Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[thompnickson2]

Oh, Frank!

 

That’s really good!

 

That’s the paradox of pragmatism.  Some things are NOT random; we just never 
know for sure which ones those are. 

 

N

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

 <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> thompnicks...@gmail.com

 <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> 
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam  On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2020 2:18 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

 

Man is Half Blind

Delmore Schwartz

 

Hope is not a certainty;
Guess is not a certainty.
So are perception and prediction.
Intuition is an illusion.
Yet they are the only aids
With which man walks, half blind.

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Sun, Jan 26, 2020, 10:49 AM Marcus Daniels mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com> > wrote:

I thought the question was about software engineering, not about predicting 
emergent behavior?Detecting undesirable behaviors is easier than predicting 
all behaviors..

 

From: Friam mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> > on 
behalf of Pieter Steenekamp mailto:piet...@randcontrols.co.za> >
Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Date: Saturday, January 25, 2020 at 10:48 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

 

I would go along with Johsua Epstein's "if you did not grow it you did not 
explain it". Keep in mind that this motto applies to problems involving 
emergence. So what I'm saying is that it's in many cases futile to apply logic 
to reasoning to find answers - and I refer to the emergent properties of the 
human brain as well as to ABM (agent based modeling) software. But even if the 
problem involves emergence, it's easy for both human and computer logic to 
apply validation logic. Similar to the P=NP problem*, it's difficult to find 
the solution, but easy to verify.  

 

So my answer to "As software engineers, what conditions would a program have to 
fulfill to say that a computer was monitoring “itself" is simply: explicitly 
verify the results. There are many approaches to do this verification; applying 
logic, checking against measured actual data, checking for violations of 
physics, etc.   

 

*I know you all know it, just a refresher, The P=NP problem is one of the 
biggest unsolved computer science problems. There is a class of very difficult 
to solve problems and a class of very easy to verify problems. The P=NP problem 
asks the following: if you have a difficult to solve but easy to verify 
problem, is it possible to find a solution that is reasonably easy for a 
computer to solve. "Reasonably easy" is defined as can you solve it in 
polynomial time. The current algorithms takes exponential time to solve it and 
even for a moderate size problem that means more time that the age of the 
universe for a supercomputer to solve it.

 

Pieter

 

On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 at 23:04, Marcus Daniels mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com> > wrote:

I would say the problem of debugging (or introspection if you insist)  is like 
if you find yourself at some random place, never seen before, and the task it 
do develop a map and learn the local language and customs.  If one is given the 
job of law enforcement (debugging violations of law), it is necessary to 
collect quite a bit of information, e.g. the laws of the jurisdiction, the 
sensitivities and conflicts in the area, and detailed geography.  In 
haphazardly-developed  software, learning about one part of a city teaches you 
nothing about another part of the city.   In well-designed software, one can 
orient oneself quickly because there are many easily-learnable conventions to 
follow.I would say this distinction between the modeler and the modeled is 
not that helpful.   To really avoid bugs, one wants to have metaphorical 
citizens that are genetically incapable of breaking laws.   Privileged access 
is kind of beside the point because in practice software is often far too big 
to fully rationalize.  

 

From: Friam mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> > on 
behalf of "thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> " 
mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> >
Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Date: Saturday, January 25, 2020 at 11:57 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

 

Thanks, Marcus, 

 

Am I correct that all of your examples fall with in this f

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Marcus Daniels]

I thought the question was about software engineering, not about predicting 
emergent behavior?Detecting undesirable behaviors is easier than predicting 
all behaviors..

From: Friam  on behalf of Pieter Steenekamp 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Saturday, January 25, 2020 at 10:48 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

I would go along with Johsua Epstein's "if you did not grow it you did not 
explain it". Keep in mind that this motto applies to problems involving 
emergence. So what I'm saying is that it's in many cases futile to apply logic 
to reasoning to find answers - and I refer to the emergent properties of the 
human brain as well as to ABM (agent based modeling) software. But even if the 
problem involves emergence, it's easy for both human and computer logic to 
apply validation logic. Similar to the P=NP problem*, it's difficult to find 
the solution, but easy to verify.

So my answer to "As software engineers, what conditions would a program have to 
fulfill to say that a computer was monitoring “itself" is simply: explicitly 
verify the results. There are many approaches to do this verification; applying 
logic, checking against measured actual data, checking for violations of 
physics, etc.

*I know you all know it, just a refresher, The P=NP problem is one of the 
biggest unsolved computer science problems. There is a class of very difficult 
to solve problems and a class of very easy to verify problems. The P=NP problem 
asks the following: if you have a difficult to solve but easy to verify 
problem, is it possible to find a solution that is reasonably easy for a 
computer to solve. "Reasonably easy" is defined as can you solve it in 
polynomial time. The current algorithms takes exponential time to solve it and 
even for a moderate size problem that means more time that the age of the 
universe for a supercomputer to solve it.

Pieter

On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 at 23:04, Marcus Daniels 
mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com>> wrote:
I would say the problem of debugging (or introspection if you insist)  is like 
if you find yourself at some random place, never seen before, and the task it 
do develop a map and learn the local language and customs.  If one is given the 
job of law enforcement (debugging violations of law), it is necessary to 
collect quite a bit of information, e.g. the laws of the jurisdiction, the 
sensitivities and conflicts in the area, and detailed geography.  In 
haphazardly-developed  software, learning about one part of a city teaches you 
nothing about another part of the city.   In well-designed software, one can 
orient oneself quickly because there are many easily-learnable conventions to 
follow.I would say this distinction between the modeler and the modeled is 
not that helpful.   To really avoid bugs, one wants to have metaphorical 
citizens that are genetically incapable of breaking laws.   Privileged access 
is kind of beside the point because in practice software is often far too big 
to fully rationalize.

From: Friam mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>> on 
behalf of "thompnicks...@gmail.com<mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>" 
mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>>
Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Date: Saturday, January 25, 2020 at 11:57 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

Thanks, Marcus,

Am I correct that all of your examples fall with in this frame;

[cid:image001.png@01D5D42D.D03A82D0]
I keep expecting you guys to scream at me, “Of course, you idiot, 
self-perception is partial and subject to error!  HTF could it be otherwise?”   
I would love that.  I would record it and put it on loop for half my colleagues 
in psychology departments around the world.

Nick
Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
thompnicks...@gmail.com<mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/


From: Friam mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>> On 
Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Saturday, January 25, 2020 12:16 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

Nick writes:


 As software engineers, what conditions would a program have to fulfill to say 
that a computer was monitoring “itself



It is common for codes that calculate things to periodically test invariants 
that should hold.   For example, a physics code might test for conservation of 
mass or energy.   A conversion between a data structure with one index scheme 
to another is often followed by a check to ensure the total number of records 
did not change, or if it did change that it changed by an expected amount.   It

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Frank Wimberly]

Introspection :  it would be possible to insert a causal inference module
into an agent-based modeling program.  The ABM could examine the causal
conclusions emerging from the data it's generating.  It seems to me that is
close to what "introspection" means to me.

Frank
---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Sun, Jan 26, 2020, 7:56 AM Frank Wimberly  wrote:

> Validation:  Bill Reynolds wrote a paper about inferring causal models
> from observational data to validate, for example, agent based models.  My
> original idea was that If the same causal edges emerge as are observed in
> the modeled system then that helps validate the model.  Bill thought it was
> better to compare the causal model with experts' opinions regarding
> causation in the modeled system.  Good enough.
>
> Reynolds, W. N., Wimberly, F. C.,
>
> Simulation Validation Using Causal Inference Theory with
> Morphological Constraints.  Proceedings of the 2011 Winter Simulation
> Conference, Arizona Grand Resort, December, 2011.
> I mentioned this here recently and Glen asked for a copy so I sent it to
> him.  I look forward to his comments.
>
> Frank
>
> ---
> Frank Wimberly
>
> My memoir:
> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>
> My scientific publications:
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
> On Sat, Jan 25, 2020, 11:48 PM Pieter Steenekamp <
> piet...@randcontrols.co.za> wrote:
>
>> I would go along with Johsua Epstein's "if you did not grow it you did
>> not explain it". Keep in mind that this motto applies to problems involving
>> emergence. So what I'm saying is that it's in many cases futile to apply
>> logic to reasoning to find answers - and I refer to the emergent properties
>> of the human brain as well as to ABM (agent based modeling) software. But
>> even if the problem involves emergence, it's easy for both human and
>> computer logic to apply validation logic. Similar to the P=NP problem*,
>> it's difficult to find the solution, but easy to verify.
>>
>> So my answer to "As software engineers, what conditions would a program
>> have to fulfill to say that a computer was monitoring “itself" is
>> simply: explicitly verify the results. There are many approaches to do this
>> verification; applying logic, checking against measured actual data,
>> checking for violations of physics, etc.
>>
>> *I know you all know it, just a refresher, The P=NP problem is one of the
>> biggest unsolved computer science problems. There is a class of very
>> difficult to solve problems and a class of very easy to verify problems.
>> The P=NP problem asks the following: if you have a difficult to solve but
>> easy to verify problem, is it possible to find a solution that is
>> reasonably easy for a computer to solve. "Reasonably easy" is defined as
>> can you solve it in polynomial time. The current algorithms takes
>> exponential time to solve it and even for a moderate size problem that
>> means more time that the age of the universe for a supercomputer to solve
>> it.
>>
>> Pieter
>>
>> On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 at 23:04, Marcus Daniels 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I would say the problem of debugging (or introspection if you insist)
>>>  is like if you find yourself at some random place, never seen before, and
>>> the task it do develop a map and learn the local language and customs.  If
>>> one is given the job of law enforcement (debugging violations of law), it
>>> is necessary to collect quite a bit of information, e.g. the laws of the
>>> jurisdiction, the sensitivities and conflicts in the area, and detailed
>>> geography.  In haphazardly-developed  software, learning about one part of
>>> a city teaches you nothing about another part of the city.   In
>>> well-designed software, one can orient oneself quickly because there are
>>> many easily-learnable conventions to follow.I would say this
>>> distinction between the modeler and the modeled is not that helpful.   To
>>> really avoid bugs, one wants to have metaphorical citizens that are
>>> genetically incapable of breaking laws.   Privileged access is kind of
>>> beside the point because in practice software is often far too big to fully
>>> rationalize.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From: *Friam  on behalf of "
>>> thompnicks...@gmail

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Frank Wimberly]

Validation:  Bill Reynolds wrote a paper about inferring causal models from
observational data to validate, for example, agent based models.  My
original idea was that If the same causal edges emerge as are observed in
the modeled system then that helps validate the model.  Bill thought it was
better to compare the causal model with experts' opinions regarding
causation in the modeled system.  Good enough.

Reynolds, W. N., Wimberly, F. C.,

Simulation Validation Using Causal Inference Theory with Morphological
Constraints.  Proceedings of the 2011 Winter Simulation Conference,
Arizona Grand Resort, December, 2011.
I mentioned this here recently and Glen asked for a copy so I sent it to
him.  I look forward to his comments.

Frank

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Sat, Jan 25, 2020, 11:48 PM Pieter Steenekamp 
wrote:

> I would go along with Johsua Epstein's "if you did not grow it you did not
> explain it". Keep in mind that this motto applies to problems involving
> emergence. So what I'm saying is that it's in many cases futile to apply
> logic to reasoning to find answers - and I refer to the emergent properties
> of the human brain as well as to ABM (agent based modeling) software. But
> even if the problem involves emergence, it's easy for both human and
> computer logic to apply validation logic. Similar to the P=NP problem*,
> it's difficult to find the solution, but easy to verify.
>
> So my answer to "As software engineers, what conditions would a program
> have to fulfill to say that a computer was monitoring “itself" is simply:
> explicitly verify the results. There are many approaches to do this
> verification; applying logic, checking against measured actual data,
> checking for violations of physics, etc.
>
> *I know you all know it, just a refresher, The P=NP problem is one of the
> biggest unsolved computer science problems. There is a class of very
> difficult to solve problems and a class of very easy to verify problems.
> The P=NP problem asks the following: if you have a difficult to solve but
> easy to verify problem, is it possible to find a solution that is
> reasonably easy for a computer to solve. "Reasonably easy" is defined as
> can you solve it in polynomial time. The current algorithms takes
> exponential time to solve it and even for a moderate size problem that
> means more time that the age of the universe for a supercomputer to solve
> it.
>
> Pieter
>
> On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 at 23:04, Marcus Daniels  wrote:
>
>> I would say the problem of debugging (or introspection if you insist)  is
>> like if you find yourself at some random place, never seen before, and the
>> task it do develop a map and learn the local language and customs.  If one
>> is given the job of law enforcement (debugging violations of law), it is
>> necessary to collect quite a bit of information, e.g. the laws of the
>> jurisdiction, the sensitivities and conflicts in the area, and detailed
>> geography.  In haphazardly-developed  software, learning about one part of
>> a city teaches you nothing about another part of the city.   In
>> well-designed software, one can orient oneself quickly because there are
>> many easily-learnable conventions to follow.I would say this
>> distinction between the modeler and the modeled is not that helpful.   To
>> really avoid bugs, one wants to have metaphorical citizens that are
>> genetically incapable of breaking laws.   Privileged access is kind of
>> beside the point because in practice software is often far too big to fully
>> rationalize.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From: *Friam  on behalf of "
>> thompnicks...@gmail.com" 
>> *Reply-To: *The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam@redfish.com>
>> *Date: *Saturday, January 25, 2020 at 11:57 AM
>> *To: *'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
>> friam@redfish.com>
>> *Subject: *Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks, Marcus,
>>
>>
>>
>> Am I correct that all of your examples fall with in this frame;
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I keep expecting you guys to scream at me, “Of course, you idiot,
>> self-perception is partial and subject to error!  HTF could it be
>> otherwise?”   I would love that.  I would record it and put it on loop for
>> half my colleagues in psychology departments around the world.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>> Nicholas Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Pro

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Pieter Steenekamp]

I would go along with Johsua Epstein's "if you did not grow it you did not
explain it". Keep in mind that this motto applies to problems involving
emergence. So what I'm saying is that it's in many cases futile to apply
logic to reasoning to find answers - and I refer to the emergent properties
of the human brain as well as to ABM (agent based modeling) software. But
even if the problem involves emergence, it's easy for both human and
computer logic to apply validation logic. Similar to the P=NP problem*,
it's difficult to find the solution, but easy to verify.

So my answer to "As software engineers, what conditions would a program
have to fulfill to say that a computer was monitoring “itself" is simply:
explicitly verify the results. There are many approaches to do this
verification; applying logic, checking against measured actual data,
checking for violations of physics, etc.

*I know you all know it, just a refresher, The P=NP problem is one of the
biggest unsolved computer science problems. There is a class of very
difficult to solve problems and a class of very easy to verify problems.
The P=NP problem asks the following: if you have a difficult to solve but
easy to verify problem, is it possible to find a solution that is
reasonably easy for a computer to solve. "Reasonably easy" is defined as
can you solve it in polynomial time. The current algorithms takes
exponential time to solve it and even for a moderate size problem that
means more time that the age of the universe for a supercomputer to solve
it.

Pieter

On Sat, 25 Jan 2020 at 23:04, Marcus Daniels  wrote:

> I would say the problem of debugging (or introspection if you insist)  is
> like if you find yourself at some random place, never seen before, and the
> task it do develop a map and learn the local language and customs.  If one
> is given the job of law enforcement (debugging violations of law), it is
> necessary to collect quite a bit of information, e.g. the laws of the
> jurisdiction, the sensitivities and conflicts in the area, and detailed
> geography.  In haphazardly-developed  software, learning about one part of
> a city teaches you nothing about another part of the city.   In
> well-designed software, one can orient oneself quickly because there are
> many easily-learnable conventions to follow.I would say this
> distinction between the modeler and the modeled is not that helpful.   To
> really avoid bugs, one wants to have metaphorical citizens that are
> genetically incapable of breaking laws.   Privileged access is kind of
> beside the point because in practice software is often far too big to fully
> rationalize.
>
>
>
> *From: *Friam  on behalf of "
> thompnicks...@gmail.com" 
> *Reply-To: *The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Date: *Saturday, January 25, 2020 at 11:57 AM
> *To: *'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject: *Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection
>
>
>
> Thanks, Marcus,
>
>
>
> Am I correct that all of your examples fall with in this frame;
>
>
>
>
> I keep expecting you guys to scream at me, “Of course, you idiot,
> self-perception is partial and subject to error!  HTF could it be
> otherwise?”   I would love that.  I would record it and put it on loop for
> half my colleagues in psychology departments around the world.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
> Nicholas Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>
> Clark University
>
> thompnicks...@gmail.com
>
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam  *On Behalf Of *Marcus Daniels
> *Sent:* Saturday, January 25, 2020 12:16 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection
>
>
>
> *Nick writes:*
>
>
>
>  As software engineers, what conditions would a program have to fulfill to
> say that a computer was monitoring “itself
>
>
>
> It is common for codes that calculate things to periodically test
> invariants that should hold.   For example, a physics code might test for
> conservation of mass or energy.   A conversion between a data structure
> with one index scheme to another is often followed by a check to ensure the
> total number of records did not change, or if it did change that it changed
> by an expected amount.   It is also possible, but less common, to write a
> code so that proofs are constructed by virtue of the code being compliable
> against a set of types.   The types describe all of the conditions that
> must hold regarding the behavior of a function.In that case it is not
> necessary to detect if something goes haywire

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Marcus Daniels]

I would say the problem of debugging (or introspection if you insist)  is like 
if you find yourself at some random place, never seen before, and the task it 
do develop a map and learn the local language and customs.  If one is given the 
job of law enforcement (debugging violations of law), it is necessary to 
collect quite a bit of information, e.g. the laws of the jurisdiction, the 
sensitivities and conflicts in the area, and detailed geography.  In 
haphazardly-developed  software, learning about one part of a city teaches you 
nothing about another part of the city.   In well-designed software, one can 
orient oneself quickly because there are many easily-learnable conventions to 
follow.I would say this distinction between the modeler and the modeled is 
not that helpful.   To really avoid bugs, one wants to have metaphorical 
citizens that are genetically incapable of breaking laws.   Privileged access 
is kind of beside the point because in practice software is often far too big 
to fully rationalize.

From: Friam  on behalf of "thompnicks...@gmail.com" 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Saturday, January 25, 2020 at 11:57 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

Thanks, Marcus,

Am I correct that all of your examples fall with in this frame;

[cid:image001.png@01D5D37F.F53D72D0]
I keep expecting you guys to scream at me, “Of course, you idiot, 
self-perception is partial and subject to error!  HTF could it be otherwise?”   
I would love that.  I would record it and put it on loop for half my colleagues 
in psychology departments around the world.

Nick
Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
thompnicks...@gmail.com<mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com>
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/


From: Friam  On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Saturday, January 25, 2020 12:16 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

Nick writes:


 As software engineers, what conditions would a program have to fulfill to say 
that a computer was monitoring “itself



It is common for codes that calculate things to periodically test invariants 
that should hold.   For example, a physics code might test for conservation of 
mass or energy.   A conversion between a data structure with one index scheme 
to another is often followed by a check to ensure the total number of records 
did not change, or if it did change that it changed by an expected amount.   It 
is also possible, but less common, to write a code so that proofs are 
constructed by virtue of the code being compliable against a set of types.   
The types describe all of the conditions that must hold regarding the behavior 
of a function.In that case it is not necessary to detect if something goes 
haywire at runtime because it is simply not possible for something to go 
haywire.  (A computer could still miscalculate due to a cosmic ray, or some 
other physical interruption, but assuming that did not happen a complete 
proof-carrying code would not fail within its specifications.)

A weaker form of self-monitoring is to periodically check for memory or disk 
usage, and to raise an alarm if they are unexpectedly high or low.   Such an 
alarm might trigger cleanups of old results, otherwise kept around for 
convenience.



Marcus



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Marcus Daniels]

Nick writes:


 As software engineers, what conditions would a program have to fulfill to say 
that a computer was monitoring “itself



It is common for codes that calculate things to periodically test invariants 
that should hold.   For example, a physics code might test for conservation of 
mass or energy.   A conversion between a data structure with one index scheme 
to another is often followed by a check to ensure the total number of records 
did not change, or if it did change that it changed by an expected amount.   It 
is also possible, but less common, to write a code so that proofs are 
constructed by virtue of the code being compliable against a set of types.   
The types describe all of the conditions that must hold regarding the behavior 
of a function.In that case it is not necessary to detect if something goes 
haywire at runtime because it is simply not possible for something to go 
haywire.  (A computer could still miscalculate due to a cosmic ray, or some 
other physical interruption, but assuming that did not happen a complete 
proof-carrying code would not fail within its specifications.)

A weaker form of self-monitoring is to periodically check for memory or disk 
usage, and to raise an alarm if they are unexpectedly high or low.   Such an 
alarm might trigger cleanups of old results, otherwise kept around for 
convenience.



Marcus



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Jon Zingale]

As an addendum to my previous comment above, I suppose
introspection to be understood in terms of querying one's
own nervous system. Perhaps, to introspect is to attempt
to simulate patterns of sensory input, stimulating the nervous
system into returning its predictions.

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Jon Zingale]

Perhaps along with manipulate and observe could be predict.
Presently, I am making my way through two books on predictive processing.

1) Surfing Uncertainty, by Andy Clark
2) Extended Consciousness and Predictive Processing, by M. Kirchhoff and J.
Kiverstein

Phenomenal consciousness either arising from, or being supported by,
top down prediction of incoming sensory inputs is a common theme
to both texts. In Glen's example an individual gets out of an unfamiliar
bed in the morning. If I am reading Clark correctly, he would assert that
the surprise Glen feels comes from Glen's nervous system incorrectly
predicting the sensory inputs to his nervous system. Perhaps this sort
of thing can be construed as an observation, but it seems a bit more.
There appears to be an anticipation present as well.

Jonathan Zingale

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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[thompnickson2]

Hi, Steve, 

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

thompnicks...@gmail.com <mailto:thompnicks...@gmail.com> 

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam  On Behalf Of Steven A Smith
Sent: Saturday, January 25, 2020 9:47 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

 

☣ -

 
Well, your abstract seems to assume something akin to coherence, the idea that 
whatever's doing the introspection is a whole/atomic thing perceiving that 
whole/atomic thing. I think we know that established types of self-perception 
(proprio-, entero-) consist of one sub-component monitoring another 
sub-component. It's not clear to me whether you intend to address that 
part-whole aspect of self-perception or not. But if you don't address it, *I* 
won't be satisfied with whatever you write. 8^)

Indulging in a "pre-buttal", are we? ;^)

- ⏰

 

 


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Steven A Smith]

☣ -

> Well, your abstract seems to assume something akin to coherence, the idea 
> that whatever's doing the introspection is a whole/atomic thing perceiving 
> that whole/atomic thing. I think we know that established types of 
> self-perception (proprio-, entero-) consist of one sub-component monitoring 
> another sub-component. It's not clear to me whether you intend to address 
> that part-whole aspect of self-perception or not. But if you don't address 
> it, *I* won't be satisfied with whatever you write. 8^)

Indulging in a "pre-buttal", are we? ;^)

- ⏰




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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[Marcus Daniels]

Nick writes (about Glen):



“At FRIAM today, some of us  were talking with wonder and gratitude about your 
extra-ordinary ability to read and comment on what others write.”



I think he must just not be distracted by Slack.  ☺

But seriously, Glen is fast!



Marcus



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[uǝlƃ ☣]

I'm sure you're being generous by *not* calling me argumentative or contrarian, 
or any number of other words. 8^) But I'll take it, anyway.

In the text you attached, you talk about that other module and privileged 
access. As far as how I think many *others* talk about self-perception, I have 
no problems with what you've written. But what the entire discussion, including 
the text you attached, ignores is that privileged access involves 
*manipulation* as well as observation, 2 necessary types of interaction.

The idea is one I've lobbed at you before re: feedback. We can consider your 
example of putting your leg down to get out of bed in the morning. My assertion 
was that my doubt that the floor is there manifests itself as very FAST 
feedback (proprioception) regarding the movement of my leg toward the floor and 
if the distance seems too great, my manipulation of my leg rapidly compensates. 
So, if I forgot that I'm sleeping in a hotel with a thicker mattress, I quickly 
*remember* that because of this privileged introspection (manipulate, observe, 
manipulate, observe, ...).

To couch this in terms of one sub-component extrocepting another (with which I 
don't disagree, in gist), it's the *speed* of the feedback between the two 
components that gives the impression that the 2 components are tightly coupled 
and can be considered one component "me introspecting" or "me propriocepting".

This sort of reasoning founds (I think) Buzsaki's "Rhythms of the Brain" and 
the concept of "neurodynamic binding". Any discussion of self-perception must 
surely talk at least a little bit about that, right?

To sum up, I think your discussion should include 2 things: 1) manipulation and 
observation, and 2) feedback between sub-components of the "self". If you 
adopted those, then you could easily dovetail into "abduction" (intra-self 
inference by action) and even "falsification" (intra-self trial and error). It 
wouldn't take much of a mention in your text to satisfy me ... just some hand 
wavy stuff telling me you've thought about (1) and (2) in the context of your 
criticism of the way "introspection" is used in psych literature.


On 1/24/20 12:45 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote:
> At FRIAM today, some of us  were talking with wonder and gratitude about your 
> extra-ordinary ability to read and comment on what others write.  I wish you 
> would come here some day so we can buy you coffee. Also, fwiw, let me say, in 
> this public forum, that I owe you commentary on any writing you are doing 
> that you need commentary on.
> 
>  
> 
> As to the issue of inter-component monitoring, I am  not sure we'll get into 
> it much in this article because the monitoring of one component by another 
> seems to me "other-perception", as I understand it.  Here is how I made the 
> argument some years back, in 
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311349078_The_many_perils_of_ejective_anthropomorphism:
>  
> 
>  
> p. 87. 
> 
>  
> I have always longed to know that an actual computer scientist would say 
> about this inexpert speculation.  How WOULD you wire a computer to assess its 
> own “state”. 

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction and Introspection

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Well, your abstract seems to assume something akin to coherence, the idea that 
whatever's doing the introspection is a whole/atomic thing perceiving that 
whole/atomic thing. I think we know that established types of self-perception 
(proprio-, entero-) consist of one sub-component monitoring another 
sub-component. It's not clear to me whether you intend to address that 
part-whole aspect of self-perception or not. But if you don't address it, *I* 
won't be satisfied with whatever you write. 8^)


On 1/24/20 7:20 AM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote:
> Anybody else?
> 
> *From:* Friam  *On Behalf Of *Pieter Steenekamp
> *Sent:* Thursday, January 23, 2020 11:05 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Your worst nightmare
> 
>  
> 
> To put a Popper inspired philosophy of science-hat on this topic. The key is 
> in the falsification and good explanations process. Conjectures form in a 
> human's mind without consciously knowing where it comes from. To try to use 
> introspection to understand the roots of the conjecture is fruitless. A 
> process of cognitive falsification then takes this conjecture further. The 
> first stages might be a very informal process. Without expressing it like 
> that, the mind asks - I have this idea, why could it be false. If it passes 
> the first stages then a good explanation for the conjecture is developed and 
> it could be put out there in the world. This idea which originally started as 
> a conjecture now develops into knowledge whilst continuously open to be 
> falsified and better explanations are developed. There is no knowledge that 
> is immune against falsification and attempts to hamper the falsification 
> process limits the growth of knowledge.
> I think this is a different paradigm in support of Nick's point that too 
> strong emphasis on introspection shuts down rather than inspiring inquiry.
> 
>  
> 
On 1/23/20 2:38 PM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote:
> New Abstract:
> 
>  
> 
> As psychologists in the behaviorist tradition, we have long had misgivings 
> about the concept of introspection.  The metaphor behind the concept is 
> misleading, and despite the wide use of the concept in both vernacular and 
> professional settings, we doubt that anybody has ever resorted to 
> introspection in the sense that the concept is usually understood.  
> Additional misgivings arise from the study of the philosophy of C S Peirce. 
> Peirce’s Pragmaticism, one of the foundations of modern behaviorism, rejects 
> the Cartesian notion that all knowledge first arises from direct knowledge of 
> one’s own mind – i.e., from introspection.   Peirce declares that all 
> knowledge arises from inference.  He even reverses the flow, declaring that 
> self-knowledge is largely inference from what we do and what happens to us.  
> The logical operation by which we infer our selves is that called  
> “Abduction” by Peirce.   When we engage in abduction, we use one or more 
> properties of an individual event or object to infer its membership in a 
> class of events or objects that share this properties with our initial event 
> or object.  Abductions have potential heuristic power because when we infer 
> what class an individual event belongs to we may infer by deduction other 
> properties that this individual may have.  However abductions vary 
> tremendously in their heuristic power ranging from the from highly useful and 
> testable expectations to implications that are mere vacuous or misleading.  
> We argue that the manner in which “introspection” is understood in psychology 
> abuses the logic of abduction, prematurely shutting down, rather than 
> inspiring inquiry.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ

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Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[Nick Thompson]

Thanks, Glen, 

 

This is really good.  I am going to repost it, in case I was not the only one 
omitted in the feed:

 

Dave West wrote:

 

1.   a secondary definition of casuistry is "resolving moral problems by 
application of theoretical rules."  NST==>Dave:  this is interesting.  Can you 
give me any idea of what a “theoretical” rule is?  <==nst

 

2. A Jesuit practice, "reform of the individual," seems to incorporate a sense 
(not definition) of "individual" consistent with Duns Scotus' concept of 
haecciety and, because Peirce used that term in his work, to explain what he 
meant by the individual, there seems to be a thread to medieval Catholicism. 
NST==>Peirce’s attachment to Scotus is legendary, so this is indeed 
interesting. <==nst

 

3. Jesuit values, e.g. "Respect For The World, Its History And Mystery" and 
especially, Learning From Experience lead to philosophical thought that is not 
contradictory to Peircian notions of experience. NST==>Dave, how do you KNOW 
this stuff, and why have you hidden it from me before. Is this from your time 
at <==nst

 

4. But, Jesuits are dualists, not in the objective world / experience of it 
sense (there they seem to be quite close to Peirce) but in the sense that TRUTH 
can come, not just from experience (and science) but from revelation - the 
direct word of God. NST==>So, whose experience are we talking about here: mine, 
yours, or OURS.  And what do we do when experience contradicts the WOG. And is 
revelation a kind of experience?<==nst

 

5. Jesuits, among many others (Galileo), often found themselves at odds with 
the Church over the issue of whether or not a thing could be true in philosophy 
but not in theology, or vice versa. The Jesuits focused on truth in philosophy 
and their method for identifying that truth would, again, not be incompatible 
with Peirce. So only point four would be contrary to Peirce's ideas. 
NST==>Again, I would love for you to say more, but that seems a lot to ask.  Is 
there a Jesuit philosophy for Idiots, anywhere?  <==nst

 

6. No intellectual lineage is evident from any Jesuit philosopher and Charles 
Sanders. NST==>Well, a quick, lazy-man’s Google suggests that you are right!  
But wouldn’t that be extraordinary?  Vry EENteresting, David.  Vary 
EENteresting.  <==nst

 

davew

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: glen [mailto:geprope...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Saturday, August 24, 2019 7:36 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group ; 
Nick Thompson ; 'The Friday Morning Applied 
Complexity Coffee Group' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

 

How about a link to his archived message?

 

 <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/2019-August/080050.html> 
http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/2019-August/080050.html

 

 

On August 24, 2019 12:21:13 PM PDT, Nick Thompson < 
<mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote:

>Oh, by the way, I DID miss Dave's contribution.  Every once a while, 

>just to keep me nimble, the FRIAM server doesn't send me something, so

>this may be a case of that.   Can you forward it to me?  

 

--

glen


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Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[glen]

How about a link to his archived message?

http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/2019-August/080050.html


On August 24, 2019 12:21:13 PM PDT, Nick Thompson  
wrote:
>Oh, by the way, I DID miss Dave's contribution.  Every once a while,
>just to keep me nimble, the FRIAM server doesn't send me something, so
>this may be a case of that.   Can you forward it to me?  

-- 
glen


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Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[Nick Thompson]

Glen, 

Oh, by the way, I DID miss Dave's contribution.  Every once a while, just to 
keep me nimble, the FRIAM server doesn't send me something, so this may be a 
case of that.   Can you forward it to me?  

Thanks, 

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of glen?C
Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2019 11:27 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

First, did you miss Dave's contribution?  It was more on-topic than mine!

On Rigor: Yes, there's quite a bit of what you say I can agree with. But only 
if I modify *my* understanding of "rigor". I think rigor is any methodical, 
systematic behavior to which one adheres to strictly. It is the fidelity, the 
strict adherence that defines "rigor", not the underlying structure of the 
method or system. And in that sense, one can be rigorously anti-method. 
Rigorously pro-method means adhering to that method and never making 
exceptions. Rigorously anti-method means *never* following a method and paying 
(infinite) attention to all exceptions, i.e. treating everything as a single 
instance particular, an exception. I grant that "methodical anti-method" is a 
paradox... but only that, not a contradiction.

On monism vs. monotheism: The simple answer is "no". I'm not confusing the two. 
By reducing every-stuff to one-stuff, *and* talking about types of inference 
like ab-, in-, and de-duction, you are being (at least in my view) axiomatic, 
with a formal system based on 1 ur-element. Everything else in the formal 
system has to be derived from that ur-element via rules. To boot, your attempt 
to classify casuistry and abduction (same or different is irrelevant, it's the 
classification effort that matters) argues for some sort of formalization of 
them. A/The formalization of abduction is an active research topic. My use of 
the word "deontological" was intended to refer to this rule-based, axiomatic 
way of thinking. I'm sorry if that lead to a red herring off into moral 
philosophy land.

On inferring from particulars: While it's true that induction builds a 
predicate around a particular, it is a "closed" set. (Scare quotes because 
"closed" can mean so much.) Abduction doesn't build predicates and any 
explanation it does build is "open" in some sense. So, I would agree with you 
that one can't really *argue* from a particular using abduction. I tend to 
think of it more like brain storming, in a kindasorta Popperian, open way. Any 
proto-hypothesis can be brought to bear on the abductive target. And the best 
we can do is play around with the abductive target to see if it might 
kindasorta *fit* into that open set of proto-hypotheses. Once you land on a set 
of proto-hypotheses that's small enough to be feasibly formulated into testable 
hypotheses, then you reason by induction over those hypotheses.

In some ways, this would be very like what I, in my ignorance, think casuistry 
is. I'd argue that an experimentalist's focus on putting data taking in 1st 
priority and hypothesis formulation in 2nd priority falls in the same camp. So, 
I agree that casuistry looks a lot like abduction. But I don't think that that 
criminologist was doing either of them.

On ontology vs. rules *and* reasoning from particulars: The proto-hypotheses I 
mention above do not have to take the form of "rules to apply" to the abductive 
target. Think of the game "connect the dots", where the dots are particulars 
and they are/can be interpolated and/or extrapolated by an infinite number of 
lines between them. On the one hand, more dots can make it more difficult to 
find a pattern that includes the *new* dot, but perhaps only when you're 
already pre-biased with a set of lines that connect the old dots. On the other 
hand, if you're rule-free when you look at the old set of dots *and* rule-free 
when you look at them with the new dot included, you're open to any set of 
connecting lines.

Of course, in science, we do have an ur-rule ... that *all* the dots must be 
connected. So, that constrains the set of lines that connect the dots. And the 
more dots, the fewer ways there are to connect them. But practicality demands 
that we doubt at least some dots. So, we're allowed to throw out the weakest 
dots if that allows us to form more interesting connective patterns.

So, in this scenario, the proto-hypotheses are really just collections of old 
dots in which the new dot must sit.  We're not reasoning from *one* particular 
to testable hypotheses. We're reasoning from the addition of that particular to 
collections of other particulars.

On 8/21/19 9:40 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u

Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[Frank Wimberly]

->> ⊢ can be treated as a relation which gives with respect to Τ *whatever*
property the investigator (the abducer) is interested in Τ's having, and
which is not delivered by Δ alone or by {A_(n+j)} alone.

That's how I read the formal paragraph.
---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Fri, Aug 23, 2019, 9:26 AM glen∈ℂ  wrote:

> Sorry for my incompleteness. I should have stated that G say the schema
> is for a *solved* abduction problem. What you're describing is the
> exploration of the *inverse* map. Using the conclusion, you infer the
> premise(s) that fit. I'd hoped it would be obvious this is possible with
> the connect the dots game. It should be easy to imagine a field of dots and
> thinking something like "That could be a face. All it needs is an extra dot
> for the nose."
>
> G mention this in general when they say:
> >> ⊢ can be treated as a relation which gives with respect to Τ *whatever*
> property the investigator (the abducer) is interested in Τ's having, and
> which is not delivered by Δ alone or by {A_(n+j)} alone.
>
>
> On 8/22/19 5:50 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> > I always thought that abduction had the form "If A entails B then the
> > presence/occurrence of B makes it more Likely that A is present/has
> > occurred." I don't see how that is represented by the formalism you
> quoted,
> > however.
>
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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> FRIAM-COMIC 
> http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

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Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[glen∈ℂ]

Sorry for my incompleteness. I should have stated that G say the schema is for a 
*solved* abduction problem. What you're describing is the exploration of the *inverse* map. 
Using the conclusion, you infer the premise(s) that fit. I'd hoped it would be obvious this 
is possible with the connect the dots game. It should be easy to imagine a field of dots and 
thinking something like "That could be a face. All it needs is an extra dot for the 
nose."

G mention this in general when they say:

⊢ can be treated as a relation which gives with respect to Τ *whatever* 
property the investigator (the abducer) is interested in Τ's having, and which 
is not delivered by Δ alone or by {A_(n+j)} alone.



On 8/22/19 5:50 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:

I always thought that abduction had the form "If A entails B then the
presence/occurrence of B makes it more Likely that A is present/has
occurred." I don't see how that is represented by the formalism you quoted,
however.




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Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[Steven A Smith]

Maybe, but I'm literally on my way to visit Glen in Portland.  
Actually... to visit daughter and grandson and much more but hoping to
see him on the trip!   I'll take a closer look in the next few days and
see if there is anything I can add.

- Steve

On 8/22/19 7:25 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Hi, Glen, 
>
> This is one of those moments when Steve Smith may be able to rescue my 
> ability to participate further in this conversation by making a translation.  
>  Steve?  Can you help here?  
>
> By the way, I am still puzzled by how one makes inferences or explanations 
> without categories and/or principles?  Can you give me an example from 
> everyday life?  
>
> So, the way into my basement requires passing through a low doorway.  Every 
> year, in the first week we come here, I go down there and ram my head on the 
> top of the door.   Ok, so the next time I go down, as soon as I enter the 
> passageway leading to the door, I feel uneasy "This is like the time I 
> bumped my head" ... and, unless I am demented by haste, I duck my head.  
> Simple as this example is, still it involves (on my account, anyway), the 
> application of a principle to a category.  
>
> Which suggests to me that when you seem to talk about rule-less thinking 
> (unruly thinking?), you actually talking about choosing among different sorts 
> of rules and categories, how we decide amongst them, when we decide to give 
> up on one and employ another. 
>
>  Perhaps this is a way of asking the same question:  As you understand 
> "deontological" thought, how is it different from plain-old logical thought?  
>
> Nick  
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
> Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
> Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2019 1:49 PM
> To: friam@redfish.com
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry
>
> Maybe to give context to my hand-wavey colloquial nonsense below, I *really* 
> like Gabbay and Woods' [†] formulation of an "abductive schema":
>
>> Let Δ=(A_1,…,A_n) be a *database* of some kind. It could be a theory or an 
>> inventory of beliefs, for example. Let ⊢ be a *yielding relation*, or, in 
>> the widest possible sense, a consequence relation. Let Τ be a given wff 
>> (well-formulated formula) representing, e.g., a fact, a true proposition, 
>> known state of affairs, etc. And let A_(n+j), j=1,…,k be wffs. Then 
>> <Δ,⊢,Τ,A_(n+j)> is an abductive resolution if and only if the following 
>> conditions hold.
>>
>> 1. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} ⊢ Τ
>> 2. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} is a consistent set
>> 3. Δ ⊬ Τ
>> 4. {A_(n+j)} ⊬ Τ
>>
>> The generality of this schema allows for variable interpretations of ⊢. In 
>> standard AI approaches to abduction there is a tendency to treat ⊢ as a 
>> classical deductive consequence. But, as we have seen, this is 
>> unrealistically restrictive.
> (Emphasis is theirs, at least in the draft copy I have.) They go on to assert:
>
>> ⊢ can be treated as a relation which gives with respect to Τ *whatever* 
>> property the investigator (the abducer) is interested in Τ's having, and 
>> which is not delivered by Δ alone or by {A_(n+j)} alone.
> In my colloquial description, Δ is the collection of old dots there at the 
> start of the process and Τ is the new dot. It's open whether or not the set 
> of wffs (A) are also dots or part of the connections drawn between them, 
> depending on how you feel about *dot composition* (e.g. subsets of dots that 
> are all very close together, so we just draw them as one big dot or somesuch) 
> and scale/resolution. Rule (2) is *clearly* a rule for how the dots can be 
> connected. In general, consistency is also an ambiguous concept.
>
> As always, I'm probably wrong about whatever it is Gabbay and Woods are 
> saying. Any errors are mine. But maybe their words above can give some 
> context for how I feel about "reasoning from particulars".
>
> [†] https://www.powells.com/book/-9780444517913
>
>
>
> On 8/22/19 8:26 AM, glen∈ℂ wrote:
>> First, did you miss Dave's contribution?  It was more on-topic than mine!
>>
>> On Rigor: Yes, there's quite a bit of what you say I can agree with. But 
>> only if I modify *my* understanding of "rigor". I think rigor is any 
>> methodical, systematic behavior to which one adheres to strictly. It is the 
>> fidelity, the strict adherence that defines "rigor", not the underlying 
>> structure of the method or system. And in that sense, one can be rigorously 
>> anti

Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[Nick Thompson]

Hi, Glen, 

This is one of those moments when Steve Smith may be able to rescue my ability 
to participate further in this conversation by making a translation.   Steve?  
Can you help here?  

By the way, I am still puzzled by how one makes inferences or explanations 
without categories and/or principles?  Can you give me an example from everyday 
life?  

So, the way into my basement requires passing through a low doorway.  Every 
year, in the first week we come here, I go down there and ram my head on the 
top of the door.   Ok, so the next time I go down, as soon as I enter the 
passageway leading to the door, I feel uneasy "This is like the time I 
bumped my head" ... and, unless I am demented by haste, I duck my head.  Simple 
as this example is, still it involves (on my account, anyway), the application 
of a principle to a category.  

Which suggests to me that when you seem to talk about rule-less thinking 
(unruly thinking?), you actually talking about choosing among different sorts 
of rules and categories, how we decide amongst them, when we decide to give up 
on one and employ another. 

 Perhaps this is a way of asking the same question:  As you understand 
"deontological" thought, how is it different from plain-old logical thought?  

Nick  

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Thursday, August 22, 2019 1:49 PM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

Maybe to give context to my hand-wavey colloquial nonsense below, I *really* 
like Gabbay and Woods' [†] formulation of an "abductive schema":

> Let Δ=(A_1,…,A_n) be a *database* of some kind. It could be a theory or an 
> inventory of beliefs, for example. Let ⊢ be a *yielding relation*, or, in the 
> widest possible sense, a consequence relation. Let Τ be a given wff 
> (well-formulated formula) representing, e.g., a fact, a true proposition, 
> known state of affairs, etc. And let A_(n+j), j=1,…,k be wffs. Then 
> <Δ,⊢,Τ,A_(n+j)> is an abductive resolution if and only if the following 
> conditions hold.
> 
> 1. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} ⊢ Τ
> 2. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} is a consistent set
> 3. Δ ⊬ Τ
> 4. {A_(n+j)} ⊬ Τ
> 
> The generality of this schema allows for variable interpretations of ⊢. In 
> standard AI approaches to abduction there is a tendency to treat ⊢ as a 
> classical deductive consequence. But, as we have seen, this is 
> unrealistically restrictive.

(Emphasis is theirs, at least in the draft copy I have.) They go on to assert:

> ⊢ can be treated as a relation which gives with respect to Τ *whatever* 
> property the investigator (the abducer) is interested in Τ's having, and 
> which is not delivered by Δ alone or by {A_(n+j)} alone.

In my colloquial description, Δ is the collection of old dots there at the 
start of the process and Τ is the new dot. It's open whether or not the set of 
wffs (A) are also dots or part of the connections drawn between them, depending 
on how you feel about *dot composition* (e.g. subsets of dots that are all very 
close together, so we just draw them as one big dot or somesuch) and 
scale/resolution. Rule (2) is *clearly* a rule for how the dots can be 
connected. In general, consistency is also an ambiguous concept.

As always, I'm probably wrong about whatever it is Gabbay and Woods are saying. 
Any errors are mine. But maybe their words above can give some context for how 
I feel about "reasoning from particulars".

[†] https://www.powells.com/book/-9780444517913



On 8/22/19 8:26 AM, glen∈ℂ wrote:
> First, did you miss Dave's contribution?  It was more on-topic than mine!
> 
> On Rigor: Yes, there's quite a bit of what you say I can agree with. But only 
> if I modify *my* understanding of "rigor". I think rigor is any methodical, 
> systematic behavior to which one adheres to strictly. It is the fidelity, the 
> strict adherence that defines "rigor", not the underlying structure of the 
> method or system. And in that sense, one can be rigorously anti-method. 
> Rigorously pro-method means adhering to that method and never making 
> exceptions. Rigorously anti-method means *never* following a method and 
> paying (infinite) attention to all exceptions, i.e. treating everything as a 
> single instance particular, an exception. I grant that "methodical 
> anti-method" is a paradox... but only that, not a contradiction.
> 
> On monism vs. monotheism: The simple answer is "no". I'm not confusing the 
> two. By reducing every-stuff to one-stuff, *and* talking about types of 
> inference like ab-, in-, and de-duction, you are being (at least in my view) 
> axiomatic, with a formal sy

Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[Frank Wimberly]

A good word to generalize implication, causation, etc. Is entailment.
There is an old book by Anderson and Belnap which may shed some light on
abduction.  It's title is The Logic of Entailment.

I always thought that abduction had the form "If A entails B then the
presence/occurrence of B makes it more Likely that A is present/has
occurred." I don't see how that is represented by the formalism you quoted,
however.

Frank

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Thu, Aug 22, 2019, 11:49 AM uǝlƃ ☣  wrote:

> Maybe to give context to my hand-wavey colloquial nonsense below, I
> *really* like Gabbay and Woods' [†] formulation of an "abductive schema":
>
> > Let Δ=(A_1,…,A_n) be a *database* of some kind. It could be a theory or
> an inventory of beliefs, for example. Let ⊢ be a *yielding relation*, or,
> in the widest possible sense, a consequence relation. Let Τ be a given wff
> (well-formulated formula) representing, e.g., a fact, a true proposition,
> known state of affairs, etc. And let A_(n+j), j=1,…,k be wffs. Then
> <Δ,⊢,Τ,A_(n+j)> is an abductive resolution if and only if the following
> conditions hold.
> >
> > 1. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} ⊢ Τ
> > 2. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} is a consistent set
> > 3. Δ ⊬ Τ
> > 4. {A_(n+j)} ⊬ Τ
> >
> > The generality of this schema allows for variable interpretations of ⊢.
> In standard AI approaches to abduction there is a tendency to treat ⊢ as a
> classical deductive consequence. But, as we have seen, this is
> unrealistically restrictive.
>
> (Emphasis is theirs, at least in the draft copy I have.) They go on to
> assert:
>
> > ⊢ can be treated as a relation which gives with respect to Τ *whatever*
> property the investigator (the abducer) is interested in Τ's having, and
> which is not delivered by Δ alone or by {A_(n+j)} alone.
>
> In my colloquial description, Δ is the collection of old dots there at the
> start of the process and Τ is the new dot. It's open whether or not the set
> of wffs (A) are also dots or part of the connections drawn between them,
> depending on how you feel about *dot composition* (e.g. subsets of dots
> that are all very close together, so we just draw them as one big dot or
> somesuch) and scale/resolution. Rule (2) is *clearly* a rule for how the
> dots can be connected. In general, consistency is also an ambiguous concept.
>
> As always, I'm probably wrong about whatever it is Gabbay and Woods are
> saying. Any errors are mine. But maybe their words above can give some
> context for how I feel about "reasoning from particulars".
>
> [†] https://www.powells.com/book/-9780444517913
>
>
>
> On 8/22/19 8:26 AM, glen∈ℂ wrote:
> > First, did you miss Dave's contribution?  It was more on-topic than mine!
> >
> > On Rigor: Yes, there's quite a bit of what you say I can agree with. But
> only if I modify *my* understanding of "rigor". I think rigor is any
> methodical, systematic behavior to which one adheres to strictly. It is the
> fidelity, the strict adherence that defines "rigor", not the underlying
> structure of the method or system. And in that sense, one can be rigorously
> anti-method. Rigorously pro-method means adhering to that method and never
> making exceptions. Rigorously anti-method means *never* following a method
> and paying (infinite) attention to all exceptions, i.e. treating everything
> as a single instance particular, an exception. I grant that "methodical
> anti-method" is a paradox... but only that, not a contradiction.
> >
> > On monism vs. monotheism: The simple answer is "no". I'm not confusing
> the two. By reducing every-stuff to one-stuff, *and* talking about types of
> inference like ab-, in-, and de-duction, you are being (at least in my
> view) axiomatic, with a formal system based on 1 ur-element. Everything
> else in the formal system has to be derived from that ur-element via rules.
> To boot, your attempt to classify casuistry and abduction (same or
> different is irrelevant, it's the classification effort that matters)
> argues for some sort of formalization of them. A/The formalization of
> abduction is an active research topic. My use of the word "deontological"
> was intended to refer to this rule-based, axiomatic way of thinking. I'm
> sorry if that lead to a red herring off into moral philosophy land.
> >
> > On inferring from particulars: While it's true that induction builds a
> predicate around a particular, it is a "closed" set. (Scare quotes because
> "closed" can mean so much.) Abduction doesn't build predicates and any
> explanation it does build is "open" in some sense. So, I would agree with
> you that one can't really *argue* from a particular using abduction. I tend
> to think of it more like brain storming, in a kindasorta Popperian, open
> way. Any proto-hypothesis can be brought to bear on the abductive target.
> And the best we can do 

Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Maybe to give context to my hand-wavey colloquial nonsense below, I *really* 
like Gabbay and Woods' [†] formulation of an "abductive schema":

> Let Δ=(A_1,…,A_n) be a *database* of some kind. It could be a theory or an 
> inventory of beliefs, for example. Let ⊢ be a *yielding relation*, or, in the 
> widest possible sense, a consequence relation. Let Τ be a given wff 
> (well-formulated formula) representing, e.g., a fact, a true proposition, 
> known state of affairs, etc. And let A_(n+j), j=1,…,k be wffs. Then 
> <Δ,⊢,Τ,A_(n+j)> is an abductive resolution if and only if the following 
> conditions hold.
> 
> 1. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} ⊢ Τ
> 2. Δ⋃{A_(n+j)} is a consistent set
> 3. Δ ⊬ Τ
> 4. {A_(n+j)} ⊬ Τ
> 
> The generality of this schema allows for variable interpretations of ⊢. In 
> standard AI approaches to abduction there is a tendency to treat ⊢ as a 
> classical deductive consequence. But, as we have seen, this is 
> unrealistically restrictive.

(Emphasis is theirs, at least in the draft copy I have.) They go on to assert:

> ⊢ can be treated as a relation which gives with respect to Τ *whatever* 
> property the investigator (the abducer) is interested in Τ's having, and 
> which is not delivered by Δ alone or by {A_(n+j)} alone.

In my colloquial description, Δ is the collection of old dots there at the 
start of the process and Τ is the new dot. It's open whether or not the set of 
wffs (A) are also dots or part of the connections drawn between them, depending 
on how you feel about *dot composition* (e.g. subsets of dots that are all very 
close together, so we just draw them as one big dot or somesuch) and 
scale/resolution. Rule (2) is *clearly* a rule for how the dots can be 
connected. In general, consistency is also an ambiguous concept.

As always, I'm probably wrong about whatever it is Gabbay and Woods are saying. 
Any errors are mine. But maybe their words above can give some context for how 
I feel about "reasoning from particulars".

[†] https://www.powells.com/book/-9780444517913



On 8/22/19 8:26 AM, glen∈ℂ wrote:
> First, did you miss Dave's contribution?  It was more on-topic than mine!
> 
> On Rigor: Yes, there's quite a bit of what you say I can agree with. But only 
> if I modify *my* understanding of "rigor". I think rigor is any methodical, 
> systematic behavior to which one adheres to strictly. It is the fidelity, the 
> strict adherence that defines "rigor", not the underlying structure of the 
> method or system. And in that sense, one can be rigorously anti-method. 
> Rigorously pro-method means adhering to that method and never making 
> exceptions. Rigorously anti-method means *never* following a method and 
> paying (infinite) attention to all exceptions, i.e. treating everything as a 
> single instance particular, an exception. I grant that "methodical 
> anti-method" is a paradox... but only that, not a contradiction.
> 
> On monism vs. monotheism: The simple answer is "no". I'm not confusing the 
> two. By reducing every-stuff to one-stuff, *and* talking about types of 
> inference like ab-, in-, and de-duction, you are being (at least in my view) 
> axiomatic, with a formal system based on 1 ur-element. Everything else in the 
> formal system has to be derived from that ur-element via rules. To boot, your 
> attempt to classify casuistry and abduction (same or different is irrelevant, 
> it's the classification effort that matters) argues for some sort of 
> formalization of them. A/The formalization of abduction is an active research 
> topic. My use of the word "deontological" was intended to refer to this 
> rule-based, axiomatic way of thinking. I'm sorry if that lead to a red 
> herring off into moral philosophy land.
> 
> On inferring from particulars: While it's true that induction builds a 
> predicate around a particular, it is a "closed" set. (Scare quotes because 
> "closed" can mean so much.) Abduction doesn't build predicates and any 
> explanation it does build is "open" in some sense. So, I would agree with you 
> that one can't really *argue* from a particular using abduction. I tend to 
> think of it more like brain storming, in a kindasorta Popperian, open way. 
> Any proto-hypothesis can be brought to bear on the abductive target. And the 
> best we can do is play around with the abductive target to see if it might 
> kindasorta *fit* into that open set of proto-hypotheses. Once you land on a 
> set of proto-hypotheses that's small enough to be feasibly formulated into 
> testable hypotheses, then you reason by induction over those hypotheses.
> 
> In some ways, this would be very like what I, in my ignorance, think 
> casuistry is. I'd argue that an experimentalist's focus on putting data 
> taking in 1st priority and hypothesis formulation in 2nd priority falls in 
> the same camp. So, I agree that casuistry looks a lot like abduction. But I 
> don't think that that criminologist was doing either of them.
> 
> On ontology vs. rules *and* reasoning 

Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[glen∈ℂ]

First, did you miss Dave's contribution?  It was more on-topic than mine!

On Rigor: Yes, there's quite a bit of what you say I can agree with. But only if I modify *my* understanding 
of "rigor". I think rigor is any methodical, systematic behavior to which one adheres to strictly. 
It is the fidelity, the strict adherence that defines "rigor", not the underlying structure of the 
method or system. And in that sense, one can be rigorously anti-method. Rigorously pro-method means adhering 
to that method and never making exceptions. Rigorously anti-method means *never* following a method and 
paying (infinite) attention to all exceptions, i.e. treating everything as a single instance particular, an 
exception. I grant that "methodical anti-method" is a paradox... but only that, not a contradiction.

On monism vs. monotheism: The simple answer is "no". I'm not confusing the two. By 
reducing every-stuff to one-stuff, *and* talking about types of inference like ab-, in-, and 
de-duction, you are being (at least in my view) axiomatic, with a formal system based on 1 
ur-element. Everything else in the formal system has to be derived from that ur-element via rules. 
To boot, your attempt to classify casuistry and abduction (same or different is irrelevant, it's 
the classification effort that matters) argues for some sort of formalization of them. A/The 
formalization of abduction is an active research topic. My use of the word 
"deontological" was intended to refer to this rule-based, axiomatic way of thinking. I'm 
sorry if that lead to a red herring off into moral philosophy land.

On inferring from particulars: While it's true that induction builds a predicate around a particular, it is a 
"closed" set. (Scare quotes because "closed" can mean so much.) Abduction doesn't build 
predicates and any explanation it does build is "open" in some sense. So, I would agree with you 
that one can't really *argue* from a particular using abduction. I tend to think of it more like brain 
storming, in a kindasorta Popperian, open way. Any proto-hypothesis can be brought to bear on the abductive 
target. And the best we can do is play around with the abductive target to see if it might kindasorta *fit* 
into that open set of proto-hypotheses. Once you land on a set of proto-hypotheses that's small enough to be 
feasibly formulated into testable hypotheses, then you reason by induction over those hypotheses.

In some ways, this would be very like what I, in my ignorance, think casuistry 
is. I'd argue that an experimentalist's focus on putting data taking in 1st 
priority and hypothesis formulation in 2nd priority falls in the same camp. So, 
I agree that casuistry looks a lot like abduction. But I don't think that that 
criminologist was doing either of them.

On ontology vs. rules *and* reasoning from particulars: The proto-hypotheses I mention above do not 
have to take the form of "rules to apply" to the abductive target. Think of the game 
"connect the dots", where the dots are particulars and they are/can be interpolated 
and/or extrapolated by an infinite number of lines between them. On the one hand, more dots can 
make it more difficult to find a pattern that includes the *new* dot, but perhaps only when you're 
already pre-biased with a set of lines that connect the old dots. On the other hand, if you're 
rule-free when you look at the old set of dots *and* rule-free when you look at them with the new 
dot included, you're open to any set of connecting lines.

Of course, in science, we do have an ur-rule ... that *all* the dots must be 
connected. So, that constrains the set of lines that connect the dots. And the 
more dots, the fewer ways there are to connect them. But practicality demands 
that we doubt at least some dots. So, we're allowed to throw out the weakest 
dots if that allows us to form more interesting connective patterns.

So, in this scenario, the proto-hypotheses are really just collections of old 
dots in which the new dot must sit.  We're not reasoning from *one* particular 
to testable hypotheses. We're reasoning from the addition of that particular to 
collections of other particulars.

On 8/21/19 9:40 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2019 6:06 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

  


Admittedly without more context -- and in my ignorance, my first reaction is to 
accuse you (and Gladwell) of a category error.

[NST==>Ach! Hoist by my own petard, again! <==nst]

The criminologist doesn't sound like he's advocating anything like casuistry 
(or what I'd argue is the inferential purpose of abduction). He seems to be 
arguing for something closer to non- or anti-deontological reasoning ... The 
only rule is that there are no rules.

[NST==>Yes, 

Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[Nick Thompson]

Hi, Glen, 

 

Almost missed this in the email litter.  Glad I didn't.  Please see larding, 
below. 

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2019 6:06 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

 

Admittedly without more context -- and in my ignorance, my first reaction is to 
accuse you (and Gladwell) of a category error.

[NST==>Ach! Hoist by my own petard, again! <==nst] 

The criminologist doesn't sound like he's advocating anything like casuistry 
(or what I'd argue is the inferential purpose of abduction). He seems to be 
arguing for something closer to non- or anti-deontological reasoning ... The 
only rule is that there are no rules.

[NST==>Yes, I wondered about that.  Can a casuist be Rigorous.  Now, Glen, do 
you and I agree, or disagree, on the value of [and also on the perils of] 
rigor.  I think of rigor as something one tries out to see where one arrives.  
One does something forced, automatic and counter intuitive for a while (think 
mathematics) in the hope that when one is done, the rigor delivers one to a 
more integrated, intelligible, articulable state of thought.  So, if casuistry 
is incapable of rigor, I probably don’t want any part of it. I am less certain 
about “meta-rigor”.  Do I have any fixed rules for when rigor “should” come 
into play.   Do you agree with any of that? <==nst] 

 

It's reasonable, of course, for a self-described monist

[NST==>Ach!  No!  See below!<==nst] 

 to hunt for the Grand Unified Rule of Reality, the master equation that need 
only have all it's many (even countably infinite) variables *bound* to values 
for the answer to bubble forth like from an oracle.

[NST==>Hang on thar, big fella!  Are you confusing monism with monotheism?  
There is nothing ethical about monism.  It is simply the position that we will 
think more clearly if we postulate only one kind of stuff (“experience”, in my 
case) and deriving all other “stuffs” from organizations of that single basic 
stuff.  <==nst] 

 But people like me might react: "Of COURSE, you have to look at the 
particulars of every situation because *any* predicate you infer (by hook or 
crook) will always be wrong." This is why I'm a supporter of jury trials, as 
I've argued here in the past.

[NST==>Glen, could you spell out for me how one reasons from a particular, full 
stop? I can see how one reasons from the assignment of a particular to a 
category, but I genuinely, honestly, non-argumentativly cannot see how one 
argues from a particular without knowing what it’s a particular OF and/or 
having some rule to apply. <==nst] 

 [NST==>For me, you raise here, explicitly for the first time, the relation 
between the terms “ontological” and “deontological”.  I have always been 
confused about them, and your message has goaded me to figure it out.  It turns 
out that THEY HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH ONE ANOTHER!  Here from 
etymologyonline.com. 

 

DEONTOLOGY: "science of moral duty, ethics," 1817, from Greek deont-, combining 
form of deon "that which is binding, duty" (neuter present participle of dei 
"is binding") + -ology. Said to have been coined by Bentham, but it is used in 
a wider sense than he intended it. Related: Deontological.

 

ONTOLOGY: metaphysical science or study of being," 1660s (Gideon Harvey), from 
Modern Latin ontologia (c. 1600), from onto- + -logy. ONTO- word-forming 
element meaning "a being, individual; being, existence," from Greek onto-, from 
stem of on (genitive ontos) "being," neuter present participle of einai "to be" 
(from PIE root *es- 
<https://www.etymonline.com/word/*es-?ref=etymonline_crossreference>  "to be" 

 

They come from entirely different Greek roots!  One is not the opposite of the 
other.  So, there is no hidden tension invoked by these words, however ever 
tempting it may be, between the world as it should be (deontology) and the 
world as it is (ontology).  I supposed if one believed that existence consisted 
entirely of obligations one would be a monist deontological ontologist.  
Reminds me of that joke about the kid who could never understand the meaning of 
Dog.  

 

<==nst] 

 

Is the criminologist truly engaging in an inferential process by which he 
builds rules to (completely, perfectly) shrink-wrap multiple particulars?  Or 
is the criminologist more of a pluralist, open to the failure of any given 
predicate he may infer?

[NST==>Glen, I wonder if you are thinking of abduction as inferring principles 
from particulars.  That, of course, is induction.  Abducing is inferring the 
identity of something from one or more of its characteristics.  You see a fla

Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[Prof David West]

perhaps relevant to Nicks question:

1. a secondary definition of casuistry is "resolving moral problems by 
application of theoretical rules." 

2. A Jesuit practice, "reform of the individual," seems to incorporate a sense 
(not definition) of "individual" consistent with Duns Scotus' concept of 
haecciety and, because Peirce used that term in his work, to explain what he 
meant by the individual, there seems to be a thread to medieval Catholicism.

3. Jesuit values, e.g. "Respect For The World, Its History And Mystery" and 
especially, Learning From Experience lead to philosophical thought that is not 
contradictory to Peircian notions of experience.

4. But, Jesuits are dualists, not in the objective world / experience of it 
sense (there they seem to be quite close to Peirce) but in the sense that TRUTH 
can come, not just from experience (and science) but from revelation - the 
direct word of God.

5. Jesuits, among many others (Galileo), often found themselves at odds with 
the Church over the issue of whether or not a thing could be true in philosophy 
but not in theology, or vice versa. The Jesuits focused on truth in philosophy 
and their method for identifying that truth would, again, not be incompatible 
with Peirce. So only point four would be contrary to Peirce's ideas.

6. No intellectual lineage is evident from any Jesuit philosopher and Charles 
Sanders.

davew


On Tue, Aug 20, 2019, at 9:25 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Hi, all,

> 

> Once you become aware of abduction as a mental operation, you start to see it 
> everywhere. I saw it in Malcom Gladwell’s three part series ( 
> https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-standard-case/id1119389968?i=1000444756825;
>  
> https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/dr-rocks-taxonomy/id1119389968?i=1000445285031;
>  
> https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/descend-into-the-particular/id1119389968?i=1000445850049)on
>  Jesuitical casuistry. I always thought of casuistry as a form of sophistry 
> or hypocrisy, but apparently it began is as method for incorporating the new 
> experiences that global travel brought to the 16th Century Catholic World. As 
> an inquiry into the identity of a particular case, it looks a lot like 
> abduction to me. Because many of you live in NM, you may take particular 
> interest in the third episode, which presents an analysis of the Angelo 
> Navarro shooting by Albuquerque police. Was it case of a violent man charging 
> the police with a weapon? Or was it the case of a racially motivated firing 
> squad of unarmed men by heavily armed police? Or, ….? You would get a lot of 
> benefit from just listening to this one episode, but to fully understand its 
> philosophical impact, you need the other two to set the context.

> 

> Enjoy. Or not.

> 

> Nick 

> 

> P. S., Does anybody know anything about the relation between Peirce and the 
> Jesuits? 

> 

> Nicholas S. Thompson

> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

> Clark University

> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> 

> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
> 

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] abduction and casuistry

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Admittedly without more context -- and in my ignorance, my first reaction is to 
accuse you (and Gladwell) of a category error. The criminologist doesn't sound 
like he's advocating anything like casuistry (or what I'd argue is the 
inferential purpose of abduction). He seems to be arguing for something closer 
to non- or anti-deontological reasoning ... The only rule is that there are no 
rules.

It's reasonable, of course, for a self-described monist to hunt for the Grand 
Unified Rule of Reality, the master equation that need only have all it's many 
(even countably infinite) variables *bound* to values for the answer to bubble 
forth like from an oracle. But people like me might react: "Of COURSE, you have 
to look at the particulars of every situation because *any* predicate you infer 
(by hook or crook) will always be wrong." This is why I'm a supporter of jury 
trials, as I've argued here in the past.

Is the criminologist truly engaging in an inferential process by which he 
builds rules to (completely, perfectly) shrink-wrap multiple particulars?  Or 
is the criminologist more of a pluralist, open to the failure of any given 
predicate he may infer?

On 8/20/19 12:19 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Once you become aware of abduction as a mental operation, you start to see it 
> everywhere.  I saw it in Malcom Gladwell’s three part series (  
> https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-standard-case/id1119389968?i=1000444756825;
>  
> https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/dr-rocks-taxonomy/id1119389968?i=1000445285031;
>  
> https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/descend-into-the-particular/id1119389968?i=1000445850049)on
>  Jesuitical casuistry.  I always thought of casuistry as a form of sophistry 
> or hypocrisy, but apparently it began is as method for incorporating the new 
> experiences that global travel brought to the 16^th Century Catholic World.  
> As an inquiry into the identity of a particular case, it looks a lot like 
> abduction to me.  Because many of you live in NM, you may take particular 
> interest in the third episode, which presents an analysis of the Angelo 
> Navarro shooting by Albuquerque police. Was it case of a violent man charging 
> the police with a weapon?  Or was it the case of a
> racially motivated firing squad of unarmed men by heavily armed police?  Or, 
> ….? You would get a lot of benefit from just listening to this one episode, 
> but to fully understand its philosophical impact, you need the other two to 
> set the context.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Eric, 

 

I do hope you relent on your new year’s resolution to avoid FRIAM.  Yours is 
one of the voices that makes it thrive.  

 

I do regret the … um .. strength of my last post, it’s … um …er….arrogance?  I 
did rather want to resist you adding your considerable authority to any notion 
that there is any truth outside enduring patterns of human experience.  But I 
should do that with the strength of my logic, not the force of my opprobrium.  

 

Do stay in touch as much as you can, where ever you are.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of David Eric Smith
Sent: Saturday, January 05, 2019 3:11 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

Nick, hi,

 

I am about to drop permanently off this thread, because the inanity (that could 
be a typo for insanity) of my year is about to begin, and all time will be 
lost.  But let me try to clarify one thing before leaving.  I mean this as an 
acknowledgment of the respect due to people who are willing to do work I am not 
doing.  (Larding below, only at one place.)





On Jan 1, 2019, at 5:46 AM, Nick Thompson mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

 

Dear Erics, C. and S., 

 

I got lost for a moment, here, but now am caught up.  I hope. 

 

Eric Charles is correct.

 

Eric Smith’s first sentence is about as unvarnished statement of pragmatism as 
one can imagine.  

 

The role of “reality” in those constructions is often an uninterpreted 
shorthand for the fact that I am willing to act without too much doubt in 
certain ways, using my attention and worry on other things than second-guessing 
that action. 

 

But then there is again, that plaintive lament, that hapless dream of a 
warrantee for a permanent, unshakeable belief in a reality not only undoubted 
but forever beyond the reach of doubt:

 

.  I don’t even try to lift that placeholder term to something that could carry 
philosophical weight."

But this is nonsense!  In the first place, because you misrepresent yourself.  
As a scientist put your philosophical weight on the scientific method every 
day.  In the second place, because you, as a human being, have no where else to 
put it! Unless, of course, you put it in God.  

I appreciate the vote of confidence, but I think it gives credit for two 
things, when only one is actually true.

 

I’m a decoherent-histories kind of guy:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.0767

https://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9407040

Like the rest of the classical variables in the universe, every time I pass 
from one moment to the next, I am in some state, or I undergo some particular 
transformation event.  In doing so, I forever cut off infinitely many whole 
trees of possible futures, and open up some particular tree of possible 
futures.  In a very empiricist sense, I would say this is the lowest sense of 
“making a choice”, though the term admits many higher-level senses that this 
lowest sense does not try to capture.

 

The trajectory of my existence is thus dense with choices in this low-level, 
kinematic sense.  I don’t consider that observation itself to entail the 
existence of a philosophy (or should I say a Philosophy).  It is just a 
consequence of the rules of existing.  I would have a philosophy if I had 
_reasons_ to make particular choices that were known to be consistent in some 
interesting way, and if my choices were really intentionally guided by those 
reasons.  

 

Two things I know I do have are inertia (lowest level) and habit (a bit more 
dynamical; kind of like the counterpart to inertia for events as opposed to 
just states, raising Zeno’s mathematics of positions to Hamilton’s mathematics 
of positions and momenta).  To the extent that either my state that inertially 
persists, or my habits that show pattern, are outcomes of my past, it could be 
said that they are particular responses to the problem of induction over 
futures.  There is, we believe, no unique solution to the problem of induction, 
but by existing I am forced instant by instant to act as if I were choosing 
some such solution.  In some very low-level empiricist kind of way, one could 
call that a “folk philosophy”.  However, I suspect that philosophers would like 
to think they try for something a little higher in the Chomsky hierarchy of 
computational power.

 

Yes, of course I have broad patterns of behavior that mimic some aspects of 
scientific work, both in my work and in the rest of life.  So maybe my folk 
philosophy is a little richer than accidental.  But compared to the density of 
events of choosing, I think it is still pretty thin (my habit is to say 
“measure zero” relative to the events of decoherence blink by blink), but I 
would want to be cautio

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[David Eric Smith]

> Now, No-one will ever deny me the pleasures of talking to God, or imagining 
> heaven, on the slim premise that I happen to be a lifelong atheist.  If I 
> want to get up each morning and thank God for the day, I will do so because 
> it makes me feel good, and makes me a better person.  And I might even abduce 
> from that fact, that God exists.  But I would do so wrongly because I have 
> much better explanations for that experience.  (It’s a plain psychological 
> fact that expressing gratitude makes people feel good; expressing bitterness 
> makes them feel lousy.  Darwinian Group selection explanation to follow, if 
> needed.)  
> 
> As I listen to people talk at Friam, I sense that most of us have a hankering 
> after God.  It expresses itself in many ways, some subtle.  One of the subtle 
> ways is in the idea of a truth beyond experience.  But whenever people start 
> to import that thought back into their science, they begin to talk non-sense. 
>  Literally:  NON  SENSE, right?  Outside the senses and their elaborations in 
> thought.  
> 
> Once long ago, I had the daughter of a Famous Person as a freshman in a 
> Writing-Across-The-Curriculum class.  The students got to write on any 
> subject they chose, and my role was as facilitator, not as an expert.  She 
> announced in class one day that she wanted to write about her voices.  Now, 
> even though I have always been an experimental psychologist, I did go to 
> school with a lot of clinicians, and I did think I knew that Hearing Voices 
> Is A Bad Sign.   So, first I tried to gently steer her away from that topic, 
> and when she resisted firmly, I went to see one of the clinicians in my 
> department, a man named Mort, to get advice on what to do.  He looked at me 
> in that way shrinks look at a client on the first visit and asked, “And what 
> do you WANT to do, Nicholas.”  
> 
> After resisting the impulse to crush his head with the snow globe on his 
> desk, I only said, “Mort.  Cut that crap out!  You know as well as I do that 
> hearing voices is a sign of serious mental illness and that I have an 
> obligation to do something, and certainly not to encourage it.”
> 
> He replied: “No.  I don’t know that!  I do know that people whose voices tell 
> them to do bad things often end up in trouble.  We don’t hear from the people 
> whose voices tell them to do good things.  Do her voices tell her to do bad 
> things. “
> 
> “No.  On the contrary!  They say things like, “Atta Girl!  Keep up the good 
> work!”  Or, “Take it easy!  You have time.”
> 
> “Sounds like good advice to me.  Leave the poor girl alone.”  
> 
> So I left her alone.  In the end she wrote a paper about something else, got 
> a good grade, and went on to graduate in 4 years. 
> 
> So.  In conclusion, Brethren and Sisteren: Cultivate your illusions, but no 
> matter how functional they may prove to be, never, never confuse them with 
> reality. 
> 
> Thus Spake Father Thompson
> 
> Happy New Year
>  
> N
>  
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
> Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ 
> <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/>
>  
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
> <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com>] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
> Sent: Sunday, December 30, 2018 9:33 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group  <mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction
>  
> "The role of “reality” in those constructions is often an uninterpreted 
> shorthand for the fact that I am willing to act without too much doubt in 
> certain ways, using my attention and worry on other things than 
> second-guessing that action.  I don’t even try to lift that placeholder term 
> to something that could carry philosophical weight."
> 
> Wait! Slow down! Why not see what happens when we ask that to carry 
> philosophical weight?
>  
> What would get you to change your habits? Presumably a failure of the "act 
> without too much doubt" plan to work out as desired would eventually get you 
> to change how you act,  right?
>  
> What if you saw others acting without doubt in the same way,  and they got 
> screwed as a result? Would that cause some doubt?
>  
> If we follow this train if thought long enough,  do we eventually end up 
> realizing it isn't just about what works for me-in-this-moment. Rather we end 
> up with something like: "Real" is how we awkwardly try to refer to the those 
> things we think will hold up over the long run of lots off people acting 
> without doubting it. 
>  
> Now THAT sounds like it might be able carry some weigh

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

Since I’ve waded in this far, I’ll finish the thought.

The underlying problem that Agile tries to address is that new/young people 
hired-on to a software development project just want to do a job.   They want 
to get promoted and they want to make more money.   They want to believe their 
careers will move forward.   A manager can possibly do that for them, and help 
them navigate a complex (software) ecosystem as they begin.

So if I see a team with a median age of say, 30, many if not most of them are 
not prepared risk their welfare to approach their work in a way that might be 
contrary to what their manager or their manager’s manager had in mind.   If 
they are told to be a certain sort of finite state machine following Agile 
process that will `free’ them, they will sign right up for that!Actually a 
lot of the middle age workers will too, because if they are not already 
managers they may feel defeated and will at least want to appear to be 
compliant.

From: Friam  on behalf of Marcus Daniels 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Friday, January 4, 2019 at 8:58 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

I find the whole Agile thing ludicrous.   People that like it border on OCD.
What I have seen is something else:  The people that experience freedom from 
management develop deeper intuition about the problem domain and simply work on 
something more important.This is completely unacceptable to management, and 
they panic, re-imposing their stupid processes.

From: Friam  on behalf of Prof David West 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Friday, January 4, 2019 at 8:52 AM
To: "friam@redfish.com" 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Perhaps a good example of failure might help.

When Kent Beck first proposed Extreme Programming, his vision was akin to a 
heterarchic community that included clients/users and every variety of 
developer - Whole Team. The teams were to be self-organizing and self managing. 
Teams had coaches who were expressly forbidding to be managers / lead 
programmers / "bosses" in any sense — they were supposed to sources of 
meta-information about the team's activities, facilitators of coordination 
arising from team interactions, and a hard barrier between the team and 
"management."

In exchange for 'freedom from management' individuals and teams promised 
continual improvement (knowledge and both hard and soft skills).

Everything fell apart and "Agile" failed (technically is still failing every 
day) because developers did not keep their continual improvement promise; and 
managers reimposed their control via end runs that mandated Scrum and Lean as 
integral elements.

davew



On Fri, Jan 4, 2019, at 8:38 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

Like the air traffic control example.   Need more situations in which respect 
of peers and a shared ethic is more important than what a manager thinks.   
Effectively manipulating (e.g. sucking-up) to a manager is a different skill as 
is detecting when manipulation is being attempted.   The very presence of a 
manager tends to undermine the development of a group ethic in my experience.  
On the other hand, some people just can’t function without a mommy or daddy 
around.



From: Friam  on behalf of Prof David West 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Friday, January 4, 2019 at 8:20 AM
To: "friam@redfish.com" 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction



Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from old 
contexts and forced into service in the new.



For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business airport 
(takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like all other airports, 
i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track and direct traffic. Instead, 
everyone communicates on an open channel, stating their location and intent. 
Everyone else  listens and adjusts their own flying accordingly. Local, to a 
specific airspace, coordinators 'emerge' and temporarily offer meta-comments on 
the same frequency in order to identify and resolve potential conflicts that 
might not be immediately noted among the pilots in that airspace. At other 
times volunteers in the tower offer meta- or meta-meta comments as well. In all 
cases, except imminent collision or similar, communication consists only of 
information - no orders, commands, control.



A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion. Companies 
attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at 10,000 employee level 
of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.



davew







On Fri, Jan 4, 2019, at 7:08 AM, David West wrote:

Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from old 
contexts and forced into service in the new.



For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business airport 
(takeoffs an

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

I find the whole Agile thing ludicrous.   People that like it border on OCD.
What I have seen is something else:  The people that experience freedom from 
management develop deeper intuition about the problem domain and simply work on 
something more important.This is completely unacceptable to management, and 
they panic, re-imposing their stupid processes.

From: Friam  on behalf of Prof David West 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Friday, January 4, 2019 at 8:52 AM
To: "friam@redfish.com" 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Perhaps a good example of failure might help.

When Kent Beck first proposed Extreme Programming, his vision was akin to a 
heterarchic community that included clients/users and every variety of 
developer - Whole Team. The teams were to be self-organizing and self managing. 
Teams had coaches who were expressly forbidding to be managers / lead 
programmers / "bosses" in any sense — they were supposed to sources of 
meta-information about the team's activities, facilitators of coordination 
arising from team interactions, and a hard barrier between the team and 
"management."

In exchange for 'freedom from management' individuals and teams promised 
continual improvement (knowledge and both hard and soft skills).

Everything fell apart and "Agile" failed (technically is still failing every 
day) because developers did not keep their continual improvement promise; and 
managers reimposed their control via end runs that mandated Scrum and Lean as 
integral elements.

davew



On Fri, Jan 4, 2019, at 8:38 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

Like the air traffic control example.   Need more situations in which respect 
of peers and a shared ethic is more important than what a manager thinks.   
Effectively manipulating (e.g. sucking-up) to a manager is a different skill as 
is detecting when manipulation is being attempted.   The very presence of a 
manager tends to undermine the development of a group ethic in my experience.  
On the other hand, some people just can’t function without a mommy or daddy 
around.



From: Friam  on behalf of Prof David West 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Friday, January 4, 2019 at 8:20 AM
To: "friam@redfish.com" 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction



Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from old 
contexts and forced into service in the new.



For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business airport 
(takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like all other airports, 
i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track and direct traffic. Instead, 
everyone communicates on an open channel, stating their location and intent. 
Everyone else  listens and adjusts their own flying accordingly. Local, to a 
specific airspace, coordinators 'emerge' and temporarily offer meta-comments on 
the same frequency in order to identify and resolve potential conflicts that 
might not be immediately noted among the pilots in that airspace. At other 
times volunteers in the tower offer meta- or meta-meta comments as well. In all 
cases, except imminent collision or similar, communication consists only of 
information - no orders, commands, control.



A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion. Companies 
attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at 10,000 employee level 
of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.



davew







On Fri, Jan 4, 2019, at 7:08 AM, David West wrote:

Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from old 
contexts and forced into service in the new.



For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business airport 
(takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like all other airports, 
i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track and direct traffic. Instead, 
everyone communicates on an open channel, stating their location and intent. 
Everyone else  listens and adjusts their own flying accordingly. Local, to a 
specific airspace, coordinators 'emerge' and temporarily offer meta-comments on 
the same frequency in order to identify and resolve potential conflicts that 
might not be immediately noted among the pilots in that airspace. At other 
times volunteers in the tower offer meta- or meta-meta comments as well. In all 
cases, except imminent collision or similar, communication consists only of 
information - no orders, commands, control.



A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion. Companies 
attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at 10,000 employee level 
of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.



davew





On Thu, Jan 3, 2019, at 4:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

"There has been a growing interest in business management with regard 
organizational structures that can be rapidly reorganized in response to change 
and the demand for innovation. The te

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

Perhaps a good example of failure might help.

When Kent Beck first proposed Extreme Programming, his vision was akin
to a heterarchic community that included clients/users and every variety
of developer - Whole Team. The teams were to be self-organizing and self
managing. Teams had coaches who were expressly forbidding to be managers
/ lead programmers / "bosses" in any sense — they were supposed to
sources of meta-information about the team's activities, facilitators of
coordination arising from team interactions, and a hard barrier between
the team and "management."
In exchange for 'freedom from management' individuals and teams promised
continual improvement (knowledge and both hard and soft skills).
Everything fell apart and "Agile" failed (technically is still failing
every day) because developers did not keep their continual improvement
promise; and managers reimposed their control via end runs that mandated
Scrum and Lean as integral elements.
davew



On Fri, Jan 4, 2019, at 8:38 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Like the air traffic control example.   Need more situations in which
> respect of peers and a shared ethic is more important than what a
> manager thinks.   Effectively manipulating (e.g. sucking-up) to a
> manager is a different skill as is detecting when manipulation is
> being attempted.   The very presence of a manager tends to undermine
> the development of a group ethic in my experience.  On the other hand,
> some people just can’t function without a mommy or daddy around.>  


> *From: *Friam  on behalf of Prof David West
>  *Reply-To: *The Friday Morning Applied
> Complexity Coffee Group  *Date: *Friday, January 4,
> 2019 at 8:20 AM *To: *"friam@redfish.com" 
> *Subject: *Re: [FRIAM] Abduction>  


> Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from
> old contexts and forced into service in the new.>  


> For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business
> airport (takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like all
> other airports, i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track and
> direct traffic. Instead, everyone communicates on an open channel,
> stating their location and intent. Everyone else  listens and adjusts
> their own flying accordingly. Local, to a specific airspace,
> coordinators 'emerge' and temporarily offer meta-comments on the same
> frequency in order to identify and resolve potential conflicts that
> might not be immediately noted among the pilots in that airspace. At
> other times volunteers in the tower offer meta- or meta-meta comments
> as well. In all cases, except imminent collision or similar,
> communication consists only of information - no orders, commands,
> control.>  


> A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion.
> Companies attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at
> 10,000 employee level of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.>  


> davew


>  


>  


>  


> On Fri, Jan 4, 2019, at 7:08 AM, David West wrote:


>> Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from
>> old contexts and forced into service in the new.>>  


>> For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business
>> airport (takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like
>> all other airports, i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track
>> and direct traffic. Instead, everyone communicates on an open
>> channel, stating their location and intent. Everyone else  listens
>> and adjusts their own flying accordingly. Local, to a specific
>> airspace, coordinators 'emerge' and temporarily offer meta-comments
>> on the same frequency in order to identify and resolve potential
>> conflicts that might not be immediately noted among the pilots in
>> that airspace. At other times volunteers in the tower offer meta- or
>> meta-meta comments as well. In all cases, except imminent collision
>> or similar, communication consists only of information - no orders,
>> commands, control.>>  


>> A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion.
>> Companies attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at
>> 10,000 employee level of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.>>  


>> davew


>>  


>>  


>> On Thu, Jan 3, 2019, at 4:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:


>>> "There has been a growing interest in business management with
>>> regard organizational structures that can be rapidly reorganized in
>>> response to change and the demand for innovation. The term most
>>> often encountered in this regard is "wirearchy" — essentially a
>>> large dynamic network where

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

Like the air traffic control example.   Need more situations in which respect 
of peers and a shared ethic is more important than what a manager thinks.   
Effectively manipulating (e.g. sucking-up) to a manager is a different skill as 
is detecting when manipulation is being attempted.   The very presence of a 
manager tends to undermine the development of a group ethic in my experience.  
On the other hand, some people just can’t function without a mommy or daddy 
around.

From: Friam  on behalf of Prof David West 

Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Date: Friday, January 4, 2019 at 8:20 AM
To: "friam@redfish.com" 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from old 
contexts and forced into service in the new.

For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business airport 
(takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like all other airports, 
i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track and direct traffic. Instead, 
everyone communicates on an open channel, stating their location and intent. 
Everyone else  listens and adjusts their own flying accordingly. Local, to a 
specific airspace, coordinators 'emerge' and temporarily offer meta-comments on 
the same frequency in order to identify and resolve potential conflicts that 
might not be immediately noted among the pilots in that airspace. At other 
times volunteers in the tower offer meta- or meta-meta comments as well. In all 
cases, except imminent collision or similar, communication consists only of 
information - no orders, commands, control.

A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion. Companies 
attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at 10,000 employee level 
of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.

davew



On Fri, Jan 4, 2019, at 7:08 AM, David West wrote:
Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from old 
contexts and forced into service in the new.

For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business airport 
(takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like all other airports, 
i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track and direct traffic. Instead, 
everyone communicates on an open channel, stating their location and intent. 
Everyone else  listens and adjusts their own flying accordingly. Local, to a 
specific airspace, coordinators 'emerge' and temporarily offer meta-comments on 
the same frequency in order to identify and resolve potential conflicts that 
might not be immediately noted among the pilots in that airspace. At other 
times volunteers in the tower offer meta- or meta-meta comments as well. In all 
cases, except imminent collision or similar, communication consists only of 
information - no orders, commands, control.

A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion. Companies 
attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at 10,000 employee level 
of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.

davew


On Thu, Jan 3, 2019, at 4:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

"There has been a growing interest in business management with regard 
organizational structures that can be rapidly reorganized in response to change 
and the demand for innovation. The term most often encountered in this regard 
is "wirearchy" — essentially a large dynamic network where connections (e.g. 
client -server, leader-follower, decision maker-decision implementer) among 
nodes shift and different nodes are more or less connected vis-a-vis other 
nodes over time. An interesting corollary of this kind of organization is that 
the majority of the "system intelligence" is shifted to the edge-node mandating 
empowered employees."



client-server, leader-follower, and decision maker-decision implementer are 
hierarchical control words.   Otherwise there can be frustration situations 
where different bosses give contradictory guidance to the same employee.  There 
cannot be insubordination in this kind of structure.



Marcus



From: Friam  on behalf of Prof David West 

Sent: Thursday, January 3, 2019 3:40:42 PM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction


Nick,

Before the conversation forks towards duality, a minor comment about heterarchy 
in a human organizational context.

Hunter-gatherer tribes were organized as heterarchies: egalitarian with no 
formal, persistent organization. Instead organization, including leadership, 
ranking, and roles was situational. A structure emerged in response to 
environmental stimuli: e.g. 1) a bumper crop of pinon, then A was in charge, 
men assumed portions of "women's work" and women organized, usually by age and 
agility, into teams that maximized ability to harvest; or 2) encroaching tribe 
bent on stealing pinon, B is in charge, men grab their arrows and spears, women 
form second line of defense with younger women

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from
old contexts and forced into service in the new.
For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business airport
(takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like all other
airports, i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track and direct
traffic. Instead, everyone communicates on an open channel, stating
their location and intent. Everyone else  listens and adjusts their own
flying accordingly. Local, to a specific airspace, coordinators 'emerge'
and temporarily offer meta-comments on the same frequency in order to
identify and resolve potential conflicts that might not be immediately
noted among the pilots in that airspace. At other times volunteers in
the tower offer meta- or meta-meta comments as well. In all cases,
except imminent collision or similar, communication consists only of
information - no orders, commands, control.
A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion.
Companies attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at
10,000 employee level of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.
davew



On Fri, Jan 4, 2019, at 7:08 AM, David West wrote:
> Yeah, the vocabulary is difficult as too many terms are borrowed from
> old contexts and forced into service in the new.> 
> For two weeks a year, Oshkosh Wisconsin is the world's business
> airport (takeoffs and landings). There is no positive control like all
> other airports, i.e. the controllers in the tower do not track and
> direct traffic. Instead, everyone communicates on an open channel,
> stating their location and intent. Everyone else  listens and adjusts
> their own flying accordingly. Local, to a specific airspace,
> coordinators 'emerge' and temporarily offer meta-comments on the same
> frequency in order to identify and resolve potential conflicts that
> might not be immediately noted among the pilots in that airspace. At
> other times volunteers in the tower offer meta- or meta-meta comments
> as well. In all cases, except imminent collision or similar,
> communication consists only of information - no orders, commands,
> control.> 
> A business wirearchy is supposed to operate in a similar fashion.
> Companies attempting to do this (mostly in Europe) can be found at
> 10,000 employee level of scale, though most are 100-700 employees.> 
> davew
> 
> 
> On Thu, Jan 3, 2019, at 4:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
>> "There has been a growing interest in business management with regard
>> organizational structures that can be rapidly reorganized in response
>> to change and the demand for innovation. The term most often
>> encountered in this regard is "wirearchy" — essentially a large
>> dynamic network where connections (e.g. client -server, leader-
>> follower, decision maker-decision implementer) among nodes shift and
>> different nodes are more or less connected vis-a-vis other nodes over
>> time. An interesting corollary of this kind of organization is that
>> the majority of the "system intelligence" is shifted to the edge-node
>> mandating empowered employees.">> 


>> client-server, leader-follower, and decision maker-decision
>> implementer are hierarchical control words.   Otherwise there can be
>> frustration situations where different bosses give contradictory
>> guidance to the same employee.  There cannot be insubordination in
>> this kind of structure.>> 


>> Marcus


>> 
>> *From:* Friam  on behalf of Prof David
>> West  *Sent:* Thursday, January 3, 2019 3:40:42
>> PM *To:* friam@redfish.com *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Abduction>>  
>> 
>> Nick,
>>
>>  Before the conversation forks towards duality, a minor comment about
>>  heterarchy in a human organizational context.
>>
>>  Hunter-gatherer tribes were organized as heterarchies: egalitarian
>>  with no formal, persistent organization. Instead organization,
>>  including leadership, ranking, and roles was situational. A
>>  structure emerged in response to environmental stimuli: e.g. 1) a
>>  bumper crop of pinon, then A was in charge, men assumed portions of
>>  "women's work" and women organized, usually by age and agility, into
>>  teams that maximized ability to harvest; or 2) encroaching tribe
>>  bent on stealing pinon, B is in charge, men grab their arrows and
>>  spears, women form second line of defense with younger women
>>  surrounding older ones.
>>
>>  There has been a growing interest in business management with regard
>>  organizational structures that can be rapidly reorganized in
>>  response to change and the demand for innovation. The term most
>>  often enc

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

"There has been a growing interest in business management with regard 
organizational structures that can be rapidly reorganized in response to change 
and the demand for innovation. The term most often encountered in this regard 
is "wirearchy" — essentially a large dynamic network where connections (e.g. 
client -server, leader-follower, decision maker-decision implementer) among 
nodes shift and different nodes are more or less connected vis-a-vis other 
nodes over time. An interesting corollary of this kind of organization is that 
the majority of the "system intelligence" is shifted to the edge-node mandating 
empowered employees."


client-server, leader-follower, and decision maker-decision implementer are 
hierarchical control words.   Otherwise there can be frustration situations 
where different bosses give contradictory guidance to the same employee.  There 
cannot be insubordination in this kind of structure.


Marcus


From: Friam  on behalf of Prof David West 

Sent: Thursday, January 3, 2019 3:40:42 PM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Nick,

Before the conversation forks towards duality, a minor comment about heterarchy 
in a human organizational context.

Hunter-gatherer tribes were organized as heterarchies: egalitarian with no 
formal, persistent organization. Instead organization, including leadership, 
ranking, and roles was situational. A structure emerged in response to 
environmental stimuli: e.g. 1) a bumper crop of pinon, then A was in charge, 
men assumed portions of "women's work" and women organized, usually by age and 
agility, into teams that maximized ability to harvest; or 2) encroaching tribe 
bent on stealing pinon, B is in charge, men grab their arrows and spears, women 
form second line of defense with younger women surrounding older ones.

There has been a growing interest in business management with regard 
organizational structures that can be rapidly reorganized in response to change 
and the demand for innovation. The term most often encountered in this regard 
is "wirearchy" — essentially a large dynamic network where connections (e.g. 
client -server, leader-follower, decision maker-decision implementer) among 
nodes shift and different nodes are more or less connected vis-a-vis other 
nodes over time. An interesting corollary of this kind of organization is that 
the majority of the "system intelligence" is shifted to the edge-node mandating 
empowered employees.

davew


On Thu, Jan 3, 2019, at 2:14 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> I just gave you an example. But it's weird because nobody ever responds
> to my mentions of eyeball saccade.  You also didn't respond to my scalar
> multiplied by a matrix analogy (an analogy because I was talking about
> comprehensions, which matrices are not, technically).  So, rather than
> give you more examples, I'll treat you like an atheist treats
> Christians.  What sort of example would make sense to you?
>
> I have no idea why you used the word "duality".  The ways of organizing
> things (heter- vs. hier-) would only produce a duality if the different
> ways of organizing were *functionally* equivalent.  My attempt to change
> language from "level" to either "layer" or "order" is an implicit
> assertion that heterarchies are functionally *different* from
> hierarchies.  (To be more specific, hierarchical systems are less
> expressive.)  So, a duality might be achievable between 2 differently
> arranged heterarchies, but not between a hier- and a heter-.
>
> By choosing 2 things of (we assume) the exact same type like Siamese
> twins, you provide a set that probably does not require a heterarchy to
> organize.  Fraternal twins would be a better choice because while they
> are both of the same kinship, their *genes* differ significantly.  Genes
> are of a lower/quicker order than kinship.  But typical understanding of
> kinship operates over BOTH the high level (who's your daddy) and low
> level (what color eyes does your daddy have).  While you *can* construct
> a hierarchy to handle that situation.  There may be some situations
> (e.g. recessive genes, step-parents, etc.) that the hierarchy can't
> express but the heterarchy can.
>
> Note that "order" doesn't technically require heterarchy, either,
> really.  Technically, an ordering like we have in 1st to 2nd order logic
> is still a hierarchy, just with mixed operators.  You'd only *need* a
> heterarchy when there are external (to a given hierarchy) objects/
> relations that need to be accounted for.  But I suggest the social
> kinship, biological kinship, and genotype system does approach that
> need, where even if you can formulate the social as a hierarchy and the
> biological as a hierarchy, the mixing of the t

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

Nick,

Before the conversation forks towards duality, a minor comment about heterarchy 
in a human organizational context.

Hunter-gatherer tribes were organized as heterarchies: egalitarian with no 
formal, persistent organization. Instead organization, including leadership, 
ranking, and roles was situational. A structure emerged in response to 
environmental stimuli: e.g. 1) a bumper crop of pinon, then A was in charge, 
men assumed portions of "women's work" and women organized, usually by age and 
agility, into teams that maximized ability to harvest; or 2) encroaching tribe 
bent on stealing pinon, B is in charge, men grab their arrows and spears, women 
form second line of defense with younger women surrounding older ones.

There has been a growing interest in business management with regard 
organizational structures that can be rapidly reorganized in response to change 
and the demand for innovation. The term most often encountered in this regard 
is "wirearchy" — essentially a large dynamic network where connections (e.g. 
client -server, leader-follower, decision maker-decision implementer) among 
nodes shift and different nodes are more or less connected vis-a-vis other 
nodes over time. An interesting corollary of this kind of organization is that 
the majority of the "system intelligence" is shifted to the edge-node mandating 
empowered employees.

davew


On Thu, Jan 3, 2019, at 2:14 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> I just gave you an example. But it's weird because nobody ever responds 
> to my mentions of eyeball saccade.  You also didn't respond to my scalar 
> multiplied by a matrix analogy (an analogy because I was talking about 
> comprehensions, which matrices are not, technically).  So, rather than 
> give you more examples, I'll treat you like an atheist treats 
> Christians.  What sort of example would make sense to you?
> 
> I have no idea why you used the word "duality".  The ways of organizing 
> things (heter- vs. hier-) would only produce a duality if the different 
> ways of organizing were *functionally* equivalent.  My attempt to change 
> language from "level" to either "layer" or "order" is an implicit 
> assertion that heterarchies are functionally *different* from 
> hierarchies.  (To be more specific, hierarchical systems are less 
> expressive.)  So, a duality might be achievable between 2 differently 
> arranged heterarchies, but not between a hier- and a heter-.
> 
> By choosing 2 things of (we assume) the exact same type like Siamese 
> twins, you provide a set that probably does not require a heterarchy to 
> organize.  Fraternal twins would be a better choice because while they 
> are both of the same kinship, their *genes* differ significantly.  Genes 
> are of a lower/quicker order than kinship.  But typical understanding of 
> kinship operates over BOTH the high level (who's your daddy) and low 
> level (what color eyes does your daddy have).  While you *can* construct 
> a hierarchy to handle that situation.  There may be some situations 
> (e.g. recessive genes, step-parents, etc.) that the hierarchy can't 
> express but the heterarchy can.
> 
> Note that "order" doesn't technically require heterarchy, either, 
> really.  Technically, an ordering like we have in 1st to 2nd order logic 
> is still a hierarchy, just with mixed operators.  You'd only *need* a 
> heterarchy when there are external (to a given hierarchy) objects/
> relations that need to be accounted for.  But I suggest the social 
> kinship, biological kinship, and genotype system does approach that 
> need, where even if you can formulate the social as a hierarchy and the 
> biological as a hierarchy, the mixing of the two different hierarchies 
> requires a heterarchy.
> 
> I hope this is not a conversation stopper.  That's not my intent.  But 
> based on my failures, here, I'm clearly very bad at this.
> 
> 
> On 1/3/19 12:38 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > Ok.   Good.  I like this.  Stick with me here. 
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Keeping your language as citizen-y as possible, please talk to me about 
> > "heterarchy".  Being of great age, I learned the song, I'm my own GrandPa 
> >   in my youth.  I assume 
> > that’s an example of heterarchy.  But I bet you have better examples.  But 
> > perhaps even more important, where does the concept stand in your approach 
> > to things?  I stipulate that every duality asserted is like Siamese twins 
> > separated.  A lot of blood is inevitably spilled.  But no thought can 
> > possibly be achieved without that sort of blood-letting.  I think I am 
> > going to argue that to the extent that the idea of heterarchy might give 
> > one a better way to separate the babies it should be entertained;  but if 
> > it is a way of stopping the conversation how best the babies might be 
> > separated, then it should not.  
> 
> 
> -- 
> ☣ uǝlƃ
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity 

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

I mean it in a sense you know: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duality_(mathematics)

I suspect you'll take issue with the way I'm using the term. Everyone always 
takes issue with everything I say. 8^) But I'm not really relying on the term 
for my argument about the expressibility of hier- and heter-archies.  So if I'm 
using the term wrong, feel free to suggest a different one and I'll use that.

On 1/3/19 1:48 PM, lrudo...@meganet.net wrote:
> Glen says to Nick:
> 
>> I have no idea why you used the word "duality".
> 
> I am very afraid that Nick's use (is metaphorical and) can probably be
> traced back to having read/heard someone writing about "the wave/particle
> duality" or the like.
> 
> I'm not sure what *you* mean by duality: the rest of your post, which I
> excised without thinking, makes it clear you have a definite, and precise,
> and *not* metaphorical meaning for it, but I don't think it's a meaning I
> know; and I'm doubtful that Nick, even if he's seen/heard you using it and
> has had it explained to him, can explain it to *me* so that I'd understand
> it...would you mind doing so (you can point me towards a reference instead
> of rehashing it yourself!)?


-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Rushing Glen to make an apt, so can't answer fully. 

Just meant by "duality" a division into two, an opposition, a polarity. 

I now see that it has a distinct mathematical meaning, which of course, I have 
no idea of. 

I thought the example of saccads was good.  Wanted more, is all. 

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 2:15 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

I just gave you an example. But it's weird because nobody ever responds to my 
mentions of eyeball saccade.  You also didn't respond to my scalar multiplied 
by a matrix analogy (an analogy because I was talking about comprehensions, 
which matrices are not, technically).  So, rather than give you more examples, 
I'll treat you like an atheist treats Christians.  What sort of example would 
make sense to you?

I have no idea why you used the word "duality".  The ways of organizing things 
(heter- vs. hier-) would only produce a duality if the different ways of 
organizing were *functionally* equivalent.  My attempt to change language from 
"level" to either "layer" or "order" is an implicit assertion that heterarchies 
are functionally *different* from hierarchies.  (To be more specific, 
hierarchical systems are less expressive.)  So, a duality might be achievable 
between 2 differently arranged heterarchies, but not between a hier- and a 
heter-.

By choosing 2 things of (we assume) the exact same type like Siamese twins, you 
provide a set that probably does not require a heterarchy to organize.  
Fraternal twins would be a better choice because while they are both of the 
same kinship, their *genes* differ significantly.  Genes are of a lower/quicker 
order than kinship.  But typical understanding of kinship operates over BOTH 
the high level (who's your daddy) and low level (what color eyes does your 
daddy have).  While you *can* construct a hierarchy to handle that situation.  
There may be some situations (e.g. recessive genes, step-parents, etc.) that 
the hierarchy can't express but the heterarchy can.

Note that "order" doesn't technically require heterarchy, either, really.  
Technically, an ordering like we have in 1st to 2nd order logic is still a 
hierarchy, just with mixed operators.  You'd only *need* a heterarchy when 
there are external (to a given hierarchy) objects/relations that need to be 
accounted for.  But I suggest the social kinship, biological kinship, and 
genotype system does approach that need, where even if you can formulate the 
social as a hierarchy and the biological as a hierarchy, the mixing of the two 
different hierarchies requires a heterarchy.

I hope this is not a conversation stopper.  That's not my intent.  But based on 
my failures, here, I'm clearly very bad at this.


On 1/3/19 12:38 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Ok.   Good.  I like this.  Stick with me here. 
> 
>  
> 
> Keeping your language as citizen-y as possible, please talk to me about 
> "heterarchy".  Being of great age, I learned the song, I'm my own GrandPa 
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYlJH81dSiw>  in my youth.  I assume that’s 
> an example of heterarchy.  But I bet you have better examples.  But perhaps 
> even more important, where does the concept stand in your approach to things? 
>  I stipulate that every duality asserted is like Siamese twins separated.  A 
> lot of blood is inevitably spilled.  But no thought can possibly be achieved 
> without that sort of blood-letting.  I think I am going to argue that to the 
> extent that the idea of heterarchy might give one a better way to separate 
> the babies it should be entertained;  but if it is a way of stopping the 
> conversation how best the babies might be separated, then it should not.  


--
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe 
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[lrudolph]

Glen says to Nick:

> I have no idea why you used the word "duality".

I am very afraid that Nick's use (is metaphorical and) can probably be
traced back to having read/heard someone writing about "the wave/particle
duality" or the like.

I'm not sure what *you* mean by duality: the rest of your post, which I
excised without thinking, makes it clear you have a definite, and precise,
and *not* metaphorical meaning for it, but I don't think it's a meaning I
know; and I'm doubtful that Nick, even if he's seen/heard you using it and
has had it explained to him, can explain it to *me* so that I'd understand
it...would you mind doing so (you can point me towards a reference instead
of rehashing it yourself!)?



FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

I just gave you an example. But it's weird because nobody ever responds to my 
mentions of eyeball saccade.  You also didn't respond to my scalar multiplied 
by a matrix analogy (an analogy because I was talking about comprehensions, 
which matrices are not, technically).  So, rather than give you more examples, 
I'll treat you like an atheist treats Christians.  What sort of example would 
make sense to you?

I have no idea why you used the word "duality".  The ways of organizing things 
(heter- vs. hier-) would only produce a duality if the different ways of 
organizing were *functionally* equivalent.  My attempt to change language from 
"level" to either "layer" or "order" is an implicit assertion that heterarchies 
are functionally *different* from hierarchies.  (To be more specific, 
hierarchical systems are less expressive.)  So, a duality might be achievable 
between 2 differently arranged heterarchies, but not between a hier- and a 
heter-.

By choosing 2 things of (we assume) the exact same type like Siamese twins, you 
provide a set that probably does not require a heterarchy to organize.  
Fraternal twins would be a better choice because while they are both of the 
same kinship, their *genes* differ significantly.  Genes are of a lower/quicker 
order than kinship.  But typical understanding of kinship operates over BOTH 
the high level (who's your daddy) and low level (what color eyes does your 
daddy have).  While you *can* construct a hierarchy to handle that situation.  
There may be some situations (e.g. recessive genes, step-parents, etc.) that 
the hierarchy can't express but the heterarchy can.

Note that "order" doesn't technically require heterarchy, either, really.  
Technically, an ordering like we have in 1st to 2nd order logic is still a 
hierarchy, just with mixed operators.  You'd only *need* a heterarchy when 
there are external (to a given hierarchy) objects/relations that need to be 
accounted for.  But I suggest the social kinship, biological kinship, and 
genotype system does approach that need, where even if you can formulate the 
social as a hierarchy and the biological as a hierarchy, the mixing of the two 
different hierarchies requires a heterarchy.

I hope this is not a conversation stopper.  That's not my intent.  But based on 
my failures, here, I'm clearly very bad at this.


On 1/3/19 12:38 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Ok.   Good.  I like this.  Stick with me here. 
> 
>  
> 
> Keeping your language as citizen-y as possible, please talk to me about 
> "heterarchy".  Being of great age, I learned the song, I'm my own GrandPa 
>   in my youth.  I assume that’s 
> an example of heterarchy.  But I bet you have better examples.  But perhaps 
> even more important, where does the concept stand in your approach to things? 
>  I stipulate that every duality asserted is like Siamese twins separated.  A 
> lot of blood is inevitably spilled.  But no thought can possibly be achieved 
> without that sort of blood-letting.  I think I am going to argue that to the 
> extent that the idea of heterarchy might give one a better way to separate 
> the babies it should be entertained;  but if it is a way of stopping the 
> conversation how best the babies might be separated, then it should not.  


-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Ok.   Good.  I like this.  Stick with me here. 

 

Keeping your language as citizen-y as possible, please talk to me about 
"heterarchy".  Being of great age, I learned the song, I'm my own GrandPa 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYlJH81dSiw>  in my youth.  I assume that’s an 
example of heterarchy.  But I bet you have better examples.  But perhaps even 
more important, where does the concept stand in your approach to things?  I 
stipulate that every duality asserted is like Siamese twins separated.  A lot 
of blood is inevitably spilled.  But no thought can possibly be achieved 
without that sort of blood-letting.  I think I am going to argue that to the 
extent that the idea of heterarchy might give one a better way to separate the 
babies it should be entertained;  but if it is a way of stopping the 
conversation how best the babies might be separated, then it should not.  

 

Thanks, Marcus, 

 

Nick

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 11:59 AM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

Heh, there you go again, rejecting the heterarchy! >8^D

 

I would claim motives are a higher order behavior, but NOT (solely) at a higher 
level of organization.  I.e. motives consist of BOTH low level behaviors like 
eyeball saccades AND high level behaviors like how one feels about another 
person.

 

On 1/3/19 10:55 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:

> Motives ARE behavior.  Just at a higher level of organization.  

 

 

--

☣ uǝlƃ

 



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Heh, there you go again, rejecting the heterarchy! >8^D

I would claim motives are a higher order behavior, but NOT (solely) at a higher 
level of organization.  I.e. motives consist of BOTH low level behaviors like 
eyeball saccades AND high level behaviors like how one feels about another 
person.

On 1/3/19 10:55 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Motives ARE behavior.  Just at a higher level of organization.  


-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Marcus,

Motives ARE behavior.  Just at a higher level of organization.  

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 11:31 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Tactics vs. strategy..   Are we watching behavior or inferring motives?

On 1/3/19, 11:29 AM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

Geez.  And I thought it was the other way.  Nick (attack); Dave (surround 
but never confront).  Grant vs Stonewall Jackson. 

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 11:07 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
    Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Chess (David) is a systematic attack at one important target and Go (Nick) 
is about taking territory.

One player seems to think that he can be instrumental (but there are far 
too many targets) and the other thinks he can be generally integrative.   Some 
recent anarchists and fascists we see (Assange and Bannon) are real 
disappointments.   I would not associate with them!  

On 1/3/19, 10:56 AM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

Great! Thanks.  But which is which?  

Anarchy v. Fascism?

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus 
Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 12:14 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 

    Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 "Challenge: I have tried and failed, so far, but can you pose the exact
same set of metaphors but absent the military/violence words?"

Go vs. Chess?

P.S.  Even Santa is doing it
https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/578959/shaman-santa/



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

Tactics vs. strategy..   Are we watching behavior or inferring motives?

On 1/3/19, 11:29 AM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

Geez.  And I thought it was the other way.  Nick (attack); Dave (surround 
but never confront).  Grant vs Stonewall Jackson. 

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 11:07 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
    Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Chess (David) is a systematic attack at one important target and Go (Nick) 
is about taking territory.

One player seems to think that he can be instrumental (but there are far 
too many targets) and the other thinks he can be generally integrative.   Some 
recent anarchists and fascists we see (Assange and Bannon) are real 
disappointments.   I would not associate with them!  

On 1/3/19, 10:56 AM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

Great! Thanks.  But which is which?  

Anarchy v. Fascism?

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus 
Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 12:14 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 

    Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 "Challenge: I have tried and failed, so far, but can you pose the exact
same set of metaphors but absent the military/violence words?"

Go vs. Chess?

P.S.  Even Santa is doing it
https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/578959/shaman-santa/



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Geez.  And I thought it was the other way.  Nick (attack); Dave (surround but 
never confront).  Grant vs Stonewall Jackson. 

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 11:07 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Chess (David) is a systematic attack at one important target and Go (Nick) is 
about taking territory.

One player seems to think that he can be instrumental (but there are far too 
many targets) and the other thinks he can be generally integrative.   Some 
recent anarchists and fascists we see (Assange and Bannon) are real 
disappointments.   I would not associate with them!  

On 1/3/19, 10:56 AM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

Great! Thanks.  But which is which?  

Anarchy v. Fascism?

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 12:14 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
    Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 "Challenge: I have tried and failed, so far, but can you pose the exact
same set of metaphors but absent the military/violence words?"

Go vs. Chess?

P.S.  Even Santa is doing it
https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/578959/shaman-santa/



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Steve S and/or Prof West<

Can either of you explain this to me in citizen speak? 

Nick? 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of ? u???
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 9:36 AM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Heh, while I appreciate the concrete example, it doesn't resolve my worry.  
Why?  Because my steelmanning of Nick/Eric(C)/Peirce (NEP) requires *more* than 
the parallelism theorem (PT - that all parallel graphs can be simulated by 
sequential graphs).  If we take NEP seriously, the PT requires us to parse 
"simulate".  I'm going to try and fail to explain my worry.  I apologize for 
how badly I'll mangle it.

Nick has taken pains to explain that there's plenty of wiggle room by claiming 
Peirce thought randomness was pervasive.  But, if the real structure is 
parallel we have 3 options:

1) The independent paths bind/obtain at the same time,
2) The paths always bind/end in the same order, or
3) The paths bind/end in a different order depending on some other factor 
including randomness.

So, the reduction of that to a sequential process requires us to add that extra 
meta-process, e.g. creates a 3-tuple choice mechanism and/or a (perhaps pseudo) 
random appendage.

This seems like a problem for NEP's convergence to the real.  I'll just work 
with (3) in this post.  But I can draw similar problems from (1) and (2).  
Let's say with a particular process, (3) seems to be the case.  Then what is it 
that NEP says is "real"?  Is the parallel process the real thing?  Or is the 
sequential process plus (perhaps pseudo) random number generator the real 
thing?  And regardless of which of those NEP might assert metaphysical Truth 
to, can we then *use* that to infer derivative metaphysical Truths?  E.g. if 
NEP says the process is really parallel, then does that imply that the universe 
does *not* have a monotonically increasing parameter (like the arrow of time or 
the control pointer in the compiled code)?  Or if the sequential+random is 
real, does that imply that the universe *does* have such a parameter?

So, my steelmanning ability ends.  I can't make an argument from what I know 
(or don't) about NEP.

Of course, this is the problem with all metaphysical claims, for every instance 
where we have to equivocate on "simulate".  So if NEP is really only saying 
that "nothing is real, some patterns are simply more robust than others", then 
why not just say that and be done with it?  Why all the fideistic rigmarole?

On 12/31/18 2:50 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Uh, why?  For example, compilation of a recursive function to a control flow 
> graph.
> 
> 
> mdaniels@m2:~$ cat t.c
> #include 
> 
> int foo(bool flag) {
>   if (flag) foo(false);
>   else return 0;
> }
> mdaniels@m2:~$ gcc -fdump-tree-cfg -c t.c mdaniels@m2:~$ cat 
> t.c.011t.cfg
> 
> ;; Function foo (foo, funcdef_no=0, decl_uid=1956, cgraph_uid=0, 
> symbol_order=0)
> 
> ;; 1 loops found
> ;;
> ;; Loop 0
> ;;  header 0, latch 1
> ;;  depth 0, outer -1
> ;;  nodes: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
> ;; 2 succs { 3 4 }
> ;; 3 succs { 5 }
> ;; 4 succs { 6 }
> ;; 5 succs { 1 }
> ;; 6 succs { 1 }
> foo (_Bool flag)
> {
>   int D.1962;
> 
>:
>   if (flag != 0)
> goto ; [INV]
>   else
> goto ; [INV]
> 
>:
>   foo (0);
>   goto ; [INV]
> 
>:
>   D.1962 = 0;
>   // predicted unlikely by early return (on trees) predictor.
>   goto ; [INV]
> 
>:
>   return;
> 
>:
> :
>   return D.1962;
> 
> }

--
∄ uǝʃƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Forget my incompetence in ε-machines for a minute. 8^)  They say:

> Take a glass shattering upon impact with the floor. In one temporal 
> direction, the future distribution of shards depends only on the glass's 
> current position, velocity,and orientation. In the opposite direction, we may 
> need to track relevant information regarding each glass shard to inferthe 
> glass’s prior trajectory. Does this require more or less information?

What's the actual answer to that question?  It's not at all obvious that "the 
future distribution of shards depends only on the glass's current position, 
velocity, and orientation."  Don't you also need the shape of the glass 
(tumbler or tulip), the material properties of the glass (leaded?), etc?  Sure, 
somewhere deep down, there may or may not be some randomness.  And that 
randomness may be asymmetric.  But this motivating example feels like a trojan 
horse for some reason.

In particular, with the heralding coin, aren't they baking in the temporal 
asymmetry by replacing the FIRST 0 with a 2?  That "first" is called "ordinal" 
for a reason.  But perhaps I'm missing the human experience (ha!) needed to 
understand how the heralding coin is canonical and to which class of other 
examples it refers?




On 1/3/19 9:03 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Possibly of interest..  
> https://journals.aps.org/prx/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevX.8.031013

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

Chess (David) is a systematic attack at one important target and Go (Nick) is 
about taking territory.

One player seems to think that he can be instrumental (but there are far too 
many targets) and the other thinks he can be generally integrative.   Some 
recent anarchists and fascists we see (Assange and Bannon) are real 
disappointments.   I would not associate with them!  

On 1/3/19, 10:56 AM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

Great! Thanks.  But which is which?  

Anarchy v. Fascism?

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 12:14 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
    Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 "Challenge: I have tried and failed, so far, but can you pose the exact
same set of metaphors but absent the military/violence words?"

Go vs. Chess?

P.S.  Even Santa is doing it
https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/578959/shaman-santa/



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Great! Thanks.  But which is which?  

Anarchy v. Fascism?

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2019 12:14 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 "Challenge: I have tried and failed, so far, but can you pose the exact
same set of metaphors but absent the military/violence words?"

Go vs. Chess?

P.S.  Even Santa is doing it
https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/578959/shaman-santa/



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[∄ uǝʃƃ]

Heh, while I appreciate the concrete example, it doesn't resolve my worry.  
Why?  Because my steelmanning of Nick/Eric(C)/Peirce (NEP) requires *more* than 
the parallelism theorem (PT - that all parallel graphs can be simulated by 
sequential graphs).  If we take NEP seriously, the PT requires us to parse 
"simulate".  I'm going to try and fail to explain my worry.  I apologize for 
how badly I'll mangle it.

Nick has taken pains to explain that there's plenty of wiggle room by claiming 
Peirce thought randomness was pervasive.  But, if the real structure is 
parallel we have 3 options:

1) The independent paths bind/obtain at the same time,
2) The paths always bind/end in the same order, or
3) The paths bind/end in a different order depending on some other factor 
including randomness.

So, the reduction of that to a sequential process requires us to add that extra 
meta-process, e.g. creates a 3-tuple choice mechanism and/or a (perhaps pseudo) 
random appendage.

This seems like a problem for NEP's convergence to the real.  I'll just work 
with (3) in this post.  But I can draw similar problems from (1) and (2).  
Let's say with a particular process, (3) seems to be the case.  Then what is it 
that NEP says is "real"?  Is the parallel process the real thing?  Or is the 
sequential process plus (perhaps pseudo) random number generator the real 
thing?  And regardless of which of those NEP might assert metaphysical Truth 
to, can we then *use* that to infer derivative metaphysical Truths?  E.g. if 
NEP says the process is really parallel, then does that imply that the universe 
does *not* have a monotonically increasing parameter (like the arrow of time or 
the control pointer in the compiled code)?  Or if the sequential+random is 
real, does that imply that the universe *does* have such a parameter?

So, my steelmanning ability ends.  I can't make an argument from what I know 
(or don't) about NEP.

Of course, this is the problem with all metaphysical claims, for every instance 
where we have to equivocate on "simulate".  So if NEP is really only saying 
that "nothing is real, some patterns are simply more robust than others", then 
why not just say that and be done with it?  Why all the fideistic rigmarole?

On 12/31/18 2:50 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Uh, why?  For example, compilation of a recursive function to a control flow 
> graph.
> 
> 
> mdaniels@m2:~$ cat t.c
> #include 
> 
> int foo(bool flag) {
>   if (flag) foo(false);
>   else return 0;
> }
> mdaniels@m2:~$ gcc -fdump-tree-cfg -c t.c
> mdaniels@m2:~$ cat t.c.011t.cfg
> 
> ;; Function foo (foo, funcdef_no=0, decl_uid=1956, cgraph_uid=0, 
> symbol_order=0)
> 
> ;; 1 loops found
> ;;
> ;; Loop 0
> ;;  header 0, latch 1
> ;;  depth 0, outer -1
> ;;  nodes: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
> ;; 2 succs { 3 4 }
> ;; 3 succs { 5 }
> ;; 4 succs { 6 }
> ;; 5 succs { 1 }
> ;; 6 succs { 1 }
> foo (_Bool flag)
> {
>   int D.1962;
> 
>:
>   if (flag != 0)
> goto ; [INV]
>   else
> goto ; [INV]
> 
>:
>   foo (0);
>   goto ; [INV]
> 
>:
>   D.1962 = 0;
>   // predicted unlikely by early return (on trees) predictor.
>   goto ; [INV]
> 
>:
>   return;
> 
>:
> :
>   return D.1962;
> 
> }

-- 
∄ uǝʃƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

 "Challenge: I have tried and failed, so far, but can you pose the exact same 
set of metaphors but absent the military/violence words?"

Go vs. Chess?

P.S.  Even Santa is doing it 
https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/578959/shaman-santa/



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

Nick,

Absolutely different. But, in ways we have barely touched upon, potentially 
complementary. War required both strategies PLUS some means of meaningful 
interaction.

Challenge: I have tried and failed, so far, but can you pose the exact same set 
of metaphors but absent the military/violence words?

davew


On Wed, Jan 2, 2019, at 6:05 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Dave, 
> 
> I dunno, Dave.  I still think we're different. I lay siege to large 
> cities; you send cavalry deep behind enemy lines.  
> 
> Nick 
> 
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
> Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West
> Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 4:37 PM
> To: friam@redfish.com
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction
> 
> while typing my last response, the conversation took an interesting 
> turn, prompting the following.
> 
> I went to college intending to become a quantum chromodynamicist. Before 
> college I had read every 'popular' science book on Physics and Cosmology 
> (Asimov, etc,) and monographs used in graduate classes on physics. 
> Physics 101 was so dull, I quit.
> 
> What had attracted me to physics and cosmology were the "big" questions, 
> the "how" questions, the "why" questions, the interpretation 
> (philosophical) questions.
> 
> Serendipitously, I was taking an Asian Philosophy class the same first 
> semester of freshman year. The philosophical questions raised were, like 
> the speculative questions of quantum interpretation and cosmology,  so 
> interesting I was hooked. I became a 'philosopher' instead of a 
> 'physicist'.
> 
>  I wanted (still want) to know everything there is to know about the 
> mind, including altered states of consciousness. My research included 
> being hooked up to a computer and measuring brain waves, multiple forms 
> of meditation, all of the seven forms of classical Yoga, and psychedelic 
> drugs. LSD was still legal and my supply came through the auspices of 
> the Psychology Department. Other experiments included LSD, psylicibin, 
> and mescaline (not all at once) in a sensory-deprivation tank. Since 
> then I have experimented with every psychoactive drug.
> 
> Never to get high.
> 
> The most serious side effect (other than  my obvious insanity) is 
> extreme isolation/loneliness; and/or, if I have the temerity to raise 
> the subject among my intellectual friends, ostracism.
> 
> Gillian posted recently about the psychedelic effects of incense. It was 
> demonstrated long ago that not only does the incense but the ritual of 
> church affects the same areas of the brain and induces the same effects 
> as "augmented meditation" (microdoses of certain types of hallucinogen 
> like ayahuasca. The context of the research was the Catholic Mass in 
> Latin and the silent meditation of the Quakers.
> 
> There is such a huge area of interesting, at least to me, research, and 
> not just for therapeutic use, here that it annoys me when a combination 
> of puritan morality and scientific elitism dismisses the entire subject.
> 
> davew
> 
> On Wed, Jan 2, 2019, at 12:50 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> > I claim the answer to your 2 questions is yes.  As Marcus (with the 
> > usage classes) and Steve (with behavioral "drugs") point out, the 
> > reason people engage in such things is to make their lives *better* 
> > (according to some definition of "better").  To think anything else is 
> > to risk the madness of morons like Nancy Reagan or those who think 
> > alcoholics suffer from a moral failing, rather than a physiochemical one.
> > 
> > You want your insulin pump to make your life better than it would be 
> > without it.  Simple.  Rational.
> > 
> > As Dave pointed out, though, we have some very promising therapeutic 
> > agents that we've ignored because we've been hoodwinked by the moral 
> > proselytizing of anti-science nutbags who think like Scientologists -- 
> > Clear Body, Clear Mind and all that.
> > 
> > On 1/2/19 11:33 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > > So is THAT the spirit in which people take psilocybin?  Is that the 
> > > spirit in which people welcome the legalization of LSD?  I fear I may 
> > > have wronged them horribly.  To be so far from a moderately happy life to 
> > > want to derange one's entire experience for even only a few hours, seems 
> > > like  a terrible thing to me.  I regard sanity as an achievement, not a 
> > > state of affairs into which life naturally folds.  I would n

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Dave, 

I dunno, Dave.  I still think we're different. I lay siege to large cities; you 
send cavalry deep behind enemy lines.  

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 4:37 PM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

while typing my last response, the conversation took an interesting turn, 
prompting the following.

I went to college intending to become a quantum chromodynamicist. Before 
college I had read every 'popular' science book on Physics and Cosmology 
(Asimov, etc,) and monographs used in graduate classes on physics. Physics 101 
was so dull, I quit.

What had attracted me to physics and cosmology were the "big" questions, the 
"how" questions, the "why" questions, the interpretation (philosophical) 
questions.

Serendipitously, I was taking an Asian Philosophy class the same first semester 
of freshman year. The philosophical questions raised were, like the speculative 
questions of quantum interpretation and cosmology,  so interesting I was 
hooked. I became a 'philosopher' instead of a 'physicist'.

 I wanted (still want) to know everything there is to know about the mind, 
including altered states of consciousness. My research included being hooked up 
to a computer and measuring brain waves, multiple forms of meditation, all of 
the seven forms of classical Yoga, and psychedelic drugs. LSD was still legal 
and my supply came through the auspices of the Psychology Department. Other 
experiments included LSD, psylicibin, and mescaline (not all at once) in a 
sensory-deprivation tank. Since then I have experimented with every 
psychoactive drug.

Never to get high.

The most serious side effect (other than  my obvious insanity) is extreme 
isolation/loneliness; and/or, if I have the temerity to raise the subject among 
my intellectual friends, ostracism.

Gillian posted recently about the psychedelic effects of incense. It was 
demonstrated long ago that not only does the incense but the ritual of church 
affects the same areas of the brain and induces the same effects as "augmented 
meditation" (microdoses of certain types of hallucinogen like ayahuasca. The 
context of the research was the Catholic Mass in Latin and the silent 
meditation of the Quakers.

There is such a huge area of interesting, at least to me, research, and not 
just for therapeutic use, here that it annoys me when a combination of puritan 
morality and scientific elitism dismisses the entire subject.

davew

On Wed, Jan 2, 2019, at 12:50 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> I claim the answer to your 2 questions is yes.  As Marcus (with the 
> usage classes) and Steve (with behavioral "drugs") point out, the 
> reason people engage in such things is to make their lives *better* 
> (according to some definition of "better").  To think anything else is 
> to risk the madness of morons like Nancy Reagan or those who think 
> alcoholics suffer from a moral failing, rather than a physiochemical one.
> 
> You want your insulin pump to make your life better than it would be 
> without it.  Simple.  Rational.
> 
> As Dave pointed out, though, we have some very promising therapeutic 
> agents that we've ignored because we've been hoodwinked by the moral 
> proselytizing of anti-science nutbags who think like Scientologists -- 
> Clear Body, Clear Mind and all that.
> 
> On 1/2/19 11:33 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > So is THAT the spirit in which people take psilocybin?  Is that the spirit 
> > in which people welcome the legalization of LSD?  I fear I may have wronged 
> > them horribly.  To be so far from a moderately happy life to want to 
> > derange one's entire experience for even only a few hours, seems like  a 
> > terrible thing to me.  I regard sanity as an achievement, not a state of 
> > affairs into which life naturally folds.  I would no more take LSD than 
> > crumple up a piece of paper before I put it in the printer.  
> 
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe 
> at St. John's College to unsubscribe 
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

David writes:



< There is such a huge area of interesting, at least to me, research, and not 
just for therapeutic use, here that it annoys me when a combination of puritan 
morality and scientific elitism dismisses the entire subject. >



On a computer, when I experiment with kernel modules or unusual hardware, I use 
a crashbox.   I don't have one of those for *me*.It isn't puritan morality 
nor is it any grand respect for academia or other scientific institutions or 
protocols.   Also it seems to me this has been explored over the last 50 years 
or so, and if there were really easy wins, they would have been found by now.



I guess I find it more interesting and plausible to consider the possibility of 
Neuralink and learning how to write programs to 
enhance my perception and cognition.   I imagine the way this will go will be 
lower-level interfaces, like the ability to overlay signals with the visual and 
auditory systems.  I imagine it will be a very challenging learning curve, like 
learning a language and that programs will be specific to each person’s 
learning history.   Farther out (maybe after I’m gone), I would guess there 
will be tunable gene regulation and maybe some family of follow-on species.



Marcus





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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

while typing my last response, the conversation took an interesting turn, 
prompting the following.

I went to college intending to become a quantum chromodynamicist. Before 
college I had read every 'popular' science book on Physics and Cosmology 
(Asimov, etc,) and monographs used in graduate classes on physics. Physics 101 
was so dull, I quit.

What had attracted me to physics and cosmology were the "big" questions, the 
"how" questions, the "why" questions, the interpretation (philosophical) 
questions.

Serendipitously, I was taking an Asian Philosophy class the same first semester 
of freshman year. The philosophical questions raised were, like the speculative 
questions of quantum interpretation and cosmology,  so interesting I was 
hooked. I became a 'philosopher' instead of a 'physicist'.

 I wanted (still want) to know everything there is to know about the mind, 
including altered states of consciousness. My research included being hooked up 
to a computer and measuring brain waves, multiple forms of meditation, all of 
the seven forms of classical Yoga, and psychedelic drugs. LSD was still legal 
and my supply came through the auspices of the Psychology Department. Other 
experiments included LSD, psylicibin, and mescaline (not all at once) in a 
sensory-deprivation tank. Since then I have experimented with every 
psychoactive drug.

Never to get high.

The most serious side effect (other than  my obvious insanity) is extreme 
isolation/loneliness; and/or, if I have the temerity to raise the subject among 
my intellectual friends, ostracism.

Gillian posted recently about the psychedelic effects of incense. It was 
demonstrated long ago that not only does the incense but the ritual of church 
affects the same areas of the brain and induces the same effects as "augmented 
meditation" (microdoses of certain types of hallucinogen like ayahuasca. The 
context of the research was the Catholic Mass in Latin and the silent 
meditation of the Quakers.

There is such a huge area of interesting, at least to me, research, and not 
just for therapeutic use, here that it annoys me when a combination of puritan 
morality and scientific elitism dismisses the entire subject.

davew

On Wed, Jan 2, 2019, at 12:50 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> I claim the answer to your 2 questions is yes.  As Marcus (with the 
> usage classes) and Steve (with behavioral "drugs") point out, the reason 
> people engage in such things is to make their lives *better* (according 
> to some definition of "better").  To think anything else is to risk the 
> madness of morons like Nancy Reagan or those who think alcoholics suffer 
> from a moral failing, rather than a physiochemical one.
> 
> You want your insulin pump to make your life better than it would be 
> without it.  Simple.  Rational.
> 
> As Dave pointed out, though, we have some very promising therapeutic 
> agents that we've ignored because we've been hoodwinked by the moral 
> proselytizing of anti-science nutbags who think like Scientologists -- 
> Clear Body, Clear Mind and all that.
> 
> On 1/2/19 11:33 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > So is THAT the spirit in which people take psilocybin?  Is that the spirit 
> > in which people welcome the legalization of LSD?  I fear I may have wronged 
> > them horribly.  To be so far from a moderately happy life to want to 
> > derange one's entire experience for even only a few hours, seems like  a 
> > terrible thing to me.  I regard sanity as an achievement, not a state of 
> > affairs into which life naturally folds.  I would no more take LSD than 
> > crumple up a piece of paper before I put it in the printer.  
> 
> -- 
> ☣ uǝlƃ
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

> Why hast thou forsaken me?


>  


> Nick



Well, did you pay your tithes last month

It is really kind of silly to think that one can either characterize
oneself, or be characterized by others, as Dionysian or Apollonian. the
concept has become so mucked up since Nietzsche used the notions to
define tragedy (a folly of his youth).  The absurd overlay / infusion of
Islamo-Judeo-Christo morality delivered a death blow to the whole idea.
In Greek Philosophy ones behavior (and thoughts if you want to allow
such) were grounded in complex blend of the the two traits; and
consequently everyone was "ambiguous" with regard to them. The
intolerance of ambiguity among the People of the Book and most of
Western culture, keeps trying to push for a two valued logic which is
not useful.
If you want to use the terms as metaphors, Apollonian vs. Dionysian
could correspond to 1) cortex vs. amygdala; or 2) right-brain vs. left-
brain. Everyone knows that any behavior is simultaneously grounded in
both elements, but to an observer, including an internal one, any given
behavior might seem to be predominantly influenced by one or the other.
My claim to "Apollonian" is grounded in a long ago commitment to
following the precepts of Jinyana (Jnana) Yoga. first in Vedic
literature, the Buddhism and Taoism — Ch'an Buddhism --> Zen. I strive
to make all of my behavior deliberate and intentional within a meta-
rational and meta-logical context, utilizing the cortex / left-brain as
a filter.  If you ever read Korzibski, there echos in my head of his "cortico-
thalamic pause."
Feel free to reduce the preceding mumbo-jumbo to: its all behavior, and
each behavior is grounded in the complexity of the whole organism.
davew



On Wed, Jan 2, 2019, at 11:18 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Dave,


>  


> Thou deniest me in my moment of need!


>  


> Thou castest me to the wolves (eg Marcus).


>  


> Why hast thou forsaken me?


>  


> Nick


>  


> Nicholas S. Thompson


> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology


> Clark University


> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


>  


>  


> -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-
> boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West Sent: Wednesday,
> January 02, 2019 10:49 AM To: friam@redfish.com Subject: Re: [FRIAM]
> Abduction>  


> Sorry Nick,


>  


> I am as hardcore Apollonian as is possible.


>  


> And if you organize your life around pleasure, even if moderate and
> consistent, it is you that are the Dionysian.>  


> davew


>  


>  


> On Wed, Jan 2, 2019, at 10:02 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:


> > Dave,


> >


> > I realize that you (and perhaps others of our colleagues here) are> > 
> > Dionysians, whereas I, always, have been a stalwart Apollonian. The> > 
> > difference, for me, is the risk one is willing to take for a peak> > 
> > experience of some sort.  Some people organize their lives around> > their 
> > vacations and holidays.  I hate holidays and vacations and


> > organize my life around a steady diet of moderate pleasure.  If you
> > see what I mean.> > For instance, I have never dreamed about what mushrooms 
> > might do
> > for me.> > Is that a fair statement of a difference between us? 


> >


> > Nick


> >


> > Nicholas S. Thompson


> > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University


> > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


> >


> > -Original Message-


> > From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of
> > Prof David> > West


> > Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 7:05 AM


> > To: friam@redfish.com


> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction


> >


> > MDMA risks = dehydration, in part because it is usually taken in the> > 
> > context of frenetic physical activity like at a rave. Disinhibition> > can 
> > pose a secondary risk because partner selection is less


> > discerning. Like too many drugs, long term effects / gender
> > different> > effects / age different effects, are unknown because unstudied.


> >


> > davew


> >


> >


> > On Tue, Jan 1, 2019, at 7:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:


> > > The premise of the series is that a drug + counseling is used to> > > 
> > > mitigate PTSD symptoms, but in fact it ends-up deleting recent
> > > memories> > > and was intended to make soldiers able to continue service. 
> > >   


> > >


> > > One might argue that accumulation of emotional trauma is part of
> > > one's> > > personality, and relieving it destr

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

I claim the answer to your 2 questions is yes.  As Marcus (with the usage 
classes) and Steve (with behavioral "drugs") point out, the reason people 
engage in such things is to make their lives *better* (according to some 
definition of "better").  To think anything else is to risk the madness of 
morons like Nancy Reagan or those who think alcoholics suffer from a moral 
failing, rather than a physiochemical one.

You want your insulin pump to make your life better than it would be without 
it.  Simple.  Rational.

As Dave pointed out, though, we have some very promising therapeutic agents 
that we've ignored because we've been hoodwinked by the moral proselytizing of 
anti-science nutbags who think like Scientologists -- Clear Body, Clear Mind 
and all that.

On 1/2/19 11:33 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> So is THAT the spirit in which people take psilocybin?  Is that the spirit in 
> which people welcome the legalization of LSD?  I fear I may have wronged them 
> horribly.  To be so far from a moderately happy life to want to derange one's 
> entire experience for even only a few hours, seems like  a terrible thing to 
> me.  I regard sanity as an achievement, not a state of affairs into which 
> life naturally folds.  I would no more take LSD than crumple up a piece of 
> paper before I put it in the printer.  

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Well, right, Steve.  Is it fair to say that, to some extent, you have 
"cultivated" dreaming?  

 

I guess that's all I mean to say.  I decided not to dream much.  

 

By the way, may I unfairly take you to task about one thing you said.  And I 
quote: 

 

rational/linear modes of thinking/being,

 

There is nothing linear about rational thought.  It is intensely hierarchical.  
It is its hieararchical nature, not it’s linearity, that leads it astray.  
Because one is working in one compartment, one misses things that would be 
obvious to people working in a less compartmentalized way.   This reminds me of 
the mis use of the “learning curve” metaphor.  People speak of a steep learning 
curve as something to be feared.  In fact, people who learn quickly have a 
steep learning curve.  

 

Your friendly metaphor police at your service, 

 

Nick 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steven A Smith
Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 12:11 PM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

I have spent my life cultivating hypnopompic and hypnogogic states... this, 
which supports lucid dreaming, is my best way to access mystical states...   
mindfulness meditation, as I practice it, can lapse into these states if I 
allow it.

 

I was put off by the drug-culture of my peers in the 60's/70's for many 
reasons, one might have included a strong steeping in rational/linear modes of 
thinking/being, in spite of an early discovery of and indulgence in lucid 
dreaming.

 

I know many who identify as "evening" or "morning" people, but there is 
evidence that before the industrial revolution brought ubiquitous artificial 
light (city gas or kerosene lamps, then electric lights, now flickering 
TV/computer/phone screens), "segmented sleep" was the standard.  It was common 
(almost ubiquitous?) for people to go to sleep soon after dark and then wake in 
the middle of the night for an hour or two of wakefulness, referred to as 
"Dorvielle" in French Speaking cultures or "wake-sleep", a somewhat hypnotic 
state (perhaps a slow slide from hypnopompia to  hypnogagia and back again?).

 

Hot climates/cultures have an alternative "segmented sleep" wherein the heat of 
the day is reserved for a "siesta" with both evening and early morning reserved 
for taking care of business when  it is cooler.   I think of a siesta as being 
somewhat lighter and more lucid-dream conducive than "night sleep".

 

- Steve

 

On 1/2/19 10:07 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

> There's also this thing one can do called `sleeping in', which tends 

> to increase the probability of dream memory and/or lucid dreaming, at 

> least for me.  A built-in neuroplasticity mechanism complete with 

> psychedelic phenomena and a safety mechanism of motor system 

> deactivation. (

> 

> On 1/2/19, 10:03 AM, "Friam on behalf of Nick Thompson" < 
> <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com%20on%20behalf%20of%20nickthomp...@earthlink.net>
>  friam-boun...@redfish.com on behalf of nickthomp...@earthlink.net> wrote:

> 

>  For instance, I have never dreamed about what mushrooms might do for me. 
>  Is that a fair statement of a difference between us?

> 

> 

> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe 

> at St. John's College to unsubscribe 

>  <http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com> 
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

> archives back to 2003:  <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/> 
> http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

> FRIAM-COMIC  <http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/> 
> http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

> 

 



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Hmmm!

Of course I take drugs.  I'm a diabetic for god's sake.  Every day I pump 
myself full of artificial insulin and the preservative that keeps if fresh, 
"l-creosotin", a form of formaldehyde, I assume.  And you are absolutely right, 
I don't look for some peak experience every time my insulin pump turns over.  I 
just want to get along.  I suspect that the only Dionysian diabetics are dead 
diabetics.  So is THAT the spirit in which people take psilocybin?  Is that the 
spirit in which people welcome the legalization of LSD?  I fear I may have 
wronged them horribly.  To be so far from a moderately happy life to want to 
derange one's entire experience for even only a few hours, seems like  a 
terrible thing to me.  I regard sanity as an achievement, not a state of 
affairs into which life naturally folds.  I would no more take LSD than crumple 
up a piece of paper before I put it in the printer.  

I agree with Marcus, by the way, despite my obstructive answer, that we are 
dealing with a dimension here, not a dichotomy.  But I do think we differ in 
the degree to which organize our life around the high points, rather than the 
mid points.  And while Dave may be correct that any kind of a admission of 
pleasure into the equasion is technically Dionysian, I think for all practical 
purposes, taking pleasure in apollonian virtues of restrain, careful planning, 
avoidance of extremes, etc. is as Apollonian as it gets.  He is correct that  I 
am a hedonist to that extent.. 
Nick 
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 12:04 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

I think this is where the misunderstanding lies.  The people who experiment 
with nootropics (nowadays, anyway) aren't really looking for a "peak 
experience".  I think the trend is toward the older shamanic use ... like my 
mom used to say about going to church on Sunday ... it's like a "shot in the 
arm".  You imagine these druggies are looking to get high.  They're not.  
They're looking for alternative perspective, sometimes (as in microdosing) a 
more "optimal" perspective, sometimes simply a jolt out of a local optimum, 
etc.  Most of the experimenters I know are practically stoics in their 
discipline ... especially the fasters who fast because they believe they think 
more clearly and work more productively when fasting.

These chemicals are *medicine*.  I assume you take medicine of some kind, yet 
are prejudiced against other sorts of medicine.  Most of us *are* prejudicial 
in our choice of medicine.  The trick is to know and recognize one's prejudice.


On 1/2/19 9:02 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> The difference, for me, is the risk one is willing to take for a peak 
> experience of some sort.
--
☣ uǝlƃ


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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe 
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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Steven A Smith]

I have spent my life cultivating hypnopompic and hypnogogic states...  
this, which supports lucid dreaming, is my best way to access mystical 
states...   mindfulness meditation, as I practice it, can lapse into 
these states if I allow it.


I was put off by the drug-culture of my peers in the 60's/70's for many 
reasons, one might have included a strong steeping in rational/linear 
modes of thinking/being, in spite of an early discovery of and 
indulgence in lucid dreaming.


I know many who identify as "evening" or "morning" people, but there is 
evidence that before the industrial revolution brought ubiquitous 
artificial light (city gas or kerosene lamps, then electric lights, now 
flickering TV/computer/phone screens), "segmented sleep" was the 
standard.  It was common (almost ubiquitous?) for people to go to sleep 
soon after dark and then wake in the middle of the night for an hour or 
two of wakefulness, referred to as "Dorvielle" in French Speaking 
cultures or "wake-sleep", a somewhat hypnotic state (perhaps a slow 
slide from hypnopompia to  hypnogagia and back again?).


Hot climates/cultures have an alternative "segmented sleep" wherein the 
heat of the day is reserved for a "siesta" with both evening and early 
morning reserved for taking care of business when  it is cooler.   I 
think of a siesta as being somewhat lighter and more lucid-dream 
conducive than "night sleep".


- Steve

On 1/2/19 10:07 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

There's also this thing one can do called `sleeping in', which tends to 
increase the probability of dream memory and/or lucid dreaming, at least for 
me.  A built-in neuroplasticity mechanism complete with psychedelic phenomena 
and a safety mechanism of motor system deactivation. (

On 1/2/19, 10:03 AM, "Friam on behalf of Nick Thompson" 
 wrote:

 For instance, I have never dreamed about what mushrooms might do for me.  
Is that a fair statement of a difference between us?


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

I think this is where the misunderstanding lies.  The people who experiment 
with nootropics (nowadays, anyway) aren't really looking for a "peak 
experience".  I think the trend is toward the older shamanic use ... like my 
mom used to say about going to church on Sunday ... it's like a "shot in the 
arm".  You imagine these druggies are looking to get high.  They're not.  
They're looking for alternative perspective, sometimes (as in microdosing) a 
more "optimal" perspective, sometimes simply a jolt out of a local optimum, 
etc.  Most of the experimenters I know are practically stoics in their 
discipline ... especially the fasters who fast because they believe they think 
more clearly and work more productively when fasting.

These chemicals are *medicine*.  I assume you take medicine of some kind, yet 
are prejudiced against other sorts of medicine.  Most of us *are* prejudicial 
in our choice of medicine.  The trick is to know and recognize one's prejudice.


On 1/2/19 9:02 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> The difference, for me, is the risk one is willing to take for a peak 
> experience of some sort.
-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Steven A Smith]

This bend within an already bent thread caused me to put down my screen 
(aka computer in this case) and pick up the lingering paper Sunday NYT 
Book Review section I'd been hoarding (at the risk of it becoming 
fire-starter when I wasn't looking).   The cover is a Surrealist 
drawing, nominally of a human hand with a pen,  but both distorted and 
illuminated with many of the tropes of psychedelic imagery.   I've been 
eyeing Michael Pollan's new(ish) book, "How to Change your Mind" for 
some time, but just haven't gotten a round tuit yet.   Back to back, 
reflecting the cover imagery and title "Altered States" are two 
articles, the first by Michael Pollan trying to describe his approach 
and methodology for writing his book, and the second by Jonathan 
Lethem's "Fiction's Fake New Drugs", a reflection on a dozen or so fake 
drugs conjured by fiction writers, including catchy names like 
"infirmall" and "forgettal", the latter being from his own Neo-Noir 
detective novel of over 20 years ago: "Guns and Occasional Music".


I did watch Homecoming, and Marcus' analysis is pretty close to my own.  
His comments reminded me of Jiddu Krishnamurti's use of the Paper 
Metaphor for the soul.   "The soul is a like a piece of paper, each 
experience we have is like a fold, and the self is the collection of 
creases left behind."    The point of trying to help people "forget" 
past traumas (as with PTSD) would seem to be about trying to avoid an 
obsessive refolding and refolding along the same crease, risking an 
eventual tear in the soul.


I've helped to walk two old men to their death's by Alzheimer's (one my 
father, the other my ex-father-in-law).   I've been in the general 
presence of a number of other's whose life-path seems to end in a 
wandering down that same path.   As Glen points out, some Alzheimer's 
victims seem to go to anger while others seem to go to a mild 
passivity.   What I was given to understand is that Alzheimer's takes 
away inhibitions first (or at least early) and those who might have 
managed their anger through repression through their lives, might be the 
ones who became angry without the inhibitory functions intact.   I've 
also watched the Alzheimer's afflicted improve in their physical health 
or at least slow the degradation of it as their inhibitions decreased.  
It seems that for many, in spite of apparent agitation in some, there is 
a reduction of stress...   as they lose their will, their acceptance (in 
some sense) goes up?


I also agree with Glen's opinion that to the extent that an individual 
is created by her context, that the decision on how to "treat" (or not) 
these kinds of disorders is intrinsically a collective decision... 
whether it is a spouse or child participating in the debate and 
decision, or the insurance company or the medical specialists involved 
determining acceptable courses of action, or the larger culture 
supporting or inhibiting various courses of action.   I was relieved of 
a tension I couldn't name when I first encountered the term 
"Neurodiverse" as an antidote to "Antisocial" or "Dysfunctional"...    
It didn't eliminate the utility of the other two terms, but did whittle 
away at what sometimes seems to be a universal diagnosis of one or the 
other.


Just over a year ago, I lost someone close to me to suicide after having 
coped with the consequences of a serious brain injury over the course of 
30 years.   I only knew him with the brain injury. That in itself  had 
long healed or at least scarred over, but the treatment including 
electroshock, the stigma, and the self-image fallout of the injury was 
what defined him most completely.   You could say that in many ways he 
*was* his brain injury (or more to the point, his ECTs, his decades of 
medication, his self-medication through alcohol, etc.).


The mind, the self, consciousness,  it's a tricky thing!

 - Steve



I agree.  It reminds me of a conversation I was just having with a friend who 
floated the idea that Alzheimer's, in stripping away many of our mental 
functions, could be considered at least partly a good thing.  My response was 
that for all the Alzheimer's patients I've had the opportunity to know (a 
handful personally, maybe 10 peripherally), it's been horrible to every one of 
them.  Subsequent conversations with Renee' revealed that her colleagues bin 
them into 2 groups, the happy ones and the angry ones.  So, perhaps the former 
are just fine with losing all those functions, maybe freeing them up to exist 
in a happy, simpler state.

The same would be true of any (treatable) condition, including PTSD.  
Ultimately, the decision to interfere/manipulate one's trajectory through the 
world depends on one's conservatism and openness to new experiences. But a 
fundamental flaw in individualist thought is that the decision lies solely with 
that one person.  Because people are at least partly socially constructed (I am 
who I am because of the roles I play in society.), 

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Dave, 

 

Thou deniest me in my moment of need!

 

Thou castest me to the wolves (eg Marcus).

 

Why hast thou forsaken me? 

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 10:49 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

Sorry Nick,

 

I am as hardcore Apollonian as is possible.

 

And if you organize your life around pleasure, even if moderate and consistent, 
it is you that are the Dionysian.

 

davew

 

 

On Wed, Jan 2, 2019, at 10:02 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:

> Dave,

> 

> I realize that you (and perhaps others of our colleagues here) are 

> Dionysians, whereas I, always, have been a stalwart Apollonian. The 

> difference, for me, is the risk one is willing to take for a peak 

> experience of some sort.  Some people organize their lives around 

> their vacations and holidays.  I hate holidays and vacations and 

> organize my life around a steady diet of moderate pleasure.  If you see what 
> I mean.

> For instance, I have never dreamed about what mushrooms might do for me.  

> Is that a fair statement of a difference between us?  

> 

> Nick

> 

> Nicholas S. Thompson

> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University 

>  <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> 

> -Original Message-

> From: Friam [ <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> 
> mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David 

> West

> Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 7:05 AM

> To:  <mailto:friam@redfish.com> friam@redfish.com

> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

> 

> MDMA risks = dehydration, in part because it is usually taken in the 

> context of frenetic physical activity like at a rave. Disinhibition 

> can pose a secondary risk because partner selection is less 

> discerning. Like too many drugs, long term effects / gender different 

> effects / age different effects, are unknown because unstudied.

> 

> davew

> 

> 

> On Tue, Jan 1, 2019, at 7:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

> > The premise of the series is that a drug + counseling is used to 

> > mitigate PTSD symptoms, but in fact it ends-up deleting recent memories

> > and was intended to make soldiers able to continue service.

> > 

> > One might argue that accumulation of emotional trauma is part of one's 

> > personality, and relieving it destroys part of a person.   One might 

> > also argue that to have just one personality, developing on a 

> > contiguous timeline, is a sort of arbitrary confinement -- like 

> > living in a freezer that just keeps getting colder.

> > 

> > I don't know what the actual risks are of MDMA.  Alcohol's side effects, 

> > in terms of impairment of judgement, are already pretty dangerous.   

> > 

> > Marcus

> > 

> > On 1/1/19, 7:23 PM, "Friam on behalf of glen" 

> > < 
> > <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com%20on%20behalf%20of%20geprope...@gmail.com>
> >  friam-boun...@redfish.com on behalf of geprope...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > 

> > I don't understand what you mean? Are you asking why 

> > psychedelics are not prescribable? Or saying that their therapeutic 

> > effect is negligible?

> > 

> > FWIW, I haven't seen Homecoming.

> > 

> > On January 1, 2019 11:28:28 AM PST, Marcus Daniels 

> > < <mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com> mar...@snoutfarm.com> wrote:

> > >Watching Homecoming I found myself thinking, "Yes, so what's 

> > the big

> > >deal?"

> > >

> > >On 12/31/18, 1:40 PM, "Friam on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣"

> > >< 
> > <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com%20on%20behalf%20of%20geprope...@gmail.com>
> >  friam-boun...@redfish.com on behalf of geprope...@gmail.com>

> > wrote:

> > >

> > >We're getting closer EVERY DAY!

> > >

> > >   <https://psi-2020.org/> https://psi-2020.org/

> > >

> > >Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:

> > >

> > >   <https://maps.org/> https://maps.org/

> > >

> > -- 

> > glen

> > 

> > 

> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv

> > Me

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

Sorry Nick,

I am as hardcore Apollonian as is possible.

And if you organize your life around pleasure, even if moderate and consistent, 
it is you that are the Dionysian.

davew


On Wed, Jan 2, 2019, at 10:02 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Dave,
> 
> I realize that you (and perhaps others of our colleagues here) are 
> Dionysians, whereas I, always, have been a stalwart Apollonian. The 
> difference, for me, is the risk one is willing to take for a peak 
> experience of some sort.  Some people organize their lives around their 
> vacations and holidays.  I hate holidays and vacations and organize my 
> life around a steady diet of moderate pleasure.  If you see what I mean.  
> For instance, I have never dreamed about what mushrooms might do for me.  
> Is that a fair statement of a difference between us?  
> 
> Nick  
> 
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
> Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West
> Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 7:05 AM
> To: friam@redfish.com
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction
> 
> MDMA risks = dehydration, in part because it is usually taken in the 
> context of frenetic physical activity like at a rave. Disinhibition can 
> pose a secondary risk because partner selection is less discerning. Like 
> too many drugs, long term effects / gender different effects / age 
> different effects, are unknown because unstudied.
> 
> davew
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jan 1, 2019, at 7:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> > The premise of the series is that a drug + counseling is used to 
> > mitigate PTSD symptoms, but in fact it ends-up deleting recent memories
> > and was intended to make soldiers able to continue service.
> > 
> > One might argue that accumulation of emotional trauma is part of one's 
> > personality, and relieving it destroys part of a person.   One might 
> > also argue that to have just one personality, developing on a 
> > contiguous timeline, is a sort of arbitrary confinement -- like living 
> > in a freezer that just keeps getting colder.
> > 
> > I don't know what the actual risks are of MDMA.  Alcohol's side effects, 
> > in terms of impairment of judgement, are already pretty dangerous.   
> > 
> > Marcus
> > 
> > On 1/1/19, 7:23 PM, "Friam on behalf of glen" 
> >  wrote:
> > 
> > I don't understand what you mean? Are you asking why psychedelics 
> > are not prescribable? Or saying that their therapeutic effect is 
> > negligible?
> > 
> > FWIW, I haven't seen Homecoming.
> > 
> > On January 1, 2019 11:28:28 AM PST, Marcus Daniels 
> >  wrote:
> > >Watching Homecoming I found myself thinking, "Yes, so what's the 
> > big
> > >deal?"
> > >
> > >On 12/31/18, 1:40 PM, "Friam on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣"
> > >
> > wrote:
> > >
> > >We're getting closer EVERY DAY!
> > >
> > >  https://psi-2020.org/
> > >
> > >Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:
> > >
> > >  https://maps.org/
> > >
> > -- 
> > glen
> > 
> > 
> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe 
> > at St. John's College to unsubscribe 
> > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe 
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
> 
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Grou

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

There's also this thing one can do called `sleeping in', which tends to 
increase the probability of dream memory and/or lucid dreaming, at least for 
me.  A built-in neuroplasticity mechanism complete with psychedelic phenomena 
and a safety mechanism of motor system deactivation. (

On 1/2/19, 10:03 AM, "Friam on behalf of Nick Thompson" 
 wrote:

For instance, I have never dreamed about what mushrooms might do for me.  
Is that a fair statement of a difference between us?


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Dave,

I realize that you (and perhaps others of our colleagues here) are Dionysians, 
whereas I, always, have been a stalwart Apollonian. The difference, for me, is 
the risk one is willing to take for a peak experience of some sort.  Some 
people organize their lives around their vacations and holidays.  I hate 
holidays and vacations and organize my life around a steady diet of moderate 
pleasure.  If you see what I mean.  For instance, I have never dreamed about 
what mushrooms might do for me.  Is that a fair statement of a difference 
between us?  

Nick  

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2019 7:05 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

MDMA risks = dehydration, in part because it is usually taken in the context of 
frenetic physical activity like at a rave. Disinhibition can pose a secondary 
risk because partner selection is less discerning. Like too many drugs, long 
term effects / gender different effects / age different effects, are unknown 
because unstudied.

davew


On Tue, Jan 1, 2019, at 7:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> The premise of the series is that a drug + counseling is used to 
> mitigate PTSD symptoms, but in fact it ends-up deleting recent memories
> and was intended to make soldiers able to continue service.
> 
> One might argue that accumulation of emotional trauma is part of one's 
> personality, and relieving it destroys part of a person.   One might 
> also argue that to have just one personality, developing on a 
> contiguous timeline, is a sort of arbitrary confinement -- like living 
> in a freezer that just keeps getting colder.
> 
> I don't know what the actual risks are of MDMA.  Alcohol's side effects, 
> in terms of impairment of judgement, are already pretty dangerous.   
> 
> Marcus
> 
> On 1/1/19, 7:23 PM, "Friam on behalf of glen" 
>  wrote:
> 
> I don't understand what you mean? Are you asking why psychedelics 
> are not prescribable? Or saying that their therapeutic effect is 
> negligible?
> 
> FWIW, I haven't seen Homecoming.
> 
> On January 1, 2019 11:28:28 AM PST, Marcus Daniels 
>  wrote:
> >Watching Homecoming I found myself thinking, "Yes, so what's the 
> big
> >deal?"
> >
> >On 12/31/18, 1:40 PM, "Friam on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣"
> >
> wrote:
> >
> >We're getting closer EVERY DAY!
> >
> >  https://psi-2020.org/
> >
> >Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:
> >
> >  https://maps.org/
> >
> -- 
> glen
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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> 
> 
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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[∄ uǝʃƃ]

I agree.  It reminds me of a conversation I was just having with a friend who 
floated the idea that Alzheimer's, in stripping away many of our mental 
functions, could be considered at least partly a good thing.  My response was 
that for all the Alzheimer's patients I've had the opportunity to know (a 
handful personally, maybe 10 peripherally), it's been horrible to every one of 
them.  Subsequent conversations with Renee' revealed that her colleagues bin 
them into 2 groups, the happy ones and the angry ones.  So, perhaps the former 
are just fine with losing all those functions, maybe freeing them up to exist 
in a happy, simpler state.

The same would be true of any (treatable) condition, including PTSD.  
Ultimately, the decision to interfere/manipulate one's trajectory through the 
world depends on one's conservatism and openness to new experiences. But a 
fundamental flaw in individualist thought is that the decision lies solely with 
that one person.  Because people are at least partly socially constructed (I am 
who I am because of the roles I play in society.), such decisions are made by 
the whole system.  And if a PTSD sufferer has become dysfunctional in his 
social fabric, then that fabric makes the decision whether to treat/manipulate 
his trajectory.

More complicated conditions might be narcissism, bipolar disorder, or 
Asperger's where the person is quixotic but not (really) dysfunctional and has 
grown into that person *with* that condition over a long haul (as opposed to a 
more acute event).  In those situations, I'd lean more toward your latter 
dilemma between continuing to hone the one personality or explore some 
alternatives.

On 1/1/19 6:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> The premise of the series is that a drug + counseling is used to mitigate 
> PTSD symptoms, but in fact it ends-up deleting recent memories and was 
> intended to make soldiers able to continue service.
> 
> One might argue that accumulation of emotional trauma is part of one's 
> personality, and relieving it destroys part of a person.   One might also 
> argue that to have just one personality, developing on a contiguous timeline, 
> is a sort of arbitrary confinement -- like living in a freezer that just 
> keeps getting colder.
> 
> I don't know what the actual risks are of MDMA.  Alcohol's side effects, in 
> terms of impairment of judgement, are already pretty dangerous.   

-- 
∄ uǝʃƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

MDMA risks = dehydration, in part because it is usually taken in the context of 
frenetic physical activity like at a rave. Disinhibition can pose a secondary 
risk because partner selection is less discerning. Like too many drugs, long 
term effects / gender different effects / age different effects, are unknown 
because unstudied.

davew


On Tue, Jan 1, 2019, at 7:46 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> The premise of the series is that a drug + counseling is used to 
> mitigate PTSD symptoms, but in fact it ends-up deleting recent memories 
> and was intended to make soldiers able to continue service.
> 
> One might argue that accumulation of emotional trauma is part of one's 
> personality, and relieving it destroys part of a person.   One might 
> also argue that to have just one personality, developing on a contiguous 
> timeline, is a sort of arbitrary confinement -- like living in a freezer 
> that just keeps getting colder.
> 
> I don't know what the actual risks are of MDMA.  Alcohol's side effects, 
> in terms of impairment of judgement, are already pretty dangerous.   
> 
> Marcus
> 
> On 1/1/19, 7:23 PM, "Friam on behalf of glen"  on behalf of geprope...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> I don't understand what you mean? Are you asking why psychedelics 
> are not prescribable? Or saying that their therapeutic effect is 
> negligible?
> 
> FWIW, I haven't seen Homecoming.
> 
> On January 1, 2019 11:28:28 AM PST, Marcus Daniels 
>  wrote:
> >Watching Homecoming I found myself thinking, "Yes, so what's the 
> big
> >deal?"
> >
> >On 12/31/18, 1:40 PM, "Friam on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣"
> > 
> wrote:
> >
> >We're getting closer EVERY DAY!
> >
> >  https://psi-2020.org/
> >
> >Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:
> >
> >  https://maps.org/
> >
> -- 
> glen
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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> 
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

The premise of the series is that a drug + counseling is used to mitigate PTSD 
symptoms, but in fact it ends-up deleting recent memories and was intended to 
make soldiers able to continue service.

One might argue that accumulation of emotional trauma is part of one's 
personality, and relieving it destroys part of a person.   One might also argue 
that to have just one personality, developing on a contiguous timeline, is a 
sort of arbitrary confinement -- like living in a freezer that just keeps 
getting colder.

I don't know what the actual risks are of MDMA.  Alcohol's side effects, in 
terms of impairment of judgement, are already pretty dangerous.   

Marcus

On 1/1/19, 7:23 PM, "Friam on behalf of glen"  wrote:

I don't understand what you mean? Are you asking why psychedelics are not 
prescribable? Or saying that their therapeutic effect is negligible?

FWIW, I haven't seen Homecoming.

On January 1, 2019 11:28:28 AM PST, Marcus Daniels  
wrote:
>Watching Homecoming I found myself thinking, "Yes, so what's the big
>deal?"
>
>On 12/31/18, 1:40 PM, "Friam on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣"
> wrote:
>
>We're getting closer EVERY DAY!
>
>  https://psi-2020.org/
>
>Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:
>
>  https://maps.org/
>
-- 
glen


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[glen]

I don't understand what you mean? Are you asking why psychedelics are not 
prescribable? Or saying that their therapeutic effect is negligible?

FWIW, I haven't seen Homecoming.

On January 1, 2019 11:28:28 AM PST, Marcus Daniels  wrote:
>Watching Homecoming I found myself thinking, "Yes, so what's the big
>deal?"
>
>On 12/31/18, 1:40 PM, "Friam on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣"
> wrote:
>
>We're getting closer EVERY DAY!
>
>  https://psi-2020.org/
>
>Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:
>
>  https://maps.org/
>
-- 
glen


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

Watching Homecoming I found myself thinking, "Yes, so what's the big deal?"

On 12/31/18, 1:40 PM, "Friam on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣"  wrote:

We're getting closer EVERY DAY!

  https://psi-2020.org/

Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:

  https://maps.org/


On 12/31/18 12:18 PM, Prof David West wrote:
> 
> 
> "Maybe the answer is to take a fistful of magic mushrooms and listen to 
some Bach? "
> 
> Always the answer!
> 
> LSD in a sensory deprivation tank, ala Timothy Hurt in the movie Altered 
States, was, for me, even better.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Marcus Daniels]

"The question I'm now worried about is the facility/frequency with which cyclic 
graphs can be "simulated" by DAGs (which is why I implied that everywhere we 
think there might be a convergence to something "real" would require a 
monotonic parameter)"


Uh, why?  For example, compilation of a recursive function to a control flow 
graph.


mdaniels@m2:~$ cat t.c
#include 

int foo(bool flag) {
  if (flag) foo(false);
  else return 0;
}
mdaniels@m2:~$ gcc -fdump-tree-cfg -c t.c
mdaniels@m2:~$ cat t.c.011t.cfg

;; Function foo (foo, funcdef_no=0, decl_uid=1956, cgraph_uid=0, symbol_order=0)

;; 1 loops found
;;
;; Loop 0
;;  header 0, latch 1
;;  depth 0, outer -1
;;  nodes: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
;; 2 succs { 3 4 }
;; 3 succs { 5 }
;; 4 succs { 6 }
;; 5 succs { 1 }
;; 6 succs { 1 }
foo (_Bool flag)
{
  int D.1962;

   :
  if (flag != 0)
goto ; [INV]
  else
goto ; [INV]

   :
  foo (0);
  goto ; [INV]

   :
  D.1962 = 0;
  // predicted unlikely by early return (on trees) predictor.
  goto ; [INV]

   :
  return;

   :
:
  return D.1962;

}




From: Friam  on behalf of uǝlƃ ☣ 

Sent: Monday, December 31, 2018 3:05:43 PM
To: FriAM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Thanks for that paper.  It forced me to remember (and look up) the discussion 
in Pearl's book ("Causality" 2000) about the Markov assumption and latent 
structure reduction.  Part of my reaction to John's statement about trying to 
find a time series that cannot be generated by a sequential machine was a 
result of Pearl's discussion.  The question I'm now worried about is the 
facility/frequency with which cyclic graphs can be "simulated" by DAGs (which 
is why I implied that everywhere we think there might be a convergence to 
something "real" would require a monotonic parameter).


On 12/31/18 12:35 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Try this link.  Now I remember that Thomas Richardson first described the
> algorithm and Danks and I implemented it.
>
> http://scholar.google.com/scholar_url?url=https://arxiv.org/pdf/1302.3599=en=X=AAGBfm23iOsgxDPx5eHVIU1aXYbP1yc_ZA=1=scholarr


--
☣ uǝlƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

I think I'm posting too frequently.  But I'm compelled to make one comment:

On 12/31/18 2:28 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
> And by just such a series of discoveries (Peirce believes), the scientific
> method progresses us towards beliefs that are ever-more stable, and...
> least some of the time... towards a belief that will hold up across all
> potential tests.

When I read your caveat progression, I do not hear "ever-more stable".  I hear 
"ever-more detailed".  It's not the stability of the core concept (whatever 
that may mean).  It's the *context* that matters.  And statements like "over 
here, but not over there" or "now but not later" ARE context.  So, what you're 
describing the scientist doing (and with which I agree) is controlled 
experimentation.  Remove the experimental details and you remove whatever Truth 
they may have contained.

The methods section is the most interesting part of the paper, right?

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Eric Charles]

Glen said " In all my posts, I've tried to push for "True as far as it
goes" ... or "true for now, maybe not true later", "true over here but not
over there", etc. "

This leads me to believe that we have lost track of Peirce being a well
established scientist, making contributions to several fields. "True as far
as it goes" is a crappy place for a scientist's work to end, but "True as
far as it goes, *and let me tell you how far it goes*" is a an ideal place
for the the scientist to end up!

That is: The progression of a series of scientific claims is often movement
towards claims of exactly the type Glen mentions. Chemical X mixed with
chemical Y makes chemical Z. No, that's not quite right. Chemical X mixed
with three parts chemical Y makes one part chemical Z. No, that isn't quite
right either, the stated reaction takes place only when we use a solution
that has in it a certain amount of oxygen (oxy-gen meaning the
acid-generating chemical). No, actually, oxygen isn't crucial after all,
that Lavoisier has acid stuff all wrong; any solvent within a certain range
of PH will do. Also, the reaction is dependent upon the addition of heat.
Well, pressure works to, so let's create an equation to specify the
necessary range of heat-pressure combinations. Etc. Etc. Etc.

And by just such a series of discoveries (Peirce believes), the scientific
method progresses us towards beliefs that are ever-more stable, and...
least some of the time... towards a belief that will hold up across all
potential tests. When a belief is found wanting, we call it "not true". As
such, it follows, that "true" is what we call beliefs that are not be found
wanting. In practice, the labeling of something as "true" is more of a bald
assertion, or expression of hope, or bold conjecture, or something like
that --- as in practice it cannot be an expression of having completely
established the truth of the belief --- but however you want to phrase
that: To believe that something is true (with a high degree of clarity
about the belief) is to believe that it will ultimately not be found
wanting.

To believe that it is "locally true", without further elaboration, should
therefore means something like: It will not be found wanting here, and
though that suggests a larger relationship to be discovered, frankly I'm
comfortable not trying to figuring out what the relevant properties of "*here"
*are.

But, of course, the game of science is largely a game of being deeply
unsatisfied with beliefs that we have noticed are "merely" of local
utility; the science game is a quest to find the higher-order belief that
connects the "locally true" beliefs into a "closer to globally true"
belief.



---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician
U.S. Marine Corps



On Mon, Dec 31, 2018 at 3:28 PM uǝlƃ ☣  wrote:

> The link doesn't work for me.  But I suspect: Yes!  In all my posts, I've
> tried to push for "True as far as it goes" ... or "true for now, maybe not
> true later", "true over here but not over there", etc.  Time is an
> important, but not the only factor.  Feedback often assumes time.  But all
> it really needs is some monotonically increasing parameter.  If Perician
> metaphysics hinges on the stability and uniqueness of the limit points,
> then it seems a lot like ToEs in physics, it may explain some very
> persnickety parts of reality, but it'll struggle with things like unicorns
> or, say, racism.
>
> On 12/31/18 12:15 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> > At CMU I implemented an algorithm called CCD (cyclic causal discovery)
> > which could infer feedback in causal graphs from observational data.  Is
> > that relevant?
> >
> > Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., and Scheines, R. Kauffman, S.,Aimale, V., &
> > Wimberly, F. (2001). Constructing Bayesian Network Models of Gene
> > Expression Networks from Microarray Data
> > , in
> *Proceedings
> > of the Atlantic Symposium on Computational Biology, Genome Information
> > Systems and Technology*, Duke University, March.
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC 
> http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Thanks for that paper.  It forced me to remember (and look up) the discussion 
in Pearl's book ("Causality" 2000) about the Markov assumption and latent 
structure reduction.  Part of my reaction to John's statement about trying to 
find a time series that cannot be generated by a sequential machine was a 
result of Pearl's discussion.  The question I'm now worried about is the 
facility/frequency with which cyclic graphs can be "simulated" by DAGs (which 
is why I implied that everywhere we think there might be a convergence to 
something "real" would require a monotonic parameter).


On 12/31/18 12:35 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Try this link.  Now I remember that Thomas Richardson first described the
> algorithm and Danks and I implemented it.
> 
> http://scholar.google.com/scholar_url?url=https://arxiv.org/pdf/1302.3599=en=X=AAGBfm23iOsgxDPx5eHVIU1aXYbP1yc_ZA=1=scholarr


-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Hi, Everybody, 

 

I am having WAY too much fun, here, and should pull back.  Before I do, just a 
word of caution.  I always forget that Peirce's definition is an asserting of 
the meaning of Truth and Real, not an assertion of their existence.  These 
definitions flow from the pragmatic maxim, which is 

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.

So what effects to we conceive a truth to have:  It would be that in the very 
long run, the community of inquiry will in the very long run, in 
asymptote-time, agree on it.   That, Peirce argues, is all we can mean by True. 
 

 

Notice that nothing at all could ever be true, and this definition could still 
represent what we mean by true.  So Glen and Peirce may agree after all. 

 

Nick 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Monday, December 31, 2018 1:40 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

We're getting closer EVERY DAY!

 

   <https://psi-2020.org/> https://psi-2020.org/

 

Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:

 

   <https://maps.org/> https://maps.org/

 

 

On 12/31/18 12:18 PM, Prof David West wrote:

> 

> 

> "Maybe the answer is to take a fistful of magic mushrooms and listen to some 
> Bach? "

> 

> Always the answer!

> 

> LSD in a sensory deprivation tank, ala Timothy Hurt in the movie Altered 
> States, was, for me, even better.

 

--

☣ uǝlƃ

 



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Dear Erics, C. and S., 

 

I got lost for a moment, here, but now am caught up.  I hope. 

 

Eric Charles is correct.

 

Eric Smith’s first sentence is about as unvarnished statement of pragmatism as 
one can imagine.  

 

The role of “reality” in those constructions is often an uninterpreted 
shorthand for the fact that I am willing to act without too much doubt in 
certain ways, using my attention and worry on other things than second-guessing 
that action. 

 

But then there is again, that plaintive lament, that hapless dream of a 
warrantee for a permanent, unshakeable belief in a reality not only undoubted 
but forever beyond the reach of doubt:

 

.  I don’t even try to lift that placeholder term to something that could carry 
philosophical weight."

But this is nonsense!  In the first place, because you misrepresent yourself.  
As a scientist put your philosophical weight on the scientific method every 
day.  In the second place, because you, as a human being, have no where else to 
put it! Unless, of course, you put it in God.  Now, No-one will ever deny me 
the pleasures of talking to God, or imagining heaven, on the slim premise that 
I happen to be a lifelong atheist.  If I want to get up each morning and thank 
God for the day, I will do so because it makes me feel good, and makes me a 
better person.  And I might even abduce from that fact, that God exists.  But I 
would do so wrongly because I have much better explanations for that 
experience.  (It’s a plain psychological fact that expressing gratitude makes 
people feel good; expressing bitterness makes them feel lousy.  Darwinian Group 
selection explanation to follow, if needed.)  

As I listen to people talk at Friam, I sense that most of us have a hankering 
after God.  It expresses itself in many ways, some subtle.  One of the subtle 
ways is in the idea of a truth beyond experience.  But whenever people start to 
import that thought back into their science, they begin to talk non-sense.  
Literally:  NON  SENSE, right?  Outside the senses and their elaborations in 
thought.  

Once long ago, I had the daughter of a Famous Person as a freshman in a 
Writing-Across-The-Curriculum class.  The students got to write on any subject 
they chose, and my role was as facilitator, not as an expert.  She announced in 
class one day that she wanted to write about her voices.  Now, even though I 
have always been an experimental psychologist, I did go to school with a lot of 
clinicians, and I did think I knew that Hearing Voices Is A Bad Sign.   So, 
first I tried to gently steer her away from that topic, and when she resisted 
firmly, I went to see one of the clinicians in my department, a man named Mort, 
to get advice on what to do.  He looked at me in that way shrinks look at a 
client on the first visit and asked, “And what do you WANT to do, Nicholas.”  

After resisting the impulse to crush his head with the snow globe on his desk, 
I only said, “Mort.  Cut that crap out!  You know as well as I do that hearing 
voices is a sign of serious mental illness and that I have an obligation to do 
something, and certainly not to encourage it.”

He replied: “No.  I don’t know that!  I do know that people whose voices tell 
them to do bad things often end up in trouble.  We don’t hear from the people 
whose voices tell them to do good things.  Do her voices tell her to do bad 
things. “

“No.  On the contrary!  They say things like, “Atta Girl!  Keep up the good 
work!”  Or, “Take it easy!  You have time.”

“Sounds like good advice to me.  Leave the poor girl alone.”  

So I left her alone.  In the end she wrote a paper about something else, got a 
good grade, and went on to graduate in 4 years. 

So.  In conclusion, Brethren and Sisteren: Cultivate your illusions, but no 
matter how functional they may prove to be, never, never confuse them with 
reality. 

Thus Spake Father Thompson

Happy New Year

 

N

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, December 30, 2018 9:33 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

"The role of “reality” in those constructions is often an uninterpreted 
shorthand for the fact that I am willing to act without too much doubt in 
certain ways, using my attention and worry on other things than second-guessing 
that action.  I don’t even try to lift that placeholder term to something that 
could carry philosophical weight."

Wait! Slow down! Why not see what happens when we ask that to carry 
philosophical weight?

 

What would get you to change your habits? Presumably a failure of the "act 
without too much doubt" plan to work out as desired would eventually get you to 
change how y

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

We're getting closer EVERY DAY!

  https://psi-2020.org/

Oh, and if anyone needs a charity to toss some 2018 money at:

  https://maps.org/


On 12/31/18 12:18 PM, Prof David West wrote:
> 
> 
> "Maybe the answer is to take a fistful of magic mushrooms and listen to some 
> Bach? "
> 
> Always the answer!
> 
> LSD in a sensory deprivation tank, ala Timothy Hurt in the movie Altered 
> States, was, for me, even better.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Frank Wimberly]

Try this link.  Now I remember that Thomas Richardson first described the
algorithm and Danks and I implemented it.

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_url?url=https://arxiv.org/pdf/1302.3599=en=X=AAGBfm23iOsgxDPx5eHVIU1aXYbP1yc_ZA=1=scholarr

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Mon, Dec 31, 2018, 1:28 PM uǝlƃ ☣  The link doesn't work for me.  But I suspect: Yes!  In all my posts, I've
> tried to push for "True as far as it goes" ... or "true for now, maybe not
> true later", "true over here but not over there", etc.  Time is an
> important, but not the only factor.  Feedback often assumes time.  But all
> it really needs is some monotonically increasing parameter.  If Perician
> metaphysics hinges on the stability and uniqueness of the limit points,
> then it seems a lot like ToEs in physics, it may explain some very
> persnickety parts of reality, but it'll struggle with things like unicorns
> or, say, racism.
>
> On 12/31/18 12:15 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> > At CMU I implemented an algorithm called CCD (cyclic causal discovery)
> > which could infer feedback in causal graphs from observational data.  Is
> > that relevant?
> >
> > Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., and Scheines, R. Kauffman, S.,Aimale, V., &
> > Wimberly, F. (2001). Constructing Bayesian Network Models of Gene
> > Expression Networks from Microarray Data
> > , in
> *Proceedings
> > of the Atlantic Symposium on Computational Biology, Genome Information
> > Systems and Technology*, Duke University, March.
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC 
> http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

The link doesn't work for me.  But I suspect: Yes!  In all my posts, I've tried 
to push for "True as far as it goes" ... or "true for now, maybe not true 
later", "true over here but not over there", etc.  Time is an important, but 
not the only factor.  Feedback often assumes time.  But all it really needs is 
some monotonically increasing parameter.  If Perician metaphysics hinges on the 
stability and uniqueness of the limit points, then it seems a lot like ToEs in 
physics, it may explain some very persnickety parts of reality, but it'll 
struggle with things like unicorns or, say, racism.

On 12/31/18 12:15 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> At CMU I implemented an algorithm called CCD (cyclic causal discovery)
> which could infer feedback in causal graphs from observational data.  Is
> that relevant?
> 
> Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., and Scheines, R. Kauffman, S.,Aimale, V., &
> Wimberly, F. (2001). Constructing Bayesian Network Models of Gene
> Expression Networks from Microarray Data
> , in *Proceedings
> of the Atlantic Symposium on Computational Biology, Genome Information
> Systems and Technology*, Duke University, March.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Eric Charles]

"And the answer embodied-situated cognition "

Well... I think that if THAT work is to be coherent,  it needs to be
grounded in pragmatism so I think that's a great answer. Trying to lay
embodied cognition on any other foundation is going to result in collapse.
Alas,  only a few people have joined me in writing about such things,  and
none of those writings sweep the full logical arc. Sigh.

(Incidentally,  it doesn't help that Peirce is incoherent when writing
about psychology or that James died after only taking us a short way down
the path.)


On Mon, Dec 31, 2018, 2:59 PM uǝlƃ ☣  Ha!  Dude.  I feel like I've said it over and over again.  Nothing is
> real.  To do what you've (or Peirce's) done and simply redefine the word
> "real" is iffy, at best.  Why not simply *admit* that nothing is real and
> move on?  The answer to your question is that there's something that lies,
> within you, apparently, that is not comfortable with the idea that there is
> no real.  Those of us who are comfortable with the idea that there is
> nothing that's real can't really provide the answer you want.  Maybe the
> answer is to take a fistful of magic mushrooms and listen to some Bach?  I
> don't know.
>
> But I can *simulate* someone like you, I think.  And the answer my
> simulation provides is either embodied-situated cognition or something like
> panpsychism. I.e. the brain-in-a-vat is a useless game and nobody should be
> playing it.  Most of it devolves into persnickety redefinitions of
> "experience".  So, because you just said "instincts are a result of natural
> selection and are products of experience", I can extend that claim to
> claims like:
>
>Dopamine, part of the generative system for human behavior, is a
> product of human experience.
>
> Is 3,4-dihydroxyphenethylamine a part of human experience, defined in
> terms of human experience?  Or is it an objective chemical whose reality
> existed before/after/independent of humans?  I'd claim this sort of
> question *requires* our inference to handle causal loops.  It's
> simultaneously a generator and a phenomenon of human experience.  Is this a
> (flat) tautology?  Would it require modal logic?  Etc.
>
> These are the answers my simulations of people like you provide.  And if
> our inference engine can't handle loops, then we're screwed. (Note that if
> I *stop* playing along and allow that Truth and Reality can come from
> something outside experience - human or not -, then the answers can change.)
>
> A little particular word-salad included below:
>
> On 12/31/18 11:21 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > Oh Joy.  Oh Rapture!  SOMEBODY understands me.  A new day is dawning.  A
> new year has begun!
>
> But Eric(S) already (however implicitly) brought up
> methodological-Peircianism.  I often worry that others really do understand
> *me* even if/when I feel like I haven't been understood.  It's based, I
> suppose, on reflection.  When someone repeats what they thought I said in
> words I would never have used, does it mean they do or don't understand me?
>
> > Yes.  Even stronger.  It is clear that we can NOT extrapolate .*  Unless
> you regard “Given normal error, the mean of the population, μ, probably
> lies within +/-  s/n, the standard error” as metaphysics.  That’s the
> absolute best you can hope for.  Somebody once called it, “A kiss from your
> aunt” realism.
>
> Yes, and I think you'd be hard-pressed to find anyone (making money
> outside an ivory tower or outside their Church) who would claim to *know*
> anything more than that.  Pluralism is the rule, not the exception.
>
> > Ok, Glen.  So now that you understand me, how can I understand you?  How
> do you break free from the he fact that when we speak of truth beyond human
> experience we inevitably extrapolate from human experience and that such
> extrapolations are inevitably human experiences? Honest.  I am not trying
> to be a jerk, here.  I just can’t see my way out of that box, given the
> brain-in-the-vat.  By the way, instincts, being the result of natural
> selection, are also taken as products of human experience.
>
> As may be obvious from my first paragraphs in this post, I may not be very
> clear on what you mean by "break free from the fact".  You're playing a
> weird game where you have access to a fact that a Peircian has no access
> to.  I'm starting to think Kellyanne Conway (with her "alternate facts")
> and Rudy Giuliani (with his "truth is not truth") are Peircians, too. >8^D
> You can break free from it by a) admitting it's not a fact - e.g. there are
> lots of people who don't make the extrapolation, b) there are no such
> things as "facts", or c) the driving force for such a demiurge is *not*
> experience.  I'm sure there are other ways to break free of it, too.
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe 

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

"Maybe the answer is to take a fistful of magic mushrooms and listen to some 
Bach? "

Always the answer!

LSD in a sensory deprivation tank, ala Timothy Hurt in the movie Altered 
States, was, for me, even better.

davew


On Mon, Dec 31, 2018, at 12:59 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> Ha!  Dude.  I feel like I've said it over and over again.  Nothing is 
> real.  To do what you've (or Peirce's) done and simply redefine the word 
> "real" is iffy, at best.  Why not simply *admit* that nothing is real 
> and move on?  The answer to your question is that there's something that 
> lies, within you, apparently, that is not comfortable with the idea that 
> there is no real.  Those of us who are comfortable with the idea that 
> there is nothing that's real can't really provide the answer you want.  
> Maybe the answer is to take a fistful of magic mushrooms and listen to 
> some Bach?  I don't know.
> 
> But I can *simulate* someone like you, I think.  And the answer my 
> simulation provides is either embodied-situated cognition or something 
> like panpsychism. I.e. the brain-in-a-vat is a useless game and nobody 
> should be playing it.  Most of it devolves into persnickety 
> redefinitions of "experience".  So, because you just said "instincts are 
> a result of natural selection and are products of experience", I can 
> extend that claim to claims like:
> 
>Dopamine, part of the generative system for human behavior, is a 
> product of human experience.
> 
> Is 3,4-dihydroxyphenethylamine a part of human experience, defined in 
> terms of human experience?  Or is it an objective chemical whose reality 
> existed before/after/independent of humans?  I'd claim this sort of 
> question *requires* our inference to handle causal loops.  It's 
> simultaneously a generator and a phenomenon of human experience.  Is 
> this a (flat) tautology?  Would it require modal logic?  Etc.
> 
> These are the answers my simulations of people like you provide.  And if 
> our inference engine can't handle loops, then we're screwed. (Note that 
> if I *stop* playing along and allow that Truth and Reality can come from 
> something outside experience - human or not -, then the answers can 
> change.)
> 
> A little particular word-salad included below:
> 
> On 12/31/18 11:21 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > Oh Joy.  Oh Rapture!  SOMEBODY understands me.  A new day is dawning.  A 
> > new year has begun! 
> 
> But Eric(S) already (however implicitly) brought up methodological-
> Peircianism.  I often worry that others really do understand *me* even 
> if/when I feel like I haven't been understood.  It's based, I suppose, 
> on reflection.  When someone repeats what they thought I said in words I 
> would never have used, does it mean they do or don't understand me?
> 
> > Yes.  Even stronger.  It is clear that we can NOT extrapolate .*  Unless 
> > you regard “Given normal error, the mean of the population, μ, probably 
> > lies within +/-  s/n, the standard error” as metaphysics.  That’s the 
> > absolute best you can hope for.  Somebody once called it, “A kiss from your 
> > aunt” realism.
> 
> Yes, and I think you'd be hard-pressed to find anyone (making money 
> outside an ivory tower or outside their Church) who would claim to 
> *know* anything more than that.  Pluralism is the rule, not the 
> exception.
> 
> > Ok, Glen.  So now that you understand me, how can I understand you?  How do 
> > you break free from the he fact that when we speak of truth beyond human 
> > experience we inevitably extrapolate from human experience and that such 
> > extrapolations are inevitably human experiences? Honest.  I am not trying 
> > to be a jerk, here.  I just can’t see my way out of that box, given the 
> > brain-in-the-vat.  By the way, instincts, being the result of natural 
> > selection, are also taken as products of human experience.
> 
> As may be obvious from my first paragraphs in this post, I may not be 
> very clear on what you mean by "break free from the fact".  You're 
> playing a weird game where you have access to a fact that a Peircian has 
> no access to.  I'm starting to think Kellyanne Conway (with her 
> "alternate facts") and Rudy Giuliani (with his "truth is not truth") are 
> Peircians, too. >8^D  You can break free from it by a) admitting it's 
> not a fact - e.g. there are lots of people who don't make the 
> extrapolation, b) there are no such things as "facts", or c) the driving 
> force for such a demiurge is *not* experience.  I'm sure there are other 
> ways to break free of it, too.
> 
> -- 
> ☣ uǝlƃ
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Frank Wimberly]

At CMU I implemented an algorithm called CCD (cyclic causal discovery)
which could infer feedback in causal graphs from observational data.  Is
that relevant?

Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., and Scheines, R. Kauffman, S.,Aimale, V., &
Wimberly, F. (2001). Constructing Bayesian Network Models of Gene
Expression Networks from Microarray Data
, in *Proceedings
of the Atlantic Symposium on Computational Biology, Genome Information
Systems and Technology*, Duke University, March.

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Mon, Dec 31, 2018, 12:59 PM uǝlƃ ☣  Ha!  Dude.  I feel like I've said it over and over again.  Nothing is
> real.  To do what you've (or Peirce's) done and simply redefine the word
> "real" is iffy, at best.  Why not simply *admit* that nothing is real and
> move on?  The answer to your question is that there's something that lies,
> within you, apparently, that is not comfortable with the idea that there is
> no real.  Those of us who are comfortable with the idea that there is
> nothing that's real can't really provide the answer you want.  Maybe the
> answer is to take a fistful of magic mushrooms and listen to some Bach?  I
> don't know.
>
> But I can *simulate* someone like you, I think.  And the answer my
> simulation provides is either embodied-situated cognition or something like
> panpsychism. I.e. the brain-in-a-vat is a useless game and nobody should be
> playing it.  Most of it devolves into persnickety redefinitions of
> "experience".  So, because you just said "instincts are a result of natural
> selection and are products of experience", I can extend that claim to
> claims like:
>
>Dopamine, part of the generative system for human behavior, is a
> product of human experience.
>
> Is 3,4-dihydroxyphenethylamine a part of human experience, defined in
> terms of human experience?  Or is it an objective chemical whose reality
> existed before/after/independent of humans?  I'd claim this sort of
> question *requires* our inference to handle causal loops.  It's
> simultaneously a generator and a phenomenon of human experience.  Is this a
> (flat) tautology?  Would it require modal logic?  Etc.
>
> These are the answers my simulations of people like you provide.  And if
> our inference engine can't handle loops, then we're screwed. (Note that if
> I *stop* playing along and allow that Truth and Reality can come from
> something outside experience - human or not -, then the answers can change.)
>
> A little particular word-salad included below:
>
> On 12/31/18 11:21 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > Oh Joy.  Oh Rapture!  SOMEBODY understands me.  A new day is dawning.  A
> new year has begun!
>
> But Eric(S) already (however implicitly) brought up
> methodological-Peircianism.  I often worry that others really do understand
> *me* even if/when I feel like I haven't been understood.  It's based, I
> suppose, on reflection.  When someone repeats what they thought I said in
> words I would never have used, does it mean they do or don't understand me?
>
> > Yes.  Even stronger.  It is clear that we can NOT extrapolate .*  Unless
> you regard “Given normal error, the mean of the population, μ, probably
> lies within +/-  s/n, the standard error” as metaphysics.  That’s the
> absolute best you can hope for.  Somebody once called it, “A kiss from your
> aunt” realism.
>
> Yes, and I think you'd be hard-pressed to find anyone (making money
> outside an ivory tower or outside their Church) who would claim to *know*
> anything more than that.  Pluralism is the rule, not the exception.
>
> > Ok, Glen.  So now that you understand me, how can I understand you?  How
> do you break free from the he fact that when we speak of truth beyond human
> experience we inevitably extrapolate from human experience and that such
> extrapolations are inevitably human experiences? Honest.  I am not trying
> to be a jerk, here.  I just can’t see my way out of that box, given the
> brain-in-the-vat.  By the way, instincts, being the result of natural
> selection, are also taken as products of human experience.
>
> As may be obvious from my first paragraphs in this post, I may not be very
> clear on what you mean by "break free from the fact".  You're playing a
> weird game where you have access to a fact that a Peircian has no access
> to.  I'm starting to think Kellyanne Conway (with her "alternate facts")
> and Rudy Giuliani (with his "truth is not truth") are Peircians, too. >8^D
> You can break free from it by a) admitting it's not a fact - e.g. there are
> lots of people who don't make the extrapolation, b) there are no such
> things as "facts", or c) the driving force for such a demiurge is *not*
> experience.  I'm sure there are other ways to break free of it, too.
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> 

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Ha!  Dude.  I feel like I've said it over and over again.  Nothing is real.  To 
do what you've (or Peirce's) done and simply redefine the word "real" is iffy, 
at best.  Why not simply *admit* that nothing is real and move on?  The answer 
to your question is that there's something that lies, within you, apparently, 
that is not comfortable with the idea that there is no real.  Those of us who 
are comfortable with the idea that there is nothing that's real can't really 
provide the answer you want.  Maybe the answer is to take a fistful of magic 
mushrooms and listen to some Bach?  I don't know.

But I can *simulate* someone like you, I think.  And the answer my simulation 
provides is either embodied-situated cognition or something like panpsychism. 
I.e. the brain-in-a-vat is a useless game and nobody should be playing it.  
Most of it devolves into persnickety redefinitions of "experience".  So, 
because you just said "instincts are a result of natural selection and are 
products of experience", I can extend that claim to claims like:

   Dopamine, part of the generative system for human behavior, is a product of 
human experience.

Is 3,4-dihydroxyphenethylamine a part of human experience, defined in terms of 
human experience?  Or is it an objective chemical whose reality existed 
before/after/independent of humans?  I'd claim this sort of question *requires* 
our inference to handle causal loops.  It's simultaneously a generator and a 
phenomenon of human experience.  Is this a (flat) tautology?  Would it require 
modal logic?  Etc.

These are the answers my simulations of people like you provide.  And if our 
inference engine can't handle loops, then we're screwed. (Note that if I *stop* 
playing along and allow that Truth and Reality can come from something outside 
experience - human or not -, then the answers can change.)

A little particular word-salad included below:

On 12/31/18 11:21 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Oh Joy.  Oh Rapture!  SOMEBODY understands me.  A new day is dawning.  A new 
> year has begun! 

But Eric(S) already (however implicitly) brought up methodological-Peircianism. 
 I often worry that others really do understand *me* even if/when I feel like I 
haven't been understood.  It's based, I suppose, on reflection.  When someone 
repeats what they thought I said in words I would never have used, does it mean 
they do or don't understand me?

> Yes.  Even stronger.  It is clear that we can NOT extrapolate .*  Unless you 
> regard “Given normal error, the mean of the population, μ, probably lies 
> within +/-  s/n, the standard error” as metaphysics.  That’s the absolute 
> best you can hope for.  Somebody once called it, “A kiss from your aunt” 
> realism.

Yes, and I think you'd be hard-pressed to find anyone (making money outside an 
ivory tower or outside their Church) who would claim to *know* anything more 
than that.  Pluralism is the rule, not the exception.

> Ok, Glen.  So now that you understand me, how can I understand you?  How do 
> you break free from the he fact that when we speak of truth beyond human 
> experience we inevitably extrapolate from human experience and that such 
> extrapolations are inevitably human experiences? Honest.  I am not trying to 
> be a jerk, here.  I just can’t see my way out of that box, given the 
> brain-in-the-vat.  By the way, instincts, being the result of natural 
> selection, are also taken as products of human experience.

As may be obvious from my first paragraphs in this post, I may not be very 
clear on what you mean by "break free from the fact".  You're playing a weird 
game where you have access to a fact that a Peircian has no access to.  I'm 
starting to think Kellyanne Conway (with her "alternate facts") and Rudy 
Giuliani (with his "truth is not truth") are Peircians, too. >8^D  You can 
break free from it by a) admitting it's not a fact - e.g. there are lots of 
people who don't make the extrapolation, b) there are no such things as 
"facts", or c) the driving force for such a demiurge is *not* experience.  I'm 
sure there are other ways to break free of it, too.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Glen, 

 

Oh Joy.  Oh Rapture!  SOMEBODY understands me.  A new day is dawning.  A new 
year has begun! 

 

In the end, a methodologically-Peircian perspective is the best you can hope 
for, right?  I.e. *acting* like a Peircian is fantastic.  But it's not clear 
whether we can extrapolate such a "way of living" into a metaphysical claim.

 

Yes.  Even stronger.  It is clear that we can NOT extrapolate .*  Unless you 
regard “Given normal error, the mean of the population, μ, probably lies within 
+/-  s/n, the standard error” as metaphysics.  That’s the absolute best you can 
hope for.  Somebody once called it, “A kiss from your aunt” realism.  

 

Ok, Glen.  So now that you understand me, how can I understand you?  How do you 
break free from the he fact that when we speak of truth beyond human experience 
we inevitably extrapolate from human experience and that such extrapolations 
are inevitably human experiences? Honest.  I am not trying to be a jerk, here.  
I just can’t see my way out of that box, given the brain-in-the-vat.  By the 
way, instincts, being the result of natural selection, are also taken as 
products of human experience.  

 

Happy New Year, 

 

Nick 

 

*  Some might claim that This Claim is self-contradictory.  In other words, I 
can be an agnostic about metaphysics but not an atheist. 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Monday, December 31, 2018 11:30 AM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

 

On 12/28/18 4:43 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:

> Ok.  What to do?  Well, we could admit that we are screwed and define truth 
> as that which is beyond all experience.  But this is nonsense, right?  If 
> truth is beyond all experience, how do we come to be talking about it.  If 
> Truth is that which we cannot talk about, then and any statement that we make 
> about it is necessarily untrue.  What to do?  Well, we could sneak a little 
> God back in.  We could talk about true intuitions that come from the spirit 
> world, etc.  Many people talk like that.  Sometimes,  I think of some of you 
> talk like that, tho I won’t name names.  For me, that’s not a starter.  

> 

> So, Truth must be defined in terms of experience.

 

We authentically part ways, here.  I agree with the no spirit world thing, but 
disagree that we *must* define Truth in terms of experience.  I'm only saying 
this so that you know that I'm "playing along".  For this conversation, I'll 
playing along with your idea that Truth must be defined in terms of experience.

 

>  Some kinds of experiences are more enduring than others.  

> [...]

> Now nothing about this implies that there is a truth concerning all matters.  
> Peirce’s notion of truth is ultimately statistical and based on the central 
> limit theorem.  He cheerfully admits that the world we live in is essentially 
> random.  However, if some things are not random, if there is systematic 
> pattern in our experience with regard to some things (such as, say, 
> saber-toothed tigers) then it would be extraordinarily useful to know it, and 
> the cognitive systems around today would tend to be those that had not been 
> eaten by tigers, right?  

> [...]

>  And science is privileged because, on the whole, over the long run, it has 
> proved itself to be the best at making those sorts of bets. 

 

And herein lies the problem.  This picture gives us ZERO efficacy.  If the 
method allows for a proposition/object to hold for, e.g., 5 billion years - 
i.e. it was real before earth and remains real after earth - this metaphysics 
tells us ZERO about whether or not that proposition/object is really real or 
whether it's just the transient brain fart of a super charismatic lineage of 
hucksters from ... somewhere.

 

Worse yet, it gives us ZERO sense of *how many* things are real versus how many 
things are fiction.  Is |real| << |fiction|?  Is |real| >> |fiction|?  How 
about |real| = |fiction|?

 

Even worser yet, all results of science depend fundamentally on the method of 
inquiry (all observations are taken from a theoretical perspective and vice 
versa).  So, BY DEFINITION, this convergence theory of the real will only ever 
suggest |real| << |fiction| because it would take more computation than atoms 
and lifetime of the universe to establish |real| = |fiction|, much less |real| 
>> |fiction|.  Hence, it (worthy of a mathematician!) is inherently elitist.  
Elite facts only accessible to elite organisms/organizations that can live long 
enough to ensconce their self-fulfilling observational procedure.

 

In the end, a methodologically-Peircian perspective is the best you can hope 
for, right?  I.e. *acting* like a Peirci

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[uǝlƃ ☣]

On 12/28/18 4:43 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Ok.  What to do?  Well, we could admit that we are screwed and define truth 
> as that which is beyond all experience.  But this is nonsense, right?  If 
> truth is beyond all experience, how do we come to be talking about it.  If 
> Truth is that which we cannot talk about, then and any statement that we make 
> about it is necessarily untrue.  What to do?  Well, we could sneak a little 
> God back in.  We could talk about true intuitions that come from the spirit 
> world, etc.  Many people talk like that.  Sometimes,  I think of some of you 
> talk like that, tho I won’t name names.  For me, that’s not a starter.  
> 
> So, Truth must be defined in terms of experience.

We authentically part ways, here.  I agree with the no spirit world thing, but 
disagree that we *must* define Truth in terms of experience.  I'm only saying 
this so that you know that I'm "playing along".  For this conversation, I'll 
playing along with your idea that Truth must be defined in terms of experience.

>  Some kinds of experiences are more enduring than others.  
> [...]
> Now nothing about this implies that there is a truth concerning all matters.  
> Peirce’s notion of truth is ultimately statistical and based on the central 
> limit theorem.  He cheerfully admits that the world we live in is essentially 
> random.  However, if some things are not random, if there is systematic 
> pattern in our experience with regard to some things (such as, say, 
> saber-toothed tigers) then it would be extraordinarily useful to know it, and 
> the cognitive systems around today would tend to be those that had not been 
> eaten by tigers, right?  
> [...]
>  And science is privileged because, on the whole, over the long run, it has 
> proved itself to be the best at making those sorts of bets. 

And herein lies the problem.  This picture gives us ZERO efficacy.  If the 
method allows for a proposition/object to hold for, e.g., 5 billion years - 
i.e. it was real before earth and remains real after earth - this metaphysics 
tells us ZERO about whether or not that proposition/object is really real or 
whether it's just the transient brain fart of a super charismatic lineage of 
hucksters from ... somewhere.

Worse yet, it gives us ZERO sense of *how many* things are real versus how many 
things are fiction.  Is |real| << |fiction|?  Is |real| >> |fiction|?  How 
about |real| = |fiction|?

Even worser yet, all results of science depend fundamentally on the method of 
inquiry (all observations are taken from a theoretical perspective and vice 
versa).  So, BY DEFINITION, this convergence theory of the real will only ever 
suggest |real| << |fiction| because it would take more computation than atoms 
and lifetime of the universe to establish |real| = |fiction|, much less |real| 
>> |fiction|.  Hence, it (worthy of a mathematician!) is inherently elitist.  
Elite facts only accessible to elite organisms/organizations that can live long 
enough to ensconce their self-fulfilling observational procedure.

In the end, a methodologically-Peircian perspective is the best you can hope 
for, right?  I.e. *acting* like a Peircian is fantastic.  But it's not clear 
whether we can extrapolate such a "way of living" into a metaphysical claim.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ


FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Eric Smith]

ay after day.  They are the sorts of experiences that when you 
> tell them to other person, that person says, “Oh yeah, that happened to me.”  
> More formally, they are the sort of experiences that survive experiments, 
> both formal experiments and the little day to day experiments we try on the 
> world around us.  Does the computer run on battery even when it is plugged 
> in? Run the battery down to zero, plug it in, and the computer won’t start 
> right away. Hmmm. Seems like.  Does my love still love me?  Oh, I will come 
> home from a business trip a day early and see if her eyes light up.  Or 
> perhaps if a foreign car is parked in the driveway and the lights are out.  
> Love, power supplies, it’s all the same.  It’s T.O.T.E, all the way down.  
> The most enduring experiences are those generated by communities of inquiry, 
> working at the same questions through rigorous experimentation and debate and 
> concerning themselves with abstract realities, force, momentum, lithium, etc. 
>  After all, look at how the 19th Century produced the periodic table!  Let’s 
> define Truth as the asymptote of that convergence.  Truth is where the 
> community of inquiry will converge in the very long run.  And real objects 
> can be something like, anything that is taken for granted by a true 
> proposition.   The existence of unicorns is definitely NOT taken for granted 
> by the proposition, “No Unicorn Exists”, so that let’s us out of that box. 
> 
>  
> 
> Now nothing about this implies that there is a truth concerning all matters.  
> Peirce’s notion of truth is ultimately statistical and based on the central 
> limit theorem.  He cheerfully admits that the world we live in is essentially 
> random.  However, if some things are not random, if there is systematic 
> pattern in our experience with regard to some things (such as, say, 
> saber-toothed tigers) then it would be extraordinarily useful to know it, and 
> the cognitive systems around today would tend to be those that had not been 
> eaten by tigers, right? 
> 
>  
> 
> Ach! You protest!  What kind of a lilly-livered reality is this?! We can 
> never know for sure whether some particular string of experiences is real or 
> not, whether it will endure to the endtimes, or whatever!  Yup.  That’s 
> right.  The day you decide the stock is a good bet is the day it may fall 20 
> percent.  That’s pragmatism for you.  We start in the middle, there are no 
> firm foundations, and everything is fallible.  But what pragmatism tells you 
> is what Darwinian experience tells you:  you bet your life everyday, and 
> sometimes you win and sometimes you lose.  Those that bet right tend to be 
> the ones who are here to tell the story.  And science is privileged because, 
> on the whole, over the long run, it has proved itself to be the best at 
> making those sorts of bets.
> 
>  
> 
> Nick 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> 
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
> 
> Clark University
> 
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
> 
>  
> 
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
> Sent: Monday, December 24, 2018 6:29 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction
> 
>  
> 
> Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true 
> propositions of the form "x is real".
> 
>  
> 
> I suspect that either begs the question or becomes a tautology.  Compare: 
> Wouldn't it make more sense to say green things are subjects of true 
> propositions of the form "x is green".
> 
>  
> 
> Though it seems convoluted,  I think "Unicorns are not real" is best 
> understood as the assertion "Beliefs about unicorns are not true", which 
> unpacks to something like: "Beliefs about the category 'unicorns' will not 
> converge," which itself means,  "if a community was to investigate claims 
> about unicorns,  they would not evidence support of those claims over the 
> long haul." 
> 
>  
> 
> For that to work,  we can't allow "nonexist" to be "a property." That is,  we 
> have to distinguish ideas about unicorns from ideas about not-unicorns. 
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 11:06 PM Nick Thompson  wrote:
> 
> Thanks, Frank.  I thought at first that was a cheat, but it seems to work, 
> actually.  It makes The Real dependent on The True, which is how Peirce 
> thinks it should be. 
> 
>  
> 
> I guess that’s why they paid you the big bucis.
> 
>  
> 
> Nick
> 
>  
> 
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> 
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology a

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Sorry, Eric, 

 

Am missing the post to which this was a response.  L

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, December 30, 2018 9:33 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

"The role of “reality” in those constructions is often an uninterpreted 
shorthand for the fact that I am willing to act without too much doubt in 
certain ways, using my attention and worry on other things than second-guessing 
that action.  I don’t even try to lift that placeholder term to something that 
could carry philosophical weight."

Wait! Slow down! Why not see what happens when we ask that to carry 
philosophical weight?

 

What would get you to change your habits? Presumably a failure of the "act 
without too much doubt" plan to work out as desired would eventually get you to 
change how you act,  right?

 

What if you saw others acting without doubt in the same way,  and they got 
screwed as a result? Would that cause some doubt?

 

If we follow this train if thought long enough,  do we eventually end up 
realizing it isn't just about what works for me-in-this-moment. Rather we end 
up with something like: "Real" is how we awkwardly try to refer to the those 
things we think will hold up over the long run of lots off people acting 
without doubting it. 

 

Now THAT sounds like it might be able carry some weight AND be true to your 
intuition.   

 

 

 

 

 

 

On Fri, Dec 28, 2018, 7:43 PM Nick Thompson mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>  wrote:

Hi, Everybody, 

 

I have been writing this email for most of the last week.

 

While I am loath to argue with Frank on matters of logic and mathematics, I 
think his solution violates Peirce’s project by making our understanding of 
truth dependent on our understanding of Real, rather than, as Peirce would have 
it, the other way around.   So Frank is surely correct on his own terms, but 
not Peircean, if you see what I mean.  

 

So, let me take a step back.  Here is Thompson’s History of Modern Philosophy.  
Once upon a time there was God.  All-seeing, all-knowing God.  What God  saw 
was Real and the Real was real whether or not anything, anybody, other than God 
could see it.  Then God died.  “Sad”, as Trump would say.  But still there was 
Descartes’s (pronounced “day cart sez”) brain in a vat.  Everything that we 
experience could be like phantom limb experiences.  Phantom legs, phantom 
hands, phantom, sounds, phantom sights, phantom me, phantom you, phantom 
thoughts, phantom WORLD.  So, here we sit, you and I, two brains in two vats, 
side by side.  The devil tickles your nerves and you see something you call, 
“horse”.  So your motor nerves are excited and you stimulate my auditory nerves 
with “horse”.   Now unless the Devil happens to simulate my nerves with exactly 
the same pattern as he stimulated yours before you said “horse”, there is no 
possible way we could know if we are talking about the same thing.  And 
remember, that’s the thing about The Devil (as we have recently learned), he 
has no commitment to the Truth.  (Notice how in this story God dies, yet the 
devil lives on; interesting; very sad) .  

 

Ok.  What to do?  Well, we could admit that we are screwed and define truth as 
that which is beyond all experience.  But this is nonsense, right?  If truth is 
beyond all experience, how do we come to be talking about it.  If Truth is that 
which we cannot talk about, then and any statement that we make about it is 
necessarily untrue.  What to do?  Well, we could sneak a little God back in.  
We could talk about true intuitions that come from the spirit world, etc.  Many 
people talk like that.  Sometimes,  I think of some of you talk like that, tho 
I won’t name names.  For me, that’s not a starter.  

 

So, Truth must be defined in terms of experience.  Some kinds of experiences 
are more enduring than others.  They are the sorts of experiences that repeat 
themselves day after day.  They are the sorts of experiences that when you tell 
them to other person, that person says, “Oh yeah, that happened to me.”  More 
formally, they are the sort of experiences that survive experiments, both 
formal experiments and the little day to day experiments we try on the world 
around us.  Does the computer run on battery even when it is plugged in? Run 
the battery down to zero, plug it in, and the computer won’t start right away. 
Hmmm. Seems like.  Does my love still love me?  Oh, I will come home from a 
business trip a day early and see if her eyes light up.  Or perhaps if a 
foreign car is parked in the driveway and the lights are out.  Love, power 
supplies, it’s all the same.  It’s T.O.T.E

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Eric Charles]

’s
> define Truth as the asymptote of that convergence.  Truth is where the
> community of inquiry will converge in the very long run.  And real objects
> can be something like, anything that is taken for granted by a true
> proposition.   The existence of unicorns is definitely NOT taken for
> granted by the proposition, “No Unicorn Exists”, so that let’s us out of
> that box.
>
>
>
> Now nothing about this implies that there is a truth concerning all
> matters.  Peirce’s notion of truth is ultimately statistical and based on
> the central limit theorem.  He cheerfully admits that the world we live in
> is essentially random.  However, if some things are not random, if there is
> systematic pattern in our experience with regard to some things (such as,
> say, saber-toothed tigers) then it would be extraordinarily useful to know
> it, and the cognitive systems around today would tend to be those that had
> not been eaten by tigers, right?
>
>
>
> Ach! You protest!  What kind of a lilly-livered reality is this?! We can
> never know for sure whether some particular string of experiences is real
> or not, whether it will endure to the endtimes, or whatever!  Yup.  That’s
> right.  The day you decide the stock is a good bet is the day it may fall
> 20 percent.  That’s pragmatism for you.  We start in the middle, there are
> no firm foundations, and everything is fallible.  But what pragmatism tells
> you is what Darwinian experience tells you:  you bet your life everyday,
> and sometimes you win and sometimes you lose.  Those that bet right tend to
> be the ones who are here to tell the story.  And science is privileged
> because, on the whole, over the long run, it has proved itself to be the
> best at making those sorts of bets.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Eric
> Charles
> *Sent:* Monday, December 24, 2018 6:29 AM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Abduction
>
>
>
> *Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true
> propositions of the form "x is real".*
>
>
>
> I suspect that either begs the question or becomes a tautology.  Compare: 
> *Wouldn't
> it make more sense to say green things are subjects of true propositions of
> the form "x is green".*
>
>
>
> Though it seems convoluted,  I think "Unicorns are not real" is best
> understood as the assertion "Beliefs about unicorns are not true", which
> unpacks to something like: "Beliefs about the category 'unicorns' will not
> converge," which itself means,  "if a community was to investigate claims
> about unicorns,  they would not evidence support of those claims over the
> long haul."
>
>
>
> For that to work,  we can't allow "nonexist" to be "a property." That is,
> we have to distinguish ideas about unicorns from ideas about not-unicorns.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 11:06 PM Nick Thompson  wrote:
>
> Thanks, Frank.  I thought at first that was a cheat, but it seems to work,
> actually.  It makes The Real dependent on The True, which is how Peirce
> thinks it should be.
>
>
>
> I guess that’s why they paid you the big bucis.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
> Wimberly
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 23, 2018 5:10 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Abduction
>
>
>
> Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true
> propositions of the form "x is real".
>
> ---
> Frank Wimberly
>
> My memoir:
> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>
> My scientific publications:
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 4:57 PM Nick Thompson  wrote:
>
> Thanks, Eric,
>
>
>
> I think you have everything right here, and it is very well laid out.
> Thank you.
>
>
>
> One point that nobody seems to quite want to help me get a grip on is the
> grammar of the two terms.  True seems to apply only to propositions, while
> re

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

 and sometimes you lose.  Those that bet right tend to be the ones who are 
here to tell the story.  And science is privileged because, on the whole, over 
the long run, it has proved itself to be the best at making those sorts of 
bets. 

 

Nick 



 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Monday, December 24, 2018 6:29 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true 
propositions of the form "x is real".

 

I suspect that either begs the question or becomes a tautology.  Compare: 
Wouldn't it make more sense to say green things are subjects of true 
propositions of the form "x is green".

 

Though it seems convoluted,  I think "Unicorns are not real" is best understood 
as the assertion "Beliefs about unicorns are not true", which unpacks to 
something like: "Beliefs about the category 'unicorns' will not converge," 
which itself means,  "if a community was to investigate claims about unicorns,  
they would not evidence support of those claims over the long haul." 

 

For that to work,  we can't allow "nonexist" to be "a property." That is,  we 
have to distinguish ideas about unicorns from ideas about not-unicorns. 

 

 

 

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 11:06 PM Nick Thompson mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>  wrote:

Thanks, Frank.  I thought at first that was a cheat, but it seems to work, 
actually.  It makes The Real dependent on The True, which is how Peirce thinks 
it should be.  

 

I guess that’s why they paid you the big bucis. 

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto: <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> 
friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2018 5:10 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < 
<mailto:friam@redfish.com> friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true 
propositions of the form "x is real".

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 4:57 PM Nick Thompson mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net>  wrote:

Thanks, Eric, 

 

I think you have everything right here, and it is very well laid out.  Thank 
you. 

 

One point that nobody seems to quite want to help me get a grip on is the 
grammar of the two terms.  True seems to apply only to propositions, while real 
only to nouns.  Now the way we get around that is by saying that the real 
things are the objects of true proposition.  But that leads to what I call the 
unicorn problem.  “Unicorns don’t exist” is a true proposition that does not, 
however, make “unicorns” real.  

 

This seems like the kind of problem a sophomore might go crazy ab0ut in an 
introductory philosophy course, so I am a bit embarrassed to be raising it.  
For my philosophical mentors, it is beneath their contempt.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto: <mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com> 
friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2018 4:02 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group < 
<mailto:friam@redfish.com> friam@redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

I think Peirce is getting at something a bit different. When Peirce is on good 
behavior, he is laying out The World According to The Scientist. When a 
Scientist says that some claim is "true" she means that future studies will 
continue to support the claim. Perhaps even a bit more than that, as she means 
all investigations that could be made into the claim would support the claim, 
whether they happen or not. Peirce also tells us that "real" is our funny way 
of talking about the object of a true belief. If "I believe X" is a statement 
about a true belief, then future investigations will not reveal anything 
contradicting X, and... as a simple matter of definition... X is real. 

 

When Peirce is first getting started, he seems to think that you could work 
that logic through with just ab

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[∄ uǝʃƃ]

Ha! In light of the g-conjecture news, you sent me on an interesting journey 
trying to find out why a philosopher of science would have contributed to 
simplicial complexes.  The answer is Adolf ≠ Branko! 8^)

  https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Branko_Gr%C3%BCnbaum
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Gr%C3%BCnbaum


On December 27, 2018 5:25:59 PM PST, Frank Wimberly  wrote:
>There was a philosophy professor at the University of Pittsburgh named
>Adolph Grunbaum whose career was partly defined by his writings on "is
>psychoanalysis science?"



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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Eric Smith]

Thanks for this Glen,

To your points below:

I don’t want to sound like I am propounding some totalizing system, or even the 
position that one exists, much less that I could say what it is.  I am very 
strongly on the side of heterarchy, and I fully concur with the arguments you 
put behind the preference for “layers” over “levels”.  

My hope — which never comes across well because when one tries to make a point 
about a particular finite thing, leaving out all the other things that are also 
present in the world, it sounds as if those were not also valued — was to offer 
examples of the “why would a discourse about what is ‘real’ need to mostly 
invoke abstractions?” question.  Typically, just because they are what I 
understand most and what physics has a pretty good formal system built around, 
I have hierarchies of equilibrium phase transitions in the theory of matter in 
the back of my mind, and the renormalization-group understanding of how they 
fit together as a conceptually consistent system.  To me they are the best 
explanation physics currently has of how a finite closed analytical system can 
be applied to a description that is by construction coarse-grained.  Moreover 
they provide an argument that any closed analytical system should _only_ ever 
be expected to be possible for entities that are coarse-grained.  

I think before the renormalization group had been mostly understood through 
1954 (Gell-Mann + Low), 1974 (Wilson and Kogut) and 1984 (Polchinski), a 
careful physicist should have worried whether it would be possible to speak 
concreately about anything when it was not possible to know about everything.  
Writers like Fermi (1930s) were at pains to emphasize that classical 
thermodynamics of state variables should be learned and used as a 
self-consistent system without reference to the statistical mechanics that is 
now used to justify it.  However, when Fermi was writing, it was at best an 
empirical description of his toolkit, and a hope, that such closed systems were 
really reliable in a formal sense.  

Having said that, however, I would not want to claim that the hierarchy of 
matter is a framework subordinate to whose levels all other descriptions can be 
nested, or that it addresses all questions of pattern that are as fundamental 
even in physics as the equilibrium hierarchy of the vacuum and matter within 
it.  There can be many other hierarchies that are, each for its own set of 
patterns, real hierarchies worth recognizing, but which cross-cut the 
equilibrium matter hierarchy, and many other patterns that exist 
(metaphorically speaking) at “points” in the question space, maybe not embedded 
within hierarchies.  Again, my mental metaphor for thinking about their role in 
the landscape of sense-making is the work by (I think) Cris Moore and Mark 
Newman of characterizing networks that are not treelike by giving a list of 
which trees can be overprinted on them, each of which accounts for some part of 
the overall connectivity.  The levels within each tree are by construction 
nested, but multiple trees are needed for reticulated networks because no 
single nesting hierarchy can describe a reticulated topology.


A second thing, re. Nick and Eric(C).  I understand what is plain on the face 
of it, too: my comments about relations between “abstraction” and either 
equivalence relations or predicates doesn’t even address the question of “what 
is ‘real’ “ which is where the main conversation is being carried out.  In most 
of my speech, if I were a phenomenologist (philosophical sense, not the 
physicist’s sense) I would have to admit that “real” in sentences is a 
structural placeholder for certain semantic and syntactic conventions.  The 
substantivev content of the sentence is mostly concentrated at other points, 
where there is some operational description of what one does and what one 
expects to see as a result.  The role of “reality” in those constructions is 
often an uninterpreted shorthand for the fact that I am willing to act without 
too much doubt in certain ways, using my attention and worry on other things 
than second-guessing that action.  I don’t even try to lift that placeholder 
term to something that could carry philosophical weight.  

Best to all,

Eric(S)

> On Dec 27, 2018, at 12:58 PM, ∄ uǝʃƃ  wrote:
> 
> 
> First, by saying you and Eric(C) *attribute* so-and-so to Peirce, I'm not 
> suggesting you're wrong.  I'm expressing my ignorance.  But I don't want to 
> (falsely) accuse Peirce of anything, since he's not here to defend himself.  
> So, I can only respond to what you say about what he said.  I'm very grateful 
> for your attempts to suss it all out and serve it on a platter for people 
> like me.
> 
> Second, in that same vane (Ha!), I haven't put in the effort to grok your 
> "Natural Designs".  So, when I'm wrong, feel free to simply call me ignorant 
> and move on.  I'm cool with that.
> 
> But on to the meat: When you say 
> 
> On 

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Frank Wimberly]

Dear Prof,

There was a philosophy professor at the University of Pittsburgh named
Adolph Grunbaum whose career was partly defined by his writings on "is
psychoanalysis science?"

His papers and books generally concluded that it isn't.  Pitt also had one
of the only university-affiliated psychoanalytic institutes in the US.

Definition: "psychoanalysis" includes the theories and treatment modalities
introduced by Freud as well as innovations like neo-Freudian psychology,
object relations theory, and other more modern treatments and theories.

One of the senior psychoanalysts, who was a friend of Grunbaum, asked why
it isn't as valid to ask if science is psychoanalytic.  This is hard to
explain. What really matters to a person are his own drives and feelings.
Grunbaum would become angry if anyone asked him
if his father was a psychoanalyst because he thought they would argue that
his interest in the topic was an expression of a childish rivalry with his
father.   His brother was a psychoanalyst even though his father wasn't.

The point is that our deepest wishes and fears are personal and rooted in
our earliest experiences.  In Grunbaum's case his scientific hypothesis
might be a form of "my father is smarter than yours".  I am not saying that
is the case.

The question of whether science is *the* royal road to the truth depends on
which truth you mean.

Is that related to your objection to the third privilege?

Frank

---
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Thu, Dec 27, 2018, 5:26 PM Prof David West  "Trump supporters are not individualists, they are just people trying to
> recover privilege they *didn’t earn *and now see slipping away"
>
> Three brief comments:
>
>   1- Refusal to "know your enemy" and insistence on erroneous straw man
> characterizations of that enemy is exactly what will allow Trump to be
> re-elected.
>
>   2- Individualism is about responsibility - not ego, not 'privilege' -
> and includes a deeply felt responsibility to aid others who's circumstances
> mandate such aid. Questioning the means of providing that aid is not an
> argument against providing it. (Same thing is true of climate change - for
> the majority, not the straw man characterization - it is not a question of
> science, but of means for rectification.)
>
>   3- The most blatant assertion of privilege that I see on this list is
> the privilege given to "Science." While I am certain that individuals among
> you have earned your position to speak about, and assert the privilege of,
> "Science," the subject itself has not demonstrated that it has "earned" its
> insistence on denying all other avenues to knowledge and understanding as
> 'erroneous', emotional (emphasis on the sexism here), irrational, or simply
> wrong. (The assertion of privilege for "liberal" viewpoints comes a very
> close second.)
>
> davew
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 27, 2018, at 5:21 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
>
> Lee Rodulph wrote:
>
>
>
> *As I have learned from Nick, Peirce is also committed to the defense of
> "the dignity of fallible knowledge" (at least, I *think* I've learned that
> from Nick; but I might be wrong...).*
>
>
>
> Well, it’s possible your learned the sentiment from me, but your way of
> expressing it, is, like Glen’s “level prejudice”, a patentable thought, and
> I would like to be the first to license it.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of
> lrudo...@meganet.net
> Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2018 9:24 AM
> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam@redfish.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction
>
>
>
> Glen wrote, in relevant part, "Like mathematicians, maybe we have to
> ultimately commit to the ontological status of our parsing methods?"  I
> wish to question the implicit assumption that mathematicians _do_ (or even
> _ought to_) "ultimately commit to the ontological status" of _anything_ in
> particular.
>
>
>
> I wrote (some time ago, and not here) something I will still stand by.  It
> appears at the beginning of a me-authored chapter in a me-edited book,
> "Qualitative Mathematics for the Social Sciences: Mathematical models for
> research on cultural dynamics"; the "our" and "we" in the first sentence
&g

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Prof David West]

"Trump supporters are not individualists, they are just people trying to
recover privilege they *didn’t earn *and now see slipping away"
Three brief comments:

  1- Refusal to "know your enemy" and insistence on erroneous straw man
  characterizations of that enemy is exactly what will allow Trump to be
  re-elected.
  2- Individualism is about responsibility - not ego, not 'privilege' -
  and includes a deeply felt responsibility to aid others who's
  circumstances mandate such aid. Questioning the means of providing
  that aid is not an argument against providing it. (Same thing is true
  of climate change - for the majority, not the straw man
  characterization - it is not a question of science, but of means for
  rectification.)
  3- The most blatant assertion of privilege that I see on this list is
  the privilege given to "Science." While I am certain that individuals
  among you have earned your position to speak about, and assert the
  privilege of, "Science," the subject itself has not demonstrated that
  it has "earned" its insistence on denying all other avenues to
  knowledge and understanding as 'erroneous', emotional (emphasis on the
  sexism here), irrational, or simply wrong. (The assertion of privilege
  for "liberal" viewpoints comes a very close second.)
davew


On Thu, Dec 27, 2018, at 5:21 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Lee Rodulph wrote:


>  


> **As I have learned from Nick, Peirce is also committed to the defense
> of "the dignity of fallible knowledge" (at least, I *think* I've
> learned that from Nick; but I might be wrong...).**>  


> Well, it’s possible your learned the sentiment from me, but your way
> of expressing it, is, like Glen’s “level prejudice”, a patentable
> thought, and I would like to be the first to license it.>  


> Nick


>  


> Nicholas S. Thompson


> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology


> Clark University


> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


>  


>  


> -Original Message- From: Friam [mailto:friam-
> boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of lrudo...@meganet.net Sent: Thursday,
> December 27, 2018 9:24 AM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
> Coffee Group'  Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction>  


> Glen wrote, in relevant part, "Like mathematicians, maybe we have to
> ultimately commit to the ontological status of our parsing methods?"
> I wish to question the implicit assumption that mathematicians _do_
> (or even _ought to_) "ultimately commit to the ontological status" of
> _anything_ in particular.>  


> I wrote (some time ago, and not here) something I will still stand by.
> It appears at the beginning of a me-authored chapter in a me-edited
> book, "Qualitative Mathematics for the Social Sciences: Mathematical
> models for research on cultural dynamics"; the "our" and "we" in the
> first sentence refer to me and my coauthor in an introductory chapter,
> not to me-and-a- mouse-in-my-pocket.  (Note that I am a mathematician,
> _not_ a social scientist, and only very occasionally a mathematical
> modeler of any sort.) I have edited out some footnotes, etc., but in
> return have expanded some of the in-line references {inside curly
> braces}.>  


> ===begin===


>  


> In our Introduction (p. 17) we quoted "three statements, by
> mathematicians {Ralph Abraham; three guys named Bohle-Carbonell, Booß,
> Jensen, who I'd not heard of before working on the book; and Phil
> Davis} on mathematical modeling". Here is a fourth.>  


> (D) Mathematics has its own structures; the world (as we perceive and
> cognize it) is, or appears to be, structured; mathematical
> modeling is a reciprocal process in which we
> _construct/discover/bring into awareness_ correspondences between
> mathematical structures and structures `in the world´, as we _take
> actions that get meaning from, and give meaning to,_ those
> structures and correspondences.>  


> Later (p. 24 ff.) we briefly viewed modeling from the standpoint of
> "evolutionary epistemology" in the style of Konrad Lorenz (1941)
> {Kant´s doctrine of the a priori in the light of contemporary
> biology}. In this chapter, I view modeling from the standpoint
> informally staked out by (D), which I propose to call "evolutionary
> ontology." My discussion is sketchy (and not very highly structured),
> but may help make sense of this volume and perhaps even mathematical
> modeling in general.>  


> Behind (D) is my conviction that there is no need to adopt any
> particular ontological> attitude(s) towards "structures", in the world at 
> large and/or in
> mathematics, in order to proceed 

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Lee Rodulph wrote: 

 

As I have learned from Nick, Peirce is also committed to the defense of "the
dignity of fallible knowledge" (at least, I *think* I've learned that from
Nick; but I might be wrong...).

 

Well, it’s possible your learned the sentiment from me, but your way of
expressing it, is, like Glen’s “level prejudice”, a patentable thought, and
I would like to be the first to license it.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of
lrudo...@meganet.net
Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2018 9:24 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

Glen wrote, in relevant part, "Like mathematicians, maybe we have to
ultimately commit to the ontological status of our parsing methods?"  I wish
to question the implicit assumption that mathematicians _do_ (or even _ought
to_) "ultimately commit to the ontological status" of _anything_ in
particular.

 

I wrote (some time ago, and not here) something I will still stand by.  It
appears at the beginning of a me-authored chapter in a me-edited book,
"Qualitative Mathematics for the Social Sciences: Mathematical models for
research on cultural dynamics"; the "our" and "we" in the first sentence
refer to me and my coauthor in an introductory chapter, not to me-and-a-
mouse-in-my-pocket.  (Note that I am a mathematician, _not_ a social
scientist, and only very occasionally a mathematical modeler of any sort.) I
have edited out some footnotes, etc., but in return have expanded some of
the in-line references {inside curly braces}.

 

===begin===

 

In our Introduction (p. 17) we quoted "three statements, by mathematicians
{Ralph Abraham; three guys named Bohle-Carbonell, Booß, Jensen, who I'd not
heard of before working on the book; and Phil Davis} on mathematical
modeling". Here is a fourth.

 

(D) Mathematics has its own structures; the world (as we perceive and
cognize it) is, or appears to be, structured; mathematical modeling is a
reciprocal process in which we _construct/discover/bring into awareness_
correspondences between mathematical structures and structures `in the
world´, as we _take actions that get meaning from, and give meaning to,_
those structures and correspondences. 

 

Later (p. 24 ff.) we briefly viewed modeling from the standpoint of
"evolutionary epistemology" in the style of Konrad Lorenz (1941) {Kant´s
doctrine of the a priori in the light of contemporary biology}. In this
chapter, I view modeling from the standpoint informally staked out by (D),
which I propose to call "evolutionary ontology." My discussion is sketchy
(and not very highly structured), but may help make sense of this volume and
perhaps even mathematical modeling in general.

 

Behind (D) is my conviction that there is no need to adopt any particular
ontological

attitude(s) towards "structures", in the world at large and/or in
mathematics, in order to proceed with the project of modeling the former by
the latter and drawing inspiration for the latter from the former. It is, I
claim, possible for someone simultaneously to adhere to a rigorously
`realist´ view of mathematics (say, naïve and unconsidered Platonism) and to
take the world to be entirely insubstantial and illusory (say, by adopting a
crass reduction of the Buddhist doctrine of Maya), _and still practice
mathematical modeling in good faith_ if not with guaranteed success. Other
(likely or unlikely) combinations of attitudes are (I claim) just as
possible, and equally compatible with the practice of modeling.  

 

I have the impression that many practitioners, if polled (which I have not
done), would declare themselves to be both mathematical `formalists´ and
physical `realists´. I also have the impression that a large, overlapping
group of practitioners, observed in action (which I have done, in a small
and unsystematic way), can reasonably be described to _behave_ like
thoroughgoing ontological agnostics.  Mathematical modeling _as human
behavior_ is based, I am claiming, on acts of pattern-matching (or
Gestalt-making)-which is to say,in other language, on
creation/recognition/awareness of `higher order structures´ relating some
`lower order structures´-that one performs (or that occur to one)
independently of one´s ontological stances. That is not all there is to it,
as behavior; but that is its basis.

 

===end===

 

To take Glen's question in (perhaps) a different direction, I note that Imre
Lakatos also used the word "ultimate" about mathematicians, as follows: "But
why on earth have `ultimate´ tests, `final authority´? Why foundations, if
they are admittedly subjective?  Why not honestly admit mathematical
fallibility, and try to defend

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Lee, 

Since your substance is way beyond me, I have to raise a matter of style.

Is, perhaps, your reference to a mouse in your pocket, a covert reference to
an old bar joke which I thought only I knew (despite my having told it a
hundred times) to which the punch line is, "And that goes for your goddamned
cat, too."

If so, good to meetya, Brothuh.

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/


-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of
lrudo...@meganet.net
Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2018 9:24 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

Glen wrote, in relevant part, "Like mathematicians, maybe we have to
ultimately commit to the ontological status of our parsing methods?"  I wish
to question the implicit assumption that mathematicians _do_ (or even _ought
to_) "ultimately commit to the ontological status" of _anything_ in
particular.

I wrote (some time ago, and not here) something I will still stand by.  It
appears at the beginning of a me-authored chapter in a me-edited book,
"Qualitative Mathematics for the Social Sciences: Mathematical models for
research on cultural dynamics"; the "our" and "we" in the first sentence
refer to me and my coauthor in an introductory chapter, not to me-and-a-
mouse-in-my-pocket.  (Note that I am a mathematician, _not_ a social
scientist, and only very occasionally a mathematical modeler of any sort.) I
have edited out some footnotes, etc., but in return have expanded some of
the in-line references {inside curly braces}.

===begin===

In our Introduction (p. 17) we quoted "three statements, by mathematicians
{Ralph Abraham; three guys named Bohle-Carbonell, Booß, Jensen, who I'd not
heard of before working on the book; and Phil Davis} on mathematical
modeling". Here is a fourth.

(D) Mathematics has its own structures; the world (as we perceive and
cognize it) is, or appears to be, structured; mathematical modeling is a
reciprocal process in which we _construct/discover/bring into awareness_
correspondences between mathematical structures and structures `in the
world´, as we _take actions that get meaning from, and give meaning to,_
those structures and correspondences. 

Later (p. 24 ff.) we briefly viewed modeling from the standpoint of
"evolutionary epistemology" in the style of Konrad Lorenz (1941) {Kant´s
doctrine of the a priori in the light of contemporary biology}. In this
chapter, I view modeling from the standpoint informally staked out by (D),
which I propose to call "evolutionary ontology." My discussion is sketchy
(and not very highly structured), but may help make sense of this volume and
perhaps even mathematical modeling in general.

Behind (D) is my conviction that there is no need to adopt any particular
ontological
attitude(s) towards "structures", in the world at large and/or in
mathematics, in order to proceed with the project of modeling the former by
the latter and drawing inspiration for the latter from the former. It is, I
claim, possible for someone simultaneously to adhere to a rigorously
`realist´ view of mathematics (say, naïve and unconsidered Platonism) and to
take the world to be entirely insubstantial and illusory (say, by adopting a
crass reduction of the Buddhist doctrine of Maya), _and still practice
mathematical modeling in good faith_ if not with guaranteed success. Other
(likely or unlikely) combinations of attitudes are (I claim) just as
possible, and equally compatible with the practice of modeling.  

I have the impression that many practitioners, if polled (which I have not
done), would declare themselves to be both mathematical `formalists´ and
physical `realists´. I also have the impression that a large, overlapping
group of practitioners, observed in action (which I have done, in a small
and unsystematic way), can reasonably be described to _behave_ like
thoroughgoing ontological agnostics.  Mathematical modeling _as human
behavior_ is based, I am claiming, on acts of pattern-matching (or
Gestalt-making)-which is to say,in other language, on
creation/recognition/awareness of `higher order structures´ relating some
`lower order structures´-that one performs (or that occur to one)
independently of one´s ontological stances. That is not all there is to it,
as behavior; but that is its basis.

===end===

To take Glen's question in (perhaps) a different direction, I note that Imre
Lakatos also used the word "ultimate" about mathematicians, as follows: "But
why on earth have `ultimate´ tests, `final authority´? Why foundations, if
they are admittedly subjective?  Why not honestly admit mathematical
fallibility, and try to defend the dignity of fallible knowledge from
cynical scepticism, rather than delude ourselves that we 

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[∄ uǝʃƃ]

First, by saying you and Eric(C) *attribute* so-and-so to Peirce, I'm not 
suggesting you're wrong.  I'm expressing my ignorance.  But I don't want to 
(falsely) accuse Peirce of anything, since he's not here to defend himself.  
So, I can only respond to what you say about what he said.  I'm very grateful 
for your attempts to suss it all out and serve it on a platter for people like 
me.

Second, in that same vane (Ha!), I haven't put in the effort to grok your 
"Natural Designs".  So, when I'm wrong, feel free to simply call me ignorant 
and move on.  I'm cool with that.

But on to the meat: When you say 

On 12/26/18 10:22 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> But we have to be careful not to mix up levels when we talk.  In any 
> particular conversation, we must not equivocate about levels, confuse things 
> within us, with things 'of' us"

I believe you're (implicitly) committing an error.  I've failed to call it out 
before.  You're asserting that the hierarchy is *strict*, which MAY be wrong.  
As Eric(S)'s post reflects (I think), higher order comprehensions (in the sense 
of "set comprehension" or quantifications like ∃ and ∀) are context-dependent 
and *may* even be dynamic.  That was my point about the inadequacy of "levels" 
(where N is stable but N+1 is unstable).  This is why "layer" is a better 
concept, because it's *softer*, weaker.

If you imagine an onion, some of the layers are like levels, thick and 
impenetrable.  And some of them (in some regions on the surface) are thin and 
mixed with the layers just inside or just outside.  The layers are 
heterarchical, not hierarchical.  If you really must use "level", we can say 
that some things in the level N comprehension are also contained in the level 
N+1 comprehension ... perhaps it helps to think of multiplying a scalar against 
a matrix, where the scalar is multiplied by each element of the matrix.  The 
scalar is of level 1, but the matrix is of level N+1 and it still makes sense 
to combine the two into something like a level 0.5 (or 1.5 ... or whatever) ... 
a fractional leveling.

Eric(S)'s discussion of equivalence, as dynamically regenerable coarse 
comprehensions of finer grained elements allows for this, whereas I'm not sure 
your "convergence to the real" does.

But my layer prejudice criticism of both your and Eric(S)'s conceptions 
applies, I think, because it's direction-independent.  While Eric(S) seems 
prejudiced to the fine-grain (inferred from his idea that the coarse 
equivalences should be robust to refinement), yours seems prejudiced to the 
coarse-grain (inferred from your "convergence to the real", and bolstered by 
your statement below about Natural Designs).  Which direction one is biased 
toward is less relevant to me than the assumption of a strict hierarchy.

And particular responses below:

On 12/26/18 10:22 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> On 12/25/18 7:02 AM, ∄ uǝʃƃ wrote:
>>  Why can't both the fine and coarse things have the same ontological status? 
>>  The example of the unicorn is unfortunate, I think, because the properties 
>> of unicorns are essentially stable.
> 
> */[NST==>Well, that’s sort of why I bring it up.  I think it’s possible that 
> inquiry might converge on what a unicorn IS without there ever having been a 
> unicorn.  Obviously, a unicorn is a white horse with a luxurious mane and 
> tail and a narwhale horn in the middle of its nose and on its back a damsel 
> with long flowing golden locks, a garland crown, and a white gown.  
> Obviously.  We all agree on THAT, don’t we?  <==nst] /*

You forgot the sparkles and the rainbows!

> [...]

>> And if we admit to a multi-level hierarchy, perhaps level N is unstable, 
>> level N+1 is stable, and level N+2 is (again) unstable?  Why not?
> 
> */[NST==>Oh wow I agree with all of THAT.  But I don’t think Peirce, or Eric 
> (Charles), or I are level-chauvinists in the way you need us to be.  I think 
> Peirce thought it was signs all the way down, i.e., he would be as happy 
> talking about sign relations in the retina as in a supermarket window.  See 
> my Nesting and Chaining  paper, if 
> you can stand it.  <==nst] /*

But both your treatment of 1) statements about unicorns and 2) convergence to 
the real *seem* to imply that this isn't true, that you *are* layer prejudiced 
in the way I infer you are.  With (1) why would comprehensions be more or less 
real/true than their components? Are matrices more or less real than scalars?  
Why wouldn't we eventually settle out that unicorns are just as real as 
statements about unicorns?  With (2) why can't temporary things be just as real 
as permanent things ... or perhaps more accurately, why can't intermediate 
states (stepping stones) be just as primary as the limit points they approach?  
Considering a furniture maker, is the chair any more real than the hammer?  
What if, after the chair is finished, on a lark, she nails the hammer she used 
to make the chair, to 

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[lrudolph]

Glen wrote, in relevant part, "Like mathematicians, maybe we have to ultimately 
commit to the 
ontological status of our parsing methods?"  I wish to question the implicit 
assumption that 
mathematicians _do_ (or even _ought to_) "ultimately commit to the ontological 
status" of 
_anything_ in particular.

I wrote (some time ago, and not here) something I will still stand by.  It 
appears at the 
beginning of a me-authored chapter in a me-edited book, "Qualitative 
Mathematics for the
Social Sciences: Mathematical models for research on cultural dynamics"; the 
"our" and "we" in 
the first sentence refer to me and my coauthor in an introductory chapter, not 
to me-and-a-
mouse-in-my-pocket.  (Note that I am a mathematician, _not_ a social scientist, 
and only very 
occasionally a mathematical modeler of any sort.) I have edited out some 
footnotes, etc., but 
in return have expanded some of the in-line references {inside curly braces}.

===begin===

In our Introduction (p. 17) we quoted "three statements, by mathematicians 
{Ralph Abraham; 
three guys named Bohle-Carbonell, Booß, Jensen, who I'd not heard of before 
working on the 
book; and Phil Davis} on mathematical modeling". Here is a fourth.

(D) Mathematics has its own structures; the world (as we perceive and cognize 
it) is, or 
appears to be, structured; mathematical modeling is a reciprocal process in 
which we 
_construct/discover/bring into awareness_ correspondences between mathematical 
structures and 
structures `in the world´, as we _take actions that get meaning from, and give 
meaning to,_ 
those structures and correspondences. 

Later (p. 24 ff.) we briefly viewed modeling from the standpoint of 
"evolutionary 
epistemology" in the style of Konrad Lorenz (1941) {Kant´s doctrine of the a 
priori in the 
light of contemporary biology}. In this chapter, I view modeling from the 
standpoint 
informally staked out by (D), which I propose to call "evolutionary ontology." 
My discussion 
is sketchy (and not very highly structured), but may help make sense of this 
volume and 
perhaps even mathematical modeling in general.

Behind (D) is my conviction that there is no need to adopt any particular 
ontological 
attitude(s) towards "structures", in the world at large and/or in mathematics, 
in order to 
proceed with the project of modeling the former by the latter and drawing 
inspiration for
the latter from the former. It is, I claim, possible for someone simultaneously 
to adhere to a 
rigorously `realist´ view of mathematics (say, naïve and unconsidered 
Platonism) and to take 
the world to be entirely insubstantial and illusory (say, by adopting a crass 
reduction of the 
Buddhist doctrine of Maya), _and still practice mathematical modeling in good 
faith_ if not 
with guaranteed success. Other (likely or unlikely) combinations of attitudes 
are (I claim) 
just as possible, and equally compatible with the practice of modeling.  

I have the impression that many practitioners, if polled (which I have not 
done), would 
declare themselves to be both mathematical `formalists´ and physical 
`realists´. I also have 
the impression that a large, overlapping group of practitioners, observed in 
action (which
I have done, in a small and unsystematic way), can reasonably be described to 
_behave_ like 
thoroughgoing ontological agnostics.  Mathematical modeling _as human behavior_ 
is based, I am 
claiming, on acts of pattern-matching (or Gestalt-making)-which is to say,in 
other language, 
on creation/recognition/awareness of `higher order structures´ relating some 
`lower order 
structures´-that one performs (or that occur to one) independently of one´s 
ontological 
stances. That is not all there is to it, as behavior; but that is its basis.

===end===

To take Glen's question in (perhaps) a different direction, I note that Imre 
Lakatos also used 
the word "ultimate" about mathematicians, as follows: "But why on earth have 
`ultimate´ tests, 
`final authority´? Why foundations, if they are admittedly subjective?  Why not 
honestly admit 
mathematical fallibility, and try to defend the dignity of fallible knowledge 
from cynical 
scepticism, rather than delude ourselves that we can invisibly mend the latest 
tear in the 
fabric of our "ultimate" intuitions?" As I have learned from Nick, Peirce is 
also committed to 
the defense of "the dignity of fallible knowledge" (at least, I *think* I've 
learned that from 
Nick; but I might be wrong...).


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Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[Nick Thompson]

Glen, 

 

I am having a terrible time keeping up with my own thread here.  (Fools rush 
in, etc.)  But I will add a little larding where I can, below.  Thanks for your 
work, here.  Thanks to Renee for loaning you to us.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of ? u???
Sent: Tuesday, December 25, 2018 8:02 AM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

 

I've tried to catch up with this thread and probably failed to grok most of it. 
 But it strikes me that your coarse- and fine-graining formulation of 
abstraction and Nick and Eric's true/real distinction are both instances of 
what I'll call "layer prejudice".  I almost want to call it a form of 
reductionism as a criticism of Nick's original posted paper and the conception 
of "Natural Design" as a favoritism for the fine-layer structure over the 
meta-stuff (self, agency, intention, etc.).  But neither your coarse-/fine- nor 
the true/real distinction seem to fully commit to reduction, perhaps for 
different reasons. [NST==> I think the term, “layer prejudice” is patentable 
and I would like, if you don’t mind, to purchase a license for its  use.  I 
might suggest “layer bias”, just because the rhythm works better, but the basic 
idea is  stunner, and I want to keep it close.  However, I hope you have 
misread “natural design” because otherwise I have mis-wrote it.  My level-bias 
is distinctly upward.  Where others might think of an intention as an inner 
state, something about my guts or my brain, I think of it as a higher-order 
patter.  For most people who talk about the brain, it is serving as a covert 
behavioral model, but without the potential for falsifiability that a genuine 
behavioral model would afford.   <==nst] 

 

 

Like mathematicians, maybe we have to ultimately commit to the ontological 
status of our parsing methods?  Are the equivalence classes 
things-in-themselves (Platonic)?  Or are they merely convenient/useful fictions 
(Construction) we use to parse an *inherently* dynamic (perhaps even unstable 
or mystical/hidden[†]) world?

[NST==>Remember, the whole point about the ding an sich is that it is 
inaccessible.  Peirce thought “generals” were real but not inaccessible.  
<==nst] 

 

It's unclear to me why we have to be "layer prejudiced". 

[NST==>I agree.  I guess I believe in “ontological “ levels, just the way the 
different levels in a fractal are real patterns.  But we have to be careful not 
to mix up levels when we talk.  In any particular conversation, we must not 
equivocate about levels, confuse things within us, with things “of” us.  ==nst] 

 Why can't both the fine and coarse things have the same ontological status?  
The example of the unicorn is unfortunate, I think, because the properties of 
unicorns are essentially stable. 

[NST==>Well, that’s sort of why I bring it up.  I think it’s possible that 
inquiry might converge on what a unicorn IS without there ever having been a 
unicorn.  Obviously, a unicorn is a white horse with a luxurious mane and tail 
and a narwhale horn in the middle of its nose and on its back a damsel with 
long flowing golden locks, a garland crown, and a white gown.  Obviously.  We 
all agree on THAT, don’t we?  <==nst] 

 Given a particular culture, every little girl knows what a unicorn is and can 
predict with certainty what another little girl will expect to see when 
presented with one.  Hence, studies of unicorns *will* eventually stabilize as 
long as the underlying culture is stable.  This is exactly the same type of 
statement one might make about the multiverse.  We can predict the properties 
of spacetime outside the observable universe *if* the underlying multiverse is 
stable.  These little unicorn experts eventually evolve into "shut up and 
calculate" adults who hang unicorns from their rear view mirrors, nostalgic for 
the (innocent) days when they were committed to the status of unicorns.  (At 
least 1/2 the cheesy XMas movies Renee's made me watch involve reinvigorating 
one's belief in "magic", "santa claus", or "christmas spirit", much like 
Einstein or Russell might have felt after their paradigms were successfully 
challenged.) So why would statements about unicorns have a different 
ontological status than statements in physics?  And, further, why would the 
subjects of statements about unicorns have a different status than the subjects 
of physical laws? 

[NST==>I am afraid I don’t have a lot to say here.  My family spent Christmas 
day rewatching The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.  <==nst] 

 

It seems reasonable to claim that the answer to my question is: one's 
metaphysical commitment (Platonic or Construction).

[NST==>I think this is also known

Re: [FRIAM] Abduction

[∄ uǝʃƃ]

I've tried to catch up with this thread and probably failed to grok most of it. 
 But it strikes me that your coarse- and fine-graining formulation of 
abstraction and Nick and Eric's true/real distinction are both instances of 
what I'll call "layer prejudice".  I almost want to call it a form of 
reductionism as a criticism of Nick's original posted paper and the conception 
of "Natural Design" as a favoritism for the fine-layer structure over the 
meta-stuff (self, agency, intention, etc.).  But neither your coarse-/fine- nor 
the true/real distinction seem to fully commit to reduction, perhaps for 
different reasons.

Like mathematicians, maybe we have to ultimately commit to the ontological 
status of our parsing methods?  Are the equivalence classes 
things-in-themselves (Platonic)?  Or are they merely convenient/useful fictions 
(Construction) we use to parse an *inherently* dynamic (perhaps even unstable 
or mystical/hidden[†]) world?

It's unclear to me why we have to be "layer prejudiced".  Why can't both the 
fine and coarse things have the same ontological status?  The example of the 
unicorn is unfortunate, I think, because the properties of unicorns are 
essentially stable.  Given a particular culture, every little girl knows what a 
unicorn is and can predict with certainty what another little girl will expect 
to see when presented with one.  Hence, studies of unicorns *will* eventually 
stabilize as long as the underlying culture is stable.  This is exactly the 
same type of statement one might make about the multiverse.  We can predict the 
properties of spacetime outside the observable universe *if* the underlying 
multiverse is stable.  These little unicorn experts eventually evolve into 
"shut up and calculate" adults who hang unicorns from their rear view mirrors, 
nostalgic for the (innocent) days when they were committed to the status of 
unicorns.  (At least 1/2 the cheesy XMas movies Renee's made me watch involve 
reinvigorating one's belief in "magic", "santa claus", or "christmas spirit", 
much like Einstein or Russell might have felt after their paradigms were 
successfully challenged.) So why would statements about unicorns have a 
different ontological status than statements in physics?  And, further, why 
would the subjects of statements about unicorns have a different status than 
the subjects of physical laws? 

It seems reasonable to claim that the answer to my question is: one's 
metaphysical commitment (Platonic or Construction).

[†] By which I intend something like B.C. Smith's "ontological wall", Hoffman's 
Interface, or OOO's withdrawn objects ... not the spiritual stuff.


p.s. In this post, I *wanted* to talk about quasi-periodicity, the 
perhaps-periodic-within-some-larger-context signals that we can successfully 
classify as periodic for some (but not other) purposes. It seems to me this 
prejudice toward "convergence" and the ontological status of limit/horizon 
points Nick and Eric keep claiming Peirce was after fits methods for 
quasi-periodicity to a tee.  But if we proceed with a badly formulated problem, 
all we'll get is a badly formulated solution.  If we don't know where we're 
going, how will we know when we (do or don't) get there? For what purposes 
should unicorns be metaphorically real and for what purposes should they be 
metaphorically fictitious?  I demoted quasi-periodicity to the postscript 
because I'm worried that not enough of us have enough experience learning 
they've been *tricked* by pareidolia.  But, ultimately, concepts like 
stationarity target the meta-friendly question of whether the coarse- can be 
stable while the fine- is unstable.  And if we admit to a multi-level 
hierarchy, perhaps level N is unstable, level N+1 is stable, and level N+2 is 
(again) unstable?  Why not?

p.p.s. Merry Christmas! >8^D


-- 
∄ uǝʃƃ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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