Re: Asifism revisited.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 13-juil.-07, à 20:03, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 12-juil.-07, à 18:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>>> ...
 Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
 thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.




 Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" can be the
 result of some set of rules. Even without comp the "arithmetical
 universe" or arithmetical truth (the "ONE" attached to the little
 Peano
 Arithmetic Lobian machine) cannot be described by finite set of 
 rules.
>>> But it can be "the result of" a finite set of rules. Arithmetic
>>> results from Peano's axioms, but a complete description of arithmetic
>>> is impossible.
>>
>>
>> I don't understand.
>>
>> Let us define ARITHMETIC (big case) by the set of true (first order
>> logical) arithmetical sentences. (like "prime number exist",
>> Let us define arithmetic (lower case) by the set of provable (first
>> order logical) arithmetical sentences, where "provable" means provable
>> by some sound lobian machine.
>> By incompleteness, whatever sound machine you consisder the
>> corresponding "arithmetic" is always a proper subset of ARITHMETIC.
>>
>> So arithmetical truth (alias ARITHMETIC) cannot be described by any
>> finite set of rules. Finite sets or rules can never generate the whole
>> of arithmetical truth.
>>
>> OK?
>>
>> Bruno
>
> Yes, I understand.  But ARITHMETIC is generated by or results from 
> Peano's axioms - right?



Only a tiny part of ARITHMETIC (the set of all true arithmetical 
sentenses, or the set of their godel-number) is generated by the Peano 
Axioms.
Even ZF genererate a little tiny part (but bigger than PA) of 
ARITHMETIC.






>> "existence" is a very very tricky notion. In the theory I am proposing
>> (actually I derived it from the comp principle) the most basic notion
>> of "exists" is remarkably well formalize by first order arithmetical
>> logic, like in Ex(prime(x)):   it exists a prime number.
>
> But isn't this just an elaboration that obscures the prior assumption 
> that numbers exist?


I don't think so. This was clearly assumed at the start. Natural 
numbers are really something you cannot get from less. Actually in 
Peano you can prove the existence of each individual number by proving 
each formula like Ex(x=0), Ex(x = s(0)), Ex(x = s(s(0))) 


>  If numbers don't exist then Ex(prime(x)) is false, or requires a 
> different interpretation of "E".


Sure. (I am not sure where is your problem)



Bruno






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

Brent Meeker skrev:

> Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>> That is exactly what I wanted to say.  You don't need to have a complete
>> description of arithmetic.  Our universe can be described by doing a
>> number of computations from a finite set of rules.  (To get to the
>> current view of our universe you have to do about 10**60 computations
>> for every point of space...)
>
> How did you arrive at that number?
>
It is the number of Planck times since the birth of Universe.  The age of
Universe is 13,7 billion years, number of seconds in a year is 31 million,
and the Planck time is 5,4 * 10**-44 seconds.  That gives 13,7*10**9 *
31*10**6 / (5,4*10**-44) = 8*10**60.

-- 
Torgny


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 12-juil.-07, à 18:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> 
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>> ...
>>> Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
>>> thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" can be the
>>> result of some set of rules. Even without comp the "arithmetical
>>> universe" or arithmetical truth (the "ONE" attached to the little 
>>> Peano
>>> Arithmetic Lobian machine) cannot be described by finite set of rules.
>> But it can be "the result of" a finite set of rules. Arithmetic 
>> results from Peano's axioms, but a complete description of arithmetic 
>> is impossible.
> 
> 
> I don't understand.
> 
> Let us define ARITHMETIC (big case) by the set of true (first order 
> logical) arithmetical sentences. (like "prime number exist",
> Let us define arithmetic (lower case) by the set of provable (first 
> order logical) arithmetical sentences, where "provable" means provable 
> by some sound lobian machine.
> By incompleteness, whatever sound machine you consisder the 
> corresponding "arithmetic" is always a proper subset of ARITHMETIC.
> 
> So arithmetical truth (alias ARITHMETIC) cannot be described by any 
> finite set of rules. Finite sets or rules can never generate the whole 
> of arithmetical truth.
> 
> OK?
> 
> Bruno

Yes, I understand.  But ARITHMETIC is generated by or results from Peano's 
axioms - right?

Brent Meeker  

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Brent Meeker]

Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Brent Meeker skrev:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>   
>>> Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>>> 
>> ...
>>   
>>> Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
>>> thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" can be the 
>>> result of some set of rules. Even without comp the "arithmetical 
>>> universe" or arithmetical truth (the "ONE" attached to the little Peano 
>>> Arithmetic Lobian machine) cannot be described by finite set of rules.
>>> 
>>
>> But it can be "the result of" a finite set of rules. Arithmetic results from 
>> Peano's axioms, but a complete description of arithmetic is impossible.
>>   
> That is exactly what I wanted to say.  You don't need to have a complete 
> description of arithmetic.  Our universe can be described by doing a 
> number of computations from a finite set of rules.  (To get to the 
> current view of our universe you have to do about 10**60 computations 
> for every point of space...)

How did you arrive at that number?

Brent Meeker

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 12-juil.-07, à 18:43, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
> ...
>> Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
>> thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" can be the
>> result of some set of rules. Even without comp the "arithmetical
>> universe" or arithmetical truth (the "ONE" attached to the little 
>> Peano
>> Arithmetic Lobian machine) cannot be described by finite set of rules.
>
> But it can be "the result of" a finite set of rules. Arithmetic 
> results from Peano's axioms, but a complete description of arithmetic 
> is impossible.


I don't understand.

Let us define ARITHMETIC (big case) by the set of true (first order 
logical) arithmetical sentences. (like "prime number exist",
Let us define arithmetic (lower case) by the set of provable (first 
order logical) arithmetical sentences, where "provable" means provable 
by some sound lobian machine.
By incompleteness, whatever sound machine you consisder the 
corresponding "arithmetic" is always a proper subset of ARITHMETIC.

So arithmetical truth (alias ARITHMETIC) cannot be described by any 
finite set of rules. Finite sets or rules can never generate the whole 
of arithmetical truth.

OK?

Bruno




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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

Brent Meeker skrev:

  Bruno Marchal wrote:
  
  

Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

  
  ...
  
  
Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.




Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" can be the 
result of some set of rules. Even without comp the "arithmetical 
universe" or arithmetical truth (the "ONE" attached to the little Peano 
Arithmetic Lobian machine) cannot be described by finite set of rules.

  
  
But it can be "the result of" a finite set of rules. Arithmetic results from Peano's axioms, but a complete description of arithmetic is impossible.
  

That is exactly what I wanted to say.  You don't need to have a
complete description of arithmetic.  Our universe can be described by
doing a number of computations from a finite set of rules.  (To get to
the current view of our universe you have to do about 10**60
computations for every point of space...)

-- 
Torgny

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
...
> Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
> thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" can be the 
> result of some set of rules. Even without comp the "arithmetical 
> universe" or arithmetical truth (the "ONE" attached to the little Peano 
> Arithmetic Lobian machine) cannot be described by finite set of rules.

But it can be "the result of" a finite set of rules. Arithmetic results from 
Peano's axioms, but a complete description of arithmetic is impossible.


> The Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) shows that even a cup of coffee 
> is eventually described by the probabilistic interferences of an 
> infinity of computations occurring in the Universal deployment (UD*), 
> which by the way explains why we cannot really duplicate exactly any 
> piece of apparent matter (comp-no cloning).
> It is an open question if those theoretical interferences correspond to 
> the quantum one. Studying the difference between the comp interference 
> and the quantum interferences gives a way to measure experimentally the 
> degree of plausibility of comp.
> 
> 
> Bruno

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

Quentin Anciaux skrev:
>>  I claim that "our universe" is the result of a finite set of rules.  Just
>> as a GoL-universe is the result of a finite set of rules, so is our universe
>> the result of a set of rules.  But these rules are more complicated than the
>> GoL-rules...
>> 
> What are your "proofs" or set of evidences that our universe as it is
> is 1) resulting from a finite set of rules 2) by 1) computable.
>   
There are two "proofs":

A)  Everything is finite.  So our universe must be the result from a 
finite set of rules.
B)  Occams razor.  Because we can explain everything in our universe 
from this finite set of rules, we don't need anything more complicated.
> If 2) is true what difference do you make between functionnaly
> equivalent model of your set of rules ? is it the same universe ?
>   
Our universe has nothing to do with different models of our universe.  A 
model is more like a picture of our universe.  You can make a model of a 
GoL-universe with red balls, or you can make a model with black dots, 
but still there will hold the same relations in both these models.  It 
is the relations that are the important things.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Quentin Anciaux]

>  I claim that "our universe" is the result of a finite set of rules.  Just
> as a GoL-universe is the result of a finite set of rules, so is our universe
> the result of a set of rules.  But these rules are more complicated than the
> GoL-rules...
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus

What are your "proofs" or set of evidences that our universe as it is
is 1) resulting from a finite set of rules 2) by 1) computable.

If 2) is true what difference do you make between functionnaly
equivalent model of your set of rules ? is it the same universe ?

Quentin

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

Bruno Marchal skrev:

Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
  
  
  
   Bruno Marchal skrev:
 


  I agree with you (despite a notion as "universe" is
not primitive in my 
opinion, unless you mean it a bit like the logician's notion of model 
perhaps). As David said, this is arithmetical realism.
  
  


Yes, you can see a universe as the same thing as a model.


When you have a (finite) set of rules, you will always get a universe
from that set of rules, by just applying those rules an unlimited
number of times. And the result of these rules is existing, in the
same way as our universe is existing.

  
  
The problem here is that an effective syntactical description of a
intended model ("universe") admits automatically an infinity of non
isomorphic models (cf Lowenheim-Skolem theorems, Godel, ...).
  

Yes, you are right, the word "model" is not quite appropriate here. 
The universe is not a model that satisfies a set of axioms.

The kind of rules I am thinking of, is rather that kind of rules you
have in Game of Life.  When you have a situation at one moment of time
and at one place in space, you can compute the situation the next
moment of time at the same place by using the situations near this
place.  The important thing is that the rules uniquely describes the
whole universe by applying the rules over and over again.

(But I want something more general than GoL-like rules, because the
GoL-rules presupposes that you have a space-time from the beginning.  I
want a set of rules that are such that the space-time is a result of
the rules.  But I don't know how to get there...)

  
  
Our universe is the result of some set of rules. The interesting
thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.

  
  
  
Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" can be the
result of some set of rules. Even without comp the "arithmetical
universe" or arithmetical truth (the "ONE" attached to the little
Peano Arithmetic Lobian machine) cannot be described by finite set of
rules.
  
The Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) shows that even a cup of
coffee is eventually described by the probabilistic interferences of
an infinity of computations occurring in the Universal deployment
(UD*), which by the way explains why we cannot really duplicate
exactly any piece of apparent matter (comp-no cloning).
  
It is an open question if those theoretical interferences correspond
to the quantum one. Studying the difference between the comp
interference and the quantum interferences gives a way to measure
experimentally the degree of plausibility of comp.
  

I claim that "our universe" is the result of a finite set of rules. 
Just as a GoL-universe is the result of a finite set of rules, so is
our universe the result of a set of rules.  But these rules are more
complicated than the GoL-rules...

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 09-juil.-07, à 17:41, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :



>  Bruno Marchal skrev:Le 05-juil.-07, à 14:19, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>> David Nyman skrev:
>>>
 You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting 
 and
 important IMO.  This concerns the necessary entailment of 
 'existence'.

>>> 1.  The relation 1+1=2 is always true.  It is true in all universes.
>>> Even if a universe does not contain any humans or any observers.  The
>>> truth of 1+1=2 is independent of all observers.
>>>
>> I agree with you (despite a notion as "universe" is not primitive in 
>> my
>> opinion, unless you mean it a bit like the logician's notion of model
>> perhaps). As David said, this is arithmetical realism.
>>
>
>  Yes, you can see a universe as the same thing as a model.
>
>  When you have a (finite) set of rules, you will always get a universe 
> from that set of rules, by just applying those rules an unlimited 
> number of times.  And the result of these rules is existing, in the 
> same way as our universe is existing.





The problem here is that an effective syntactical description of a 
intended model ("universe") admits automatically an infinity of non 
isomorphic models  (cf Lowenheim-Skolem theorems, Godel, ...).





>
>  Our universe is the result of some set of rules.  The interesting 
> thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.



Assuming comp, I don't find plausible that "our universe" can be the 
result of some set of rules. Even without comp the "arithmetical 
universe" or arithmetical truth (the "ONE" attached to the little Peano 
Arithmetic Lobian machine) cannot be described by finite set of rules.
The Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) shows that even a cup of coffee 
is eventually described by the probabilistic interferences of an 
infinity of computations occurring in the Universal deployment (UD*), 
which by the way explains why we cannot really duplicate exactly any 
piece of apparent matter (comp-no cloning).
It is an open question if those theoretical interferences correspond to 
the quantum one. Studying the difference between the comp interference 
and the quantum interferences gives a way to measure experimentally the 
degree of plausibility of comp.


Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[David Nyman]

On 10/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>  But I am not bored

I'm glad to hear you're not a zombie after all :)

> If I look at our universe from the outside

I'd like to know how you perform this feat.

> I see that I will do something
> tomorrow

I don't doubt it.  But this is my point: your ability to 'see' this
depends on your being able to discriminate differences dynamically.
You may nevertheless believe that, from a "gods' eye" perspective, the
context which instantiates this is nonetheless 'static'. But this
should surely be a sharp reminder that we aren't gods. We can't "look
at our universe from the outside". We can only pose it questions 'from
within', and both the manner of our enquiring, and the content of the
answers we receive, are consequently constrained in highly specific
ways.  This, I think, is the point of Bruno's methodology.  It's also
the point of my insistence  on 'reflexivity'.  The "gods' eye view" is
a just manner of speaking, not a manner of 'existing'.

David

>
>  David Nyman skrev:
>  On 09/07/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>  There can be no dynamic time. In the space-time, time is always
> static.
>
>  Then you must get very bored ;)
>
> David
>
>  But I am not bored, because I don't know what will happen tomorrow.  If I
> look at our universe from the outside, I see that I will do something
> tomorrow, and I see what will happen in one million years.  There will never
> be any changes in the situations that will happen in the future.
>
>  But it is impossible to know today what will happen in the future, because
> we can not have total knowledge about how the universe looks like just now.
> If we try to find the exact position and the exact speed of an electron,
> then that electron will be disturbed by me looking at it.  So it is
> impossible for me to compute how our universe will look like tomorrow.  But
> the rules of our universe decide what our universe will look like tomorrow.
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus
>
>  >
>

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

David Nyman skrev:

  On 09/07/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

  
  
There can be no dynamic time.  In the space-time, time is always
static.

  
  
Then you must get very bored ;)

David
  

But I am not bored, because I don't know what will happen tomorrow.  If
I look at our universe from the outside, I see that I will do something
tomorrow, and I see what will happen in one million years.  There will
never be any changes in the situations that will happen in the future.

But it is impossible to know today what will happen in the future,
because we can not have total knowledge about how the universe looks
like just now.  If we try to find the exact position and the exact
speed of an electron, then that electron will be disturbed by me
looking at it.  So it is impossible for me to compute how our universe
will look like tomorrow.  But the rules of our universe decide what our
universe will look like tomorrow.
-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[David Nyman]

On 09/07/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> There can be no dynamic time.  In the space-time, time is always
> static.

Then you must get very bored ;)

David

>
>
>
> On Jul 9, 7:47 pm, "David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 09/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > Because
> > > everything that happens in A-Universe will also happen in B-Universe.
> > > All objects in A-Universe obey the laws of physics, and all objects in
> > > B-Universe obey the same laws, so the same things will happen in both
> > > universes.
> >
> > We're disagreeing because you just don't accept my basic point about
> > reflexive existence, which IMO is a pity, because ISTM to clarify what
> > the "stuff" might be, and makes it much more difficult to take the
> > 'zombie world' seriously.  In fact, as I've said, I think you would
> > have to postulate the absence of dynamic time in the B-Universe in
> > order to make your claims plausible, but then the B-Universe could
> > hardly be claimed to be "exactly the same".
>
> There can be no dynamic time.  In the space-time, time is always
> static.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[torgny]

(Reposted because of some techical problems...)

On Jul 7, 2:00 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 05-juil.-07, à 14:19, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
>
>
> > David Nyman skrev:
> >> You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
> >> important IMO.  This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
> > 1.  The relation 1+1=2 is always true.  It is true in all universes.
> > Even if a universe does not contain any humans or any observers.  The
> > truth of 1+1=2 is independent of all observers.
>
> I agree with you (despite a notion as "universe" is not primitive in my
> opinion, unless you mean it a bit like the logician's notion of model
> perhaps). As David said, this is arithmetical realism.

Yes, you can see a universe as the same thing as a model.

When you have a (finite) set of rules, you will always get a universe
from that set of rules, by just applying those rules an unlimited
number of times.  And the result of these rules is existing, in the
same way as our universe is existing.

Our universe is the result of some set of rules.  The interesting
thing is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.

--
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[torgny]

On Jul 9, 7:47 pm, "David Nyman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 09/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Because
> > everything that happens in A-Universe will also happen in B-Universe.
> > All objects in A-Universe obey the laws of physics, and all objects in
> > B-Universe obey the same laws, so the same things will happen in both
> > universes.
>
> We're disagreeing because you just don't accept my basic point about
> reflexive existence, which IMO is a pity, because ISTM to clarify what
> the "stuff" might be, and makes it much more difficult to take the
> 'zombie world' seriously.  In fact, as I've said, I think you would
> have to postulate the absence of dynamic time in the B-Universe in
> order to make your claims plausible, but then the B-Universe could
> hardly be claimed to be "exactly the same".

There can be no dynamic time.  In the space-time, time is always
static.

--
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[David Nyman]

On 09/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> One object in one universe can not affect any object in some other universe.
> But we can look at the objects in an other universe.

I would say that the conjunction of the above two sentences is a contradiction.

> Because
> everything that happens in A-Universe will also happen in B-Universe.
> All objects in A-Universe obey the laws of physics, and all objects in
> B-Universe obey the same laws, so the same things will happen in both
> universes.

We're disagreeing because you just don't accept my basic point about
reflexive existence, which IMO is a pity, because ISTM to clarify what
the "stuff" might be, and makes it much more difficult to take the
'zombie world' seriously.  In fact, as I've said, I think you would
have to postulate the absence of dynamic time in the B-Universe in
order to make your claims plausible, but then the B-Universe could
hardly be claimed to be "exactly the same".  However, Bruno doesn't
necessarily agree with me on this, so from a comp perspective, if you
say you're a zombie, I can only sympathise ;)

David

>
> David Nyman skrev:
> > Consequently we can't 'interview' B-Universe objects.
> >
> It is true that we can not interview objects in B-Universe.  One object
> in one universe can not affect any object in some other universe.
>
> But we can look at the objects in an other universe.  Just in the same
> way that we can look at a GoL-universe.  So we in the A-Universe can
> look at the objects in B-Universe, and see what they are doing.
>
> One way to interview the objects in B-Universe is to do interviewing in
> the A-Universe.  If A-Torgny is interviewing A-David in the A-Universe,
> then B-Torgny will be interviewing B-David in the B-Universe.  Because
> everything that happens in A-Universe will also happen in B-Universe.
> All objects in A-Universe obey the laws of physics, and all objects in
> B-Universe obey the same laws, so the same things will happen in both
> universes.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

Bruno Marchal skrev:

  
Le 05-juil.-07, à 14:19, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
  
  
David Nyman skrev:


  You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
important IMO.  This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
  

1.  The relation 1+1=2 is always true.  It is true in all universes.
Even if a universe does not contain any humans or any observers.  The
truth of 1+1=2 is independent of all observers.

  
  
I agree with you (despite a notion as "universe" is not primitive in my 
opinion, unless you mean it a bit like the logician's notion of model 
perhaps). As David said, this is arithmetical realism.
  


Yes, you can see a universe as the same thing as a model.

When you have a (finite) set of rules, you will always get a universe
from that set of rules, by just applying those rules an unlimited
number of times.  And the result of these rules is existing, in the
same way as our universe is existing.

Our universe is the result of some set of rules.  The interesting thing
is to discover the specific rules that span our universe.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

David Nyman skrev:
> Consequently we can't 'interview' B-Universe objects.
>   
It is true that we can not interview objects in B-Universe.  One object 
in one universe can not affect any object in some other universe.

But we can look at the objects in an other universe.  Just in the same 
way that we can look at a GoL-universe.  So we in the A-Universe can 
look at the objects in B-Universe, and see what they are doing.

One way to interview the objects in B-Universe is to do interviewing in 
the A-Universe.  If A-Torgny is interviewing A-David in the A-Universe, 
then B-Torgny will be interviewing B-David in the B-Universe.  Because 
everything that happens in A-Universe will also happen in B-Universe.  
All objects in A-Universe obey the laws of physics, and all objects in 
B-Universe obey the same laws, so the same things will happen in both 
universes.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[David Nyman]

On 05/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> For us humans are the universes that contain observers more
> interesting.  But there is no qualitaive difference between universes
> with observers and universes without observers.  They all exist in the
> same way.

I still disagree, but I have a slightly different formulation of my
previous replies which might be more consistent with my remarks to
Bruno re the 1-personal discrimination of self-relation as 'action' or
'behaviour'.  Essentially, if we conceive of the plenitude of all
possible universes as existing 'statically', then the recovery of
'dynamic' or temporal existence must be seen as characteristic of
1-personal self-relation: that is, 1-persons are active participants,
not merely 'observers'.  What I said to Bruno was that my
justification was simply that such a brute claim seems to be required
if dynamism is to be recovered at all from stasis.  I'm less sure
however that such a claim is strictly 'necessary' in the logical
sense.

Given this, I suppose it is possible to conceive of a B-Universe in
which this brute claim is not granted.  IOW no aspect of the
self-relation of the B-Universe is characteristically dynamic or
1-personal.  Such a universe would be static in all aspects - 'inside'
and 'outside' - and consequently it would contain no active
participants and consequently none of the "stuff" characteristic of
such participative behaviour.  However, such a static universe could
not, by the same token, be claimed to be "exactly the same" as the
A-Universe, precisely because nothing whatsoever could be said to
'happen' to any object it instantiates.  The points I made earlier
about the mutual inaccessibility of A and B-Universes still stand.
Consequently we can't 'interview' B-Universe objects.

In some sense 'interviews' between B-Universe structures could be said
to exist, but not to 'occur'.  The content of the statements of
B-Universe objects about their internal states would be similarly
'justified' in terms of static self-relation as those in the
A-Universe, but it wouldn't indeed be 'like anything to be' a
B-Universe object.  What is really interesting about this is it
suggests that the notion of consciousness as equating to 'what it's
like to be' something is incoherent.  Rather, consciousness seems more
'what it's like to enact' something.  Consequently, the 'absolute'
quality of consciousness is just what its like for the One (per
Plotinus) to enact particular kinds of self-relation.  And such
quality indeed seems 'absolute' as opposed to 'relative', because it
doesn't seem logically necessary for such enaction to emerge
1-personally from static self-relation.  It's just that our own case
demonstrates its 'absolute' contingency in the A-Universe.  So zombies
may be possible, but not in the A-Universe, and consequently we
needn't fear ever being fooled by one in any accessible encounter.

What this amounts to is understanding 'consciousness' essentially as
the recovery of dynamism from stasis, or active participation from
instantiation, or time from eternity, or the A-series from the
B-series.  It's also treating 'dynamism' as 'experientiaI' rather than
'physical', which of course is moot.  But I've never seen any really
satisfactory direct treatment of dynamism with respect to static
formulations of existence except as a brute assertion, or mere
implication, of its being characteristic of 1-personal self-relation
to appropriate structure.  Perhaps Bruno could comment whether this
way of looking at things is consistent with comp?  For example, it
might seem that 'dovetailing' carries some implication of dynamism, or
at least sequentiality, with it from the outset.

Alternatively, if a static background is not granted, then in such a
view dynamism is already at the heart of self-relation, and with it,
the necessary return of 1-personal participation.  However, a
fundamentally 'tensed' view of reality presents its own (particularly
structural) problems, which are kettle of fish for a different
discussion.

David

>
> David Nyman skrev:
> > You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
> > important IMO.  This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
> 1.  The relation 1+1=2 is always true.  It is true in all universes.
> Even if a universe does not contain any humans or any observers.  The
> truth of 1+1=2 is independent of all observers.
>
> 2.  If you have a set of rules and an initial condition, then there
> exist a universe with this set of rules and this initial condition.
> Because it is possible to compute a new situation from a situation, and
> from this new situation it is possible to compute another new situation,
> and this can be done for ever.  This unlimited set of situations will be
> a universe that exists independent of all humans and all observers.
> Noone needs to make these computations, the results of the computations
> will exist anyhow.
>
> 3.  All mathmatically poss

Re: Asifism revisited.

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 05-juil.-07, à 14:19, Torgny Tholerus wrote:

>
> David Nyman skrev:
>> You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
>> important IMO.  This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
> 1.  The relation 1+1=2 is always true.  It is true in all universes.
> Even if a universe does not contain any humans or any observers.  The
> truth of 1+1=2 is independent of all observers.


I agree with you (despite a notion as "universe" is not primitive in my 
opinion, unless you mean it a bit like the logician's notion of model 
perhaps). As David said, this is arithmetical realism.


>
> 2.  If you have a set of rules and an initial condition, then there
> exist a universe with this set of rules and this initial condition.
> Because it is possible to compute a new situation from a situation, and
> from this new situation it is possible to compute another new 
> situation,
> and this can be done for ever.  This unlimited set of situations will 
> be
> a universe that exists independent of all humans and all observers.
> Noone needs to make these computations, the results of the computations
> will exist anyhow.

OK, but I would mention bifurcating computations (with respect to 
Oracle or just Universal machine ...)


>
> 3.  All mathmatically possible universes exists, and they all exist in
> the same way.  Our universe is one of those possible universes.  Our
> universe exists independant of any humans or any observers.


I can agree or disagree with the first sentence. It is too fuzzy. I 
disagree with the second sentence. I have argued that the comp 
assumption you should say "our universes" (note the "s"), and strictly 
speaking all (accessible) universes are ours. Of course "universes", or 
better (imo) computational histories (up to some equivalence) exists 
independent of observers, like the fact that machine A on argument B 
stops or does not stops independently of me.



>
> 4.  For us humans are the universes that contain observers more
> interesting.

Oh! Surely the discovery of a baby tiny universe would be interesting, 
even without observers  (like the moon is not so bad ...)


> But there is no qualitaive difference between universes
> with observers and universes without observers.  They all exist in the
> same way.

It really depends what you mean by "universe". This cannot be an 
obvious notion in the comp setting. Have you read the UDA up to step 7 
(at least) ?


> The GoL-universes (every initial condition will span a
> separate universe) exist in the same way as our universe.  But because
> we are humans, we are more intrested in universes with observers, and 
> we
> are specially interested in our own universe.

Again what do you mean by our own "universe"? Are you meaning Deutsch 
Multiverse or the comp-many computations seen from inside ?
I think that apparent universes emerge from personal gluing of 
histories.


> But otherwise there is
> noting special with our universe.


There is nothing special about our historical geographies I would say.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[David Nyman]

On 05/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

TT:  All mathmatically possible universes exists, and they all exist in
the same way.  Our universe is one of those possible universes.  Our
universe exists independant of any humans or any observers.

DN: But here at the heart of your argument is the confusion again over
language.  If we grant that a mathematically possible universe exists
'independently' (i.e. other than as a sub-structure of the A-Universe) it -
and all consequences flowing from it - must exist self-relatively.  This is
the crucial entailment of 'independent' existence, as we discussed before.
And it exposes the confusion of the two distinct senses of 'independent'.
The first sense is of course that an independent universe does not 'depend'
on any observers it instantiates to grant it existence (i.e. they don't
'cause' it to exist).  It's in just this sense that it's 'independent' or
self-relative, and this is the sense you rely on.

But the second and crucial sense flows directly out of this 'self-relative
independence': which is that any self-relative universe capable of
generating the necessary structure simply *entails* the existence of
'observers' (i.e. self-relative sub-structures).  IOW, self-relation is what
observation *is*.   It's in precisely this crucial sense that an
'independently existing universe' is not 'independent of observation'. On
the contrary: it *entails* observation.  And of course our existence as
observers in self-relation to the A-Universe demonstrates this 'dependency'
in precisely this critical sense.

David

>
> David Nyman skrev:
> > You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
> > important IMO.  This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
> 1.  The relation 1+1=2 is always true.  It is true in all universes.
> Even if a universe does not contain any humans or any observers.  The
> truth of 1+1=2 is independent of all observers.
>
> 2.  If you have a set of rules and an initial condition, then there
> exist a universe with this set of rules and this initial condition.
> Because it is possible to compute a new situation from a situation, and
> from this new situation it is possible to compute another new situation,
> and this can be done for ever.  This unlimited set of situations will be
> a universe that exists independent of all humans and all observers.
> Noone needs to make these computations, the results of the computations
> will exist anyhow.
>
> 3.  All mathmatically possible universes exists, and they all exist in
> the same way.  Our universe is one of those possible universes.  Our
> universe exists independant of any humans or any observers.
>
> 4.  For us humans are the universes that contain observers more
> interesting.  But there is no qualitaive difference between universes
> with observers and universes without observers.  They all exist in the
> same way.  The GoL-universes (every initial condition will span a
> separate universe) exist in the same way as our universe.  But because
> we are humans, we are more intrested in universes with observers, and we
> are specially interested in our own universe.  But otherwise there is
> noting special with our universe.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

David Nyman skrev:
> You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and 
> important IMO.  This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.
1.  The relation 1+1=2 is always true.  It is true in all universes.  
Even if a universe does not contain any humans or any observers.  The 
truth of 1+1=2 is independent of all observers.

2.  If you have a set of rules and an initial condition, then there 
exist a universe with this set of rules and this initial condition.  
Because it is possible to compute a new situation from a situation, and 
from this new situation it is possible to compute another new situation, 
and this can be done for ever.  This unlimited set of situations will be 
a universe that exists independent of all humans and all observers.  
Noone needs to make these computations, the results of the computations 
will exist anyhow.

3.  All mathmatically possible universes exists, and they all exist in 
the same way.  Our universe is one of those possible universes.  Our 
universe exists independant of any humans or any observers.

4.  For us humans are the universes that contain observers more 
interesting.  But there is no qualitaive difference between universes 
with observers and universes without observers.  They all exist in the 
same way.  The GoL-universes (every initial condition will span a 
separate universe) exist in the same way as our universe.  But because 
we are humans, we are more intrested in universes with observers, and we 
are specially interested in our own universe.  But otherwise there is 
noting special with our universe.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[David Nyman]

On 04/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

TT:  You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the
"gliders" move.  If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia, you
can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner.  This is
possible although there is no observer integral to that Universe.

DN:  Please, if we are to make progress, may we have more precision?  You
clearly specified a hypothetical B-Universe which you invited us to consider
might be different in some fundamental way to ours.  GoL is clearly in no
way a different 'universe' in this sense - you're making a loose,
conversational use of the term which has an entirely different entailment.
GoL is a part of the A-Universe just as we are, so as integral observers of
course we can observe it.

You have however drawn our attention to something very interesting and
important IMO.  This concerns the necessary entailment of 'existence'.  When
we perform the thought experiment, we cause a B-Universe to 'exist'.  What
kind of existence is this?  Well, it's a thought pattern, so you may wish to
consider it as an aspect of brain, or mind, or both.  Either way, its part
of us, and as such, its 'existence' consists of participation in the
A-Universe. Simply put, the entailment of 'existence' is participation.

So we may grant real existence to the *idea* of the B-Universe whilst
recognising that its putative reference is non-existent in the A-Universe.
Nevertheless, we may still 'flesh-out' the metaphor of the B-Universe, but
crucially, if we are to do so without misleading ourselves, we must grant
events within it the equivalent category of actual - not metaphorical -
existence as that possessed by events within the A-Universe: that of
participation, or self-relation.

David


 David Nyman skrev:
>
> On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> SP:  We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A
> and B side by side, interviewing their occupants.
>
> DN:  Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate sleight
> of imagination where the thought experiment goes amiss.  When one imagines
> the 'external' observer 'looking' at two universes, one constructs precisely
> the false relationship that is the source of the confusion with respect to
> consciousness.  Any possible observer must in fact be integral to their own
> universe.
>
> You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the
> "gliders" move.  If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia, you
> can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner.  This is
> possible although there is no observer integral to that Universe.
>
> The same is true about the B-Universe.  You can look at it as an outside
> observer.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
> >
>

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Quentin Anciaux]

You're doing a giant step for considering current GoL as an
universe... but anyway you can, but it's not because you see one
glider in your tiny framed GoL that the interaction of billions of
cells does not generate a consciousness inside the GoL universe and
you as an "external" observer couldn't see/recognize it as it is.

Quentin

2007/7/4, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>  David Nyman skrev:
> On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  SP:  We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A
>  and B side by side, interviewing their occupants.
>
>  DN:  Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate sleight of
> imagination where the thought experiment goes amiss.  When one imagines the
> 'external' observer 'looking' at two universes, one constructs precisely the
> false relationship that is the source of the confusion with respect to
> consciousness.  Any possible observer must in fact be integral to their own
> universe.
>  You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the
> "gliders" move.  If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia, you
> can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner.  This is
> possible although there is no observer integral to that Universe.
>
>  The same is true about the B-Universe.  You can look at it as an outside
> observer.
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus
>
>  >
>

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

David Nyman skrev:
On 04/07/07, Stathis
Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
  
SP:  We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes
A
  
and B side by side, interviewing their occupants.
  
DN:  Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate
sleight of imagination where the thought experiment goes amiss.  When
one imagines the 'external' observer 'looking' at two universes, one
constructs precisely the false relationship that is the source of the
confusion with respect to consciousness.  Any possible observer must in
fact be integral to their own universe.
  

You can look at the Game-of-Life-Universe, where you can see how the
"gliders" move.  If you look at "Conway's game of Life" in Wikipedia,
you can look at how the Glider Gun is working in the top right corner. 
This is possible although there is no observer integral to that
Universe.

The same is true about the B-Universe.  You can look at it as an
outside observer.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Quentin Anciaux]

Your example suppose many things which are not granted to be possible:
1- The one who compare them is in neither of them... What is comparing
these universes ? a conscious being ?
2- The fact that they are identical implies that both have
consciousness. If one really lacked it then they would be no one to
ask what it feels as they're would be no person in it and that would
be a huge difference.

I don't remember having read participants of this list arguing for a
dualism of consciousness. Consciousness must be a process created by
properties of this universe, it is not a component that can be thrown
out, it is part of it.

If behavior is the same as a conscious being (please mind that for
this comparison you acknowledge the existence of at least one to
compare) then the being is conscious too. You can't say they're the
same but are different, it is not consistant.

Regards,
Quentin

2007/7/4, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Jason skrev:
> > Note that you did not say "thought" was non-existent in B-universe, I
> > think one can construct complex conscious awareness to the collection
> > of a large number of simultaneous thoughts.
> I had the intention to include "thoughts", but I was unsure about how to
> spell that word (where to put all those "h":s...), so I included the
> thoughts in "all that kind of stuff".  The B-Universe should not include
> any thouths(!).  The B-Universe should be a strictly materialistic Universe.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Torgny Tholerus]

Jason skrev:
> Note that you did not say "thought" was non-existent in B-universe, I
> think one can construct complex conscious awareness to the collection
> of a large number of simultaneous thoughts.
I had the intention to include "thoughts", but I was unsure about how to 
spell that word (where to put all those "h":s...), so I included the 
thoughts in "all that kind of stuff".  The B-Universe should not include 
any thouths(!).  The B-Universe should be a strictly materialistic Universe.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus



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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Jason]

On Jul 3, 10:07 am, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Imagine that we have a second Universe, that looks exactly the same as
> the materialistic parts of our Universe.  We may call this second
> Universe B-Universe.  (Our Universe is A-Universe.)
>
> This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.  Where there is a
> hydrogen atom in A-Universe, there will also be a hydrogen atom in
> B-Universe, and everywhere that there is an oxygen atom in A-Universe,
> there will be an oxygen atom i B-universe.  The only difference between
> A-Universe and B-Universe is that B-Universe is totally free from
> consciousness, feelings, minds, souls, and all that kind of stuff.  The
> only things that exist in B-Universe are atoms reacting with eachother.
> All objects in B-Universe behave in exactly the same way as the objects
> in A-Universe.
>
> The objects in B-Universe produces the same kind of sounds as we produce
> in A-Universe, and the objects in B-Universe pushes the same buttons on
> their computers as we do in our A-Universe.
>
> Questions:
>
> Is B-Universe possible?

In my opinion, for B-universe to be particle-for-particle identical to
A-universe yet not contain consciousness/feelings/minds/souls it
requires that consciousness as it appears in A-universe is due to some
manner of dualism, that is to say, consciousness in A-universe must
not be an innate feature of the material, mathematical or
informational structures that correspond to observers.

> If we interview an object in B-Universe, what will that object answer,
> if we ask it: "Are you conscious?"?
>

I assume you are looking for people who will say B-universe is
possible, and that the non-conscious observers will answer identically
to those in A-universe, thereby proving that consciousness is an
unneeded theory to be done away with by Occam's razor.  In any case if
the atoms interact identically in both universes the B-universe
occupants will answer the same way as A-universe observers, but I
don't think it is possible for B-universe occupants to be non-
conscious.  Here is why:

Note that you did not say "thought" was non-existent in B-universe, I
think one can construct complex conscious awareness to the collection
of a large number of simultaneous thoughts.  Let me define the most
basic thought as an excited/firing neuron which is increasing the
likelihood of neighboring neurons firing.  Now consider the most
primitive form of vision possible for an organism, it is only able to
tell lightness from darkness and only see one pixel.  The information
content of its vision is a single bit.  The conscious experience of
seeing white could correspond to a certain neuron firing, which though
its neural network increases the likelihood of  thoughts such as
warmth, safety, daytime, etc.  And also increases the likelihood of
certain behaviors, such as saying "I see white."  This will be the
same in both A and B universes.  Now scale up the capabilities of that
primitive vision to human vision, which contains hundreds of millions
of pixels, differentiating millions of colors, and receiving new
information from the optic nerve at 1 Gbps.  The current state of your
brain's visual center corresponds to billions of individual,
simultaneous, and involuntary "thoughts"; this I believe is
responsible for the phenomenon of consciousness, and you can't
eliminate it without also eliminating the functionality of the brain.

Jason


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Re: Asifism revisited.

[David Nyman]

On 04/07/07, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

SP:  We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A
and B side by side, interviewing their occupants.

DN:  Yes, and my point precisely is that this is an illegitimate sleight of
imagination where the thought experiment goes amiss.  When one imagines the
'external' observer 'looking' at two universes, one constructs precisely the
false relationship that is the source of the confusion with respect to
consciousness.  Any possible observer must in fact be integral to their own
universe.

David


> On 04/07/07, David Nyman < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > TT:  This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.
> >
> > DN:  IMO your thought experiment might as well stop right here.  No
> universe
> > can "look" like anything to anyone except a participant in it - i.e. an
> > 'observer' who is an embedded sub-structure of that universe. The
> "looking"
> > that you refer to here is an illusory artefact of syntax - i.e. the
> relation
> > is to an imaginative construct which in fact is part of A-Universe.  IOW
> > this sort of 'existence' is a metaphor which is relative to *us*, not
> the
> > self-relation of any realisable B-Universe.  What you describe as
> B-Universe
> > "looking exactly the same" is really an implicit relation to an observer
> in
> > *that* universe, and consequently that observer is already accepted as
> > conscious.  Alternatively, it doesn't "look" like anything to anyone,
> and
> > hence is by no stretch of the imagination "exactly the same".
>
> We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A
> and B side by side, interviewing their occupants.
>
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> >
>

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 04/07/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> TT:  This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.
>
> DN:  IMO your thought experiment might as well stop right here.  No universe
> can "look" like anything to anyone except a participant in it - i.e. an
> 'observer' who is an embedded sub-structure of that universe. The "looking"
> that you refer to here is an illusory artefact of syntax - i.e. the relation
> is to an imaginative construct which in fact is part of A-Universe.  IOW
> this sort of 'existence' is a metaphor which is relative to *us*, not the
> self-relation of any realisable B-Universe.  What you describe as B-Universe
> "looking exactly the same" is really an implicit relation to an observer in
> *that* universe, and consequently that observer is already accepted as
> conscious.  Alternatively, it doesn't "look" like anything to anyone, and
> hence is by no stretch of the imagination "exactly the same".

We can imagine an external observer looking at two model universes A
and B side by side, interviewing their occupants.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[meekerdb]

Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Imagine that we have a second Universe, that looks exactly the same as 
> the materialistic parts of our Universe.  We may call this second 
> Universe B-Universe.  (Our Universe is A-Universe.)
>
> This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.  Where there is a 
> hydrogen atom in A-Universe, there will also be a hydrogen atom in 
> B-Universe, and everywhere that there is an oxygen atom in A-Universe, 
> there will be an oxygen atom i B-universe.  The only difference between 
> A-Universe and B-Universe is that B-Universe is totally free from 
> consciousness, feelings, minds, souls, and all that kind of stuff.  The 
> only things that exist in B-Universe are atoms reacting with eachother.  
> All objects in B-Universe behave in exactly the same way as the objects 
> in A-Universe.
>
> The objects in B-Universe produces the same kind of sounds as we produce 
> in A-Universe, and the objects in B-Universe pushes the same buttons on 
> their computers as we do in our A-Universe.
>
> Questions:
>
> Is B-Universe possible?
> If we interview an object in B-Universe, what will that object answer, 
> if we ask it: "Are you conscious?"?
>
>   
So far as I know, consciousness is some processes in (at least some) 
human brains.  Since B-universe would have brains with the same 
processes, I'd say those objects would answer, "Yes." with the same 
likelihood as in this universe - in other words I don't think there's 
any difference between the A-universe and the B-universe.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Asifism revisited.

[David Nyman]

On 03/07/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

TT:  This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.

DN:  IMO your thought experiment might as well stop right here.  No universe
can "look" like anything to anyone except a participant in it - i.e. an
'observer' who is an embedded sub-structure of that universe. The "looking"
that you refer to here is an illusory artefact of syntax - i.e. the relation
is to an imaginative construct which in fact is part of A-Universe.  IOW
this sort of 'existence' is a metaphor which is relative to *us*, not the
self-relation of any realisable B-Universe.  What you describe as B-Universe
"looking exactly the same" is really an implicit relation to an observer in
*that* universe, and consequently that observer is already accepted as
conscious.  Alternatively, it doesn't "look" like anything to anyone, and
hence is by no stretch of the imagination "exactly the same".

TT:  Is B-Universe possible?

DN:  If you mean could it exist independently of our imagining it in
A-Universe, then yes - as long as we postulate that it exists
self-relatively, as opposed to relative-to-us.

TT:  If we interview an object in B-Universe, what will that object answer,
if we ask it: "Are you conscious?"?

DN:  We cannot interview an object in a self-relative B-Universe, because we
can have no relation to it.  If an object in a possible (i.e. self-relative)
B-Universe interviews another object and asks it "Are you conscious", this
equates to "Do you self-relate?", to which the answer would be yes, given
your other assumptions. IOW, the possible B-Universe is in fact a clone of
A-Universe.

Notice that we're not concerned with absolute 'qualities' here because these
can only be known to participants.  What is relevant is the self-relation
and reflexivity of participants, and realising that there is a language trap
in trying to perform these thought experiments with mental constructs that
allow us the illusion of abstracting 'universes' from their necessarily
participatory contexts.

David


> Imagine that we have a second Universe, that looks exactly the same as
> the materialistic parts of our Universe.  We may call this second
> Universe B-Universe.  (Our Universe is A-Universe.)
>
> This B-Universe looks exactly the same as A-Universe.  Where there is a
> hydrogen atom in A-Universe, there will also be a hydrogen atom in
> B-Universe, and everywhere that there is an oxygen atom in A-Universe,
> there will be an oxygen atom i B-universe.  The only difference between
> A-Universe and B-Universe is that B-Universe is totally free from
> consciousness, feelings, minds, souls, and all that kind of stuff.  The
> only things that exist in B-Universe are atoms reacting with eachother.
> All objects in B-Universe behave in exactly the same way as the objects
> in A-Universe.
>
> The objects in B-Universe produces the same kind of sounds as we produce
> in A-Universe, and the objects in B-Universe pushes the same buttons on
> their computers as we do in our A-Universe.
>
> Questions:
>
> Is B-Universe possible?
> If we interview an object in B-Universe, what will that object answer,
> if we ask it: "Are you conscious?"?
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

QA: ' By the way, I'm sure dogs are conscious (have inner
> personal world).'

MP: And I am sure I agree with you and that I have a pretty good 
idea what you mean when you say that.
And you will understand me when I say that from a 3P view the 
'inner world' of the dog is not at all experienced as inner; the 
dog's experience is all about the world around it, except if it 
has a tummy ache or some such, in which case it finds itself 
eating stringy green cow food.


Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Thursday 28 June 2007 19:22:35 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>  Quentin Anciaux skrev:
>> On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>> Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive.  Therefore
>> human beings show that type of behaviour.
>>
>> I don't know what is consciouslike behaviour without consciousness in the
>> first place.
>>
>>  An animal can show a consciouslike behaviour.  When a dog sees a rabbit,
>> then the dog behaves as if he is conscious about that there is food in
>> front of him.  He starts running after the rabbit as quick as he can.
>>
>>  --
>>  Torgny Tholerus
> 
> It doesn't mean anything... what means "as if" if the thing you are comparing 
> it to does not exists (here consciousness). You can't act as if you are 
> conscious if cousciousness is something which does not exists, it simply 
> doesn't mean anything. By the way, I'm sure dogs are conscious (have inner 
> personal world).
> 
> Quentin
> 

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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Thursday 28 June 2007 21:59:40 Brent Meeker wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> >> Bruno Marchal skrev:
> >>> But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness
> >>> (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor
> >>> explain it completely.
> >>
> >> That sentence is wrong.
> >
> > Don't think so...
> >
> >> There is at least one person (me...) that
> >> really doubts about my own consciousness.  I am conscious about that I
> >> am not conscious.  I know that I does not know anything.  When I go to
> >> the dentist I behave as if I am feeling strong pain, because my pain
> >> center is directly stimulated by the dentist, which is causing my
> >> behaviour.
> >
> > What is behaving ? (can't ask for who obviously you're insisting that
> > there isn't any).
> >
> >> Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive.  Therefore
> >> human beings show that type of behaviour.
> >
> > I don't know what is consciouslike behaviour without consciousness in the
> > first place.
> >
> > Quenton
>
> But if consciousness is implied by conscious like behavior then it may
> be explained by the same things that explain behavior, i.e. physics and
> chemistry.
>
> Brent Meeker

Well, I don't see how that denies consciousness... In the other hand, 
currently, physics and chemistry don't explain everything... and maybe Bruno 
hypothesis is what underlink all this... still that does not deny 
consciousness phenomena. And still I *can't* accept any (so called) proof 
that consciousness does not exists given *I* at least am conscious for sure.

Regards,
Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>> But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness
>>> (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor
>>> explain it completely.
>> That sentence is wrong.  
> 
> Don't think so...
> 
>> There is at least one person (me...) that 
>> really doubts about my own consciousness.  I am conscious about that I
>> am not conscious.  I know that I does not know anything.  When I go to
>> the dentist I behave as if I am feeling strong pain, because my pain
>> center is directly stimulated by the dentist, which is causing my
>> behaviour.
> 
> What is behaving ? (can't ask for who obviously you're insisting that there 
> isn't any).
> 
>> Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive.  Therefore
>> human beings show that type of behaviour.
> 
> I don't know what is consciouslike behaviour without consciousness in the 
> first place.
> 
> Quenton

But if consciousness is implied by conscious like behavior then it may 
be explained by the same things that explain behavior, i.e. physics and 
chemistry.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Asifism

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 19-juin-07, à 21:27, Brent Meeker wrote to Quentin:
> 
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>>> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You 
>>> can
>>> make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers 
>>> are
>>> enough complicated.
>>  But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not 
>> see how
>> you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the 
>> behavior
>> that a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this 
>> first
>> person experience.
>>
>>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just 
>> some
>> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective
>> experience of first person", I can see that you are just showing a
>> special kind of behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the 
>> subjective
>> experience of first person".  And it is possible for an enough
>> complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour.  But in 
>> the
>> case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective
>> experience", there are just a lot of electrical fenomena 
>> interacting
>> with each other.
>>
>>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no 
>> first
>> person experience.
>>
>>  --
>>  Torgny Tholerus
> Like I said earlier, this is pure nonsense as I have proof that I 
> have
> inner experience... I can't prove it to you because this is what 
> this is
> all about, you can't prove 1st person pov to others. And I don't 
> see why
> the fact that a computer is made of wire can't give it 
> consciousness...
> there is no implication at all.
>
> Again denying the phenomena does not make it disappear... it's no
> explanation at all.
>
> Quentin
 I think the point is that after all the behavior is explained, 
 including
 brain processes,  we will just say, "See, that's the consciousness 
 there."
 Just as after explaining metabolism and growth and reproduction we 
 said,
 "See, that's life."  Some people still wanted to know where the 
 "life"
 (i.e. "elan vital") was, but it seemed to be an uninteresting 
 question of
 semantics.

 Brent Meeker
>>> I don't think the comparison is fair... between 'elan vital' and
>>> consciousness.
>> I think it is fair.  Remember that in prospect people argued that 
>> chemistry and physics could never explain life no matter how 
>> completely they described the physical processes in a living thing.  
>> All those cells and molecules and atoms were inanimate, none of them 
>> had life - so they couldn't possibly explain the difference between 
>> alive and dead.
> 
> 
> I think you miss the point.  To define life/death can only be a useless 
> semantic game. But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness 
> (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor 
> explain it completely. Like Quentin I do think it is unfair to compare
> "elan vital" and "consciousness". Somehow "elan vital" is a poor theory 
> which has been overthrown by a better one. "consciousness" is a fact, 
> albeit a peculiar personal one" in need of an explanation; and there is 
> a quasi consensus among workers in that field that we don't see how to 
> explain consciousness from something simpler (a bit like the number 
> btw...).

Whether we can explain consciousness completely (or at least as 
completely as we have explained life) is an open question - no need to 
give up yet.  I think there is a good deal of mystery mongering about 
consciousness, as there was about life, which may one day be seen as a 
matter of asking the wrong questions.  There was also a quasi consensus 
that life could not be explained.  Every theory is seen to be a poor one 
from the viewpoint of a better one.

> 
> 
> 
>>> I don't think consciousness is just a semantic question.
>> I didn't mean to imply that.  I meant that the residual question, 
>> after all the behavior and processes are explained (answering very 
>> substantive questions) will seem to be a matter of making semantic 
>> distinctions, like the question, "Is a virus alive?"
>>
>>> As I
>>> don't believe that you could pin point consciousness... until proved
>>> otherwise.
>> No it won't be pin pointed.  It will be diffuse, an interaction of 
>> multiple sensory and action processes and you won't be able to point 
>> to a single location.  But, if we do succeed with our explanation, 
>> maybe we'll be able to say, "This being is conscious of this now and 
>> not conscious of that." or "This being does not have self-awareness 
>> and this one does."
> 
> 
> 
> Well,  now,

Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Thursday 28 June 2007 19:22:35 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>  Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive.  Therefore
> human beings show that type of behaviour.
>
> I don't know what is consciouslike behaviour without consciousness in the
> first place.
>
>  An animal can show a consciouslike behaviour.  When a dog sees a rabbit,
> then the dog behaves as if he is conscious about that there is food in
> front of him.  He starts running after the rabbit as quick as he can.
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus

It doesn't mean anything... what means "as if" if the thing you are comparing 
it to does not exists (here consciousness). You can't act as if you are 
conscious if cousciousness is something which does not exists, it simply 
doesn't mean anything. By the way, I'm sure dogs are conscious (have inner 
personal world).

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

Quentin Anciaux skrev:

  On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
  
  
Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive.  Therefore
human beings show that type of behaviour.

  
  I don't know what is consciouslike behaviour without consciousness in the 
first place.
  

An animal can show a consciouslike behaviour.  When a dog sees a
rabbit, then the dog behaves as if he is conscious about that there is
food in front of him.  He starts running after the rabbit as quick as
he can.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Thursday 28 June 2007 16:52:12 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
> > But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness
> > (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor
> > explain it completely.
>
> That sentence is wrong.  

Don't think so...

> There is at least one person (me...) that 
> really doubts about my own consciousness.  I am conscious about that I
> am not conscious.  I know that I does not know anything.  When I go to
> the dentist I behave as if I am feeling strong pain, because my pain
> center is directly stimulated by the dentist, which is causing my
> behaviour.

What is behaving ? (can't ask for who obviously you're insisting that there 
isn't any).

> Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive.  Therefore
> human beings show that type of behaviour.

I don't know what is consciouslike behaviour without consciousness in the 
first place.

Quenton

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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

Bruno Marchal skrev:
>
> But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness 
> (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor 
> explain it completely.
That sentence is wrong.  There is at least one person (me...) that 
really doubts about my own consciousness.  I am conscious about that I 
am not conscious.  I know that I does not know anything.  When I go to 
the dentist I behave as if I am feeling strong pain, because my pain 
center is directly stimulated by the dentist, which is causing my behaviour.

Consciouslike behaviour is good for a species to survive.  Therefore 
human beings show that type of behaviour.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 19-juin-07, à 21:27, Brent Meeker wrote to Quentin:

>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You 
>> can
>> make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers 
>> are
>> enough complicated.
>  But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not 
> see how
> you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the 
> behavior
> that a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this 
> first
> person experience.
>
>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just 
> some
> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective
> experience of first person", I can see that you are just showing a
> special kind of behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the 
> subjective
> experience of first person".  And it is possible for an enough
> complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour.  But in 
> the
> case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective
> experience", there are just a lot of electrical fenomena 
> interacting
> with each other.
>
>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no 
> first
> person experience.
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus
 Like I said earlier, this is pure nonsense as I have proof that I 
 have
 inner experience... I can't prove it to you because this is what 
 this is
 all about, you can't prove 1st person pov to others. And I don't 
 see why
 the fact that a computer is made of wire can't give it 
 consciousness...
 there is no implication at all.

 Again denying the phenomena does not make it disappear... it's no
 explanation at all.

 Quentin
>>> I think the point is that after all the behavior is explained, 
>>> including
>>> brain processes,  we will just say, "See, that's the consciousness 
>>> there."
>>> Just as after explaining metabolism and growth and reproduction we 
>>> said,
>>> "See, that's life."  Some people still wanted to know where the 
>>> "life"
>>> (i.e. "elan vital") was, but it seemed to be an uninteresting 
>>> question of
>>> semantics.
>>>
>>> Brent Meeker
>>
>> I don't think the comparison is fair... between 'elan vital' and
>> consciousness.
>
> I think it is fair.  Remember that in prospect people argued that 
> chemistry and physics could never explain life no matter how 
> completely they described the physical processes in a living thing.  
> All those cells and molecules and atoms were inanimate, none of them 
> had life - so they couldn't possibly explain the difference between 
> alive and dead.


I think you miss the point.  To define life/death can only be a useless 
semantic game. But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness 
(especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor 
explain it completely. Like Quentin I do think it is unfair to compare 
"elan vital" and "consciousness". Somehow "elan vital" is a poor theory 
which has been overthrown by a better one. "consciousness" is a fact, 
albeit a peculiar personal one" in need of an explanation; and there is 
a quasi consensus among workers in that field that we don't see how to 
explain consciousness from something simpler (a bit like the number 
btw...).



>
>> I don't think consciousness is just a semantic question.
>
> I didn't mean to imply that.  I meant that the residual question, 
> after all the behavior and processes are explained (answering very 
> substantive questions) will seem to be a matter of making semantic 
> distinctions, like the question, "Is a virus alive?"
>
>> As I
>> don't believe that you could pin point consciousness... until proved
>> otherwise.
>
> No it won't be pin pointed.  It will be diffuse, an interaction of 
> multiple sensory and action processes and you won't be able to point 
> to a single location.  But, if we do succeed with our explanation, 
> maybe we'll be able to say, "This being is conscious of this now and 
> not conscious of that." or "This being does not have self-awareness 
> and this one does."



Well,  now, I can prove that if the comp hyp is true then those 
"brave-new-worlds"-like assertions are provably wrong. If comp is true, 
nobody, I should perhaps say nosoul, will ever been able to decide if 
any other entity is conscious or not. Actually comp could be false 
because it is not even clear some entity can be completely sure of 
his/her/it own consciousness 





> And "conscious" and "aware" will have well defined operational ("3rd 
> person") meanings.
>
> Or maybe we'll discover that we have to talk in some other terms not 
> yet invented, just as our predecessors had to stop talking abo

Re: Asifism

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 19-juin-07, à 10:55, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote (to Torgny Tholerus)

> TT: The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You 
> can make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers 
> are enough complicated.
>
> But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see 
> how you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the 
> behavior  that a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is 
> this first person experience.


Of course, in this context, I do agree with Mohsen Ravanbakhsh's anwer. 
But eventually, I could say, perhaps with David, that the first person 
experience is not so much the problem. On the contrary, the third 
person discourse and its apparent sharability (first person plural, 
with the comp hyp), is the "real" difficult problem. It just happens 
that we are used to take that problem for granted.
Also, for Torgny, I doubt there is a problem with first person notions, 
given that for him (if that means something) there is no first person!
Torgny self-zombiness is irrefutable, like solipsism (but more original 
than solipsism though). Of course each of us capable of knowing 
anything knows that Torgny is wrong about us, and I guess Torgny is not 
a zombie so that I guess (and cannot do anything more than that) that 
he is also wrong about himself. But this nobody can know for sure. OK?


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

Hi Brent,

Brent: ' > You seem to imply that the advent of the scientific 
method banished slavery and tyranny and racism.  Would that it 
were so.  Perhaps the scientific method can be applied to 
politics and perhaps it would have that effect, but historically 
the scientific method has been used to justify racism, Facism, 
Nazism, and Communism, as well as liberal democracy.  One can 
point to those political movements now and regard them as 
experiments that demonstrated their faults, but that's not much 
help in shaping the future.'

MP: No Brent, I am an optimist as a matter of principle but I 
don't believe in fairies. This is why I assert that all four 
'fundamental ingredients' are necessary. Doom will follow if any 
is missing!  :-o   My point is that scientific method has 
provided the key to unlocking the true latent power available 
but otherwise hidden in the natural world. For example fossil 
hydrocarbons and the engines they power have vastly increased 
the energy available to be deployed in human work. Put simply, 
slave labour as means and method for creating capital works or 
maintenance is not just cruel, it is stupidly inefficient also. 
I am sure we are on the same page with this.

I am asserting that none of compassion, democracy, ethics or 
scientific method is an 'optional extra'; without any of these 
your society is doomed both to reversion into authoritarian 
barbarity with concomitant lethal conflict, plus mass poverty 
and all the ills that come with it.

As I am sure you have noticed people often loosely talk about 
science as being responsible for all manner of problems or bad 
things [paraphrasing Pratchett: 'All things actions are bad for 
some particular value of 'bad']. The truth is that scientific 
method is just a tool, and the uses or abuses to which it is put 
depend on the ethical stance and decisions of those responsible.

In summary: I assert that all policies of governing bodies, 
private or public, will become self-defeating where they leave 
out any of these essential ingredients. So a country governed by 
"Sharia Law" or "Biblical principles" [to name but two] to the 
exclusion of any of the four essential ingredients, is doomed 
eventually to poverty, strife, and all the miseries these evils 
bring.

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Brent Meeker wrote:
> Mark Peaty wrote:
>> History has not finished yet, and I am proposing that we try to 
>> ensure that it doesn't.
>>
>> If you truly think I am wrong in my assertion, then you have a 
>> moral duty to show me - and the rest of the world - on the basis 
>> of clear and unambiguous empirical evidence where and how I am 
>> wrong. Without such evidence you have only your opinion, 
> 
> What assertion? That history has not finished yet?  I certainly wouldn't 
> disagree with that, nor with trying to ensure that it doesn't.
> 
>> which 
>> of course is safe for you in a democracy, and that you have an 
>> opinion can be important, especially if it is well thought out. 
>> "Agreeing to disagree" is an honourable stance when accompanied 
>> by respect.
>>
>> The modern era is so because of the advent of scientific method. 
>> Buddha, Jesus of Nazareth, KongZi, LaoZi, Socrates, Pythagoras, 
>> Archimedes, and the rest knew nothing of scientific method, 
>> certainly not as we know it. They lived and benefited from what 
>> were, essentially, slave societies in which the ascription of 
>> sub-human status was made upon the servant classes and 
>> unfavoured ethnic groups. To put it simply, most people, for 
>> most of the history of 'civilisation', have been treated as 
>> things, mere things, by their rulers. Ignorance, fear, 
>> superstition, have been the guardians of poverty and the 
>> champions of warfare for millennia, but we don't really have 
>> time for that any more, and it time for us all to grow up..
> 
> You seem to imply that the advent of the scientific method banished slavery 
> and tyranny and racism.  Would that it were so.  Perhaps the scientific 
> method can be applied to politics and perhaps it would have that effect, but 
> historically the scientific method has been used to justify racism, Facism, 
> Nazism, and Communism, as well as liberal democracy.  One can point to those 
> political movements now and regard them as experiments that demonstrated 
> their faults, but that's not much help in shaping the future.
> 
> I recently defended the global warming science in a public debate.  The 
> opposition came mostly from libertarians who were sure it was all a 
> conspiracy to justify a world  government with totalitarian powers.  They 
> weren't against science, but they feared an authoritarian government.
> 
> Our unfortunate experience in the mideast over the last few decades is that 
> given democracy, the citizens will vote to impose majority views on 
> minorities in the most draconian fashion.  So it is not only democracy that 
> is need

Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

QA: '... you can't
> assert "Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method. These are 
> prerequisites for the survival of civilisation."... if you really believe 
> that History has not finished yet.

MP: The fact of me making the assertion is logical; what I 
assert is not a closed prescription of thought and action, quite 
the opposite in fact.


This is not some academic argument or computer simulation in 
which the parameters can be changed and the program re-run. True 
history is 'once-off'.
We in our culture and history are like fish in water but whereas 
the fish cannot change their water [they don't even see it] we 
who are capable of reflexive awareness and contemplation can, 
through work on ourselves and on communication media, change the 
'world' as it appears to others and therefore potentially we can 
change our world for the better.

I am not referring to some kind of Trotskyist 'end of history', 
I am referring to the real possibility of anthropogenic terminal 
catastrophe.

CA: '
> I don't think you're wrong nor you're right... least to say that I can't 
> truly 
> say our democratic system is the top of the art political system... It can't 
> be or the top of the art has serious flaws. I can't point to you what better 
> system could be but I can easily point what flaws there are.'

MP: But here we agree! This is an essential feature that 
democracy shares with science: its eternal incompleteness. [As 
folk are wont to say about the World according to Bill Gates: 
'It's not a fault, it's a feature!' :-] What we can say is that 
democracy in most of its evolving forms is much better than all 
the alternatives.

QA: '... Science has grown without democracy, ethics
> too, compassion too, moral basis too.'

MP: Don't be so quick to dismiss the world-transforming power of 
science. 'Speciation' is what is happening to homo sapiens right 
now, but we want ALL members of our species to participate. 
Also, the seeds of science appeared in many parts of the world 
through history since, well 'the Bronze Age' I think, but 
germination required the printing presses and alphabet based 
writing systems of Europe to grow into real existence. My guess 
is the difficulties of learning to read and write Chinese [and I 
am well familiar with the difficulties] is what prevented the 
earlier growth of scientific method in East Asia where block 
printing had been known for centuries before the idea came to 
Europe.

But the growth of good science needs real democracy, just like 
real democracy needs the profound cultural support of knowledge 
of scientific method. Remember, Athenian 'democracy' required a 
totally disenfranchised slave class to create the surplus value 
consumed by the warrior elite as members of the latter contested 
for status and power amongst their own class.



Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/


Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Friday 22 June 2007 20:38:50 Mark Peaty wrote:
>> History has not finished yet, and I am proposing that we try to
>> ensure that it doesn't.
> 
> Agreed, but it was not what I meant to say... it is the opposite... you can't 
> assert "Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method. These are 
> prerequisites for the survival of civilisation."... if you really believe 
> that History has not finished yet.
> 
>> If you truly think I am wrong in my assertion, then you have a
>> moral duty to show me - and the rest of the world - on the basis
>> of clear and unambiguous empirical evidence where and how I am
>> wrong.
> 
> I don't think you're wrong nor you're right... least to say that I can't 
> truly 
> say our democratic system is the top of the art political system... It can't 
> be or the top of the art has serious flaws. I can't point to you what better 
> system could be but I can easily point what flaws there are.
> 
>> Without such evidence you have only your opinion, which 
>> of course is safe for you in a democracy, and that you have an
>> opinion can be important, especially if it is well thought out.
>> "Agreeing to disagree" is an honourable stance when accompanied
>> by respect.
> 
> You do not have evidence too... Science has grown without democracy, ethics 
> too, compassion too, moral basis too. Maybe I missed your demonstration of 
> your assertion... but what you're saying are not "all time certainty".
> 
> Regards,
> Quentin

> << snip>>

>>
>> Hmm, I went on more than I intended here, but the issue is not
>> trivial, and it is not going to go away.
>>
>> Regards
>>
>> Mark Peaty  CDES
>>
>> 
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> This is completely arbitrary and history does not show this.
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>> 2007/6/22, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
 CDES = Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method

 These are prerequisites for the survival of civilisation.

 Regards

 Mark Peaty  CDES


 David Nyman wrote:
> On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Pe

Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Friday 22 June 2007 20:38:50 Mark Peaty wrote:
> History has not finished yet, and I am proposing that we try to
> ensure that it doesn't.

Agreed, but it was not what I meant to say... it is the opposite... you can't 
assert "Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method. These are 
prerequisites for the survival of civilisation."... if you really believe 
that History has not finished yet.

> If you truly think I am wrong in my assertion, then you have a
> moral duty to show me - and the rest of the world - on the basis
> of clear and unambiguous empirical evidence where and how I am
> wrong.

I don't think you're wrong nor you're right... least to say that I can't truly 
say our democratic system is the top of the art political system... It can't 
be or the top of the art has serious flaws. I can't point to you what better 
system could be but I can easily point what flaws there are.

> Without such evidence you have only your opinion, which 
> of course is safe for you in a democracy, and that you have an
> opinion can be important, especially if it is well thought out.
> "Agreeing to disagree" is an honourable stance when accompanied
> by respect.

You do not have evidence too... Science has grown without democracy, ethics 
too, compassion too, moral basis too. Maybe I missed your demonstration of 
your assertion... but what you're saying are not "all time certainty".

Regards,
Quentin

> The modern era is so because of the advent of scientific method.
> Buddha, Jesus of Nazareth, KongZi, LaoZi, Socrates, Pythagoras,
> Archimedes, and the rest knew nothing of scientific method,
> certainly not as we know it. They lived and benefited from what
> were, essentially, slave societies in which the ascription of
> sub-human status was made upon the servant classes and
> unfavoured ethnic groups. To put it simply, most people, for
> most of the history of 'civilisation', have been treated as
> things, mere things, by their rulers. Ignorance, fear,
> superstition, have been the guardians of poverty and the
> champions of warfare for millennia, but we don't really have
> time for that any more, and it time for us all to grow up.
>
> The Buddha, Jesus, and many others made plain that compassion is
> not a symptom of weakness but a necessary attribute of true
> human strength;
> ethics is the foundation of civilisation;
> Karl Popper explained the intrinsic logic underlying the success
> of democracy in comparison with competing forms of government
> and those of us who live in democracies, imperfect though they
> are, we know - if we are honest with ourselves - that we don't
> really want to 'go back' to feudal authoritarianism with its
> necessary commitment to warfare and xenophobia;
> the application of scientific method is transforming the human
> species in a way unparalleled since the advent of versatile
> grammar. The changes wrought to us and this world we call ours,
> following the advent of science, can only be dealt with by the
> further application of the method, and so it will ever be.
>
> Hmm, I went on more than I intended here, but the issue is not
> trivial, and it is not going to go away.
>
> Regards
>
> Mark Peaty  CDES
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > This is completely arbitrary and history does not show this.
> >
> > Quentin
> >
> > 2007/6/22, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> >> CDES = Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method
> >>
> >> These are prerequisites for the survival of civilisation.
> >>
> >> Regards
> >>
> >> Mark Peaty  CDES
> >>
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >>
> >> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
> >>
> >> David Nyman wrote:
> >>> On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>  I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
>  relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
>  relationships entail existence and difference.
> >>>
> >>> I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
> >>> whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
> >>> a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
> >>> suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
> >>> usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.
> >>>
>  Particles of matter are knots,
>  topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
>  properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
>  whatever other structural/topological features occur.
> >>>
> >>> Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
> >>> has had something to say about this in the past.
> >>>
>  If an
>  mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
>  differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
> >>>
> >>> Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
> >>> 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
> >>> imply that di

Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

[Brent Meeker]

Mark Peaty wrote:
> History has not finished yet, and I am proposing that we try to 
> ensure that it doesn't.
> 
> If you truly think I am wrong in my assertion, then you have a 
> moral duty to show me - and the rest of the world - on the basis 
> of clear and unambiguous empirical evidence where and how I am 
> wrong. Without such evidence you have only your opinion, 

What assertion? That history has not finished yet?  I certainly wouldn't 
disagree with that, nor with trying to ensure that it doesn't.

>which 
> of course is safe for you in a democracy, and that you have an 
> opinion can be important, especially if it is well thought out. 
> "Agreeing to disagree" is an honourable stance when accompanied 
> by respect.
> 
> The modern era is so because of the advent of scientific method. 
> Buddha, Jesus of Nazareth, KongZi, LaoZi, Socrates, Pythagoras, 
> Archimedes, and the rest knew nothing of scientific method, 
> certainly not as we know it. They lived and benefited from what 
> were, essentially, slave societies in which the ascription of 
> sub-human status was made upon the servant classes and 
> unfavoured ethnic groups. To put it simply, most people, for 
> most of the history of 'civilisation', have been treated as 
> things, mere things, by their rulers. Ignorance, fear, 
> superstition, have been the guardians of poverty and the 
> champions of warfare for millennia, but we don't really have 
> time for that any more, and it time for us all to grow up..

You seem to imply that the advent of the scientific method banished slavery and 
tyranny and racism.  Would that it were so.  Perhaps the scientific method can 
be applied to politics and perhaps it would have that effect, but historically 
the scientific method has been used to justify racism, Facism, Nazism, and 
Communism, as well as liberal democracy.  One can point to those political 
movements now and regard them as experiments that demonstrated their faults, 
but that's not much help in shaping the future.

I recently defended the global warming science in a public debate.  The 
opposition came mostly from libertarians who were sure it was all a conspiracy 
to justify a world  government with totalitarian powers.  They weren't against 
science, but they feared an authoritarian government.

Our unfortunate experience in the mideast over the last few decades is that 
given democracy, the citizens will vote to impose majority views on minorities 
in the most draconian fashion.  So it is not only democracy that is needed, but 
*liberal* democracy, democracy that preserves individual autonomy and values.  
The problem is how to inculcate a scientific attitude of tolerance for 
disagreement and uncertanity in people.

Brent Meeker

> 
> The Buddha, Jesus, and many others made plain that compassion is 
> not a symptom of weakness but a necessary attribute of true 
> human strength;
> ethics is the foundation of civilisation;
> Karl Popper explained the intrinsic logic underlying the success 
> of democracy in comparison with competing forms of government 
> and those of us who live in democracies, imperfect though they 
> are, we know - if we are honest with ourselves - that we don't 
> really want to 'go back' to feudal authoritarianism with its 
> necessary commitment to warfare and xenophobia;
> the application of scientific method is transforming the human 
> species in a way unparalleled since the advent of versatile 
> grammar. The changes wrought to us and this world we call ours, 
> following the advent of science, can only be dealt with by the 
> further application of the method, and so it will ever be.
> 
> Hmm, I went on more than I intended here, but the issue is not 
> trivial, and it is not going to go away.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Mark Peaty  CDES
> 
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> This is completely arbitrary and history does not show this.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>> 2007/6/22, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>> CDES = Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method
>>>
>>> These are prerequisites for the survival of civilisation.
>>>
>>> Regards
>>>
>>> Mark Peaty  CDES
>>>
>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>>
>>> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> David Nyman wrote:
 On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.
 I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
 whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
 a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
 suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
 usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.

> Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-t

Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

History has not finished yet, and I am proposing that we try to 
ensure that it doesn't.

If you truly think I am wrong in my assertion, then you have a 
moral duty to show me - and the rest of the world - on the basis 
of clear and unambiguous empirical evidence where and how I am 
wrong. Without such evidence you have only your opinion, which 
of course is safe for you in a democracy, and that you have an 
opinion can be important, especially if it is well thought out. 
"Agreeing to disagree" is an honourable stance when accompanied 
by respect.

The modern era is so because of the advent of scientific method. 
Buddha, Jesus of Nazareth, KongZi, LaoZi, Socrates, Pythagoras, 
Archimedes, and the rest knew nothing of scientific method, 
certainly not as we know it. They lived and benefited from what 
were, essentially, slave societies in which the ascription of 
sub-human status was made upon the servant classes and 
unfavoured ethnic groups. To put it simply, most people, for 
most of the history of 'civilisation', have been treated as 
things, mere things, by their rulers. Ignorance, fear, 
superstition, have been the guardians of poverty and the 
champions of warfare for millennia, but we don't really have 
time for that any more, and it time for us all to grow up.

The Buddha, Jesus, and many others made plain that compassion is 
not a symptom of weakness but a necessary attribute of true 
human strength;
ethics is the foundation of civilisation;
Karl Popper explained the intrinsic logic underlying the success 
of democracy in comparison with competing forms of government 
and those of us who live in democracies, imperfect though they 
are, we know - if we are honest with ourselves - that we don't 
really want to 'go back' to feudal authoritarianism with its 
necessary commitment to warfare and xenophobia;
the application of scientific method is transforming the human 
species in a way unparalleled since the advent of versatile 
grammar. The changes wrought to us and this world we call ours, 
following the advent of science, can only be dealt with by the 
further application of the method, and so it will ever be.

Hmm, I went on more than I intended here, but the issue is not 
trivial, and it is not going to go away.

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> This is completely arbitrary and history does not show this.
> 
> Quentin
> 
> 2007/6/22, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> CDES = Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method
>>
>> These are prerequisites for the survival of civilisation.
>>
>> Regards
>>
>> Mark Peaty  CDES
>>
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>
>> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> David Nyman wrote:
>>> On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>>
 I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
 relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
 relationships entail existence and difference.
>>> I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
>>> whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
>>> a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
>>> suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
>>> usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.
>>>
 Particles of matter are knots,
 topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
 properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
 whatever other structural/topological features occur.
>>> Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
>>> has had something to say about this in the past.
>>>
 If an
 mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
 differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
>>> Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
>>> 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
>>> imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
>>> - i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
>>> orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality
>>>
>>> PS - Mark, what is CDES?
>>>
> 
> > 
> 
> 

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Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On 22/06/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

MP:
Who is to say what mbranes really are, except that in this
interpretation of the idea, each IS its own existence; I assume
we can say nothing definite about how each such existence would
compare with others or anything much about 'where' they are,
i.e. are they in a 'higher dimensional' space, do they interact
in anyway apart from interpenetration, are they ontogenically
related, do they have babies?

DN:
.and if they have babies, where the ortho-dimensional-hell are we going
to find baby-sitters?  Seriously though folks, what I enjoy about such
speculations, pace more rigorous mathematico-physical investigation (of
which I am incapable), is to try to understand how they converge on the
implicit semantics we use to intuit meaning from the worlds we inhabit.
It's a bit like comparative philology, in the sense of reconciling
narratives coded in different symbols, to explicate a common set of
intuitions.   But on the other hand this may just be what Russell, more
acerbically, calls gibberish (and he may be right!)

David

>
> MN: 'If an
> >> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> >> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
> >
> > Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
> > 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
> > imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
> > - i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
> > orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality
>
> MP: Yes, the 'mutually inaccessible dimensionality'  a lovely way to put put it now isn't it> is exactly what I was
> thinking about. Frictionless and 'ghostly', and yet it would be
> the source of entropy, which I take to be the expansion of the
> universe writ small.
>
> one way to think of this is that what we call matter is where
> _our_ mbrane predominates and what we fondly think of as empty
> space and mysterious quantum vacuum is where the other mbrane
> predominates.
>
> Who is to say what mbranes really are, except that in this
> interpretation of the idea, each IS its own existence; I assume
> we can say nothing definite about how each such existence would
> compare with others or anything much about 'where' they are,
> i.e. are they in a 'higher dimensional' space, do they interact
> in anyway apart from interpenetration, are they ontogenically
> related, do they have babies?
>
>
> Regards
>
> Mark Peaty  CDES
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
>
> David Nyman wrote:
> > On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> >> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> >> relationships entail existence and difference.
> >
> > I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
> > whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
> > a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
> > suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
> > usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.
> >
> >> Particles of matter are knots,
> >> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> >> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> >> whatever other structural/topological features occur.
> >
> > Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
> > has had something to say about this in the past.
> >
> >> If an
> >> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> >> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
> >
> > Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
> > 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
> > imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
> > - i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
> > orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality
> >
> > David
> >
> >
> >> DN: '
> >>
> >>> I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
> >>> field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
> >>> fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
> >>> 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The notion of
> >>> a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
> >>> 'parts' separated by 'nothing'.  The quotes I have sprinkled so
> >>> liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
> >>> feel need to be accounted for somehow.  'Parts' (particles, digits)
> >>> then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
> >>> continuum.  Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
> >>> from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
> >> MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
> >> crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
> >> "Why is there anything at all?"
> >>
> >> As 

Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

MN: 'If an
>> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
>> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
> 
> Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
> 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
> imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
> - i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
> orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality

MP: Yes, the 'mutually inaccessible dimensionality'  is exactly what I was 
thinking about. Frictionless and 'ghostly', and yet it would be 
the source of entropy, which I take to be the expansion of the 
universe writ small.

one way to think of this is that what we call matter is where 
_our_ mbrane predominates and what we fondly think of as empty 
space and mysterious quantum vacuum is where the other mbrane 
predominates.

Who is to say what mbranes really are, except that in this 
interpretation of the idea, each IS its own existence; I assume 
we can say nothing definite about how each such existence would 
compare with others or anything much about 'where' they are, 
i.e. are they in a 'higher dimensional' space, do they interact 
in anyway apart from interpenetration, are they ontogenically 
related, do they have babies?


Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/

David Nyman wrote:
> On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
>> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
>> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
>> relationships entail existence and difference.
> 
> I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
> whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
> a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
> suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
> usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.
> 
>> Particles of matter are knots,
>> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
>> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
>> whatever other structural/topological features occur.
> 
> Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
> has had something to say about this in the past.
> 
>> If an
>> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
>> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
> 
> Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
> 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
> imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
> - i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
> orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality
> 
> David
> 
> 
>> DN: '
>>
>>> I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
>>> field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
>>> fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
>>> 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The notion of
>>> a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
>>> 'parts' separated by 'nothing'.  The quotes I have sprinkled so
>>> liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
>>> feel need to be accounted for somehow.  'Parts' (particles, digits)
>>> then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
>>> continuum.  Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
>>> from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
>> MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
>> crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
>> "Why is there anything at all?"
>>
>> As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
>> 'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
>> As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
>> explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
>> simple minded view :-)
>>
>> Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; "I don't exist"
>> is either metaphor or nonsense.
>> As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
>> parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
>> Currently this makes me sympathetic to
>> *   a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
>> it's just not our brane/s] and
>> *   a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
>>
>> I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
>> unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
>> arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
>> that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
>> something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
>> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
>> relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
>> 'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
>> and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an

Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

This is completely arbitrary and history does not show this.

Quentin

2007/6/22, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> CDES = Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method
>
> These are prerequisites for the survival of civilisation.
>
> Regards
>
> Mark Peaty  CDES
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
>
>
>
>
>
> David Nyman wrote:
> > On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> >> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> >> relationships entail existence and difference.
> >
> > I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
> > whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
> > a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
> > suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
> > usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.
> >
> >> Particles of matter are knots,
> >> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> >> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> >> whatever other structural/topological features occur.
> >
> > Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
> > has had something to say about this in the past.
> >
> >> If an
> >> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> >> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
> >
> > Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
> > 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
> > imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
> > - i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
> > orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality
> >
> > PS - Mark, what is CDES?
> >
>
> >
>

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Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

CDES = Compassion, Democracy, Ethics, and Scientific method

These are prerequisites for the survival of civilisation.

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





David Nyman wrote:
> On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
>> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
>> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
>> relationships entail existence and difference.
> 
> I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
> whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
> a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
> suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
> usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.
> 
>> Particles of matter are knots,
>> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
>> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
>> whatever other structural/topological features occur.
> 
> Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
> has had something to say about this in the past.
> 
>> If an
>> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
>> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
> 
> Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
> 'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
> imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
> - i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
> orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality
> 
> PS - Mark, what is CDES?
> 

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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.

I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.

> Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> whatever other structural/topological features occur.

Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
has had something to say about this in the past.

> If an
> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.

Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
- i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality

PS - Mark, what is CDES?

David

On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> DN: '
>
> > I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
> > field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
> > fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
> > 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The notion of
> > a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
> > 'parts' separated by 'nothing'.  The quotes I have sprinkled so
> > liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
> > feel need to be accounted for somehow.  'Parts' (particles, digits)
> > then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
> > continuum.  Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
> > from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
>
> MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
> crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
> "Why is there anything at all?"
>
> As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
> 'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
> As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
> explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
> simple minded view :-)
>
> Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; "I don't exist"
> is either metaphor or nonsense.
> As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
> parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
> Currently this makes me sympathetic to
> *   a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
> it's just not our brane/s] and
> *   a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
>
> I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
> unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
> arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
> that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
> something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
> 'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
> and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an
> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
>
> In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang
> of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception
> however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not
> important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and
> the other one provides what otherwise we must call
> 'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate
> basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I
> described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections]
> and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous
> simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which
> results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the
> direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> whatever other structural/topological features occur. The
> intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the
> direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce
> interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing
> waves with harmonics.
>
> For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus'
> connection need have no internal structure and therefore no
> 'internal' 

Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.

I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.

> Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> whatever other structural/topological features occur.

Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
has had something to say about this in the past.

> If an
> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.

Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
- i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality

PS - Mark, what is CDES?

David

On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> DN: '
>
> > I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
> > field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
> > fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
> > 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The notion of
> > a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
> > 'parts' separated by 'nothing'.  The quotes I have sprinkled so
> > liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
> > feel need to be accounted for somehow.  'Parts' (particles, digits)
> > then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
> > continuum.  Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
> > from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
>
> MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
> crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
> "Why is there anything at all?"
>
> As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
> 'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
> As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
> explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
> simple minded view :-)
>
> Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; "I don't exist"
> is either metaphor or nonsense.
> As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
> parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
> Currently this makes me sympathetic to
> *   a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
> it's just not our brane/s] and
> *   a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
>
> I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
> unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
> arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
> that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
> something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
> 'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
> and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an
> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
>
> In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang
> of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception
> however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not
> important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and
> the other one provides what otherwise we must call
> 'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate
> basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I
> described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections]
> and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous
> simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which
> results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the
> direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> whatever other structural/topological features occur. The
> intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the
> direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce
> interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing
> waves with harmonics.
>
> For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus'
> connection need have no internal structure and therefore no
> 'internal' 

Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.

I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.

> Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> whatever other structural/topological features occur.

Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
has had something to say about this in the past.

> If an
> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.

Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
- i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality.

PS - Mark, what is CDES?

David

On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> DN: '
>
> > I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
> > field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
> > fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
> > 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The notion of
> > a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
> > 'parts' separated by 'nothing'.  The quotes I have sprinkled so
> > liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
> > feel need to be accounted for somehow.  'Parts' (particles, digits)
> > then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
> > continuum.  Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
> > from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
>
> MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
> crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
> "Why is there anything at all?"
>
> As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
> 'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
> As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
> explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
> simple minded view :-)
>
> Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; "I don't exist"
> is either metaphor or nonsense.
> As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
> parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
> Currently this makes me sympathetic to
> *   a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
> it's just not our brane/s] and
> *   a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
>
> I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
> unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
> arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
> that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
> something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
> 'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
> and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an
> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
>
> In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang
> of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception
> however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not
> important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and
> the other one provides what otherwise we must call
> 'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate
> basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I
> described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections]
> and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous
> simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which
> results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the
> direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> whatever other structural/topological features occur. The
> intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the
> direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce
> interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing
> waves with harmonics.
>
> For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus'
> connection need have no internal structure and therefore no
> 'internal'

Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference.

I sympathise.  In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships).  But I
suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'.  I await clarification.

> Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> whatever other structural/topological features occur.

Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff.  Bruno
has had something to say about this in the past.

> If an
> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.

Yes, this may be an attractive notion.  I've wondered about myself.
'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
- i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality

David


> DN: '
>
> > I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
> > field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
> > fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
> > 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The notion of
> > a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
> > 'parts' separated by 'nothing'.  The quotes I have sprinkled so
> > liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
> > feel need to be accounted for somehow.  'Parts' (particles, digits)
> > then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
> > continuum.  Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
> > from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
>
> MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
> crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
> "Why is there anything at all?"
>
> As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
> 'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
> As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
> explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
> simple minded view :-)
>
> Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; "I don't exist"
> is either metaphor or nonsense.
> As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
> parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
> Currently this makes me sympathetic to
> *   a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
> it's just not our brane/s] and
> *   a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
>
> I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
> unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
> arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
> that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
> something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
> relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
> relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
> 'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
> and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an
> mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
> differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
>
> In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang
> of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception
> however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not
> important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and
> the other one provides what otherwise we must call
> 'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate
> basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I
> described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections]
> and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous
> simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which
> results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the
> direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots,
> topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
> properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
> whatever other structural/topological features occur. The
> intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the
> direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce
> interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing
> waves with harmonics.
>
> For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus'
> connection need have no internal structure and therefore no
> 'internal' distance, save perhaps the Planck length, so each
> face would connect with others 

Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

DN: '
> I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
> field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
> fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
> 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The notion of
> a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
> 'parts' separated by 'nothing'.  The quotes I have sprinkled so
> liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
> feel need to be accounted for somehow.  'Parts' (particles, digits)
> then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
> continuum.  Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
> from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'

MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
"Why is there anything at all?"

As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
simple minded view :-)

Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; "I don't exist"
is either metaphor or nonsense.
As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
Currently this makes me sympathetic to
*   a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
it's just not our brane/s] and
*   a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.

I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very 
unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano 
arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept 
that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of 
something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that 
relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but 
relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how 
'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured - 
and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an 
mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide 
differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.

In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang 
of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception 
however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not 
important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and 
the other one provides what otherwise we must call 
'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate 
basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I 
described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections] 
and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous 
simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which 
results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the 
direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots, 
topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their 
properties depending on the number of self-crossings and 
whatever other structural/topological features occur. The 
intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the 
direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce 
interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing 
waves with harmonics.

For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus' 
connection need have no internal structure and therefore no 
'internal' distance, save perhaps the Planck length, so each 
face would connect with others in a 'quorum' or node. This 
provides a potential explanation of quantum entanglement in that 
if each of the two faces of a Janus connection were in different 
particles, those particles might be fleeing from each other at 
the speed of light, or something close to it, yet for that 
particular Janus connection each face will still be simply the 
back side of its twin such that their temporal separation might 
be no more than the Planck time.

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





David Nyman wrote:
> On Jun 12, 2:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
>>> If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
>> We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
>> (Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
>> reflexivity power of the number's themselves.
> 
> I simply meant that in AR numbers 'assert themselves', in that they
> are taken as being (in some sense) primitive rather than being merely
> mental constructs (intuitionism, I think?)  Is this not so?
> 
>> OK (but again the "symmetry-breaking" is a consequence (too be sure
>> there remains technical problems ...)
> 
> I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
> field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
> fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
> 'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The

Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 20, 8:56 am, "Mohsen Ravanbakhsh" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:

> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> person experience."
>
> Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of
> view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY behavior. It's ONE'S own
> perception of his OWN experience matters! and it is more obvious than any
> other fact.

Mohsen, I agree with what you're trying to say here, but I wonder
whether the best 'move' against Torgny's little 'game' (I'm sure he's
playing with us!) is actually to accept what he's saying.  I can agree
with him that:

"there is no first person experience"

because I don't find myself 'experiencing' my 'first person
experience' (this would lead to an infinite regression of
'experiencers').  Rather, I find myself always simply participating in
a 1-person world, which is a subset of a larger participatory
actuality.  Torgny is of course equally a participant in this
actuality.  His error is that he confuses 3-person descriptions with
the 'participants' they merely 'represent'.  3-person descriptions are
always proxies for some distal participant, 'external' to our own 1-
person world: they are 'abstractions'.

As soon as one commits this cognitive error, one is of course struck
by the lack of 1-person characteristics from the proxy 3-person 'point
of view'.  Quite correct: the proxy in itself *doesn't have* an
independent point of view: it's just a parasite on one's own 1-person
world. Metaphorically, it's a sort of 'mirror' that 'reflects' an
external actuality.  'Proxy Torgny' *represents* something else: i.e.
'Participatory Torgny' - and *he* of course may well be granted such a
point of view (as you imply) by reflexive analogy.  But the two must
not be confused.  Ironically, Torgny is presenting us with a textbook
case of the category error that arises from mistaking one's
'reflection' for oneself!

David

> What you're referring to, is another problem, namely the "other's mind". how
> we know that another human is experiencing what we do? We actually assume
> that to be true, that everyone has consciousness.
> But it doesn't justify the other mistake. This does not mean you can deny
> your possible(!) consciousness.
>
> "What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some sort
> of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective experience of
> first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of first
> person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show up
> the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see that
> there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of electrical
> fenomena interacting with each other.
>
> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> person experience."
>
> Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of
> view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY behavior. It's ONE'S own
> perception of his OWN experience matters! and it is more obvious than any
> other fact.
>
> On 6/19/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > > On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> > >>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
> > >> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective
> > >> experience
> > >> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> > >> behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of
> > >> first
> > >> person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show
> > >> up
> > >> the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see
> > >> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of
> > >> electrical fenomena interacting with each other.
>
> > >>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> > >> person experience.
>
> > > In all your reasoning you implicitely use "consciousness" for example
> > when
> > > you
> > > says "When you claim that you have the subjective experience
> > > of first person, *I* can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> > > behaviour."
>
> > > Who/what is "I" ? Who/what is seeing ? What does it means for you to see
> > > if
> > > you have no inner representation of what you (hmmm if you're not
> > > conscious,
> > > you is not an appropriate word) see, what does it means to see at all ?
>
> > > In all your reasonning you allude to "I", this is what 1st pov is about
> > > not
> > > about you (the conscious being/knower) looking at another person as if
> > > there
> > > was no obsever (means you) in the observation.
>
> > > Quentin
>
> > Our language is very primitive.  You can not decribe the reality with it.
>
> > If you have a computer robot with a camera and an arm, how should that
> > robot express it

Re: Asifism

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

What you're referring to, is another problem, namely the "other's mind". how
we know that another human is experiencing what we do? We actually assume
that to be true, that everyone has consciousness.
But it doesn't justify the other mistake. This does not mean you can deny
your possible(!) consciousness.

"What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some sort
of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective experience of
first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of first
person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show up
the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see that
there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of electrical
fenomena interacting with each other.

There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
person experience."

Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of
view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY behavior. It's ONE'S own
perception of his OWN experience matters! and it is more obvious than any
other fact.

On 6/19/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> >
> > On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> >>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
> >> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective
> >> experience
> >> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> >> behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of
> >> first
> >> person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show
> >> up
> >> the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see
> >> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of
> >> electrical fenomena interacting with each other.
> >>
> >>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> >> person experience.
> >
> > In all your reasoning you implicitely use "consciousness" for example
> when
> > you
> > says "When you claim that you have the subjective experience
> > of first person, *I* can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> > behaviour."
> >
> > Who/what is "I" ? Who/what is seeing ? What does it means for you to see
> > if
> > you have no inner representation of what you (hmmm if you're not
> > conscious,
> > you is not an appropriate word) see, what does it means to see at all ?
> >
> > In all your reasonning you allude to "I", this is what 1st pov is about
> > not
> > about you (the conscious being/knower) looking at another person as if
> > there
> > was no obsever (means you) in the observation.
> >
> > Quentin
>
> Our language is very primitive.  You can not decribe the reality with it.
>
> If you have a computer robot with a camera and an arm, how should that
> robot express itself to descibe what it observes?  Could the robot say: "I
> see a red brick and a blue brick, och when I take the blue brick and
> places it on the red brick, then I see that the blue brick is over the red
> brick."?
>
> But if the robot says this, then you will say that this proves that the
> robot is conscious, because it uses the word "I".
>
> How shall the robot express itself, so it will be correct?  It this
> possible?  Or is our language incapable of expressing reality?
>
> We human beings are slaves under our language.  The language restricts out
> thinking.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
>
> >
>


-- 

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,
Sharif University of Technology,
Tehran.

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Re: Asifism

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Jun 20, 2007 at 02:22:20AM +0800, Mark Peaty wrote:
> 
> I heard someone on the radio the other day saying that Moore's 
> Law [doubling every 2 years] predicts that computers in about 
> 2050 will have gross processing power similar to that of the 
> human brain. Well the architecture may be a bit of a hurdle, but 
> then again if each generation of computers acquires software 
> enabling them to participate in, if not actually direct, the 
> design of the next generation, it is feasible that during the 
> second half of the 21Century some computers may start asking US 
> why we think we are conscious.
> 

Yes, except that its actually about 2020. We already have simulation
of a mouse brain about 10 times slower than realtime, on a
big IBM supercomputer. And Moore's law is actually doubling every 18
months, not 2 years (perhaps that explains the discrepancy in the
figures).

By about 2035, or so, your average PC will have the computational
power to simulate a human brain.

I don't believe computational power is enough, and that significant
software hurdles need to be overcome, but it is believable that this
could happen on that sort of time scale (assuming Moore's law doesn't
peter out).

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Asifism

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can
> make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are
> enough complicated.
  But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how
 you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavior 
 that a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this first
 person experience.

  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
 sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective
 experience of first person", I can see that you are just showing a
 special kind of behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective
 experience of first person".  And it is possible for an enough
 complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour.  But in the
 case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective
 experience", there are just a lot of electrical fenomena interacting
 with each other.

  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
 person experience.

  --
  Torgny Tholerus
>>> Like I said earlier, this is pure nonsense as I have proof that I have
>>> inner experience... I can't prove it to you because this is what this is
>>> all about, you can't prove 1st person pov to others. And I don't see why
>>> the fact that a computer is made of wire can't give it consciousness...
>>> there is no implication at all.
>>>
>>> Again denying the phenomena does not make it disappear... it's no
>>> explanation at all.
>>>
>>> Quentin
>> I think the point is that after all the behavior is explained, including
>> brain processes,  we will just say, "See, that's the consciousness there." 
>> Just as after explaining metabolism and growth and reproduction we said,
>> "See, that's life."  Some people still wanted to know where the "life"
>> (i.e. "elan vital") was, but it seemed to be an uninteresting question of
>> semantics.
>>
>> Brent Meeker
> 
> I don't think the comparison is fair... between 'elan vital' and 
> consciousness. 

I think it is fair.  Remember that in prospect people argued that chemistry and 
physics could never explain life no matter how completely they described the 
physical processes in a living thing.  All those cells and molecules and atoms 
were inanimate, none of them had life - so they couldn't possibly explain the 
difference between alive and dead.

>I don't think consciousness is just a semantic question. 

I didn't mean to imply that.  I meant that the residual question, after all the 
behavior and processes are explained (answering very substantive questions) 
will seem to be a matter of making semantic distinctions, like the question, 
"Is a virus alive?"

>As I 
> don't believe that you could pin point consciousness... until proved 
> otherwise.

No it won't be pin pointed.  It will be diffuse, an interaction of multiple 
sensory and action processes and you won't be able to point to a single 
location.  But, if we do succeed with our explanation, maybe we'll be able to 
say, "This being is conscious of this now and not conscious of that." or "This 
being does not have self-awareness and this one does."  And "conscious" and 
"aware" will have well defined operational ("3rd person") meanings.

Or maybe we'll discover that we have to talk in some other terms not yet 
invented, just as our predecessors had to stop talking about "animate" and 
"inanimate" and instead talk about "metabolism" and "replication".

Brent Meeker
"One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before
having solved it."
   --- Carl Ludwig Siegel

> 
> Quentin
> 
> > 
> 
> 


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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:21:10 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Our language is very primitive.  You can not decribe the reality with it.
>
> If you have a computer robot with a camera and an arm, how should that
> robot express itself to descibe what it observes?  Could the robot say: "I
> see a red brick and a blue brick, och when I take the blue brick and
> places it on the red brick, then I see that the blue brick is over the red
> brick."?

It depends on the pov of the robots... but if after all turing test like I 
could do against him, I'm not able to differentiate it with a human being... 
I have to conclude it has consciousness, because to tell otherwise I would 
need a proof that he's not conscious, and the only possible proof is that 
I'll be able to differentiate it through 3rd persons tests, or we've just 
said that it succeed every tests.

it is not the usage of the word 'I', it's all the concept related to it and 
the understanding at a personal level of the word from the teller that 
matter.

Quentin


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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> >>  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
> >>> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can
> >>> make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are
> >>> enough complicated.
> >>
> >>  But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how
> >> you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavior 
> >> that a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this first
> >> person experience.
> >>
> >>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
> >> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective
> >> experience of first person", I can see that you are just showing a
> >> special kind of behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective
> >> experience of first person".  And it is possible for an enough
> >> complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour.  But in the
> >> case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective
> >> experience", there are just a lot of electrical fenomena interacting
> >> with each other.
> >>
> >>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> >> person experience.
> >>
> >>  --
> >>  Torgny Tholerus
> >
> > Like I said earlier, this is pure nonsense as I have proof that I have
> > inner experience... I can't prove it to you because this is what this is
> > all about, you can't prove 1st person pov to others. And I don't see why
> > the fact that a computer is made of wire can't give it consciousness...
> > there is no implication at all.
> >
> > Again denying the phenomena does not make it disappear... it's no
> > explanation at all.
> >
> > Quentin
>
> I think the point is that after all the behavior is explained, including
> brain processes,  we will just say, "See, that's the consciousness there." 
> Just as after explaining metabolism and growth and reproduction we said,
> "See, that's life."  Some people still wanted to know where the "life"
> (i.e. "elan vital") was, but it seemed to be an uninteresting question of
> semantics.
>
> Brent Meeker

I don't think the comparison is fair... between 'elan vital' and 
consciousness. I don't think consciousness is just a semantic question. As I 
don't believe that you could pin point consciousness... until proved 
otherwise.

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

TT; ' You behave as if you have "the subjective
> experience of first person". And it is possible for an enough
> complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour.  But in the 
> case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective 
> experience", there are just a lot of electrical phenomena interacting 
> with each other.
> 
> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first 
> person experience.

MP: But surely, if the computer is complicated enough to show up 
'THE EXACT SAME' behaviour, then we do not know that 'there is 
no first person experience'.

This is the very paradox of experience; the argument from 
behaviour cuts BOTH ways.

The danger comes from putting that little word "just" in the 
sentence. The fact is if there are a lot of electrical phenomena 
[a really, really, BIG lot] then it is quite feasible that the 
system may be responding to its own responses, as the 
behaviourists like to say. I think the wisely placed betting 
money is mainly going to that logical structure as prerequisite 
for sentience of any sort. The embodiment, though, would need to 
be in a massively parallel, multiply recursive, autonomous 
learning system in order to have sufficient scope and depth of 
experience to deal with interesting questions.

I heard someone on the radio the other day saying that Moore's 
Law [doubling every 2 years] predicts that computers in about 
2050 will have gross processing power similar to that of the 
human brain. Well the architecture may be a bit of a hurdle, but 
then again if each generation of computers acquires software 
enabling them to participate in, if not actually direct, the 
design of the next generation, it is feasible that during the 
second half of the 21Century some computers may start asking US 
why we think we are conscious.

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>> >The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can 
>> make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are 
>> enough complicated.
>>
>> But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see 
>> how you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the 
>> behavior  that a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is 
>> this first person experience.
> What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some 
> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective 
> experience of first person", I can see that you are just showing a 
> special kind of behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective 
> experience of first person".  And it is possible for an enough 
> complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour.  But in the 
> case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective 
> experience", there are just a lot of electrical fenomena interacting 
> with each other.
> 
> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first 
> person experience.
> 
> -- 
> Torgny Tholerus
> 
> > 

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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

>
> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
>> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective
>> experience
>> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
>> behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of
>> first
>> person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show
>> up
>> the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see
>> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of
>> electrical fenomena interacting with each other.
>>
>>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
>> person experience.
>
> In all your reasoning you implicitely use "consciousness" for example when
> you
> says "When you claim that you have the subjective experience
> of first person, *I* can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> behaviour."
>
> Who/what is "I" ? Who/what is seeing ? What does it means for you to see
> if
> you have no inner representation of what you (hmmm if you're not
> conscious,
> you is not an appropriate word) see, what does it means to see at all ?
>
> In all your reasonning you allude to "I", this is what 1st pov is about
> not
> about you (the conscious being/knower) looking at another person as if
> there
> was no obsever (means you) in the observation.
>
> Quentin

Our language is very primitive.  You can not decribe the reality with it.

If you have a computer robot with a camera and an arm, how should that
robot express itself to descibe what it observes?  Could the robot say: "I
see a red brick and a blue brick, och when I take the blue brick and
places it on the red brick, then I see that the blue brick is over the red
brick."?

But if the robot says this, then you will say that this proves that the
robot is conscious, because it uses the word "I".

How shall the robot express itself, so it will be correct?  It this
possible?  Or is our language incapable of expressing reality?

We human beings are slaves under our language.  The language restricts out
thinking.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>>> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can make
>>> computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
>>> complicated.
>>  But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how
>> you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavior  that
>> a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this first person
>> experience.
>>
>>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
>> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective experience
>> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
>> behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of first
>> person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show up
>> the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see
>> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of
>> electrical fenomena interacting with each other.
>>
>>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
>> person experience.
>>
>>  --
>>  Torgny Tholerus
> 
> Like I said earlier, this is pure nonsense as I have proof that I have inner 
> experience... I can't prove it to you because this is what this is all about, 
> you can't prove 1st person pov to others. And I don't see why the fact that a 
> computer is made of wire can't give it consciousness... there is no 
> implication at all.
> 
> Again denying the phenomena does not make it disappear... it's no explanation 
> at all.
> 
> Quentin

I think the point is that after all the behavior is explained, including brain 
processes,  we will just say, "See, that's the consciousness there."  Just as 
after explaining metabolism and growth and reproduction we said, "See, that's 
life."  Some people still wanted to know where the "life" (i.e. "elan vital") 
was, but it seemed to be an uninteresting question of semantics.

Brent Meeker 

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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>>>The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can make
>>> computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
>>> complicated.
>
>>  But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how
>> you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavior  that
>> a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this first person
>> experience.
>
>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective experience
> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of first
> person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show up
> the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see
> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of
> electrical fenomena interacting with each other.
>
>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> person experience.
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus

In all your reasoning you implicitely use "consciousness" for example when you 
says "When you claim that you have the subjective experience
of first person, *I* can see that you are just showing a special kind of
behaviour."

Who/what is "I" ? Who/what is seeing ? What does it means for you to see if 
you have no inner representation of what you (hmmm if you're not conscious, 
you is not an appropriate word) see, what does it means to see at all ?

In all your reasonning you allude to "I", this is what 1st pov is about not 
about you (the conscious being/knower) looking at another person as if there 
was no obsever (means you) in the observation.

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hello again,

I mean your point could be made about the universe like this:

Something which exists is contained/located somewhere.
The universe is not contained nor located anywhere, therefore the universe 
does not exist.

This is a logical inconsistency and prove nothing, except that the logical 
reasoning above is wrong.

Quentin

On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
> >The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can make
> > computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
> > complicated.
>
>  But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how
> you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavior  that
> a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this first person
> experience.
>
>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective experience
> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of first
> person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show up
> the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see
> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of
> electrical fenomena interacting with each other.
>
>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> person experience.
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus
>
>  


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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
> >The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can make
> > computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
> > complicated.
>
>  But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how
> you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavior  that
> a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this first person
> experience.
>
>  What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
> sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective experience
> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of
> behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of first
> person".  And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show up
> the exact same behaviour.  But in the case of the computer, you can see
> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of
> electrical fenomena interacting with each other.
>
>  There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
> person experience.
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus

Like I said earlier, this is pure nonsense as I have proof that I have inner 
experience... I can't prove it to you because this is what this is all about, 
you can't prove 1st person pov to others. And I don't see why the fact that a 
computer is made of wire can't give it consciousness... there is no 
implication at all.

Again denying the phenomena does not make it disappear... it's no explanation 
at all.

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>The "subjective experience" is
just some sort of behaviour.  You can
make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are
enough complicated.
  
But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how
you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavior 
that a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this first
person experience.
  

What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some
sort of behaviour.  When you claim that you have "the subjective
experience of first person", I can see that you are just showing a
special kind of behaviour.  You behave as if you have "the subjective
experience of first person".  And it is possible for an enough
complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour.  But in the
case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective
experience", there are just a lot of electrical fenomena interacting
with each other.

There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first
person experience.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: Asifism

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

>The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can make
computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers are enough
complicated.

But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not see how you
reduce the subjective experience of first person to the behavior  that a
third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this first person
experience.


On 6/11/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>
> What is the subjective experience then?
>
> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can make
> computers show the same sort of behavior, if the computers are enough
> complicated.
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
>
> On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > The question, as I see it, is if there is anything "more" than just
> > atoms reacting with each other in our brains.  I claim that there is not
> > anything "more".  The atoms reacting with each other explain fully my (and
> > your...) behaviour.  Our brains are very complicated structures, but it is
> > nothing supernatural with them.  Physics explains everything.
> >
>
>
> >
>


-- 

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh

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Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

Yes that is the issue and I don't think I read all the postings 
on that thread at the time.
SP [Feb 21]: 'It is a complicated issue'

MP: Yep!

SP: 'So how do I know I'm not that special kind of
zombie or partial zombie now? I feel absolutely sure that I am 
not but then
I would think that, wouldn't I?'

MP: I think the way this asifism thread has been going, it looks 
like we have
A/  1POV which we experience and remember, and
B/  3POV which is a construction from inference and on-going, 
informal, Turing tests of everyone we know.

We can never _know for certain_ that the other person is aware 
of being here now in the same way that we ourselves are but we 
get a leg-up from the mirror neurons that seem able to recognise 
and emulate the behaviour sequences of people we see. [This is 
the basis of most human learning, and the brain-side locus of 
memetic existence, but that's another story.]

It is basically that people act like we do and share the same 
description of the world which leads us to believe they are 
conscious just like we are, and that's it! End of story; no 
rocket science involved.

For what it is worth, my current surmise on blindsight: the 
reason sufferers cannot report seeing the stimulus but seem to 
act as if they ARE seeing it/them is to do with timing; whatever 
it is that updates that part of their model of self in the world 
which would be *the representation of their 3D spatial 
relationship to the stimulus* is out of kilter.
Given that the strongest candidate for binding is synchronous, 
resonant, mutual and reciprocal stimulation patterns, my guess 
is that damage of some sort is preventing incorporation into the 
model of the resonance patterns which embody that/those 
aspects/s of the representation. I think that means the damage 
could be in 'white matter', ie the communication between 
cortical areas rather than within them. If the person is able to 
see other parts of their visual field clearly then _clearly_ 
there must be effective linkage between the visual cortex and 
the regions controlling eye movements. This implies that 
information _about_ stimuli in the blinded part of the visual 
field is available to some areas of visual cortex and thus  may 
also be available from there to temporal lobe regions dealing 
with language.

If the above is the case, and I reckon it is quite reasonable to 
think so, then what the blind sight patients describe is 
understandable. They can look for something which is described 
to them sufficiently for the verbal information to evoke the 
working memory storage of task and target information, and this 
can effect the kind of unconscious searching activity which we 
are used to. Well I am used to it any way! I hunt around the 
house or garden for something named and may have no clearly 
conscious pre-conceived image of it for example my offspring are 
forever misplacing hair brushes, shoes, and so forth and I often 
have the experience of looking at the place they turn out to be 
- which strangely enough is always the last place I think to 
look for them :-0 and the item just seems to appear out of nowhere.

The work of Benjamin Libet and others has shown that conscious 
registration of something usually follows about 0.4 or 0.5 
second after the primary sensory response occurs. With 
blindsight patients the primary sensory response is occurring 
and affecting various secondary areas in a useful way but not 
all of that is available to update the navigational self-model.

This ties in with Oliver Sachs's work with many patients who 
presented with unique and interesting deficiencies of awareness 
who's autopsies revealed specific lesions within their brains. 
It conforms with the idea that conscious mental experience is 
what it is like to be certain processes within the brain. It 
does not conform with the idea that a 'zombie' could be an 
effective member of society. The key issue is that in order to 
function as an effective, self-preserving, autonomous being, a 
human has to be able to review her actions as soon as they occur 
and be able to correct and behaviour that is sub optimal or not 
in line with prior planning. Consciousness is simply what it is 
like to be this reviewing process.


Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 10/06/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> *   But I agree also that you are highly unlikely to come across
> someone who can truthfully say 'I am not conscious'. It seems
> totally self-contradictory: for example a person not just with
> 'hemi' neglect, but total neglect. How could such a person
> encounter themselves or the world?
> Or is there the possibility of something like so-called
> blindsight in every sensory modality? For example: deaf-hearing,
> numb-sensing, proprio-non-ception? This would imply a zombie
> [without 'a life

Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

On Thursday 14 June 2007 15:08:15 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> > 2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> >> If a rock shows the same behavior as a human being, then you should be
> >> able to use the same words ("know", believe", "think") to describe this
> >> behaviour.
> >
> > If the rock know something and it behaves like it knows it, then it is
> > conscious.
>
> If the rock does *not* know anything, *but* the rock behaves as if it
> knows it, then it is reasonable to say that "the rock knows it".


I don't understand at all what it could means... The only thing you can 
account with a 3rd pov is *behavior* and only that ! so if it acts like, it 
is.

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 14, 2:08 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> If the rock does *not* know anything, *but* the rock behaves as if it
> knows it, then it is reasonable to say that "the rock knows it".

Ah, but of course it is *not* reasonable to say this.  You account is
an 'action-only' account.  Consequently, it is 'reasonable' in such an
account to say only that the rock *acts* in a certain way.  You are
falling into a massive category error in appropriating an outcome such
as 'knowing', that supervenes on 'sensing', the prerequisite of
action, to a partial 'action-only' account.  Such 'action-only'
accounts are abstractions mediated by mental constructs - they are
*not* the reality to which they (partially) refer: if they were, such
a reality would be posited as 'relating' in the absence of 'sensing',
and thus 'knowing' would be cut out at the start.  But ask yourself:
are the semantics of a 'reality' that self-relates without self-
sensing coherent?  Can you 'react' to me without 'sensing' me?  If
not, then neither can the fundamental components on which you
supervene.

BTW, you are able to fall prey to such perceptual errors only because
your own mental activity supervenes on a sense-action substrate, like
the rest of us.  Get used to it!

David

> Quentin Anciaux skrev:> 2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> If a rock shows the same behavior as a human being, then you should be able
> >> to use the same words ("know", believe", "think") to describe this
> >> behaviour.
>
> > If the rock know something and it behaves like it knows it, then it is
> > conscious.
>
> If the rock does *not* know anything, *but* the rock behaves as if it
> knows it, then it is reasonable to say that "the rock knows it".
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> 2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>   
>> If a rock shows the same behavior as a human being, then you should be able
>> to use the same words ("know", believe", "think") to describe this
>> behaviour.
>> 
> If the rock know something and it behaves like it knows it, then it is
> conscious.
>   
If the rock does *not* know anything, *but* the rock behaves as if it 
knows it, then it is reasonable to say that "the rock knows it".

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 14, 12:19 pm, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
> believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
> conscious, there is no 'me', no 'I', so there exists no 'person like
> you' because then you're not a person.

Quentin, ISTM that your exchanges with Torgny and Stathis demonstrate
at points an all too prevalent experience of determinedly using the
same words to mean divergent things, often with the lack of definite
result.  In my dialogue with Bruno, I'm attempting to re-construct
'from the ground up' the semantics of 'exist', 'sense' and 'act',
amongst other key terms, in order that it may then be possible to re-
construct consistent meanings of 'know', 'believe', etc.  If there is
no agreement on such fundamentals, then these higher-order 'emergents'
are simply undefined.

>From this perspective, I agree with you that a non-conscious entity
can neither 'know' nor 'believe'.  This is because a 'conscious'
entity is a participatory emergent supervening directly on fundamental
'sense-action', whereas Torgny's 'action-only' account could supervene
only on a domain in which 'action' is conceived as occurring in the
absence of 'sensing' between elements (i.e. like 'windowless monads'
that would require divine coordination).  If this is coherent
semantically (in other words logically tenable - which I doubt), such
a domain would necessarily be disconnected from our own in such a way
that Occam would demand its total discount by us.  Torgny, of course,
could not be communicating with us were he a participant in such a
domain, and in any case it is a category error of the first magnitude
to appropriate to such a domain outcomes (e.g. 'knowing') that
supervene on the 'sense' prerequisite of 'action'.

A computer or a rock could be counted as 'knowing' or 'believing' if
its behaviour were consistent with this, and moreover if the internal
causal organisation generating the knowing-believing-action sequence
emerged directly (i.e. supervened on)  fundamental levels of sense-
action.  Insofar as its behaviour was dependent on a 'software'
account, this would not hold, as 'software causality' is merely an
external imputation supplied by us, not one emerging organically from
the entity itself.  Our own knowing-believing-action sequences have
evolved from (and supervene on) such fundamental sense-action, and can
rely on no distinguished 'software account' (as an infinite number of
such accounts could be imputed to the activity of our brains).

David

> 2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
>
>
> >  Bruno Marchal skrev:
>
> > Le 07-juin-07, à 15:47, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>
> > What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny the
> > existence of the consciousness?
> >  An eliminativist.
> >  "Eliminativist" is not a good term for persons like me, because that term
> > implies that you are eliminating an important part of reality.  But you
> > can't eliminate something that does not exists.  If you don't believe in
> > ghosts, are you then an eliminativist?  If you don't believe in Santa Claus,
> > are you then an eliminativist, eliminating Santa Claus?
>
> >  --
> >  Torgny Tholerus
>
> Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
> believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
> conscious, there is no 'me', no 'I', so there exists no 'person like
> you' because then you're not a person.
>
> Quentin


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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>  Quentin Anciaux skrev:
>  2007/6/14, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>  On 14/06/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
> believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
> conscious, there is no 'me', no 'I', so there exists no 'person like
> you' because then you're not a person.
>  Sure, but Torgny is just displaying the person-like behaviour of claiming
> to
> be a person.
>
>  Yes, in this case his writing is just garbage because it doesn't have
> any meaning. I can't understand what it means for an unconscious thing
> (for example a rock) to know something, to believe in something, to
> have thought (especially this one, because it could be a definition of
> consciousness, ie: something which has thought).
>
>  If the rock behaves as if it knows something (if you say something to the
> rock, and the rock gives you an intelligent answer), then you can say that
> the rock knows something.  When the rock behaves as if it believes in
> something, then you can say that the rock believes in something.  If the
> rock behaves as if it has thought, then you can say that the rock has
> thought.
>
>  If a rock shows the same behavior as a human being, then you should be able
> to use the same words ("know", believe", "think") to describe this
> behaviour.
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus

If the rock know something and it behaves like it knows it, then it is
conscious.

Consciousness is that from a third person pov... nobody can know
others consciousness, conscious experience is a 1st person pov, and by
this not communicable in its entirety. I will never know what it is
like to be Torgny like you'll never know what it is like to be me,
these things are not 3rd person communicable in there entirety. You
must be it to know it.

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

Quentin Anciaux skrev:

  2007/6/14, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
  
  
On 14/06/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

  Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
conscious, there is no 'me', no 'I', so there exists no 'person like
you' because then you're not a person.

Sure, but Torgny is just displaying the person-like behaviour of claiming to
be a person.

  
  Yes, in this case his writing is just garbage because it doesn't have
any meaning. I can't understand what it means for an unconscious thing
(for example a rock) to know something, to believe in something, to
have thought (especially this one, because it could be a definition of
consciousness, ie: something which has thought).
  

If the rock behaves as if it knows something (if you say something to
the rock, and the rock gives you an intelligent answer), then you can
say that the rock knows something.  When the rock behaves as if it
believes in something, then you can say that the rock believes in
something.  If the rock behaves as if it has thought, then you can say
that the rock has thought.

If a rock shows the same behavior as a human being, then you should be
able to use the same words ("know", believe", "think") to describe this
behaviour.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

2007/6/14, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> On 14/06/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > >  "Eliminativist" is not a good term for persons like me, because that
> term
> > > implies that you are eliminating an important part of reality.  But you
> > > can't eliminate something that does not exists.  If you don't believe in
> > > ghosts, are you then an eliminativist?  If you don't believe in Santa
> Claus,
> > > are you then an eliminativist, eliminating Santa Claus?
> > >
> > >  --
> > >  Torgny Tholerus
> >
> > Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
> > believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
> > conscious, there is no 'me', no 'I', so there exists no 'person like
> > you' because then you're not a person.
> >
> Sure, but Torgny is just displaying the person-like behaviour of claiming to
> be a person.

Yes, in this case his writing is just garbage because it doesn't have
any meaning. I can't understand what it means for an unconscious thing
(for example a rock) to know something, to believe in something, to
have thought (especially this one, because it could be a definition of
consciousness, ie: something which has thought).

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 14/06/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


> >  "Eliminativist" is not a good term for persons like me, because that
> term
> > implies that you are eliminating an important part of reality.  But you
> > can't eliminate something that does not exists.  If you don't believe in
> > ghosts, are you then an eliminativist?  If you don't believe in Santa
> Claus,
> > are you then an eliminativist, eliminating Santa Claus?
> >
> >  --
> >  Torgny Tholerus
>
> Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
> believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
> conscious, there is no 'me', no 'I', so there exists no 'person like
> you' because then you're not a person.
>
Sure, but Torgny is just displaying the person-like behaviour of claiming to
be a person.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

2007/6/14, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>  Bruno Marchal skrev:
>
> Le 07-juin-07, à 15:47, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
>
> What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny the
> existence of the consciousness?
>  An eliminativist.
>  "Eliminativist" is not a good term for persons like me, because that term
> implies that you are eliminating an important part of reality.  But you
> can't eliminate something that does not exists.  If you don't believe in
> ghosts, are you then an eliminativist?  If you don't believe in Santa Claus,
> are you then an eliminativist, eliminating Santa Claus?
>
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus

Sure but I still don't understand what could mean 'to know', 'to
believe' for an entity which is not conscious. Also if you're not
conscious, there is no 'me', no 'I', so there exists no 'person like
you' because then you're not a person.

Quentin

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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

Bruno Marchal skrev:
Le 07-juin-07, à 15:47, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :
  
  What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that
totally deny
the existence of the consciousness?
  
An eliminativist.
  

"Eliminativist" is not a good term for persons like me, because that
term implies that you are eliminating an important part of reality. 
But you can't eliminate something that does not exists.  If you don't
believe in ghosts, are you then an eliminativist?  If you don't believe
in Santa Claus, are you then an eliminativist, eliminating Santa Claus?

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 12, 2:01 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> > If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
>
> We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
> (Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
> reflexivity power of the number's themselves.

I simply meant that in AR numbers 'assert themselves', in that they
are taken as being (in some sense) primitive rather than being merely
mental constructs (intuitionism, I think?)  Is this not so?

> OK (but again the "symmetry-breaking" is a consequence (too be sure
> there remains technical problems ...)

I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking'  the differentiating of an 'AR
field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'.  My
fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'.  The notion of
a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
'parts' separated by 'nothing'.  The quotes I have sprinkled so
liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
feel need to be accounted for somehow.  'Parts' (particles, digits)
then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
continuum.  Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?

> Actually if COMP does not give the right physics, that would be
> interesting too. In such a case we could use comp and experimental
> physics to measure somehow the degree of non-computability, well not of
> the physical world which is necessary not completely computable with
> the comp hyp, but of our mind. But of course if comp leads directly to
> the right physics, that would be nice, sure.

Agreed.  But actually I meant that you would wish it to be an
empirical matter (rather than Father Jack's 'ecumenical' one!)

It seems to me that overall in this exchange we seem to be more in
agreement than sometimes formerly. Would you still describe my
position as positing 'consciousness' as primitive?  That's not my own
intuition. Rather, I'm trying to reverse the finger we point towards
the 'external' world when we seek to indicate the direction of 'what
exists'. I'm also stressing the immediacy of the mutual 'grasp' that
self-motivates the elements of what is real, and which constitutes
simultaneously their 'awareness' and their 'causal power' - and
consequently our own.  Beyond this, we seem to be in substantial
agreement that all complexity, including of course reflexive self-
consciousness', is necessarily a higher-order emergent from such basic
givens (which seem to me, in some form at least, intuitively
unavoidable).

David

> Le 11-juin-07, à 13:24, David Nyman wrote in part: (I agree with the
> non quoted part) 
>
> > Are we any closer to agreement, mutatis terminoligical mutandis?  My
> > scheme does not take 'matter' to be fundamental, but rather an
> > emergent (with 'mind') from something prior that possesses the
> > characteristics of self-assertion, self-sensing, and self-action.  I
> > posit these because they are what is (Occamishly) required to save the
> > appearances.
>
> ... And here too.
>
> > If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
>
> We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
> (Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
> reflexivity power of the number's themselves.
>
> > with
> > its intrinsic (arithmetical) set of symmetry-breaking axioms,
>
> OK (but again the "symmetry-breaking" is a consequence (too be sure
> there remains technical problems ...)
>
> > then
> > COMP perhaps can stand for the process that drives this potential
> > towards emergent layers of self-action and self-sensing.
>
> Yes. Perhaps, indeed.
>
> > It then
> > becomes an empirical programme whether AR+COMP possesses the synthetic
> > power to save all the necessary phenomena.
>
> Exactly.
>
> > As you would wish it, I
> > imagine.
>
> Actually if COMP does not give the right physics, that would be
> interesting too. In such a case we could use comp and experimental
> physics to measure somehow the degree of non-computability, well not of
> the physical world which is necessary not completely computable with
> the comp hyp, but of our mind. But of course if comp leads directly to
> the right physics, that would be nice, sure.
>
> Bruno
>
> htttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Asifism

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 11-juin-07, à 13:24, David Nyman wrote in part: (I agree with the 
non quoted part) 

> Are we any closer to agreement, mutatis terminoligical mutandis?  My
> scheme does not take 'matter' to be fundamental, but rather an
> emergent (with 'mind') from something prior that possesses the
> characteristics of self-assertion, self-sensing, and self-action.  I
> posit these because they are what is (Occamishly) required to save the
> appearances.


... And here too.




> If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,


We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR 
(Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative 
reflexivity power of the number's themselves.





> with
> its intrinsic (arithmetical) set of symmetry-breaking axioms,


OK (but again the "symmetry-breaking" is a consequence (too be sure 
there remains technical problems ...)





> then
> COMP perhaps can stand for the process that drives this potential
> towards emergent layers of self-action and self-sensing.


Yes. Perhaps, indeed.



> It then
> becomes an empirical programme whether AR+COMP possesses the synthetic
> power to save all the necessary phenomena.


Exactly.




> As you would wish it, I
> imagine.

Actually if COMP does not give the right physics, that would be 
interesting too. In such a case we could use comp and experimental 
physics to measure somehow the degree of non-computability, well not of 
the physical world which is necessary not completely computable with 
the comp hyp, but of our mind. But of course if comp leads directly to 
the right physics, that would be nice, sure.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Consciousness and Consistency (was Re: Asifism)

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 11-juin-07, à 08:05, Tom Caylor a écrit :



>
> On Jun 10, 5:10 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> ...
>> After Godel, Lob,  I do think that comp is the best we can hope to
>> "save" the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia,
>> (first)-persons, and many notions like that.  Tthe "only" price: the
>> notion of matter looses is fundamental character, and we have to
>> explain matter without postulating it as usual ...). We have to come
>> back (assuming comp) to Plato, or better Plotinus, Proclus, ...
>>
>
> How is assuming comp any better than believing in the personal God?




Because in general it is hard to make third person testable statements 
on personal God. Also, with comp, machines HAVE TO be "theological 
machine". That is, comp does not prevent some "mystical" (true but 
unprovable) beliefs:  on the contrary, comp makes them obligatory (at 
least for the ideally correct machines).

With comp we can argue that consciousness is already such a mystical 
state. It is a state such that  you have "visions" making you belief in 
"a reality". Even cats can believe in invisible mouse, when hunting!

The closer thing to consciousness for the lobian machine is the "state 
of being consistent". With machine talking first order arithmetics, "to 
be consistent" can be identified (actually by 1930 Godel Completeness 
theorem) with "having a unameable reality" capable of satisfying your 
set of beliefs. and "to be consistent" belongs to machines' corona [G* 
minus G]. Indeed, by Godel second theorem, the machine statement "to be 
consistent" is true (as we can know for simple machine) but unprovable 
by the machine. After Godel we know that machine can understand/infer 
that any of their beliefs in a reality has to be theological, even the 
belief in a physical reality, or whatever.

Few people seems to realize the immensity of impact of Godel's 
discovery (to begin by Godel himself as compared to Emil Post or Alan 
Turing, ...). Before Godel, after the work of Cantor, mathematicians 
were hoping to secure the many use of infinities in math by the 
finistic use of their names in finistic theories. After Godel, we know 
that we cannot secure the finistic realm itself and that we have to 
invoke higher infinities just to talk on those finite things. Before 
Godel we could have believe that the infinite can be secure by the 
finite. After Godel we know we have to rely on the infinites just to 
get a tiny scratch idea of what the finite things are capable of. This 
has given rise to the branch of logic known as "model theory", for 
example, where infinite objects are used to give clues on finite 
theories.

Note that I am not equating consciousness and consistency. But I am 
open to the idea that consciousness is related to unconscious 
(automatic, preprogrommed) self-interrogation of self-consistency. This 
makes possible to interpret Helmholtz theory of perception (as 
unconscious bet) in the lobian self-referential discourses.

Because we got that "mystical state" at birth since most probably 
billions years, we tend to be a little blase about it, and this 
explains why we have to do some work to abstract from long-time 
prejudices, but then that is what science is all about (as Plato and 
Descartes have seen).

(For the "modalist", consciousness is not "Dt", but "Dt?". The 
interrogation mark remind that Dt belongs to G* minus G.)

I have to go by now and I will try to explain soon why such an 
inference of "Dt?" gives some advantage relatively to some very general 
relative survival goal (mainly it gives a relative speed-up) ...


> Comp seems like a lot of work.


Yes indeed. Two times more work than materialist are used to think. We 
have to isolate a "theory of mind" AND then, it remains to test the 
physical laws forced by that theory of mind, as the UDA and the 
arithmetical UDA justifies (or should justify).

But the scientific attitude always asks for "lot of works",as I just 
said above.

C'mon Tom, we are not in a Holiday club here, are we?

:)

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 1, 6:04 pm, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> I look at myself in the third person view.  I then see a lot of protons 
> reacting with eachother, and I see how they explain my behavior and the words 
> I produce.  I see how they cause me saying "I am conscious!  I have a free 
> will!  I am happy!".

Torgny, you give yourself away in the phrase 'I look at myself in the
third person view'.  The 3rd-person world thus revealed to you can
only be encountered in the way you describe within a 1st-person pov
where it is modelled and grasped.  Given that you directly refer to
this view in your justification, and further given that you have
passed, as far as I'm concerned, the Turing Test, you indeed do
possess such a 1st-person pov.  Consequently you are as conscious as I
am, and you are just doing what Galen Strawson calls 'looking-
glassing' - i.e. "using a term in such a way that whatever one means
by it, it excludes what the term means".

It is a category error of the first magnitude to believe that the 3rd-
person world simply exists 'out there by itself'. To claim this is to
try to claim that there is nothing, and nobody to care about it - the
ultimate attempt at self-defeating nihilism.  The source of the error
- ironically - is that it's the 1st-person pov alone that allows us to
create the 3rd-person models that we are then at liberty to mistake
for *that which is modelled*.  This very act conjures up the 'zombie
3rd-person world' *which exists only in our imagination* (what Bruno I
think calls 1st-person plural).  What is in fact 'out there' beyond
the 1st person - i.e. whatever is unconscious from one's own pov - is
*not* a 3rd-person world.  It is the rest of the *participatory*
world, within which one gets a vote solely in virtue of the fact that
one is emergently constituted by participatory 'elements'  (i.e.
process and structure).  These, by directly *grasping* each other,
without mediation, are the foundation of everything that 'knows' and
'acts'.

If you're not participating, you can't exist, or know, or act.  Sorry
- welcome to the club!

David

> Bruno Marchal skrev:Le 01-juin-07, à 14:35, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :The only 
> thing that exists is a lot of protons, neutrons, and electrons reacting with 
> each other inside my brain.Are you *sure*?
> By the way, are you more sure about proton than about your belief in proton? 
> What would that mean?
> I look at myself in the third person view.  I then see a lot of protons 
> reacting with eachother, and I see how they explain my behavior and the words 
> I produce.  I see how they cause me saying "I am conscious!  I have a free 
> will!  I am happy!".  This is all that is.  This explains everything.
> --
> Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Asifism

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 11/06/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Mark Peaty skrev:
> > * Then again it may be that I have misunderstood TT's grammar
> > and that what he is denying is simply the separate existence of
> > something called 'consciousness'. If that be the case then I
> > would not argue because I agree that the subjective impression
> > of being here now is simply what it is like to be part of the
> > processing the brain does, ie updating the model of self in the
> > world.
> >
> Yes, I simpy deny the separate existence of something called
> 'consciousness'.


You could deny that there is any difference between conscious behaviour and
conscious-like behaviour, equivalent to denying the *separate* existence of
consciousness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

Mark Peaty skrev:
> MP: There is possibly a loose end or two here and perhaps 
> clarification is needed, yet again:
>
> * Or this could conceivably be construed as a 'state of grace' 
> in that Torgny is operating with no mental capacity being wasted 
> on self-talk or internal commentary: 'just doing' whatever needs 
> to be done and 'just being' what he needs to be; very Zen!
>   
To discuss the nature of consciousness is waste of time, because 
consciousness or mind is not an entity that exists in the real world.  
The only thing that exists in the real world is matter.  What you can 
talk about is consciouslike behaviour, objects that behave as if they 
were conscious, objects that claim that they are conscious.
> * Then again it may be that I have misunderstood TT's grammar 
> and that what he is denying is simply the separate existence of 
> something called 'consciousness'. If that be the case then I 
> would not argue because I agree that the subjective impression 
> of being here now is simply what it is like to be part of the 
> processing the brain does, ie updating the model of self in the 
> world.
>   
Yes, I simpy deny the separate existence of something called 
'consciousness'.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus



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Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 10, 1:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Up to here comp basically agree (modulo misunderstanding of my part,
> sure).
> I mean that what you say is not just consistent with comp (which is not
> a lot after Godel: even inconsistency is consistent with comp!) but
> probably near truth.

Phew!  This will help with what follows, I hope.

> Well, perhaps OK, unless by field you assume geometry at the start.
> (Geometry like physics is secondary with comp).
> You could perhaps elaborate of what you mean by field.

In this case by 'field' I simply mean a self-asserting (i.e.
primitive) subjective ground (in my view equating to the least we can
say about existence per se) conceived as logically prior to any
differentiation.  Thereafter we and all phenomena (including geometry)
emerge by some self-motivated action of symmetry breaking (e.g.
vibrating strings, COMP?).  Field may well be the wrong word.

> Careful: comp cannot equate consciousness and computation. It can only
> "equate" consciousness with higher order emergent modality (emergent on
> a continuum of computations).

Yes, I agree, in the sense of 'reflexive self-consciousness'. I meant
rather that no consciousness of whatever sort can be associated with
purely 'computational' processes within a 'physical computer', as
opposed to those actions that emerge 'organically' from self-acting
processes of symmetry breaking.  In my scheme, the sense-action that
we experience as conscious subjects (and that of everything else we
observe) must inherit its awareness ('sense') and its causal power
('action') directly from fundamental self-sensing and self-acting
symmetry-breaking.

> > The reason is that computational
> > 'causation' depends on the introjection of 'rules' from a context
> > external to the computed 'world',
>
> I don't see why.

My use of the term 'self' here is intended (Occamishly) to halt
explanatory regression, and this is why we must not rely on superadded
'rules' coming from 'outside the system' (if so, we must go 'further
out' to incorporate them). 'Computation', in the sense of the
programmed action of a 'physical computer', exists only at a
metaphorical level, one that we *impute* to the behaviour of a system,
rather than one which emerges from its intrinsic sense-action.  In
this sense, the 'rules of programmed behaviour' are introjected from
our mental context, which is *external* to the computer itself.

> > and hence loses contact both with
> > intrinsic causal self-motivation and the fundamental linkage of felt-
> > sense and action.
>
> You are quick here ...

Have I slowed down at all? What I'm saying is that as layers of
phenomena emerge self-actingly and self-sensingly (self-graspingly?),
a distinction must always be made between what is an 'organic'
emergent - which can be the basis for quasi-independent sensing and
acting, inherited directly from the fundamental level - and what is an
imputed or metaphorical narrative - meaning it exists merely as a
model *within* an organic emergent. In that sense it has 'lost
contact' with the direct sense-action from which all higher-level
sensing and action emerge.  All the content of our consciousness
exists in the form of such narratives, models or metaphors - my
*model* of 'Bruno' doesn't have independent consciousness *as such*.
Likewise, a 'program' (whether intended by a programmer, or imputed to
random activity) is merely a mental introject imposed *by us* on
organic action whose intrinsic felt-sense is independent of this
interpretation.

If you'll bear with me, Bruno, it may be possible to reconcile my
scheme with AR+COMP.  The 'realism' of AR posits that everything real
(necessarily including the subjectively real) emerges from what is
axiomatically intrinsic to AR.  ISTM then that the self-sensing, self-
acting process of differentiation or symmetry-breaking looks like the
detailed working-out of AR's 'active potential' through COMP.  I
really feel that much of this is an implicit aspect of your scheme,
because, by analogy with my argument above, AR+COMP *must* be
(Occamishly) self-sensing, self-acting and self-justifying so that we
who are posited to emerge from it can inherit precisely those
characteristics. Else, we would have nothing left but a perversely
incoherent appeal to something 'external' to this universe of
explanation.

If one uses 'computation' in the sense merely of the behaviour of a
'physical' computer (already a higher-level emergent in either
scheme), then purely metaphorical interpretations of its behaviour do
indeed 'lose contact', as I argue above, with its organically
inherited self-sense-action.  But if by 'computation' we mean the
fundamental emergence of phenomena by AR+COMP, then in such a scheme
we retain the ability to track self-sense-action through layers of
emergence.  We can also differentiate those narratives which 'exist'
metaphorically as mental models and hence could never account for real
states of existence-consciousn

Re: Asifism

[Quentin Anciaux]

The question was "what's in your head...?"

If you don't have subjective (inner) experiences... then yes, you are
a zombie, and you should go to a museum... You 'll be then the first
real zombie on earth !

Quentin


2007/6/11, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>  Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
> What is the subjective experience then?
>  The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can make
> computers show the same sort of behavior, if the computers are enough
> complicated.
>  --
>  Torgny Tholerus
>
>
>
> On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > The question, as I see it, is if there is anything "more" than just atoms
> reacting with each other in our brains.  I claim that there is not anything
> "more".  The atoms reacting with each other explain fully my (and your...)
> behaviour.  Our brains are very complicated structures, but it is nothing
> supernatural with them.  Physics explains everything.
> >
>
>
>  >
>

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Re: Asifism

[Torgny Tholerus]

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
What is the subjective experience then?

The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour.  You can
make computers show the same sort of behavior, if the computers are
enough complicated.
-- 
Torgny Tholerus

  On 6/8/07, Torgny
Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
  
The question, as I see it, is
if there is anything "more" than just
atoms reacting with each other in our brains.  I claim that there is
not anything "more".  The atoms reacting with each other explain fully
my (and your...) behaviour.  Our brains are very complicated
structures, but it is nothing supernatural with them.  Physics explains
everything.

  
  



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Re: Asifism

[Tom Caylor]

On Jun 10, 5:10 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> ...
> After Godel, Lob,  I do think that comp is the best we can hope to
> "save" the notion of consciousness, free will, responsibility, qualia,
> (first)-persons, and many notions like that.  Tthe "only" price: the
> notion of matter looses is fundamental character, and we have to
> explain matter without postulating it as usual ...). We have to come
> back (assuming comp) to Plato, or better Plotinus, Proclus, ...
>

How is assuming comp any better than believing in the personal God?
Comp seems like a lot of work.

Tom


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Re: Asifism

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 10-juin-07, à 01:49, David Nyman a écrit :

>
> On Jun 9, 2:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Le 08-juin-07, à 18:39, Jef Allbright a écrit :
>
>> I don't believe that people in this list would take consciousness as a
>> primary reality, except perhaps those who singles out the third
>> "universal soul" hypostasis (the first person, alias the one described
>> by Bp & p in the lobian interview) like George Levy, David, etc.
>
> Since my name has popped up I'll stop lurking and come clean!  I've
> been thinking about this again since reading Galen Strawson's recent
> defence of 'panpsychism' in "Consciousness and its place in Nature".
> His view is that any 'emergent' phenomenon must supervene on
> fundamental properties of the same type - e.g. 'liquidity' is a
> characteristic behaviour of a fluid that simply supervenes on the
> objective characteristics of its constituent molecules, which in turn
> supervenes on quantum-level phenomena and so on down to superstrings
> or whatever.  But there is no analogous narrative in which it is
> correspondingly obvious that 1st-person *experience* should ever
> 'emerge' from any objective or 3rd-person description, in his view.
>
> Also in mine.  Reviewing some of my earlier posts on this subject, I
> would now say that my view is that our 1st-person experience is
> privileged direct evidence (i.e. the *only* direct evidence we have)
> that we, and all phenomena of which we are aware, emerge through
> differentiation of a subjective existential field. Such
> differentiation may be termed 'sense-action', because it is
> simultaneously the self-sensing relationships of (what Strawson terms)
> 'ultimates' (e.g. vibrational strings) that emerge through
> differentiation, and the source of all action and structure.  We
> abstract our notion of 'physical law' from the inter-relations of such
> ultimates, but it is crucial that we do not concretise such 'law' as
> some real superadded influence introjected from 'outside' the
> existential field.  Rather, we take the field for what it is, and
> accept that it feels and does as we find it.  This is simply wielding
> Occam's razor with precision to prevent an infinite regress of
> 'explanation'. Ultimately, to preserve the appearances, existence must
> necessarily be self-actualising , self-motivating, and self-sensing.
>
> By rooting sense-action in the ultimates, we can now embed our own
> intuitive sensing and motivation firmly where it needs to be in
> ultimate reality.  Fundamentally, we do what we do for (something
> like) the reasons we believe, and we feel what we feel because that is
> (something like) how reality ultimately feels about it.  Our actions
> emerge from ultimate action, and our sensing emerges from ultimate
> sensing.  This is crucial for questions of 'free will' and suffering
> (which I do not put in scare quotes).  Our 'will' is a complex
> emergent of ultimate will-to-action, and our painful experiences are
> directly inherited from underlying layers of sense-action that
> simultaneously motivate our consequential actions.
>
> By contrast, the 'non-conscious' zombie is existentially and causally
> disconnected - as postulated, it is abstracted from sense-action; it
> cannot see, hear, or feel and hence cannot enact (except in *our*
> imagination).  No self-sensing = no relationship = no action.  The
> poor creature is a free-standing 'physical abstraction' - the
> uninhabited husk of a self-actualised subject.  It's the notion you're
> left with when you posit an 'externalised world' (i.e. a model) in
> pure intellectual abstraction from concrete self-actualisation.



Up to here comp basically agree (modulo misunderstanding of my part, 
sure).
I mean that what you say is not just consistent with comp (which is not 
a lot after Godel: even inconsistency is consistent with comp!) but 
probably near truth.


>
>> With comp neither matter nor mind can be taken as primitive or primary
>> reality.
>
> My approach proposes something like a fundamental subjective field as
> 'primitive' (in an Occamish way).  Such a field is not yet mind nor
> matter, but both 'mind' and 'matter' emerge from it through
> differentiation, with characteristics that supervene naturally on
> those proposed as primitive.  That is: its fundamental action is self-
> motivated and self-sensing, and consequently all complex emergents are
> experienced as self-motivated and self-sensing.


Well, perhaps OK, unless by field you assume geometry at the start. 
(Geometry like physics is secondary with comp).
You could perhaps elaborate of what you mean by field.



> If valid, this
> approach is a knock-down argument against the equation of
> consciousness with computation.

Careful: comp cannot equate consciousness and computation. It can only 
"equate" consciousness with higher order emergent modality (emergent on 
a continuum of computations).



> The reason is that computational
> 'causation' depends on the introj

Re: Asifism

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 10/06/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

*   But I agree also that you are highly unlikely to come across
> someone who can truthfully say 'I am not conscious'. It seems
> totally self-contradictory: for example a person not just with
> 'hemi' neglect, but total neglect. How could such a person
> encounter themselves or the world?
> Or is there the possibility of something like so-called
> blindsight in every sensory modality? For example: deaf-hearing,
> numb-sensing, proprio-non-ception? This would imply a zombie
> [without 'a life'] which survived by making apparently random
> guesses about everything yet getting significantly more than
> chance success in each modality.
>

See this discussion with Jesse Mazer a few months ago on cortical blindness:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/93962ea1b2e09e2/e1dcc437c27c2877?lnk=gst&q=cortical+blindness&rnum=1#e1dcc437c27c2877



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Asifism

[Jason]

I think it can be useful to look at the problem of consciousness from
a third person point of view, doing so you would conclude we are a
bunch of apes aware of our surroundings wondering why it is we are
aware of our surroundings.  If you explored further you would see
plenty of reasons to explain why those apes were aware; they have
senses which take inputs from the environment and brains which process
those inputs to create an internal representation, about which they
can speak (and wonder) about.  I can see the path of logic that Torngy
is following: qualia are simply manifestations of physical events ->
there is nothing magical or special about -> their reality is an
illusion -> they don't exist.  However even if qualia/consciousness is
an elaborate illusion then it is that illusion they are referring to
when they claim to be conscious.

Jason


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Re: Asifism

[David Nyman]

On Jun 9, 2:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 08-juin-07, à 18:39, Jef Allbright a écrit :

> I don't believe that people in this list would take consciousness as a
> primary reality, except perhaps those who singles out the third
> "universal soul" hypostasis (the first person, alias the one described
> by Bp & p in the lobian interview) like George Levy, David, etc.

Since my name has popped up I'll stop lurking and come clean!  I've
been thinking about this again since reading Galen Strawson's recent
defence of 'panpsychism' in "Consciousness and its place in Nature".
His view is that any 'emergent' phenomenon must supervene on
fundamental properties of the same type - e.g. 'liquidity' is a
characteristic behaviour of a fluid that simply supervenes on the
objective characteristics of its constituent molecules, which in turn
supervenes on quantum-level phenomena and so on down to superstrings
or whatever.  But there is no analogous narrative in which it is
correspondingly obvious that 1st-person *experience* should ever
'emerge' from any objective or 3rd-person description, in his view.

Also in mine.  Reviewing some of my earlier posts on this subject, I
would now say that my view is that our 1st-person experience is
privileged direct evidence (i.e. the *only* direct evidence we have)
that we, and all phenomena of which we are aware, emerge through
differentiation of a subjective existential field. Such
differentiation may be termed 'sense-action', because it is
simultaneously the self-sensing relationships of (what Strawson terms)
'ultimates' (e.g. vibrational strings) that emerge through
differentiation, and the source of all action and structure.  We
abstract our notion of 'physical law' from the inter-relations of such
ultimates, but it is crucial that we do not concretise such 'law' as
some real superadded influence introjected from 'outside' the
existential field.  Rather, we take the field for what it is, and
accept that it feels and does as we find it.  This is simply wielding
Occam's razor with precision to prevent an infinite regress of
'explanation'. Ultimately, to preserve the appearances, existence must
necessarily be self-actualising , self-motivating, and self-sensing.

By rooting sense-action in the ultimates, we can now embed our own
intuitive sensing and motivation firmly where it needs to be in
ultimate reality.  Fundamentally, we do what we do for (something
like) the reasons we believe, and we feel what we feel because that is
(something like) how reality ultimately feels about it.  Our actions
emerge from ultimate action, and our sensing emerges from ultimate
sensing.  This is crucial for questions of 'free will' and suffering
(which I do not put in scare quotes).  Our 'will' is a complex
emergent of ultimate will-to-action, and our painful experiences are
directly inherited from underlying layers of sense-action that
simultaneously motivate our consequential actions.

By contrast, the 'non-conscious' zombie is existentially and causally
disconnected - as postulated, it is abstracted from sense-action; it
cannot see, hear, or feel and hence cannot enact (except in *our*
imagination).  No self-sensing = no relationship = no action.  The
poor creature is a free-standing 'physical abstraction' - the
uninhabited husk of a self-actualised subject.  It's the notion you're
left with when you posit an 'externalised world' (i.e. a model) in
pure intellectual abstraction from concrete self-actualisation.

> With comp neither matter nor mind can be taken as primitive or primary
> reality.

My approach proposes something like a fundamental subjective field as
'primitive' (in an Occamish way).  Such a field is not yet mind nor
matter, but both 'mind' and 'matter' emerge from it through
differentiation, with characteristics that supervene naturally on
those proposed as primitive.  That is: its fundamental action is self-
motivated and self-sensing, and consequently all complex emergents are
experienced as self-motivated and self-sensing. If valid, this
approach is a knock-down argument against the equation of
consciousness with computation.  The reason is that computational
'causation' depends on the introjection of 'rules' from a context
external to the computed 'world', and hence loses contact both with
intrinsic causal self-motivation and the fundamental linkage of felt-
sense and action.  Hence any felt-sense a computer may possess as a
concrete object must necessarily be independent of whatever purely
programmed 'actions' it may be instantiating. Also, the notion of,
say, a rock implementing any computation, and hence potentially any
attached consciousness, is likewise struck down by the lack of
coordination between ultimate sense-action and the notional
computational content.

I've written the above fairly quickly and it's probably not very well
expressed, but if anyone's interested I'd be happy to debate and
enlarge.  But it expresses why I think Torgny's position is a

Re: Asifism

[John Mikes]

Mark,
you put your finger usually on the 'not-so-obvious' (but relevant). I
confess to not having memorized all the posts concerning conscious(ness?) on
this list since 1996 or so, but looked up the topic prior to that.
I found a historically developing noumenon, unidentified and a loose cannon,
everybody including whatever he needed for his theoretical justification,
some only static (awareness, etc.) some also dynamic (control of
life-processes), as our enriching cognitive inventory served the theorists
over the past 3000 years.
I tried to generalize the concept and posted my result several times here
and elsewhere.
 (Responding to information, i.e. to perception of a difference not only
human not only even mental,).

Important is that 'conscious' (especially "of") is NOT the adjective for
consciousness, which in turn is NOT the opposite of 'unconscious(ness)'.

 Do we have this involved discussion, because we did not agree what we are
talking about? Do we agree in "What is a ZOMBIE"? the fictional figment that
does not exist? if it 'does not have Ccness, then what is that Ccness it
does not have? It is not a computer: a computer has (???) Ccness.
 I asked such questions on at least 10 lists and the best answer was:
"everybody knows what it is".Now I am not asking "what Ccness is, I ask what
are we talking about, then comes the next: do we have a matching mindset
(believe system) for the discussion (the lack of which preempts discussions
between faithful and faithless).
*
Mark , these questions are not really aimed at you. I know: Stathis, Bruno,
Brent, Torgny, and some more on this list have answers, but are those
answers compatible?

What I would prefer is to talk about the elements we include in this
noumenon as single nouimena, each on its own merit and meaning,
irrespectively of any adjustment to other elements. That comes later.

John

On 6/9/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> SP:
> 'I've seen quite a few deluded people who believe that they are
> dead, but
> > no-one who thinks they're unconscious...'
>
> MP: There is possibly a loose end or two here and perhaps
> clarification is needed, yet again:
>
> *   It may well be that history is in the making, Torgny Tholerus
> is breaking new ground with Earth shaking results [sorry :-],
> and kudos will be yours if you can book him in first for a
> consultation [or dissection if it comes to that].
>
> *   Or this could conceivably be construed as a 'state of grace'
> in that Torgny is operating with no mental capacity being wasted
> on self-talk or internal commentary: 'just doing' whatever needs
> to be done and 'just being' what he needs to be; very Zen!
>
> *   Then again it may be that I have misunderstood TT's grammar
> and that what he is denying is simply the separate existence of
> something called 'consciousness'. If that be the case then I
> would not argue because I agree that the subjective impression
> of being here now is simply what it is like to be part of the
> processing the brain does, ie updating the model of self in the
> world.
>
> *   But I agree also that you are highly unlikely to come across
> someone who can truthfully say 'I am not conscious'. It seems
> totally self-contradictory: for example a person not just with
> 'hemi' neglect, but total neglect. How could such a person
> encounter themselves or the world?
> Or is there the possibility of something like so-called
> blindsight in every sensory modality? For example: deaf-hearing,
> numb-sensing, proprio-non-ception? This would imply a zombie
> [without 'a life'] which survived by making apparently random
> guesses about everything yet getting significantly more than
> chance success in each modality.
>
> A scary thought!
>
> Regards
>
> Mark Peaty  CDES
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 09/06/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:'
> >
> > >  What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally
> deny
> > >  the existence of the consciousness?'
> >
> > MP: I think the word you are looking for is "deluded".
> >
> >
> >
> > I've seen quite a few deluded people who believe that they are dead, but
> > no-one who thinks they're unconscious...  something to keep an eye out
> for.
> >
> >
> > --
> > Stathis Papaioannou
>
> >
>

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Re: Asifism

[Mark Peaty]

SP:
'I've seen quite a few deluded people who believe that they are 
dead, but
> no-one who thinks they're unconscious...'

MP: There is possibly a loose end or two here and perhaps 
clarification is needed, yet again:

*   It may well be that history is in the making, Torgny Tholerus 
is breaking new ground with Earth shaking results [sorry :-], 
and kudos will be yours if you can book him in first for a 
consultation [or dissection if it comes to that].

*   Or this could conceivably be construed as a 'state of grace' 
in that Torgny is operating with no mental capacity being wasted 
on self-talk or internal commentary: 'just doing' whatever needs 
to be done and 'just being' what he needs to be; very Zen!

*   Then again it may be that I have misunderstood TT's grammar 
and that what he is denying is simply the separate existence of 
something called 'consciousness'. If that be the case then I 
would not argue because I agree that the subjective impression 
of being here now is simply what it is like to be part of the 
processing the brain does, ie updating the model of self in the 
world.

*   But I agree also that you are highly unlikely to come across 
someone who can truthfully say 'I am not conscious'. It seems 
totally self-contradictory: for example a person not just with 
'hemi' neglect, but total neglect. How could such a person 
encounter themselves or the world?
Or is there the possibility of something like so-called 
blindsight in every sensory modality? For example: deaf-hearing, 
numb-sensing, proprio-non-ception? This would imply a zombie 
[without 'a life'] which survived by making apparently random 
guesses about everything yet getting significantly more than 
chance success in each modality.

A scary thought!

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 
> 
> On 09/06/07, *Mark Peaty* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:'
> 
> >  What is the philosophical term for persons like me, that totally deny
> >  the existence of the consciousness?'
> 
> MP: I think the word you are looking for is "deluded".
> 
>  
> 
> I've seen quite a few deluded people who believe that they are dead, but 
> no-one who thinks they're unconscious...  something to keep an eye out for.
> 
> 
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Asifism

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 08-juin-07, à 18:39, Jef Allbright a écrit :

> While I would point out that physics cannot possibly explain
> everything, being a necessarily constrained subjective model of
> "reality", I would like to reinforce the point about "consciousness."
> Consciousness certainly exists, as a description relating a set of
> observations having to do with subjective awareness, but there is
> nothing requiring that we assign it the status of an ontological
> entity.


The importance of being precise! Now I agree with you, although I did 
disagree with your answer to Torgny.
BTW distinguishing subjective awareness  and consciousness is a 
1004-fallacy ... at this stage.

Also, to say that consciousness exists as a description could be 
misleading. It could exist as a phenomenon.
I don't believe that people in this list would take consciousness as a 
primary reality, except perhaps those who singles out the third 
"universal soul" hypostasis (the first person, alias the one described 
by Bp & p in the lobian interview) like George Levy, David, etc.

With comp neither matter nor mind can be taken as primitive or primary 
reality.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Asifism

[Mohsen Ravanbakhsh]

What is the subjective experience then?

On 6/8/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Quentin Anciaux skrev:
>
> On Friday 08 June 2007 17:37:06 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
>  What is the problem?
>
> If a computer behaves as if it knows anything, what is the problem with
> that?  That type of behaviour increases the probability for the computer
> to survive, so the natural selection will favour that type of behaviour.
>
>  I claim that if it behaves as if, then it means it has consciousness...
> Philosophical zombie (which is what it is all about) are not possible... If
> it is impossible to discern it with what we define as conscious (and when I
> say impossible, I mean there exists no test that can show between the
> presuposed zombie and a conscious being a difference of behavior) then there
> is no point whatsover you can say to prove that one is conscious and one is
> not. Either both are conscious or both aren't... While you say you're not
> conscious... I am, therefore you're conscious.
>
>  The question, as I see it, is if there is anything "more" than just atoms
> reacting with each other in our brains.  I claim that there is not anything
> "more".  The atoms reacting with each other explain fully my (and your...)
> behaviour.  Our brains are very complicated structures, but it is nothing
> supernatural with them.  Physics explains everything.
>
> --
> Torgny Tholerus
>
>
> >
>


-- 

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,

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