Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 Nov 2017, at 00:44, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 29/11/2017 9:29 pm, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:
Quote. " With our ideal realization of the delayed-choice  
entanglement swapping gedanken experiment, we have demonstrated a  
generalization of Wheeler’s “delayed-choice” tests, going from the  
wave-particle duality of a single particle to the entanglement- 
separability duality of two particles. Whether these two particles  
are entangled or separable has been decided after they have been  
measured. If one views the quantum state as a real physical object,  
one could get the seemingly paradoxical situation that future  
actions appear as having an influence on past and already  
irrevocably recorded events. However, there is never a paradox if  
the quantum state is viewed as to be no more than a “catalogue of  
our knowledge”. Then the state is a probability list for all  
possible measurement outcomes, the relative temporal order of the  
three observer’s events is irrelevant and no
physical interactions whatsoever between these events, especially  
into the past, are necessary to explain the delayed-choice  
entanglement swapping. What, however, is important is to relate the  
lists of Alice, Bob and Victor’s measurement results. On the basis  
of Victor’s measurement settings and results, Alice and Bob can  
group their earlier and locally totally random results into subsets  
which each have a different meaning and interpretation. This  
formation of subsets is independent of the temporal order of the  
measurements. According to Wheeler, Bohr said: 'No elementary  
phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered phenomenon.'
We would like to extend this by saying: 'Some registered phenomena  
do not have a meaning unless they are put in relationship with  
other registered phenomena.' "


But you lost physical realism. I would bet that the many world  
justifies this, saving a large part of physical realism, the most part  
of it. The Mechanist (who thinks) know that the ulimate physical  
reality is a projection from inside a universal mind.


This should reconcialite Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and the Everettians,  
but of course in science we still shoot on the diplomats. I confess  
that mechanism is too much first person plural to me, but then we  
can't change the physical laws, like you said, still less when they  
are justified by elementay arithmetic and Turing machine's notion of  
observable.







-- Zeilinger et al. https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6578
It seems to me that ontic interpretations of quantum states, *if*  
future measurements appear as having an influence on past and  
already irrevocably recorded events, are untenable. Now the MWI is,  
for sure, an 'ontic' interpretation (an ontic theory if you  
prefer). How can we explain, within MWI, in 'ontic' terms,  that  
future actions appear as having an influence on past and already  
irrevocably recorded events? Is it possible that in MWI is both a  
real physical object and a “catalogue of our knowledge”?


Thanks for posting this, Serafino. Zeilinger's group in Vienna have  
certainly mastered quantum optics experiments. I would like to see  
the MWI explanation of the apparent non-locality here.


Me too!



Zeilinger interprets this according to Bohr's Copenhagen  
interpretation of QM, but it really boils down to an epistemic  
understanding of the wave function.


It is how Heinberg interpret its matrix picture. German Idealism. Not  
so far from the Indian-Greek one. Correct from the Mechanist view, but  
even mechanism reintroduces a bit more of physical realism with the  
histories, which are (first person plural) *real*.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Nov 2017, at 23:40, Bruce Kellett wrote (to John Clark):

So for changes in constants to be unitary, there needs to be a  
hermitian operator that brings about these changes. But changes in  
constants only make sense for dimensionless constants such as the  
fine structure constant, and there is currently no theory as to how  
this would change in a unitary manner.


Interesting!

Of course, if you set up a situation in which a quantum event is  
amplified to give a difference in macroscopic outcomes, such as in  
Schrödinger's cat, then you can say that the macroscopic uncertainty  
has a quantum origin. But the majority of quantum events are not  
amplified in this way -- they simply occur randomly in large numbers  
so that the expectation value is unaffected by individual  
uncertainties.


OK. But when you toss a coin, you mix the quantum uncertainty of the  
position of the coin + the chaotic behavior entailed by you tossing  
mechanically the coin. Little difference in the position of the coin  
will be amplified by the chaotic shaking working together, that is  
shaking the coin long enough. By linearity, the errors does not grow  
much, but the chaos (due to the movement of your arms) amplifies the  
small quantum uncertainties, so that after some long time enough, the  
universe is a superposition of  the two outcomes possibles, in many  
different worlds.


Bruno






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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 5:38:23 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
>
> Non-locality. As Zeilinger says: "Any explanation of what goes on in a 
> specific individual observation of one photon has to take into account the 
> whole experimental apparatus of the complete quantum state consisting of 
> both photons, and it can only make sense after all information concerning 
> complementary variables has been recorded."
> arXiv:1206.6578
>
> Bruce.
>

This then means the measurement process is self-referential and could be 
said to be not computable by quantum means. In this way we have on some 
fundamental level a failure of any axiomatic description of so called 
collapse, or eigenbranching in MWI or all mechanisms proposed by quantum 
interpretations. In this sense I see self-reference in physics; it is what 
takes place with any fundamental decoherence of a wave function, which if 
some IGUS or intelligent being is involved we call it an observation.

LC

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Nov 2017, at 23:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 30/11/2017 2:24 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Nov 2017, at 04:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes  
up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is  
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial  
conditions, air currents and the like.


It depends. If you shake the coin long enough, the quantum  
uncertainties can add up to the point that the toss is a quantum  
event. With some student we have evaluate this quantitavely (a long  
time ago) and get that if was enough to shake the coin less than a  
minute, but more than few seconds ... (Nothing rigorous).


That is a misunderstanding of quantum randomness. For the outcome of  
a coin toss to be determined by quantum randomness, we would have to  
have a single quantum event where the outcome was amplified by  
decoherence so that it was directly entangled with the way the coin  
landed. Schematically:


  |quantum event>|coin> = (|outcome A> + |outcome B>)|coin>
  = (|outcome A>|coin heads> + |outcome B>|coin tails>)


The coin is quantum. The quantum event is given by its position, the  
Heisenberg uncertainty makes it diffusing rapidly (at the speed of  
light) and decoherence is only local contamination of the  
superposition of the "gaussian" position, this evolves in infinity of  
(gigantic number of universe) with the coin landing on tail or head  
about one halve the contexts.






This direct entanglement is not reproduced by the sum over many  
random quantum events where the ensuing entanglement is extremely  
complicated, with no direct connection between a quantum outcome and  
the result of the toss.


Why? It looks you make QM wrong for the coin.




Such accumulation of quantum uncertainties is similar to simple  
thermal noise, and could not be distinguished from it.


I agree. In no worlds there will be able to distinguish the MW from  
some UM, but that was not the point. Yet, it seems to me that with the  
quantum (the real) coin, the Heisenberg uncertainties on the position  
grows with shaking leading after some times to an infinity of  
universes, having different results, but with the right classical  
statistics (1/2). It is just that decoherence is almost at speed c  
that at no time we can detect intermediate interference, and then, as  
usual, we don't feel the split.


Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Nov 2017, at 22:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 30/11/2017 5:53 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 11:10 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:


​ >> ​ And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse  
fundamentally different from the String Theory Multiverse? ​


​ > ​ I didn't say they were different from each other; I  
said they were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett  
which all share the same physics with the same physical  
constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same  
physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger  
equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all  
physical evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying  
physics -- such as a change in the value of fundamental  
constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example  
-- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from  
eternal inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the  
level ii multiverse from the string theory landscape has  
physical constants and the number of space-time dimensions  
varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen.  
But lets assume you're right, then the string theory  
multiverse must be larger than the many worlds multiverse  
incorporating everything in Everett's version and MORE; after  
all if it contains universes with radically different laws of  
physics it must also contain more modest things like a world  
where my coin came up heads instead of tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin  
comes up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum  
event; it is determined by quite classical laws of physics  
governing initial conditions, air currents and the like.


That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1


I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least  
convincing: air current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and  
quantum uncertainties in times of neural firings are not  
responsible for the results of coin tosses, or random digits of  
pi. We can construct classical coin tossers, etc. It sounds like  
they are very close to superdeterminism.


Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since  
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin  
and catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.


Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect  
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain  
is a hot system with decoherence times of the order of  
nanoseconds. If random quantum effects affected behaviour,  
behaviour would be random and purposeful action would be 
impossible.


But some randomness is useful and evolution would not try to drive  
it to zero (c.f. Buridan's ass), which is not to say it needs  
quantum randomness.  There are plenty of of sources of randomness  
in the environment.


As you say, not all randomness is quantum randomness.

This is ruled out by experience -- as is the related notion of  
superdeterminism.


I don't see that superdeterminism is ruled out, or can be ruled out  
by experience.  Experience would seem to rule out MWI too, because  
like superdeterminism it posits stuff that can't be experienced:  
superdeterminism because the don't happen, MWI because they happen  
in another "world" to a different "you".


Maybe that is a good reason to disregard such ideas as pure fantasy.  
The problem with superdeterminism, as outlined by Tim Maudlin, is  
that is would render science and the endeavour to understand the  
nature and operation of the world futile -- nothing could ever be  
tested because there could be a giant conspiracy to deceive us.


I agree. Superdeterminism is worst than "God" as an explanation. It  
looks more like using "Devil"  to explain the things. It is not less  
wrong, nor more wrong, but it can only be wrong as an *explanation*.  
It is self-defeating, like positivism. It sides also with the social  
dilution of responsibility or superpaternalism.


With mechanism, like with some marriage of QM and GR, there are "malin  
génies" or (arithmetical) Boltzmann Brains, indeed an infinity of  
them, but then we can explain why the probability is null that they  
influences our normal histories. Thank God :)


Bruno




Bruce


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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Nov 2017, at 22:55, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 9:14:48 PM UTC,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM,  wrote:

​> ​If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,

​That​ is NOT​​ what I claimed​.​ I claimed any​ ​ 
fundamental parameter​ that​ can exist​ does exist, I did  
NOT ​claim any​ ​fundamental parameter can exist. There is a  
HUGE difference!


That's much more Tegmarkian than MWI. In the latter, the claim is  
that except for the measurement realized, identical universes come  
into being where the values not measured in this world, are  
realized, that is, measured. So these other universes, if they  
exist, have the same fundamental constants as our universe. AG


Even if all parameters consistent with logic CAN occur, it doesn't  
necessarily mean they DO. I illustrated this possibility, but  
haven't proved it (and AFAIK, no one has), with my thought  
experiment using the real line. And in the case of the MWI, the  
parameters of those other worlds must be IDENTICAL to this world,  
since the claim of MWI is that those universes are identical except  
for the values measured. Now let's go back to Joe the Plumber.  
Suppose in this world he leaves the casino after one pull of the  
slot machine, having now created 10 million other universes.  
Presumably some of those other Joe's continue playing, some not,  
resulting in tens of millions of new universes, with identical  
Joe's, some continuing to play, and some not. And on and on it goes.  
Does this really make sense to you? Joe and slot machines is a  
parable. Purists can think of Joe in a lab, shooting an electron at  
a double slit. AG


It seems to me it makes much sense that Bohm or Copenhagen. It is just  
the SWE, viewed by machine which evolves doing the coding in some  
position base, probably for some reason.


It is shocking perhaps. But then for a Platonist, if the ultimate  
reality is not shocking, it is a symptom you have not yet seen it. It  
is normal, our brain are not build to study that ultimate reality, and  
I think that somehow, it is even build for hidden some parts of the  
ultimate reality.


With Mechanism, it becomes conceptually very simple. You need only the  
numbers and addition or multiplication (or any first order theory  
Turing equivalent to it). That is, you need only a universal machine,  
in the mathematical sense of Church, Post, Turing, Kleene, ... Then  
the existence of all pieces of dreams is given by very elementary  
theory, and it involves the dreamers sometimes sharing very long  
dreams, and some other consciousness state. In fact this gives a  
theology in the greek sense of the terms, meaning that it contains  
physics, making Mechanism testable. The "many-apparent worlds" is a  
confirmation of the infinitely many dreams below our substitution  
levels, and the math of self-reference provides three quantum logics  
for the notion of "observable" by a mean Universal Turing machine".


Bruno








​> ​then there would be universes where matter could NOT exist,  
and the reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!


​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen does  
happen, not everything that can't happen does happen.


​> ​You need help, badly, urgently.

​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have reached  
the following conclusion: ​ you sir are an ass.


John K Clark​

You shouldn't have deleted what you actually wrote. Then we could  
judge what your words conveyed. I don't time now to dredge it up. In  
any event, the parable about the slot machine says it all. AG









AG

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 11:42:51 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 30/11/2017 10:32 pm, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 4:08:20 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote: 
>>
>> On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote: 
>>
>> On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett  
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> ​ >​
>> ​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
>>
>>
>> ​ > ​
>> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
>> applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is 
>> unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the 
>> value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for 
>> example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
>>
>>
>> ​
>> Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if 
>> ​ ​
>> Newton's constant had any value other than 
>> ​ ​
>> 6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2 
>> ​  ​
>> the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 1. 
>> If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's constant 
>> directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm 
>> right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize. 
>>
>> Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to unity, that 
>>> is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition of it. A unitary 
>>> transformation is one that can be reversed: so the unitary operator U can 
>>> be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the complex conjugate (or the 
>>> adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation.
>>>
>> *Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that describes 
>>> the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear? Is nonlinear a 
>>> problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How would it effect 
>>> the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG *
>>>
>>
> Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- 
> intrinsically non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since there 
> are plenty of non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do with hidden 
> variables.
>
> *Why would it be non linear? Brent claimed (on page 1)*
>
>
> Page 1 of what?
>


*On Google it's organized as pages, now up to page 15. Go to top of thread 
and read second message by Brent. AG *

>
> * that if the QM could be made deterministic, say by a DE that described 
> collapse, it would imply awful consequences, such as the future determining 
> the past.*
>
>
> No, it wouldn't imply that.
>
> * Would making QM into a deterministic theory imply an inconsistency in 
> the postulates of QM? TIA, AG*
>
>
> QM in MWI is deterministic. Bohm's theory is deterministic, though 
> expressly non-local. Determinism is not really an issue. One world theories 
> are intrinsically random, not deterministic.
>


*How can MWI be deterministic if it can't tell us what outcome we will 
observe in this world, or any other? AG *

>
> Bruce
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 30/11/2017 10:32 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 4:08:20 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:

On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:


​ >​
​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have
the same physics,


​ > ​
Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the
Schrödinger equation applies everywhere without
exception, so that all physical evolution is
unitary. A change in the underlying physics --
such as a change in the value of fundamental
constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant
for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot
occur in MWI.


​
Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if
​ ​
Newton's constant had any value other than
​ ​
6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2
​  ​
the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer
add up to exactly 1. If you can really do that then
you've just derived Newton's constant directly from
first principles and you should but a ticket to
Stockholm right now because you're absolutely certain
to win the next nobel Prize.


Although unitarity does mean that probabilities
always sum to unity, that is a consequence of unitary
evolution, not a definition of it. A unitary
transformation is one that can be reversed: so the
unitary operator U can be written as exp(-iH), for
example, and the complex conjugate (or the adjoint
for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation.*
*


*Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists
a DE that describes the collapse process, would it
necessarily be nonlinear? Is nonlinear a problem; that
is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How would it
effect the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG *


Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- 
intrinsically non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since 
there are plenty of non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do 
with hidden variables.

*
*
*Why would it be non linear? Brent claimed (on page 1)*


Page 1 of what?*

*
*that if the QM could be made deterministic, say by a DE that 
described collapse, it would imply awful consequences, such as the 
future determining the past.*


No, it wouldn't imply that.

*Would making QM into a deterministic theory imply an inconsistency in 
the postulates of QM? TIA, AG*


QM in MWI is deterministic. Bohm's theory is deterministic, though 
expressly non-local. Determinism is not really an issue. One world 
theories are intrinsically random, not deterministic.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 30/11/2017 10:18 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2017-11-30 12:08 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett >:


On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com
 wrote:

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:

On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:


​ >​
​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the
same physics,


​ > ​
Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the
Schrödinger equation applies everywhere without
exception, so that all physical evolution is unitary.
A change in the underlying physics -- such as a
change in the value of fundamental constants,
Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example --
would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


​
Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if
​ ​
Newton's constant had any value other than
​ ​
6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2
​  ​
the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add
up to exactly 1. If you can really do that then you've
just derived Newton's constant directly from first
principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm right
now because you're absolutely certain to win the next
nobel Prize.


Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to
unity, that is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a
definition of it. A unitary transformation is one that can be
reversed: so the unitary operator U can be written as
exp(-iH), for example, and the complex conjugate (or the
adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation.*
*

*
Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that
describes the collapse process, would it necessarily be
nonlinear? Is nonlinear a problem; that is, what is the downside
to nonlinear? How would it effect the issue of hidden variables?
TIA, AG *


Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- intrinsically
non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since there are
plenty of non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do with
hidden variables.


How could that be compatible with delayed choice experiment ?


Non-locality. As Zeilinger says: "Any explanation of what goes on in a 
specific individual observation of one photon has to take into account 
the whole experimental apparatus of the complete quantum state 
consisting of both photons, and it can only make sense after all 
information concerning complementary variables has been recorded."

arXiv:1206.6578

Bruce



Quentin


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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 4:08:20 AM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote: 
>
> On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett  
> wrote:
>
>
> ​ >​
> ​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
>
>
> ​ > ​
> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
> applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is 
> unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the 
> value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for 
> example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
>
>
> ​
> Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if 
> ​ ​
> Newton's constant had any value other than 
> ​ ​
> 6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2 
> ​  ​
> the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 1. 
> If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's constant 
> directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm 
> right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize. 
>
> Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to unity, that 
>> is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition of it. A unitary 
>> transformation is one that can be reversed: so the unitary operator U can 
>> be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the complex conjugate (or the 
>> adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation.
>>
> *Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that describes 
>> the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear? Is nonlinear a 
>> problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How would it effect 
>> the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG *
>>
>
Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- 
intrinsically non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since there 
are plenty of non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do with hidden 
variables.

*Why would it be non linear? Brent claimed (on page 1) that if the QM could 
be made deterministic, say by a DE that described collapse, it would imply 
awful consequences, such as the future determining the past. Would making 
QM into a deterministic theory imply an inconsistency in the postulates of 
QM? TIA, AG*

> ...

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Quentin Anciaux]

2017-11-30 12:08 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> ​ >​
>> ​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
>>
>>
>> ​ > ​
>> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation
>> applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is
>> unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the
>> value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for
>> example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
>>
>>
>> ​
>> Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if
>> ​ ​
>> Newton's constant had any value other than
>> ​ ​
>> 6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2
>> ​  ​
>> the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 1.
>> If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's constant
>> directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm
>> right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize.
>>
>>
>> Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to unity, that
>> is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition of it. A unitary
>> transformation is one that can be reversed: so the unitary operator U can
>> be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the complex conjugate (or the
>> adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation.
>>
>
> * Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that describes
> the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear? Is nonlinear a
> problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How would it effect
> the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG *
>
>
> Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- intrinsically
> non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since there are plenty of
> non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do with hidden variables.
>

How could that be compatible with delayed choice experiment ?

Quentin

>
>
> Bruce
>
>
>
>> So for changes in constants to be unitary, there needs to be a hermitian
>> operator that brings about these changes. But changes in constants only
>> make sense for dimensionless constants such as the fine structure constant,
>> and there is currently no theory as to how this would change in a unitary
>> manner.
>>
>
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:

On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:


​ >​
​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same
physics,


​ > ​
Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the
Schrödinger equation applies everywhere without exception,
so that all physical evolution is unitary. A change in the
underlying physics -- such as a change in the value of
fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's
constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot
occur in MWI.


​
Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if
​ ​
Newton's constant had any value other than
​ ​
6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2
​  ​
the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to
exactly 1. If you can really do that then you've just derived
Newton's constant directly from first principles and you
should but a ticket to Stockholm right now because you're
absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize.


Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to
unity, that is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a
definition of it. A unitary transformation is one that can be
reversed: so the unitary operator U can be written as exp(-iH),
for example, and the complex conjugate (or the adjoint for
hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation.*
*

*
Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that 
describes the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear? Is 
nonlinear a problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How 
would it effect the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG *


Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- intrinsically 
non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since there are plenty 
of non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do with hidden variables.


Bruce




So for changes in constants to be unitary, there needs to be a
hermitian operator that brings about these changes. But changes in
constants only make sense for dimensionless constants such as the
fine structure constant, and there is currently no theory as to
how this would change in a unitary manner.



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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>
> ​ >​
> ​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
>
>
> ​ > ​
> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
> applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is 
> unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the 
> value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for 
> example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
>
>
> ​
> Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if 
> ​ ​
> Newton's constant had any value other than 
> ​ ​
> 6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2 
> ​  ​
> the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 1. 
> If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's constant 
> directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm 
> right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize. 
>
>
> Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to unity, that 
> is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition of it. A unitary 
> transformation is one that can be reversed: so the unitary operator U can 
> be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the complex conjugate (or the 
> adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation.
>

*Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that describes 
the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear? Is nonlinear a 
problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How would it effect 
the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG *

>
> So for changes in constants to be unitary, there needs to be a hermitian 
> operator that brings about these changes. But changes in constants only 
> make sense for dimensionless constants such as the fine structure constant, 
> and there is currently no theory as to how this would change in a unitary 
> manner.
>
>
> ​ >> ​
> lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be larger 
> than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in Everett's 
> version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with radically 
> different laws of physics it must also contain more modest things like a 
> world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.
>
>
> ​ > ​
> I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up head 
> or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event;
>
>
> ​Do you actually think reality can be neatly divided ​
>   
> ​ between quantum and non-quantum events? A unstable atom has a 50% chance 
> of decaying and producing a easily detectable high speed electron, if the 
> electron ​is detected a computer controlled robot arm turns my coin to 
> heads, if it detects no electron it turns my coin to tails.
>
>
> Of course, if you set up a situation in which a quantum event is amplified 
> to give a difference in macroscopic outcomes, such as in Schrödinger's cat, 
> then you can say that the macroscopic uncertainty has a quantum origin. But 
> the majority of quantum events are not amplified in this way -- they simply 
> occur randomly in large numbers so that the expectation value is unaffected 
> by individual uncertainties.
>
> ​ > ​
> Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the initial 
> conditions could differ to an extent such that everything was identical in 
> the two worlds up to your coin toss.
>
>
> ​Quite
>  unlikely 
> ​ events are going to happen if the number of universes is large enough, 
> and if there are a infinity of worlds then anything with a non-zero 
> probability is certain to happen in some universe.
>
>
> Except events of measure zero.
>
>  
>
> ​ > ​
> Worlds are not random objects, they follow the laws of physics, so given 
> some initial conditions, the future is determined i
>
> ...

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Nov 2017, at 19:53, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/28/2017 11:10 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:


​ >> ​ And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse  
fundamentally different from the String Theory Multiverse? ​


​ > ​ I didn't say they were different from each other; I  
said they were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett  
which all share the same physics with the same physical  
constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger  
equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all  
physical evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying  
physics -- such as a change in the value of fundamental  
constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example  
-- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from  
eternal inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the  
level ii multiverse from the string theory landscape has  
physical constants and the number of space-time dimensions  
varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen.  
But lets assume you're right, then the string theory  
multiverse must be larger than the many worlds multiverse  
incorporating everything in Everett's version and MORE; after  
all if it contains universes with radically different laws of  
physics it must also contain more modest things like a world  
where my coin came up heads instead of tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin  
comes up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event;  
it is determined by quite classical laws of physics governing  
initial conditions, air currents and the like.


That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1


I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing:  
air current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum  
uncertainties in times of neural firings are not responsible for  
the results of coin tosses, or random digits of pi. We can  
construct classical coin tossers, etc. It sounds like they are  
very close to superdeterminism.


Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since  
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin  
and catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.


Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect  
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain  
is a hot system with decoherence times of the order of nanoseconds.  
If random quantum effects affected behaviour, behaviour would be  
random and purposeful action would be impossible.


But some randomness is useful and evolution would not try to drive  
it to zero (c.f. Buridan's ass), which is not to say it needs  
quantum randomness.  There are plenty of of sources of randomness in  
the environment.


This is ruled out by experience -- as is the related notion of  
superdeterminism.


I don't see that superdeterminism is ruled out, or can be ruled out  
by experience.  Experience would seem to rule out MWI too, because  
like superdeterminism it posits stuff that can't be experienced:  
superdeterminism because the don't happen, MWI because they happen  
in another "world" to a different "you".



This assumes Aristotle, or St-Thomas criterion of reality (what we can  
see). That does not beg the question in physics, but does beg the  
question in metaphysics.


But Platonists are skeptical precisely on what they see. They want a  
theory that they can understand, and this, most of the times posit  
invisible entities, from number to quarcks, from the consciousness of  
an other, to some possible ONE, from atoms to mind.


Aristotle principle is seen as a form of solipsism.

Bruno





Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Nov 2017, at 17:21, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 3:24:38 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 29 Nov 2017, at 04:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker   
wrote:


​ >> ​ And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally  
different from the String Theory  
Multiverse?​


​ > ​ I didn't say they were different from each other; I said  
they were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all  
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,

Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation  
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution  
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change  
in the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or  
Newton's constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot  
occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal  
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii  
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants  
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


Yes. The Everettian view of string theory leads to a multi- 
multiverse. Perhaps 10^500 multiverses ...


Wow! What a coincidence! Same estimate as the landscape in string  
theory. Is this before or after Joe the Plumber did his experiments  
which adds universes according to the MWI? AG


I was using the string theory landscape for saying this. If the  
physical reality of the landscape are quantum reality, they are all  
multiverse in the Everett-Deutch sense.


With Mechanism, we have 0 "universe", only histories and dreams, which  
exists in arithmetic. We need to postulate only 0, s(0), s(s(0)) ...,  
together with addition and multiplication.


It is the very idea of "universe" which might be spurious. Primary  
matter is a sort of last phlogiston. But you will need to study some  
papers to get this right.


Bruno










unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But  
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be  
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in  
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with  
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest  
things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up  
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is  
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial  
conditions, air currents and the like.


It depends. If you shake the coin long enough, the quantum  
uncertainties can add up to the point that the toss is a quantum  
event. With some student we have evaluate this quantitavely (a long  
time ago) and get that if was enough to shake the coin less than a  
minute, but more than few seconds ... (Nothing rigorous).







Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the  
initial conditions could differ to an extent such that everything  
was identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think  
Tegmark is wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book)  
assumes that worlds are made up at random out of the available  
constituents, so every way of filling space-time units is realized  
somewhere. But this is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they  
follow the laws of physics, so given some initial conditions, the  
future is determined in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It  
is not the case that everything logically possible happens -- only  
those things that follow from the initial conditions by  
deterministic evolution happen. So although all possible initial  
conditions may be realized somewhere, not everything can follow  
deterministically -- the laws of physics cannot be broken.


OK. We agree on this.

Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/29/2017 10:17 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 6:09:26 AM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 11/29/2017 9:34 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 5:21:40 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John
Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM,
wrote:

​> ​
If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can
exist,


​
That
​ is NOT​
​
 what I claimed
​.​
I claimed any
​ ​f
undamental parameter
​ that​
can exist
​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim
any
​ ​f
undamental parameter
 can exist. There is a HUGE difference!

​> ​
then there would be universes where matter could
NOT exist, and the reproducing of the measuring
scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!


​And that is why the MWI says everything that can
happen does happen, not everything that can't happen
does happen.

​> ​
You need help, badly, urgently.


​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I
have reached the following conclusion:
​ you sir are an ass.


Have you been speaking with my wife lately? LOL. Can't deny
that, but here's what I wrote and your response:

*
AG >For string theory, the multiverse universes could have
radically different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's
law with force a function of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity,
and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged universes have the SAME
laws,
*

JC> No,
​
MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a
universe with 4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a
function of 1/ r^3
​, If string theory is right about such a universe not
violating the laws of logic then that universe can happen.
and if that universe can happen then
MWI
​says it does happen.
 And such a universe would exist in the Eternal Inflation
​multiverse​
 too.​
*
But that's NOT what MMI alleges. That's essentially what
Tegmark claims, but the Many Worlds of MWI have the SAME
defining parameters as our universe since OUR universe is
claimed to be reproduced EXACTLY, except for the measurements
realized in different universes when a quantum experiment is
performed in OUR universe.  Of course, if we lived in a
universe with DIFFERENT defining parameters, I suppose MWI
would claim copies of those would be identical, but this is
my first encounter with the EXPANDED, TEGMARKIAN-LIKE claim
that the MWI ALSO claims all possible universes must exist. AG*


*In fact, when you think about it, the possible universes claimed
by MWI is HUGELY GREATER than the number  claimed by string
theory EVEN IF OUR UNIVERSE IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE UNIVERSE -- not
a mere 10^500 -- since there's no limit on how many universes
metastasize when Joe the Plumber enters a casino (or the lab in
an electron double slit experiment) and pulls the slot machine
only one time. AG*


The string theory number is the number of possible different
physics.  Each different physics gives rise to a branching
sequence of MWI.

Brent


Right, but according to MWI branching only occurs when a quantum 
experiment is done in one of those universes, AG


That's not so clear.  When a radioactive nucleus decays it makes a 
difference which we can measure later.  If it happens in a crystal it 
leaves a defect track and according to MWI that makes it a classically 
discernible different world.  But when the nucleus decays is a 
continuous variable.  So a continuum of worlds is generated.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/29/2017 1:57 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I don't see that superdeterminism is ruled out, or can be ruled out 
by experience.  Experience would seem to rule out MWI too, because 
like superdeterminism it posits stuff that can't be experienced: 
superdeterminism because the don't happen, MWI because they happen in 
another "world" to a different "you".


Maybe that is a good reason to disregard such ideas as pure fantasy. 
The problem with superdeterminism, as outlined by Tim Maudlin, is that 
is would render science and the endeavour to understand the nature and 
operation of the world futile -- nothing could ever be tested because 
there could be a giant conspiracy to deceive us.


How is it any different than the block universe view?  So long as 
everything that happens is in accord with some physical law I don't see 
that superdeterminism is different from any other theory.  Of course 
there could always be a giant conspiracy to deceive us as to whether 
there are physical laws...and in fact Donald Trump believes science is a 
giant conspiracy.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 6:09:26 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/29/2017 9:34 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 5:21:40 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark wrote: 

 On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM,  wrote:
  

> ​> ​
> If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,
>

 ​
 That 
 ​ is NOT​
 ​
  what I claimed 
 ​.​
 I claimed any 
 ​ ​f
 undamental parameter 
 ​ that​
 can exist 
 ​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim 
 any 
 ​ ​f
 undamental parameter 
  can exist. There is a HUGE difference!

  

> ​> ​
> then there would be universes where matter could NOT exist, and the 
> reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!
>

 ​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen does happen, 
 not everything that can't happen does happen.

 ​> ​
> You need help, badly, urgently.


 ​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have reached the 
 following conclusion:
   
 ​ you sir are an ass.

>>>
>> Have you been speaking with my wife lately? LOL. Can't deny that, but 
>> here's what I wrote and your response:
>>
>> * AG >For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically 
>> different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function 
>> of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged 
>> universes have the SAME laws, * 
>>
>> JC> No, 
>> ​ 
>> MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a universe 
>> with 4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a function of 1/ r^3 
>> ​, If string theory is right about such a universe not violating the laws 
>> of logic then that universe can happen. and if that universe can happen 
>> then 
>> MWI 
>> ​says it does happen. 
>>  And such a universe would exist in the Eternal Inflation 
>> ​multiverse​
>>  too.​
>>
>> * But that's NOT what MMI alleges. That's essentially what Tegmark 
>> claims, but the Many Worlds of MWI have the SAME defining parameters as our 
>> universe since OUR universe is claimed to be reproduced EXACTLY, except for 
>> the measurements realized in different universes when a quantum experiment 
>> is performed in OUR universe.  Of course, if we lived in a universe with 
>> DIFFERENT defining parameters, I suppose MWI would claim copies of those 
>> would be identical, but this is my first encounter with the EXPANDED, 
>> TEGMARKIAN-LIKE claim that the MWI ALSO claims all possible universes must 
>> exist. AG* 
>>
>
> *In fact, when you think about it, the possible universes claimed by MWI 
> is HUGELY GREATER than the number  claimed by string theory EVEN IF OUR 
> UNIVERSE IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE UNIVERSE -- not a mere 10^500 -- since 
> there's no limit on how many universes metastasize when Joe the Plumber 
> enters a casino (or the lab in an electron double slit experiment) and 
> pulls the slot machine only one time. AG*
>
>
> The string theory number is the number of possible different physics.  
> Each different physics gives rise to a branching sequence of MWI.
>
> Brent
>

Right, but according to MWI branching only occurs when a quantum experiment 
is done in one of those universes, AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/29/2017 9:34 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 5:21:40 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:




On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark
wrote:

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM, wrote:

​> ​
If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,


​
That
​ is NOT​
​
 what I claimed
​.​
I claimed any
​ ​f
undamental parameter
​ that​
can exist
​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim
any
​ ​f
undamental parameter
 can exist. There is a HUGE difference!

​> ​
then there would be universes where matter could NOT
exist, and the reproducing of the measuring scenario
would be IMPOSSIBLE!


​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen
does happen, not everything that can't happen does happen.

​> ​
You need help, badly, urgently.


​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have
reached the following conclusion:
​ you sir are an ass.


Have you been speaking with my wife lately? LOL. Can't deny that,
but here's what I wrote and your response:

*
AG >For string theory, the multiverse universes could have
radically different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law
with force a function of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or
whatever. In MWI, all alleged universes have the SAME laws,
*

JC> No,
​
MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a
universe with 4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a
function of 1/ r^3
​, If string theory is right about such a universe not violating
the laws of logic then that universe can happen. and if that
universe can happen then
MWI
​says it does happen.
 And such a universe would exist in the Eternal Inflation
​multiverse​
 too.​
*
But that's NOT what MMI alleges. That's essentially what Tegmark
claims, but the Many Worlds of MWI have the SAME defining
parameters as our universe since OUR universe is claimed to be
reproduced EXACTLY, except for the measurements realized in
different universes when a quantum experiment is performed in OUR
universe.  Of course, if we lived in a universe with DIFFERENT
defining parameters, I suppose MWI would claim copies of those
would be identical, but this is my first encounter with the
EXPANDED, TEGMARKIAN-LIKE claim that the MWI ALSO claims all
possible universes must exist. AG*


*In fact, when you think about it, the possible universes claimed by 
MWI is HUGELY GREATER than the number claimed by string theory EVEN IF 
OUR UNIVERSE IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE UNIVERSE -- not a mere 10^500 -- 
since there's no limit on how many universes metastasize when Joe the 
Plumber enters a casino (or the lab in an electron double slit 
experiment) and pulls the slot machine only one time. AG*


The string theory number is the number of possible different physics.  
Each different physics gives rise to a branching sequence of MWI.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 5:21:40 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM,  wrote:
>>>  
>>>
 ​> ​
 If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,

>>>
>>> ​
>>> That
>>> ​ is NOT​
>>> ​
>>>  what I claimed
>>> ​.​
>>> I claimed any
>>> ​ ​f
>>> undamental parameter
>>> ​ that​
>>> can exist
>>> ​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim 
>>> any
>>> ​ ​f
>>> undamental parameter
>>>  can exist. There is a HUGE difference!
>>>
>>>  
>>>
 ​> ​
 then there would be universes where matter could NOT exist, and the 
 reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!

>>>
>>> ​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen does happen, 
>>> not everything that can't happen does happen.
>>>
>>> ​> ​
 You need help, badly, urgently.
>>>
>>>
>>> ​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have reached the 
>>> following conclusion:
>>>  
>>> ​ you sir are an ass.
>>>
>>
> Have you been speaking with my wife lately? LOL. Can't deny that, but 
> here's what I wrote and your response:
>
> *AG >For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically 
> different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function 
> of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged 
> universes have the SAME laws,*
>
> JC> No,
> ​ 
> MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a universe 
> with 4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a function of 1/ r^3
> ​, If string theory is right about such a universe not violating the laws 
> of logic then that universe can happen. and if that universe can happen 
> then 
> MWI 
> ​says it does happen. 
>  And such a universe would exist in the Eternal Inflation 
> ​multiverse​
>  too.​
>
> *But that's NOT what MMI alleges. That's essentially what Tegmark claims, 
> but the Many Worlds of MWI have the SAME defining parameters as our 
> universe since OUR universe is claimed to be reproduced EXACTLY, except for 
> the measurements realized in different universes when a quantum experiment 
> is performed in OUR universe.  Of course, if we lived in a universe with 
> DIFFERENT defining parameters, I suppose MWI would claim copies of those 
> would be identical, but this is my first encounter with the EXPANDED, 
> TEGMARKIAN-LIKE claim that the MWI ALSO claims all possible universes must 
> exist. AG* 
>

*In fact, when you think about it, the possible universes claimed by MWI is 
HUGELY GREATER than the number  claimed by string theory EVEN IF OUR 
UNIVERSE IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE UNIVERSE -- not a mere 10^500 -- since 
there's no limit on how many universes metastasize when Joe the Plumber 
enters a casino (or the lab in an electron double slit experiment) and 
pulls the slot machine only one time. AG*

John K Clark​

>
>> You shouldn't have deleted what you actually wrote. Then we could judge 
>> what your words conveyed. I don't time now to dredge it up. In any event, 
>> the parable about the slot machine says it all. AG 
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
 AG
>
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>>>
>>>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM,  wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,
>>>
>>
>> ​
>> That
>> ​ is NOT​
>> ​
>>  what I claimed
>> ​.​
>> I claimed any
>> ​ ​f
>> undamental parameter
>> ​ that​
>> can exist
>> ​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim 
>> any
>> ​ ​f
>> undamental parameter
>>  can exist. There is a HUGE difference!
>>
>>  
>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> then there would be universes where matter could NOT exist, and the 
>>> reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!
>>>
>>
>> ​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen does happen, not 
>> everything that can't happen does happen.
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> You need help, badly, urgently.
>>
>>
>> ​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have reached the 
>> following conclusion:
>>  
>> ​ you sir are an ass.
>>
>
Have you been speaking with my wife lately? LOL. Can't deny that, but 
here's what I wrote and your response:

*AG >For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically 
different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function 
of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged 
universes have the SAME laws,*

JC> No,
​ 
MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a universe with 
4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a function of 1/ r^3
​, If string theory is right about such a universe not violating the laws 
of logic then that universe can happen. and if that universe can happen 
then 
MWI 
​says it does happen. 
 And such a universe would exist in the Eternal Inflation 
​multiverse​
 too.​

*But that's NOT what MMI alleges. That's essentially what Tegmark claims, 
but the Many Worlds of MWI have the SAME defining parameters as our 
universe since OUR universe is claimed to be reproduced EXACTLY, except for 
the measurements realized in different universes when a quantum experiment 
is performed in OUR universe.  Of course, if we lived in a universe with 
DIFFERENT defining parameters, I suppose MWI would claim copies of those 
would be identical, but this is my first encounter with the EXPANDED, 
TEGMARKIAN-LIKE claim that the MWI ALSO claims all possible universes must 
exist. AG* 

>
>> John K Clark​
>>
>
> You shouldn't have deleted what you actually wrote. Then we could judge 
> what your words conveyed. I don't time now to dredge it up. In any event, 
> the parable about the slot machine says it all. AG 
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> AG

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>>
>>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/29/2017 6:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Nov 2017, at 02:19, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/28/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Nov 2017, at 23:02, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing 
a Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or 
having Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever 
believes that some medication will work, then it work, then she 
will believe the medication works!


But that's equivocating on "B". In the formula it means 
beweisbar=prove not "believes". I think that is obfuscation.


Before Gödel, everyone thought that B was an operator for a 
knowledge predicate. But after Gödel (1931), we know that B verifies 
all the axiom of knowledge minus the key one (Bp -> p), making it 
into a (rational) notion of belief. I could have defined by 
axiomatically belief by:


The subject believes x + 0 = x, the subject believes x + s(y) = s(x 
+ y), etc.


But the etc. involves infinitely many beliefs...which I don't have.



No, you need only the finite number of beliefs:


I think the belief that there is a total successor function s() is 
already and infinite set of beliefs.


Brent



0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Together with the belief that if ever you believe A, and A -> B, you 
will believe B.


Such beliefs can be distributed in a neural net on with any finite 
representation. Here we make things simple.






If this applies to you, as I am sure it does, the results will apply 
to you or any of your recursive computational continuations.


This would be ridiculous if that was used to model human psychology,


Then why do continually use the word "belief" which does refer to 
human psychology?  I think you are obfuscating the assumption that 
your "ideal entities" "believe" everything provable from whatever set 
of axioms characterize them.


Yes. That is why sometimes I use "rational belief". In fact, I could 
define belief by assertion. I could say that a machine believes A if 
she asserts A, and then explain that I limit myself to machine which 
never believes an arithmetical falsity. So the machine could have any 
number of non-arithmetical axioms, with the condition that this makes 
not them inconsistent in arithmetic. If you believe in the axiom 
above, and in the closure of the axioms for the modus ponens rule 
(that means that the modus ponens preserves the truth of the axioms) 
then, if you would say yes to a doctor and survive, the consequence of 
Löbianity apply to you, and explain why the observable obeys a quantum 
logic, with apparent interfering multi-histories.


Bruno




Brent

but it is not a problem for the derivation of the physical laws 
(unless you believes that the universe depends conceptually of human 
psychology, but that would be a rather strong coming back to the 
kind of anthropomorphism we usually avoid here.


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/11/2017 9:29 pm, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote:


Quote. " With our ideal realization of the delayed-choice entanglement 
swapping gedanken experiment, we have demonstrated a generalization of 
Wheeler’s “delayed-choice” tests, going from the wave-particle duality 
of a single particle to the entanglement-separability duality of two 
particles. Whether these two particles are entangled or separable has 
been decided *after* they have been measured. *If one views the 
quantum state as a **real physical object*, one could get the 
seemingly *paradoxical situation* that *future actions appear as 
having an **influence on past and already irrevocably recorded 
events*. However, there is never a paradox*if the quantum **state is 
viewed as to be no more than a “catalogue of our knowledge*”. Then the 
state is a probability list for all possible measurement outcomes, the 
relative temporal order of the three observer’s events is irrelevant 
and no
physical interactions whatsoever between these events, especially into 
the past, are necessary to explain the delayed-choice entanglement 
swapping. What, however, is important is to relate the lists of Alice, 
Bob and Victor’s measurement results. On the basis of Victor’s 
measurement settings and results, Alice and Bob can group their 
earlier and locally totally random results into subsets which each 
have a different meaning and interpretation. This formation of subsets 
is independent of the temporal order of the measurements. According to 
Wheeler, Bohr said: 'No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it 
is a registered phenomenon.'
We would like to extend this by saying: 'Some registered phenomena do 
not have a meaning unless they are put in relationship with other 
registered phenomena.' "


-- Zeilinger et al. https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6578

It seems to me that ontic interpretations of quantum states, **if** 
future measurements appear as having an influence on past and already 
*irrevocably* *recorded* events, are untenable. Now the MWI is, for 
sure, an 'ontic' interpretation (an ontic theory if you prefer). How 
can we explain, within MWI, in 'ontic' terms,  that *future actions 
appear as having an **influence on past and already irrevocably 
recorded events? *Is it possible that in MWI is *both* a real physical 
object and a *“catalogue of our knowledge*”?**




Thanks for posting this, Serafino. Zeilinger's group in Vienna have 
certainly mastered quantum optics experiments. I would like to see the 
MWI explanation of the apparent non-locality here. Zeilinger interprets 
this according to Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation of QM, but it really 
boils down to an epistemic understanding of the wave function.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:





​ >​
​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


​ > ​
Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger
equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all
physical evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying physics
-- such as a change in the value of fundamental constants,
Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example -- would not be
unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


​
Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if
​ ​
Newton's constant had any value other than
​ ​
6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2
​  ​
the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 
1. If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's 
constant directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to 
Stockholm right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next 
nobel Prize.


Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to unity, 
that is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition of it. A 
unitary transformation is one that can be reversed: so the unitary 
operator U can be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the complex 
conjugate (or the adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse 
transformation.


So for changes in constants to be unitary, there needs to be a hermitian 
operator that brings about these changes. But changes in constants only 
make sense for dimensionless constants such as the fine structure 
constant, and there is currently no theory as to how this would change 
in a unitary manner.




​ >> ​
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse
must be larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating
everything in Everett's version and MORE; after all if it
contains universes with radically different laws of physics it
must also contain more modest things like a world where my
coin came up heads instead of tails.


​ > ​
I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes
up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event;


​Do you actually think reality can be neatly divided ​
​ between quantum and non-quantum events? A unstable atom has a 50% 
chance of decaying and producing a easily detectable high speed 
electron, if the electron ​is detected a computer controlled robot arm 
turns my coin to heads, if it detects no electron it turns my coin to 
tails.


Of course, if you set up a situation in which a quantum event is 
amplified to give a difference in macroscopic outcomes, such as in 
Schrödinger's cat, then you can say that the macroscopic uncertainty has 
a quantum origin. But the majority of quantum events are not amplified 
in this way -- they simply occur randomly in large numbers so that the 
expectation value is unaffected by individual uncertainties.



​ > ​
Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the
initial conditions could differ to an extent such that everything
was identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss.


​Quite
 unlikely
​ events are going to happen if the number of universes is large 
enough, and if there are a infinity of worlds then anything with a 
non-zero probability is certain to happen in some universe.


Except events of measure zero.



​ > ​
Worlds are not random objects, they follow the laws of physics, so
given some initial conditions, the future is determined in a
deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case that
everything logically possible happens -- only those things that
follow from the initial conditions


​ But there is not just one initial condition, there are as many ​
initial condition
​ s as there are universes.​


But there may well be outcomes that are impossible, whatever the initial 
conditions -- the laws of physics rule out many things that appear to be 
logically possible.




​ > ​
the laws of physics cannot be broken.


​ Yes but what are the true laws of physics? Kepler thought that the 
fact there were 7 and only 7 planets was a law of physics that could 
be derived from pure mathematics.

​ He was wrong. We may be as wrong as Kepler about some of our laws.


The laws of physics governing the universe do not care whether we know 
them or not -- they still cannot be broken.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 30/11/2017 2:24 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Nov 2017, at 04:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like.


It depends. If you shake the coin long enough, the quantum 
uncertainties can add up to the point that the toss is a quantum 
event. With some student we have evaluate this quantitavely (a long 
time ago) and get that if was enough to shake the coin less than a 
minute, but more than few seconds ... (Nothing rigorous).


That is a misunderstanding of quantum randomness. For the outcome of a 
coin toss to be determined by quantum randomness, we would have to have 
a single quantum event where the outcome was amplified by decoherence so 
that it was directly entangled with the way the coin landed. Schematically:


   |quantum event>|coin> = (|outcome A> + |outcome B>)|coin>
   = (|outcome A>|coin heads> + |outcome B>|coin tails>)

This direct entanglement is not reproduced by the sum over many random 
quantum events where the ensuing entanglement is extremely complicated, 
with no direct connection between a quantum outcome and the result of 
the toss. Such accumulation of quantum uncertainties is similar to 
simple thermal noise, and could not be distinguished from it.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 30/11/2017 5:53 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 11:10 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:


​ >> ​
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse
fundamentally different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​


​ > ​
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said
they were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett
which all share the same physics with the same physical
constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger 
equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all 
physical evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying physics 
-- such as a change in the value of fundamental constants,  
Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example -- would not 
be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii 
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical 
constants and the number of space-time dimensions varying from 
world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. 
But lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse 
must be larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating 
everything in Everett's version and MORE; after all if it 
contains universes with radically different laws of physics it 
must also contain more modest things like a world where my coin 
came up heads instead of tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes 
up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 


That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1


I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: 
air current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum 
uncertainties in times of neural firings are not responsible for 
the results of coin tosses, or random digits of pi. We can 
construct classical coin tossers, etc. It sounds like they are very 
close to superdeterminism.


Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since 
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin and 
catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.


Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect 
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain is 
a hot system with decoherence times of the order of nanoseconds. If 
random quantum effects affected behaviour, behaviour would be random 
and purposeful action would be impossible. 


But some randomness is useful and evolution would not try to drive it 
to zero (c.f. Buridan's ass), which is not to say it needs quantum 
randomness.  There are plenty of of sources of randomness in the 
environment.


As you say, not all randomness is quantum randomness.

This is ruled out by experience -- as is the related notion of 
superdeterminism.


I don't see that superdeterminism is ruled out, or can be ruled out by 
experience.  Experience would seem to rule out MWI too, because like 
superdeterminism it posits stuff that can't be experienced: 
superdeterminism because the don't happen, MWI because they happen in 
another "world" to a different "you".


Maybe that is a good reason to disregard such ideas as pure fantasy. The 
problem with superdeterminism, as outlined by Tim Maudlin, is that is 
would render science and the endeavour to understand the nature and 
operation of the world futile -- nothing could ever be tested because 
there could be a giant conspiracy to deceive us.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 9:14:48 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM,  wrote:
>>>  
>>>
 ​> ​
 If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,

>>>
>>> ​
>>> That
>>> ​ is NOT​
>>> ​
>>>  what I claimed
>>> ​.​
>>> I claimed any
>>> ​ ​f
>>> undamental parameter
>>> ​ that​
>>> can exist
>>> ​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim 
>>> any
>>> ​ ​f
>>> undamental parameter
>>>  can exist. There is a HUGE difference!
>>>
>>
> That's much more Tegmarkian than MWI. In the latter, the claim is that 
> except for the measurement realized, identical universes come into being 
> where the values not measured in this world, are realized, that is, 
> measured. So these other universes, if they exist, have the same 
> fundamental constants as our universe. AG 
>

Even if all parameters consistent with logic CAN occur, it doesn't 
necessarily mean they DO. I illustrated this possibility, but haven't 
proved it (and AFAIK, no one has), with my thought experiment using the 
real line. And in the case of the MWI, the parameters of those other worlds 
must be IDENTICAL to this world, since the claim of MWI is that those 
universes are identical except for the values measured. Now let's go back 
to Joe the Plumber. Suppose in this world he leaves the casino after one 
pull of the slot machine, having now created 10 million other universes. 
Presumably some of those other Joe's continue playing, some not, resulting 
in tens of millions of new universes, with identical Joe's, some continuing 
to play, and some not. And on and on it goes. Does this really make sense 
to you? Joe and slot machines is a parable. Purists can think of Joe in a 
lab, shooting an electron at a double slit. AG

>
>
>>>  
>>>
 ​> ​
 then there would be universes where matter could NOT exist, and the 
 reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!

>>>
>>> ​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen does happen, 
>>> not everything that can't happen does happen.
>>>
>>> ​> ​
 You need help, badly, urgently.
>>>
>>>
>>> ​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have reached the 
>>> following conclusion:
>>>  
>>> ​ you sir are an ass.
>>>
>>> John K Clark​
>>>
>>
>> You shouldn't have deleted what you actually wrote. Then we could judge 
>> what your words conveyed. I don't time now to dredge it up. In any event, 
>> the parable about the slot machine says it all. AG 
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
 AG
>
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>>>
>>>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 8:44:18 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM,  wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,
>>>
>>
>> ​
>> That
>> ​ is NOT​
>> ​
>>  what I claimed
>> ​.​
>> I claimed any
>> ​ ​f
>> undamental parameter
>> ​ that​
>> can exist
>> ​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim 
>> any
>> ​ ​f
>> undamental parameter
>>  can exist. There is a HUGE difference!
>>
>
That's much more Tegmarkian than MWI. In the latter, the claim is that 
except for the measurement realized, identical universes come into being 
where the values not measured in this world, are realized, that is, 
measured. So these other universes, if they exist, have the same 
fundamental constants as our universe. AG 

>
>>  
>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> then there would be universes where matter could NOT exist, and the 
>>> reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!
>>>
>>
>> ​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen does happen, not 
>> everything that can't happen does happen.
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> You need help, badly, urgently.
>>
>>
>> ​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have reached the 
>> following conclusion:
>>  
>> ​ you sir are an ass.
>>
>> John K Clark​
>>
>
> You shouldn't have deleted what you actually wrote. Then we could judge 
> what your words conveyed. I don't time now to dredge it up. In any event, 
> the parable about the slot machine says it all. AG 
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> AG

>>> -- 
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>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
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>>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
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>>>
>>
>>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 5:29:01 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM, > 
> wrote:
>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,
>>
>
> ​
> That
> ​ is NOT​
> ​
>  what I claimed
> ​.​
> I claimed any
> ​ ​f
> undamental parameter
> ​ that​
> can exist
> ​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim 
> any
> ​ ​f
> undamental parameter
>  can exist. There is a HUGE difference!
>
>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> then there would be universes where matter could NOT exist, and the 
>> reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!
>>
>
> ​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen does happen, not 
> everything that can't happen does happen.
>
> ​> ​
>> You need help, badly, urgently.
>
>
> ​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have reached the 
> following conclusion:
>  
> ​ you sir are an ass.
>
> John K Clark​
>

You shouldn't have deleted what you actually wrote. Then we could judge 
what your words conveyed. I don't time now to dredge it up. In any event, 
the parable about the slot machine says it all. AG 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> AG
>>>
>> -- 
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>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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>> .
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>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/28/2017 11:10 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:


​ >> ​
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​


​ > ​
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger 
equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all 
physical evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying physics 
-- such as a change in the value of fundamental constants,  
Planck's constant or Newton's constant for example -- would not be 
unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii 
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants 
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But 
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must 
be larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating 
everything in Everett's version and MORE; after all if it 
contains universes with radically different laws of physics it 
must also contain more modest things like a world where my coin 
came up heads instead of tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes 
up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 


That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1


I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: 
air current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum 
uncertainties in times of neural firings are not responsible for the 
results of coin tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct 
classical coin tossers, etc. It sounds like they are very close to 
superdeterminism.


Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since 
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin and 
catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.


Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect 
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain is a 
hot system with decoherence times of the order of nanoseconds. If 
random quantum effects affected behaviour, behaviour would be random 
and purposeful action would be impossible. 


But some randomness is useful and evolution would not try to drive it to 
zero (c.f. Buridan's ass), which is not to say it needs quantum 
randomness.  There are plenty of of sources of randomness in the 
environment.


This is ruled out by experience -- as is the related notion of 
superdeterminism.


I don't see that superdeterminism is ruled out, or can be ruled out by 
experience.  Experience would seem to rule out MWI too, because like 
superdeterminism it posits stuff that can't be experienced: 
superdeterminism because the don't happen, MWI because they happen in 
another "world" to a different "you".


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

>
> ​>​
>> ​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
>
>
> ​> ​
> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation
> applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is
> unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the
> value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for
> example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
>

​
Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if
​ ​
Newton's constant had any value other than
​ ​
6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2
​  ​
the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 1.
If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's constant
directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm
right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize.

​>> ​
>> lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be
>> larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in
>> Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with
>> radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest things
>> like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.
>
>
> ​> ​
> I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up head
> or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event;
>

​Do you actually think reality can be neatly divided ​

​between quantum and non-quantum events? A unstable atom has a 50% chance
of decaying and producing a easily detectable high speed electron, if the
electron ​is detected a computer controlled robot arm turns my coin to
heads, if it detects no electron it turns my coin to tails.


> ​> ​
> Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the initial
> conditions could differ to an extent such that everything was identical in
> the two worlds up to your coin toss.
>

​Quite
 unlikely
​ events are going to happen if the number of universes is large enough,
and if there are a infinity of worlds then anything with a non-zero
probability is certain to happen in some universe.



> ​> ​
> Worlds are not random objects, they follow the laws of physics, so given
> some initial conditions, the future is determined in a deterministic
> Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case that everything logically
> possible happens -- only those things that follow from the initial
> conditions
>

​But there is not just one initial condition, there are as many ​
initial condition
​s as there are universes.​


> ​> ​
> the laws of physics cannot be broken.


​Yes but what are the true laws of physics? Kepler thought that the fact
there were 7 and only 7 planets was a law of physics that could be derived
from pure mathematics.

​He was wrong. We may be as wrong as Kepler about some of our laws.

 John K Clark

​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:51 PM,  wrote:


> ​> ​
> If, as you claim, any fundamental parameters can exist,
>

​
That
​ is NOT​
​
 what I claimed
​.​
I claimed any
​ ​f
undamental parameter
​ that​
can exist
​ does exist, I did NOT ​claim
any
​ ​f
undamental parameter
 can exist. There is a HUGE difference!



> ​> ​
> then there would be universes where matter could NOT exist, and the
> reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE!
>

​And that is why the MWI says everything that can happen does happen, not
everything that can't happen does happen.

​> ​
> You need help, badly, urgently.


​Hmm, after communicating with ​you for a while I have reached the
following conclusion:

​ you sir are an ass.

John K Clark​









> AG
>>
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:46 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​> ​
> Everett just takes the Schrodinger equation of evolution according to some
> Hamiltionian.  The Hamiltonian doesn't change the physical
> constants...that's why they're called constants.


The
​ ​
Hubble
​ ​
Constant
​ ​
is
​most ​
certainly not
​a ​
constant
​ ​
in our universe, and there is some experimental evidence that the Fine
​ ​
Structure
​ ​
Constant isn't either, and it
​'s​
a dimensionless quantity, a pure number
​ very close to 1/137​
. There probably are true constants that hold true
​ ​
throughout
​ the Multiverse, but nobody knows what they are.

 John K Clark

​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 3:24:38 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2017, at 04:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker < 
> meek...@verizon.net > wrote:
>
> ​ >> ​
> And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from 
> the String Theory Multiverse? 
> ​ 
>
>
> ​ > ​
> I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were 
> different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the same 
> physics with the same physical constant values.
>
>
> ​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
>
>
> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
> applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is 
> unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the 
> value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's constant for 
> example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
>
> The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
> inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii multiverse from 
> the string theory landscape has physical constants and the number of 
> space-time dimensions varying from world to world.
>
>
> Yes. The Everettian view of string theory leads to a multi-multiverse. 
> Perhaps 10^500 multiverses ...
>

*Wow! What a coincidence! Same estimate as the landscape in string theory. 
Is this before or after Joe the Plumber did his experiments which adds 
universes according to the MWI? AG *

>
>
>
>
> unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But lets 
> assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be larger than 
> the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in Everett's version 
> and MORE; after all if it contains universes with radically different laws 
> of physics it must also contain more modest things like a world where my 
> coin came up heads instead of tails.
>
>
> I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up head 
> or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is determined by quite 
> classical laws of physics governing initial conditions, air currents and 
> the like. 
>
>
> It depends. If you shake the coin long enough, the quantum uncertainties 
> can add up to the point that the toss is a quantum event. With some student 
> we have evaluate this quantitavely (a long time ago) and get that if was 
> enough to shake the coin less than a minute, but more than few seconds ... 
> (Nothing rigorous).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the initial 
> conditions could differ to an extent such that everything was identical in 
> the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think Tegmark is wrong about this. 
> His argument (as outlined in his book) assumes that worlds are made up at 
> random out of the available constituents, so every way of filling 
> space-time units is realized somewhere. But this is wrong. Worlds are not 
> random objects, they follow the laws of physics, so given some initial 
> conditions, the future is determined in a deterministic Everettian MW 
> scenario. It is not the case that everything logically possible happens -- 
> only those things that follow from the initial conditions by deterministic 
> evolution happen. So although all possible initial conditions may be 
> realized somewhere, not everything can follow deterministically -- the laws 
> of physics cannot be broken.
>
>
> OK. We agree on this.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Bruce
>
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to 
>
> ...

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Nov 2017, at 04:59, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker  
 wrote:


​ >> ​ And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally  
different from the String Theory Multiverse? ​


​ > ​ I didn't say they were different from each other; I said  
they were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all  
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation  
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution  
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change  
in the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or  
Newton's constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot  
occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal  
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii  
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants  
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


Yes. The Everettian view of string theory leads to a multi-multiverse.  
Perhaps 10^500 multiverses ...






unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But  
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be  
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in  
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with  
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more  
modest things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of  
tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up  
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is  
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial  
conditions, air currents and the like.


It depends. If you shake the coin long enough, the quantum  
uncertainties can add up to the point that the toss is a quantum  
event. With some student we have evaluate this quantitavely (a long  
time ago) and get that if was enough to shake the coin less than a  
minute, but more than few seconds ... (Nothing rigorous).







Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the  
initial conditions could differ to an extent such that everything  
was identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think  
Tegmark is wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book)  
assumes that worlds are made up at random out of the available  
constituents, so every way of filling space-time units is realized  
somewhere. But this is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they  
follow the laws of physics, sogiven some initial conditions, the  
future is determined in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It  
is not the case that everything logically possible happens -- only  
those things that follow from the initial conditions by  
deterministic evolution happen. So although all possible initial  
conditions may be realized somewhere, not everything can follow  
deterministically -- the laws of physics cannot be broken.


OK. We agree on this.

Bruno





Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 Nov 2017, at 02:19, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/28/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Nov 2017, at 23:02, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing  
a Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or  
having Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she  
ever believes that some medication will work, then it work, then  
she will believe the medication works!


But that's equivocating on "B".  In the formula it means  
beweisbar=prove not "believes".  I think that is obfuscation.


Before Gödel, everyone thought that B was an operator for a  
knowledge predicate. But after Gödel (1931), we know that B  
verifies all the axiom of knowledge minus the key one (Bp -> p),  
making it into a (rational) notion of belief. I could have defined  
by axiomatically belief by:


The subject believes x + 0 = x, the subject believes x + s(y) = s(x  
+ y), etc.


But the etc. involves infinitely many beliefs...which I don't have.



No, you need only the finite number of beliefs:

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Together with the belief that if ever you believe A, and A -> B, you  
will believe B.


Such beliefs can be distributed in a neural net on with any finite  
representation. Here we make things simple.






If this applies to you, as I am sure it does, the results will  
apply to you or any of your recursive computational continuations.


This would be ridiculous if that was used to model human psychology,


Then why do continually use the word "belief" which does refer to  
human psychology?  I think you are obfuscating the assumption that  
your "ideal entities" "believe" everything provable from whatever  
set of axioms characterize them.


Yes. That is why sometimes I use "rational belief". In fact, I could  
define belief by assertion. I could say that a machine believes A if  
she asserts A, and then explain that I limit myself to machine which  
never believes an arithmetical falsity. So the machine could have any  
number of non-arithmetical axioms, with the condition that this makes  
not them inconsistent in arithmetic. If you believe in the axiom  
above, and in the closure of the axioms for the modus ponens rule  
(that means that the modus ponens preserves the truth of the axioms)  
then, if you would say yes to a doctor and survive, the consequence of  
Löbianity apply to you, and explain why the observable obeys a quantum  
logic, with apparent interfering multi-histories.


Bruno




Brent

but it is not a problem for the derivation of the physical laws  
(unless you believes that the universe depends conceptually of  
human psychology, but that would be a rather strong coming back to  
the kind of  anthropomorphism we usually avoid here.


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

['scerir' via Everything List]

Quote. " With our ideal realization of the delayed-choice entanglement swapping 
gedanken experiment, we have demonstrated a generalization of Wheeler’s 
“delayed-choice” tests, going from the wave-particle duality of a single 
particle to the entanglement-separability duality of two particles. Whether 
these two particles are entangled or separable has been decided after they have 
been measured. If one views the quantum state as a real physical object, one 
could get the seemingly paradoxical situation that future actions appear as 
having an influence on past and already irrevocably recorded events. However, 
there is never a paradox if the quantum state is viewed as to be no more than a 
“catalogue of our knowledge”. Then the state is a probability list for all 
possible measurement outcomes, the relative temporal order of the three 
observer’s events is irrelevant and no
physical interactions whatsoever between these events, especially into the 
past, are necessary to explain the delayed-choice entanglement swapping. What, 
however, is important is to relate the lists of Alice, Bob and Victor’s 
measurement results. On the basis of Victor’s measurement settings and results, 
Alice and Bob can group their earlier and locally totally random results into 
subsets which each have a different meaning and interpretation. This formation 
of subsets is independent of the temporal order of the measurements. According 
to Wheeler, Bohr said: 'No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a 
registered phenomenon.'
We would like to extend this by saying: 'Some registered phenomena do not have 
a meaning unless they are put in relationship with other registered phenomena.' 
"

-- Zeilinger et al. https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6578

It seems to me that ontic interpretations of quantum states, *if* future 
measurements appear as having an influence on past and already irrevocably 
recorded events, are untenable. Now the MWI is, for sure, an 'ontic' 
interpretation (an ontic theory if you prefer). How can we explain, within MWI, 
in 'ontic' terms,  that future actions appear as having an influence on past 
and already irrevocably recorded events? Is it possible that in MWI is both a 
real physical object and a “catalogue of our knowledge”?

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/11/2017 7:49 pm, smitra wrote:

On 29-11-2017 08:10, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:

​ >> ​ And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​

​ > ​ I didn't say they were different from each other; I said
they were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
 Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in
the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's
constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.

 The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii multiverse
from the string theory landscape has physical constants and the number
of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest
things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.


 I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial
conditions, air currents and the like.
 That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1 [1]

 I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: air
current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum uncertainties
in times of neural firings are not responsible for the results of coin
tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct classical coin
tossers, etc. It sounds like they are very close to superdeterminism.

 Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin and
catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.

 Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain is a
hot system with decoherence times of the order of nanoseconds. If
random quantum effects affected behaviour, behaviour would be random
and purposeful action would be impossible. This is ruled out by
experience -- as is the related notion of superdeterminism.

 Bruce


There is no such thing as a "real classical world", the world is 
quantum mechanical, everything is ultimately always a quantum event, 
albeit involving a huge number of degrees of freedom, in general. 
Classical physics only yields an approximate description of the world, 
which can be exceedingly accurate, just like e.g. thermodynamics can 
yield an excellent description of properties of materials.


And your point is.?

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[smitra]

On 29-11-2017 08:10, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:

​ >> ​ And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​

​ > ​ I didn't say they were different from each other; I said
they were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
 Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in
the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's
constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.

 The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii multiverse
from the string theory landscape has physical constants and the number
of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest
things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.


 I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial
conditions, air currents and the like.
 That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1 [1]

 I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: air
current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum uncertainties
in times of neural firings are not responsible for the results of coin
tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct classical coin
tossers, etc. It sounds like they are very close to superdeterminism.

 Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin and
catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.

 Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain is a
hot system with decoherence times of the order of nanoseconds. If
random quantum effects affected behaviour, behaviour would be random
and purposeful action would be impossible. This is ruled out by
experience -- as is the related notion of superdeterminism.

 Bruce


There is no such thing as a "real classical world", the world is quantum 
mechanical, everything is ultimately always a quantum event, albeit 
involving a huge number of degrees of freedom, in general. Classical 
physics only yields an approximate description of the world, which can 
be exceedingly accurate, just like e.g. thermodynamics can yield an 
excellent description of properties of materials.


Saibal



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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/11/2017 5:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:


​ >> ​
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​


​ > ​
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger 
equation applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical 
evolution is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as 
a change in the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant 
or Newton's constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot 
occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii 
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants 
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But 
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must 
be larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything 
in Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes 
with radically different laws of physics it must also contain more 
modest things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of 
tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes 
up head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 


That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1


I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: air 
current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum uncertainties 
in times of neural firings are not responsible for the results of 
coin tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct classical coin 
tossers, etc. It sounds like they are very close to superdeterminism.


Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since 
Persis Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin and 
catch it so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.


Actually, the whole idea that quantum effects in the brain affect 
behavioural outcomes is pretty nonsensical. As we know, the brain is a 
hot system with decoherence times of the order of nanoseconds. If random 
quantum effects affected behaviour, behaviour would be random and 
purposeful action would be impossible. This is ruled out by experience 
-- as is the related notion of superdeterminism.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:


​ >> ​
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​


​ > ​
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution 
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change 
in the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or 
Newton's constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot 
occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii 
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants 
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But 
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be 
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with 
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more 
modest things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of 
tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 


That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1


I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: air 
current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum uncertainties 
in times of neural firings are not responsible for the results of coin 
tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct classical coin 
tossers, etc. It sounds like they are very close to superdeterminism.


Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since Persis 
Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin and catch it 
so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.


Brent



Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the 
initial conditions could differ to an extent such that everything 
was identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think 
Tegmark is wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) 
assumes that worlds are made up at random out of the available 
constituents, so every way of filling space-time units is realized 
somewhere. But this is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they 
follow the laws of physics, so given some initial conditions, the 
future is determined in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It 
is not the case that everything logically possible happens -- only 
those things that follow from the initial conditions by 
deterministic evolution happen. So although all possible initial 
conditions may be realized somewhere, not everything can follow 
deterministically -- the laws of physics cannot be broken.


Right: http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702121v1 The Schrodinger 
equation predicts some zeros.


That is more interesting. It is not the case that everything possible 
according to some ideas actually can happen in reality.


Bruce
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:


​ >> ​
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​


​ > ​
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution 
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in 
the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's 
constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii 
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants 
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But 
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be 
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with 
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest 
things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 


That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1


I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: air 
current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum uncertainties in 
times of neural firings are not responsible for the results of coin 
tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct classical coin tossers, 
etc. It sounds like they are very close to superdeterminism.


Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the initial 
conditions could differ to an extent such that everything was 
identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think Tegmark is 
wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) assumes that 
worlds are made up at random out of the available constituents, so 
every way of filling space-time units is realized somewhere. But this 
is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they follow the laws of 
physics, so given some initial conditions, the future is determined 
in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case that 
everything logically possible happens -- only those things that 
follow from the initial conditions by deterministic evolution happen. 
So although all possible initial conditions may be realized 
somewhere, not everything can follow deterministically -- the laws of 
physics cannot be broken.


Right: http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702121v1 The Schrodinger 
equation predicts some zeros.


That is more interesting. It is not the case that everything possible 
according to some ideas actually can happen in reality.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:


​ >> ​
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​


​ > ​
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution 
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in 
the value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's 
constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii multiverse 
from the string theory landscape has physical constants and the number 
of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But 
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be 
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with 
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest 
things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 


That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1

Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the initial 
conditions could differ to an extent such that everything was 
identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think Tegmark is 
wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) assumes that 
worlds are made up at random out of the available constituents, so 
every way of filling space-time units is realized somewhere. But this 
is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they follow the laws of 
physics, so given some initial conditions, the future is determined in 
a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case that 
everything logically possible happens -- only those things that follow 
from the initial conditions by deterministic evolution happen. So 
although all possible initial conditions may be realized somewhere, 
not everything can follow deterministically -- the laws of physics 
cannot be broken.


Right: http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702121v1  The Schrodinger 
equation predicts some zeros.


Brent



Bruce
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 3:46:03 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/28/2017 7:29 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from 
>>> the String Theory Multiverse? 
>>> ​ 
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were 
>> different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the same 
>> physics with the same physical constant values.
>>
>
> ​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics, unless it 
> turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. 
>
>
> Everett just takes the Schrodinger equation of evolution according to some 
> Hamiltionian.  The Hamiltonian doesn't change the physical 
> constants...that's why they're called constants.
>
> But lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be 
> larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
> Everett's version and MORE; 
>
>
> Right.  
>

But string theory doesn't guarantee or imply virtually identical copies of 
our universe, differing only in what outcome is realized in some quantum 
experiment. There is no clear argument of such virtually identical 
repetitions. AG 

>
> Brent
>
> after all if it contains universes with radically different laws of 
> physics it must also contain more modest things like a world where my coin 
> came up heads instead of tails. 
>
>  John K Clark  ​
>  
>
> ​
>
>  
> -- 
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker >wrote:


​ >> ​
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​


​ > ​
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were
different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the
same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,


Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is 
unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the 
value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's constant 
for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.


The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii multiverse 
from the string theory landscape has physical constants and the number 
of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.


unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But lets 
assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be larger 
than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in Everett's 
version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with radically 
different laws of physics it must also contain more modest things like 
a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.


I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is determined 
by quite classical laws of physics governing initial conditions, air 
currents and the like. Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite 
unlikely that the initial conditions could differ to an extent such that 
everything was identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think 
Tegmark is wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) 
assumes that worlds are made up at random out of the available 
constituents, so every way of filling space-time units is realized 
somewhere. But this is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they follow 
the laws of physics, so given some initial conditions, the future is 
determined in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case 
that everything logically possible happens -- only those things that 
follow from the initial conditions by deterministic evolution happen. So 
although all possible initial conditions may be realized somewhere, not 
everything can follow deterministically -- the laws of physics cannot be 
broken.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 3:14:28 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 5:34 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> All 3 assume the same physics.
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> ​For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically 
>> different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function 
>> of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged 
>> universes have the SAME laws,
>
>
>
> No,
> ​ 
> MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a universe 
> with 4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a function of 1/ r^3, 
>
>  

> You need help, badly, urgently. Those other universes in the MWI allegedly 
> result in the UN-measured values of some quantum experiment performed in 
> our universe, being *observed*. If, as you claim, any fundamental 
> parameters can exist, then there would be universes where matter could NOT 
> exist, and the reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE! AG
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/28/2017 7:29 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker >wrote:


​>> ​
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?
​


​> ​
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were
different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the
same physics with the same physical constant values.


​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics, unless 
it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen.


Everett just takes the Schrodinger equation of evolution according to 
some Hamiltionian.  The Hamiltonian doesn't change the physical 
constants...that's why they're called constants.


But lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must 
be larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
Everett's version and MORE;


Right.

Brent

after all if it contains universes with radically different laws of 
physics it must also contain more modest things like a world where my 
coin came up heads instead of tails.


 John K Clark  ​

​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​>> ​
>> And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from
>> the String Theory Multiverse?
>> ​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were
> different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the same
> physics with the same physical constant values.
>

​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics, unless it
turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But lets assume you're
right, then the string theory multiverse must be larger than the many
worlds multiverse incorporating everything in Everett's version and MORE;
after all if it contains universes with radically different laws of physics
it must also contain more modest things like a world where my coin came up
heads instead of tails.

 John K Clark  ​


​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 5:34 PM,  wrote:

​>> ​
>> All 3 assume the same physics.
>
>
> ​> ​
> ​For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically
> different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function
> of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged
> universes have the SAME laws,


No,
​
MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a universe with
4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a function of 1/ r^3
​, If string theory is right about such a universe not violating the laws
of logic then that universe can happen. and if that universe can happen
then
MWI
​says it does happen.
 And such a universe would exist in the Eternal Inflation
​multiverse​
 too.​

​>​
> I feel like I am arguing with a silly girl.
>

​A bit sexist don't you think?​



> ​> ​
> It was YOU who defacto alleged "no smudge", implying the electron has a
> spatial extent of ZERO.
>

No, implying the electron has a spatial extent
​ considerably smaller that the photographic plate, that's why I said it
would make a spot on the plate, ​I did not say it would make a point.



> ​> ​
> if the electron has zero width, it would have infinite density.
>

​True.​


> ​> ​
> Is this logical?
>

​Given the premise the conclusion is logical, if one quality, length, can
be infinitely small then another quality, density, can be infinitely large.
B
ut nobody knows if a physical length smaller than
1.6 x 10
​^-35 meters is logical, my hunch is that it is not but its only a hunch
and I could be wrong.


> ​>​
> Experiments have placed limits on its width
>

​All experiments can ​say is that the electron's radius is smaller that
10^16 meters, possibly much smaller, possibly infinitely smaller.


> ​>
>> ​>>​
>> ​
>> It can't do what you claim without violating the UP.
>>
>>
>> ​>> ​
>> ​Ah but you forget to take IHA into account.​
>>
>>
>
> ​> ​
> IHA?
>

​*I H*ATE *A*CRONYMS ​



> ​> ​
> Logically, its diameter must be non-zero. Otherwise its density would be
> infinite.
>

​Apparently you ​believe that infinite is another of those stories
mathematicians tell each other in the language of mathematics. Who knows
you may be right, infinity could be a story no closer to reality that a
Harry Potter story written in the language of English.


> ​>
>> ​>> ​
>> ​
>> Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it,
>> let me know. AG
>>
>>
>> ​>> ​
>> ​OK I'm officially letting you know, I just did exactly what you said
>> but I still can't find it, I still can find no evidence ​Weinberg thinks
>> the multiverse may have merit but not the MWI.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> I reasonably inferred that from his words. He thinks MWI "repellent",
> meaning "ugly", and is hugely skeptical of its claims.
>

 He said repellent and I can infer ugly
​,​
but where did
​
"hugely skeptical"
​
come from? And
​however strong Weinberg's emotional aversion to Many Worlds may be he
admits he doesn't have a better idea. Look, maybe all current quantum
interpretations are wrong and tomorrow somebody will find a better one, but
right now Many Worlds is the least bad.

 John K Clark

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/28/2017 9:30 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Brent Meeker >wrote:


​>> ​
I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the
inflation theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett
​/​
​D​
eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently
point in the same direction nature may be trying to tell you
something. 



​> ​
They don't point in the same direction.  The string theory and
inflation theory multiverse posits different universes with
different physical parameters due to random symmetry breaking. 
Everett/Deutsch assume the same physics


​
All 3 assume the same physics.
​ ​
There must be some basic fundamental physical principles that remain 
the same in every string universe and every

​ ​
Everett/Deutsch
​ ​
universe, although we don't know what they are, we don't know what's 
really fundamental and what is not. 400 years ago Kepler tried to 
derive the fact that there are 7 and only 7 planets from pure 
mathematics but he failed to do so, he failed for 2 reasons, it turns 
out there are more than 7 planets and he failed because the number of 
planets is not a fundamental law of logic or physics but is a result 
of random happenstance. Some of the laws of physics that we think of 
as fundamental may be like that, they are only true in this universe. 
But there must be some laws of physics that are true in every 
universe, I'd bet money that the second law of thermodynamics is one 
of them

​,​
but there will be others.

And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different 
from the String Theory Multiverse?

​


I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were 
different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the same 
physics with the same physical constant values.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/28/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Nov 2017, at 23:02, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a 
Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having 
Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever believes 
that some medication will work, then it work, then she will believe 
the medication works!


But that's equivocating on "B".  In the formula it means 
beweisbar=prove not "believes".  I think that is obfuscation.


Before Gödel, everyone thought that B was an operator for a knowledge 
predicate. But after Gödel (1931), we know that B verifies all the 
axiom of knowledge minus the key one (Bp -> p), making it into a 
(rational) notion of belief. I could have defined by axiomatically 
belief by:


The subject believes x + 0 = x, the subject believes x + s(y) = s(x + 
y), etc.


But the etc. involves infinitely many beliefs...which I don't have.

If this applies to you, as I am sure it does, the results will apply 
to you or any of your recursive computational continuations.


This would be ridiculous if that was used to model human psychology, 


Then why do continually use the word "belief" which does refer to human 
psychology?  I think you are obfuscating the assumption that your "ideal 
entities" "believe" everything provable from whatever set of axioms 
characterize them.


Brent

but it is not a problem for the derivation of the physical laws 
(unless you believes that the universe depends conceptually of human 
psychology, but that would be a rather strong coming back to the kind 
of  anthropomorphism we usually avoid here.


Bruno







Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, November 28, 2017 at 9:12:17 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:59 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> ​ 
> ​>> ​
> The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that 
> photographic
> ​ plate regardless ​of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit 
> at all. 
>
>
> ​> ​
> Three strikes as follows: If it produced a mathematical point, it could 
> never be observed. 
>
>
> ​Maybe that's why there is no evidence that mathematical points exist, 
> other than in the stories mathematicians tell each other in the language of 
> mathematics.  
>

I feel like I am arguing with a silly girl. It was YOU who defacto alleged 
"no smudge", implying the electron has a spatial extent of ZERO. I claimed 
it has finite width -- which is logical considering it has a finite, 
measured mass -- and you use my claim to make a totally irrelevant, self 
serving comment about no use of some mathematical concepts in physics. You 
want to present yourself as a master of, and respectful of logic. Consider 
this; if the electron has zero width, it would have infinite density. Is 
this logical? Experiments have placed limits on its width, and some 
theories allege it has zero width. But this is wrong, as simply logic 
shows. AG​

>  
>
> ​> ​
> It can't do what you claim without violating the UP.
>
>
> ​Ah but you forget to take IHA into account.​
>  
>

IHA? AG 

>  
>
> ​> ​
> Moreover, you fail to take into account the finite width of the electron. 
>
>
> ​No experiment has indicated that the electron has any size at all, I 
> think the best experiment shows that the radius must be smaller than 
> 10^-16 meters. ​It's probably larger than 10^-35 meters because that's the 
> Planck Length and if it's smaller than that we're going to need new physics 
> to explain it.
>

Logically, its diameter must be non-zero. Otherwise its density would be 
infinite. AG 

>  
>
> ​>> ​
> And even if there is which way information if that information is erased 
> after it passed the slits but before it hits the photographic plate there 
> will be a interference pattern. Think about that for a minute, its in the 
> past, the electron either went through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow 
> of time is real then there is nothing you can do about it now, 
> but apparently you can. Many Worlds can explain this without the future 
> changing the past, Copenhagen can't. 
>
>
Not very familiar with delayed choice experiment. Interesting, need to 
think about, but don't trust your conclusions. AG 

>
> ​> ​
> The interference effect is manifest in the distribution of the ensemble. I 
> don't what what your complaint is here. 
>
>
> Use Copenhagen
> ​ to explain how ​the decision to erase or not to erase which way 
> information made *AFTER* the electrons have passed the 2 slits but before 
> they hit the photographic plate can produce a effect on that photographic 
> plate and make sure that explanation is realistic and the arrow of time is 
> respected. 
>
>
> ​>
> ​>>​
> ​
> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit, 
> but NOT the MWI,
>
>
> ​
> ​>> ​
> Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? 
>
>
> ​> ​
> Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it, 
> let me know. AG
>
>
> ​OK I'm officially letting you know, I just did exactly what you said but 
> I still can't find it, I still can find no evidence ​Weinberg thinks the 
> multiverse may have merit but not the MWI.
>

I reasonably inferred that from his words. He thinks MWI "repellent", 
meaning "ugly", and is hugely skeptical of its claims. WRT the multiverse 
of string theory, he seems worried that it might be true because in that 
case the mass of quarks and other parameters can't be deduced from 
fundamental principles. Luck of the draw, good or bad, would prevail. AG

>  
>
> ​>> ​
> how can you have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a 
> multiverse? ​
>  
>
>
> ​> ​
> You keep making the same error as Brent pointed out earlier
>
>
> ​Brent was wrong and so are you.​
>

Brent is rarely wrong. See earlier comment. AG.

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, November 28, 2017 at 5:30:07 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the inflation 
>>> theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett 
>>> ​/​
>>> ​D​
>>> eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently point in the 
>>> same direction nature may be trying to tell you something. 
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> They don't point in the same direction.  The string theory and inflation 
>> theory multiverse posits different universes with different physical 
>> parameters due to random symmetry breaking.  Everett/Deutsch assume the 
>> same physics
>>
>
> ​
> All 3 assume the same physics.
>
>
​For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically different 
fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function of 1/ 
r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged universes have 
the SAME laws, only difference being what is measured in each universe. AG 

There must be some basic fundamental physical principles that remain the 
> same in every string universe and every
> ​ ​
> Everett/Deutsch
> ​ ​
> universe, although we don't know what they are, we don't know what's 
> really fundamental and what is not. 400 years ago Kepler tried to derive 
> the fact that there are 7 and only 7 planets from pure mathematics but he 
> failed to do so, he failed for 2 reasons, it turns out there are more than 
> 7 planets and he failed because the number of planets is not a fundamental 
> law of logic or physics but is a result of random happenstance. Some of the 
> laws of physics that we think of as fundamental may be like that, they are 
> only true in this universe. But there must be some laws of physics that are 
> true in every universe, I'd bet money that the second law of thermodynamics 
> is one of them
> ​,​
> but there will be others. 
>
> And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from 
> the String Theory Multiverse?
> ​ 
>
>  J​ohn K Clark
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:59 PM,  wrote:

​
>> ​>> ​
>> The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that
>> photographic
>> ​ plate regardless ​of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit
>> at all.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Three strikes as follows: If it produced a mathematical point, it could
> never be observed.
>

​Maybe that's why there is no evidence that mathematical points exist,
other than in the stories mathematicians tell each other in the language of
mathematics.   ​


> ​> ​
> It can't do what you claim without violating the UP.
>

​Ah but you forget to take IHA into account.​



> ​> ​
> Moreover, you fail to take into account the finite width of the electron.
>

​No experiment has indicated that the electron has any size at all, I think
the best experiment shows that the radius must be smaller than
10^-16 meters. ​It's probably larger than 10^-35 meters because that's the
Planck Length and if it's smaller than that we're going to need new physics
to explain it.


> ​>> ​
>> And even if there is which way information if that information is erased
>> after it passed the slits but before it hits the photographic plate there
>> will be a interference pattern. Think about that for a minute, its in the
>> past, the electron either went through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow
>> of time is real then there is nothing you can do about it now,
>> but apparently you can. Many Worlds can explain this without the future
>> changing the past, Copenhagen can't.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> The interference effect is manifest in the distribution of the ensemble. I
> don't what what your complaint is here.
>

Use Copenhagen
​ to explain how ​the decision to erase or not to erase which way
information made *AFTER* the electrons have passed the 2 slits but before
they hit the photographic plate can produce a effect on that photographic
plate and make sure that explanation is realistic and the arrow of time is
respected.


​>
>> ​>>​
>> ​
>> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have
>> merit, but NOT the MWI,
>>
>>
>> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that?
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it,
> let me know. AG
>

​OK I'm officially letting you know, I just did exactly what you said but I
still can't find it, I still can find no evidence ​Weinberg thinks the
multiverse may have merit but not the MWI.


> ​>> ​
>> how can you have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without
>> a multiverse? ​
>>
>>
>
> ​> ​
> You keep making the same error as Brent pointed out earlier
>

​Brent was wrong and so are you.​

​> ​
> The Multiverse of String theory, aka the Landscape, arises in a totally
> different context and theory than the MW of the MWI.
>

​I agree, the context was totally different. The string theorists had their
reasons for coming up with a Multiverse, ​
 Everett
​ had completely different reasons for coming up with a Multiverse, and the
reasons Eternal Inflation theorists needed a Multiverse had nothing to do
with string theory or Everett. The fact that all 3 needed a multiverse
gives strength to the idea, it certainly isn't a weakness!   ​

 John K Clark

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​>> ​
>> I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the inflation
>> theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett
>> ​/​
>> ​D​
>> eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently point in the
>> same direction nature may be trying to tell you something.
>
>
> ​> ​
> They don't point in the same direction.  The string theory and inflation
> theory multiverse posits different universes with different physical
> parameters due to random symmetry breaking.  Everett/Deutsch assume the
> same physics
>

​
All 3 assume the same physics.
​ ​
There must be some basic fundamental physical principles that remain the
same in every string universe and every
​ ​
Everett/Deutsch
​ ​
universe, although we don't know what they are, we don't know what's really
fundamental and what is not. 400 years ago Kepler tried to derive the fact
that there are 7 and only 7 planets from pure mathematics but he failed to
do so, he failed for 2 reasons, it turns out there are more than 7 planets
and he failed because the number of planets is not a fundamental law of
logic or physics but is a result of random happenstance. Some of the laws
of physics that we think of as fundamental may be like that, they are only
true in this universe. But there must be some laws of physics that are true
in every universe, I'd bet money that the second law of thermodynamics is
one of them
​,​
but there will be others.

And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from
the String Theory Multiverse?
​

 J​ohn K Clark

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 10:46 PM,  wrote:

*​> ​If Weinberg thinks the MWI is "repellent", do you really think he
> finds it plausible?*


Yes
​ ​
absolutely!! Weinberg is on record for saying the universe is "pointless"
and he probably thinks being pointless is pretty repellent but I'll bet he
nevertheless thinks the existence of the universe is plausible because he's
smart enough to know that the universe (or the multiverse) is not obligated
to be concerned with the personal likes and dislikes of Steven Weinberg.
Feynman was smart enough to know that too, he didn't like many worlds any
better that Weinberg but admitted "it's possible" because he didn't have a
better idea that could explain the weird quantum world. As
​ ​
California Institute of
​ ​
Technology
​ ​
physicist and Many World
​s​
fan
​Sean Carroll
says "Our job as scientists is to formulate the best possible description
of the world as it is, not to force the world to bend to our
pre-conceptions."

​ John K Clark​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 Nov 2017, at 11:56, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 12:19:53 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 26 Nov 2017, at 21:56, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

and in modal logic it is □p → p.

No, that is the reflexion formula, typically not provable in general  
(for exemple Bf -> f, with f representing the constant falsity, or  
"0 = 1") expresses consitency (~Bf), which is not provable.


Löb's theorem asserts that the machine will say Bp -> p only when  
she actually prove p, which is a statement of modesty. Obviously if  
she proves p, she can prove Bp -> p, because p / (q -> p) is a valid  
rule in classical logic. But the machine, by Löb's theorem says the  
converse, if ever she proves Bp -> p, she proves p.


The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

You are right, it has been a long time since I looked at this.


OK. No problem. I am already glad when people can say "I was wrong".  
It means that they have a bit of the scientific attitude.






It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a  
Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having  
Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever believes  
that some medication will work, then it work, then she will believe  
the medication works!


It solves Henkin's problem about the status of the proposition  
asserting their own provability: p <-> Bp. We know with Gödel that  
those asserting their own non-provability to a consistent system  
must be true and unprovable by the system, that is not obvious for  
the Löbian sentences, as they could a priori be false and non  
provable, or true and provable, but it happens that they are always  
true (and provable).


The modus tolens is ⌐p → ⌐□p (⌐ = NOT) which is not the  
same as p → □p. The □ means necessarily and ⌐□⌐ means not  
necessarily not or possibly abbreviated as ◊ and so  ⌐p →  
◊⌐p. Godel's theorem illustrates a case where p → □p is false;


Indeed: ~Bf -> ~B (~Bf)(consistency implies non-provability of  
consistency).


And so this is an aspect of Gödel's theorem or one way of thinking  
about it. I will be honest with physics and information theory I  
have found the computation or Turing machine approach more useful.


Gödel's is concerned with the provability notion, Turing was concerned  
with the computability notion. In fact Gödel missed the Church-thesis,  
and was very close to it, by its use of what we call now the  
"primitive recursive functions".


Computability is the only "absolute" notion here (if you are willing  
to believe in the Church-Turing thesis). provability is a relative  
notion which depends on the formal system under concern. Yet, there  
are important relation between provability and computatibility. The  
main one is that the restricted sigma_1-provability is  equivalent  
with Turing universality. But provability in general is not concerned  
by this restriction. Simulation and emulation is on the type  
computation, not of the type proof. A weak system like Robinson  
arithmetic can emulate (simulate exactly) Peano arithmetic, like I can  
in principle emulate Einstein's brain, and this without understanding  
what the simulation of Einstein explains to me. For example Robinson  
Arithmetic can prove that Peano Arithmetic can prove Robinson's  
arithmetic consistent, but that cannot convince Robinson Arithmetic.








I has been a while again since I looked at Penrose's approach to  
these matters. As I recall he leans heavily on the Cantor  
diagonalization.


The whole of Recursion Theory (Turing, Post, Kleene, ...) and  
Mathematical logic (Gödel, ...) relies on diagonalisation. It is used  
all the times everywhere. Most are constructive, some are not  
constrtuctive, and in theoretical AI, like in theoretical theology,  
most are necessarily (provably) not constructive.






Turing's demonstration of no universal Turing machine


Turing on the countrary proved the existence of a universal machine  
(in math, and later in arithmetic). Then he begun to build one. But  
the war arrived and he build only a decoder machine for fighting the  
Nazis ... Babbage can arguably be considered as the first one  
understanding that "universality" notion, but Turing is the first to  
make that explicit and precise.






and the Gödel first theorem on predicates enumerating their Gödel  
numbers are a form of diagonalization.


Well, once you can enumerate things (constructively or not like with  
Cantor), you can diagonalize the enumeration (constructively or not ).  
I can come back on this. few people know that incompleteness is a two  
lines consequence from Church-Turing thesis, by a simple constructive  
diagonalization. I have already explain this about 5 times on this  
list, but it is so short and elegant that I might not resist coming  
back to this. It is the starting point of theoretical computer science.






What does concern me is that these mathematics involve infin

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Nov 2017, at 23:02, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a  
Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having  
Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever  
believes that some medication will work, then it work, then she  
will believe the medication works!


But that's equivocating on "B".  In the formula it means  
beweisbar=prove not "believes".  I think that is obfuscation.


Before Gödel, everyone thought that B was an operator for a knowledge  
predicate. But after Gödel (1931), we know that B verifies all the  
axiom of knowledge minus the key one (Bp -> p), making it into a  
(rational) notion of belief. I could have defined by axiomatically  
belief by:


The subject believes x + 0 = x, the subject believes x + s(y) = s(x +  
y), etc.
If this applies to you, as I am sure it does, the results will apply  
to you or any of your recursive computational continuations.


This would be ridiculous if that was used to model human psychology,  
but it is not a problem for the derivation of the physical laws  
(unless you believes that the universe depends conceptually of human  
psychology, but that would be a rather strong coming back to the kind  
of  anthropomorphism we usually avoid here.


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Nov 2017, at 21:53, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:56:39 PM UTC, Brent wrote:


On 11/26/2017 9:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;  
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it  
purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with  
the same memories and life histories for example. Give me  
abreak. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is  
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth  
and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the  
bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world, ending  
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular  
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you  
justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the  
universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe.  
Maybe it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level  
I multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?


A multiverse is not a strange hypothesis.  If the universe arose  
from some physical process, then it is natural to suppose that same  
process could operate to produce multiple universes.  This is true  
even for supernatural creation: even if a god or gods created the  
universe they might very well create many.


Brent

Agreed. The subject is entirely speculative with zero evidence  
AFAICT. I don't believe in infinite repeats, and I offered a thought  
experiment to show a scenario with no repeats. AG


Zero universe, one universe, two universes, omega universes, aleph_1  
universes, ... all assumption of the number of universe is  
speculative. But if we assume Mechanism or Quantum Mechanism, we tend  
to zero universes, and infinitely many histories, as a consequence of  
the theories.
There is not one evidence for a "Universe" if taken as an ontological  
("really existing") being.


The collapse assumption is worst than speculative, as it assumes that  
QM is simply wrong, without any evidence, nor any precision of where  
it becomes wrong. Then it speculates on magical things like the spooky  
action at a distance, a 3p physical indeterminism, etc.


Bruno



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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Nov 2017, at 20:46, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:13:32 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:48:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case  
of the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must  
be realized in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in  
order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there  
is absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E  
quation ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who  
have to assume that somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE  
alone didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible  
measurements MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of  
the waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically  
the assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer:  
they assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or  
for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you  
put the cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible  
results of measurements. They don't assert that every possible  
measurement will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG



Measured by who?

Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds  
the problem seems to metastasize. AG


More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the  
wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the  
particles. The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down.  
Are you OK to say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says  
that the measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down,  
but that NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without  
collapse, a measurement is a first person experience. In this  
case, it is arguably the same as the experience of being duplicated.


If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state  
(without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be  
able to evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ).  
For example, I am not clear how you apply linearly.Does each term  
in the sum represent a tensor product? TIA AG


I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable  
interaction, which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product  
of Alice (|A>)and a simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (| 
UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> .


Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled  
pair since it is isolated;


Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on  
the very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.




nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a  
superposition of states.


Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never  
eliminate a superposition.





So your tensor addition is based on fallacies,


? Be explicit, please.

When you write  |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> , on left  
side you're assuming Alice is entangled with the entangled pair. But  
she is NOT since the entangled pair is assumed to be isolated before  
the measurement. AG


As I said, we agree on this. There is no entanglement. I am just  
reminding the linearity of the tensor product. There are no pairs of  
particle.





Correction:
Since the right term on LHS is NOT the state of the entangled pair  
before measurement, it must be after measurement.  How can Alice be  
entangled with a superposition that spans two universes? Still  
doesn't make sense. AG



OK. But in that part of the explanation, there were just no  
entanglement. Once Alice measure that single simple one-particle  
superposition, she get entangled with the particle, but that is NOT  
the singlet state used in EPR-BELL. For this look at the appendice of  
Michael Clive Price here (or in the archive, as we have discussed this  
already more than once).



 http://www.anthro

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Nov 2017, at 18:10, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:29:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The  
idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact  
(many histories)" does not work, and is not really an explanation  
at all -- you are simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the  
linear evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not  
yet seen one proof that some action at a distance are at play in  
quantum mechanics, although I agree that would be the case if the  
outcome where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.


Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action  
at a distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or  
just want to dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But  
after Aspect, the choice is really between deterministic and local  
QM + many worlds, or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non  
locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your poison.



Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments  
here. In weighing in here I might be making an error of not  
addressing things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do  
not have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all  
that is identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are  
replaced with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no  
sense to talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the  
observer makes a measurement that resultsin a  
measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the  
entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the  
apparatus, and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the  
entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of  
the entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is  
blind to any idea there is some "geography" associated with the  
individual spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the  
individual spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that  
with the two spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying  
where the spins are before the measurement there is no sense to  
ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins.


This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing  
that is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships  
well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get  
wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get  
out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain  
power and will never be able to understand QM in some way that has  
a completeness with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality.  
There is also a far more radical possibility. It is that a  
measurement of a quantum system is ultimately a set of quantum  
states that are encoding information about quantum states. This is  
the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing Machine that  
emulates other Turing machines, or asort of Goedel  
self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with  
the prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the  
ontic and epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some  
sense not knowable by any axiomatic structure.


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here  
to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether  
many worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a  
purely local understanding of EPR is available in Everettian  
models. I have argued that this is not the case -- that non- 
locality is inherent in the entangled singlet state, and many  
worlds does not avoid this non-locality. I think from what you say  
above that you might well agree with this position.


Bruce

Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the  
same problem all quantum interpretations suffer from.


I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the  
collapse axiom) explains the violation of inequality in a way which  
avoids any action at a distance, but when we assume one universe,  
like Einstein explains very clearly already i

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 12:19:53 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Nov 2017, at 21:56, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> and in modal logic it is □p → p.
>
>
> No, that is the reflexion formula, typically not provable in general (for 
> exemple Bf -> f, with f representing the constant falsity, or "0 = 1") 
> expresses consitency (~Bf), which is not provable.
>
> Löb's theorem asserts that the machine will say Bp -> p only when she 
> actually prove p, which is a statement of modesty. Obviously if she proves 
> p, she can prove Bp -> p, because p / (q -> p) is a valid rule in classical 
> logic. But the machine, by Löb's theorem says the converse, if ever she 
> proves Bp -> p, she proves p.
>
> The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.
>

You are right, it has been a long time since I looked at this.  
 

>
> It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a Löbian 
> entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having Löb's theorem 
> for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever believes that some medication 
> will work, then it work, then she will believe the medication works!
>
> It solves Henkin's problem about the status of the proposition asserting 
> their own provability: p <-> Bp. We know with Gödel that those asserting 
> their own non-provability to a consistent system must be true and 
> unprovable by the system, that is not obvious for the Löbian sentences, as 
> they could a priori be false and non provable, or true and provable, but it 
> happens that they are always true (and provable).
>
> The modus tolens is ⌐p → ⌐□p (⌐ = NOT) which is not the same as p → □p. 
> The □ means necessarily and ⌐□⌐ means not necessarily not or possibly 
> abbreviated as ◊ and so  ⌐p → ◊⌐p. Godel's theorem illustrates a case where 
> p → □p is false; 
>
>
> Indeed: ~Bf -> ~B (~Bf)(consistency implies non-provability of 
> consistency).
>

And so this is an aspect of Gödel's theorem or one way of thinking about 
it. I will be honest with physics and information theory I have found the 
computation or Turing machine approach more useful.

I has been a while again since I looked at Penrose's approach to these 
matters. As I recall he leans heavily on the Cantor diagonalization. 
Turing's demonstration of no universal Turing machine and the Gödel first 
theorem on predicates enumerating their Gödel numbers are a form of 
diagonalization.

What does concern me is that these mathematics involve infinite systems, 
and with physics we can only measure finite quantities. I has been a 
thought that somehow physical systems might in effect approximate Univeral 
TMs or Gödel's theorem in a truncated or finite manner. This might be at 
the intersection of P vs NP and prvability vs undecidability. I am though 
not versed enough in these matters to push on with it.

LC
 

>
>
> a proposition about an math system is true, but is not necessarily or 
> provably true.
>
>
> Well the Löbian systems are completely captured by G, for the provable 
> statement on provability, and G* for the true statement on provability.
>
> G has axioms 
>
> B(p -> q) -> (Bp -> Bq)
> Bp -> BBp  (redundant, follows from Löb).
> B(Bp -> p) -> Bp (Löb)
>
> With the rule of modus ponens and necessitation a/Ba.
>
> G* has as axioms all theorem of G, +
> Bp -> p
>
> But lost the necessitation rule. I let you show that G* is inconsistent if 
> you add the necessitation rule.
>
>
>
> If that is false then ⌐□p → ⌐p is false or ◊⌐p → ⌐p is false. We can then 
> only say that p being true is "possible." This seems to have some 
> connection with quantum measurement and the update on knowledge of a system 
> with prior probabilities =  plausible estimates.
>
> I wrote a paper involving Gödel's theorem, but it was not that well 
> received. I will take a look at the paper on the web. I have a certain 
> cautionary issue with these sorts of issues. I have learned lots of 
> physicists take some umbrage with it.
>
>
> Penrose has repeated old errors in the field, already well addressed in 
> the literature. That a great mathematician could be wrong on Gödel wary a 
> bit the physicists. I decided to do mathematics and mathematical logic to 
> masteries metamathematics, as it solved already many problem I was 
> interested in in biology and genetics. I can give you reference on this. 
> Gödel's theorem is only a first big theorem in a very rich field, and it 
> has important relation with computer science, and, by consequence, in the 
> computationalist approach of the mind-body problem.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> LC
>
> ...

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Nov 2017, at 01:55, John Clark wrote:


On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 6:36 PM,  wrote:

​> ​Feynman, who wasn't an MWI enthusiast​ [...]

​"​Political scientist" L David Raub reports a poll of 72 of the  
"leading cosmologists and other quantum field theorists" about the  
"Many-Worlds Interpretation" ​[...] Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI  
is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking and Nobel Laureates Murray  
Gell-Mann and Richard Feynman. Gell-Mann and Hawking recorded  
reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with the theory's  
content. Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned as a many- 
worlder​"​


https://www.hedweb.com/everett/everett.htm#believes


This link does not work anymore, but recently Jason gave

 http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html




​But to be fair, Feynman wasn't exactly a enthusiast, I think he  
believed Many Worlds was the the least bad quantum interpretation  
but he wasn't really a fan of philosophy and had sympathy for the  
"shut up and calculate" ​quantum interpretation.



You are right. Feynman does not hide the philosophical difficulties,  
but still wrote in his "The nature of Light" popular book, if I  
remember well, that the collapse is a collective hallucination.


Bruno





 ​> ​no human observer is necessary to perform a quantum  
experiment.


​Hey you don't have to convince me that an observer is not  
needed ​for something to exist in one definite state, but then I'm  
not a fan of Copenhagen.


​> ​If the detector is designed for a which-way measurement, the  
interference is destroyed.


​If the which way information is retained the interference pattern  
is destroyed, if the information ​​is destroyed then you have  
interference, and that is what Many Worlds predicts.   ​
​>> ​The very heart the Copenhagen interpretation is that things  
do not have definite properties ​before​ they are measured,


​> ​Wrong.

 ​"​According to the Copenhagen interpretation, physical systems  
generally do not have definite properties prior to being measured​ 
"​


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation

​> ​Your claim only applies in a special situation of quantum  
experiments which manifest interference effects.


I agree, interference effects​ only manifest in special  
circumstances, when a world splits become different and then the two  
evolve in such a way that the two become identical again and so  
merge back together, and that is only likely to happen if the  
difference between the two worlds is very small; that's why we don't  
see weird quantum stuff in our macro world, like in the Earth Moon  
system.


 John K Clark​

​




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 Nov 2017, at 00:07, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 2:29:22 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The  
idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact  
(many histories)" does not work, and is not really an explanation  
at all -- you are simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the  
linear evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not  
yet seen one proof that some action at a distance are at play in  
quantum mechanics, although I agree that would be the case if the  
outcome where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.


Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action  
at a distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or  
just want to dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But  
after Aspect, the choice is really between deterministic and local  
QM + many worlds, or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non  
locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your poison.



Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments  
here. In weighing in here I might be making an error of not  
addressing things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do  
not have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all  
that is identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are  
replaced with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no  
sense to talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the  
observer makes a measurement that resultsin a  
measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the  
entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the  
apparatus, and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the  
entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of  
the entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is  
blind to any idea there is some "geography" associated with the  
individual spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the  
individual spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that  
with the two spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying  
where the spins are before the measurement there is no sense to  
ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins.


This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing  
that is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships  
well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get  
wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get  
out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain  
power and will never be able to understand QM in some way that has  
a completeness with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality.  
There is also a far more radical possibility. It is that a  
measurement of a quantum system is ultimately a set of quantum  
states that are encoding information about quantum states. This is  
the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing Machine that  
emulates other Turing machines, or asort of Goedel  
self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with  
the prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the  
ontic and epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some  
sense not knowable by any axiomatic structure.


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here  
to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether  
many worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a  
purely local understanding of EPR is available in Everettian  
models. I have argued that this is not the case -- that non- 
locality is inherent in the entangled singlet state, and many  
worlds does not avoid this non-locality. I think from what you say  
above that you might well agree with this position.


Bruce

Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the  
same problem all quantum interpretations suffer from.


I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the  
collapse axiom) explains the violation of inequality in a way which  
avoids any action at a distance, but when we assume one universe,  
like Einstein explains very clearly alr

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, November 28, 2017 at 2:59:33 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 8:57:41 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>   wrote:
>
> > 
> ​>>​
>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The 
> electron, say, moves
> ​ ​
> through space as a wave -- which explains the interference effects due to 
> splitting into 
> ​t​
> wo waves, each emanating from one of the slits
>
>  
>
> ​>> ​
> Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the 
> photographic 
> ​plate ​
> why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge as one wave 
> should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should?  
>
>
> ​> ​
> It probably is a smudge, consistent with the UP. 
>
>
> ​NO! The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that 
> photographic
> ​ plate regardless ​of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit 
> at all. 
>
>
> Three strikes as follows: If it produced a mathematical point, it could 
> never be observed. It can't do what you claim without violating the UP. 
> Moreover, you fail to take into account the finite width of the electron.  
> AG
>  
>
> It ALWAYS produces a localized spot unless there is information on which 
> slot the electron went through. 
>
>
> It always produces a localized spot. Period. AG
>  
>
> And even if there is which way information if that information is erased 
> after it passed the slits but before it hits the photographic plate there 
> will be a interference pattern. Think about that for a minute, its in the 
> past, the electron either went through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow 
> of time is real then there is nothing you can do about it now, 
> but apparently you can. Many Worlds can explain this without the future 
> changing the past, Copenhagen can't. 
>
>
> The interference effect is manifest in the distribution of the ensemble. I 
> don't what what your complaint is here. AG
>
>
>> and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE. 
>
>
> ​But that particle is NEVER localized at the two slits,
> ​ ​
> it's only localized at the photographic plate,
> ​ ​
> so "observation" made it localized. And as they can't say how observation 
> does this, what qualifications it takes to be considered a legitimate 
> observer, or even explain exactly what "observation" is
> ​,​
> Copenhagen might just as well say magic made it localized.   
>  
>
> ​> ​
> That is, the wave collapses 
> ​ ​
> into a particle! 
>
>
> ​And it does this because of a thing called "observation" aka magic.​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> There is no other reasonable interpretation of results of the double slit 
> experiment, 
>
>
> ​There are no reasonable interpretations of the
>  double slit experiment
> ​!​ Nature is nuts, you may not like it but that's the way it is.
>
> ​>> ​
> So tell me exactly what this *observer* thing is.   Exactly what is it 
> about observation that allows it to collapse the wave particle?
>
>  
>
>  
> ​>​
> Dunno.  
>
>
> ​I've noticed. ​
>  
>
>
> There's a huge difference between our approach to this problem. I know 
> what I don't know. You don't know what you don't know.  AG
>
>
> ​> ​
> But using MWI without collapse, why do we get some particular value and 
> not others?
>
>
> ​A version of John Clark sees that particle have every value that doesn't 
> violate the laws of physics. T
> he reason any particular John Clark sees only one value is because when 
> the particle splits at the 2 slits John Clark splits too.​
>  
>
> ​>> ​
> those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only one, 
> and that's pretty simple.  
>
>  
>
> ​> ​
> As simple as a woman who gives birth to twins, millions of times over and 
> then some?
>
>
> ​I have no idea what that question means, but I do know that a billion or 
> even a infinite number of identical universes is 
> indistinguishable from only one, both objectively and subjectively.   
>
>
> I meant to illustrate that you have no clue as to what you don't know, 
> even though I have laid it out numerous.times. What you call "pretty 
> simple" is as much or more of a mystery than the collapse. You have invoked 
> a form of magic based on a misguided interpretation of the wf, but you fail 
> to see that magic. AG 
>
> ​
>  
>
> ​>> ​
> Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking 
> and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann andRichard Feynman. Gell-Mann and 
> Hawking recorded reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with the 
> theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned as a 
> many-worlder "  
>
>
> ​> ​
> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit, 
> but NOT the MWI,
>
>
> ​Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? 
>
>
> Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it, 
> let me know. AG
>  
>
> And how can you have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds 
> without a multiverse? ​
>  
>
>
> You kee

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

mana

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 8:57:41 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>   wrote:
>
> > 
> ​>>​
>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The 
> electron, say, moves
> ​ ​
> through space as a wave -- which explains the interference effects due to 
> splitting into 
> ​t​
> wo waves, each emanating from one of the slits
>
>  
>
> ​>> ​
> Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the 
> photographic 
> ​plate ​
> why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge as one wave 
> should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should?  
>
>
> ​> ​
> It probably is a smudge, consistent with the UP. 
>
>
> ​NO! The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that 
> photographic
> ​ plate regardless ​of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit 
> at all. 
>

Three strikes as follows: If it produced a mathematical point, it could 
never be observed. It can't do what you claim without violating the UP. 
Moreover, you fail to take into account the finite width of the electron.  
AG
 

> It ALWAYS produces a localized spot unless there is information on which 
> slot the electron went through. 
>

It always produces a localized spot. Period. AG
 

> And even if there is which way information if that information is erased 
> after it passed the slits but before it hits the photographic plate there 
> will be a interference pattern. Think about that for a minute, its in the 
> past, the electron either went through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow 
> of time is real then there is nothing you can do about it now, 
> but apparently you can. Many Worlds can explain this without the future 
> changing the past, Copenhagen can't. 
>

The interference effect is manifest in the distribution of the ensemble. I 
don't what what your complaint is here. AG

>
>> and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE. 
>
>
> ​But that particle is NEVER localized at the two slits,
> ​ ​
> it's only localized at the photographic plate,
> ​ ​
> so "observation" made it localized. And as they can't say how observation 
> does this, what qualifications it takes to be considered a legitimate 
> observer, or even explain exactly what "observation" is
> ​,​
> Copenhagen might just as well say magic made it localized.   
>  
>
> ​> ​
> That is, the wave collapses 
> ​ ​
> into a particle! 
>
>
> ​And it does this because of a thing called "observation" aka magic.​
>  
>
> ​> ​
> There is no other reasonable interpretation of results of the double slit 
> experiment, 
>
>
> ​There are no reasonable interpretations of the
>  double slit experiment
> ​!​ Nature is nuts, you may not like it but that's the way it is.
>
> ​>> ​
> So tell me exactly what this *observer* thing is.   Exactly what is it 
> about observation that allows it to collapse the wave particle?
>
>  
>
>  
> ​>​
> Dunno.  
>
>
> ​I've noticed. ​
>  
>

There's a huge difference between our approach to this problem. I know what 
I don't know. You don't know what you don't know.  AG

>
> ​> ​
> But using MWI without collapse, why do we get some particular value and 
> not others?
>
>
> ​A version of John Clark sees that particle have every value that doesn't 
> violate the laws of physics. T
> he reason any particular John Clark sees only one value is because when 
> the particle splits at the 2 slits John Clark splits too.​
>  
>
> ​>> ​
> those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only one, 
> and that's pretty simple.  
>
>  
>
> ​> ​
> As simple as a woman who gives birth to twins, millions of times over and 
> then some?
>
>
> ​I have no idea what that question means, but I do know that a billion or 
> even a infinite number of identical universes is 
> indistinguishable from only one, both objectively and subjectively.   
>

I meant to illustrate that you have no clue as to what you don't know, even 
though I have laid it out numerous.times. What you call "pretty simple" is 
as much or more of a mystery than the collapse. You have invoked a form of 
magic based on a misguided interpretation of the wf, but you fail to see 
that magic. AG 

> ​
>  
>
> ​>> ​
> Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking 
> and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann andRichard Feynman. Gell-Mann and 
> Hawking recorded reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with the 
> theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned as a 
> many-worlder "  
>
>
> ​> ​
> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit, 
> but NOT the MWI,
>
>
> ​Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? 
>

Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it, let 
me know. AG
 

> And how can you have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds 
> without a multiverse? ​
>  
>

You keep making the same error as Brent pointed out earlier -- and as I 
have numerous times. The Multiverse of String theory, aka the Lands

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, November 28, 2017 at 12:22:04 AM UTC, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote: 
> >   wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > ​> ​ 
> > > Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have 
> merit, 
> > > but NOT the MWI, 
> > 
> > 
> > ​Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you 
> > have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a 
> multiverse? ​ 
>
> Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string 
> landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by 
> everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally 
> intended by 
> the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more 
> generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles. 
>
> Alan, please bear that in mind, and qualify your statement with string 
> landscape or similar to indicate you are using the term differently to 
> everybody 
> else on this list, and prevent these sorts of stupid confusions. 
>
> Cheers 
>

As I distinctly recall, Weinberg uses "Multiverse" to refer to the string 
theory landscape, and he laments that if it exists, there will be no way to 
find a theory which explains quark masses. And Yes, I have made it clear 
several times here that when I use the term "Multiverse", I am referring to 
the landscape of string theory. AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/27/2017 6:14 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 05:09:13PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 11/27/2017 4:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:

wrote:


​> ​
Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
but NOT the MWI,

​Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? ​

Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended by
the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.

I think we should use "multiverse" to refer to the cosmological multiplicity
per Tegmark and use "multiple worlds" to refer to the quantum multiplicity
of Everett (so it's consistent with the abbreviation MWI).


Tegmark uses "multiverse" to refer to any of his parallel universe
classes, including the many worlds. This wikipedia article also takes
the same view https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse

In my book, I use Multiverse consistently to refer to the quantum many
worlds, following David Deutsch, who I believe(d) introduced the term, and
Plenitude to refer to Tegmark's level 4. I don't have nicknames for
the other two Tegmarkian "multiverses".

PS - according to Wikipedia, the actual term was coined by William
James in 1895!

It is just terminology, and terminology should be allowed to evolve,
just so long as everybody is clear about what is being discussed. I
appreciate that it appears these days that multiverse can refer to any parallel
universe theory, a la Tegmark, so that's how we should be using it,
and qualify (eg quantum multiverse) where needed.


It's shorter and clearer to MWI for Everett/Deutsch multiplicity.

Brent






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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/27/2017 6:09 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Russell Standish 
mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>>wrote:


​> ​
Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
​
landscape. 



And I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the 
inflation theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett

​/​
​D​
eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently point in 
the same direction nature may be trying to tell you something.


They don't point in the same direction.  The string theory and inflation 
theory multiverse posits different universes with different physical 
parameters due to random symmetry breaking. Everett/Deutsch assume the 
same physics and universes that are only approximately orthogonal.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 05:09:13PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11/27/2017 4:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
> > >wrote:
> > > 
> > > > ​> ​
> > > > Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have 
> > > > merit,
> > > > but NOT the MWI,
> > > 
> > > ​Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
> > > have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a 
> > > multiverse? ​
> > Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
> > landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
> > everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended 
> > by
> > the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
> > generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.
> 
> I think we should use "multiverse" to refer to the cosmological multiplicity
> per Tegmark and use "multiple worlds" to refer to the quantum multiplicity
> of Everett (so it's consistent with the abbreviation MWI).
> 

Tegmark uses "multiverse" to refer to any of his parallel universe
classes, including the many worlds. This wikipedia article also takes
the same view https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse

In my book, I use Multiverse consistently to refer to the quantum many
worlds, following David Deutsch, who I believe(d) introduced the term, and
Plenitude to refer to Tegmark's level 4. I don't have nicknames for
the other two Tegmarkian "multiverses".

PS - according to Wikipedia, the actual term was coined by William
James in 1895!

It is just terminology, and terminology should be allowed to evolve,
just so long as everybody is clear about what is being discussed. I
appreciate that it appears these days that multiverse can refer to any parallel
universe theory, a la Tegmark, so that's how we should be using it,
and qualify (eg quantum multiverse) where needed.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Russell Standish 
wrote:

​> ​
> Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
> ​
> landscape.


And I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the inflation
theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett
​/​
​D​
eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently point in the
same direction nature may be trying to tell you something.

​ John K Clark​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/27/2017 4:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:

   wrote:


​> ​
Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
but NOT the MWI,


​Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? ​

Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended by
the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.


I think we should use "multiverse" to refer to the cosmological 
multiplicity per Tegmark and use "multiple worlds" to refer to the 
quantum multiplicity of Everett (so it's consistent with the 
abbreviation MWI).


Brent



Alan, please bear that in mind, and qualify your statement with string
landscape or similar to indicate you are using the term differently to everybody
else on this list, and prevent these sorts of stupid confusions.

Cheers




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 28/11/2017 11:17 am, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:

   wrote:


​> ​
Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
but NOT the MWI,


​Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? ​

Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended by
the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.

Alan, please bear that in mind, and qualify your statement with string
landscape or similar to indicate you are using the term differently to everybody
else on this list, and prevent these sorts of stupid confusions.


I think this is non-standard usage. De Witt introduced the term "many 
worlds" for the Everettian relative states. That has stuck almost 
universally. "Multiverse" is used to denote the multiple universes of 
eternal inflation, the string theory landscape, or Tegmark's  "all 
mathematical structures". If the usage is different on this list, then 
it is non standard -- just as non-standard as Deutsch's understanding of 
MWI.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
>   wrote:
> 
> >
> > ​> ​
> > Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
> > but NOT the MWI,
> 
> 
> ​Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
> have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? ​

Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended by
the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.

Alan, please bear that in mind, and qualify your statement with string
landscape or similar to indicate you are using the term differently to everybody
else on this list, and prevent these sorts of stupid confusions.

Cheers


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/27/2017 1:05 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:08:47 PM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 11/26/2017 10:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, >
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp
wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25, 
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound
gorilla in the room; introducing Many
Worlds creates hugely more complications
than it purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite observers with
the same memories and life histories for
example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which
everything is duplicated to an arbitrary
level of detail, including the Earth and its
inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is
the bizarreness of this idea an argument for
a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit
of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite,
expanding hypersphere, meaning in any direction,
if go far enough, you return to your starting
position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and
thus infinite; not asymptotically flat and
therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy
the former since they also concede it is finite
in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
likely be infinite in space and time, with
erupting BB universes, some like ours, most
definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with
multiple copies of everything *in itself* an argument
against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse
implies infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved
that? AG


If there are uncountable possibilities for different
universes, why should there be any repetitions? I don't think
infinite repetitions has been proven, and I don't believe it. AG

If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then
every finite subset should repeat. It might not; for example,
from a radius of 10^100 m out it might be just be vacuum forever,
or Donald Trump dolls.


If there is a repetition, is it really a different universe?


Yes, because it would be located in a different position in the 
multiverse. AG



Position relative to what?  And don't answer relative to it's duplicate, 
because duplicate means the same in relation to everything too.


Brent



What happened to Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles?

Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a 
Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having 
Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever believes 
that some medication will work, then it work, then she will believe 
the medication works!


But that's equivocating on "B".  In the formula it means beweisbar=prove 
not "believes".  I think that is obfuscation.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 28 Nov 2017 at 7:41 am,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 3:28:20 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>> On Mon, 27 Nov 2017 at 6:23 pm,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>


 On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than 
>>> it purports
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
>>> same memories
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
>> and its
>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
>> this idea
>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
>> what we can
>> see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you 
> return to your
> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
> infinite; not
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
> cannot
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
> they also
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
> would
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
> some like
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple
 copies of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
>>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes,
>> why should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite 
>> repetitions has
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG
>>
>>

> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
> finite
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
> 10^100 m
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of
 possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
 think
 the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random
 process. AG

>>>
>>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number
>>> on the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic 
>>> to
>>> the real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number
>>> representing our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>>
>>
>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I
>> am the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my
>> body that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal 
>> place
>> of some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not 
>> on a
>> real number.
>>
>>
>>

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/27/2017 9:10 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:29:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my
argument. The idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical
weirdness by one fact (many histories)" does not work,
and is not really an explanation at all -- you are
simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are
explained by the linear evolution, and the linear tensor
products only. I have not yet seen one proof that some
action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics,
although I agree that would be the case if the outcome
where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.

Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they
find action at a distance astonishing, but are unaware
of the many-worlds, or just want to dismiss it directly
as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice is
really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds,
or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like
Maudlin said, choose your poison.


Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the
arguments here. In weighing in here I might be making an
error of not addressing things properly.

Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two
spin 1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we
really do not have the two spin particles. The entanglement
state is all that is identifiable. The degrees of freedom
for the two spins are replaced with those of the
entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about
the individual spin particles existing. If the observer
makes a measurement that results in a measurement the
entanglement state is "violently" lost, the entanglement
phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus,
and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the
entanglement.

We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence
of the entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;"
it is blind to any idea there is some "geography" associated
with the individual spins. There in fact really is no such
thing as the individual spins. The loss of the entangled
state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is
no "metric" specifying where the spins are before the
measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal action
that ties the two resulting spins.

This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is
because we are thinking in classical terms. There are two
ways of thinking about our problem with understanding
whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. It could be
that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum
world. I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is
they do not understand spatial relationships well; they get
leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped up
around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of
it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power
and will never be able to understand QM in some way that has
a completeness with respect to causality, reality and
nonlocality. There is also a far more radical possibility.
It is that a measurement of a quantum system is ultimately a
set of quantum states that are encoding information about
quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's
Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing
machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If
this is the case we may be faced with the prospect there
can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and
epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense
not knowable by any axiomatic structure.


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have
come here to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is
whether many worlds avoids the implications of Bell's
theorem, so that a purely local understanding of EPR is
available in Everettian models. I have argued that this is
not the case -- that n

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 4:05 PM,  wrote:

​>> ​
>> If there is a repetition, is it really a different universe?
>>
>>
> ​> ​
> Yes, because it would be located in a different position in the multiverse.
>

​How do you even know they are is a different position, what does
"different" even mean in this context?
If the position of 2 ​

​identical people is instantaneously exchanged there in 2 identical
universes there is no way anything or anyone could notice a difference, not
objectively and not subjectively either.I would maintain that if there is
no objective difference and there is no subjective difference then there is
just no difference.

 John K Clark   ​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/27/2017 7:28 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On Mon, 27 Nov 2017 at 6:23 pm, > wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp
wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM
UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at
5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at
5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27,
2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at
13:33,

wrote:

You keep ignoring
the obvious 800
pound gorilla in
the room;
introducing Many
Worlds creates
hugely more
complications than
it purports to do
away with;
multiple, indeed
infinite observers
with the same
memories and life
histories for
example. Give me a
break. AG


What about a single,
infinite world in
which everything is
duplicated to an
arbitrary level of
detail, including the
Earth and its
inhabitants, an
infinite number of
times? Is the
bizarreness of this
idea an argument for a
finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit
of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live
in huge, but finite,
expanding hypersphere,
meaning in any direction,
if go far enough, you
return to your starting
position. Many
cosmologists say it's flat
and thus infinite; not
asymptotically flat and
therefore spatially
finite. Measurements
cannot distinguish the two
possibilities. I don't buy
the former since they also
concede it is finite in
age. A Multiverse might
 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/27/2017 6:45 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


I think your distaste with MWI comes from an incorrect view of
how splitting occurs. Shooting a photon of at a slit doesn't
instantly create millions or infinite numbers of universes.


*But that's NOT what the enthusiasts of the MWI claim. They say
all possible results are realized, that is measured, in other
universes, which come into existence when a measurement is made in
this universe. AG*


Does this mean you are OK with the description of QM as I have 
provided below?


Your description assumes the measurement is just right-v-left.  In the 
canonical form of the two-slit experiment the detection is a spot on a 
film.  So the possible outcomes are on the order of the number of silver 
halide atoms on the film...not infinite, but not just two either.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:08:47 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/26/2017 10:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote: 



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>>> purports 
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>>> memories 
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated 
>> to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its 
>> inhabitants, 
>> an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument 
>> for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
> like 
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
 everything *in itself* an argument against it? 

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite 
>>> copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>
> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite 
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m 
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>
>
> If there is a repetition, is it really a different universe? 
>
>
Yes, because it would be located in a different position in the multiverse. 
AG
 

> What happened to Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles?
>
> Brent
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:56:39 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/26/2017 9:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, > wrote: 
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
>>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
>>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to 
>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an 
>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a 
>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular 
>> assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that 
>> assumption?
>>
>
> The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the 
> universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's 
> false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an 
> *argument* for its falseness? 
>
>
> A multiverse is not a strange hypothesis.  If the universe arose from some 
> physical process, then it is natural to suppose that same process could 
> operate to produce multiple universes.  This is true even for supernatural 
> creation: even if a god or gods created the universe they might very well 
> create many.
>
> Brent
>

Agreed. The subject is entirely speculative with zero evidence AFAICT. I 
don't believe in infinite repeats, and I offered a thought experiment to 
show a scenario with no repeats. AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 3:28:20 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, 27 Nov 2017 at 6:23 pm, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:

>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, 
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than 
>> it purports 
>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
>> same memories 
>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
> and its 
> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
> this idea 
> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
> what we can 
> see?
>
>
> --stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
 hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you 
 return to your 
 starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
 infinite; not 
 asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
 cannot 
 distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
 they also 
 concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
 would 
 likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
 some like 
 ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 

>>>
>>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple 
>>> copies of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>
>
> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, 
> why should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite 
> repetitions has 
> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>
>  
>>>
 If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
 configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
 finite 
 subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
 10^100 m 
 out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of 
>>> possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
>>> think 
>>> the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
>>> process. AG 
>>>
>>
>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number 
>> on the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic 
>> to 
>> the real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
>> representing our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>
>
> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I 
> am the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my 
> body that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal 
> place 
> of some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on 
> a 
> real number.
>  
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
 our universe won

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:13:32 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:48:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the 
 MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in 
 some 
 world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
 insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*

>>>
>>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
>>> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
>>> he Schrodinger 
>>> ​Wave ​E
>>> quation 
>>> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume 
>>> that somehow it does. ​
>>>
>>>
>>> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone 
>>> didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name 
>> indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST 
>> be 
>> measured, in this case in other worlds. *
>>
>>
>> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the 
>> waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the 
>> assumption 
>> that the wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong 
>> for 
>> the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von 
>> Neumann) depending where you put the cut.
>>
>
> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
> realized.*
>
> What do you mean by realize? 
>

  *Realized = Measured. AG*



 Measured by who? 

>>>
>>> Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the 
>>> problem seems to metastasize. AG
>>>  
>>>
 More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave 
 is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves 
 evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a 
 measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives 
 either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon 
 the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person 
 experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of 
 being duplicated.

>>>
>>> If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state 
>>> (without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to 
>>> evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am 
>>> not clear how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a 
>>> tensor product? TIA AG
>>>
>>>
>>> I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction, 
>>> which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (|A>)and a 
>>> simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> 
>>> |DN> .
>>>
>>
>> *Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled pair 
>> since it is isolated; *
>>
>>
>> Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on the 
>> very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.
>>
>>
>>
>> *nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a 
>> superposition of states. *
>>
>>
>> Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never 
>> eliminate a superposition. 
>>
>>
>>
>> * So your tensor addition is based on fallacies, *
>>
>>
>> ? Be explicit, please.
>>
>
> When you write  |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> , on left side 
> you're assuming Alice is entangled with the entangled pair. But she is NOT 
> since the entangled pair is assumed to be isolated before the measurement. 
> AG
>

Correction:
Since the right term on LHS is NOT the state of the entangled pair before 
measurement, it must be after measurement.  How can Alice be entangled wit

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/26/2017 11:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 1:18 AM, > wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:54:13 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM
UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at
5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017
at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp
wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at
13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the
obvious 800 pound
gorilla in the room;
introducing Many
Worlds creates hugely
more complications
than it purports to do
away with; multiple,
indeed infinite
observers with the
same memories and life
histories for example.
Give me a break. AG


What about a single,
infinite world in which
everything is duplicated
to an arbitrary level of
detail, including the
Earth and its inhabitants,
an infinite number of
times? Is the bizarreness
of this idea an argument
for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of
what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in
huge, but finite, expanding
hypersphere, meaning in any
direction, if go far enough,
you return to your starting
position. Many cosmologists
say it's flat and thus
infinite; not asymptotically
flat and therefore spatially
finite. Measurements cannot
distinguish the two
possibilities. I don't buy the
former since they also concede
it is finite in age. A
Multiverse might exist, and
that would likely be infinite
in space and time, with
erupting BB universes, some
like ours, most definitely
not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a
multiverse with multiple copies of
everything *in itself* an argument
against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an
infini

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/26/2017 10:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 17:36, > wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM
UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800
pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates
hugely more complications than it
purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite
observers with the same memories
and life histories for example.
Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in
which everything is duplicated to an
arbitrary level of detail, including
the Earth and its inhabitants, an
infinite number of times? Is the
bizarreness of this idea an argument
for a finite world, ending perhaps at
the limit of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but
finite, expanding hypersphere, meaning in
any direction, if go far enough, you
return to your starting position. Many
cosmologists say it's flat and thus
infinite; not asymptotically flat and
therefore spatially finite. Measurements
cannot distinguish the two possibilities.
I don't buy the former since they also
concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse
might exist, and that would likely be
infinite in space and time, with erupting
BB universes, some like ours, most
definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse
with multiple copies of everything *in itself*
an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite
multiverse implies infinite copies of everything.
Has anyone proved that? AG


If there are uncountable possibilities for different
universes, why should there be any repetitions? I
don't think infinite repetitions has been proven, and
I don't believe it. AG

If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite
number of configurations and the Cosmological Principle is
correct, then every finite subset should repeat. It might
not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m out it might
be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of
possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no
reason to think the parameters characterizing our universe
will come again in a random process. AG


Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some
number on the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something
isomorphic to the real line, what's the chance of the dart landing
on the number representing our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG


But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I 
am the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in 
my body that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth 
decimal place of some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land 
on a blob, not on a real number.


Right.  And a "universe" is not a well defin

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:48:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the 
>>> MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in 
>>> some 
>>> world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
>>> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>>
>>
>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
>> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
>> he Schrodinger 
>> ​Wave ​E
>> quation 
>> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
>> somehow it does. ​
>>
>>
>> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone 
>> didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name 
> indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be 
> measured, in this case in other worlds. *
>
>
> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the 
> waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption 
> that the wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong 
> for 
> the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von 
> Neumann) depending where you put the cut.
>

 *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
 measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
 realized.*

 What do you mean by realize? 

>>>
>>>  *Realized = Measured. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Measured by who? 
>>>
>>
>> Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the 
>> problem seems to metastasize. AG
>>  
>>
>>> More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave 
>>> is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves 
>>> evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a 
>>> measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives 
>>> either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon 
>>> the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person 
>>> experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of 
>>> being duplicated.
>>>
>>
>> If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state (without 
>> the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to evaluate 
>> your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am not clear 
>> how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a tensor 
>> product? TIA AG
>>
>>
>> I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction, 
>> which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (|A>)and a 
>> simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> 
>> |DN> .
>>
>
> *Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled pair 
> since it is isolated; *
>
>
> Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on the 
> very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.
>
>
>
> *nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a 
> superposition of states. *
>
>
> Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never 
> eliminate a superposition. 
>
>
>
> * So your tensor addition is based on fallacies, *
>
>
> ? Be explicit, please.
>

When you write  |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> , on left side 
you're assuming Alice is entangled with the entangled pair. But she is NOT 
since the entangled pair is assumed to be isolated before the measurement. 
AG


> Bruno
>
>
>
> *which I infer permeates your general analysis of this situation. BTW, 
> please see my last post where I raised additional issues. TY, AG*
>
>>
>> In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - 
>> |DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any direction, 
>> and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others (the notation is 
>> misleading). We

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/26/2017 10:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, > wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound
gorilla in the room; introducing Many Worlds
creates hugely more complications than it
purports to do away with; multiple, indeed
infinite observers with the same memories and
life histories for example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which
everything is duplicated to an arbitrary level of
detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants,
an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of
this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite,
expanding hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go
far enough, you return to your starting position. Many
cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite.
Measurements cannot distinguish the two possibilities.
I don't buy the former since they also concede it is
finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that
would likely be infinite in space and time, with
erupting BB universes, some like ours, most definitely
not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple
copies of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse
implies infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG


If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes,
why should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite
repetitions has been proven, and I don't believe it. AG

If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
finite subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius 
of 10^100 m out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.


If there is a repetition, is it really a different universe?  What 
happened to Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles?


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/26/2017 9:48 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25, >
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the
room; introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more
complications than it purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same
memories and life histories for example. Give me a
break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the
Earth and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is
the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite
world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you
return to your starting position. Many cosmologists say it's
flat and thus infinite; not asymptotically flat and therefore
spatially finite. Measurements cannot distinguish the two
possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also concede
it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB
universes, some like ours, most definitely not. Like I said,
FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG


I think it depends on assumptions about what kind of infinities are 
involved.  Is spacetime a continuum?  Is the universe spacially finite?  
Does the Planck scale imply the universe has only countably many 
possibilities?  Nobody proves anything in science; and in this case it's 
hard to get any empirical evidence.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/26/2017 9:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications
than it purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite
observers with the same memories and life histories for
example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth
and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the
bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you
justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the 
universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe 
it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I 
multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?


A multiverse is not a strange hypothesis.  If the universe arose from 
some physical process, then it is natural to suppose that same process 
could operate to produce multiple universes.  This is true even for 
supernatural creation: even if a god or gods created the universe they 
might very well create many.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 Nov 2017, at 21:56, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:22:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2017, at 00:15, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here.  
In weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing  
things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do  
not have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that  
is identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are  
replaced with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no  
sense to talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the  
observer makes a measurement that results in a measurement the  
entanglement state is "violently" lost, the entanglement phase is  
transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, and the  
individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the  
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to  
any idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual  
spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the individual  
spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two  
spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins  
are before the measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal  
action that ties the two resulting spins.


I agree. But we can trace out locally the prediction possible, and  
this explains locally the results in the MW view, not so in the mono- 
universe view which requires some (incomprehensible) action at a  
distance. That is why I took the Aspect confirmation that QM violate  
Bell's inequality (well the CHSH's one) as a confirmation of the  
physical existence of the parallel computations/worlds, and not of  
action at a distance.


The MWI has worlds in superposition, which as you say is preferable  
to the idea of some action at a distance. I have had many email  
battles with people over this, but this idea of action at a distance  
or its space plus time version of retrocausality keeps coming up. It  
is like shooting ducks in a carnival shooting gallery; you can shoot  
them down but the damned things keep popping back up. This does not  
mean I am a convert to the MWI interpretation. In many ways M-theory  
of D-branes is more friendly to the Copenhagen Interpretation, where  
D-branes are condensates of strings that form a classical(like)  
structure that act in ways as decoherence systems on strings. The ψ- 
epistemic viewpoint has some merits with respect to looking at the  
classical world as a way that information or Bayesian updates can be  
made on quantum systems. The problem of course with this is it leads  
into a sort of quantum solipsism  The converse ψ-ontological  
perspective avoids this classical-quantum dichotomy, but I have  
always found problems with the issue of contextuality. This goes  
back to my pointing out how MWI fails to indicate how an observer is  
"pushed" into a particular eigenbranch of the world and how this  
occurs at a given time. With the lack of simultaneity in special  
relativity and spacetime in general what is the spatial surface at  
which the world wave function appears to split according to an  
observer?


Such question needs in fine a quantum theory of space-time/gravitation.

I am personally convinced that EPR-BELL violation + a mono-universe +  
minimal physical realism do lead to action at a distance. But I do  
think such action disappear when seen in the big wave or matrix picture.











This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing  
that is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships well;  
they get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped  
up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of it.  
In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and will  
never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness  
with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a  
far more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum  
system is ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding  
information about quantum states. This is the a quantum form of  
Turing's Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing  
machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If this is  
the case we may be faced with the prospect there can't ever be a  
complete understanding of the ontic and epistemic nature of quantum  
mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by any axiomatic  
stru

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Nov 2017, at 19:16, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 3:39:00 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  wrote:

​>​>>​ ​Do you really think that when you pull a slot machine  
and get some outcome, the 10 million other possible outcomes occur  
in 10 million other universe?


​>> ​​I could be wrong but that would be my best guess.​

​> ​Is the slot machine duplicated in those 10 million new  
universes?


​If the Schrodinger​ ​Wave Equation really means what it says  
then the answer can only be yes.


Since your conclusions seem immensely more bizarre than collapse of  
the wf, your interpretation of what the SE means must be in error. AG



"finding bizarre" is a personal opinion, which is not valid in an  
definitive argument, but it can be used to justify or not a new axiom.


What we have with the SWE is a theory which predicts bifurcating and  
fusing histories/computation. By linearity you can start from many  
histories, and consider that there is only differentiation (on first  
person content of memory of experiences).


It is already provable in very weak fragments of arithmetic that all  
pieces of computations, halting of not, exists in Arithmetic and are  
emulated infinitely often by infinitely many universal machine/number.


So the many worlds/histories aspect of reality is to be expected for a  
mechanist/cartesian philosopher/inquirer. It is "one universe" which  
would be weird.


Now, to avoid that histories-proliferation, and contemplate oneself in  
the mirror feeling to be unique, the founders of QM added to the SWE  
the collapse postulate, which lead to the measurement problem: which  
is just the problem of explaining what is that collapse. It leads to  
third person (3p) indeterminacy, and 3p influence at a distance, and  
this with ten thousand of incompatible incompatible theories, most of  
them refuted by experiences (from Borh's idea that QM worked only on  
the microscopic scale, to Wigner's idea that consciousness was  
responsible for the cut (which is the only one theory  
undistinguishable from Everett phenomenologically, except for Bohm  
hidden variables which simulates the whole wave to interact at a  
distance unusable information to give to primitively material  
particles the ability to select consciousness in the many histories,  
and this leads to infinitely many weird creature, looking like p- 
zombies, but lacking consciousness and material particles (yet having  
some role in the absence or presence of light on my computer screen.  
If that is not bizarre,


At some level, the error of adding the collapse, is the same error  
done by Aristotle to Plato, adding a "real universe" in the Ocean of  
Ideas proposed by Plato. That has lead to the Mind-Body problem, which  
is the same as the problem of the foundation of Theology (What is the  
Mind? What is Matter? and how are they related). The quantum  
measurement problem is a sort of toy version of the Mind-Body problem,  
and its solution consists (and has to consist if we assume digital  
Mechanism) in extracting physics from a measure on first person  
(hopefully plural) from a relative state statistics on all  
computations. We have to justify what the quantum computations win in  
the first person limit, in arithmetic.


Monism imposes to embed the knower in the picture. Newton would have  
agreed that a physicist of mass m1 attracts a physicist of mass m2  
following the law of gravitation, and many accept the idea that  
physics applies on physicists, and that is only what Everett did.
Now, with Gödel's 1931 technic we can embed the mathematicians (or an  
approximation, without Mechanism) in arithmetic, and we can see that  
the monist and mechanist mind-body problem reduces into justifying  
physics from the experiences available in arithmetic of the universal  
(Turing) Machine. We keep monism, and get a very simple conceptual  
realm or reality, and then explains the experience by the lawfulness  
of arithmetic, as seen from inside using Gödel's definition of  
"belief" and its many intensional arithmetical or non arithmetical  
variants.


Bruno





  The​ ​Copenhagen​ ​people felt that was ​just ​too  
strange so they stuck stuff into their theory that the mathematics  
alone didn't say, as a result they got rid of one form of weirdness,  
the multiverse, but inadvertently created two new forms of  
weirdness: the future can effect the past and things only exist when  
you look at them. There is just no way to stamp out the weird from  
the quantum world and be consistent with experiment.



​> ​And the gambler cranking it? And the casino? And the city  
where the casino is resident? And Andromeda, and beyond, up to and  
including the BB?


​Yes, and that raises ​another question, how can the MWI produce  
finite probabilities if infinite numbers are involved? To make  
matters even worse the infinite numbers involved are not even  

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:29:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The idea 
>>> that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many histories)" 
>>> does not work, and is not really an explanation at all -- you are simply 
>>> evading the issue.
>>>
>>>
>>> Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the linear 
>>> evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not yet seen one 
>>> proof that some action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics, 
>>> although I agree that would be the case if the outcome where unique, as 
>>> EPER/BELL show convincingly.
>>>
>>> Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at a 
>>> distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just want to 
>>> dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice 
>>> is really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds, or one world 
>>> and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your 
>>> poison.
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>>
>> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
>> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
>> properly. 
>>
>> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
>> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
>> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
>> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
>> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
>> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
>> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
>> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
>> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>>
>> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
>> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
>> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
>> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
>> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
>> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
>> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>>
>> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
>> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
>> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
>> It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
>> I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
>> spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
>> if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
>> get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
>> will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
>> with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
>> more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
>> ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
>> quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
>> Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
>> self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
>> prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
>> epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
>> any axiomatic structure.
>>
>>
>> Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here to 
>> avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
>> The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether many 
>> worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a purely local 
>> understanding of EPR is available in Everettian models. I have argued that 
>> this is not the case -- that non-locality is inherent in the entangled 
>> singlet state, and many worlds does not avoid this non-locality. I think 
>> from what you say above that you might well agree with this position.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the same 
> problem all quantum interpretations suffer from. 
>
>
> I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the collapse 
> axiom) explains the violation

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Nov 2017, at 18:55, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 3:06:50 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell  
wrote:
On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 9:21:14 PM UTC-6,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 11:15:40 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell  
wrote:



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here.  
In weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing  
things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not  
have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is  
identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced  
with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no sense to  
talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the observer  
makes a measurement that results in a measurement the entanglement  
state is "violently" lost, the entanglement phase is transmitted to  
the needle states of the apparatus, and the individual spin degrees  
of freedom replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the  
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to  
any idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual  
spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the individual  
spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two  
spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins  
are before the measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal  
action that ties the two resulting spins.


This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic.


The fact that probability waves evolve and interfere with each  
other, and effect ensembles but not individual members, is  
inherently baffling. So the wf can't be completely epistemic since  
it modifies physical reality. That is, It must be ontic in some  
respect, but in ways that defy rational analysis. AG


I think you are falling into a trap that David Hume warns against.  
Causality gives rise to correlation, but correlation is not  
necessarily the result of causality. There is no effect or some  
causal principle at work with either individual wave functions or  
wave functions in an ensemble of experiments. The ensemble of  
experiments, the classic case being the two slit experiment, is  
meant to deduces the wave nature of the quantum physics. It is not  
there to deduce some causal influence underlying quantum nonlocality.


LC

Applying deBroglie's formula, a change in p changes the wave length,  
and thus the distribution on the screen. That is, the ensemble  
responds to changes in the wave length due to interference. I  
therefore deduce that the wave length has a physical effect on the  
ensemble, but not on individual outcomes. AG


But then how do you explain that there a parts of the screen where we  
can predict that no photon at all will get there, even when sent  
individually?


Bruno




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of  
the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be  
realized in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in  
order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there is  
absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E  
quation ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have  
to assume that somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible  
measurements MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they  
assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the  
conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the  
cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results  
of measurements. They don't assert that every possible  
measurement will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG



Measured by who?

Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the  
problem seems to metastasize. AG


More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the  
wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the  
particles. The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down.  
Are you OK to say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says  
that the measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but  
that NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without  
collapse, a measurement is a first person experience. In this case,  
it is arguably the same as the experience of being duplicated.


If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state  
(without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be  
able to evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ).  
For example, I am not clear how you apply linearly.Does each term  
in the sum represent a tensor product? TIA AG


I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable  
interaction, which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product  
of Alice (|A>)and a simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (| 
UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> .


Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled  
pair since it is isolated;


Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on the  
very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.




nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a  
superposition of states.


Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never  
eliminate a superposition.





So your tensor addition is based on fallacies,


? Be explicit, please.

Bruno



which I infer permeates your general analysis of this situation.  
BTW, please see my last post where I raised additional issues. TY, AG


In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - | 
DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any  
direction, and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others  
(the notation is misleading). We must keep in mind the rotational  
invariance of the spin. So we the Alice Bob situation is more  
intricate and tedious to describe.
Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett  
FAQ by Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some  
times. We have copied the relevant details in previous discussions  
though, so you might try to find it in the archives with the key  
word "Michael", or something. I have unfortunately not the time  
"here and now".  Later perhaps. With Everett, it is important to  
reason independently of the bases in between the measurements.


I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a  
distance" if we assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory.  I don't  
see Bell' argument applying in the MW context, though.


Bruno





Without collapse, the measureme

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Nov 2017, at 20:32, Jason Resch wrote:




On Fri, Nov 24, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable  
interaction, which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product  
of Alice (|A>)and a simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (| 
UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> .


In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - | 
DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any  
direction, and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others  
(the notation is misleading). We must keep in mind the rotational  
invariance of the spin. So we the Alice Bob situation is more  
intricate and tedious to describe.
Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett  
FAQ by Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some  
times. We have copied the relevant details in previous discussions  
though, so you might try to find it in the archives with the key  
word "Michael", or something. I have unfortunately not the time  
"here and now".  Later perhaps. With Everett, it is important to  
reason independently of the bases in between the measurements.


I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a  
distance" if we assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory.  I don't  
see Bell' argument applying in the MW context, though.


Bruno





Is this the Many Worlds FAQ you were referring to? 
http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html


Yes, that one! Thank you Jason!




I think the parts relevant to EPR, Bell Inequality and Locality (for  
those interested) are Q12 and Q32.


Yes, right, and also its appendices. (Not sure why the page contains  
the whole FAQ in two exemplars).


I am glad it is still available online, as it is, imo, a very good FAQ  
on Everett. I just saw that M. C. Price also recall that Everett gives  
a new theory, not a new interpretation. Good! Usually only logicians  
see this!


Best,

Bruno





Jason

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Mon, 27 Nov 2017 at 6:23 pm,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>


 On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
> same memories
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
 and its
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
 this idea
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
 what we can
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
>>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>>> to your
>>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>>> infinite; not
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>>> cannot
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
>>> they also
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>>> would
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>>> some like
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
>> of everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG


>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>>> finite
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
>>> 10^100 m
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of
>> possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
>> think
>> the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random
>> process. AG
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on
> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the
> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
> representing
> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

 But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am
 the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body
 that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of
 some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a
 real number.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of
>>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are
>>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a
>>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and
>>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the
>>>

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Jason Resch]

On Monday, November 27, 2017,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 8:03:47 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 12:54 AM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>


 On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
> same memories
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
 and its
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
 this idea
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
 what we can
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
>>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>>> to your
>>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>>> infinite; not
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>>> cannot
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
>>> they also
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>>> would
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>>> some like
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
>> of everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG


>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>>> finite
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
>>> 10^100 m
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of
>> possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
>> think
>> the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random
>> process. AG
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on
> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the
> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
> representing
> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

 But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am
 the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body
 that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of
 some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a
 real number.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of
>>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are
>>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a
>>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and
>>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the
>>>

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 8:03:47 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 12:54 AM, > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
 introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
 purports 
 to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
 memories 
 and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
>>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>>> its 
>>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
>>> this idea 
>>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>>> we can 
>>> see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>> to your 
>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>> infinite; not 
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>> cannot 
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>> also 
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>> would 
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>> some like 
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies 
> of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
 infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 

>>>
>>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>>
>>>  
>
>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>> finite 
>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 
>> m 
>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
> process. 
> AG 
>

 Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
 the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the 
 real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
 representing 
 our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG

>>>
>>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
>>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
>>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
>>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
>>> real number.
>>>  
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and 
>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the 
>> variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG
>>
>
> I think your distaste with MWI comes from an incorrect view of