subject:"free will and mathematics"

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 9:39 PM, meekerdb  wrote:


> I means that, in retrospect, I can't trace back to external (to me)
> causes, a deterministic sequence that inevitably led me to do that.
>

Isn't that randomness?


>   Conceivably we could make an intelligent machine that could keep a
> record of all its internal states so that when did something it could then
> cite the sequence of internal states and say, "See I had to do it.  It was
> just physics."
>
>
And the machine would be right ...


>
>  Or in other words, if the same situation is repeated "I would do
> otherwise". But it's difficult to explain (I might be wrong too).
>
> OK, let's suppose that exactly the same conscious state is repeated N
> times. If each time we do a different action, even opposite ones (such as
> killing or not killing someone), then our decision making is basically
> random. I don't think that is what is meant by free will.
>
>
> I think that's wrong. You are equating unpredictable with random.  Suppose
> the same conscious state is repeated and one second later you either shoot
> someone or you punch him.  In that second different unconscious processes
> may determine what you do; so that which you do is unpredictable.
>

Agreed, but then the reason is unconscious. To me, that's not free will.


> But it is only 'random' within a range which is determined by who you are
> - and in this case you are very angry with the someone -
>

OK, but I think a defender of free will would say that you could have also
kissed that person instead of attacking him.


> so it is still an exercise of your will.  And it's not constrained or
> coerced, so it's 'free will'.
>
>
But you are removing all possible decisions except different ways of
attaking the victim, so it is not free will, at least not that feeling that
I could have done anything no matter what.


>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-12 Thread meekerdb

On 6/12/2012 11:42 AM, R AM wrote:

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 7:44 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

Well then it seems to come down to a question of timing. If this 'same
conscious
state' is before the action, then I can certainly imagine changing my mind.

Yes, but why would you do that? You didn't change your mind in the first situation. Why
would you change your mind if exactly the same conscious state is repeated?

And this holds all the way up to the action, which is why you are even
unpredictable
by yourself. You don't know (for sure) what you'll do until you do it.

I agree, but that's not exactly what I'm saying. I'm trying to make sense of the "I
could have done otherwise". What does it mean?

I means that, in retrospect, I can't trace back to external (to me) causes, a
deterministic sequence that inevitably led me to do that. Conceivably we could make an
intelligent machine that could keep a record of all its internal states so that when did
something it could then cite the sequence of internal states and say, "See I had to do
it. It was just physics."

Or in other words, if the same situation is repeated "I would do otherwise". But it's
difficult to explain (I might be wrong too).
OK, let's suppose that exactly the same conscious state is repeated N times. If each
time we do a different action, even opposite ones (such as killing or not killing
someone), then our decision making is basically random. I don't think that is what is
meant by free will.

I think that's wrong. You are equating unpredictable with random. Suppose the same
conscious state is repeated and one second later you either shoot someone or you punch
him. In that second different unconscious processes may determine what you do; so that
which you do is unpredictable. But it is only 'random' within a range which is determined
by who you are - and in this case you are very angry with the someone - so it is still an
exercise of your will. And it's not constrained or coerced, so it's 'free will'.

Let's go to an extreme case. We have to make an important decision. We spend one year
pondering our alternatives, and a decision is reached (we will kill someone). We are
pretty certain about it. Do you think that if we repeat the same conscious state of just
before making the decision, we would conclude not to kill?

Yes, it's possible. Of course there are feelings of resolve or hesitancy that make it more
or less likely we will carry out a plan. But in that moment some different unconscious
process could change our mind, or an external event, such as seeing child might remind us
our intended victim was once an innocent child, might change our mind.

Brent

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 7:44 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>
> Why not.  That's the compatibilist view of 'free will' and that's
> apparently why Sam Harris disagrees with compatibilism: he defines 'free
> will' to be *conscious* authorship of decisions.
>

I think that is what is meant by typical defenders of free will too.

> In the course of a day almost all my decisions are made without conscious
> thought, like which keys to strike in typing the previous line.  Earlier
> today I had to enter a computer generated random security code; I had to
> think about each character.  So was the latter an exercise of free will and
> the former wasn't??
>

That's a good question for defenders of free will to answer. I think they
would say that you can always stop consciously your "unconscious will"
(that's one of the defences against Libet's experiments). However, Most of
the day we are not even conscious that we could exercise that kind of free
will, so ... I gues 99% of the time our decisions are not "free willed".
And it makes no difference, of course.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 7:23 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> No. But the gangster does not know this determination. So although at that
> level he could not do otherwise, from his perspective, it still can make
> genuine sense that he could have done otherwise, from our embedded pov
> perspective. Only for God, it does not make sense, but locally we are not
> God.
>
>
>
> More specifically. You are in a situation where you crave for spaghetti,
> you haven't had spaghetti in the last month, you know spaghetti is good for
> er ... whatever. You therefore make the decision to eat spaghetti. Now, you
> are put again in exactly the same situation and ... do you really think you
> could choose strawberries instead? would you choose strawberries?
>
>
>
>
If I am craving spaghetti I could not do otherwise.
>

Well, parents routinely punish their children for eating too much candy.
Why do they do that, if their children could not do otherwise?

> But then I would not have said it. The situation is when I remember having
> hesitate, and the day after, despite the determination, I can think that I
> could have done otherwise, because I cannot be aware of the complete
> determination. And, indeed, after that hesitation, I might well have taken
> the strawberry.
>

Yes, but for the sake of the argument, I wanted you to consider the case
where you are pretty certain about eating spaghetti. Defenders of free will
would say that free will is active whenever you make a decision, hesitating
or not hesitating.

>
>

>
> Determinism is just not incompatible with genuine "free will" or "will",
> for the will is not playing at the same level than the determination. If
> they were on the same level, you could trivially justify all your act by "I
> am just obeying the physical laws", which is just false, because you are an
> abstract person, not a body.
>
>

I am not really  talking about physical determination. But in any case, I
think the justification is correct. This is not important, though, because
we do not actually punish people because they could have done otherwise. We
punish people so that they will not repeat their bad behaviour in the
future (among other reasons).

> He will convince nobody  because we all believe that he (and all of us)
> could have done otherwise. And we all believe that because, for some
> reason, we believe it is unfair to punish someone if he cannot do
> otherwise. What I'm saying is that belief in free-will is just a
> justification for punishing people.
>
>
> OK. And rightly so, unless unfair trial of course.
>
>

What i'm saying is that we believe in free will  (although it is a false
belief) so that we can punish people without feeling guilty. Usually, the
opposite is claimed: we punish people because they have free will (but I'm
claiming that's wrong).

> Actually this is not proved, and some argue that going in jail can augment
> the probability of recurrence of certain type of crime. But that's not
> relevant. So OK.
>
>

I agree, but if that's the case, we should change the punishment.

> He learned "to do otherwise".
>
>

Agreed. But that's what I'm saying. Making people responsible has nothing
to do with their free will, but with reinforcement and learning. Belief in
free will is just a excuse to discipline people.

> Let's suppose that a person forgets everything every morning. Would it
> make any sense to punish someone like that, because he just could have done
> otherwise?
>
> Someone like that must go to an hospital, be cured, and then can be judged
> responsible or not. It can depend on many factors. There are no general
> rules, nor any scientific criteria for judging with any certainty the
> responsibility.
>
>

Agreed. However, If we punish people because they have free will (i.e. they
could have done otherwise), then this person should also be punished. Again
and again. It's not his free will that is failing, it's his memory.
However, it makes no sense to punish such a person, because having no
memory, the punishment will not change his future behavior.

>
>>
>>
> But "exactly the same subjective experience" is ambiguous. Our doing
> depends also on unconscious processing, of the luminosity of the sky, of
> possible subliminal messages from peers, of hormone concentration, and all
> those factors might be unknown.
>

But that's basically randomness! you cannot be sent to Hell because of the
luminosity of the sky! I don't think that would be considered free will.
Free will should be the result of deliberation, even if at the end you
decide to do something random.

> Or something equivalent, if we were put again in exactly the same
> subjective situation, would we do otherwise? I don't think so, but If yes,
> why?
>
>
> We can't. Given your condition. But the determination being unknown, we
> can correctly conceive of having done otherwise, for a little unknown
> reason which would have influence the choice made after some hesitation.
> Even without hesitation, th

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 7:44 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> Well then it seems to come down to a question of timing.  If this 'same
> conscious state' is before the action, then I can certainly imagine
> changing my mind.
>

Yes, but why would you do that? You didn't change your mind in the first
situation. Why would you change your mind if exactly the same conscious
state is repeated?

> And this holds all the way up to the action, which is why you are even
> unpredictable by yourself.  You don't know (for sure) what you'll do until
> you do it.
>

I agree, but that's not exactly what I'm saying. I'm trying to make sense
of the "I could have done otherwise". What does it mean? Or in other words,
if the same situation is repeated "I would do otherwise". But it's
difficult to explain (I might be wrong too).

OK, let's suppose that exactly the same conscious state is repeated N
times. If each time we do a different action, even opposite ones (such as
killing or not killing someone), then our decision making is basically
random. I don't think that is what is meant by free will.

Let's go to an extreme case. We have to make an important decision. We
spend one year pondering our alternatives, and a decision is reached (we
will kill someone). We are pretty certain about it. Do you think that if
we repeat the same conscious state of just before making the decision, we
would conclude not to kill?

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-12 Thread meekerdb


On 6/12/2012 1:31 AM, R AM wrote:



On Mon, Jun 11, 2012 at 6:42 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 6/11/2012 8:45 AM, R AM wrote:

But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, 
about the
subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine ourselves 
in exactly
the same subjective situation and still think that we could have done 
otherwise.


I can certainly imagine that.  But I wonder if your use of "subjective 
situation" is
ambiguous.  Do you mean exactly the same state, including memory, conscious 
and
unconscious thoughts..., or do you just mean satisfying the same subjective 
description?


I would say exactly the same conscious state.

If we are put again in the same conscious state, I don't think that we can consistently 
imagine ourselves doing otherwise.


Well then it seems to come down to a question of timing.  If this 'same conscious state' 
is before the action, then I can certainly imagine changing my mind.  And this holds all 
the way up to the action, which is why you are even unpredictable by yourself.  You don't 
know (for sure) what you'll do until you do it.  If the 'same conscious state' is at the 
moment of action, then it's not so clear.  It's not the usual case, but sometimes we are 
surprised by our own action.


If at subjective situation t we decided x, why would we decide otherwise if *exactly* 
the same subjective situation was again the case?


Of course, unconscious processes might make the difference (in fact, they do), but this 
is no help for a defender of free will, because he cannot maintain that decisions have, 
at bottom, an unconscious origin.


Why not.  That's the compatibilist view of 'free will' and that's apparently why Sam 
Harris disagrees with compatibilism: he defines 'free will' to be *conscious* authorship 
of decisions.  In the course of a day almost all my decisions are made without conscious 
thought, like which keys to strike in typing the previous line.  Earlier today I had to 
enter a computer generated random security code; I had to think about each character.  So 
was the latter an exercise of free will and the former wasn't??


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:45, R AM wrote:




On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:34 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:
On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate  
spaghetti because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you  
think you could have done otherwise?


Now, let's suppose a gangster decides to rob a bank after  
considering all his options. Later he might be judged and told that  
"he could have done otherwise"? Could he really have done otherwise?


At the level of the arithmetical laws, or physical laws, the answer  
is no. But we don't live at that level, so at the level of its first  
person impression the answer is yes.


OK. So that means that if you (or the ganster) were put again in  
exactly the same subjective situation (same beliefs, likings,  
emotions, intentions, memories, same everything) you could do  
otherwise?


No. But the gangster does not know this determination. So although at  
that level he could not do otherwise, from his perspective, it still  
can make genuine sense that he could have done otherwise, from our  
embedded pov perspective. Only for God, it does not make sense, but  
locally we are not God.





More specifically. You are in a situation where you crave for  
spaghetti, you haven't had spaghetti in the last month, you know  
spaghetti is good for er ... whatever. You therefore make the  
decision to eat spaghetti. Now, you are put again in exactly the  
same situation and ... do you really think you could choose  
strawberries instead? would you choose strawberries?


If I am craving spaghetti I could not do otherwise. But then I would  
not have said it. The situation is when I remember having hesitate,  
and the day after, despite the determination, I can think that I could  
have done otherwise, because I cannot be aware of the complete  
determination. And, indeed, after that hesitation, I might well have  
taken the strawberry.


Determinism is just not incompatible with genuine "free will" or  
"will", for the will is not playing at the same level than the  
determination. If they were on the same level, you could trivially  
justify all your act by "I am just obeying the physical laws", which  
is just false, because you are an abstract person, not a body.






A guy rapes and tortures 10 children, could he have done otherwise?  
Well, there is a sense for some medical expert to say that he could  
have done otherwise, for the guy is judged responsible and not under  
some mental disease (for example). Now, if the guy defends himself  
in saying that he was just obeying to the physical laws, he will  
convince nobody, and rightly so.


He will convince nobody  because we all believe that he (and all of  
us) could have done otherwise. And we all believe that because, for  
some reason, we believe it is unfair to punish someone if he cannot  
do otherwise. What I'm saying is that belief in free-will is just a  
justification for punishing people.


OK. And rightly so, unless unfair trial of course.




But in fact, we punish people, not because "he could have done  
otherwise" but because next time, he will think twice.


Actually this is not proved, and some argue that going in jail can  
augment the probability of recurrence of certain type of crime. But  
that's not relevant. So OK.




Next time, he will not be in the same subjective situation: he will  
have the memories of his punishment and he will take that into  
account.


He learned "to do otherwise".




If next time he is in exactly the same subjective situation, he will  
do exactly the same. Why would he do otherwise? Why didn't he already?


The point is not that he is determinate, but that he is aware of his  
non knowledge of determination, making him capable to think correctly  
that he might have done otherwise; perhaps having a slight change of  
state of mind, or awaken in different mood, or any detail he knows  
that he did not know.


Sometimes, we might become aware of the reason which might have invite  
us to do otherwise, so we prepare ourselves better for the future  
hesitation.





Let's suppose that a person forgets everything every morning. Would  
it make any sense to punish someone like that, because he just could  
have done otherwise?


Someone like that must go to an hospital, be cured, and then can be  
judged responsible or not. It can depend on many factors. There are no  
general rules, nor any scientific criteria for judging with any  
certainty the responsibility.





We are determinate, but we cannot known completely our  
determination, so from our point of view there is a genuine spectrum  
of different possibilities and we can choose "freely" among them. It  
does not matter that a God, or a Laplacean daemon can predict our  
actions, for *we* can't, and have no other choice than choosing  
without complete information, and in some case it makes sense that  
we could have made a different cho

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 12:18 AM, RMahoney  wrote:

>
> I'm assuming you mean by exactly the same situation, every atom in it's
> exact same physical state.
>

Not really. I mean the same conscious or subjective situation. From the
free will point of view, decisions are conscious and can only be based on
what is available to consciousness at the moment of decision. Defenders of
free will are commited to say that, no matter how long and deep we ponder a
question before making a decision, if we were put again in exactly the same
subjective situation (after all the pondering, etc) we could still do
otherwise.

> Now the question that came up, is this person not responsible for his/her
> actions if only at the mercy of the physical laws of the universe (no free
> will). The answers I've been hearing that suggest she/he may not be
> responsible miss the point. The measure of wrongness was defined by
> society.
>

I agree. People is not responsible in some ontological way. But society
considers us responsible (i.e. punishable). And we take that into account.
The important fact is not whether we have free will or not, but to know
that we are considered responsible.

It's interesting to notice that discussions about free will almost always
go hand in hand with discussions about responsability and punishment.

If history and experience yields a member of society that does a horrendous
> wrong, he/she is a defect of society and needs to be removed,
> rehabilitated, or whatever society dictates. Here's where I don't agree
> with aquitting someone due to mental defect. If the defect is there, the
> result is the same. Fix it if it's fixable or if it's not fixable remove
> them from society.
>

I agree, but we have to be careful here, lest we consider people to be
machines (something that has to be fixed or removed, like in
the Clockwork Orange movie).

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Mon, Jun 11, 2012 at 6:42 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> On 6/11/2012 8:45 AM, R AM wrote:
>
>> But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact,
>> about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine
>> ourselves in exactly the same subjective situation and still think that we
>> could have done otherwise.
>>
>
> I can certainly imagine that.  But I wonder if your use of "subjective
> situation" is ambiguous.  Do you mean exactly the same state, including
> memory, conscious and unconscious thoughts..., or do you just mean
> satisfying the same subjective description?
>

I would say exactly the same conscious state.

If we are put again in the same conscious state, I don't think that we can
consistently imagine ourselves doing otherwise. If at subjective situation
t we decided x, why would we decide otherwise if *exactly* the same
subjective situation was again the case?

Of course, unconscious processes might make the difference (in fact, they
do), but this is no help for a defender of free will, because he cannot
maintain that decisions have, at bottom, an unconscious origin.

>
> Brent
>
>
>  Or something equivalent, if we were put again in exactly the same
>> subjective situation, would we do otherwise? I don't think so, but If yes,
>> why?
>>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to 
> everything-list@googlegroups.**com
> .
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@
> **googlegroups.com .
> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**
> group/everything-list?hl=en
> .
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-11 Thread RMahoney

On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:45:16 AM UTC-5, RAM wrote: 
>
>  But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, 
> about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine 
> ourselves in exactly the same subjective situation and still think that we 
> could have done otherwise. Or something equivalent, if we were put again in 
> exactly the same subjective situation, would we do otherwise? I don't think 
> so, but If yes, why?
>

I'm assuming you mean by exactly the same situation, every atom in it's 
exact same physical state. You might think the next moment in time would be 
exactly the same, but at the quantum level the next physical state in time 
could be different at the quantum level, and if one was truly on the fence 
in making a decision, the decision could possibly fall to the other side of 
the fence. The two different futures both exist but do not interact. Any 
moment in time has multiple futures and multiple histories.

Now the question that came up, is this person not responsible for his/her 
actions if only at the mercy of the physical laws of the universe (no free 
will). The answers I've been hearing that suggest she/he may not be 
responsible miss the point. The measure of wrongness was defined by 
society. If history and experience yields a member of society that does a 
horrendous wrong, he/she is a defect of society and needs to be removed, 
rehabilitated, or whatever society dictates. Here's where I don't agree 
with aquitting someone due to mental defect. If the defect is there, the 
result is the same. Fix it if it's fixable or if it's not fixable remove 
them from society.

- Roy

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/rWOnm6N7FyoJ.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-11 Thread meekerdb


On 6/11/2012 8:45 AM, R AM wrote:
But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, about the 
subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine ourselves in exactly the 
same subjective situation and still think that we could have done otherwise. 


I can certainly imagine that.  But I wonder if your use of "subjective situation" is 
ambiguous.  Do you mean exactly the same state, including memory, conscious and 
unconscious thoughts..., or do you just mean satisfying the same subjective description?


Brent

Or something equivalent, if we were put again in exactly the same subjective situation, 
would we do otherwise? I don't think so, but If yes, why?


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-11 Thread R AM

On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 7:34 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>
>>
> The answer must be relative to our (imperfect) knowledge.  Since that
> knowledge is not sufficient to predict what he would do, we say "Yes, he
> could have done otherwise."  In the same way we may say, "I know him well
> and he's not a person to rob a bank."  We may believe the world is
> deterministic and yet still unpredictable, so when you ask "could" we need
> to think in what sense it is meant.
>
>
I completely agree. It's not clear what we mean by "could" in this case (in
the same sense that it's not clear what is meant by free-will). That is why
I'm trying to reformulate the question as "if you were put again in exactly
the same subjective situation, do you think you would do otherwise?"


Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-11 Thread R AM

On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:34 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate spaghetti
> because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you think you could have
> done otherwise?
>
> Now, let's suppose a gangster decides to rob a bank after considering all
> his options. Later he might be judged and told that "he could have done
> otherwise"? Could he really have done otherwise?
>
>
> At the level of the arithmetical laws, or physical laws, the answer is no.
> But we don't live at that level, so at the level of its first person
> impression the answer is yes.
>

OK. So that means that if you (or the ganster) were put again in exactly
the same subjective situation (same beliefs, likings, emotions, intentions,
memories, same everything) you could do otherwise?

More specifically. You are in a situation where you crave for spaghetti,
you haven't had spaghetti in the last month, you know spaghetti is good for
er ... whatever. You therefore make the decision to eat spaghetti. Now, you
are put again in exactly the same situation and ... do you really think you
could choose strawberries instead? would you choose strawberries?

> A guy rapes and tortures 10 children, could he have done otherwise? Well,
> there is a sense for some medical expert to say that he could have done
> otherwise, for the guy is judged responsible and not under some mental
> disease (for example). Now, if the guy defends himself in saying that he
> was just obeying to the physical laws, he will convince nobody, and rightly
> so.
>

He will convince nobody  because we all believe that he (and all of us)
could have done otherwise. And we all believe that because, for some
reason, we believe it is unfair to punish someone if he cannot do
otherwise. What I'm saying is that belief in free-will is just a
justification for punishing people.

But in fact, we punish people, not because "he could have done otherwise"
but because next time, he will think twice. Next time, he will not be in
the same subjective situation: he will have the memories of his punishment
and he will take that into account.

If next time he is in exactly the same subjective situation, he will do
exactly the same. Why would he do otherwise? Why didn't he already?

Let's suppose that a person forgets everything every morning. Would it make
any sense to punish someone like that, because he just could have done
otherwise?

> We are determinate, but we cannot known completely our determination, so
> from our point of view there is a genuine spectrum of different
> possibilities and we can choose "freely" among them. It does not matter
> that a God, or a Laplacean daemon can predict our actions, for *we* can't,
> and have no other choice than choosing without complete information, and in
> some case it makes sense that we could have made a different choice (even
> if that is senseless at the basic ontological level, for the choice is made
> at another level, from an internal first person perspectives.
>

But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, about
the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine ourselves
in exactly the same subjective situation and still think that we could have
done otherwise. Or something equivalent, if we were put again in exactly
the same subjective situation, would we do otherwise? I don't think so, but
If yes, why?

> To justify our acts by God Will or by Physical Laws (or Arithmetical laws)
> is the same type of level confusion, or perspective confusion, mistake. I
> would say.
>

> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread meekerdb


On 6/7/2012 5:15 AM, R AM wrote:



On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:



Because he remembers that he was hesitating. Yesterday I have eaten 
spaghetti, but I
could have decide otherwise, I hesitated a lot.


OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate spaghetti because that's 
what you liked at that moment. Do you think you could have done otherwise?


Now, let's suppose a gangster decides to rob a bank after considering all his options. 
Later he might be judged and told that "he could have done otherwise"? Could he really 
have done otherwise?


The answer must be relative to our (imperfect) knowledge.  Since that knowledge is not 
sufficient to predict what he would do, we say "Yes, he could have done otherwise."  In 
the same way we may say, "I know him well and he's not a person to rob a bank."  We may 
believe the world is deterministic and yet still unpredictable, so when you ask "could" we 
need to think in what sense it is meant.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> There is no meaningful difference between will and free will.

The will is in the state it is in for a reason or for no reason, but
according to Craig Weinberg your free will is in the state it is in for no
reason and isn't in the state it is in for no reason, therefore the
meaningful difference between will and free will is that one is gibberish
and the other is not.

> All will implies the capacity to intentionally control, which is not
> logically consistent with 100% determinism.

Your ideas are not logically consistent with determinism and they are not
logically consistent with indeterminism, in other words your ideas are so
bad they're not even wrong.

> Execution is not intended to alter the behavior of the prisoner.
>

I don't give a hoot in hell what the intention was, it remains a fact
beyond dispute that execution DID alter the behavior of the prisoner.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:

> > If he axed you because he has a brain tumor that caused him to see you
> as an alien monster, we wouldn't hold him culpable.
>

What's with this "we" business, speak for yourself I certainly would hold
him culpable, I don't understand why that particular reason for his action
would render him non-responsible but another reason for his action would
render him responsible.

> We'd operate on him, remove the tumor
>

If you could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that had fixed the problem
(most unlikely) then I would be satisfied with that solution.

> If he were coerced into axing you by a hostile government that was
> holding his wife and children hostage and going to kill them if he didn't
> do you in, we would consider him much less culpable
>

In that case it would be very unlikely he would ever again chase people
with a ax and his punishment would be unlikely to deter people in a similar
predicament from doing the same thing in the future, and so punishment
would be pointless  and be nothing but cruel.

> If he did it on an impulse because you offended him (e.g. you told him he
> spoke gibberish) we'd consider him less culpable than if you he had long
> planned to kill you for money.
>

Again with this "we" business! I'd consider him MORE culpable if he did it
on impulse over some trivial insult because that would mean he is a very
very dangerous man; he is certain to receive other trivial insults just
like that in the future likely causing more chasing with axes. And I would
consider him LESS culpable if he did it for a large amount of money and
planned the crime for 5 years because then he would be far less likely than
the impulsive homicidal jerk to do something like that again.

> "culpability" is roughly equivalent to how likely the perp or people in
> his situation are to do it or similar again.
>

That's how it should be but that's not what society does nor how you
explained it in your post.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Jun 2012, at 14:15, R AM wrote:




On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


Because he remembers that he was hesitating. Yesterday I have eaten  
spaghetti, but I could have decide otherwise, I hesitated a lot.


OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate  
spaghetti because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you think  
you could have done otherwise?


Now, let's suppose a gangster decides to rob a bank after  
considering all his options. Later he might be judged and told that  
"he could have done otherwise"? Could he really have done otherwise?


At the level of the arithmetical laws, or physical laws, the answer is  
no. But we don't live at that level, so at the level of its first  
person impression the answer is yes.


A guy rapes and tortures 10 children, could he have done otherwise?  
Well, there is a sense for some medical expert to say that he could  
have done otherwise, for the guy is judged responsible and not under  
some mental disease (for example). Now, if the guy defends himself in  
saying that he was just obeying to the physical laws, he will convince  
nobody, and rightly so.


We are determinate, but we cannot known completely our determination,  
so from our point of view there is a genuine spectrum of different  
possibilities and we can choose "freely" among them. It does not  
matter that a God, or a Laplacean daemon can predict our actions, for  
*we* can't, and have no other choice than choosing without complete  
information, and in some case it makes sense that we could have made a  
different choice (even if that is senseless at the basic ontological  
level, for the choice is made at another level, from an internal first  
person perspectives. To justify our acts by God Will or by Physical  
Laws (or Arithmetical laws) is the same type of level confusion, or  
perspective confusion, mistake. I would say.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread R AM

On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> Because he remembers that he was hesitating. Yesterday I have eaten
> spaghetti, but I could have decide otherwise, I hesitated a lot.
>

OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate spaghetti
because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you think you could have
done otherwise?

Now, let's suppose a gangster decides to rob a bank after considering all
his options. Later he might be judged and told that "he could have done
otherwise"? Could he really have done otherwise?

> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

I have started reading Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics and I see 
one definition that seems to be pertinent to this discussion.


p. 27 "Def. 4. To assume it to suppose by an act of free choice.

A person who 'makes an assumption' is making a supposition about which 
he is aware that he might if he chose make not that but another. All 
assumptions are suppositions, but all suppositions are not assumptions: 
for some are made altogether unawares, and others, though the persons 
what make them may be conscious of making them, are made without any 
consciousness of the possibility, if it is a possibility, that others 
might have been made instead. When correctly used, the word 'assumption' 
is always used with this implication of free choice, as when it is said 
'let us assume x = 10'."


What about that? It looks to be not far away from what Aleksandr Lokshin 
has suggested.


Evgenii

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 07 Jun 2012, at 10:00, R AM wrote:




On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


I agree free-will is silly if it is defined like that. So let us try  
a less silly definition. So instead of "was exactly the same" in  
your definition, we can use "was exactly the same from the subject  
point of view".


OK.

In that case, if the subject was aware of not having all  
information, he might consistently think that he could have done  
otherwise, because he was hesitating for example, as far as he can  
remember.


It depends on what we mean by "could". If we mean that "I would have  
done otherwise because I could have done otherwise", I still think  
that belief in free-will is silly. If the subject was aware of not  
having all information and yet he did what he did, why would the  
subject think (later) that he could have done otherwise?


Because he remembers that he was hesitating. Yesterday I have eaten  
spaghetti, but I could have decide otherwise, I hesitated a lot.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread R AM

On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> I agree free-will is silly if it is defined like that. So let us try a
> less silly definition. So instead of "was exactly the same" in your
> definition, we can use "was exactly the same from the subject point of
> view".
>

OK.


> In that case, if the subject was aware of not having all information, he
> might consistently think that he could have done otherwise, because he was
> hesitating for example, as far as he can remember.
>

It depends on what we mean by "could". If we mean that "I would have done
otherwise because I could have done otherwise", I still think that belief
in free-will is silly. If the subject was aware of not having all
information and yet he did what he did, why would the subject think (later)
that he could have done otherwise?


>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-07 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Jun 2012, at 19:43, R AM wrote:


On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:30 PM, R AM  wrote:
On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:18 PM, Brian Tenneson   
wrote:
I think people make choices from among available options many times  
every day and that is why the concept in question exists.



Deep down, free will is the belief that, if we were put again under  
exactly the same situation, exactly the same feelings, the same  
perceptions, the same beliefs, the same memories, the same past, the  
same values, etc ... if everything was exactly the same, the belief  
in free will says that we still could do otherwise.


It's silly.


I agree free-will is silly if it is defined like that. So let us try a  
less silly definition. So instead of "was exactly the same" in your  
definition, we can use "was exactly the same from the subject point of  
view". In that case, if the subject was aware of not having all  
information, he might consistently think that he could have done  
otherwise, because he was hesitating for example, as far as he can  
remember.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-06 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Jun 6, 1:48 pm, John Clark  wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 Craig Weinberg  wrote:

There is no meaningful difference between will and free will. Adding
'free' only emphasizes that the intention is your own and not
compelled by circumstances beyond your control. All will implies the
capacity to intentionally control, which is not logically consistent
with 100% determinism. If a rolling stone needs no experience of will
to decide which way it will roll, then a person needs no such
experience to function mechanically.

>
>
>
> > > Punishment only works if something 1. cares whether or not it's
> > experience is unpleasant
>
> Yes.
>
> > 2. has causally efficacious motive to alter their behavior,
>
>                  
> No, although if the criminal's actions are not causal, if they are random,
> then the range of potential punishments that are effective becomes much
> more limited.  However be the criminal random or causal a bullet in the
> brain will most certainly alter their behavior, and sometimes for the
> better.
>

Execution is not intended to alter the behavior of the prisoner. In
order for us to have an expectation that the threat of execution could
be a deterrent, we have to have an expectation that potential
criminals have enough control over their own actions that that they
will voluntarily choose to avoid it. We do not think that a deterrent
is the same thing as a guarantee that crime cannot occur - in fact,
the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent is variable. It's up to
the individuals, at least some individuals some of the time, to some
extent or another, to determine for themselves whether they are
deterred.

Craig

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 8:52 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>
>  Contral-causal, I guess. What I'm defending is that the belief in
> free-will is, in part, a social construct, useful from the social/legal
> point of view, as you say. We are educated to believe it.
>
>
> The social/legal concept is certainly a social construct, and one that has
> evolved over time from simple revenge and "an eye for an eye" to all sorts
> mitigating and exacerbating factors.  I think that belief in contra causal
> free will is natural and not a social construct.  It arises from that
> "feeling I could have done otherwise" and then, by the theory of mind, the
> other guy "could have done otherwise".  We will have be educated to
> disbelieve it.
>
>
I think the feeling that "I could have done otherwise" comes from
education. When our parents got mad at something we did when kids, what
belief could have we learned, except that "I could have done otherwise" or
"damn it, why didn't I do otherwise?"

But I'm not sure if we can substitute that belief with something else  ...

"Next time I will do otherwise" perhaps doesn't work equally well, because
you might think, "ok, next time I will do the same, and it will be next
next time that I will do otherwise"


>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On 6/6/2012 10:56 AM, R AM wrote:
On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:57 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

On 6/6/2012 9:30 AM, R AM wrote:

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:18 PM, Brian Tenneson mailto:tenn...@gmail.com>> wrote:

I think people make choices from among available options many times
every day
and that is why the concept in question exists.

I agree that people make choices. I dont't think it is free will.

You said that people would believe that it would unfair to punish anyone if
there
were no "free will". I agree that people believe that

If there were no "free will" of what kind? contra-causal? compatibilist?
social/legal?

Contral-causal, I guess. What I'm defending is that the belief in free-will is, in part,
a social construct, useful from the social/legal point of view, as you say. We are
educated to believe it.

The social/legal concept is certainly a social construct, and one that has evolved over
time from simple revenge and "an eye for an eye" to all sorts mitigating and exacerbating
factors. I think that belief in contra causal free will is natural and not a social
construct. It arises from that "feeling I could have done otherwise" and then, by the
theory of mind, the other guy "could have done otherwise". We will have be educated to
disbelieve it.

And even if it's not fair (another social term) it may be a useful thing
for society
to do.

I'm pretty convinced it is not fair. "Doing the right thing" is just a skill, like any
other (running fast, jumping, intelligence, ...), and different people posess it to
different degrees. Yet, from a social point of view, we consider everybody to have "the
same amount of free will", excet in extreme cases (madness, drunkenness, etc). It's
definitely not fair, but on the other hand, it is difficult to see what else we could
do. It's useful for society to consider it that way.

We take into account those causative factors we understand and can change, but even if we
realize the brain is strictly deterministic we don't know how to modify it except by crude
methods like punishment and drugs and frontal lobotomies. We don't know how adjust
people's values (or maybe we do, c.f. "A Clockwork Orange") or will.

Brent

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:57 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 6/6/2012 9:30 AM, R AM wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:18 PM, Brian Tenneson  wrote:
>
>> I think people make choices from among available options many times every
>> day and that is why the concept in question exists.
>
>
>  I agree that people make choices. I dont't think it is free will.
>
>  You said that people would believe that it would unfair to punish anyone
> if there were no "free will". I agree that people believe that
>
>
> If there were no "free will" of what kind? contra-causal? compatibilist?
> social/legal?
>

Contral-causal, I guess. What I'm defending is that the belief in free-will
is, in part, a social construct, useful from the social/legal point of
view, as you say. We are educated to believe it.

And even if it's not fair (another social term) it may be a useful thing
> for society to do.
>

I'm pretty convinced it is not fair. "Doing the right thing" is just a
skill, like any other (running fast, jumping, intelligence, ...), and
different people posess it to different degrees. Yet, from a social point
of view, we consider everybody to have "the same amount of free will",
excet in extreme cases (madness, drunkenness, etc). It's definitely not
fair, but on the other hand, it is difficult to see what else we could do.
It's useful for society to consider it that way.

> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics


On 6/6/2012 10:43 AM, R AM wrote:

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:30 PM, R AM mailto:ramra...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:18 PM, Brian Tenneson mailto:tenn...@gmail.com>> wrote:

I think people make choices from among available options many times 
every day
and that is why the concept in question exists.



Deep down, free will is the belief that, if we were put again under exactly the same 
situation, exactly the same feelings, the same perceptions, the same beliefs, the same 
memories, the same past, the same values, etc ... if everything was exactly the same, 
the belief in free will says that we still could do otherwise.


It's silly.


That's why punishment is a deterrent.  The person punished will remember it and so will 
have different memories even if the situation is otherwise the same.  Can work fine on 
deterministic systems.  No so well if the system is random or has no memory.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On 6/6/2012 9:37 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 Brian Tenneson mailto:tenn...@gmail.com>> wrote:

> how can we hold criminals culpable in that they had no choice but to commit crime?

It just mystifies me that someone would even ask a question like that. If you're chasing
me with a bloody ax I don't care if you had a "choice" (whatever the hell that is
supposed to mean) to do so or not, nor do I care what thoughts, be they beautiful or
ugly, are dancing around in your brain while you're doing it; all I want is for you to
stop chasing me with that damn ax and I want measures taken to discourage that sort of
thing happening in the future by you or anybody else.

The question though was what to do about him *after* he committed the crime. If he axed
you because he has a brain tumor that caused him to see you as an alien monster, we
wouldn't hold him culpable. We'd operate on him, remove the tumor, and send regrets to
your widow.

If he were coerced into axing you by a hostile government that was holding his wife and
children hostage and going to kill them if he didn't do you in, we would consider him much
less culpable and might not punish him.

If he did it on an impulse because you offended him (e.g. you told him he spoke gibberish)
we'd consider him less culpable than if you he had long planned to kill you for money.

So as actually applied "culpability" is roughly equivalent to how likely the perp or
people in his situation are to do it or similar again.

Brent

> Seems unfair to punish anyone under those circumstances.

It seems even more unfair for me to get chopped up by your ax. There are only 2
legitimate reasons to punish anybody for anything:

1) To make sure they don't continue with such crimes.

2) To deter others from committing similar crimes.

I admit there is another reason that the oldest reptilian parts of my brain can come up
with, the fun of seeing somebody I dislike suffer, but that is not a reason the newer
more evolved parts of my brain are proud of so I will not defend it. And the ASCII
string "free will" has absolutely nothing to do with any of this, or anything else for
that matter except gibberish.

John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>
> > Punishment only works if something 1. cares whether or not it's
> experience is unpleasant

Yes.

> 2. has causally efficacious motive to alter their behavior,
>

No, although if the criminal's actions are not causal, if they are random,
then the range of potential punishments that are effective becomes much
more limited.  However be the criminal random or causal a bullet in the
brain will most certainly alter their behavior, and sometimes for the
better.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-06 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 06 Jun 2012, at 18:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/6/2012 9:08 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

Speaking of the legal aspect,
Yes, Hitler exercised his *insert gibberish here* when he issued  
orders to kill the Jews.
IF "*gibberish*" does not exist, then how can we hold criminals  
culpable in that they had no choice but to commit crime?  Seems  
unfair to punish anyone under those circumstances.


It's that idea of fairness or justice that seems to connect the idea  
of 'free will' to social policy.  But is it really needed to make  
the connection?  Why not look at as just rule utilitarianism, e.g.  
punishment will be a deterrent to others (would we execute murders  
to satisfy justice if it were known to increase the incidence of  
murder?) and a satisfaction to victims.  So justice and fairness are  
values derived to make a good society and need not be considered  
fundamental.  The social/legal 'free will', meaning nobody made him  
do it, still applies and we even distinguish degrees of coercion as  
mitigating factors.  Low level Nazis were considered less culpable  
because to disobey would have risked their own lives.


OK, but then they are more victim than guilty, and have to present  
themselves as such. A popular jury might help to evaluate the sincerity.


It is difficult to judge responsibility, and more so when it is  
diluted in social collective organizations, and even much more so when  
fear and intimidation are technic of power.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:30 PM, R AM  wrote:

> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:18 PM, Brian Tenneson  wrote:
>
>> I think people make choices from among available options many times every
>> day and that is why the concept in question exists.
>
>
>
Deep down, free will is the belief that, if we were put again under exactly
the same situation, exactly the same feelings, the same perceptions, the
same beliefs, the same memories, the same past, the same values, etc ... if
everything was exactly the same, the belief in free will says that we still
could do otherwise.

It's silly.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> It's not possible to punish something that doesn't have free will.


I can't say anything directly about that because neither you nor I know
what the hell "free will" means, but I do know what "will" means and if
something wants to do X and I prevent that something from doing X then that
something will be unhappy and look upon my actions as a punishment and will
not want it repeated. So independent of what if anything the noise "free
will" means, punishment is a deterrent; but you should have already known
that.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-06 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Jun 6, 12:37 pm, John Clark  wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012  Brian Tenneson  wrote:
>
> >  how can we hold criminals culpable in that they had no choice but to
> > commit crime?
>
> It just mystifies me that someone would even ask a question like that. If
> you're chasing me with a bloody ax I don't care if you had a "choice"
> (whatever the hell that is supposed to mean) to do so or not, nor do I care
> what thoughts, be they beautiful or ugly, are dancing around in your brain
> while you're doing it; all I want is for you to stop chasing me with that
> damn ax and I want measures taken to discourage that sort of thing
> happening in the future by you or anybody else.

But that doesn't explain why we would pick 'punishment' as a
prophylactic measure. If it was an axe that fell off the wall of your
garage, do you seek to punish the garage? The axe? Punishment only
works if something

1. cares whether or not it's experience is unpleasant - ie has sense
qualia of pleasure and pain contrast

and

2. has causally efficacious motive to alter their behavior, and by
extension alter the circumstances of their environment - ie motive
power: (continuum ranging from libertarian free will in our innermost
thoughts and imagination, to voluntary control over some aspects of
our attention and neuromuscular system, to involuntary reflex of
subconscious and unconscious processes).

Craig

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-06 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Jun 6, 12:23 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

> It's that idea of fairness or justice that seems to connect the idea of 'free 
> will' to
> social policy.  But is it really needed to make the connection?  Why not look 
> at as just
> rule utilitarianism, e.g. punishment will be a deterrent to others (would we 
> execute
> murders to satisfy justice if it were known to increase the incidence of 
> murder?) and a
> satisfaction to victims.

Fairness and justice, in this context supervenes on the idea that
punishment can possibly have a containing effect which circumscribes
behavior - which in turn supervenes upon free will to be able to
control one's own behavior to some degree to avoid the experience of
punishment.

It's not possible to punish something that doesn't have free will. It
has no choice but to do whatever it does, so no amount of pain or fear
could cause the recipient to suddenly be able to change their own
behavior if they couldn't change their own behavior voluntarily to
begin with. You can't punish inanimate objects, and without free will,
an organism is just an inanimate object that thinks it's in motion
(for no reason).

Craig

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics


On 6/6/2012 9:30 AM, R AM wrote:
On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:18 PM, Brian Tenneson > wrote:


I think people make choices from among available options many times every 
day and
that is why the concept in question exists.


I agree that people make choices. I dont't think it is free will.

You said that people would believe that it would unfair to punish anyone if there were 
no "free will". I agree that people believe that


If there were no "free will" of what kind? contra-causal? compatibilist? 
social/legal?

And even if it's not fair (another social term) it may be a useful thing for 
society to do.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012  Brian Tenneson  wrote:

>  how can we hold criminals culpable in that they had no choice but to
> commit crime?

It just mystifies me that someone would even ask a question like that. If
you're chasing me with a bloody ax I don't care if you had a "choice"
(whatever the hell that is supposed to mean) to do so or not, nor do I care
what thoughts, be they beautiful or ugly, are dancing around in your brain
while you're doing it; all I want is for you to stop chasing me with that
damn ax and I want measures taken to discourage that sort of thing
happening in the future by you or anybody else.

> Seems unfair to punish anyone under those circumstances.
>

It seems even more unfair for me to get chopped up by your ax.  There are
only 2 legitimate reasons to punish anybody for anything:

1) To make sure they don't continue with such crimes.

2) To deter others from committing similar crimes.

I admit there is another reason that the oldest reptilian parts of my brain
can come up with, the fun of seeing somebody I dislike suffer, but that is
not a reason the newer more evolved parts of my brain are proud of so I
will not defend it. And the ASCII string "free will" has absolutely nothing
to do with any of this, or anything else for that matter except gibberish.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics


On 6/6/2012 9:08 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

Speaking of the legal aspect,
Yes, Hitler exercised his *insert gibberish here* when he issued orders to kill 
the Jews.
IF "*gibberish*" does not exist, then how can we hold criminals culpable in that they 
had no choice but to commit crime?  Seems unfair to punish anyone under those 
circumstances.


Interestingly, Bill Press at UT has recently shown why the idea of placing a high value on 
justice and fairness might have evolved along with a theory of mind including 'free will':


http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/05/16/1206569109

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:18 PM, Brian Tenneson  wrote:

> I think people make choices from among available options many times every
> day and that is why the concept in question exists.


I agree that people make choices. I dont't think it is free will.

You said that people would believe that it would unfair to punish anyone if
there were no "free will". I agree that people believe that



>
> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 9:15 AM, R AM  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:08 PM, Brian Tenneson  wrote:
>>
>>> Speaking of the legal aspect,
>>> Yes, Hitler exercised his *insert gibberish here* when he issued orders
>>> to kill the Jews.
>>> IF "*gibberish*" does not exist, then how can we hold criminals culpable
>>> in that they had no choice but to commit crime?  Seems unfair to punish
>>> anyone under those circumstances.
>>
>>
>> Perhaps the concept of free-will exists because people think it is unfair
>> to punish anyone under those circumstances?
>>
>>
>>> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 9:05 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>


 On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 8:53 AM, John Clark wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 5, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:
>
>
>  > while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know
>> your preferences most of the time.
>>
>
> And Turing proved that some of the time a computer can tell if it will
> eventually stop or not, but not all of the time.
>
>   > The feeling of 'free will' comes from the inability
>> retrospectively to see all the causes; so that, out of ignorance, it 
>> seems
>> that one could have done otherwise.
>>
>
> Yes, and unlike other definitions of "free will" this one is not
> gibberish, however when you boil it down all it's really saying is you
> don't know what you don't know. The highest status the philosophical
> "concept" called "free will" can aspire to is that of being right but
> trivially circular, most of the time it's not even that, most of the time
> it's just gibberish.
>

 Aside from the philosophical concept, there is the social/legal concept
 of not coerced, referred to as exercising 'free will', which is what
 Stenger proposes just to call "autonomy".

 Brent

 --
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
 Groups "Everything List" group.
 To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
 To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
 everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
 For more options, visit this group at
 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

>>>
>>>  --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>
>>
>>  --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics


On 6/6/2012 9:08 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

Speaking of the legal aspect,
Yes, Hitler exercised his *insert gibberish here* when he issued orders to kill 
the Jews.
IF "*gibberish*" does not exist, then how can we hold criminals culpable in that they 
had no choice but to commit crime?  Seems unfair to punish anyone under those circumstances.


It's that idea of fairness or justice that seems to connect the idea of 'free will' to 
social policy.  But is it really needed to make the connection?  Why not look at as just 
rule utilitarianism, e.g. punishment will be a deterrent to others (would we execute 
murders to satisfy justice if it were known to increase the incidence of murder?) and a 
satisfaction to victims.  So justice and fairness are values derived to make a good 
society and need not be considered fundamental.  The social/legal 'free will', meaning 
nobody made him do it, still applies and we even distinguish degrees of coercion as 
mitigating factors.  Low level Nazis were considered less culpable because to disobey 
would have risked their own lives.


Brent


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-06 Thread Brian Tenneson

I think people make choices from among available options many times every
day and that is why the concept in question exists.

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 9:15 AM, R AM  wrote:

> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:08 PM, Brian Tenneson  wrote:
>
>> Speaking of the legal aspect,
>> Yes, Hitler exercised his *insert gibberish here* when he issued orders
>> to kill the Jews.
>> IF "*gibberish*" does not exist, then how can we hold criminals culpable
>> in that they had no choice but to commit crime?  Seems unfair to punish
>> anyone under those circumstances.
>
>
> Perhaps the concept of free-will exists because people think it is unfair
> to punish anyone under those circumstances?
>
>
>> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 9:05 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 8:53 AM, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Jun 5, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:


  > while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know
> your preferences most of the time.
>

 And Turing proved that some of the time a computer can tell if it will
 eventually stop or not, but not all of the time.

   > The feeling of 'free will' comes from the inability
> retrospectively to see all the causes; so that, out of ignorance, it seems
> that one could have done otherwise.
>

 Yes, and unlike other definitions of "free will" this one is not
 gibberish, however when you boil it down all it's really saying is you
 don't know what you don't know. The highest status the philosophical
 "concept" called "free will" can aspire to is that of being right but
 trivially circular, most of the time it's not even that, most of the time
 it's just gibberish.

>>>
>>> Aside from the philosophical concept, there is the social/legal concept
>>> of not coerced, referred to as exercising 'free will', which is what
>>> Stenger proposes just to call "autonomy".
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> For more options, visit this group at
>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>>
>>
>>  --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 6:08 PM, Brian Tenneson  wrote:

> Speaking of the legal aspect,
> Yes, Hitler exercised his *insert gibberish here* when he issued orders to
> kill the Jews.
> IF "*gibberish*" does not exist, then how can we hold criminals culpable
> in that they had no choice but to commit crime?  Seems unfair to punish
> anyone under those circumstances.


Perhaps the concept of free-will exists because people think it is unfair
to punish anyone under those circumstances?


> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 9:05 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 8:53 AM, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 5, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  > while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know
 your preferences most of the time.

>>>
>>> And Turing proved that some of the time a computer can tell if it will
>>> eventually stop or not, but not all of the time.
>>>
>>>   > The feeling of 'free will' comes from the inability retrospectively
 to see all the causes; so that, out of ignorance, it seems that one could
 have done otherwise.

>>>
>>> Yes, and unlike other definitions of "free will" this one is not
>>> gibberish, however when you boil it down all it's really saying is you
>>> don't know what you don't know. The highest status the philosophical
>>> "concept" called "free will" can aspire to is that of being right but
>>> trivially circular, most of the time it's not even that, most of the time
>>> it's just gibberish.
>>>
>>
>> Aside from the philosophical concept, there is the social/legal concept
>> of not coerced, referred to as exercising 'free will', which is what
>> Stenger proposes just to call "autonomy".
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-06 Thread Brian Tenneson

Speaking of the legal aspect,
Yes, Hitler exercised his *insert gibberish here* when he issued orders to
kill the Jews.
IF "*gibberish*" does not exist, then how can we hold criminals culpable in
that they had no choice but to commit crime?  Seems unfair to punish anyone
under those circumstances.

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 9:05 AM, meekerdb  wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 8:53 AM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Jun 5, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>
>>  > while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know your
>>> preferences most of the time.
>>>
>>
>> And Turing proved that some of the time a computer can tell if it will
>> eventually stop or not, but not all of the time.
>>
>>   > The feeling of 'free will' comes from the inability retrospectively
>>> to see all the causes; so that, out of ignorance, it seems that one could
>>> have done otherwise.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, and unlike other definitions of "free will" this one is not
>> gibberish, however when you boil it down all it's really saying is you
>> don't know what you don't know. The highest status the philosophical
>> "concept" called "free will" can aspire to is that of being right but
>> trivially circular, most of the time it's not even that, most of the time
>> it's just gibberish.
>>
>
> Aside from the philosophical concept, there is the social/legal concept of
> not coerced, referred to as exercising 'free will', which is what Stenger
> proposes just to call "autonomy".
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 8:53 AM, John Clark > wrote:

On Tue, Jun 5, 2012  meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

> while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know your
preferences most of the time.

And Turing proved that some of the time a computer can tell if it will 
eventually
stop or not, but not all of the time.

> The feeling of 'free will' comes from the inability retrospectively 
to see all
the causes; so that, out of ignorance, it seems that one could have 
done otherwise.

Yes, and unlike other definitions of "free will" this one is not gibberish, 
however
when you boil it down all it's really saying is you don't know what you 
don't know.
The highest status the philosophical "concept" called "free will" can 
aspire to is
that of being right but trivially circular, most of the time it's not even 
that,
most of the time it's just gibberish.

Aside from the philosophical concept, there is the social/legal concept of not coerced, 
referred to as exercising 'free will', which is what Stenger proposes just to call "autonomy".

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-06 Thread Brian Tenneson

I will exercise my *insert gibberish here* by disagreeing.

On Wed, Jun 6, 2012 at 8:53 AM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 5, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:
>
>
> > while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know your
>> preferences most of the time.
>>
>
> And Turing proved that some of the time a computer can tell if it will
> eventually stop or not, but not all of the time.
>
>  > The feeling of 'free will' comes from the inability retrospectively to
>> see all the causes; so that, out of ignorance, it seems that one could have
>> done otherwise.
>>
>
> Yes, and unlike other definitions of "free will" this one is not
> gibberish, however when you boil it down all it's really saying is you
> don't know what you don't know. The highest status the philosophical
> "concept" called "free will" can aspire to is that of being right but
> trivially circular, most of the time it's not even that, most of the time
> it's just gibberish.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 5, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:

> while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know your
> preferences most of the time.
>

And Turing proved that some of the time a computer can tell if it will
eventually stop or not, but not all of the time.

> The feeling of 'free will' comes from the inability retrospectively to
> see all the causes; so that, out of ignorance, it seems that one could have
> done otherwise.
>

Yes, and unlike other definitions of "free will" this one is not gibberish,
however when you boil it down all it's really saying is you don't know what
you don't know. The highest status the philosophical "concept" called "free
will" can aspire to is that of being right but trivially circular, most of
the time it's not even that, most of the time it's just gibberish.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-05 Thread meekerdb

On 6/5/2012 10:35 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jun 5, 2012 on Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

>> There are only two things I mean by "free will" because they are the
only two
that are not gibberish, but nobody around here except me likes either
definition:
1) Free Will is the inability to always know what you are going to do
before you do it.

> That would be too large. Pebbles does not know what they will do, for
example.

Yes, so pebbles have free will. I didn't say my definition of free will was useful, I
only said it was not gibberish.

> Free will is more in the knowledge of that inability,

But many people lack that knowledge including everyone on this list except me,

It's a matter of degree though. People may very reliably predict that they will not
choose to drive to Phoenix tonight and that they will have coffee with breakfast
tomorrow. So while you do not *always* know what you're going to do, you know your
preferences most of the time.

it is a fact that they can be absolutely positively 100% certain they will do X at
future time Y but when the time comes they find themselves doing something not even
close to X. In fact such a thing is not even rare.

But this doesn't affect their belief in 'free will' because they just think, "I changed my
mind." They may even regard it as evidence of contra-causal free will since there was no
cause known to them that changed their mind and yet the choice was still purposeful. The
feeling of 'free will' comes from the inability retrospectively to see all the causes; so
that, out of ignorance, it seems that one could have done otherwise.

Brent

> including its exploitation to accelerate the decision in absence of
complete
information.

Computers can make guesses based on the most probable outcome too, and if fitted with a
simple hardware random number generator can make guesses based on nothing at all; as
I've said computers used that fact to tell people how to build a H-bomb with the Monty
Carlo algorithm.

> 2) Free Will is a noise made by the mouth by a certain subset of bipedal
creatures.

I don't think so. Here you confuse the concept of free will with the noise
made by
mouth when talking on that concept in english.

But that's exactly the problem, there is no concept of free will, there is only the
noise "free will", a noise like a duck's "quack" that stands for nothing.

> there are many situation when a computer can predict its doing

Yes, but in general they can not.

John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-05 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jun 5, 2012  on Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >> There are only two things I mean by "free will" because they are the
> only two that are not gibberish, but nobody around here except me likes
> either definition:
> 1) Free Will is the inability to always know what you are going to do
> before you do it.
>
>
> > That would be too large. Pebbles does not know what they will do, for
> example.
>

Yes, so pebbles have free will. I didn't say my definition of free will was
useful, I only said it was not gibberish.

> Free will is more in the knowledge of that inability,
>

But many people lack that knowledge including everyone on this list except
me, it is a fact that they can be absolutely positively 100%  certain they
will do X at future time Y but when the time comes they find themselves
doing something not even close to X.  In fact such a thing is not even
rare.

> including its exploitation to accelerate the decision in absence of
> complete information.
>

Computers can make guesses based on the most probable outcome too, and if
fitted with a simple hardware random number generator can make guesses
based on nothing at all; as I've said computers used that fact to tell
people how to build a H-bomb with the Monty Carlo algorithm.

> > 2) Free Will is a noise made by the mouth by a certain subset of bipedal
> creatures.
>
> I don't think so. Here you confuse the concept of free will with the noise
> made by mouth when talking on that concept in english.
>

But that's exactly the problem, there is no concept of free will, there is
only the noise "free will", a noise like a duck's "quack" that stands for
nothing.

> there are many situation when a computer can predict its doing

Yes, but in general they can not.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 05 Jun 2012, at 18:02, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jun 4, 2012 meekerdb wrote:

> And so you know that pursuant to the purpose of winning a game it
may be useful to make a random choice.

Certainly! Random choice is a key part of the Monte Carlo method of
statistical mechanics and it is one of the most important computer
algorithms ever made, the H-bomb could never have been invented
without it.

> Deep Blue purposefully acted to win chess games. Spirit and
Opportunity purposely explored parts of Mars.

Agreed.

> Depends on what you mean by "free will".

There are only two things I mean by "free will" because they are the
only two that are not gibberish, but nobody around here except me
likes either definition:
1) Free Will is the inability to always know what you are going to
do before you do it.

That would be too large. Pebbles does not know what they will do, for
example. Free will is more in the knowledge of that inability,
including its exploitation to accelerate the decision in absence of
complete information. OK.

2) Free Will is a noise made by the mouth by a certain subset of
bipedal creatures.

I don't think so. Here you confuse the concept of free will with the
noise made by mouth when talking on that concept in english.

> I think that with certain AI programming a computer could have the
so called "feeling of free will"

Yes, as Turing proved, even computers don't know what they will do
until they do it.

I can see what you mean, but you should say, *some* computers, in
special states (actually also knowing that they don't know, as above).
I mean there are many situation when a computer can predict its doing,
and even with free will conditions, there will be a mixing of self-
determinacy and self-indeterminacy, leading to possible hesitations.
Free will is what makes us hesitating, very often.

Bruno

John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-05 Thread meekerdb

On 6/5/2012 9:02 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Jun 4, 2012  meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> And so you know that pursuant to the purpose of winning a game it may be 
useful to
make a random choice.

Certainly!  Random choice is a key part of the Monte Carlo method of statistical 
mechanics and it is one of the most important computer algorithms ever made, the H-bomb 
could never have been invented without it.

> Deep Blue purposefully acted to win chess games. Spirit and Opportunity 
purposely
explored parts of Mars.

Agreed.

> Depends on what you mean by "free will".

There are only two things I mean by "free will" because they are the only two that are 
not gibberish, but nobody around here except me likes either definition:

1) Free Will is the inability to always know what you are going to do before 
you do it.

I like it.  I called it upredictability (even by yourself).  But I also added that it 
included acting purposefully; otherwise simple randomness is 'free will'.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-05 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Jun 4, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:

 > And so you know that pursuant to the purpose of winning a game it may be
> useful to make a random choice.
>

Certainly!  Random choice is a key part of the Monte Carlo method of
statistical mechanics and it is one of the most important computer
algorithms ever made, the H-bomb could never have been invented without it.

> Deep Blue purposefully acted to win chess games. Spirit and Opportunity
> purposely explored parts of Mars.

Agreed.

> Depends on what you mean by "free will".
>

There are only two things I mean by "free will" because they are the only
two that are not gibberish, but nobody around here except me likes either
definition:
1) Free Will is the inability to always know what you are going to do
before you do it.
2) Free Will is a noise made by the mouth by a certain subset of bipedal
creatures.

> I think that with certain AI programming a computer could have the so
> called "feeling of free will"
>

Yes, as Turing proved, even computers don't know what they will do until
they do it.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-04 Thread meekerdb

On 6/4/2012 10:07 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jun 3, 2012 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> You're hung up on the idea that purposeful action must be predictable.
Apparently
you never studied game theory.

I'm no world class expert but I've taken several college courses on game theory and I
know enough to understand that there has been no difficulty in incorporating the ideas
of that discipline into computer programs, indeed many recent advances in game theory
have come from the results of computer experiments.

And so you know that pursuant to the purpose of winning a game it may be useful to make a
random choice.

So are computers purposeful?

It depends on their program. Deep Blue purposefully acted to win chess games. Spirit and
Opportunity purposely explored parts of Mars.

Do computers have this thing you call "free will"? If not why not.

Depends on what you mean by "free will". I think that with certain AI programming a
computer could have the so called "feeling of free will", i.e. it could infer that it made
a choice that was purposeful but not determined (even in cases where it was determined).
If it were equipped to act it could act free of coercion.

Brent

John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-04 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jun 3, 2012  Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> > I don't understand what's odd about that, certainly we need retributive
>> punishment if we don't want to be murdered in our beds.
>>
>
> I don't understand why anyone could not see that as a glaring violation of
> common sense, except that I think it must be like handedness or gender
> orientation. Why would punishment work in any way if people are determined
> to commit crimes regardless?

If people are determined then if we change them ( fine them, confine them,
kill them, perform surgery on them) or change the environment (make the
possibility of severe punishment more likely) then they're behavior will
change. That's the nature of determinism, change the input and the output
changes, otherwise it wouldn't be deterministic.

> How could punishment act on anything except the will?

As I've said I have no problem with the word "will" and it does act on the
will, if I change things their will will change and either they will no
longer want to commit crimes (fear of punishment) or no longer able to
fulfill the desire of their will because they are in jail or dead.

> Can you punish phosphorus until phosphorus changes?

Yes, I can put it into a fireproof box or combine the phosphorous with
other chemicals and turn it into fertilizer, something that is actually
useful.

> I have never seen anyone with such a personal axe to grind about this
> subject.

Thank you.

>You hate free will.

Well, a lot of quacking ducks can become annoying.

> > It is unworthy of even a hallucinatory status.

Correct.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-04 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jun 3, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:

>   > You're hung up on the idea that purposeful action must be
> predictable.  Apparently you never studied game theory.
>

I'm no world class expert but I've taken several college courses on game
theory and I know enough to understand that there has been no difficulty in
incorporating the ideas of that discipline into computer programs, indeed
many recent advances in game theory have come from the results of computer
experiments. So are computers purposeful? Do computers have this thing you
call "free will"? If not why not.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-04 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jun 3, 2012 Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> You try moving your arm with an explanation or a reason or with no
> reason. Did it move?

That's like asking how long is a piece of string. It depends on if I wanted
to move my arm or not.

> Now just move your arm.

This time I wanted to move my arm and so, unless it was tied down it moved.
If it was tied down then a desire of my will remained unfulfilled and I
will be unhappy and that will cause me to look for a way to untie my arm.
And my will was in the state it was in, the state of wanting to move my
arm, for a reason or for no reason, there is no third alternative.

> Was it a lack of explanation or reason or randomness that was preventing
> you from FREEly excercising your WILL over your own arm?
>

I didn't move my arm because I didn't want to move my arm, and I don't know
if I didn't want to because of determinism or randomness, but I do know it
was one or the other, I do know there was a reason I didn't want to move it
(although I might not know what it is) or there was no reason I didn't want
to move it .

> Please explain how your arm moved in a way that shows it is purely
> deterministic or purely random

You seem to believe that if you combine determinism and randomness you can
make the "free will" noise more meaningful than a duck's "quack", but you
refuse to answer a question I have asked several times before; if I combine
a calculator with a roulette wheel so that on average one time in 39 it
gives the wrong answer to a calculation does that hybrid device have free
will?  If not why not.

> find a way to say that a reason or non- reason alone caused it

Well that's not very difficult and I don't even need to know what the word
"reason" means!  I can also say without fear of contradiction that klogknee
caused it or non klognee  caused it.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

OOPS. I hit "send" instead of "delete".

Brent

On 6/3/2012 4:25 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/3/2012 9:38 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012  Brian Tenneson mailto:tenn...@gmail.com>> wrote:

> The capacity (which can be defined) of an agent (which can be defined) to 
be able
(which can be defined) to choose (which can be defined)

If it can be done then do so!  Explain "choose" in a way that shows it is not 
deterministic and also not random, find a way to say that a choice did not happen for a 
reason and did not happen for no reason, and do so in a way that is not embarrassingly 
self contradictory. Do that and you have won the argument.

> when (which can be defined)  presented (which can be defined) 

By the way, "defined" can't be defined unless you already know what "defined" means, 
that's why examples are more important than definitions;  so if a definition is too 
hard for you just give me examples of things that can make choices  and things that 
can't, but be prepared to defend your reasoning (a deterministic process) why they are 
in one category and not the other.

> with a choice (which can be defined). Certainly not meaningless.

The word "choice" is perfectly respectable, I use it myself, but you are a fan of the 
"free will" noise so I would bet money that any definition you give of it will be 
self-contradictory or circular or both.

  John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything 
List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything 
List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On 6/3/2012 9:38 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012  Brian Tenneson mailto:tenn...@gmail.com>> wrote:

> The capacity (which can be defined) of an agent (which can be defined) to 
be able
(which can be defined) to choose (which can be defined)

If it can be done then do so!  Explain "choose" in a way that shows it is not 
deterministic and also not random, find a way to say that a choice did not happen for a 
reason and did not happen for no reason, and do so in a way that is not embarrassingly 
self contradictory. Do that and you have won the argument.

> when (which can be defined)  presented (which can be defined) 

By the way, "defined" can't be defined unless you already know what "defined" means, 
that's why examples are more important than definitions;  so if a definition is too hard 
for you just give me examples of things that can make choices  and things that can't, 
but be prepared to defend your reasoning (a deterministic process) why they are in one 
category and not the other.

> with a choice (which can be defined). Certainly not meaningless.

The word "choice" is perfectly respectable, I use it myself, but you are a fan of the 
"free will" noise so I would bet money that any definition you give of it will be 
self-contradictory or circular or both.

  John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything 
List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On 6/3/2012 9:53 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012  meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> "Agent" might be defined as an entity with acts unpredictably

Without a reason.

> but purposefully.

With a reason.

> But both of those are a little fuzzy.

That's not fuzzy, it's idiotic.

You're hung up on the idea that purposeful action must be predictable.  Apparently you 
never studied game theory.

You can arrange the words free, decide, choose, purpose, reason, pick, voluntary and 
unpredictable in any order you like but it won't change the fact that at the end of the 
day things happen for a reason or things don't happen for a reason.

   John K Clark

Brent
"I've given you an argument. I'm not obliged to give you an understanding."
--- Oliver Heaviside

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

On 6/1/2012 8:59 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, May 31, 2012 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

> Look up 'teleology'.

Why? I already know it means things happen for a purpose, although it is never made
clear who's purpose were talking about or what his purpose is supposed to be. One thing
is clear, they had a purpose for a reason or they had a purpose for no reason, there is
no third alternative.

But is you have a purpose, even for no reason, it doesn't follow that your
actions are random.

> Almost any reason a person will give

If he has a reason then he is deterministic.

You keep equating 'having a purpose', 'having a reason' and 'being determined', but I
don't think they are the same thing. If your purpose is to win money at poker your
optimum strategy includes some random actions.

> for their actions will be a reference to some future state.

I did it because I desire to be in state X and I believe my present action will bring
that about; and my desire and my belief have a cause or they do not have a cause, there
is no third alternative.

People who believe in 'free will' also agree that their decisions and beliefs and actions
have causes or not. The difference is they believe that the causes are immaterial.

> In a deterministic world all physics is time reversible

Not necessarily, in a deterministic world X and Y will always produce Z, but Q and T
could also always produce Z, so if you detect the existence of Z you can't reverse
things and figure out what the world was like in the past, you don't know if it was a
world of X and Y or a world of Q and T. In a universe like that you could predict the
future but you wouldn't know what happened in the past. Of course this is really moot,
we probably don't live in a deterministic world, some things happen for no reason, some
things are random.

> the question is whether this reason in terms of future purpose had a
*physical*
cause.

I don't understand your emphasis, even information is physical, it determines entropy
and takes energy to manipulate. I don't know what on earth would a non physical cause
be like but I do know that the non physical cause would itself have a cause or it would
not have a cause, there is no third alternative.

> Believers in 'contra causal free will' suppose that it did not, that my
'soul' or
'spirit' initiated the physical process without any determinative physical
antecedent.

A belief that was enormously popular during the dark ages and led to a thousand years of
philosophical dead ends; not surprising really, confusion is inevitable if you insist on
trying to make sense out of gibberish.

It was, and is, enormously popular. It's not gibberish since it can be empirically
tested. The idea that all events are either physically determined or random is relatively
recent. Before it was recognized how complex the activity of physical systems can be and
how physically complex biota are it was reasonable to suppose there was something
extra-physical about people and animals that made them unpredictable but purposeful.

> they think some events are physically uncaused

So they think it had no cause

No they think the cause is an immaterial spirit.

> but not-random

So they "think" it happened for no cause and didn't happen for no cause and once again
we enter into the merry world of gibberish.

> because they are purposeful.

Then the purpose is the cause, and the purpose exists for a reason or the purpose exists
for no reason, there is no third alternative.

> it is hard to eliminate the possibility that a 'spirit' might influence
the
distribution of these random events

Then of course they would not be random but determined by the spirit, and the spirit
influenced those things for a reason or for no reason, there is no third alternative.

> I think the apparent markers of 'free will', unpredictability and
purposefulness,
are easily explained without invoking 'spirits'.

Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII string "free will" means and neither do
you.

John K Clark

There's no point explaining something to someone determined not to understand.

Brent

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-03 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Jun 3, 1:00 pm, John Clark  wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 8:55 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> > oddly after spending 60 pages attacking free will as an illusion of an
> > illusion, Sam Harris seems to that we may need retributive punishment
> > anyway.
>
> I don't understand what's odd about that, certainly we need retributive
> punishment if we don't want to be murdered in our beds.

I don't understand why anyone could not see that as a glaring
violation of common sense, except that I think it must be like
handedness or gender orientation. Why would punishment work in any way
if people are determined to commit crimes regardless? How could
punishment act on anything except the will? What law of physics
supports the effectiveness of punishment? Can you punish phosphorus
until phosphorus changes? Why not?

> And I disagree
> about "free will" being a illusion, a illusion is a real subjective
> phenomenon, "free will" is just a noise.

I have never seen anyone with such a personal axe to grind about this
subject. You hate free will. It is unworthy of even a hallucinatory
status. It is intolerable to you. It's as if you were trying to...deny
something that is undeniable.

Craig

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-03 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Jun 3, 12:38 pm, John Clark  wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 2, 2012  Brian Tenneson  wrote:
>
> > The capacity (which can be defined) of an agent (which can be defined) to
> > be able (which can be defined) to choose (which can be defined)
>
> If it can be done then do so!  Explain "choose" in a way that shows it is
> not deterministic and also not random, find a way to say that a choice did
> not happen for a reason and did not happen for no reason,

How about this. You try moving your arm with an explanation or a
reason or with no reason. Did it move? Now just move your arm. Was it
a lack of explanation or reason or randomness that was preventing you
from FREEly excercising your WILL over your own arm?

Please explain how your arm moved in a way that shows it is purely
deterministic or purely random, find a way to say that a reason or non-
reason alone caused it without the assistance of your choice, and do
so in away that is not embarrassingly self contradictory. Do that and
you have not lost the argument.

Craig

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-03 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 8:55 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> oddly after spending 60 pages attacking free will as an illusion of an
> illusion, Sam Harris seems to that we may need retributive punishment
> anyway.
>

I don't understand what's odd about that, certainly we need retributive
punishment if we don't want to be murdered in our beds. And I disagree
about "free will" being a illusion, a illusion is a real subjective
phenomenon, "free will" is just a noise.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-03 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012  meekerdb  wrote:

> "Agent" might be defined as an entity with acts unpredictably
>

Without a reason.

> but purposefully.
>

With a reason.

> But both of those are a little fuzzy.
>

That's not fuzzy, it's idiotic. You can arrange the words free, decide,
choose, purpose, reason, pick, voluntary and unpredictable in any order you
like but it won't change the fact that at the end of the day things happen
for a reason or things don't happen for a reason.

   John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-03 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012  Brian Tenneson  wrote:

> The capacity (which can be defined) of an agent (which can be defined) to
> be able (which can be defined) to choose (which can be defined)

If it can be done then do so!  Explain "choose" in a way that shows it is
not deterministic and also not random, find a way to say that a choice did
not happen for a reason and did not happen for no reason, and do so in a
way that is not embarrassingly self contradictory. Do that and you have won
the argument.

> when (which can be defined)  presented (which can be defined)

By the way, "defined" can't be defined unless you already know what
"defined" means, that's why examples are more important than definitions;
so if a definition is too hard for you just give me examples of things that
can make choices  and things that can't, but be prepared to defend your
reasoning (a deterministic process) why they are in one category and not
the other.

> > with a choice (which can be defined). Certainly not meaningless.
>

The word "choice" is perfectly respectable, I use it myself, but you are a
fan of the "free will" noise so I would bet money that any definition you
give of it will be self-contradictory or circular or both.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

I don't think any of us qualify since you have to believe and be aware of your belief of
every tautology which means all possible mathematical proofs.

Actually it seems to me that so much self awareness is contrary to the common notion of
'free will'. The feeling of 'free will' comes about because not only or our decisions
unpredictable, they are unpredictable even by us. If you had really complete
self-awareness you could trace your every decision back to various external inputs or
random events and you would be disabused of the feeling that "I could have done otherwise".

Brent

On 6/2/2012 5:59 PM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

How about define agent to be a type 4 agent as explained here:
http://cs.wallawalla.edu/~aabyan/Colloquia/Aware/aware2.html

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 5:22 PM, meekerdb > wrote:

The hard one to define with falling into circularity is "agent" which is
often
defined as an entity with free will. To test something you need an
operational
definition. "Agent" might be defined as an entity with acts unpredictably
but
purposefully. But both of those are a little fuzzy.

Brent

On 6/2/2012 10:40 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:

The capacity (which can be defined) of an agent (which can be defined) to
be able
(which can be defined) to choose (which can be defined) when (which can be
defined) presented (which can be defined) with a choice (which can be
defined).

Certainly not meaningless.

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 9:58 AM, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Fri, Jun 1, 2012 Brian Tenneson mailto:tenn...@gmail.com>> wrote:

> The fact that free will is debated lends credence to the notion
that
"Free will" is not meaningless. "Free will" has to mean something
before
it can be attacked.

But I'm not saying "free will" does not exist, and I'm not attacking it
because
there is nothing to attack, it would be like attacking a duck's
"quack". I'm
saying I don't know what the hell you're talking about when you type
the ASCII
characters "free will" and neither do you. I'm not saying the idea is
wrong,
I'm saying there is no idea there. How do I know this? Because whenever
anybody
talks about "free will" the resulting verbiage is ALWAYS a blizzard of
contradictory statements, circular definitions, vague illusions, pious
speeches, and just plain old idiocy; there is never any substance
there. Never.

John K Clark

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics

2012-06-02 Thread Brian Tenneson

How about define agent to be a type 4 agent as explained here:
http://cs.wallawalla.edu/~aabyan/Colloquia/Aware/aware2.html

On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 5:22 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  The hard one to define with falling into circularity is "agent" which is
> often defined as an entity with free will.  To test something you need an
> operational definition.  "Agent" might be defined as an entity with acts
> unpredictably but purposefully.  But both of those are a little fuzzy.
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 6/2/2012 10:40 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>
> The capacity (which can be defined) of an agent (which can be defined) to
> be able (which can be defined) to choose (which can be defined) when (which
> can be defined)  presented (which can be defined) with a choice (which can
> be defined).
>
> Certainly not meaningless.
>
> On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 9:58 AM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Jun 1, 2012  Brian Tenneson  wrote:
>>
>>  > The fact that free will is debated lends credence to the notion that
>>> "Free will" is not meaningless.  "Free will" has to mean something before
>>> it can be attacked.
>>
>>
>> But I'm not saying "free will" does not exist, and I'm not attacking it
>> because there is nothing to attack, it would be like attacking a duck's
>> "quack". I'm saying I don't know what the hell you're talking about when
>> you type the ASCII characters "free will" and neither do you. I'm not
>> saying the idea is wrong, I'm saying there is no idea there. How do I know
>> this? Because whenever anybody talks about "free will" the resulting
>> verbiage  is ALWAYS a blizzard of contradictory statements, circular
>> definitions, vague illusions, pious speeches, and just plain old idiocy;
>> there is never any substance there. Never.
>>
>>   John K Clark
>>
>>
>>   --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> For more options, visit this group at
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics


On 6/1/2012 11:25 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

The fuss is because the concept is thought to be fundamental to
jurisprudence and social policy (it's even cited in some Supreme
Court decisions). The concept of free will has been carried over from
past theological and philosophical ideas. But now the concept is
attacked by scientists and some philosophers as incoherent or
empirically false. If they are right it would seem to imply revision
of the social/legal concepts and laws derived from it. Can existing
practice be justified on a purely utilitarian basis?


What about that if you see something working (like a human society) and you do not 
understand how it is working, then it might be a good idea not to try to change it. 


I agree with that.  An oddly after spending 60 pages attacking free will as an illusion of 
an illusion, Sam Harris seems to that we may need retributive punishment anyway.



The drive for change usually comes from people who are not satisfied with their position 
in the current society. Why the drive for change should come from some metaphysical 
discussions?


Every successful revolution has its ideology and philosophy though.

Brent
"Without the pen of Paine, the sword of Washington would have been wielded in 
vain."
--- John Adams

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: free will and mathematics


On 6/2/2012 11:45 AM, John Mikes wrote:
Did ANYBODY so far - among those ~100(+?) posts (so far  erased in this discussion) *I D 
E N T I F Y* */_free will_/*?


I've tried to identify two meanings: One, which I consider unproblematic, is the social 
and legal attribute of decisions which are not coerced.  The other is the folk meaning 
attributing decisions to a spirit or soul which can initiate physical events but which is 
independent of all prior physical events.


Brent


I red about a /_'relatively'_/ free will, (= among (given) choices)  as well as 'totally 
freely chosen' decisions etc. etc. - none of them too impressive.
I tried to substantiate several time that we live in a steadily  evolving state of 
cognition and consider (observe?) as of yesterday more than earlier, consequently (by 
induction) there is more to the "world" than our today-s position. Whatever we know - 
either consciously, or not knowingly: subconsciously adds to our decision making and by 
tomorrow we may be able to draw different conclusions.

(When I wrote my reply up to this point, my mailbox induced Brian's post:)
---
/_"*The capacity*_ (which can be defined) *_of an agent_* (which can be defined) *_to be 
able_* (which can be defined) *_to choose_* (which can be defined) *_when_* (which can 
be defined) *_presented_* (which can be defined) *_with a choice_* (which can be 
defined).//Certainly not meaningless. - Brian Tenneson"/

/---/
(emphasis of the ID words by me) - and I reflect:
It certainly IS not meaningless and IS an identification, however not of a *_FREE_* 
will. It is a decision between "given" choices. "Tomorrow" more info may be given to us 
and our today's choice may be overridden.
What I consider a *_"free will"_*  is independent of the 'choices' we *_G E T_* and is 
solely formatted by our (pesonal? inside?) mindset (call it will?). We, however, are 
part of a more extended (expanded?) world, I like to call it 'Everything' (an infinite 
complexity of so far(?) unknowable content) and all of its influences (may) contribute 
to our 'decisionmaking' although we may not know about either the nature of most of 
those influences, nor that we ARE responding to them.

Brent Meeker (if it really came from YOUR post ):
*/" Can existing practice be justified on a purely utilitarian basis?" /*
Of course it can, in the 'purely utilitarian sense'. Just do not mix such into a 
theoretical aspect and don't call it (rational?) truth.
(Let me stay out of discussing Max Velman's position. I appreciate his scientific base - 
however different from my agnostic views).

John M
*//*
*

//*
On Sat, Jun 2, 2012 at 1:53 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi > wrote:


On 01.06.2012 20:48 meekerdb said the following:

On 6/1/2012 8:59 AM, John Clark wrote:


Believers in 'contra causal free will' suppose that it did not,
that

my 'soul' or 'spirit' initiated the physical process without any
determinative physical antecedent.


A belief that was enormously popular during the dark ages and led
to a thousand years of philosophical dead ends; not surprising
really, confusion is inevitable if you insist on trying to make
sense out of gibberish.


So you think the existence of soul or spirit is not just false but
incomprehensible. I disagree since there are experiments (e.g.
healing prayer, NDE tests) that could have provided evidence for
these extra-physical phenomena. By their null result they provide
evidence against them. But on your view there cannot be evidence for
or against because the concept cannot be given any meaning, much less
an operational meaning that can be tested.


From Understanding Consciousness by Max Velmans:

p. 300 "To make matters worse, there are four distinct ways in which 
body/brain and
mind/consciousness might in principle, enter into casual relationship. 
There might
be physical causes of physical states, physical causes of mental states, 
mental
causes of mental states, and mental causes of physical states. Establishing 
which
forms of causation are effective in practice has clear implication for 
understanding
the aetiology and proper treatment of illness and disease.

Within conventional medicine, physical -> physical is taken for granted.
Consequently, the proper treatment for physical disorders is assumed to be 
some from
of physical intervention. Psychiatry takes the efficacy of physical -> 
mental
causation for granted, along with the assumption that the proper treatment 
for
psychological disorders may involve psychoactive drugs, neurosurgery and so 
on. Many
forms of psychotherapy take mental -> mental causation for granted, and 
assume that
psychological disorders can be alleviated by means

Re: free will and mathematics