary 3-OMs states. That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. I have explained this to Stephen a long time ago, when explaining why the work of Pratt, although very interesting fails to address the comp mind body problem. Basically Pratt's duality is recover by the duality between Bp (G) and Bp Dt (Z1*) or Bp Dt p (X1*). You might serach what I said by looking at Pratt in the archive, with some luck. If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. It is the set of all infinite binary strings (isomorphic to [0,1) ). It is described in my book. Equation (2.1) of my book (which is a variant of Ray Solomonoff's beautiful formula http://world.std.com/~rjs/index.html) gives a value of precisely zero for the information content of this set. I do still think the universal dovetailer trace, UD*, is equivalent to this set, How? UD* structure relies on computer science, and give a non random countable sets, or strings. The set of binary strings is the set of reals, and it appears in UD*, but only from a first person views, with the real playing the role of oracles. but part of this thread is to understand why you might think otherwise. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. Not even if the reference machine is the observer erself? What do you mean by the reference machine? What is an observer? How would S-L distribution be applied to the first person expectancy? This would seem to be applying S-L theory to the first person description. How will you avoid huge programs accessing your current states. It might work if we were able to justify why little programs multiply much more observer's state than huge programs, but I doubt S-L could explain this. Any idea? I think I might be the only person to suggest doing this, though, which I first did in my Why Occam's razor paper. I'm not sure, because Marcus Hutter suggested something similar in a recent paper (quite independently of me, it appears). This result follows from the compiler theorem - composition of a UTM with another one is still a UTM. So even if there is a rich structure to the OMs caused by them being generated in a UD, that structure will be lost in the process of observation. The net effect is that UD* is just as much a veil on the ultimate ontology as is the no information ensemble. UD*, or sigma_1 arithmetic, can be seen as an effective (mechanically defined) definition of a zero information. It is the everything for the computational approach, but it is tiny compared to the first person view of it by internal observers accounted in the limit by the UD. But isn't first person view of the UD given by a slice of UD*? UD* is a countable structure, but the math of the first person involves a continuum, so I doubt it can be a slice of UD*. This makes the measure problem very difficult, and that is why I tackle it by the self-reference modal logic, which gives the complete math of the propositional logic of observation (together
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/22/2011 10:41 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. [SPK] Hi Russell, Does this countable number of distinct UM states account for all possible versions of the OM? How do we deal with the set of transformations of the OM that represent rotations, dilations, translations, reflections and boosts? These form a set of smooth functions that imply a continuum, no? Or are you considering each and every POV to be a OM where the moment (duration of time) is an irreducible unit? That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. [SPK] It would be wonderful to have an easily accessible glossary/wiki of these terms. I have a hard time keeping track of them myself. If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. It is the set of all infinite binary strings (isomorphic to [0,1) ). It is described in my book. Equation (2.1) of my book (which is a variant of Ray Solomonoff's beautiful formula http://world.std.com/~rjs/index.html) gives a value of precisely zero for the information content of this set. [SPK] Is it possible that the zero value of the information content of the set is an indication of the inability to distinguish proper subsets of the set? I am thinking of information in the differences that make a difference sense... I do still think the universal dovetailer trace, UD*, is equivalent to this set, but part of this thread is to understand why you might think otherwise. [SPK] I am not sure that I have a good verbal/visual handle on what a trace is. :-( Is it like the trace of a matrix? and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. Not even if the reference machine is the observer erself? This would seem to be applying S-L theory to the first person description. I think I might be the only person to suggest doing this, though, which I first did in my Why Occam's razor paper. I'm not sure, because Marcus Hutter suggested something similar in a recent paper (quite independently of me, it appears). [SPK] Is the observer erself that you are considering here the generator of the OM or the description/representation of the machine that Löb's theorem induces? It seems to me that the fixed point is the self, but the self identifies/represents itself with the boundary of the set of objects over which transformations induce the fixed point. We humans do this when we identify the surface of our skin and all that it contains with our self and yet somehow still have the sense of self ' as separate from that skin bag of ... . This result follows from the compiler theorem - composition of a UTM with another one is still a UTM. So even if there is a rich structure to the OMs caused by them being generated in a UD, that structure will be lost in the process of observation. The net effect is that UD* is just as much a veil on the ultimate ontology as is the no information ensemble. UD*, or sigma_1 arithmetic, can be seen as an effective (mechanically defined) definition of a zero information. It is the everything for the computational approach, but it is tiny compared to the first person view of it by internal observers accounted in the limit by the UD. But isn't first person view of the UD given by a slice of UD*?
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/22/2011 10:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:01:40AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Russell, The Stone duality was first found as an isomorphism between Boolean algebras and totaly disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces. Generalizations are being studied. Consider what these topological spaces look like... What does a Cantor set look like, for example? The idea is to shift from thinking of algebras and spaces as purely static and consider them as evolving systems, ala Hintikka's game theoretic semantics for proof theory. The idea that I am studying was first proposed by Vaughan Pratt using Chu spaces. See: http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf Maybe I should take a look. The trouble is it'll require some study, and I'm rather time poor, at present :). Its a pity Bruno hasn't had more time to look into it, as it seems a closer match for his ontology... Cheers Hi Russel, Aye, I wish you would have some time to look into it. I found Pratt's Chu space construction to be equivalent (in a limited sense) to the topological system discussed in Steve Vickers' book, Topology via Logic. Vickers' discussion of Continuous maps is another form, albeit a bit more simple, of the dynamics that I am considering. Vickers, as far as I have studied, only seems to consider his own version of Chu_2, which is the 2-valued logic version of the Chu construction. Bruno seems to want a purely ideal monist ontology at the primitive level. I am assuming something more like Bertrand Russell's neutral monism at the primitive level and a vanishing in the limit dualism that supervenes on it. Like a dual aspect dualism + property bundle theory on a neutral monism. Bruno's ideas would map into and onto the abstract algebras side of the duality, thus if Bruno's result is false then so to is the idea that I am exploring as it seems to be a non-severable component. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 22 Oct 2011, at 16:46, Stephen P. King wrote: How is a space defined in strictly arithmetic terms? Why do you want to define it in arithmetic. With comp, arithmetic can be used for the ontology, but the internal epistemology needs much more. Remember that the tiny effective sigma_1 arithmetic already emulate all Löbian machines like PA, ZF, etc. Numbers can use sets to understand themselves. Yes, that numbers are what the Stone duality based idea assumes, but numbers alone do not induce the understanding unless and until sets are defined in distinction to them. Numbers alone are not enough, you need to make explicit the assumption of addition and multiplication. And that is provably quite enough. To understand this you need to understand that the partial recursive functions are representable in very tiny theories of arithmetic (like Robinson Arithmetic), and you need to recall that you assume that you would survive with a digital brain/body. The rest follows from the UD reasoning. That is not addressing my point. What is your point? My point is that we don't need sets to have dreaming machines (notably dreaming about sets, and perhaps making good use of them). This is why it cannot be monistic above the nothing level. ? Tarski's theorem prevents understanding in number monist theories. ? If arithmetic truth cannot be defined in arithmetic, how can a notion of understanding obtain. Lobian machines are not just pure arithmetic, it seems. It is pure arithmetic. It is the very idea of Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematic. The study of Löbian machines can be seen as the study of what numbers can prove about themselves and their points of view by using nothing more than addition and multiplication + a bit of classical logic (which is part of the number, by the arithmetization). How could a Löbian machine grasp arithmetical truth? Well, she can't. But she can define truth for all Sigma-i or Pi_i truth notions, and she can approximate the whole truth, talk indirectly about it, or intuit stronger arithmetical or mathematical axioms, and transform herself. Tiny as opposed to ??? To big! Or strong. ZF proves much more arithmetical propositions than PA. Oh, the number of independent but mutually necessary axioms? This would not been a good measure of complexity or strongness, given that you can find theories with many independent and mutually necessary axioms which can be forlaised with the use of very few (different) axioms. It is less ambiguous to measure the force of a theory by the amount of arithmetic theorem they are able to prove. Note that ZF and ZFC (ZF + axiom of choice) have the exact same force. The axiom of choice has no bearing on the arithmetical reality. Of course, some proofs of arithmetical theorem can be shorter, but all proof using the axiom of choice can be done without using the axiom choice. I wish I could find a broader discussion of that claim. I proved this as an exercise in set theory when student. Hint: use Gödel constructible sets (cf V = L). Buy the very good book by Krivine on Set Theory. But this is something technical about two particular LUMs, and has no bearing with the topic, I think. ZF + k (ZF + the existence of an accessible cardinal) proves much more arithmetical propositions than ZF and ZFC, for example the arithmetization of ZF consistency). How so? Please point to a discussion of this! Everett is explicitly non-relativistic I suggest you read the original long text by Everett, in the DeWitt and Graham book. The fact that Everett shows this without assuming anything about relativity makes the case even stronger. But I don't think this is relevant on the topic. The digital mechanist hypothesis is neutral on physics. And the conclusion is that the whole of physics is a number illusion. Yes, and that is its failing. It takes the physical world to be epiphenomena. Why epiphenomena? Why not phenomena? Why does the physical world even need to exist at all? Its phenomenological existence is a theorem in the number's theory of number's dreams. The idea is that every 1p would observe itself, in the Lob sense, to be recursive. ? How does a Lobian machine recognize its properties? Which properties. I'm sorry but you are losing me. Any of its properties. How does a Lobian machine know what it is, even if incompletely? By the numbers (machines, programs, ...) self-referential abilities. You might read the paper by Smorynski: 50 years of arithmetical self- references. See the general biblio of Conscience et Mécanisme. The proof would require showing that a Lobian machine on a non- standard model of arithmetic would *not* be able to see its non-standardness and thus it would bet that only it is recursive, thus it's Bpp would be 1p
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 21 Oct 2011, at 20:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/21/2011 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Oct 2011, at 15:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/21/2011 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2011, at 05:30, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97 paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of histories, due to the random oracles you were talking about. All UDs do that. It is always the same beast. On reflection, yes you're correct. The new algorithm you proposed is more efficient than the previous one described in your thesis, as machines are only executed once for each prefix, rather over and over again for each input having the same prefix. But in an environment of unbounded resources, such as we're considering here, that has no import. Note that my programs are not prefixed. They are all generated and executed. To prefix them is usefulm when they are generated by a random coin, which I do not need to do. So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. Hi Bruno and Russel, I would like to better understand what topological semantics means. Are you considering relations defined only in set theoretical sense, ala the closed or open or clopen nature of the sets relative to each other? I guess you know the topological semantics of intuitionist logic. Instead of interpreting the propositions by sets in a boolean algebra, you interpret it by open set in a topological space. You have soundness and completeness theorem for that. I think this came from semantics for the semantics for the modal logic S4, which mirrors well intuitionist logic. What about the form of the axiom of choice for the set theory? ? There are multiple versions of set theory depending on the selection of its form of axiom of choice. There are many set theories at the start, and they are not equivalent. Set theories assumed too much, especially with respect to the mechanist assumptions. How do you induce compactness? Why do you want the space being compact. The point of the topological semantics is that it works for all topological spaces, like any boolean algebra can be used for classical logic. A space needs to be compact for many reasons including, but not exclusive to, the ability to have a physics in them. Spaces that are not compact will not have, for instance, fixed points that allow for notions such as centers of mass, etc. There are also analycity reasons, and more. UDA shows that space and time belongs to the category of mind or machine perceptions, themselves belonging to the category of number relation. To *assume* space and time in the ontology can only be misleading, with respect to the mechanist formulation of the mind-body problem. How is a space defined in strictly arithmetic terms? Why do you want to define it in arithmetic. With comp, arithmetic can be used for the ontology, but the internal epistemology needs much more. Remember that the tiny effective sigma_1 arithmetic already emulate all Löbian machines like PA, ZF, etc. Numbers can use sets to understand themselves. Yes, that numbers are what the Stone duality based idea assumes, but numbers alone do not induce the understanding unless and until sets are defined in distinction to them. Numbers alone are not enough, you need to make explicit the assumption of addition and multiplication. And that is provably quite enough. To understand this you need to understand that the partial recursive functions are representable in very tiny theories of arithmetic (like Robinson Arithmetic), and you need to recall that you assume that you would survive with a digital brain/body. The rest follows from the UD reasoning. This is why it cannot be monistic above the nothing level. ? Tarski's theorem prevents understanding in number monist theories. ? If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/22/2011 8:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Oct 2011, at 20:34, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/21/2011 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Oct 2011, at 15:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/21/2011 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2011, at 05:30, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97 paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of histories, due to the random oracles you were talking about. All UDs do that. It is always the same beast. On reflection, yes you're correct. The new algorithm you proposed is more efficient than the previous one described in your thesis, as machines are only executed once for each prefix, rather over and over again for each input having the same prefix. But in an environment of unbounded resources, such as we're considering here, that has no import. Note that my programs are not prefixed. They are all generated and executed. To prefix them is usefulm when they are generated by a random coin, which I do not need to do. So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. Hi Bruno and Russel, I would like to better understand what topological semantics means. Are you considering relations defined only in set theoretical sense, ala the closed or open or clopen nature of the sets relative to each other? I guess you know the topological semantics of intuitionist logic. Instead of interpreting the propositions by sets in a boolean algebra, you interpret it by open set in a topological space. You have soundness and completeness theorem for that. I think this came from semantics for the semantics for the modal logic S4, which mirrors well intuitionist logic. What about the form of the axiom of choice for the set theory? ? There are multiple versions of set theory depending on the selection of its form of axiom of choice. There are many set theories at the start, and they are not equivalent. Set theories assumed too much, especially with respect to the mechanist assumptions. How do you induce compactness? Why do you want the space being compact. The point of the topological semantics is that it works for all topological spaces, like any boolean algebra can be used for classical logic. A space needs to be compact for many reasons including, but not exclusive to, the ability to have a physics in them. Spaces that are not compact will not have, for instance, fixed points that allow for notions such as centers of mass, etc. There are also analycity reasons, and more. UDA shows that space and time belongs to the category of mind or machine perceptions, themselves belonging to the category of number relation. To *assume* space and time in the ontology can only be misleading, with respect to the mechanist formulation of the mind-body problem. [SPK] I am thinking of mathematical spaces, not the physical space of experience. How is a space defined in strictly arithmetic terms? Why do you want to define it in arithmetic. With comp, arithmetic can be used for the ontology, but the internal epistemology needs much more. Remember that the tiny effective sigma_1 arithmetic already emulate all Löbian machines like PA, ZF, etc. Numbers can use sets to understand themselves. Yes, that numbers are what the Stone duality based idea assumes, but numbers alone do not induce the understanding unless and until sets are defined in distinction to them. Numbers alone are not enough, you need to make explicit the assumption of addition and multiplication. And that is provably quite enough. To understand this you need to understand that the partial recursive functions are representable in very tiny theories of arithmetic (like Robinson Arithmetic), and you need to recall that you assume that you would survive with a digital brain/body. The rest follows from the UD reasoning. That is not addressing my point. This is why it cannot be monistic above the nothing level. ? Tarski's theorem prevents understanding in number monist theories. ? If arithmetic truth cannot be defined in arithmetic, how can a notion of understanding obtain. Lobian machines are not just pure arithmetic, it seems. If we take the no
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. Apriori, no. The UMs dovetailing on the reals will have only executed a finite number of steps, and read a finite number of bits for a given OM. There are only a countable number of distinct UM states making up the OM. That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. You will need to expand on this. I don't know what you mean. If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. It is the set of all infinite binary strings (isomorphic to [0,1) ). It is described in my book. Equation (2.1) of my book (which is a variant of Ray Solomonoff's beautiful formula http://world.std.com/~rjs/index.html) gives a value of precisely zero for the information content of this set. I do still think the universal dovetailer trace, UD*, is equivalent to this set, but part of this thread is to understand why you might think otherwise. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. Not even if the reference machine is the observer erself? This would seem to be applying S-L theory to the first person description. I think I might be the only person to suggest doing this, though, which I first did in my Why Occam's razor paper. I'm not sure, because Marcus Hutter suggested something similar in a recent paper (quite independently of me, it appears). This result follows from the compiler theorem - composition of a UTM with another one is still a UTM. So even if there is a rich structure to the OMs caused by them being generated in a UD, that structure will be lost in the process of observation. The net effect is that UD* is just as much a veil on the ultimate ontology as is the no information ensemble. UD*, or sigma_1 arithmetic, can be seen as an effective (mechanically defined) definition of a zero information. It is the everything for the computational approach, but it is tiny compared to the first person view of it by internal observers accounted in the limit by the UD. But isn't first person view of the UD given by a slice of UD*? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:01:40AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Russell, The Stone duality was first found as an isomorphism between Boolean algebras and totaly disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces. Generalizations are being studied. Consider what these topological spaces look like... What does a Cantor set look like, for example? The idea is to shift from thinking of algebras and spaces as purely static and consider them as evolving systems, ala Hintikka's game theoretic semantics for proof theory. The idea that I am studying was first proposed by Vaughan Pratt using Chu spaces. See: http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf Maybe I should take a look. The trouble is it'll require some study, and I'm rather time poor, at present :). Its a pity Bruno hasn't had more time to look into it, as it seems a closer match for his ontology... Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/21/2011 1:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 08:00:55PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat into solipsism. I think it very much an open problem what that is. Hi Russell, Would the conjecture that the Stone duality provide a coherent version of this identity thesis? Minds, as per Comp, - logical algebras and Brains - topological spaces. Not not, how so? Onward! Stephen I have to confess to not having the slightest inkling what you're saying here. I did briefly look at Stone duality on Wikipedia, but it didn't help much. I assume that you're interested in some duality between an algebra (perhaps one of Bruno's hypostases, if they're an algebra) and a topological space that could stand in for physical reality, but beyond that I'm totally lost :). Hi Russell, The Stone duality was first found as an isomorphism between Boolean algebras and totaly disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces. Generalizations are being studied. Consider what these topological spaces look like... What does a Cantor set look like, for example? The idea is to shift from thinking of algebras and spaces as purely static and consider them as evolving systems, ala Hintikka's game theoretic semantics for proof theory. The idea that I am studying was first proposed by Vaughan Pratt using Chu spaces. See: http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf If Bruno's UD is a logical algebra, then it would have a Stone space as its dual. If the UD evolves, then so too does its Stone space. This implies a nice identity thesis and avoids the Occam catastrophe because of compactness. BTW, compactness requires a topological form of finiteness, thus the measure problem is also solved. There are still some open problems, such as the degenerasy into solipsistic systems, that need to be addressed. I suspect that Tennenbaum's theorem might be a place to start. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 19 Oct 2011, at 05:30, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97 paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of histories, due to the random oracles you were talking about. All UDs do that. It is always the same beast. On reflection, yes you're correct. The new algorithm you proposed is more efficient than the previous one described in your thesis, as machines are only executed once for each prefix, rather over and over again for each input having the same prefix. But in an environment of unbounded resources, such as we're considering here, that has no import. Note that my programs are not prefixed. They are all generated and executed. To prefix them is usefulm when they are generated by a random coin, which I do not need to do. So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. This result follows from the compiler theorem - composition of a UTM with another one is still a UTM. So even if there is a rich structure to the OMs caused by them being generated in a UD, that structure will be lost in the process of observation. The net effect is that UD* is just as much a veil on the ultimate ontology as is the no information ensemble. UD*, or sigma_1 arithmetic, can be seen as an effective (mechanically defined) definition of a zero information. It is the everything for the computational approach, but it is tiny compared to the first person view of it by internal observers accounted in the limit by the UD. Unless I'm missing something here. Lets leave the discussion of the universal prior to another post. In a nutshell, though, no matter what prior distribution you put on the no information ensemble, an observer of that ensemble will always see the Solomonoff-Levin distribution, or universal prior. I don't think it makes sense to use a universal prior. That would make sense if we suppose there are computable universes, and if we try to measure the probability we are in such structure. This is typical of Schmidhuber's approach, which is still quite similar to physicalism, where we conceive observers as belonging to computable universes. Put in another way, this is typical of using some sort of identity thesis between a mind and a program. I understand your point, but the concept of universal prior is of far more general applicability than Schmidhuber's model. There need not be any identity thesis invoked, as for example in applications such as observers of Rorshach diagrams. And as for identity thesis, you do have a type of identity thesis in the statement that brains make interaction with other observers relatively more likely (or something like that). yes, by the duplication (multiplication) of populations of observers, like in comp, but also like in Everett. There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat into solipsism. I think it very much an open problem what that is. This will depend on the degree of similarity between between quantum mechanics and the comp physics, which is given entirely by the (quantified) material hypostases (mainly the Z1* and X1* logics). Open but well mathematically circumscribed problem.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/21/2011 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2011, at 05:30, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97 paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of histories, due to the random oracles you were talking about. All UDs do that. It is always the same beast. On reflection, yes you're correct. The new algorithm you proposed is more efficient than the previous one described in your thesis, as machines are only executed once for each prefix, rather over and over again for each input having the same prefix. But in an environment of unbounded resources, such as we're considering here, that has no import. Note that my programs are not prefixed. They are all generated and executed. To prefix them is usefulm when they are generated by a random coin, which I do not need to do. So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which are in a sequel when emulated by some universal UM,there are infinitely many UMs, including one dovetailing on the reals, leading to intermediate states. So I think that the computational neighborhoods are a priori uncoutable. That fits with the topological semantics of the first person logics (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X, X*, X1, X1*). But many math problems are unsolved there. Hi Bruno and Russel, I would like to better understand what topological semantics means. Are you considering relations defined only in set theoretical sense, ala the closed or open or clopen nature of the sets relative to each other? What about the form of the axiom of choice for the set theory? How do you induce compactness? How is a space defined in strictly arithmetic terms? If we take the no information ensemble, You might recall what you mean by this exactly. and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This is a bit unclear to me. Solomonof-Levin distribution are very nice, they are machine/theory independent, and that is quite in the spirit of comp, but it seems to be usable only in ASSA type approach. I do not exclude this can help for providing a role to little program, but I don't see at all how it could help for the computation of the first person indeterminacy, aka the derivation of physics from computer science needed when we assume comp in cognitive science. In the work using Solomonof-Levin, the mind-body problem is still under the rug. They don't seem aware of the first/third person description. S-L seems to assume 1p = 3p or no 1p at all! This result follows from the compiler theorem - composition of a UTM with another one is still a UTM. So even if there is a rich structure to the OMs caused by them being generated in a UD, that structure will be lost in the process of observation. The net effect is that UD* is just as much a veil on the ultimate ontology as is the no information ensemble. UD*, or sigma_1 arithmetic, can be seen as an effective (mechanically defined) definition of a zero information. It is the everything for the computational approach, but it is tiny compared to the first person view of it by internal observers accounted in the limit by the UD. How do we define this notion of size? Tiny as opposed to ??? Unless I'm missing something here. Lets leave the discussion of the universal prior to another post. In a nutshell, though, no matter what prior distribution you put on the no information ensemble, an observer of that ensemble will always see the Solomonoff-Levin distribution, or universal prior. I don't think it makes sense to use a universal prior. That would make sense if we suppose there are computable universes, and if we try to measure the probability we are in such structure. This is typical of Schmidhuber's approach, which is still quite similar to physicalism, where we conceive observers as belonging to computable universes. Put in another way, this is typical of using some sort of identity thesis between a mind and a program. I understand your point, but the concept of universal prior is of far more general applicability than Schmidhuber's model. There need not be any identity thesis invoked, as for example in applications such as observers of Rorshach diagrams. And as for identity thesis, you do have a type of identity thesis in the statement that brains make interaction with other observers relatively more likely (or something like that). yes, by the duplication (multiplication) of
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/18/2011 11:30 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97 paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of histories, due to the random oracles you were talking about. All UDs do that. It is always the same beast. On reflection, yes you're correct. The new algorithm you proposed is more efficient than the previous one described in your thesis, as machines are only executed once for each prefix, rather over and over again for each input having the same prefix. But in an environment of unbounded resources, such as we're considering here, that has no import. So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. If we take the no information ensemble, and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This result follows from the compiler theorem - composition of a UTM with another one is still a UTM. So even if there is a rich structure to the OMs caused by them being generated in a UD, that structure will be lost in the process of observation. The net effect is that UD* is just as much a veil on the ultimate ontology as is the no information ensemble. Unless I'm missing something here. Lets leave the discussion of the universal prior to another post. In a nutshell, though, no matter what prior distribution you put on the no information ensemble, an observer of that ensemble will always see the Solomonoff-Levin distribution, or universal prior. I don't think it makes sense to use a universal prior. That would make sense if we suppose there are computable universes, and if we try to measure the probability we are in such structure. This is typical of Schmidhuber's approach, which is still quite similar to physicalism, where we conceive observers as belonging to computable universes. Put in another way, this is typical of using some sort of identity thesis between a mind and a program. I understand your point, but the concept of universal prior is of far more general applicability than Schmidhuber's model. There need not be any identity thesis invoked, as for example in applications such as observers of Rorshach diagrams. And as for identity thesis, you do have a type of identity thesis in the statement that brains make interaction with other observers relatively more likely (or something like that). There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat into solipsism. I think it very much an open problem what that is. Hi Russell, Would the conjecture that the Stone duality provide a coherent version of this identity thesis? Minds, as per Comp, - logical algebras and Brains - topological spaces. Not not, how so? Onward! Stephen snip -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 08:00:55PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote: There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat into solipsism. I think it very much an open problem what that is. Hi Russell, Would the conjecture that the Stone duality provide a coherent version of this identity thesis? Minds, as per Comp, - logical algebras and Brains - topological spaces. Not not, how so? Onward! Stephen I have to confess to not having the slightest inkling what you're saying here. I did briefly look at Stone duality on Wikipedia, but it didn't help much. I assume that you're interested in some duality between an algebra (perhaps one of Bruno's hypostases, if they're an algebra) and a topological space that could stand in for physical reality, but beyond that I'm totally lost :). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97 paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of histories, due to the random oracles you were talking about. All UDs do that. It is always the same beast. On reflection, yes you're correct. The new algorithm you proposed is more efficient than the previous one described in your thesis, as machines are only executed once for each prefix, rather over and over again for each input having the same prefix. But in an environment of unbounded resources, such as we're considering here, that has no import. So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs (bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely still countable. If we take the no information ensemble, and transform it by applying a universal turing machine and collect just the countable output string where the machine halts, then apply another observer function that also happens to be a UTM, the final result will still be a Solomonoff-Levin distribution over the OMs. This result follows from the compiler theorem - composition of a UTM with another one is still a UTM. So even if there is a rich structure to the OMs caused by them being generated in a UD, that structure will be lost in the process of observation. The net effect is that UD* is just as much a veil on the ultimate ontology as is the no information ensemble. Unless I'm missing something here. Lets leave the discussion of the universal prior to another post. In a nutshell, though, no matter what prior distribution you put on the no information ensemble, an observer of that ensemble will always see the Solomonoff-Levin distribution, or universal prior. I don't think it makes sense to use a universal prior. That would make sense if we suppose there are computable universes, and if we try to measure the probability we are in such structure. This is typical of Schmidhuber's approach, which is still quite similar to physicalism, where we conceive observers as belonging to computable universes. Put in another way, this is typical of using some sort of identity thesis between a mind and a program. I understand your point, but the concept of universal prior is of far more general applicability than Schmidhuber's model. There need not be any identity thesis invoked, as for example in applications such as observers of Rorshach diagrams. And as for identity thesis, you do have a type of identity thesis in the statement that brains make interaction with other observers relatively more likely (or something like that). There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat into solipsism. I think it very much an open problem what that is. Unfortunately the mainstream scientists still ignore the first person indeterminacy today, meaning that they just ignore the 1-person / 3-person distinction---not mentioning the mind body problem (and, to be sure, I still don't know if this comes from a genuine non understanding, or if it is still the problem of acknowledging my work, which would be a notoriety problem for some). As I said, I don't know if the problem is really genuine, for the 1- indeterminacy, which is rather a simple notion. Some researchers told me that it is a problem to cite my name, but not so much my work if they change the vocabulary. Wow, you must've really got some people's noses out of joint. Incidently, New Scientist has a recent article about dastardly deeds done in science, including some well know ones like Newton's treatment of Hooke and Watson Crick's treatment of Franklin. Even Einstein gets a serve about claiming the equation E=mc^2 for himself. What a pity, what a waste of time. It is less tragic than the illegality of cannabis and drugs, but it is seems clear that human corporatism leads to an accumulation of human catastrophes, everywhere. Corporatism perverts democracies and academies. This has an unavoidable costs and moneys based on lies has no genuine value. The rule publish or perish is also both a killing-science and killing-human procedure: it creates a redundancy which hides the interesting results, and it multiplies the fake researches. Ranking the number of citation creates circular loops of people citing each others and not much more. It also creates the psychopathic reviewer, who does all to undermine the credibility of a paper. I have experienced one or two like that - not many, but its still a nuisance. It is a nonsense. A researcher who does not find or solve something should NOT publish, but should not perish either. He should still allow to search. Well its more about lack of funding. One can research anything one desires if you are independently wealthy, or have an
Re: COMP is empty(?)
While the comments made here make interesting and amusing reading the underlying rationale of COMP as an attempt to resolve the mind-body problem which worried earlier philosophers is, in my view fatally flawed. Here are some of the main reasons: 1. There is no longer a mind-body problem. Objective current understandings of physics, chemistry and biology easily dispel the mystical notions previously associated with consciousness. As long as we take care to avoid the trap of introspection with its attendant self-referential recursive loops we can now see that this feature, which happens to be greatly hypertrophied in our species, is merely an extension and enhancement of the navigational facility seen in most animals. The degree of sophistication being a result natural selection to permit optimal interaction of the organism with its environment. Which in our case, of course is extraordinarily high. 2. The language of mathematics has evolved to handle more efficiently the relatively simple situations not requiring the high levels of abstraction found in the natural languages. The latter are, for the most part, more appropriate for complex disciplines such as chemistry and particularly biology. A tree, for instance, or a cell, defies mathematical description. Only for the simpler aspects of these disciplines does mathematics play a minor (but nevertheless valuable part) as an adjunct. For this reason, mathematics would not be a good contender for the solution of the mind-body problem even if it still had any significance. 3. Even in those areas where mathematics is most valuable we must bear in mind that, like all languages, it is capable of generating fictions. Most importantly, of the multitudinous mathematical models that can be envisaged, only a small subset correspond to empirical reality. For example, any number of dimensions can be handled within mathematics yet only the three of space and one of time have, as yet, been observed. Science has found no straight lines or points in our universe. It is the failure to recognize these inherent limitations which, to me, appear to inspire much of the contention in the above discussions of this topic. A treatment of consciousness and related issues is provided within the context of a broad evolutionary model which extends beyond biology in: The Goldilocks Effect: What Has Serendipity Ever Done For Us? (free download in e-book formats from the Unusual Perspectives website) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Hi Peter, On 18 Oct 2011, at 13:00, Peter Kinnon wrote: While the comments made here make interesting and amusing reading the underlying rationale of COMP as an attempt to resolve the mind-body problem which worried earlier philosophers is, in my view fatally flawed. Here are some of the main reasons: 1. There is no longer a mind-body problem. Objective current understandings of physics, chemistry and biology easily dispel the mystical notions previously associated with consciousness. The problem is already here. I suggest you read my paper here: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html It shows that mechanism is incompatible with weak form of materialism and physicalism. It provides a new precise reformulation of the mind- body problem in the form of a pure body problem in arithmetic (or in any first order logical specification of a universal machine). In a nutshell, universal machine cannot distinguish physical reality (if that makes sense) from virtual reality nor, it is the key point, from arithmetical reality. Their subjective continuations has to be given by an average of some sort on *all* computations foing through their actual state, and existing in the additive and multiplicative structure of the numbers. So, even if locally, you could dispel the mind-body problem with current physics, you cannot do that to solve the problem before you justify the physical laws from that relative measure on the computations. Then computer science and mathematical logic can already provide quickly the propositional logic of the observable events, and up to now, QM confirms comp, so that comp seems to be confirmed in its weirdest consequences (which is that we are multiplied into infinities of computations 'all the time'). The propositional logic of the observable extracted from comp already justify statistical interference of the computations, and a linear symmetrical bottom for physics. Better than that, the splitting of those logics into a provable and true part (by and on the machine respectively) gives a solid hint on how we can distinguish the quanta (sharable by universal machines) and the qualia (irreducibly NON sharable and private). As long as we take care to avoid the trap of introspection with its attendant self-referential recursive loops we can now see that this feature, which happens to be greatly hypertrophied in our species, If you avoid introspection, you avoid the very nature of consciousness and qualia. is merely an extension and enhancement of the navigational facility seen in most animals. I am OK with this. The degree of sophistication being a result natural selection to permit optimal interaction of the organism with its environment. Which in our case, of course is extraordinarily high. That does not explain the nature of the qualia. A priori such explanations explain only complex third person describable phenomena, not the inner qualia. yet, the logic above does explains the qualia, gives them a role, and give a role to consciousness (self-speeding up relatively to other universal machines). 2. The language of mathematics has evolved to handle more efficiently the relatively simple situations not requiring the high levels of abstraction found in the natural languages. The latter are, for the most part, more appropriate for complex disciplines such as chemistry and particularly biology. A tree, for instance, or a cell, defies mathematical description. Only for the simpler aspects of these disciplines does mathematics play a minor (but nevertheless valuable part) as an adjunct. For this reason, mathematics would not be a good contender for the solution of the mind-body problem even if it still had any significance. I insist, if a mechanist explanation can work, then the price of the mind-body solution is an explanation of physics, from the non physical. No need of magical soul, programs and numbers are enough, but we have to explain the origin of the appearance of the physical laws from this. 3. Even in those areas where mathematics is most valuable we must bear in mind that, like all languages, it is capable of generating fictions. You confuse the arithmetical reality, with the theories exploring it, and you confuse the theories with the languages which can be used to express those theories. To say that math is language is conventionalism, and this has been abandoned, because it is refuted by facts, notably that arithmetical truth is beyond the reach of any possible theory. Mechanism is often use in a reductionist way by materialist, but when you look at the detail mechanism defeats all possible reductionism of our conception of number and machine. Most importantly, of the multitudinous mathematical models that can be envisaged, only a small subset correspond to empirical reality. Sure. Note that what you call models is called
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Hi Russell, I have been guilty of responding a little too quickly to your posts :). No problem. I want to just focus on the following exchange about the Universal dovetailer, and put aside questions of ontology, measure, induction, anthropic principle, etc. On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 04:51:20PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). It is a priori a continuum, due to the dovetailing on the infinite real input on programs by the UD. IIUC, the programs dovetailed by the UD do not take inputs. Why. By the SMN theorem, this would not be important, but to avoid its use I always describe the dovetailing as being done on one input programs. For all i, j, k compute the kth first steps of phi_i(j)(and thus all programs dovetailed by the UD have an input (j)) End The UD has no input, but the programs executed by the UD have one input. OK - but this is equivalent to dovetailing all zero input programs of the form \psi_k() = \phi_i(j) where k is given by the Cantor pairing function of (i,j). No matter, but there's still only a countable number of machines being run. You need to use the SMN theorem on phi_u(i,j). But your conclusion is exact. Unless you take some no-comp notion of 'machines', machines are always countable. Their histories and their semantics, and epistemologies, are not. I'm not sure what you mean by random inputs. The exact definition of random does not matter. They all work in this context. You can choose the algorithmic definition of Chaitin, or my own favorite definition where a random sequence is an arbitrary sequence. With this last definition, my favorite example of random sequence is the sequence 1 (infinity of 1). The UD dovetails on all inputs, but the dovetailing is on the non random answers given by the programs on those possible arbitrary inputs. Sorry - I know what you mean by random - its the inputs part that was confusing me (see above). By dovetailing on the reals, which is 3-equivalent with dovetailing on larger and larger arbitrary finite input, there is a sense to say that from their 1-views, the machines are confronted with the infinite bitstrings (a continuum), but only as input to some machine, unless our substitution level is infinitely low, like if we need to be conscious the exact real position of some particles, in which case our bodies would be part of the oracle (infinite bitstring). This gives a UD* model of NOT being a machine. Comp is consistent with us or different creature not being machine, a bit like PA is consistent with the provability of 0=1. (but not with 0=1 itself. For the machine '0=1' is quite different from B'0=1'). Schmidhuber's description of the UD in his 1997 paper is clear. His dovetailer runs all zero input programs. To be more precise, he dovetails a universal machine on all finite strings (or equivalently all strings with a finite number of '1' bits). In this state of affairs, there can only ever be a countable number of universes. In your Brussells thesis, on page 11 you describe the UD. You start of by limiting your programs to no input programs (sans entrees). Then you argue that the UD must also be dovetailing all 1 input programs, n-input programs etc - by virtue of eg a LISP interpreter being written in FORTRAN. Fair enough, but whilst it is possible to convert a one input program into a zero input program by concatenating the program and the input (with the possible addition of a prefix the tells the UTM where the program ends and the data starts), by dovetailing over all zero input programs, one is not actually dovetailing over the reals. One cannot say one is running all programs with random oracles - the oracles can at best be simply the output of some zero input machine. However, just recently, you introduced a new dovetailer, which does dovetail over the reals. For program i when reading bit k of the input, you split the program into two instances, and execute both instances with the bit being '0' or '1'. This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97 paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of histories, due to the random oracles you were talking about. All UDs do that. It is always the same beast. A computation of phi_i(x, y) can be emulated by a dovetailing on infinitely many programs parametrized with k: phi_i(x, k), as you know. Likewize, you can emulate a finite program having an infinite real oracle by the infinitely many programs like phi_i(x, 0) phi_i(x,1) phi_i(x, 00) phi_i(x, 01) phi_i(x, 10) phi_i(x, 11) etc. If such a phi_i needs the
Re: COMP is empty(?)
is not absurd at all, but pretty much a formulation of what immaterialism is/means. So this argument works for materialism, but I don't know what it has to do with the belief that consciousness is the fundamental thing. I don't see how this argument could be used against this, as experience with null measurable conscious activity is not absurd, either, since consciousness may just be unmeasurable (it even obviously is, I'd say), and also - being beyond time - may not rely on activity as such (and it is hard to find a anology equivalent to modifying a device in the first place). COMP wants to show that from YES doctor (and the two other hypothesis) the conclusion follows, while just adressing the incoherence of materialism (and YES), and not non-mechanist immaterialism and YES. So it doesn't work if you believe we are immaterial non-machines that still can be (theoretically) replaced while still surviving in a similiar history. If you would exclude this as a fourth hypothesis of COMP, the reasoning is quite valid in my view, but it had the very severe disadvantage that it postulates the falsity of the only real competitor (non-mechanist immaterialism). Bruno Marchal wrote: but yours isn't strictly formal (necessarily so because Yes doctor, including correct substitution level is not formal and the reasoning has to reference that), and so no formal contradiction can be found - or even no contradiction at all. You can get informal contradiction. But informal contradictions are subjective, even though there is often a strong inter-subjective agreement whether something constitutes a contradiction or not. Bruno Marchal wrote: If you were true, no discussion at all would make sense. We don't have to discuss to refute the other, we can also discuss to incorporate the others view, which is more productive, IMO. Bruno Marchal wrote: In fact rigorous/non-rigorous has nothing to do with formal/informal. Uhm, that's clearly not true, even just because it is harder to determine what rigor even means in an informal context (as it can't be easily defined as in a formal context). And if something remains more undetermined/ vague, it is clearly less rigorous, is it? Bruno Marchal wrote: This doesn't imply that the reasoning is valid. Otherwise all informal arguments would be valid, which is clearly not true. Of course. But if you find a reasoning non valid, it is up to you to say where and why specifically. OK. I have done this now. This still doesn't mean that I agree with all of the rest of the reasoning, necessarily (I still believe there may be non-concrete flaws - flaws with the meta-assumptions of the reasoning, which you don't seem to count), but I hope the point is concrete enough to count for you. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: PS I might comment other paragraph, but I am unfortunately very busy, so I will limit to answer only one paragraph which I might find more important, or summing up others. Don't bother. You are just wasting your time, frankly I have no interest in this discussion anymore. You did really lost me. I did not see your point at all in some of your late posts. I have begun to answer one, but then some remarks you did made me realize it would make no sense of trying to answer the post. I was enjoying discussing with you, but then, all of a sudden, you lost me through a labyrinth of negative and emotional remarks, which cannot really been answered. This is no wonder, as what I said was not based on rationality (and I was mostly not even making a concrete point refutable point) and thus it would be hard to give any rational answer, which apparently would be the only kind of answer you would find appropiate. I tried to make a more rational point in this answer, so maybe you appreciate that. I would like to hear answer to that. I won't get into a long winded discussion, though (hopefully :D). benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32658678.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 16 Oct 2011, at 00:10, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 06:53:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Oct 2011, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:
I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe.
Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of
bayes theorem to justify the laws of physics, presuppose that a
physical universe is an object (may be mathematical, like in
Tegmark) among other objects.
Then why couldn't the physical universe be a trace (aka history)
of UD*?
Because the UDA show it to be a sum of infinitely many computations.
Even 2^(aleph_0) due to the dovetailing of the real (and complex
...) inputs of the program generated and executed by the UD. This
cannot be generated by any programs. It can only be lived or
inferred by the internal observers experimenting their golabl (on
UD*) first person indeterminacies.
Fair point. Let me rephrase: Why couldn't the physical universe be a
set of computations, all giving rise to the same experienced history.
If by this you mean that the physical universe is the first person
sharable experience due to the first person plural indeterminacy
bearing on that set of computations, then it is OK. This is the step7
consequences in big universe, or the step8 consequence in the general
case.
All it
assumes is a prior probability distribution. Something like the
universal prior of Solomonoff-Levin, or the distribution of
observer
moments within UD*.
I don't think such a distribution makes sense. What makes sense
is a
computational state, and a distribution of (competing) universal
machines relating that state with other states through the
computations that they emulate.
Whenever an observer interprets multiple different input strings (ie
observations) as the same thing, the S-L distribution makes
sense. Particularly so if the mapping process is a computation.
I am not sure I understand this.
The S-L distribution is defined as the sum over all programs that
halt and
produce a given output (x say) of 2^{- length of program expressed as
a bitstring}.
We can replace the Turing machine with any function
Replacing a machine by a function? What does that mean?
that takes
bitstrings, and maps them to a countable set of meanings (which can be
identified with N, obviously),
Meaning in the epistemological sense, or in the 3-person sense of
outputs?
That paragraph was a bit unclear for me.
provided the map is prefix free (ie if we
read n bits, and decide the meaning is x, we cannot change our mind
after reading n+m bits).
The UDA indicates we must be supervenient on all programs passing
through our current observer moment.
It makes sense with OM = 3-OM = relative computational state. But
this is not Bostrom's OM a priori (provably with comp).
It seems we've been around the world on this one. There is only one OM
concept, which is defined by the information content of the observer
at a point in time.
Information content as measure by Shannon or Chaitin theories, or
used in my sense or first person experience (which is also Bostrom
epistemological sense of experience). This is a key difference with
respect to the goal of shedding some light on the hard part of the
mind-body problem.
But there may be multiple programs instantiating a given observer, so
there will in general be multiple machine states corresponding to a
given
OM.
I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this
entail
only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of
histories?
I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially
influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no
information ensemble (aka Nothing).
It is a priori a continuum, due to the dovetailing on the infinite
real input on programs by the UD.
IIUC, the programs dovetailed by the UD do not take inputs.
Why. By the SMN theorem, this would not be important, but to avoid its
use I always describe the dovetailing as being done on one input
programs.
For all i, j, k
compute the kth first steps of phi_i(j)(and thus all programs
dovetailed by the UD have an input (j))
End
The UD has no input, but the programs executed by the UD have one input.
You
expanded a bit on this in your response to Brent, but I don't
follow, sorry.
Could it be that there are only a countable number of histories
after
all, given there are only a countable number of programs. That would
be one big difference right there.
We do agree on this. The difference is that the comp statistics is a
statistics on non-random things, even if those things include
computations (non random) with random inputs.
Are you agreeing there may only be a countable number of histories
after all? Or something different :).
It is a
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 09:33:10AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Fair point. Let me rephrase: Why couldn't the physical universe be a set of computations, all giving rise to the same experienced history. If by this you mean that the physical universe is the first person sharable experience due to the first person plural indeterminacy bearing on that set of computations, then it is OK. This is the step7 consequences in big universe, or the step8 consequence in the general case. The point being that one can apply Bayes theorem in this ontology. Also, the Anthropic principle is still relevant, albeit a little mysterious in this case, as I point out in my book. We can replace the Turing machine with any function Replacing a machine by a function? What does that mean? A machine is a (partial) function from the set of bitstrings (the input tape prior to running) to the set of bitstrings (the input tape once the machine halts). We can generalise things by using any function, it needn't be a computable one. that takes bitstrings, and maps them to a countable set of meanings (which can be identified with N, obviously), Meaning in the epistemological sense, or in the 3-person sense of outputs? That paragraph was a bit unclear for me. No, just in the straight forward mathematical sense :). Information content as measure by Shannon or Chaitin theories, or used in my sense or first person experience (which is also Bostrom epistemological sense of experience). In the first person experience sense - not the quantity of information. This is a key difference with respect to the goal of shedding some light on the hard part of the mind-body problem. But there may be multiple programs instantiating a given observer, so there will in general be multiple machine states corresponding to a given OM. I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). It is a priori a continuum, due to the dovetailing on the infinite real input on programs by the UD. IIUC, the programs dovetailed by the UD do not take inputs. Why. By the SMN theorem, this would not be important, but to avoid its use I always describe the dovetailing as being done on one input programs. For all i, j, k compute the kth first steps of phi_i(j)(and thus all programs dovetailed by the UD have an input (j)) End The UD has no input, but the programs executed by the UD have one input. OK - but this is equivalent to dovetailing all zero input programs of the form \psi_k() = \phi_i(j) where k is given by the Cantor pairing function of (i,j). No matter, but there's still only a countable number of machines being run. I'm not sure what you mean by random inputs. The exact definition of random does not matter. They all work in this context. You can choose the algorithmic definition of Chaitin, or my own favorite definition where a random sequence is an arbitrary sequence. With this last definition, my favorite example of random sequence is the sequence 1 (infinity of 1). The UD dovetails on all inputs, but the dovetailing is on the non random answers given by the programs on those possible arbitrary inputs. Sorry - I know what you mean by random - its the inputs part that was confusing me (see above). Surely, if random inputs were applicable, then the histories will be random things. Why? Many programs can even just ignore the inputs, or, if they don't ignore them, by definition of what is a program, they will do computable things from those inputs. In computer science they correspond to the notion of computability with (random) oracle. How will this be distingishable from an observer observing a random string and computing a result (meaning/interpretation)? What I'm trying to get at - is there any difference in distribution of observed results? It could be that a different set of axioms is more appropriate - eg incorporating ideas from evolutionary theory. Do you think that the laws of physics could depend on the evolution of species? No - evolutionary theory is about far more than evolution of species. I was actually thinking of something more along the lines of Popperian epistemology when applied in an epistemological context. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 16 Oct 2011, at 11:31, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 09:33:10AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Fair point. Let me rephrase: Why couldn't the physical universe be a set of computations, all giving rise to the same experienced history. If by this you mean that the physical universe is the first person sharable experience due to the first person plural indeterminacy bearing on that set of computations, then it is OK. This is the step7 consequences in big universe, or the step8 consequence in the general case. The point being that one can apply Bayes theorem in this ontology. Also, the Anthropic principle is still relevant, albeit a little mysterious in this case, as I point out in my book. It will be interesting to use the Bayes theorem, it might gives the cosmology of the physics, for example. But for this we still need the measure and the probability, which have to be extracted from the experiences of the machines in front of their distribution in UD*. This is made precise in arithmetic by the intensional (modal) variants of ideally correct machine's self-reference, which gave the logic of the certainty case. For physics it gives a logic of yes/no experiments. We can replace the Turing machine with any function Replacing a machine by a function? What does that mean? A machine is a (partial) function from the set of bitstrings (the input tape prior to running) to the set of bitstrings (the input tape once the machine halts). Hmm... This is to loose at this level of the discussion. A machine is a *finite* body, or number, or program, or machine. It is finite, and can access only finite states, locally. Those states are finite objects reached by the UD. You can *associate* a function (an infinite object), to such a number/ machine/program/finite-object, which is the function computed by the machine. It is the difference between i and phi_i. The function phi_i is the semantics of i, and is not a machine, or a number, but is an infinite set. Also, I guess you mean by bitstring the finite bitstrings. We can generalise things by using any function, it needn't be a computable one. But where to stop? Why not the set of all operator (the function from set of functions in set of functions), or meta-operator? In fact you abstract completely from bodies, and I am no more sure of what the probabilities of what bear on. I will have to ask you what is your ontology in some precise sense. You seem to work in some set theory, where you can distinguish between finite bitstrings and infinite one at the ontological level. With comp, things are far simpler: the finite is in the ontology, the infinite appears in the discourse by the finite entities, and are projection of the everything see from inside. If we are machine the cardinality of the everything is absolutely unknowable, and it is simpler to chose a (recursively) countable set of finite things, given Church thesis and theoretical computer science. But the epistemology will be non countable. that takes bitstrings, and maps them to a countable set of meanings (which can be identified with N, obviously), Meaning in the epistemological sense, or in the 3-person sense of outputs? That paragraph was a bit unclear for me. No, just in the straight forward mathematical sense :). I don't think there is any straightforward sense for meaning in math. There are many semantics, and their taxonomies looks more like a zoo to me, despite some progresses in model theory. You are missing me completely, because I don't see how you identify a set of meanings with N. I guess you are using the vocabulary in some non standard sense. Information content as measure by Shannon or Chaitin theories, or used in my sense or first person experience (which is also Bostrom epistemological sense of experience). In the first person experience sense - not the quantity of information. But then you do epistemology. The first person notion is eminently a cognitive, phenomenological sense, which I identifie with the knower. The first person is the knower (and then the other intensional variants, like the observer and the feeler). This is a key difference with respect to the goal of shedding some light on the hard part of the mind-body problem. But there may be multiple programs instantiating a given observer, so there will in general be multiple machine states corresponding to a given OM. I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). It is a priori a continuum, due to the dovetailing on the infinite real input on programs by the UD. IIUC, the programs dovetailed by the UD do
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Dear Bruno, I have been guilty of responding a little too quickly to your posts :). I want to just focus on the following exchange about the Universal dovetailer, and put aside questions of ontology, measure, induction, anthropic principle, etc. On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 04:51:20PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). It is a priori a continuum, due to the dovetailing on the infinite real input on programs by the UD. IIUC, the programs dovetailed by the UD do not take inputs. Why. By the SMN theorem, this would not be important, but to avoid its use I always describe the dovetailing as being done on one input programs. For all i, j, k compute the kth first steps of phi_i(j)(and thus all programs dovetailed by the UD have an input (j)) End The UD has no input, but the programs executed by the UD have one input. OK - but this is equivalent to dovetailing all zero input programs of the form \psi_k() = \phi_i(j) where k is given by the Cantor pairing function of (i,j). No matter, but there's still only a countable number of machines being run. You need to use the SMN theorem on phi_u(i,j). But your conclusion is exact. Unless you take some no-comp notion of 'machines', machines are always countable. Their histories and their semantics, and epistemologies, are not. I'm not sure what you mean by random inputs. The exact definition of random does not matter. They all work in this context. You can choose the algorithmic definition of Chaitin, or my own favorite definition where a random sequence is an arbitrary sequence. With this last definition, my favorite example of random sequence is the sequence 1 (infinity of 1). The UD dovetails on all inputs, but the dovetailing is on the non random answers given by the programs on those possible arbitrary inputs. Sorry - I know what you mean by random - its the inputs part that was confusing me (see above). By dovetailing on the reals, which is 3-equivalent with dovetailing on larger and larger arbitrary finite input, there is a sense to say that from their 1-views, the machines are confronted with the infinite bitstrings (a continuum), but only as input to some machine, unless our substitution level is infinitely low, like if we need to be conscious the exact real position of some particles, in which case our bodies would be part of the oracle (infinite bitstring). This gives a UD* model of NOT being a machine. Comp is consistent with us or different creature not being machine, a bit like PA is consistent with the provability of 0=1. (but not with 0=1 itself. For the machine '0=1' is quite different from B'0=1'). Schmidhuber's description of the UD in his 1997 paper is clear. His dovetailer runs all zero input programs. To be more precise, he dovetails a universal machine on all finite strings (or equivalently all strings with a finite number of '1' bits). In this state of affairs, there can only ever be a countable number of universes. In your Brussells thesis, on page 11 you describe the UD. You start of by limiting your programs to no input programs (sans entrees). Then you argue that the UD must also be dovetailing all 1 input programs, n-input programs etc - by virtue of eg a LISP interpreter being written in FORTRAN. Fair enough, but whilst it is possible to convert a one input program into a zero input program by concatenating the program and the input (with the possible addition of a prefix the tells the UTM where the program ends and the data starts), by dovetailing over all zero input programs, one is not actually dovetailing over the reals. One cannot say one is running all programs with random oracles - the oracles can at best be simply the output of some zero input machine. However, just recently, you introduced a new dovetailer, which does dovetail over the reals. For program i when reading bit k of the input, you split the program into two instances, and execute both instances with the bit being '0' or '1'. This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97 paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of histories, due to the random oracles you were talking about. I am wondering if this is the heart of the disagreement you had with Schmidhuber 10 years ago, about (amongst other things) the cardinality of the histories. My idea of the no information ensemble (aka Nothing in my book) was very strongly influenced by that discussion you had with Schmidhuber. Yet, until now, I would say I had the misconception of the dovetailer running just the no input
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 15 Oct 2011, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote: I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe. Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of bayes theorem to justify the laws of physics, presuppose that a physical universe is an object (may be mathematical, like in Tegmark) among other objects. Then why couldn't the physical universe be a trace (aka history) of UD*? Because the UDA show it to be a sum of infinitely many computations. Even 2^(aleph_0) due to the dovetailing of the real (and complex ...) inputs of the program generated and executed by the UD. This cannot be generated by any programs. It can only be lived or inferred by the internal observers experimenting their golabl (on UD*) first person indeterminacies. All it assumes is a prior probability distribution. Something like the universal prior of Solomonoff-Levin, or the distribution of observer moments within UD*. I don't think such a distribution makes sense. What makes sense is a computational state, and a distribution of (competing) universal machines relating that state with other states through the computations that they emulate. Whenever an observer interprets multiple different input strings (ie observations) as the same thing, the S-L distribution makes sense. Particularly so if the mapping process is a computation. I am not sure I understand this. It is discussed in my book (page 83). The terminology (Occam catastrophe) is mine, but it is certainly possible that other people may have raised the issue by a different name. I will look at this again asap. I thought we discuss all this during the ASSA/RSSA debate. I don't recall this issue being discussed during that debate. There was some discussion on it after my book came out, but more about the conclusion that self-awareness is required for consciousness, which apparently people found counter-intuitive for some reason. I don't see the relation with this. There is, but I'll let you reread the book if you're interested. OK. What would it be with respect of UD*?. IFAICT, UD* should be equivalent to the all strings ensemble. I don't think so at all. This is missing the highly non trivial structure on the set of all computations coming from the non trivial notion of computations. Allmost all strings are random, but no computations at all is random, except the result of the application of the identity program on the arbitrary inputs when dovetailing on inputs. But that is just a part of UD*. Most of UD* is not random at all, and it has an extreme redundancy. There is the presence of deep computations, self-referential entities, etc. You may be right, but I think that needs to be demonstrated. ? The UD generates computations, and only computations, so in all portion of the UD*, there is nothing random at all. randomness crops out in the machine's epistemologies or first person views, because they are intrinsically ignorant to which computations they can belong. The UDA indicates we must be supervenient on all programs passing through our current observer moment. It makes sense with OM = 3-OM = relative computational state. But this is not Bostrom's OM a priori (provably with comp). Randomness comes differentiating between running programs (eg being in Washington or being in Moscow). OK. I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). It is a priori a continuum, due to the dovetailing on the infinite real input on programs by the UD. Could it be that there are only a countable number of histories after all, given there are only a countable number of programs. That would be one big difference right there. We do agree on this. The difference is that the comp statistics is a statistics on non-random things, even if those things include computations (non random) with random inputs. If true, it should give rise to observable differences between my theory and yours, which would be an interesting and important result. Yes. You are still trying a theory which would be comp-independent, apparently. Good luck :) Its always worth clarifying what still goes through in an argument when some of the assumptions are relaxed, even if the programme itself hits a wall. Sure. It wasn't a critique of your UDA and AUDA reasoning, (which I agree does not use probability, nor anthropic principle) but of your statement that Bayes' and the Anthropic Principle is inapplicable. Not in all context. The anthropic principle might been use for deriving
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 15 Oct 2011, at 05:44, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 06:40:04PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2011 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). There must be a continuum of histories since there are infinitely long histories which go through a given state (or is it an OM - I don't think they are the same) infinitely many times. But if you're only looking ahead a finite interval then it seems there would only be a countable, or even finite, number of continuations. That would be the relative measure for predicting physics. Brent I was assuming that the histories are infinite in general. It would be surprising if all consciousnesses were halting programs. Just because there is an infinite number of histories passing through each OM does not imply the cardinality of the histories is greater than aleph_0. It is bigger than aleph_0, if you accept the Y = II rule (bifurcation of history = differentiation of consciousness), and if you realize that no matter what, all UDs, stupidly enough, dovetail on the infinite real *inputs*. Those inputs being internal to the program or external (but still UD generated), being dummy argument never interfering with the computations, or interfering with them all the times. The UD does all that. You cannot diagonalized againist the UD for preventing it from doing that. The UD concept inherits the robustness of the UM concept. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Arithmetic is consistent, then Peano Arithmetic cannot prove it. COMP is very similar with a notion of self-consistency, and it provides a sort of rational near inconsistency experience. Hm, I don't see the connection of your answer with what I said. I already got the point you made there. I am not saying that COMP might not be shown to be true, I said that it might not be able to be shown that your reasoning is valid (without or even without assuming COMP). That is, your reasoning might need the same faith that COMP needs, and it seems exactly this is the case. This is most apparent in step 8, which might be a valid argument considering materialism and COMP, but for someone believing that spirit is the basis of reality and who says YES (in theory), this argument doesn't seem to work at all. any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness is not absurd at all, but pretty much a formulation of what immaterialism is/means. So this argument works for materialism, but I don't know what it has to do with the belief that consciousness is the fundamental thing. I don't see how this argument could be used against this, as experience with null measurable conscious activity is not absurd, either, since consciousness may just be unmeasurable (it even obviously is, I'd say), and also - being beyond time - may not rely on activity as such (and it is hard to find a anology equivalent to modifying a device in the first place). COMP wants to show that from YES doctor (and the two other hypothesis) the conclusion follows, while just adressing the incoherence of materialism (and YES), and not non-mechanist immaterialism and YES. So it doesn't work if you believe we are immaterial non-machines that still can be (theoretically) replaced while still surviving in a similiar history. If you would exclude this as a fourth hypothesis of COMP, the reasoning is quite valid in my view, but it had the very severe disadvantage that it postulates the falsity of the only real competitor (non-mechanist immaterialism). Bruno Marchal wrote: but yours isn't strictly formal (necessarily so because Yes doctor, including correct substitution level is not formal and the reasoning has to reference that), and so no formal contradiction can be found - or even no contradiction at all. You can get informal contradiction. But informal contradictions are subjective, even though there is often a strong inter-subjective agreement whether something constitutes a contradiction or not. Bruno Marchal wrote: If you were true, no discussion at all would make sense. We don't have to discuss to refute the other, we can also discuss to incorporate the others view, which is more productive, IMO. Bruno Marchal wrote: In fact rigorous/non-rigorous has nothing to do with formal/informal. Uhm, that's clearly not true, even just because it is harder to determine what rigor even means in an informal context (as it can't be easily defined as in a formal context). And if something remains more undetermined/vague, it is clearly less rigorous, is it? Bruno Marchal wrote: This doesn't imply that the reasoning is valid. Otherwise all informal arguments would be valid, which is clearly not true. Of course. But if you find a reasoning non valid, it is up to you to say where and why specifically. OK. I have done this now. This still doesn't mean that I agree with all of the rest of the reasoning, necessarily (I still believe there may be non-concrete flaws - flaws with the meta-assumptions of the reasoning, which you don't seem to count), but I hope the point is concrete enough to count for you. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: PS I might comment other paragraph, but I am unfortunately very busy, so I will limit to answer only one paragraph which I might find more important, or summing up others. Don't bother. You are just wasting your time, frankly I have no interest in this discussion anymore. You did really lost me. I did not see your point at all in some of your late posts. I have begun to answer one, but then some remarks you did made me realize it would make no sense of trying to answer the post. I was enjoying discussing with you, but then, all of a sudden, you lost me through a labyrinth of negative and emotional remarks, which cannot really been answered. This is no wonder, as what I said was not based on rationality (and I was mostly not even making a concrete point refutable point) and thus it would be hard to give any rational answer, which apparently would be the only kind of answer you would find appropiate. I tried to make a more rational point in this answer, so maybe you appreciate that. I would like to hear answer to that. I won't get into a long winded discussion, though (hopefully :D). benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 06:53:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Oct 2011, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:
I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe.
Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of
bayes theorem to justify the laws of physics, presuppose that a
physical universe is an object (may be mathematical, like in
Tegmark) among other objects.
Then why couldn't the physical universe be a trace (aka history)
of UD*?
Because the UDA show it to be a sum of infinitely many computations.
Even 2^(aleph_0) due to the dovetailing of the real (and complex
...) inputs of the program generated and executed by the UD. This
cannot be generated by any programs. It can only be lived or
inferred by the internal observers experimenting their golabl (on
UD*) first person indeterminacies.
Fair point. Let me rephrase: Why couldn't the physical universe be a
set of computations, all giving rise to the same experienced history.
All it
assumes is a prior probability distribution. Something like the
universal prior of Solomonoff-Levin, or the distribution of observer
moments within UD*.
I don't think such a distribution makes sense. What makes sense is a
computational state, and a distribution of (competing) universal
machines relating that state with other states through the
computations that they emulate.
Whenever an observer interprets multiple different input strings (ie
observations) as the same thing, the S-L distribution makes
sense. Particularly so if the mapping process is a computation.
I am not sure I understand this.
The S-L distribution is defined as the sum over all programs that halt and
produce a given output (x say) of 2^{- length of program expressed as
a bitstring}.
We can replace the Turing machine with any function that takes
bitstrings, and maps them to a countable set of meanings (which can be
identified with N, obviously), provided the map is prefix free (ie if we
read n bits, and decide the meaning is x, we cannot change our mind
after reading n+m bits).
The UDA indicates we must be supervenient on all programs passing
through our current observer moment.
It makes sense with OM = 3-OM = relative computational state. But
this is not Bostrom's OM a priori (provably with comp).
It seems we've been around the world on this one. There is only one OM
concept, which is defined by the information content of the observer
at a point in time.
But there may be multiple programs instantiating a given observer, so
there will in general be multiple machine states corresponding to a given
OM.
I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail
only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories?
I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially
influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no
information ensemble (aka Nothing).
It is a priori a continuum, due to the dovetailing on the infinite
real input on programs by the UD.
IIUC, the programs dovetailed by the UD do not take inputs. You
expanded a bit on this in your response to Brent, but I don't follow, sorry.
Could it be that there are only a countable number of histories after
all, given there are only a countable number of programs. That would
be one big difference right there.
We do agree on this. The difference is that the comp statistics is a
statistics on non-random things, even if those things include
computations (non random) with random inputs.
Are you agreeing there may only be a countable number of histories
after all? Or something different :).
I'm not sure what you mean by random inputs. Surely, if random inputs
were applicable, then the histories will be random things.
Well, because UDA shows that the laws of physics are logico-
arithmetical, and that they take the form of internal
(epistemological) relative statistics on computation.
I actually don't get that conclusion from your work, so it might be
worth elaborating more.
This already happens in the UDA step 7. We don't need the
immateriality or the 'arithmeticality'.
Sorry - I think I minsinterpreted what you said previously...
The Theatetus definition leading to the AUDA has the feel of something
put in by hand, rather than being a logical consequence of the
UDA. Nothing wrong with that, of course, but we should be honest with
it, if it is the case.
I agree I am not always clear on that. That is why I try to
distinguish comp (used in UDA), and comp+theaetetus, used in AUDA.
But the theaetetus ca be shown to be the unique definition meeting
the requirement of computer science, provability logic, and the
usual definition of knowledge (Kp - p, Kp - KKp,
K(p-q)-(Kp-Kq)). It can be motivated, as it is by Socrates in the
Theaetetus of
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 13 Oct 2011, at 22:50, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about whether you reasoning is valid or not. I don't defend any truth but I am still offering a reasoning to you. If you find it invalid it is your task to find the flaw. That's is by definition of reasoning. By saying that no flaw has been found, while people have pointed out flaws that you just don't accept as such (whether valid or not is not even important), On the contrary, once we are genuinely interested in the topic, that is what is important. The rest is meta-discussion distracting from the topic. It seems to me purely rational arguments are only especially dogmatic arguments, like arguments purely based on belief. Rational argument are always based on belief, that is, by people ready to be shown false. Irrational arguments are based on knowledge, which is never rational, nor even a rational notion, because it is based on truth. That is why in science, there is only beliefs, at least if we accept Popper idea that a scientific proposition has to be refutable. I am not talking on human scientists, who falls in the trap of believing non fallible, but on sort of ideal science. *All* reasoning suppose their premise true for the sake of the reasoning. But in some case the reasoning itself cannot be seperated from the premise. If I don't share the premise that 1+1=2, I can still see that 1+2=3 follows from that. This may not be the case with all arguments, and it seems to me this is the case with COMP. Comp, on the contrary, warns explicitly that it might be false, and that: if it is true, this cannot be shown by a rational argument. If a doctor pretended that science has proved that the brain is a computer, you better run away, because, IF the brain is a computer THEN no one can show it to be a computer. This is a subtle point. It is like consistency for a LUM (or for Peano Arithmetic). Peano Arithmetic can prove that if Peano Arithmetic is consistent, then Peano Arithmetic cannot prove it. COMP is very similar with a notion of self-consistency, and it provides a sort of rational near inconsistency experience. Bruno Marchal wrote: A common technic to prove that A entails B consists in supposing A and getting B from that. This does not prove that A is true, it proves only that IF A is true then B is true. In many-world terms it means that in all words were A is true, B is also true. It means there is no world in which A is true and B is not true. But it does not mean that A is true in all world. A common technic to prove that A is false, for example, will consists in assuming A and getting a contradiction from it (like 0 = 1), and then deducing NOT A, from that, despite the reasoning worked by supposing A to be true. So the validity of a reasoning is completely independent of the true or falsity of the premise. This may be the case for formal arguments, It is the case with informal argument too. but yours isn't strictly formal (necessarily so because Yes doctor, including correct substitution level is not formal and the reasoning has to reference that), and so no formal contradiction can be found - or even no contradiction at all. You can get informal contradiction. That's what Stathis shows up with Craig's theory. Stathis' reasoning is informal but valid. Craig's reply is informal but non valid, as Stathis patiently points out. If you were true, no discussion at all would make sense. In fact rigorous/non-rigorous has nothing to do with formal/informal. This doesn't imply that the reasoning is valid. Otherwise all informal arguments would be valid, which is clearly not true. Of course. But if you find a reasoning non valid, it is up to you to say where and why specifically. Bruno Marchal wrote: PS I might comment other paragraph, but I am unfortunately very busy, so I will limit to answer only one paragraph which I might find more important, or summing up others. Don't bother. You are just wasting your time, frankly I have no interest in this discussion anymore. You did really lost me. I did not see your point at all in some of your late posts. I have begun to answer one, but then some remarks you did made me realize it would make no sense of trying to answer the post. I was enjoying discussing with you, but then, all of a sudden, you lost me through a labyrinth of negative and emotional remarks, which cannot really been answered. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 05:20:11PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2011, at 23:48, Russell Standish wrote: I certainly appreciate you don't use Bayes' theorem in your work, but don't understand why you say you cannot use it. I am not saying that we cannot use it in some context. I am not sure we can use it to explain the physical laws in the comp frame, because, it seems to me that it assume that we belong in a physical universes among other possible one. But when we assume comp, we do not belong to a universe, our bodies (at the subst level) belong in infinitely many computations at once, and the appearance of the universe results from the competition among those infinities of computations. It seems to me that in the comp theory Bayes's theorem can be used to justify some geographical aspect, but not laws which have to e independent of any observers. I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe. Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of bayes theorem to justify the laws of physics, presuppose that a physical universe is an object (may be mathematical, like in Tegmark) among other objects. All it assumes is a prior probability distribution. Something like the universal prior of Solomonoff-Levin, or the distribution of observer moments within UD*. I don't think such a distribution makes sense. What makes sense is a computational state, and a distribution of (competing) universal machines relating that state with other states through the computations that they emulate. It is discussed in my book (page 83). The terminology (Occam catastrophe) is mine, but it is certainly possible that other people may have raised the issue by a different name. I will look at this again asap. I thought we discuss all this during the ASSA/RSSA debate. I don't recall this issue being discussed during that debate. There was some discussion on it after my book came out, but more about the conclusion that self-awareness is required for consciousness, which apparently people found counter-intuitive for some reason. I don't see the relation with this. Does the OCCAM catastrophe relies on Bayes? It is a consequence of the Occam's razor theorem, which in turn relies on the Solomonoff-Levin universal prior, and the working assumption of living in an ensemble. It doesn't rely on Bayes' theorem itself, but you can apply Bayes' theorem to the universal prior to get the only effective form of induction known. Li and Vitanyi has a good technical discussion of this, though not of the catastrophe, as they don't assume an ontology. But this is closer to Hal Finney Universal Distribution theory, based on ASSA. Like in the doomsday argument, the reference base seems to me undefined. I am not oppose to such an approach, I just don't understand how it could work, and I prefer to avoid it. I take observer dependent reference base. The beauty of something like COMP is one can show that all observers must generate equivalent reference bases - agreeing up to some additive constant independent of the complexity of what's being opbserved. What would it be with respect of UD*?. IFAICT, UD* should be equivalent to the all strings ensemble. I don't think so at all. This is missing the highly non trivial structure on the set of all computations coming from the non trivial notion of computations. Allmost all strings are random, but no computations at all is random, except the result of the application of the identity program on the arbitrary inputs when dovetailing on inputs. But that is just a part of UD*. Most of UD* is not random at all, and it has an extreme redundancy. There is the presence of deep computations, self-referential entities, etc. You may be right, but I think that needs to be demonstrated. ? The UD generates computations, and only computations, so in all portion of the UD*, there is nothing random at all. randomness crops out in the machine's epistemologies or first person views, because they are intrinsically ignorant to which computations they can belong. If true, it should give rise to observable differences between my theory and yours, which would be an interesting and important result. Yes. You are still trying a theory which would be comp-independent, apparently. Good luck :) BTW - I'm not convinced by Schmidhuber's speed prior work, which prima facie looks like an attempt in this direction. Are you? I have a problem with all absolute prior to derive physical laws, but I have no problem of the use of some relative prior, to derive many facts in general. They might play a role in the choice made on the deep computations (cosmological features). I have also some technical problems with the speed prior based on the version of the speed-up theorem for inductive inference. Universal entities have that crazy property of being
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote: I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe. Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of bayes theorem to justify the laws of physics, presuppose that a physical universe is an object (may be mathematical, like in Tegmark) among other objects. Then why couldn't the physical universe be a trace (aka history) of UD*? All it assumes is a prior probability distribution. Something like the universal prior of Solomonoff-Levin, or the distribution of observer moments within UD*. I don't think such a distribution makes sense. What makes sense is a computational state, and a distribution of (competing) universal machines relating that state with other states through the computations that they emulate. Whenever an observer interprets multiple different input strings (ie observations) as the same thing, the S-L distribution makes sense. Particularly so if the mapping process is a computation. It is discussed in my book (page 83). The terminology (Occam catastrophe) is mine, but it is certainly possible that other people may have raised the issue by a different name. I will look at this again asap. I thought we discuss all this during the ASSA/RSSA debate. I don't recall this issue being discussed during that debate. There was some discussion on it after my book came out, but more about the conclusion that self-awareness is required for consciousness, which apparently people found counter-intuitive for some reason. I don't see the relation with this. There is, but I'll let you reread the book if you're interested. What would it be with respect of UD*?. IFAICT, UD* should be equivalent to the all strings ensemble. I don't think so at all. This is missing the highly non trivial structure on the set of all computations coming from the non trivial notion of computations. Allmost all strings are random, but no computations at all is random, except the result of the application of the identity program on the arbitrary inputs when dovetailing on inputs. But that is just a part of UD*. Most of UD* is not random at all, and it has an extreme redundancy. There is the presence of deep computations, self-referential entities, etc. You may be right, but I think that needs to be demonstrated. ? The UD generates computations, and only computations, so in all portion of the UD*, there is nothing random at all. randomness crops out in the machine's epistemologies or first person views, because they are intrinsically ignorant to which computations they can belong. The UDA indicates we must be supervenient on all programs passing through our current observer moment. Randomness comes differentiating between running programs (eg being in Washington or being in Moscow). I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). Could it be that there are only a countable number of histories after all, given there are only a countable number of programs. That would be one big difference right there. If true, it should give rise to observable differences between my theory and yours, which would be an interesting and important result. Yes. You are still trying a theory which would be comp-independent, apparently. Good luck :) Its always worth clarifying what still goes through in an argument when some of the assumptions are relaxed, even if the programme itself hits a wall. It wasn't a critique of your UDA and AUDA reasoning, (which I agree does not use probability, nor anthropic principle) but of your statement that Bayes' and the Anthropic Principle is inapplicable. Not in all context. The anthropic principle might been use for deriving cosmological principles, but not the physical *laws*. Why not? Well, because UDA shows that the laws of physics are logico- arithmetical, and that they take the form of internal (epistemological) relative statistics on computation. I actually don't get that conclusion from your work, so it might be worth elaborating more. The Theatetus definition leading to the AUDA has the feel of something put in by hand, rather than being a logical consequence of the UDA. Nothing wrong with that, of course, but we should be honest with it, if it is the case. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/14/2011 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote: I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe. Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of bayes theorem to justify the laws of physics, presuppose that a physical universe is an object (may be mathematical, like in Tegmark) among other objects. Then why couldn't the physical universe be a trace (aka history) of UD*? All it assumes is a prior probability distribution. Something like the universal prior of Solomonoff-Levin, or the distribution of observer moments within UD*. I don't think such a distribution makes sense. What makes sense is a computational state, and a distribution of (competing) universal machines relating that state with other states through the computations that they emulate. Whenever an observer interprets multiple different input strings (ie observations) as the same thing, the S-L distribution makes sense. Particularly so if the mapping process is a computation. It is discussed in my book (page 83). The terminology (Occam catastrophe) is mine, but it is certainly possible that other people may have raised the issue by a different name. I will look at this again asap. I thought we discuss all this during the ASSA/RSSA debate. I don't recall this issue being discussed during that debate. There was some discussion on it after my book came out, but more about the conclusion that self-awareness is required for consciousness, which apparently people found counter-intuitive for some reason. I don't see the relation with this. There is, but I'll let you reread the book if you're interested. What would it be with respect of UD*?. IFAICT, UD* should be equivalent to the all strings ensemble. I don't think so at all. This is missing the highly non trivial structure on the set of all computations coming from the non trivial notion of computations. Allmost all strings are random, but no computations at all is random, except the result of the application of the identity program on the arbitrary inputs when dovetailing on inputs. But that is just a part of UD*. Most of UD* is not random at all, and it has an extreme redundancy. There is the presence of deep computations, self-referential entities, etc. You may be right, but I think that needs to be demonstrated. ? The UD generates computations, and only computations, so in all portion of the UD*, there is nothing random at all. randomness crops out in the machine's epistemologies or first person views, because they are intrinsically ignorant to which computations they can belong. The UDA indicates we must be supervenient on all programs passing through our current observer moment. Randomness comes differentiating between running programs (eg being in Washington or being in Moscow). I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). There must be a continuum of histories since there are infinitely long histories which go through a given state (or is it an OM - I don't think they are the same) infinitely many times. But if you're only looking ahead a finite interval then it seems there would only be a countable, or even finite, number of continuations. That would be the relative measure for predicting physics. Brent Could it be that there are only a countable number of histories after all, given there are only a countable number of programs. That would be one big difference right there. If true, it should give rise to observable differences between my theory and yours, which would be an interesting and important result. Yes. You are still trying a theory which would be comp-independent, apparently. Good luck :) Its always worth clarifying what still goes through in an argument when some of the assumptions are relaxed, even if the programme itself hits a wall. It wasn't a critique of your UDA and AUDA reasoning, (which I agree does not use probability, nor anthropic principle) but of your statement that Bayes' and the Anthropic Principle is inapplicable. Not in all context. The anthropic principle might been use for deriving cosmological principles, but not the physical *laws*. Why not? Well, because UDA shows that the laws of physics are logico- arithmetical, and that they take the form of internal (epistemological) relative statistics on computation. I actually don't get that conclusion from your work, so it might be worth elaborating more. The Theatetus definition leading to the AUDA has the feel of something put in by hand, rather than being a logical consequence of the UDA. Nothing wrong with that, of course, but we should be honest with
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 06:40:04PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/14/2011 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories? I did think the latter (and you seemed to agree), but I am partially influenced by the continuum of histories available in the no information ensemble (aka Nothing). There must be a continuum of histories since there are infinitely long histories which go through a given state (or is it an OM - I don't think they are the same) infinitely many times. But if you're only looking ahead a finite interval then it seems there would only be a countable, or even finite, number of continuations. That would be the relative measure for predicting physics. Brent I was assuming that the histories are infinite in general. It would be surprising if all consciousnesses were halting programs. Just because there is an infinite number of histories passing through each OM does not imply the cardinality of the histories is greater than aleph_0. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 12 Oct 2011, at 21:43, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: You might say cannot be captured entirely, but anyone has the right to suggest hypotheses and reasoning in any field. Questions makes always sense. I think you might attribute to me pretensions that I do not have. If you just ask questions, OK. But even if you don't want to do more, you do more. You claim for example often that no one yet showed the invalidity of your reasoning (implying it is valid), making people belief that there is some truth in it. It is the difference between between proving A == B, and arguing for the truth of A. A proof is verifiable by any good willing people. A truth is in general not verifiable at all. Here I have a problem because you lack some familiarity with those kind of things. If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about whether you reasoning is valid or not. I don't defend any truth but I am still offering a reasoning to you. If you find it invalid it is your task to find the flaw. That's is by definition of reasoning. One problem I do have, is that I am tempted to use the formal arithmetical version(AUDA) to invalidate some flaws people believe to have found. Usually they use intuition on machine which is invalidated by non completely trivial discovery in computer science. You really don't know, maybe the criticism of many different people is actually valid and you just don't recognize it. No. I usually debunk them, and usually people get the point. There are exception as I have discover that some people just are not familiar with what is a reasoning. Making assertions that you admit are not provable, or defensable through reason is actually more humble than that. That's why I don't like it as much if you say,just say no', as you pretty much take away the fundament of any discussion. But you were just saying no, but still arguing that comp has to be nonsense. I am not defending the truth of comp at all, but I do debunk invalid argument against comp, like I do debunk invalid argument for the truth of comp. That's my job. If you don't want to discuss, that's fine, but then it is more wise to not say anything at all and not discuss while not wanting to discuss the real issue at hand. You seem to be the one who want to discuss and you question the validity of the reasoning. But some time I feel them as being only emotional, and this means something about you, not about any point in the discussion. I am happy you find Terren's post worth, and it is a good point for you that you are aware of your emotional factor. Maybe the reasoning and COMP are not clearly seperable, as the reasoning supposes COMP to be true. *All* reasoning suppose their premise true for the sake of the reasoning. A common technic to prove that A entails B consists in supposing A and getting B from that. This does not prove that A is true, it proves only that IF A is true then B is true. In many-world terms it means that in all words were A is true, B is also true. It means there is no world in which A is true and B is not true. But it does not mean that A is true in all world. A common technic to prove that A is false, for example, will consists in assuming A and getting a contradiction from it (like 0 = 1), and then deducing NOT A, from that, despite the reasoning worked by supposing A to be true. So the validity of a reasoning is completely independent of the true or falsity of the premise. If you prove that A entails B, you also prove that (NOT B) entails (NOT A), for example. Bruno PS I might comment other paragraph, but I am unfortunately very busy, so I will limit to answer only one paragraph which I might find more important, or summing up others. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 12 Oct 2011, at 23:48, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 02:54:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2011, at 22:14, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my book). My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example. Like Brent, I don't follow you here. See my answer to Brent. Basically, Bayes is induction. Conditional probability is usual deductive-type probability. I certainly appreciate you don't use Bayes' theorem in your work, but don't understand why you say you cannot use it. I am not saying that we cannot use it in some context. I am not sure we can use it to explain the physical laws in the comp frame, because, it seems to me that it assume that we belong in a physical universes among other possible one. But when we assume comp, we do not belong to a universe, our bodies (at the subst level) belong in infinitely many computations at once, and the appearance of the universe results from the competition among those infinities of computations. It seems to me that in the comp theory Bayes's theorem can be used to justify some geographical aspect, but not laws which have to e independent of any observers. Without the anthropic principle, ISTM that your theory would suffer the Occam catastrophe fate. How do you avoid that? Is that equivalent with the white rabbits? No, it is quite the opposite problem. As Einstein purportedly said Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. Occam's razor theorem, which comes from Solomonoff and Levin's considerations of algorithmic information theory would imply that we don't see anything interesting at all. That is the Occam catastrophe. Something prevents the world from being too simple. I think that something is the Anthropic Principle, but I'm interested if you have an alternative suggestion. You can give me a link to this. It is discussed in my book (page 83). The terminology (Occam catastrophe) is mine, but it is certainly possible that other people may have raised the issue by a different name. I will look at this again asap. I thought we discuss all this during the ASSA/RSSA debate. Does the OCCAM catastrophe relies on Bayes? It is a consequence of the Occam's razor theorem, which in turn relies on the Solomonoff-Levin universal prior, and the working assumption of living in an ensemble. It doesn't rely on Bayes' theorem itself, but you can apply Bayes' theorem to the universal prior to get the only effective form of induction known. Li and Vitanyi has a good technical discussion of this, though not of the catastrophe, as they don't assume an ontology. But this is closer to Hal Finney Universal Distribution theory, based on ASSA. Like in the doomsday argument, the reference base seems to me undefined. I am not oppose to such an approach, I just don't understand how it could work, and I prefer to avoid it. What would it be with respect of UD*?. IFAICT, UD* should be equivalent to the all strings ensemble. I don't think so at all. This is missing the highly non trivial structure on the set of all computations coming from the non trivial notion of computations. Allmost all strings are random, but no computations at all is random, except the result of the application of the identity program on the arbitrary inputs when dovetailing on inputs. But that is just a part of UD*. Most of UD* is not random at all, and it has an extreme redundancy. There is the presence of deep computations, self-referential entities, etc. I don't use probability at all in my reasoning, except as a result (first person indeterminacy) which transforms physics into a probability or uncertainty or indeterminacy calculus on computations or arithmetical relations, without using Bayes, nor #-thropic principles. It wasn't a critique of your UDA and AUDA reasoning, (which I agree does not use probability, nor anthropic principle) but of your statement that Bayes' and the Anthropic Principle is inapplicable. Not in all context. The anthropic principle might been use for deriving cosmological principles, but not the physical *laws*. If you explain this in your book, remind me the pages, or just the title of your paper (which I have on some of my hard disks). I deduce (or show how to deduce) the necessary physical laws for all machine-observer. IIUC, you manage to show that a von Neumann quantum logic arises in one
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Just to clarify, when I say we need discipline to avoid getting emotionally attached to beliefs, I don't mean it in the sense of punishment and reward. I mean disciplined (not lazy) and rigorous about always being willing to doubt what we hold to be true, and that this goes against our natural wiring, so to speak. However I think it's also important to realize that we use many of our beliefs completely unconsciously and that many of these help us navigate the world moment by moment, enabling us to make quick use of intuition, and instinctual/emotional responses. Becoming and staying unattached to belief systems is a luxury paid for in contemplative time and as you say, mindfulness. Terren On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 4:17 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: Yes, ideas in opposition to one another are necessarily defined by, and draw energy from, their opposite. So people attached to those ideas, ironically enough, need their enemies as much as they need their own beliefs. Emotional attachment to belief is the real culprit. But we are hard-wired for that and have to train ourselves with discipline to avoid it. What makes it harder is that identifying with a particular belief system is anxiety-reducing, a source of comfort in an uncertain world. That's true, but at some point it stops to work, namely if you realize your beliefs aren't true, as I slowly do. Yet I still believe them again and again. Belief is quite a trap. I think it is more healthy to not believe anything, including your own beliefs (that is, just treat them as thoughts that come up now and again, and not as anything worth holding on to). I am not sure discipline will help there, to the contrary, a lot of our emotional attachments show themselves in the way that we discipline us to do something we don't really want. The only thing that really helps is mindfulness, unfortunately you can't make that happen, and it often takes a long time to realize your bad habits and their root, and see the path to avoiding them (this includes not minding them, in my experience). I mean we tried discipline for a long time (think of schools a few decades ago), but mostly we became less disciplined and more wealthy (and bit more happy, maybe). benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32640682.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Bruno Marchal wrote: If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about whether you reasoning is valid or not. I don't defend any truth but I am still offering a reasoning to you. If you find it invalid it is your task to find the flaw. That's is by definition of reasoning. By saying that no flaw has been found, while people have pointed out flaws that you just don't accept as such (whether valid or not is not even important), you are defending the truth that your reasoning is valid, obviously so. Bruno Marchal wrote: You really don't know, maybe the criticism of many different people is actually valid and you just don't recognize it. No. I usually debunk them, and usually people get the point. There are exception as I have discover that some people just are not familiar with what is a reasoning. Or maybe you just don't share their conceptions of what a valid reasoning is, you simply assume that your conception is the right one. If you insist on that of course no one will find a valid flaw. Bruno Marchal wrote: But some time I feel them as being only emotional, and this means something about you, not about any point in the discussion. What if any useful argument can only come from emotion (or more broadly intuition)? That might explain why rational arguments work only in few cases, and even where one could expect non-emotional discussion, people discuss emotionally (like totally unimportant topics). It seems to me purely rational arguments are only especially dogmatic arguments, like arguments purely based on belief. Bruno Marchal wrote: I am happy you find Terren's post worth, and it is a good point for you that you are aware of your emotional factor. Yes, being aware of your own emotions is a key for happiness, and also for deep insights in general. Bruno Marchal wrote: Maybe the reasoning and COMP are not clearly seperable, as the reasoning supposes COMP to be true. *All* reasoning suppose their premise true for the sake of the reasoning. But in some case the reasoning itself cannot be seperated from the premise. If I don't share the premise that 1+1=2, I can still see that 1+2=3 follows from that. This may not be the case with all arguments, and it seems to me this is the case with COMP. Bruno Marchal wrote: A common technic to prove that A entails B consists in supposing A and getting B from that. This does not prove that A is true, it proves only that IF A is true then B is true. In many-world terms it means that in all words were A is true, B is also true. It means there is no world in which A is true and B is not true. But it does not mean that A is true in all world. A common technic to prove that A is false, for example, will consists in assuming A and getting a contradiction from it (like 0 = 1), and then deducing NOT A, from that, despite the reasoning worked by supposing A to be true. So the validity of a reasoning is completely independent of the true or falsity of the premise. This may be the case for formal arguments, but yours isn't strictly formal (necessarily so because Yes doctor, including correct substitution level is not formal and the reasoning has to reference that), and so no formal contradiction can be found - or even no contradiction at all. This doesn't imply that the reasoning is valid. Otherwise all informal arguments would be valid, which is clearly not true. Bruno Marchal wrote: PS I might comment other paragraph, but I am unfortunately very busy, so I will limit to answer only one paragraph which I might find more important, or summing up others. Don't bother. You are just wasting your time, frankly I have no interest in this discussion anymore. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32648400.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 05:20:11PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Oct 2011, at 23:48, Russell Standish wrote: I certainly appreciate you don't use Bayes' theorem in your work, but don't understand why you say you cannot use it. I am not saying that we cannot use it in some context. I am not sure we can use it to explain the physical laws in the comp frame, because, it seems to me that it assume that we belong in a physical universes among other possible one. But when we assume comp, we do not belong to a universe, our bodies (at the subst level) belong in infinitely many computations at once, and the appearance of the universe results from the competition among those infinities of computations. It seems to me that in the comp theory Bayes's theorem can be used to justify some geographical aspect, but not laws which have to e independent of any observers. I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe. All it assumes is a prior probability distribution. Something like the universal prior of Solomonoff-Levin, or the distribution of observer moments within UD*. It is discussed in my book (page 83). The terminology (Occam catastrophe) is mine, but it is certainly possible that other people may have raised the issue by a different name. I will look at this again asap. I thought we discuss all this during the ASSA/RSSA debate. I don't recall this issue being discussed during that debate. There was some discussion on it after my book came out, but more about the conclusion that self-awareness is required for consciousness, which apparently people found counter-intuitive for some reason. Does the OCCAM catastrophe relies on Bayes? It is a consequence of the Occam's razor theorem, which in turn relies on the Solomonoff-Levin universal prior, and the working assumption of living in an ensemble. It doesn't rely on Bayes' theorem itself, but you can apply Bayes' theorem to the universal prior to get the only effective form of induction known. Li and Vitanyi has a good technical discussion of this, though not of the catastrophe, as they don't assume an ontology. But this is closer to Hal Finney Universal Distribution theory, based on ASSA. Like in the doomsday argument, the reference base seems to me undefined. I am not oppose to such an approach, I just don't understand how it could work, and I prefer to avoid it. I take observer dependent reference base. The beauty of something like COMP is one can show that all observers must generate equivalent reference bases - agreeing up to some additive constant independent of the complexity of what's being opbserved. What would it be with respect of UD*?. IFAICT, UD* should be equivalent to the all strings ensemble. I don't think so at all. This is missing the highly non trivial structure on the set of all computations coming from the non trivial notion of computations. Allmost all strings are random, but no computations at all is random, except the result of the application of the identity program on the arbitrary inputs when dovetailing on inputs. But that is just a part of UD*. Most of UD* is not random at all, and it has an extreme redundancy. There is the presence of deep computations, self-referential entities, etc. You may be right, but I think that needs to be demonstrated. If true, it should give rise to observable differences between my theory and yours, which would be an interesting and important result. BTW - I'm not convinced by Schmidhuber's speed prior work, which prima facie looks like an attempt in this direction. Are you? It wasn't a critique of your UDA and AUDA reasoning, (which I agree does not use probability, nor anthropic principle) but of your statement that Bayes' and the Anthropic Principle is inapplicable. Not in all context. The anthropic principle might been use for deriving cosmological principles, but not the physical *laws*. Why not? Again if people have alternative, [to Theatetus] and show to me how to translate them in arithmetic, I will interview the LUMs accordingly :) Sorry - I don't really have a good suggestion either. Epistemology is not my field :). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 11 Oct 2011, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote: On 10/11/2011 9:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example. Isn't relative indeterminacy quantified by conditional probability; for which Bayes theorem is the appropriate tool. Conditional probability is quantified by its definition P(A/B) = P(A intersect B)/P(B). In this case Bayes probability is P(B/A), and is given by Bayes formula. The first one is typical of the use of probability, like in QM. The second one is used to do inductive reasoning. Bayes theorem depends on conditional probability, but the reverse is not true. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 11 Oct 2011, at 22:14, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my book). My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example. Like Brent, I don't follow you here. See my answer to Brent. Basically, Bayes is induction. Conditional probability is usual deductive-type probability. Computations are not infinite strings, but can have infinite strings as inputs, and so infinite strings can play a role in the (re)normalization needed to avoid the infinities of abnormal histories. That wasn't my point. The set of computational extensions is infinite, uncountable cardinality even. Yes. A point where Schmidhuber disagreed on this list, but I am glad that we agree on this. Without the anthropic principle, ISTM that your theory would suffer the Occam catastrophe fate. How do you avoid that? Is that equivalent with the white rabbits? No, it is quite the opposite problem. As Einstein purportedly said Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. Occam's razor theorem, which comes from Solomonoff and Levin's considerations of algorithmic information theory would imply that we don't see anything interesting at all. That is the Occam catastrophe. Something prevents the world from being too simple. I think that something is the Anthropic Principle, but I'm interested if you have an alternative suggestion. You can give me a link to this. Does the OCCAM catastrophe relies on Bayes? What would it be with respect of UD*?. I don't use probability at all in my reasoning, except as a result (first person indeterminacy) which transforms physics into a probability or uncertainty or indeterminacy calculus on computations or arithmetical relations, without using Bayes, nor #-thropic principles. If you explain this in your book, remind me the pages, or just the title of your paper (which I have on some of my hard disks). I deduce (or show how to deduce) the necessary physical laws for all machine- observer. I don't infer anything from observations at all (which would be needed to use an anthropic principle and Bayes). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 12 Oct 2011, at 03:01, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 2:11 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: That's a nice strategy to be right, that's for sure. You just don't understand it, study more. The ideas are understandable if you're willing to depart from your preferred way of viewing the world. I guess that's the main difficulty. Mystics can appreciate the conclusion but feel often quite uneasy with the assumption. Rationalists usually appreciate the assumption but feel often quite uneasy with the conclusion. I though, not so much unlike Descartes I think, and very naively to be sure, that mechanism might help to conciliate the heart with the brain, the left brain with the right brain, the first person view with the third person view, the mind with the body, and the mystics with the rationalists. We live in an era where rationalism and mysticism are considered as opposite and that does not help. They consider themselves so much as opposite that they both still prefer to kill the diplomats, and destroy the bridges under construction. Sometimes the enemy brothers share a common passion of hating even more the possible conciliators. Which is natural, usual, but sad. That reminds me an argument of Bruno in Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno, about Spinach. If I remember well. Something like: '---don't make me *love* spinach because thats really the worst possible which can happen for someone who *hates* spinach.' Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That reminds me an argument of Bruno in Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno, about Spinach. If I remember well. Something like: '---don't make me *love* spinach because thats really the worst possible which can happen for someone who *hates* spinach.' Bruno Yes, ideas in opposition to one another are necessarily defined by, and draw energy from, their opposite. So people attached to those ideas, ironically enough, need their enemies as much as they need their own beliefs. Emotional attachment to belief is the real culprit. But we are hard-wired for that and have to train ourselves with discipline to avoid it. What makes it harder is that identifying with a particular belief system is anxiety-reducing, a source of comfort in an uncertain world. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
will accept it, so I grant that it is absurd to believe in MEC and MAT. So I just defend my own position, namely that even if no experience can be associated with computations in general, the substitution might still work. The association may just work in practice (even though I strongly doubt this), even though we can't associate them as a general principle. The substitution might just works in an abstract way that certain substitutions are without consequence as they are subjectively not happening, even when they do happen (due to subjective consistency of experience) Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: You just say yes if you buy your reasoning, because if the reasoning is wrong you can't be an immaterial machine, here you make an error in logic. Th reasoning can be wrong, and yet the conclusion true, for some other reason. That's true. But that doesn't really matter with regards to this discussion. Then it means your point was not relevant for the discussion. Exactly. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital machine matter, making them say NO, as they don't agree with a digital substitution in the way you mean it. I meant in in the usual clinical sense of suriving some medical operation. The immateriality is a non trivial consequences, needing all the steps of the reasoning. You cannot refute an argument by simplifying it and criticize *your* simplification of it. The reasoning doesn't work just with the assumption that we survive some medical operation. Then show me the flaw. There is no specific flaw in the reasoning. We just might surive the substitution regardless whether we are actually digital machines. If you say I will substitute your generalized brain, which is the whole milky way with a digital machine, I won't say no, in theory (if we makes me unconscious during the procedure and has the yes from the rest of the sentient being in the milky way also, and I know for sure that he can do what he claims to be able to, which of course will never be the case in practive). Since I am pretty sure I will just experience that this was a dream anyways (though it actually happened in a parallel universe); the digital part of my personal history will just be a minor interference of my actually experienced personal history. We can say YES in theory, but not in practice, and so your reasoning may only follow in theory, but not in practice. Yet you should accept our yes, since it is just a thought experiment. This is why I argue against COMPC even though I could in theory, say yes. Bruno Marchal wrote: The reasoning assumes that just the digital functioning of the device matters. That is ambiguous. Maybe the digital functioning does not matter and we still survive. Bruno Marchal wrote: We may survive, even if not just the digital functioning of the device matters. What should be add? The ability of concsiousness to build itself a consistent history / world independent of any digital functioning, and despite a digital substitution. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: For them a digital substitution means a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely* digital, making them say NO. On the contrary, to refute the argument they have to say yes. Yes. So what? If all materialist say no, the reasoning makes no sense to refute materialism. It does not refute at all materialism. It refute materialism + mechanism. Indeed the materialist who says no like you and Craig should love UDA (but can hate AUDA; which keep mechanism, despite UDA, and go on to show it mlakes sense already to the UMs and LUMs). OK. I am not a materialist at all, but I really don't mind what I am called. You can call me materialist if matter is God / consciousness. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32640678.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
terren wrote: Hey Benjay, On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 2:11 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: Honestly, I won't bother to study a theory in much depth that I hold to be utterly implausible at the start. I have to wonder why you're putting so much energy into refuting an idea you feel to be utterly implausible. Yes, I wondering about that too. I am just a persons that tends to be drawn inside those kinds of discussions because I am too habitual with regards to disussions to stop discussing even if I see there is nothing to gain. I guess that's a symptom of our culture, after all politicians do nothing else and in school irrelevant discussion were almost necessary for a good grade (if you couldn't shine by giving appropiate answers to concrete questions). I am also corrupted by that, sadly. terren wrote: Anyway, if you put all the energy you've invested into attacking the idea into really understanding the consequences of the UDA you'd be in a much better position to actually criticize it. I think I have an OK understanding of the argument. Basically my criticism isn't even rational criticism, since the argument (seems to) makes sense if you just use your ratio, so it doesn't matter either way. terren wrote: You really show a bad sort of professor mentality here. You give me a bunch of complicated semi-nonsense, which is really impossible to understand (one may understand technicalities, but these really solve no question at all) and as long as I don't understand it (forever), you will say I must study more until I am really able to critisize what you say. But you are unwilling to discuss the very fundament of your theory (then you claim I don't even understand stuff from high school or primary school, or maybe at some point, kindergarten). That's a nice strategy to be right, that's for sure. You just don't understand it, study more. The ideas are understandable if you're willing to depart from your preferred way of viewing the world. Bruno has been adamant about not committing to whether comp is true - he is not trying to sell you anything. Yes, he isn't directly selling that COMP is true (though I find subliminally it feels as if he is doing that). I am more concerned with his claim that his theory is actually a refutable scientific theory. But basically he can do however he wishes, I am just drawn into this argument due to my own ignorance (subconciously I still want to fundamentally figure things out, and Bruno is a nice person to discuss with in this regard :D). terren wrote: The only thing is he is saying is *if* comp is true, then *these* are the consequences (materialism is false). That is only threatening if you believe comp is true *and* you believe the materialist worldview. It doesn't sound like you're committed to either, so really I don't understand why you take such a defensive stance. You are right, this is just my intellect being afraid of losing it solid foundation and thus feeling that it is necessary to discuss that. Essentially I am just wanting to convince myself that what I say is true and this is easier to do in a discussion than by myself. But really it is stupid, since I am precisely defending the position that one should rely on experience, not some belief. I fully admit that my discussion reveals that I have some psychological dissonance. ;) Many thanks for reminding me, I really need those reminders. Your comment is probably of much more worth than all other posts I have read yet. :) terren wrote: A good theory, in my opinion, is open to criticism if you just know the basics. I appreciate the sentiment expressed here. Einstein's deep belief in the power of a beautifully simple idea is an example of that. But just to add my own 2 cents, Bruno's ideas are good (brilliant, actually) *and* unfortunately, you need to be able to understand the technical aspects of the UDA to see why. It is unfortunate that one must have some minimum competence in philosphy of mind and computer science to do that (which you would seem to have)... although it's possible someone more gifted than Bruno at teaching could explain the ideas in a simple enough way that you don't even need to know that much. With your defensive posture however it seems as though you won't give yourself a chance to appreciate the ideas, even if you ultimately disagree with them. I've thought about these ideas for years, quite a lot actually. I appreciated Brunos ideas a long time, even defended it myself. I just found that it makes no sense (not from a rational standpoint, though!), yet I still feel I have to defend myself in the same way I would have defended a rational belief that I am attached to. I guess it is better to just stop posting here... ;) benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32640679.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com
Re: COMP is empty(?)
terren wrote: On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That reminds me an argument of Bruno in Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno, about Spinach. If I remember well. Something like: '---don't make me *love* spinach because thats really the worst possible which can happen for someone who *hates* spinach.' Bruno Yes, ideas in opposition to one another are necessarily defined by, and draw energy from, their opposite. So people attached to those ideas, ironically enough, need their enemies as much as they need their own beliefs. Emotional attachment to belief is the real culprit. But we are hard-wired for that and have to train ourselves with discipline to avoid it. What makes it harder is that identifying with a particular belief system is anxiety-reducing, a source of comfort in an uncertain world. That's true, but at some point it stops to work, namely if you realize your beliefs aren't true, as I slowly do. Yet I still believe them again and again. Belief is quite a trap. I think it is more healthy to not believe anything, including your own beliefs (that is, just treat them as thoughts that come up now and again, and not as anything worth holding on to). I am not sure discipline will help there, to the contrary, a lot of our emotional attachments show themselves in the way that we discipline us to do something we don't really want. The only thing that really helps is mindfulness, unfortunately you can't make that happen, and it often takes a long time to realize your bad habits and their root, and see the path to avoiding them (this includes not minding them, in my experience). I mean we tried discipline for a long time (think of schools a few decades ago), but mostly we became less disciplined and more wealthy (and bit more happy, maybe). benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32640682.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 02:54:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2011, at 22:14, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my book). My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example. Like Brent, I don't follow you here. See my answer to Brent. Basically, Bayes is induction. Conditional probability is usual deductive-type probability. I certainly appreciate you don't use Bayes' theorem in your work, but don't understand why you say you cannot use it. Without the anthropic principle, ISTM that your theory would suffer the Occam catastrophe fate. How do you avoid that? Is that equivalent with the white rabbits? No, it is quite the opposite problem. As Einstein purportedly said Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. Occam's razor theorem, which comes from Solomonoff and Levin's considerations of algorithmic information theory would imply that we don't see anything interesting at all. That is the Occam catastrophe. Something prevents the world from being too simple. I think that something is the Anthropic Principle, but I'm interested if you have an alternative suggestion. You can give me a link to this. It is discussed in my book (page 83). The terminology (Occam catastrophe) is mine, but it is certainly possible that other people may have raised the issue by a different name. Does the OCCAM catastrophe relies on Bayes? It is a consequence of the Occam's razor theorem, which in turn relies on the Solomonoff-Levin universal prior, and the working assumption of living in an ensemble. It doesn't rely on Bayes' theorem itself, but you can apply Bayes' theorem to the universal prior to get the only effective form of induction known. Li and Vitanyi has a good technical discussion of this, though not of the catastrophe, as they don't assume an ontology. What would it be with respect of UD*?. IFAICT, UD* should be equivalent to the all strings ensemble. I don't use probability at all in my reasoning, except as a result (first person indeterminacy) which transforms physics into a probability or uncertainty or indeterminacy calculus on computations or arithmetical relations, without using Bayes, nor #-thropic principles. It wasn't a critique of your UDA and AUDA reasoning, (which I agree does not use probability, nor anthropic principle) but of your statement that Bayes' and the Anthropic Principle is inapplicable. If you explain this in your book, remind me the pages, or just the title of your paper (which I have on some of my hard disks). I deduce (or show how to deduce) the necessary physical laws for all machine-observer. IIUC, you manage to show that a von Neumann quantum logic arises in one of your hypostases. This requires a (still questionable IMHO) definition of knowledge (Plato's Theatetus one). It is still a long way from there to something like Schrodinger's equation or Born's rule. I don't infer anything from observations at all (which would be needed to use an anthropic principle and Bayes). Well excuse me for thinking that this might be the missing ingredient in your ontology! Cheers. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10 Oct 2011, at 22:50, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn blue or taste like broccoli. Assuming non-comp. There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say that arithmetic has an internal view. If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using non comp. The point is that we don't need any assumptions for that. It is just an observation. There is only the internal view viewing into itself, and it belongs to no one. It is just not possible to find an owner, simply because only objects can be owned. It is a category error to say subjectivity (consciousness) can be owned, just like, for example, numbers can't be owned. We have discuss this. You are not aware that we search an explanation for matter and consciousness. I am aware of that. It is obvious that this is what you searching. The point is, if you try to explain concsciousness you are applying a concept to something that just doesn't fit what is talked about. I agree. That is part of the difficulty. Explaining consciousness in the sense you mean it (explain it *from* something) is nonsense, as consciousness is already required *before* anything at all can arise. This is not valid. I need consciousness, like a need a brain, to understand consciousness or the working of the brain. Like I need logic to to do metalogic. Perhaps you are asking for some kind of total or complete explanation, but this does not exist for anything. The nice thing is that we can explain consciousness by showing that machine introspecting herself are lead to a term # which can help us to understand they see the problem, and should perhaps not be considered as zombie. Machine can understand that such a # run deep, is non communicable, cannot be explain, etc. An explanation *from something* can just work if what you explain from exists prior to that what is to be explained. exists prior is ambiguous (especilly for a non believer in a fundamental time). No numbers can arise without consciousness, and therefore consciousnes can't be explained from them. But numbers do not belong to the category of what arise. Numbers never arise. The category error is here. And it is quasi obvious that if we assume comp, consciousness has something to do with number relations, given that some number relation emulates computation, in the sense of Turing, Church Co. Bruno Marchal wrote: As soon as you use Gödel, you go beyond arithmetic, making the label arithmetical truth close to meaningless. Godel's prove does not go beyond arithmetic. PA can prove its own Gödel's theorem. Where in arithmetic is the axiom that numbers can encode things? You don't need such an axiom. You can prove the existence of encoding just by using the usual axioms. How does Gödel prove work if they can't encode things? But number can encode things? They can even prove that they can encode things. I can explain the detail in some period where I have more time, or you can consult any textbook on the subject. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: It makes as much sense to say that a concept has an internal view. nternal view just applies to the only thing that can have/is a view, namely consciousness. It applies to person. No. There is no person to find that has consciousness. This is depriving the littele ego, man, from having conscious experience. That makes me chill. Of course, it is threatening to the ego. The little ego has no conscious experience. It is an object within the conscious experience. You talk from experience. If that can inspire you for a theory, bring the theory, not the experience. Your threatening of the ego is frightening coming from someone saying no to the doctor. You can evacuate your little ego like that, but not the other one, nor the machine's one. Bruno Marchal wrote: You statement contradict the whole endeavor of science, Yes, if science thinks it can explain fundamental things. Science explains nothing. Science put some light, including on its limitation. It can relatively explain local things, and describe things very well, and be a good tool for development of technology. If you confine science on this, irrationalism will crop up in the fundamental, and we already know the amount of despair and suffering this leads to. Bruno Marchal wrote: and even of life. Life is not for the ego, life is for God. Er... I am not sure of that. It is rather ambiguous also. Bruno Marchal wrote: It is like saying look we will go in heaven, so why not kill ourselves right now to
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 11 Oct 2011, at 02:58, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 02:13:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: here you are summing up well my critics of Schmidhuber and Tegmark which I have done when entering in this list discussion. This has given the big debate between ASSA and RSSA (the absolute and the relative Self-Sampling-Assumption). DM, or comp, does not work with the ASSA, which indeed would make the physical as a sort of geographical. In a sense, comp rescues physics from such approaches, and it introduces a new invariant (the change of the phi_i, or the change for the initial ontic theory). But comp also rescues consciousness and persons from the materialist tendency to eliminate them. Anthropic principles are not completely evacuated, some defense of them and variants are still possible, especially for the cosmological history and for some explanation of geography. But the laws of physics are not anthropic. They might be said in a loose sense to be universal machine-thropic, or Löbian-Thropic, but not in the Bayesian sense. The probabilities and their rôle are derived from the first person indeterminacy. With COMP, I don't see any difference between Anthropic and Löbian-Thropic. That is why I prefer to avoid the expression Löbian-thropic, except for some cosmological or geographical aspect of reality. With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my book). My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example. Computations are not infinite strings, but can have infinite strings as inputs, and so infinite strings can play a role in the (re)normalization needed to avoid the infinities of abnormal histories. Without the anthropic principle, ISTM that your theory would suffer the Occam catastrophe fate. How do you avoid that? Is that equivalent with the white rabbits? We avoid this by having just much more normal or lawful local histories than abnormal one. It is the redundancy of the UD* + the non triviality of the self- referential constraints which saves, up to now, the consistency of comp. The anthropic principle might be capable to explain geographical and historical features, but it cannot explain why we remain in those geographico-historical computations, or why they are stable. Best, Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/11/2011 9:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example. Isn't relative indeterminacy quantified by conditional probability; for which Bayes theorem is the appropriate tool. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
because I know that actually no substitution takes place for my future self, as I will be lead into another consistent history were this didn't happen (even though my past self was being substituted). And if the substitution actually is not determining at all what will happen to me, because it *practically* does not happen, the conclusion of COMP does not follow. I just say yes because I don't mind being substituted, not because I believe it is successful in any way beyond that it doesn't matter (just as it doesn't matter if I this whole universe ceases to exists, in which case I will just find myself in another one). So then I might grudgingly accept that COMP might be true, but won't accept its conclusion for the reason above. Uhm, as I think about it, it even has to be true according to my own assumptions, since the digital substitution, if the level is low enough, will necessarily end up being without any consequence :D Lol, so I actually do accept COMP after all. Yet none of it conclusions follow, as they only follow if I am actually a machine, and not if I just happen to survive being substituted with a machine (or something arbitrarily else) even when I am not a machine. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32629477.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my book). My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular computations, just a relative indeterminacy bearing on all computations going through my state. In particular we cannot use Bayes theorem, for example. Like Brent, I don't follow you here. Computations are not infinite strings, but can have infinite strings as inputs, and so infinite strings can play a role in the (re)normalization needed to avoid the infinities of abnormal histories. That wasn't my point. The set of computational extensions is infinite, uncountable cardinality even. Without the anthropic principle, ISTM that your theory would suffer the Occam catastrophe fate. How do you avoid that? Is that equivalent with the white rabbits? No, it is quite the opposite problem. As Einstein purportedly said Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. Occam's razor theorem, which comes from Solomonoff and Levin's considerations of algorithmic information theory would imply that we don't see anything interesting at all. That is the Occam catastrophe. Something prevents the world from being too simple. I think that something is the Anthropic Principle, but I'm interested if you have an alternative suggestion. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Oct 11, 4:14 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: That is the Occam catastrophe. Something prevents the world from being too simple. I think that something is the Anthropic Principle, but I'm interested if you have an alternative suggestion. In addition to the Anthropic Principle, I offer a Law of Improbability Preservation. If a universe had only rules it would get only unknowable unconsciousness and no possibility of novel patterns. If it had only novelty, then it would get intolerable insanity. Life is a quintessential example what you get when you have a principle which counterbalances rules and novelty, since intentional reproduction of uncommon patterns would be one way of preserving them in the face of endlessly recurring common patterns. So yes, it's the Anthropic Principle, but what makes it even possible for an Antrhopic Principle to even exist is a small but significant statistical advantage that this universe gives oddball events to stick around long enough to collect into patterns. That advantage of unexpected statistical bias toward the unexpected is the seed of 'significance' itself and the motivation behind that bias is the essence of teleology and biology. Natural selection is a concrete manifestation of this law, preserving and extinguishing species as an engine of biodiversity, and sexual reproduction is an even more amplified diversity engine, providing intentionality of individual organisms to combine their dominant common genomes and nurture their desirable recessive phenomes. For those who see life as ‘simply’ a matter of Anthropic inevitability, they are partially right. To those who see life as a special, meaningful magical process, they are partially right too. Both things arise from their distinction to the other. Without probability there could be no improbability, and life, if nothing else, is literally the embodiment of improbability. A tradition of exceptional rules which preserve and promote exceptions to the rules. Life is what improbability feels like. It is the midpoint between inevitability and impossibility. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Hey Benjay, On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 2:11 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: Honestly, I won't bother to study a theory in much depth that I hold to be utterly implausible at the start. I have to wonder why you're putting so much energy into refuting an idea you feel to be utterly implausible. Anyway, if you put all the energy you've invested into attacking the idea into really understanding the consequences of the UDA you'd be in a much better position to actually criticize it. You really show a bad sort of professor mentality here. You give me a bunch of complicated semi-nonsense, which is really impossible to understand (one may understand technicalities, but these really solve no question at all) and as long as I don't understand it (forever), you will say I must study more until I am really able to critisize what you say. But you are unwilling to discuss the very fundament of your theory (then you claim I don't even understand stuff from high school or primary school, or maybe at some point, kindergarten). That's a nice strategy to be right, that's for sure. You just don't understand it, study more. The ideas are understandable if you're willing to depart from your preferred way of viewing the world. Bruno has been adamant about not committing to whether comp is true - he is not trying to sell you anything. The only thing is he is saying is *if* comp is true, then *these* are the consequences (materialism is false). That is only threatening if you believe comp is true *and* you believe the materialist worldview. It doesn't sound like you're committed to either, so really I don't understand why you take such a defensive stance. In fact, you can use Bruno's arguments to support the idea that comp is false by invoking the absurdity of his conclusions (I once read Bruno say this). But you are in a poor position to criticize his argumentation if you don't think comp is true, or are unwilling to assume it for the sake of argument, because that's really the starting point for the argument. That's step 1 of UDA. Fine, you disagree with step 1. You're done, have a sandwich. A good theory, in my opinion, is open to criticism if you just know the basics. I appreciate the sentiment expressed here. Einstein's deep belief in the power of a beautifully simple idea is an example of that. But just to add my own 2 cents, Bruno's ideas are good (brilliant, actually) *and* unfortunately, you need to be able to understand the technical aspects of the UDA to see why. It is unfortunate that one must have some minimum competence in philosphy of mind and computer science to do that (which you would seem to have)... although it's possible someone more gifted than Bruno at teaching could explain the ideas in a simple enough way that you don't even need to know that much. With your defensive posture however it seems as though you won't give yourself a chance to appreciate the ideas, even if you ultimately disagree with them. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/6/2011 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete mental objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you get the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. Bruno Marchal wrote: The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact does not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say that concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive materialism might be false, so why would little concrete pieces on stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there are no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the simple equation x^2 = 2y^2. This is just a consequence of using our definitions consistently. Not really. In this case, we can indeed derived this from our definitions and axioms, but this is contingent to us. The very idea of being realist about the additive and multiplicative structure of numbers, is that such a fact might be true independently of our cognitive abilities. We don't know if there is an infinity of twin primes, but we can still believe that God has a definite idea on that question. That the diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution, is considered to be a discovery about natural numbers. It is not a convention, or the result of a vote, nor of a decision. For the early Pythagoricians that was a secret, and it seems they killed the one who dare to make that discovery public (at least in some legend). Of course we can say 1+2=3 is 3 just because we defined numbers in the way that this is true, without resorting to any concreteness. Yes. Mathematical realism stems from the intuition that abstract entities can have theor own life (relations with other abstract or concrete entities). My point is that we can't derive something about the fundamental nature of things just by adhering to our own definitions of what numbers are, since these ultimately are just a bunch of definitions, You are right. We need some philosophical principles (like comp) to understand that eventually we don't need those philosophical principle. In the case of comp, we can understand why some (relative) numbers will bet on it, and why some other numbers will not. In fine, it is like with the south american, we can feel them enough close to us to listen to them. whereas the actual thing they rely on (what numbers, or 0 and succesor actually are), remains totally undefined. Not with comp. An apple becomes something very complex when defined in pure number theory. It will involve infinite sets of long computations, complex group of symmetries, etc. But it is definable (in principle) from numbers (some including LUM observers). So whatever we derive from it is just as mysterious as consciousness, or matter, or whatever else, since the basis is totally undefined. The problem does not consist in finding the ultimate definitions, but to agree on elementary propositions, and to explain the rest, of as much as possible from them. Bruno Marchal wrote: If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. Yes. But this too me seems senseless. It like saying that we cannot prove that 17 is really prime, we have just prove that the fiollowing line . cannot be broken in equal non trivial parts (the trivial parts being the tiny . and the big . itself). But we have no yet verify this for each of the following: . . . . . . . . . . . etc. On the contrary: to understand arithmetic, is quasi-equivalent with the understanding that a statement like 17 is prime, is independent of all concrete situation, in which 17 might be represented. Lol, the funny thing is that in your explantion you used concrete things, namely .. Is that a problem? Of course concrete is relative. I think so. It's concreteness is not really relevant, the point is that numbers just apply to countable or measurable things. Yes. The natural numbers are somehow the type of the finite discrete or discernible entities. Without being countable natural numbers don't even make sense. In order for COMP to be applicable to reality, reality had to be countable,
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 09 Oct 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote: On 10/9/2011 3:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Depends on what you mean by the whole of physics. Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But it seems that everything theories and the string theory landscape and Tegmark's all of mathematics threaten to do exactly that - make of all of physics geographical, an accident of where you find yourself with the anthropic principle as the all-purpose explanation. here you are summing up well my critics of Schmidhuber and Tegmark which I have done when entering in this list discussion. This has given the big debate between ASSA and RSSA (the absolute and the relative Self-Sampling-Assumption). DM, or comp, does not work with the ASSA, which indeed would make the physical as a sort of geographical. In a sense, comp rescues physics from such approaches, and it introduces a new invariant (the change of the phi_i, or the change for the initial ontic theory). But comp also rescues consciousness and persons from the materialist tendency to eliminate them. Anthropic principles are not completely evacuated, some defense of them and variants are still possible, especially for the cosmological history and for some explanation of geography. But the laws of physics are not anthropic. They might be said in a loose sense to be universal machine-thropic, or Löbian-Thropic, but not in the Bayesian sense. The probabilities and their rôle are derived from the first person indeterminacy. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:20, John Mikes wrote: In the Bruno - Brent exchange I enjoyed Bruno''s remarks Usually I agree with BrentM. Probability (in my terms) means a distribution within infinite bounds, no specifics for probable/non probable. The 'fantasy-world' of physics is a time-related explanatory Procrustean bed for those partly (maybe at all?) understood phenomena that transpired (BY OBSERVATION - Bruno) till 'yesterday into our knowledge-base (forget about oomniscient Comp). It works almost well in circumstances we realize today. (Consider some mishaps that occur,,,) Whole Physics IMO is the conventional science we carry as of yesterday. It includes the ancient 'facts' (measurements?) ad their refutations by fantasy-land theories (Q-chapters) as well as the modifications by math (another fantasy-land IMO.) Granted: we travel in space, predict genetics, screw-up economics, have societal predictions and ruin our environment very successfully. We don't understand anything. Comp does (if it exists) but it is not understandable to us. Logic? which one? the Zarathustrian octimality(8)? or the equation of opposites? (which is btw. a true outcome of the infinite everything). I THINK (not sure!) self-reference is anchoring ourselves into our ignorance. Unfortunately we have no better means to contemplate with than our material infested brain-function, a poor excuse for mentality. Even the R.Rosen version infinite complexity worldview (with a base of unknowable everything) is restricted to our models made up of human-mind approved topics and features, processes and happenings - an array of conventional thinking. (I have no proof that the 'model-content' indeed represents anything from the infinite complexity and its relations.) BTW there is no proof at all. Only in a restricted limitational view. Evidence: ditto. So what do we have? a thinking agnosticism - acknowleged ignorance, but we use it very skillfully. Sorry to blunderize the holly Grail of science thinking. I agree with all what you say here, John. Indeed the mechanist assumption go far well in that direction. It extends it a lot, to be sure, because you can replace our human limitation by our Löbian limitation, and this leads to a reversal of the aristotelian view of reality into the older one by Plato, and developed by the rationalist mystics, like Plato itself, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Plotinus, etc. Comp might not be true, but it provides at least a quite different rationalist picture of reality. Which is fun, OK? Comp is the Salvia divinorum of rationalism :) Bruno On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations. I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory. Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different for a repeatable experience. If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory. Depends on what you mean by the whole of physics. Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But the logic of self-reference explains why such logics does not collapse, and why there are physical laws, indeed the quantum laws. Of course, this leads to many open problems, but that is the interest of mechanism (believed by most scientist). What has been thought to be the whole of physics has been refuted. Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general relativity. General relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. OK, I just answered this above. So which whole of physics does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent with the physics of computer games? It is has to be consistent with the physics of all computer games played at once, as it is the case in arithmetic, and persons observe a sort of average.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
have to come back to the Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is wrong. I don't buy your argument, even though I agree with part of the conclusion. (better read the rest before responding to this, it may be unecessary): [Why I don't buy your argument? It is a thought experiment that can't be carried out in practice, I use the practical comp assumption in step 1-6, for pedagogical reason, and eliminate it in step 7 and 8. and the implications of thoughts experiments don't necessarily apply in the real world, The real world is what we search. Also, I have no clue what you mean by that given that only consciousness is real in your theory. so none of the conclusions are necessarily valid. For example a substitution level is a theoretical construct. In reality all substitution levels blur into each other via quantum interference. Also there is no such thing as a perfect digital machine, also due to quantum mechanics. It might be the case that some digital machines work, and some don't.] QM is not part of the assumption. But hopefully part of the conclusion, and this is already partially confirmed technically. Actually if you are strict in the interpretation of COMP, like you want it (so what I said above doesn't apply, because you assume quantum stuff doesn't matter), your whole reasoning is tautological. A refutable theory cannot be tautological. Come on, you have admitted not having studied the theory, and now you talk like if you did, when clearly you did not. The yes you speak of is really a yes towards being an immaterial machine, because you assume that just the digital functioning of the actual device matters (and digital functioning is not something that can be defined in terms of matter). And if you (and everybody else) are *only* an immaterial machine, and thus you have no world to be in, necessarily pysical reality has to come from that and can't be primary. How could it if you assume that you are an *immaterial* machine. This is not the argument. If it was I would not need the step 8. Your move here is equivalent with a move made by Peter Jones (1Z) which I have answered. It is true that, by saying yes to the doctor, we can already get the point that we are immaterial, but we can still believe that we need a body to be conscious. Step 8 makes clear that eventually the bodies are a construct of the (löbian numbers) mind in a literal and precise (testable) sense. You just say yes if you buy your reasoning, because if the reasoning is wrong you can't be an immaterial machine, here you make an error in logic. Th reasoning can be wrong, and yet the conclusion true, for some other reason. contradicting your yes. So in this case, you really just prove that if you say yes, you say yes, which, well, is sort of obvious in the first place. The problem is that no materialst is going to say yes in the precise way you want it. Why is that a problem? On the contrary They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital machine matter, making them say NO, as they don't agree with a digital substitution in the way you mean it. I meant in in the usual clinical sense of suriving some medical operation. The immateriality is a non trivial consequences, needing all the steps of the reasoning. You cannot refute an argument by simplifying it and criticize *your* simplification of it. For them a digital substitution means a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely* digital, making them say NO. On the contrary, to refute the argument they have to say yes. If they say no, it just means that they believe that there is no level of comp substitution. Bruno benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32619924.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 09 Oct 2011, at 22:45, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know that at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism. For the flaw in the reasoning, see my post above. Below. I will see. Bruno Marchal wrote: The point is that successor and 0 become meaningless, or just mere symbols, when removed from that context. What context are you talking about. The theory is interpretation independent. The interpretations themselves are part of model theory. For using the axiom you need only the inference rules. But just rules give just rules. The context I am talking about are particular measurements, or particular countable things. COMP uses it outside of this context, making it meaningless. What context? Also, if you were right here, all theories, especially the first order theory, would be meaningless. Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't agree with these axioms removed from any context, as without it, they are meaningless. I don't necessarily disagree with them, either, I just treat them as mere symbols then. They are much more than that. There are symbols + finitist rule of manipulation. Which are just symols as well. The rules are just more then symbols with unspecified meaning if they represent something. The rules are algorithmic. They make the theorem checkable by machine. You are arguing against all theories. Bruno Marchal wrote: The difference is as big as the difference between what you can feel looking at the string z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c and what you can feel looking at a rendering of what it describes, like this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7JLHxBm0eY This just works if we give the rules meaning in terms of particular objects, namely pixels on the screen. In this context they aren't removed from context, because an image of a screen with measureable distance is an obvious context for numbers. The equation without an geometrical context means very little to an average human (of course to mathematician it means a lot in terms of other mathematical things, which is no valid context for the average human). COMP doesn't give an adequate context. If it would, you could give particular predictions of what COMP entails in term of measureable or countable objects. Comp just do that in the extreme, given that it gives the physical laws. That is what the UDA proves. (And AUDA confirms partially, and shows it consistent, also). Bruno Marchal wrote: Of course we can still use them in a meta-sense by using .. = 2 as a representation for, say a nose, and ... = 3 as a representation for a rose and succesor= +1 as a representation for smelling, and then 2+1=3 means that a nose smells a rose. But then we could just as well use any other symbol, like ß or more meaningfully :o) o-. I am not sure that you are serious. I am serious, I just presented it in a ;)-manner. Well, if you are serious, you have to study a bit about numbers, addition and multiplication. You are confusing the symbol 2, which can indeed represent a nose, and the number 2, which does not represent anything a priori, but is the number 2 that you are supposed to be acquainted with since high school. Bruno Marchal wrote: There are intented meaning, and logics is a science which study the departure between intended meaning and a mathematical study of meaning. Logic studied both the syntactical transformation (a bit like neurophysiologist study the neuronal firings) and the space of the possible interpretations. Interesting things happen for the machine doing that on themselves. This is a lot of talk of how meaningful it is without presenting any actual relevant meaning. What is missing? Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Personally, I might prefer to use the combinators. But we have to agree on some principle about some initial universal system to see how they reflect UDA, in such a way that we can explain the quanta and the qualia, with the comp assumption in the background, and in the theory itself. Yes, you can use any universal system, which is going to be just as meaningless as numbers. That is like saying that a brain, which only manipulate finite meaningless information pattern (assuming comp) is useless. No, because it is an actual existing real object, you can interact with, therefore it is not useless. I thought only consciousness was real, and now you are telling me that there are actual existing real object? It is hard to follow you. Also, numbers are of course not useless in general, just in the context you are using it. Numbers are not useful in computer science? So you could say in the context you are using it, that is, in the context of a TOE, the brain is pretty useless also. It can just generate a lot of words and concepts, but no useful TOE is
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10 Oct 2011, at 08:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/6/2011 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete mental objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you get the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. Bruno Marchal wrote: The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact does not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say that concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive materialism might be false, so why would little concrete pieces on stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there are no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the simple equation x^2 = 2y^2. This is just a consequence of using our definitions consistently. Not really. In this case, we can indeed derived this from our definitions and axioms, but this is contingent to us. The very idea of being realist about the additive and multiplicative structure of numbers, is that such a fact might be true independently of our cognitive abilities. We don't know if there is an infinity of twin primes, but we can still believe that God has a definite idea on that question. That the diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution, is considered to be a discovery about natural numbers. It is not a convention, or the result of a vote, nor of a decision. For the early Pythagoricians that was a secret, and it seems they killed the one who dare to make that discovery public (at least in some legend). Of course we can say 1+2=3 is 3 just because we defined numbers in the way that this is true, without resorting to any concreteness. Yes. Mathematical realism stems from the intuition that abstract entities can have theor own life (relations with other abstract or concrete entities). My point is that we can't derive something about the fundamental nature of things just by adhering to our own definitions of what numbers are, since these ultimately are just a bunch of definitions, You are right. We need some philosophical principles (like comp) to understand that eventually we don't need those philosophical principle. In the case of comp, we can understand why some (relative) numbers will bet on it, and why some other numbers will not. In fine, it is like with the south american, we can feel them enough close to us to listen to them. whereas the actual thing they rely on (what numbers, or 0 and succesor actually are), remains totally undefined. Not with comp. An apple becomes something very complex when defined in pure number theory. It will involve infinite sets of long computations, complex group of symmetries, etc. But it is definable (in principle) from numbers (some including LUM observers). So whatever we derive from it is just as mysterious as consciousness, or matter, or whatever else, since the basis is totally undefined. The problem does not consist in finding the ultimate definitions, but to agree on elementary propositions, and to explain the rest, of as much as possible from them. Bruno Marchal wrote: If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. Yes. But this too me seems senseless. It like saying that we cannot prove that 17 is really prime, we have just prove that the fiollowing line . cannot be broken in equal non trivial parts (the trivial parts being the tiny . and the big . itself). But we have no yet verify this for each of the following: . . . . . . . . . . . etc. On the contrary: to understand arithmetic, is quasi-equivalent with the understanding that a statement like 17 is prime, is independent of all concrete situation, in which 17 might be represented. Lol, the funny thing is that in your explantion you used concrete things, namely .. Is that a problem? Of course concrete is relative. I think so. It's concreteness is not really relevant, the point is that numbers just apply to countable or measurable things. Yes. The natural numbers are somehow the type of the finite discrete or discernible entities. Without being countable
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/9/2011 11:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Reality is an idea itself. [SPK] Whose idea exactly? If there is no one to whom Reality has a meaning does it have a meaning? No. You seem to assume that meaningfulness exist in the absence of a subject to whom that meaning obtains. That is a contradiction. I'd say reality only has a meaning to subjects. But reality exists, ex hypothesi, independent of subjects. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/9/2011 11:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: What do you propose as an alternative theory? My point is just that if we say yes to the doctor, then we have literally no choice on this matter. [SPK] To assume Yes Doctor is to assume that the physical reality of substitution exists. This existence cannot be then eliminated by some trick. Yes, that is a point that confuses me. As I understand it accepting a brain prosthesis is supposed to maintain ones consciousness in one of two different ways: 1. The materialist supposes that the prosthesis will faithfully (to a sufficient approximation) implement the deterministic input/output function of the brain and then by the no-zombie argument one will have confidence that one's consciousness will be preserved. 2. The computationalist supposes that the prosthesis will be a quantum mechanical object and as such will be realized in all subsequent branches of the multiverse and whose Hilbert space evolution will include all those computational continuations of the infinite computational histories that instantiate you. I'm not sure these two are compatible. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
you assume quantum stuff doesn't matter), your whole reasoning is tautological. A refutable theory cannot be tautological. COMP itself can bre refuted, of course yes doctor can be refuted by showing that actually no one survives with a digital brain. I am only saying the reasoning is (almost) tautological, that it, it doesn't say much more than what is already assumed at the beginning. Bruno Marchal wrote: Come on, you have admitted not having studied the theory, and now you talk like if you did, when clearly you did not. What do you expect from me? I have read the reasoning and understood the gist of it, of course I can't study 20 years computer science before I can respond to the reasoning,...? Bruno Marchal wrote: The yes you speak of is really a yes towards being an immaterial machine, because you assume that just the digital functioning of the actual device matters (and digital functioning is not something that can be defined in terms of matter). And if you (and everybody else) are *only* an immaterial machine, and thus you have no world to be in, necessarily pysical reality has to come from that and can't be primary. How could it if you assume that you are an *immaterial* machine. This is not the argument. If it was I would not need the step 8. Step 8 doesn't work if we are digital-material machine. You assume there that experiences are associated to computations, not actual computations, which are not mere computations in the sense of computer science. You are arguing with precise computations, like in For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience,... which don't exist if we assume we are only digital-material machine. Bruno Marchal wrote: It is true that, by saying yes to the doctor, we can already get the point that we are immaterial, but we can still believe that we need a body to be conscious. But if we are immaterial, but need the material, then we aren't really immaterial after all, are we? I thought immaterial means independent of material. Bruno Marchal wrote: You just say yes if you buy your reasoning, because if the reasoning is wrong you can't be an immaterial machine, here you make an error in logic. Th reasoning can be wrong, and yet the conclusion true, for some other reason. That's true. But that doesn't really matter with regards to this discussion. Bruno Marchal wrote: contradicting your yes. So in this case, you really just prove that if you say yes, you say yes, which, well, is sort of obvious in the first place. The problem is that no materialst is going to say yes in the precise way you want it. Why is that a problem? On the contrary The problem is that if just people that believe we are immaterial machine say yes, the conlusion that we are immaterial machine that dream up the world, and the world has to be derived from the workings of the immaterial machines is almost just a restatement of the assumption, making the reasoning quite empty as an argument (but a nice explanation of the hypothesis). Bruno Marchal wrote: They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital machine matter, making them say NO, as they don't agree with a digital substitution in the way you mean it. I meant in in the usual clinical sense of suriving some medical operation. The immateriality is a non trivial consequences, needing all the steps of the reasoning. You cannot refute an argument by simplifying it and criticize *your* simplification of it. The reasoning doesn't work just with the assumption that we survive some medical operation.The reasoning assumes that just the digital functioning of the device matters. We may survive, even if not just the digital functioning of the device matters. Bruno Marchal wrote: For them a digital substitution means a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely* digital, making them say NO. On the contrary, to refute the argument they have to say yes. Yes. So what? If all materialist say no, the reasoning makes no sense to refute materialism. Bruno Marchal wrote: If they say no, it just means that they believe that there is no level of comp substitution. Right, that is the point. There can just be a precise level of correct substitution if we already assume we are immaterial machine, because matter has no precise levels, making the reason invalid for the purpose of refuting materialism. If the premise already excludes materialism, it is of no use to refute it. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32627355.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/10/2011 1:50 PM, benjayk wrote: I am aware of that. It is obvious that this is what you searching. The point is, if you try to explain concsciousness you are applying a concept to something that just doesn't fit what is talked about. Explaining consciousness in the sense you mean it (explain it*from* something) is nonsense, as consciousness is already required*before* anything at all can arise. That kind of reasoning implies that language cannot be explained because words are already required before anything can be explained. Logical priority doesn't entail explanatory priority. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
meekerdb wrote: On 10/10/2011 1:50 PM, benjayk wrote: I am aware of that. It is obvious that this is what you searching. The point is, if you try to explain concsciousness you are applying a concept to something that just doesn't fit what is talked about. Explaining consciousness in the sense you mean it (explain it*from* something) is nonsense, as consciousness is already required*before* anything at all can arise. That kind of reasoning implies that language cannot be explained because words are already required before anything can be explained. Exactly. That's why no one can give a complete explanation of language, especially of its beginning (it really has no beginning, it is a smooth transition from non-language). Of course we can explain aspects of language in terms of other aspects of language. I am not saying that we can't explain aspects of consciousness, just not consciousness as such, and the same is true for language. meekerdb wrote: Logical priority doesn't entail explanatory priority. I think so, with regards to fundamental matters and fundamental explanations. One could also say that this means that there are no fundamental verbal explanations, since they would require words to exist before their fundament, which of course is not possible. The only fundamental explanations in this case are non-linguistic, which fits our experience. The more fundamental, the less words suffice. That's why you can't explain sight to a blind person, the experience of sight is more fundamental than where the next bus stop is. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32627914.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 02:13:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: here you are summing up well my critics of Schmidhuber and Tegmark which I have done when entering in this list discussion. This has given the big debate between ASSA and RSSA (the absolute and the relative Self-Sampling-Assumption). DM, or comp, does not work with the ASSA, which indeed would make the physical as a sort of geographical. In a sense, comp rescues physics from such approaches, and it introduces a new invariant (the change of the phi_i, or the change for the initial ontic theory). But comp also rescues consciousness and persons from the materialist tendency to eliminate them. Anthropic principles are not completely evacuated, some defense of them and variants are still possible, especially for the cosmological history and for some explanation of geography. But the laws of physics are not anthropic. They might be said in a loose sense to be universal machine-thropic, or Löbian-Thropic, but not in the Bayesian sense. The probabilities and their rôle are derived from the first person indeterminacy. With COMP, I don't see any difference between Anthropic and Löbian-Thropic. With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my book). Without the anthropic principle, ISTM that your theory would suffer the Occam catastrophe fate. How do you avoid that? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations. I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory. Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different for a repeatable experience. If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory. Depends on what you mean by the whole of physics. Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But the logic of self-reference explains why such logics does not collapse, and why there are physical laws, indeed the quantum laws. Of course, this leads to many open problems, but that is the interest of mechanism (believed by most scientist). What has been thought to be the whole of physics has been refuted. Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general relativity. General relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. OK, I just answered this above. So which whole of physics does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent with the physics of computer games? It is has to be consistent with the physics of all computer games played at once, as it is the case in arithmetic, and persons observe a sort of average. What does Comp predict about dark matter? Will it be a new particle? A modified gravity? This will remain the job of the usual physicist. Just that if we assume mechanism, we have to understand its consequence. To use mechanism to solve the dark matter problem is like to use string theory to prepare tea. We have already the logic of measure one. I don't understand what measure there is on logics. There is no measure on logics, but on sigma_1 sentences proofs. There are logics of the measure *one*, and I have explained what it is (mainly the logic of the intensional variant Bp p ( Dt). The explanation is quasi literal if you grasp UDA, and is arithmetical (by AUDA). If physics was newtonian or boolean, comp would be refuted already. How would it be inconsistent with a Newtonian world? With a newtonian world the logic of observable proposition is boolean. It is already proved that the logic of the observable proposition invariant for all UMs and LUMs cannot be boolean (and is already proved to be a variant of von Neumann quantum logic). Bruno Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete mental objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you get the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. But that does this *mean*? These are just a bunch of words. You could as well write It means that when you colmüd the pööl of ämpod with itself you get the pööl of trübda, or the pööl of the pööl of ämpod.. Exactly! That is the point of axiomatization. Hilbert said this to explain what his axiomatic geometry means: you can replace the terms 'points', 'lines', and 'planes', by the term 'elephant', 'table' and 'glass of bear'. Now, doing this would not be pedagogical, and we use the most commonly used symbols. That is + for colmüd, s for pööl, and the symbol 0 for your ämpod. We already have some axioms for logic and equality, and all you need consists in agreeing or not with the following principles: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The intended meaning being 0 is not a successor of any number, etc. You can say the ämpod is different from all pööls. No problem, but it is obviously quite unpedagogical, I think. You don't get the point. Of course I can agree with these principles concerning countable and measureable things. But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know that at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism. The point is that successor and 0 become meaningless, or just mere symbols, when removed from that context. What context are you talking about. The theory is interpretation independent. The interpretations themselves are part of model theory. For using the axiom you need only the inference rules. I don't agree with these axioms removed from any context, as without it, they are meaningless. I don't necessarily disagree with them, either, I just treat them as mere symbols then. They are much more than that. There are symbols + finitist rule of manipulation. The difference is as big as the difference between what you can feel looking at the string z_n+1 = (z_n)^2 + c and what you can feel looking at a rendering of what it describes, like this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7JLHxBm0eY Of course we can still use them in a meta-sense by using .. = 2 as a representation for, say a nose, and ... = 3 as a representation for a rose and succesor= +1 as a representation for smelling, and then 2+1=3 means that a nose smells a rose. But then we could just as well use any other symbol, like ß or more meaningfully :o) o-. I am not sure that you are serious. There are intented meaning, and logics is a science which study the departure between intended meaning and a mathematical study of meaning. Logic studied both the syntactical transformation (a bit like neurophysiologist study the neuronal firings) and the space of the possible interpretations. Interesting things happen for the machine doing that on themselves. Bruno Marchal wrote: Personally, I might prefer to use the combinators. But we have to agree on some principle about some initial universal system to see how they reflect UDA, in such a way that we can explain the quanta and the qualia, with the comp assumption in the background, and in the theory itself. Yes, you can use any universal system, which is going to be just as meaningless as numbers. That is like saying that a brain, which only manipulate finite meaningless information pattern (assuming comp) is useless. Are you just telling me that, like Craig, you assume non-comp? Let's take a programming language. When the code says while(i5) then i++; print Nose smells rose end then this make sense for the user as he can read nose smells rose. But in an abstract context, nose smells rose has no particular meaning and the while loop is just a loop, which also has no particular meaning (though it has a particular function). This is false, it has a meaning (mainly that if the condition occur it has to print some string). What you do with that information is more complex, as it needs to study your brain, body, context (indeed). But you illustrate that you agree that xhile (i5) ... has a meaning. Obviously, it has nothing to do with rose and
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn blue or taste like broccoli. Assuming non-comp. There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say that arithmetic has an internal view. If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using non comp. If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense in which it is a category error. It makes as much sense to say that a concept has an internal view. nternal view just applies to the only thing that can have/is a view, namely consciousness. It applies to person. It might be a category error to say that consciousness has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even cosmic consciousness. This is not a belief, this is just the obvious reality right now. Obvious for you. But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for. Can you find any number(s) flying around that has any claim to an internal view right now? Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest ourself relatively to each other. The only thing that you can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person that consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in consciousness). Here you present a theory like if it was a fact. If that was obvious, we would not even discuss it. Consciousness, despite being an obvious fact for conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not think. You abstract so much that you miss the obvious. In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term obvious. I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point of view of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon machine can emulate a conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)? Do you agree that this is not obvious for everybody (Craig believes it is false). I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 9 October 2011 14:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Can you find any number(s) flying around that has any claim to an internal view right now? Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest ourself relatively to each other. Very succinctly put. However, speaking as a (grateful!) survivor of many conversations on this topic, on this list, over the years, I would venture to suggest that confusion about, or even ignorance of, the very distinctions you draw in the above remark are responsible for many of the more commonly encountered (perhaps simplistic) misunderstandings of your ideas. I know that you have (indefatigably) attempted to explain, in various places, the distinctively different roles of the various concepts you mention above - i.e. programs, numbers, persons, brains, bodies and what have you. However, it still seems to be the case that various correspondents are quite confused (and indeed differently confused) about what motivates this particular approach in the first place, why and how the entities and roles in question then appear in the theory, and finally precisely how they are related and matched up in terms of the theory. Of course, I realise that these topics can all be studied in much more detail via your published papers, but in terms of this list, how might one best set out these motivations and distinctions for pedagogical purposes? David On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn blue or taste like broccoli. Assuming non-comp. There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say that arithmetic has an internal view. If by arithmetic you mean some theory/machine like PA, you *are* using non comp. If by arithmetic you mean arithmetical truth then I can see some sense in which it is a category error. It makes as much sense to say that a concept has an internal view. nternal view just applies to the only thing that can have/is a view, namely consciousness. It applies to person. It might be a category error to say that consciousness has consciousness. Consciousness is not a person, even cosmic consciousness. This is not a belief, this is just the obvious reality right now. Obvious for you. But is it obvious that PA is conscious: I don't think so. Nevertheless, in case it is conscious, it is obvious from her point of view. It is that obviousness we are looking a theory for. Can you find any number(s) flying around that has any claim to an internal view right now? Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number can have. A person is not a brain, not a body, not a number, not anything 3-describable. But we can bet on brains, numbers, etc. as tool for being able to manifest ourself relatively to each other. The only thing that you can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person that consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in consciousness). Here you present a theory like if it was a fact. If that was obvious, we would not even discuss it. Consciousness, despite being an obvious fact for conscious person, is a concept. As you say, concept does not think. You abstract so much that you miss the obvious. In interdisciplinary researches it is better to avoid the term obvious. I do agree that consciousness is obvious from the first person point of view of a conscious person, but do you agree that a silicon machine can emulate a conscious person, indeed yourself (little ego)? Do you agree that this is not obvious for everybody (Craig believes it is false). I don't know the answer to that question, but I can show that if that is the case (that you can survive without any conscious change with such a silicon prosthesis), then we have to come back to the Platonician theologies, and naturalism and weak materialism, despite being a fertile simplifying assumption (already done by nature) is wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: COMP is empty(?)
In the Bruno - Brent exchange I enjoyed Bruno''s remarks Usually I agree with BrentM. Probability (in my terms) means a distribution within infinite bounds, no specifics for probable/non probable. The 'fantasy-world' of physics is a time-related explanatory Procrustean bed for those partly (maybe at all?) understood phenomena that transpired (BY OBSERVATION - Bruno) till 'yesterday into our knowledge-base (forget about oomniscient Comp). It works almost well in circumstances we realize today. (Consider some mishaps that occur,,,) Whole Physics IMO is the conventional science we carry as of yesterday. It includes the ancient 'facts' (measurements?) ad their refutations by fantasy-land theories (Q-chapters) as well as the modifications by math (another fantasy-land IMO.) Granted: we travel in space, predict genetics, screw-up economics, have societal predictions and ruin our environment very successfully. We don't understand anything. Comp does (if it exists) but it is not understandable to us. Logic? which one? the Zarathustrian octimality(8)? or the equation of opposites? (which is btw. a true outcome of the infinite everything). I THINK (not sure!) self-reference is anchoring ourselves into our ignorance. Unfortunately we have no better means to contemplate with than our material infested brain-function, a poor excuse for mentality. Even the R.Rosen version infinite complexity worldview (with a base of unknowable everything) is restricted to our models made up of human-mind approved topics and features, processes and happenings - an array of conventional thinking. (I have no proof that the 'model-content' indeed represents anything from the infinite complexity and its relations.) BTW there is no proof at all. Only in a restricted limitational view. Evidence: ditto. So what do we have? a thinking agnosticism - acknowleged ignorance, but we use it very skillfully. Sorry to blunderize the holly Grail of science thinking. John Mikes On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 6:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations. I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory. Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different for a repeatable experience. If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory. Depends on what you mean by the whole of physics. Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But the logic of self-reference explains why such logics does not collapse, and why there are physical laws, indeed the quantum laws. Of course, this leads to many open problems, but that is the interest of mechanism (believed by most scientist). What has been thought to be the whole of physics has been refuted. Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general relativity. General relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. OK, I just answered this above. So which whole of physics does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent with the physics of computer games? It is has to be consistent with the physics of all computer games played at once, as it is the case in arithmetic, and persons observe a sort of average. What does Comp predict about dark matter? Will it be a new particle? A modified gravity? This will remain the job of the usual physicist. Just that if we assume mechanism, we have to understand its consequence. To use mechanism to solve the dark matter problem is like to use string theory to prepare tea. We have already the logic of measure one. I don't understand what measure there is on logics. There is no measure on logics, but on sigma_1 sentences proofs. There are logics of the measure *one*, and I have explained what it is (mainly the logic of the intensional variant Bp p ( Dt). The explanation is quasi literal if you grasp UDA, and
Re: COMP is empty(?)
want it (so what I said above doesn't apply, because you assume quantum stuff doesn't matter), your whole reasoning is tautological. The yes you speak of is really a yes towards being an immaterial machine, because you assume that just the digital functioning of the actual device matters (and digital functioning is not something that can be defined in terms of matter). And if you (and everybody else) are *only* an immaterial machine, and thus you have no world to be in, necessarily pysical reality has to come from that and can't be primary. How could it if you assume that you are an *immaterial* machine. You just say yes if you buy your reasoning, because if the reasoning is wrong you can't be an immaterial machine, contradicting your yes. So in this case, you really just prove that if you say yes, you say yes, which, well, is sort of obvious in the first place. The problem is that no materialst is going to say yes in the precise way you want it. They will have to argue the particular instantiation of the digital machine matter, making them say NO, as they don't agree with a digital substitution in the way you mean it. For them a digital substitution means a particular digital machine, which is actually not *purely* digital, making them say NO. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32619924.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/9/2011 3:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Depends on what you mean by the whole of physics. Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality. But UDA explains where the observation and observable comes from, and physics can be defined as what is invariant for all the observer. If the material hypostases did collapse, it would have mean that physics, as such would be empty, and that all observable truth would be geographical. But it seems that everything theories and the string theory landscape and Tegmark's all of mathematics threaten to do exactly that - make of all of physics geographical, an accident of where you find yourself with the anthropic principle as the all-purpose explanation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
some more important role to figure out some aspect of reality, but that has to be deduced from a theory independent approach to computation if we want to extract and distinguish the quanta and the qualia (like trough the logics of self- reference). Why make it so complicated? We have no choice, when we tackle a complex question. But it isn't a complex question. Qualia are obviously here already, and they don't need a theory, as they are self-explanatory and quanta are content of qualia, which science has made sense of pretty well already (and explained as far as it can). Bruno Marchal wrote: Ulitamtely, logic can't capture self-reference anyway, That is what logic handles the better. That's Cantor Post Gödel Turing revolution. It isn't much use to say I can't capture that. It is precisely a statement of the fact that it can't handle it. Bruno Marchal wrote: so why not skip that stage and just go to the source of self-reference, the self itself (yourself). I agree the main point relies there. But then it is fun to see that the numbers can go there too. Numbers can go nowhere. They are tools to express measurements. Or weird symbols that weird people use to express obvious things in a terrible complex way. Bruno Marchal wrote: It is deep also, and it makes us more modest, and it changes the world around us. Thinking that numbers can be conscious is very immodest. The only thing that is conscious s consciousness and it is modest to accept that. It is immodest to want something more than everything, or something more than the unlimited freedom of existence. Or more accurately, is is just stupid to want more (not to say the people that want more are necessarily stupid), as there is nothing more. Bruno Marchal wrote: My deepest goal is humanitarian. I sincerely believe that the more we will be rigorous (and thus modest to begin with) in theology (as opposed to centuries of dogma), the most we will be happy and peaceful. I like very much that you want all of us to be happy and peaceful (indeed I think if you truly sincerely want this as your *highest priority*, and see that this depends on your own happiness and peace, you are on the best way to your own peace), and I like that you want to be modest. What I don't like so much is that you want to be rigorous with something that is completely beyond rigor, namely consciousness itself. You will just fail in that endavour, I am sorry. Rigor is just another dogma when it comes to this. Are you dogmatic about rigor? If yes, why is this better than other dogma, if no, why should we be rigorous when it comes to this? Bruno Marchal wrote: Possible truth might be a bit frightening, for the unprepared, but hiding them is worst in the mid run, and fatal in the long run. Hm, I think hiding is impossible, but the attempt is inevitable, and indeed fatal in the long run. It will lead to the death of I, since at some point you just can't stand to hide anymore from the fact that there is no I that is somehow not equal to God, and at some point God will just awaken and thus dismantle the I. But there is nothing bad about that honestly. Yes, it leads to suffering, but suffering also plays a part in realizing enlightenment. It is just temporary, and honestly no big deal for God. It just appears to be a big deal because we think we are the sufferer, and we think we are somethin that can be hurt. Suffering is finite (and based on an illusion), so it is basically nothing at all for the infinite being. It is so strong that bearing all the suffering in the world is its easiest task. Of course, it has no choice but to bear whatever comes up. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32620919.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete mental objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you get the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. But that does this *mean*? These are just a bunch of words. You could as well write It means that when you colmüd the pööl of ämpod with itself you get the pööl of trübda, or the pööl of the pööl of ämpod.. Exactly! That is the point of axiomatization. Hilbert said this to explain what his axiomatic geometry means: you can replace the terms 'points', 'lines', and 'planes', by the term 'elephant', 'table' and 'glass of bear'. Now, doing this would not be pedagogical, and we use the most commonly used symbols. That is + for colmüd, s for pööl, and the symbol 0 for your ämpod. We already have some axioms for logic and equality, and all you need consists in agreeing or not with the following principles: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x The intended meaning being 0 is not a successor of any number, etc. You can say the ämpod is different from all pööls. No problem, but it is obviously quite unpedagogical, I think. You don't get the point. Of course I can agree with these principles concerning countable and measureable things. But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know that at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism. For the flaw in the reasoning, see my post above. Sorry, I mean below! -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32621211.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
declare that number 17 shall not be prime, then it is not prime. No. You are just deciding to talk about something else. OK, the point is that it is just a definition, and as such doesn't mean anything without our interpretation. Bruno Marchal wrote: Who says that your conception of natural numbers is right, and mine is wrong? Then you have to tell me what axioms you want me to make a change. But you will only propose something else universal, and I have already said that I am not sanguine about numbers in particular. I would prefer to use the combinators, or the lambda expression, but natural numbers are well known, and that is why I use them in this list. The laws of mind and matter are independent of the initial theory, once that theory verify the condition of being sigma_1 complete = sufficiently strong to represent the partial computable functions, and to emulate the UD. It doesn't matter. You get the same problems I described above with other universal systems (they are just other bunchs of definitions). Bruno Marchal wrote: Yes, my proposal of declaring 17 to not be prime is ridiculous, because it doesn't fit with our conceptions of what properties numbers ought to have, or ought to be able to have. But these conceptions come from our sense perceptions, and imagination, were we can count and measure things. So when you want to apply numbers to the fundamental realtiy, which as such obviously is not countable, nor measurable, your natural numbers are as weird as mine, because they both miss the point that reality is not countable. Of course we can do a lot of interpretation to rescue our theory, for example by interpreting something beyond numbers into numbers via Gödel, but then we could as well just use our capability of interpretation and skip the number magic. The numbers are just more pedagogical. When you say yes to the doctor he can put a java program on a disk, or a combinators, but usually people will see only 0 and 1, and still call that a numbers. We assume DIGITAL mechanism, and my goal is just to show that this leads to a reversal physics/machine psychology making the hypothesis testable. The question of using numbers or java programs is a question of implementation and engineering, like using a mac or a PC. This is all nice and well, but I am precisely questioning your goal. Actually many of your conclusion sound good and right to me, but it doesn't have to do anything with digital mechanism in particular. You are just using the fact that universal systems are useful for representing EVERYTHING. I am only critizing your claim that this has to do anything with (abstract) universal systems in particular. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32614057.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations. I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory. Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different for a repeatable experience. If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory. We have already the logic of measure one. If physics was newtonian or boolean, comp would be refuted already. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
laws, etc... It is not a dogma. (but it is used to make sense on expression like programs, machines, numbers, finite, which we already used. OK, but then why do you believe it without evidence? Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp is not a dogma. It is a testable theory, which really means only a refutable theory, as understood by Popper. What could refute it? You need to have precise predictions, otherwise it is just useless. I can make a theory that says that the earth is round and you can refute it if you show the opposite, and as long as this is not the case whatever the theory says is plausible. This is not how science works. Of course you can say COMP is refutable by something which is utterly implausible in the first place, but then I wonder why you even bother with it. And of course in this case COMP is not being made plausible by being refutable. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32614925.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Bruno Marchal wrote: meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. It's always true in Platonia, where true just means satisfying the axioms. In real life it's not always true because of things like: This business is so small we just have one owner and one employee and 1+1=1. Yeah, but it remains to be shown that platonia is more than just an idea. Physical reality is an an idea too. But as a primitive ontological reality, it cannot even explain the belief in the physical fact by machine. It needs a notion of body-observer which incarnate actual infinities. I am not defending physical reality as primary. But it is not an idea as commonly understood (you could say it is an idea of God). It is content of our experience. I believe the observer is an actual infinity, why not? Aside from that, I don't think machines can believe in anything. You just interpret that in them. Beliefs are just patterns within consciousness. Ultimately there is no one that is believing. This itself is just a belief. Bruno Marchal wrote: I haven't yet seen any evidence of that. Bruno seems to justify that by reductio ad absurdum of 1+1=2 being dependent on ourselves, so 1+1=2 has to be true objectively in Platonia. I don't buy that argument. If our mind (or an equivalent mind, say of another species with the same intellectual capbilites) isn't there isn't even any meaning to 1+1=2, because there is no way to interpret the meaning in it. This contradicts your agreement that 1+1=2 is a feature of God in a preceding post. Not really, when I say 1+1=2 is a feature of God I am just saying it is a valid expression of some regularity within God. I am not implying that it has any independent meaning outside of our mind(s) (which is God's mind). 1+1=2 is a feature of God with respect to the fact that concrete objects and measurements tend to behave like that, not as an independent fact. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32614927.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 07 Oct 2011, at 22:33, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 7, 9:21 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's definition. This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit that is much more than its definition. That is the base of Gödel's discovery: the arithmetical reality is FAR beyond ANY attempt to define it. Can't you also interpret that Gödel's discovery is that arithmetic can never be fully realized through definition? The usual model (N, +, *), taught in school, and called standard model of arithmetic by logician fully realize it, and is definition independent. What is it that is taught if not definitions? The ability to use the definition to solve problems. And the consequence of those definition. But in high school we don't give any definition at all. We gives examples and develop the familiarity with the concepts from that. This doesn't imply an arithmetic reality to me at all, it implies 'incompleteness'; lacking the possibility of concrete realism. The word concrete has no absolute meaning. Comp is many types---no Token. It doesn't need to have an absolute meaning. A relative meaning makes the same point. Incompleteness says to me 'lacking in completeness', not 'complete beyond all reckoning'. Incompleteness is a technical term in logic. It means that the arithmetical propositions true in the structure (N, +, *) cannot been effectively captured by any axiomatizable theory. It means truth is far bigger than any notion of proof. So, the number 17 is always prime because we defined numbers in the way. If I define some other number system of natural numbers where I just declare that number 17 shall not be prime, then it is not prime. No. You are just deciding to talk about something else. I think Ben is right. We can just say that 17 is also divisible by number Θ (17 = 2 x fellini, which is 8.5), 8.5 is not a 0, s(0), s(s0)), You are just calling natural number what we usually call rational number. It's not 8.5, it's Θ. It doesn't matter what we usually call it, now we are calling it a natural number. The fact that we feel uncomfortable with this illustrates that our basis for arithmetic truth is sensorimotive, and not itself purely arithmetic. Who feels uncomfortable? Arithmetic and arithmetical theories is what mathematicians agree on the more. You make complex what is simple. I have still no clue by what sensorimotive means for you beyond the arithmetical propositions Bp Dt p. We feel that natural numbers are 'natural', but there is no arithmetic reason for that. They are the simplest illustration of our intuition of finiteness. It's sentimental. I can use combinators if you don't like the number. I assume digital mechanism. The laws of physics (quanta and qualia) becomes independent of the choice of the initial axiomatic system, as far as it is Turing universal. I brought up the idea earlier of a number system without any repetition. A base-∞ number system which would run 0-9 and then alphaumeric, symbolic, pictograms, names of people in the Tokyo phonebook, etc. This would be closer to an arithmetic system independent of sensorimotive patterning. The familiarity of the digits I think functions like a mantra, hypnotically conjuring the dream of an arithmetic reality where there is none. There is a sensorimotive reality and an electromagnetic 3-p side to that reality, and there are 1-p arithmetic computations with which the sensorimotive can model 3-p isomorphic experiences for itself, but there is no truly primitive arithmetic reality independent of subjective observers. You illustrate my point. You talk about something else, and you should have disagree with the axioms that I have already given. Not sure what you mean. I asked if you agree with: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x I don't use anything else when I mention the numbers (The induction axioms will be part of the observers, and will be any sound consistant extension of above, capable of proving its own universality). and build our number system around that. Like non-Euclidean arithmetic. That already exists, even when agreeing with the axioms, of, say, Peano Arithmetic. We can build model of arithmetic where we have the truth of provable(0=1), despite the falsity of it in the standard model, given that PA cannot prove the consistency of PA. This means that we have non standard models of PA, and thus of arithmetic. But it can be shown that in such model the 'natural number' are very weird infinite objects, and they do not concern us directly. But 17 is prime is provable in PA and is thus true in ALL interpretations or models of
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations. I don't see how probability theory is going to help even if you can prove some canonical measure applies. Suppose our world turns out to be extremely improbable? It still would not invalidate the theory. Probabilities like that use some absolute self-sampling assumption, which does not make much sense. Comp, like QM, only provide conditional or relative probabilities. Comp can be refuted by predicting anything different for a repeatable experience. If comp predict that an electron weight one ton, then it will be refuted. Comp+the classical theory of knowledge, predicts the whole physics, so it is hard to ever imagine a more easy to refute theory. Depends on what you mean by the whole of physics. What has been thought to be the whole of physics has been refuted. Newtonian physics was refuted by special and general relativity. General relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. So which whole of physics does Comp predict? Is it inconsistent with the physics of computer games? What does Comp predict about dark matter? Will it be a new particle? A modified gravity? We have already the logic of measure one. I don't understand what measure there is on logics. If physics was newtonian or boolean, comp would be refuted already. How would it be inconsistent with a Newtonian world? Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
if theoretically possible. Using some convoluted way of reprenting things beyond numbers with numbers is just useless, as we can more easily represent these things with concepts in language (you have to resort to that anyway, as examplified by your heavy use of words in critical points). Bruno Marchal wrote: Some universal system can play some more important role to figure out some aspect of reality, but that has to be deduced from a theory independent approach to computation if we want to extract and distinguish the quanta and the qualia (like trough the logics of self- reference). Why make it so complicated? Ulitamtely, logic can't capture self-reference anyway, so why not skip that stage and just go to the source of self-reference, the self itself (yourself). benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32616754.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Bruno Marchal wrote: and build our number system around that. Like non-Euclidean arithmetic. That already exists, even when agreeing with the axioms, of, say, Peano Arithmetic. We can build model of arithmetic where we have the truth of provable(0=1), despite the falsity of it in the standard model, given that PA cannot prove the consistency of PA. This means that we have non standard models of PA, and thus of arithmetic. But it can be shown that in such model the 'natural number' are very weird infinite objects, and they do not concern us directly. But 17 is prime is provable in PA and is thus true in ALL interpretations or models of PA. Likewise, the Universal Dovetailer is the same object in ALL models of PA. All theorems of PA are true in all interpretations of PA (by Gödel's completeness theorem). I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn blue or taste like broccoli. Assuming non-comp. There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error to say arithmetics turns into a taste. It is also a category error to say that arithmetic has an internal view. It makes as much sense to say that a concept has an internal view. Internal view just applies to the only thing that can have/is a view, namely cosciousness. This is not a belief, this is just the obvious reality right now. Can you find any number(s) flying around that has any claim to an internal view right now? The only thing that you can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person that consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in consciousness). You abstract so much that you miss the obvious. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32616782.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Oct 8, 10:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 07 Oct 2011, at 22:33, Craig Weinberg wrote: The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's definition. This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit that is much more than its definition. That is the base of Gödel's discovery: the arithmetical reality is FAR beyond ANY attempt to define it. Can't you also interpret that Gödel's discovery is that arithmetic can never be fully realized through definition? The usual model (N, +, *), taught in school, and called standard model of arithmetic by logician fully realize it, and is definition independent. What is it that is taught if not definitions? The ability to use the definition to solve problems. And the consequence of those definition. But in high school we don't give any definition at all. We gives examples and develop the familiarity with the concepts from that. All of the problem solving abilities (which are not taught but rather guided - the actual learning is developed subjectively through sensorimotive exploration), concepts, consequences, and concepts are dependent on the definition of the arithmetic systems. My point was that arithmetic is not definition independent. It's a language, like any other, but it is a universally generic language so that it can be applied to anything which is generic (i.e. not subjectivity, which is non-generic and proprietary). This doesn't imply an arithmetic reality to me at all, it implies 'incompleteness'; lacking the possibility of concrete realism. The word concrete has no absolute meaning. Comp is many types---no Token. It doesn't need to have an absolute meaning. A relative meaning makes the same point. Incompleteness says to me 'lacking in completeness', not 'complete beyond all reckoning'. Incompleteness is a technical term in logic. It means that the arithmetical propositions true in the structure (N, +, *) cannot been effectively captured by any axiomatizable theory. It means truth is far bigger than any notion of proof. That's why I worded it that incompleteness 'says to me', because I'm giving you what I think is an unintentional clue to interpreting the concept. The observation that arithmetic propositions cannot be completely captured by an axiomatic theory can be interpreted either your way; that arithmetic truth is greater than arithmetic proof -or- it can also be interpreted my way at the same time; that the failure of arithmetic to prove itself demonstrates that the complete truth can never be expressed arithmetically. There is always more than one way to interpret profound truths. So, the number 17 is always prime because we defined numbers in the way. If I define some other number system of natural numbers where I just declare that number 17 shall not be prime, then it is not prime. No. You are just deciding to talk about something else. I think Ben is right. We can just say that 17 is also divisible by number Θ (17 = 2 x fellini, which is 8.5), 8.5 is not a 0, s(0), s(s0)), You are just calling natural number what we usually call rational number. It's not 8.5, it's Θ. It doesn't matter what we usually call it, now we are calling it a natural number. The fact that we feel uncomfortable with this illustrates that our basis for arithmetic truth is sensorimotive, and not itself purely arithmetic. Who feels uncomfortable? Arithmetic and arithmetical theories is what mathematicians agree on the more. You make complex what is simple. I have still no clue by what sensorimotive means for you beyond the arithmetical propositions Bp Dt p. We feel that natural numbers are 'natural', but there is no arithmetic reason for that. They are the simplest illustration of our intuition of finiteness. Those four concepts - simplicity, illustration (metaphor), intuition, and finiteness are all sensorimotive references. Those are natural and mandatory to awareness. Numbers are a learned language of counting. They are completely optional. If we didn't have 10 digits on our hands, our natural numbers could have been anything - binary, hexadecimal, or, as I suggested, non-repeating names that go on indefinitely. Innumeracy is quite possible, but Inexperiential is not possible. It's sentimental. I can use combinators if you don't like the number. I assume digital mechanism. The laws of physics (quanta and qualia) becomes independent of the choice of the initial axiomatic system, as far as it is Turing universal. Turing universality supervenes upon sensorimotive phenomenology. The whole idea of something which has a continuous purpose propagated through discrete iterations, with sequential read/writes (energy, events), memory (tape), coding and encoding...this assumes a whole universe of underlying bootstrap ontology underneath it. Machineness doesn't
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 05 Oct 2011, at 17:33, benjayk wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. It's easy. It's the way you explain it to children: Take those red blocks over there and ad them to the green blocks in this box. That's addition. Now make all possible different pairs of one green block and one red block. That's multiplication. OK. We don't have to use numbers per se, but notions of more and less of something. Anyway, we get the same problem in explaining what addition and multiplication are in the absence of any concrete thing of which there can be more or less, or measurements that can be compared in terms of more and less. meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. It's always true in Platonia, where true just means satisfying the axioms. In real life it's not always true because of things like: This business is so small we just have one owner and one employee and 1+1=1. Yeah, but it remains to be shown that platonia is more than just an idea. I haven't yet seen any evidence of that. Bruno seems to justify that by reductio ad absurdum of 1+1=2 being dependent on ourselves, so 1+1=2 has to be true objectively in Platonia. I don't buy that argument. If our mind (or an equivalent mind, say of another species with the same intellectual capbilites) isn't there isn't even any meaning to 1+1=2, because there is no way to interpret the meaning in it. Would you say that if the big bang is not observed then there is no big bang? Why would it be different for 1+1 = 2? I think that you are confusing 1+1=2 is true and the fact that 1+1=2. We need a subject to asses the truth of the string 1+1=2, but no one is a priori needed for the fact itself to be true or false, a priori. It only seems to us to be true independently because we defined it without explicit reference to anything outside of it. But this doesn't prove that it is true independently anymore than the fact that Harry Potter doesn't mention he is just a creation of the mind makes him exist independently of us eternally in Harry-Potter-land. This does not logically follows, and beyond this, it is obvious that Harry-Potter land does exist in any everything type of theories. Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations. The mere existence of them cannot be used in a reductio ad absurdum. We don't know what reality is. We are searching. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's definition. This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit that is much more than its definition. That is the base of Gödel's discovery: the arithmetical reality is FAR beyond ANY attempt to define it. Can't you also interpret that Gödel's discovery is that arithmetic can never be fully realized through definition? The usual model (N, +, *), taught in school, and called standard model of arithmetic by logician fully realize it, and is definition independent. This doesn't imply an arithmetic reality to me at all, it implies 'incompleteness'; lacking the possibility of concrete realism. The word concrete has no absolute meaning. Comp is many types---no Token. So, the number 17 is always prime because we defined numbers in the way. If I define some other number system of natural numbers where I just declare that number 17 shall not be prime, then it is not prime. No. You are just deciding to talk about something else. I think Ben is right. We can just say that 17 is also divisible by number Θ (17 = 2 x fellini, which is 8.5), 8.5 is not a 0, s(0), s(s0)), You are just calling natural number what we usually call rational number. You illustrate my point. You talk about something else, and you should have disagree with the axioms that I have already given. and build our number system around that. Like non-Euclidean arithmetic. That already exists, even when agreeing with the axioms, of, say, Peano Arithmetic. We can build model of arithmetic where we have the truth of provable(0=1), despite the falsity of it in the standard model, given that PA cannot prove the consistency of PA. This means that we have non standard models of PA, and thus of arithmetic. But it can be shown that in such model the 'natural number' are very weird infinite objects, and they do not concern us directly. But 17 is prime is provable in PA and is thus true in ALL interpretations or models of PA. Likewise, the Universal Dovetailer is the same object in ALL models of PA. All theorems of PA are true in all interpretations of PA (by Gödel's completeness theorem). Primeness isn't a reality, it's an epiphenomenon of a particular motivation to recognize particular patterns. They have to exist to be able of being recognized by some entities, in case they have the motivation. The lack of motivation of non human animal for the planet Saturn did not prevent it of having rings before humans discovered them. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:29, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote: I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. I am not sure this makes any sense. Addition of what? In scientific theories we don't pretend to explain everything from nothing. We can only explain complex things from simpler things. The rest is playing with word. Why is it playing with words? We can explain simple things from complex things too. You can do that from a logical point of view, but an explanation is not a logical thing, but a pragmatical thing, and it makes no sense to explain what we already understand from things that we do not understand. If that was the case, we might be able to explain everything with just one three letter word: GOD. But that kind of explanation, sometimes propose by some people, is a mockery of both GOD and reality. I decide to move my hand, and a lot of complicated physiological change happens. This has nothing to do with the idea of explanation. Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Here yo are the one talking like a 19th rationalist who believe that we can dismiss *intuition*. Since Gödel's rationalist knows that they can't. In particular we need some undefinable intuition to grasp anything formalized, be it number, or programs, or machines, etc. I chose the numbers because people already grasp them sufficiently well, so that we can proceed. I disagree. I understand what he is saying exactly. What makes numbers any more deserving than awareness of a primitive status, exempt from definition? In that case I prefer the pseudo-virtually deep impetus, exempt from definition. OK. But what else is 0? Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we start from that. So why is it better to start with nobody knows-0 Nobody starts with nobody knows 0. We start from 0 ≠ s(x), or things like that. and derive something from that than just start with nobody knows-consciousness and just interpet what consciousness means to us? Because 0, as a useful technical object does not put any conceptual problem. Consciousness is far more complex. Consciousness isn't complex, it's as simple or complex as whoever it is that is the subject. See my answer to what you said about the simplicity of yellow. You confuse levels. In order to have 0, you have to have something that is aware of 0, You confuse 0 and 0. but you don't need to know 0 to have awareness. What makes you sure of that? In which theory will you argue? If there is 0€ in a bank account, this is sad, but is not very mysterious. If someone is in a comatose state, the question of consciousness is much more conceptually troubling. Humans took time to grasp zero, but eventually got the point. For consciousness, there are still many scientist who does not believe in it, lie some people does not understand the notion of qualia. Is consciousness related to matter, is it primary, ... all that are question still debated. That's only because they aren't thinking about it the right way. They are trying to fit a who and why into a what and how. That can't be done. I agree, but It is even worst. They believe that the fact that consciousness is not 3p, that it cannot be studied with 3p theories. This is a vary grave error, because it prevents the use of the scientific attitude on it. The same mistake is done with theology since the closure of Plato academy. This has given the free way for abusing of authority, and the lack of rigor in the human sciences, and we are paying the big price in the 20th and 21th centuries. But for 0, there is no more problem. Everyone agree on any different axioms rich enough to handle them in their application. There is agreement because 0 is nothing but an agreement. You continue to confuse 0 and 0. Only 0 needs an agreement, not 0. It's a word for an idea, The idea is independent of the word. It precedes the word. 0* 7 = 0 has nothing to do with the word 0, 7, times, =, for the same reason that the ring of Saturn would exist even if the letters r, i, n, g were not existing. which has meanings in relations to other words and ideas of the same arithmetic type. 1 is the successor of 0. You are confusing the number 0 and its cardinal denotation. OK. But what else is 1? The successor of zero. The predecessor of 2. The only number which divides all other numbers, ... (I don't see your point). But what does successor mean? You are just circling within your own
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Oct 7, 9:21 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's definition. This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit that is much more than its definition. That is the base of Gödel's discovery: the arithmetical reality is FAR beyond ANY attempt to define it. Can't you also interpret that Gödel's discovery is that arithmetic can never be fully realized through definition? The usual model (N, +, *), taught in school, and called standard model of arithmetic by logician fully realize it, and is definition independent. What is it that is taught if not definitions? This doesn't imply an arithmetic reality to me at all, it implies 'incompleteness'; lacking the possibility of concrete realism. The word concrete has no absolute meaning. Comp is many types---no Token. It doesn't need to have an absolute meaning. A relative meaning makes the same point. Incompleteness says to me 'lacking in completeness', not 'complete beyond all reckoning'. So, the number 17 is always prime because we defined numbers in the way. If I define some other number system of natural numbers where I just declare that number 17 shall not be prime, then it is not prime. No. You are just deciding to talk about something else. I think Ben is right. We can just say that 17 is also divisible by number Θ (17 = 2 x fellini, which is 8.5), 8.5 is not a 0, s(0), s(s0)), You are just calling natural number what we usually call rational number. It's not 8.5, it's Θ. It doesn't matter what we usually call it, now we are calling it a natural number. The fact that we feel uncomfortable with this illustrates that our basis for arithmetic truth is sensorimotive, and not itself purely arithmetic. We feel that natural numbers are 'natural', but there is no arithmetic reason for that. It's sentimental. I brought up the idea earlier of a number system without any repetition. A base-∞ number system which would run 0-9 and then alphaumeric, symbolic, pictograms, names of people in the Tokyo phonebook, etc. This would be closer to an arithmetic system independent of sensorimotive patterning. The familiarity of the digits I think functions like a mantra, hypnotically conjuring the dream of an arithmetic reality where there is none. There is a sensorimotive reality and an electromagnetic 3-p side to that reality, and there are 1-p arithmetic computations with which the sensorimotive can model 3-p isomorphic experiences for itself, but there is no truly primitive arithmetic reality independent of subjective observers. You illustrate my point. You talk about something else, and you should have disagree with the axioms that I have already given. Not sure what you mean. and build our number system around that. Like non-Euclidean arithmetic. That already exists, even when agreeing with the axioms, of, say, Peano Arithmetic. We can build model of arithmetic where we have the truth of provable(0=1), despite the falsity of it in the standard model, given that PA cannot prove the consistency of PA. This means that we have non standard models of PA, and thus of arithmetic. But it can be shown that in such model the 'natural number' are very weird infinite objects, and they do not concern us directly. But 17 is prime is provable in PA and is thus true in ALL interpretations or models of PA. Likewise, the Universal Dovetailer is the same object in ALL models of PA. All theorems of PA are true in all interpretations of PA (by Gödel's completeness theorem). I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn blue or taste like broccoli. Primeness isn't a reality, it's an epiphenomenon of a particular motivation to recognize particular patterns. They have to exist to be able of being recognized by some entities, in case they have the motivation. The lack of motivation of non human animal for the planet Saturn did not prevent it of having rings before humans discovered them. Rings from whose perspective? Without something to anchor perceptual frame of reference, there would be no difference between the ringlike visual qualities of them and the crunchiness of the oceans of ice, dust and rocks that make them up, or the tiny nubs of light on either side of a speck in a distant sky, or the nothing at all that it would be in the absence of visual qualia. Who says Saturn has rings at all? Only our eyes, through telescopic extension, and our sensorimotive feedback loops of our brains with their observations and experiences in applied astronomy. The rings are part of the human story of the Saturn, not necessarily Saturn's story
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Oct 7, 9:27 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:29, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote: I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. I am not sure this makes any sense. Addition of what? In scientific theories we don't pretend to explain everything from nothing. We can only explain complex things from simpler things. The rest is playing with word. Why is it playing with words? We can explain simple things from complex things too. You can do that from a logical point of view, but an explanation is not a logical thing, but a pragmatical thing, and it makes no sense to explain what we already understand from things that we do not understand. Complexity doesn't mean it's any harder to understand. A sand dune is simple, the granular relations of the sand within it are complex, but they are both equally understandable and contribute equally in any explanation of one with the other. If that was the case, we might be able to explain everything with just one three letter word: GOD. But that kind of explanation, sometimes propose by some people, is a mockery of both GOD and reality. Billions of people alive today do just that. I decide to move my hand, and a lot of complicated physiological change happens. This has nothing to do with the idea of explanation. Why not? Your position is just racist against simple, high level processes. Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Here yo are the one talking like a 19th rationalist who believe that we can dismiss *intuition*. Since Gödel's rationalist knows that they can't. In particular we need some undefinable intuition to grasp anything formalized, be it number, or programs, or machines, etc. I chose the numbers because people already grasp them sufficiently well, so that we can proceed. I disagree. I understand what he is saying exactly. What makes numbers any more deserving than awareness of a primitive status, exempt from definition? In that case I prefer the pseudo-virtually deep impetus, exempt from definition. ? OK. But what else is 0? Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we start from that. So why is it better to start with nobody knows-0 Nobody starts with nobody knows 0. We start from 0 ≠ s(x), or things like that. and derive something from that than just start with nobody knows-consciousness and just interpet what consciousness means to us? Because 0, as a useful technical object does not put any conceptual problem. Consciousness is far more complex. Consciousness isn't complex, it's as simple or complex as whoever it is that is the subject. See my answer to what you said about the simplicity of yellow. You confuse levels. No, you amputate levels. You are mistaking the experience of yellow for the neurological mechanics associated with that experience (which are not sufficient to explain the experience) In order to have 0, you have to have something that is aware of 0, You confuse 0 and 0. No, I'm saying that the referent of 0 is not an arithmetically real entity, but a lowest common denominator sensorimotive phenomena which we share with many, but not all phenomena. but you don't need to know 0 to have awareness. What makes you sure of that? In which theory will you argue? No theory, just first hand experience. You have to learn what 0 is, but you don't have to learn what blue is. You see it whether or not you know any name for it. For 0, we generally need to learn the concept by being introduced to the name 0 first. Zero was invented by human minds, blue was not (although it may have been invented by photosynthetic eukaryotes 'minds'. If there is 0€ in a bank account, this is sad, but is not very mysterious. If someone is in a comatose state, the question of consciousness is much more conceptually troubling. Humans took time to grasp zero, but eventually got the point. For consciousness, there are still many scientist who does not believe in it, lie some people does not understand the notion of qualia. Is consciousness related to matter, is it primary, ... all that are question still debated. That's only because they aren't thinking about it the right way. They are trying to fit a who and why into a what and how. That can't be done. I agree, but It is even worst. They believe that the fact that consciousness is not 3p, that it cannot be studied with 3p theories. I don't
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete mental objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you get the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. Bruno Marchal wrote: The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact does not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say that concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive materialism might be false, so why would little concrete pieces on stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there are no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the simple equation x^2 = 2y^2. This is just a consequence of using our definitions consistently. Not really. In this case, we can indeed derived this from our definitions and axioms, but this is contingent to us. The very idea of being realist about the additive and multiplicative structure of numbers, is that such a fact might be true independently of our cognitive abilities. We don't know if there is an infinity of twin primes, but we can still believe that God has a definite idea on that question. That the diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution, is considered to be a discovery about natural numbers. It is not a convention, or the result of a vote, nor of a decision. For the early Pythagoricians that was a secret, and it seems they killed the one who dare to make that discovery public (at least in some legend). Of course we can say 1+2=3 is 3 just because we defined numbers in the way that this is true, without resorting to any concreteness. Yes. Mathematical realism stems from the intuition that abstract entities can have theor own life (relations with other abstract or concrete entities). My point is that we can't derive something about the fundamental nature of things just by adhering to our own definitions of what numbers are, since these ultimately are just a bunch of definitions, You are right. We need some philosophical principles (like comp) to understand that eventually we don't need those philosophical principle. In the case of comp, we can understand why some (relative) numbers will bet on it, and why some other numbers will not. In fine, it is like with the south american, we can feel them enough close to us to listen to them. whereas the actual thing they rely on (what numbers, or 0 and succesor actually are), remains totally undefined. Not with comp. An apple becomes something very complex when defined in pure number theory. It will involve infinite sets of long computations, complex group of symmetries, etc. But it is definable (in principle) from numbers (some including LUM observers). So whatever we derive from it is just as mysterious as consciousness, or matter, or whatever else, since the basis is totally undefined. The problem does not consist in finding the ultimate definitions, but to agree on elementary propositions, and to explain the rest, of as much as possible from them. Bruno Marchal wrote: If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. Yes. But this too me seems senseless. It like saying that we cannot prove that 17 is really prime, we have just prove that the fiollowing line . cannot be broken in equal non trivial parts (the trivial parts being the tiny . and the big . itself). But we have no yet verify this for each of the following: . . . . . . . . . . . etc. On the contrary: to understand arithmetic, is quasi-equivalent with the understanding that a statement like 17 is prime, is independent of all concrete situation, in which 17 might be represented. Lol, the funny thing is that in your explantion you used concrete things, namely .. Is that a problem? Of course concrete is relative. I think so. It's concreteness is not really relevant, the point is that numbers just apply to countable or measurable things. Yes. The natural numbers are somehow the type of the finite discrete or discernible entities. Without being countable natural numbers don't even make sense. In order for COMP to be applicable to reality, reality had to be countable,
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. But it is technical. I was just saying that we can axiomatize arithmetic without taking 0 as a primitive. Of course we will need the additive and multiplicative axiomatic definition, and the technical definition of 0, will not be an explanation of zero, in the sense you are using explanation. Basically you can define 0 by the formula F(x) = for all y (x + y = y). It is a number such that when add to any other number gives that other number. Then you might be able to prove that it is unique, and that it verifies what we usually take as a separate axiom, notably that such a number cannot be a successor of any number. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. You are just supposed to have follow some course in elementary arithmetic, like in high school. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. I am not sure this makes any sense. Addition of what? In scientific theories we don't pretend to explain everything from nothing. We can only explain complex things from simpler things. The rest is playing with word. Comp explains the origin of mind and matter, and their relations, from any sigma_1 complete theory. but we have still to agree on some axioms (making that sigma_1 complete theory). Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. So you might say that you mean the usual natural numbers. But usual is relative. Maybe for me 1+1= is more usual. Usual is just another word anyway. You fix the definition of natural numbers and use this to defend the absolute truths of the statements about natural numbers. This is just dogmatism. Of course you are going to get this result if you cling to your definition of natural numbers. If you don't like the numbers, propose me anything else. Combinators are more cute, and in fact much more easy than numbers, so here is an alternative theory of everything for the ontic level: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) Search combinators in the archive for the explanation that this is enough (together with some axioms on equality). I don't need logic. With the numbers I can also abandon logic, but then the theory of everything is a bit more complex (see below(*)) Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Here yo are the one talking like a 19th rationalist who believe that we can dismiss *intuition*. Since Gödel's rationalist knows that they can't. In particular we need some undefinable intuition to grasp anything formalized, be it number, or programs, or machines, etc. I chose the numbers because people already grasp them sufficiently well, so that we can proceed. The sort of explanation of
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:57, meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. It's easy. It's the way you explain it to children: Take those red blocks over there and ad them to the green blocks in this box. That's addition. Now make all possible different pairs of one green block and one red block. That's multiplication. Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. It's always true in Platonia, where true just means satisfying the axioms. Not at all. True means satisfied by the standard model (N, *, +). That is *much more* than what we can captured in any effective theory or machine. You are confusing truth and proved. You are confusing p with Bp. You are confusing God and Man. You are confusing the first hypostase with the terrestrial version of the second one, the discursive reasoner. Bruno In real life it's not always true because of things like: This business is so small we just have one owner and one employee and 1+1=1. Brent So you might say that you mean the usual natural numbers. But usual is relative. Maybe for me 1+1= is more usual. Usual is just another word anyway. You fix the definition of natural numbers and use this to defend the absolute truths of the statements about natural numbers. This is just dogmatism. Of course you are going to get this result if you cling to your definition of natural numbers. Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But if the very foundation is undefined, it can mean anything, and anything derived from it can mean anything. Then all the scientific endeavor is ruined, including the one done by the brains. This would mean that nothing can have any sense. This is an argument against all science, not just mechanism. No. It is an argument against science based on rationality. We can use it based on our intuition. That is something else. Science is build from intuition, always. Rationality is shared intuition. Choice of axioms are done by intuition. And comp explains the key role of intuition and first person in the very fabric of reality. I don't see the link with what you are saying above. It seems on the contrary that you are the one asking for precise foundation, where rationality says that there are none, and which is something intuition can grasp. OK. I don't see how from the foundation being undefined, and possibly meaning anything, ruins the scientific endavour. If anything, it makes it more inclusive. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: One might argue that
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 05 Oct 2011, at 17:33, benjayk wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. It's easy. It's the way you explain it to children: Take those red blocks over there and ad them to the green blocks in this box. That's addition. Now make all possible different pairs of one green block and one red block. That's multiplication. OK. We don't have to use numbers per se, but notions of more and less of something. Anyway, we get the same problem in explaining what addition and multiplication are in the absence of any concrete thing of which there can be more or less, or measurements that can be compared in terms of more and less. meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. It's always true in Platonia, where true just means satisfying the axioms. In real life it's not always true because of things like: This business is so small we just have one owner and one employee and 1+1=1. Yeah, but it remains to be shown that platonia is more than just an idea. Physical reality is an an idea too. But as a primitive ontological reality, it cannot even explain the belief in the physical fact by machine. It needs a notion of body-observer which incarnate actual infinities. I haven't yet seen any evidence of that. Bruno seems to justify that by reductio ad absurdum of 1+1=2 being dependent on ourselves, so 1+1=2 has to be true objectively in Platonia. I don't buy that argument. If our mind (or an equivalent mind, say of another species with the same intellectual capbilites) isn't there isn't even any meaning to 1+1=2, because there is no way to interpret the meaning in it. This contradicts your agreement that 1+1=2 is a feature of God in a preceding post. Bruno It only seems to us to be true independently because we defined it without explicit reference to anything outside of it. But this doesn't prove that it is true independently anymore than the fact that Harry Potter doesn't mention he is just a creation of the mind makes him exist independently of us eternally in Harry-Potter-land. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32595469.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's definition. This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit that is much more than its definition. That is the base of Gödel's discovery: the arithmetical reality is FAR beyond ANY attempt to define it. Can't you also interpret that Gödel's discovery is that arithmetic can never be fully realized through definition? This doesn't imply an arithmetic reality to me at all, it implies 'incompleteness'; lacking the possibility of concrete realism. So, the number 17 is always prime because we defined numbers in the way. If I define some other number system of natural numbers where I just declare that number 17 shall not be prime, then it is not prime. No. You are just deciding to talk about something else. I think Ben is right. We can just say that 17 is also divisible by number Θ (17 = 2 x fellini, which is 8.5), and build our number system around that. Like non-Euclidean arithmetic. Primeness isn't a reality, it's an epiphenomenon of a particular motivation to recognize particular patterns. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote: I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. I am not sure this makes any sense. Addition of what? In scientific theories we don't pretend to explain everything from nothing. We can only explain complex things from simpler things. The rest is playing with word. Why is it playing with words? We can explain simple things from complex things too. I decide to move my hand, and a lot of complicated physiological change happens. Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Here yo are the one talking like a 19th rationalist who believe that we can dismiss *intuition*. Since Gödel's rationalist knows that they can't. In particular we need some undefinable intuition to grasp anything formalized, be it number, or programs, or machines, etc. I chose the numbers because people already grasp them sufficiently well, so that we can proceed. I disagree. I understand what he is saying exactly. What makes numbers any more deserving than awareness of a primitive status, exempt from definition? OK. But what else is 0? Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we start from that. So why is it better to start with nobody knows-0 Nobody starts with nobody knows 0. We start from 0 ≠ s(x), or things like that. and derive something from that than just start with nobody knows-consciousness and just interpet what consciousness means to us? Because 0, as a useful technical object does not put any conceptual problem. Consciousness is far more complex. Consciousness isn't complex, it's as simple or complex as whoever it is that is the subject. In order to have 0, you have to have something that is aware of 0, but you don't need to know 0 to have awareness. If there is 0€ in a bank account, this is sad, but is not very mysterious. If someone is in a comatose state, the question of consciousness is much more conceptually troubling. Humans took time to grasp zero, but eventually got the point. For consciousness, there are still many scientist who does not believe in it, lie some people does not understand the notion of qualia. Is consciousness related to matter, is it primary, ... all that are question still debated. That's only because they aren't thinking about it the right way. They are trying to fit a who and why into a what and how. That can't be done. But for 0, there is no more problem. Everyone agree on any different axioms rich enough to handle them in their application. There is agreement because 0 is nothing but an agreement. It's a word for an idea, which has meanings in relations to other words and ideas of the same arithmetic type. 1 is the successor of 0. You are confusing the number 0 and its cardinal denotation. OK. But what else is 1? The successor of zero. The predecessor of 2. The only number which divides all other numbers, ... (I don't see your point). But what does successor mean? You are just circling within your own definitions, which doesn't explain anything. You have to study mathematical logic. yes I am circling. This is allowed and encouraged in foundations. There are precise technic to make such circles senseful. I agree with Ben. It's circular reasoning to say that addition and succession define each other. To me, it's clear that succession is one of the many primitive elements of sense - symmetry, reflection/ imitation, looping, association, dissociation, etc. are others. Yes. So you want to explain mysterious consciousness and substitute the equally mysterious numbers. Where exactly lies the explanation in that? If you can derive the mass of the proton from a theory of consciousness, explain me how. I have never met any difficulty about any statement I have ever made on any finite beings constituting universal systems. But on consciousness, humans have never cease to met difficulties. The numbers are taught in high school. Consciousness has entered in *some* university level course, and only with many difficulties. Consciousness can be understood in it's entirety by contemplating the meaning of the word I, and it cannot be understood at all without understanding the meaning of that word. It's misleading to look for exterior knowledge to inform us about subjectivity. Knowledge is an obstruction to understanding in the case of awareness. I think you restrict science too much. Like I think you restrict rationality.´ It all depends on what we mean with science, and
Re: COMP is empty(?)
meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. It's easy. It's the way you explain it to children: Take those red blocks over there and ad them to the green blocks in this box. That's addition. Now make all possible different pairs of one green block and one red block. That's multiplication. OK. We don't have to use numbers per se, but notions of more and less of something. Anyway, we get the same problem in explaining what addition and multiplication are in the absence of any concrete thing of which there can be more or less, or measurements that can be compared in terms of more and less. meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. It's always true in Platonia, where true just means satisfying the axioms. In real life it's not always true because of things like: This business is so small we just have one owner and one employee and 1+1=1. Yeah, but it remains to be shown that platonia is more than just an idea. I haven't yet seen any evidence of that. Bruno seems to justify that by reductio ad absurdum of 1+1=2 being dependent on ourselves, so 1+1=2 has to be true objectively in Platonia. I don't buy that argument. If our mind (or an equivalent mind, say of another species with the same intellectual capbilites) isn't there isn't even any meaning to 1+1=2, because there is no way to interpret the meaning in it. It only seems to us to be true independently because we defined it without explicit reference to anything outside of it. But this doesn't prove that it is true independently anymore than the fact that Harry Potter doesn't mention he is just a creation of the mind makes him exist independently of us eternally in Harry-Potter-land. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32595469.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 03 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing everything on computations. This is not correct. Comp is the assumption that the brain functions without extra magic, or that the brain is just a natural machine, like the heart or the liver. It might be false, but still is a widespread belief among rationalist since many centuries, and there are no sign that it might be refuted. Materialists are often using comp as a method to hide the mind-body problem. My own works shows that attempt to be incorrect, and I use comp to formulate precisely the mind body problem. Comp reduces indeed the mind-body problem to a purely mathematical body problem, and this makes comp a scientific (testable, refutable) hypothesis. I wanted to express what you said with the words Comp reduces indeed the mind-body problem to a purely mathematical body problem. OK. And mind is already (almost by definition, assuming comp, reduced to computer science/mathematical logic). For example, the quanta/qualia gap is explained by the ability of machine to get immediate truth impossible to prove to others, etc.) Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. Bruno Marchal wrote: But if the very foundation is undefined, it can mean anything, and anything derived from it can mean anything. Then all the scientific endeavor is ruined, including the one done by the brains. This would mean that nothing can have any sense. This is an argument against all science, not just mechanism. No. It is an argument against science based on rationality. We can use it based on our intuition. That is something else. Science is build from intuition, always. Rationality is shared intuition. Choice of axioms are done by intuition. And comp explains the key role of intuition and first person in the very fabric of reality. I don't see the link with what you are saying above. It seems on the contrary that you are the one asking for precise foundation, where rationality says that there are none, and which is something intuition can grasp. Bruno Marchal wrote: One might argue that even though 0 and successor can not be defined it is a specific thing that has a specific meaning. But really, it doesn't. 0 just signifies the absence of something, It might be intepreted like that. But that use extra-metaphysical assumptions. OK. But what else is 0? Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we start from that. Bruno Marchal wrote: which makes sense if we count things, but as a foundation for a TOE, it is just meaningless (absence of anything at all?), or could mean anything (the absence of anything in particular). Successor signifies that there is one more of something, which makes sense with concrete object, but what is one more of the absence of something (which could mean anything). 1 is the successor of 0. You are confusing the number 0 and its cardinal denotation. OK. But what else is 1? The successor of zero. The predecessor of 2. The only number which divides all other numbers, ... (I don't see your point). Bruno Marchal wrote: So even if we assume that COMP is correct, it is essentially empty, It is not empty to say yes to a doctor, for any operation proposed. OK, this isn't empty. I did not mean COMP as just saying yes doctor, but the (supposed) metaphysical consequences of it. It is a big
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) : On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: snip The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought construct which essentially reveals its own emptiness. What can COMP possibly mean? For it to have any use we have to make a bet grounded on pure faith... So we could just as well believe in God, Why not if you make it enough precise so that people can see the scientific problem. usually God is used as an empty (indeed) answer. But with comp, both comp and God is a question, not an answer. or - better -just take the stance of observing whatever happens! Maybe that we have to bet on an substitution level for COMP to have any meaning, and our inability to know any substitution level should lead us to conclude that there probably is no substitution level, or it is undefined, which would just make sense, given that apparently COMP is undefined in its very foundations. So how would react if your daughter want to say yes to a digitalist doctor? Or what if your doctor says that this is the only chance for her to survive some disease? You are using a machine to send this post, which would not even exist if comp did not make sense. I mean ... if comp did not make sense for the reason you gave above. Obviously computer makes sense even if comp is false. But computer would not have appeared if we did not grasp the elementary arithmetical ideas. But we did grasp the elementary ideas. My point is just that it makes no sense to treat arithmetics as something that is meaningful without concrete objects. I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact does not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say that concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive materialism might be false, so why would little concrete pieces on stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there are no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the simple equation x^2 = 2y^2. If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. Yes. But this too me seems senseless. It like saying that we cannot prove that 17 is really prime, we have just prove that the fiollowing line . cannot be broken in equal non trivial parts (the trivial parts being the tiny . and the big . itself). But we have no yet verify this for each of the following: . . . . . . . . . . . etc. On the contrary: to understand arithmetic, is quasi-equivalent with the understanding that a statement like 17 is prime, is independent of all concrete situation, in which 17 might be represented. 1, 2, 3,... make only sense in terms of one of something, two of something,... OK, we could say it makes sense to have one of nothing, two of nothing, etc, but in this case numbers are superfluous, and all numbers, and all computations are equivalent. I think that 0, 1, 2, and many others are far more simple conceptually than any something you can multiply them by. But comp needs only that you belief that the elementary arithmetical truth does not depend on you or us (little ego). Are you thinking that if an asteroid rips of humanity from the cosmos, the number 17 would get a non trivial divisor? That does not make sense, I think. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
