Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Jon S, Gary F, List,

Jeff wrote: "Let's start with this question:  why is the sign (or
representamen), which is the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine
triadic relation, the simplest of the three? "

GR: The sign is simplest, is first, is a 1ns,  *because* it is a mere
possibility. Of all the forms (characters) of an object that *might* be
represented in a sign, something is "singled out," so to speak--a mere*
form  (the ground) *which *may* be represented in the way some, *this*,
sign represents it).

Jeff continues: "i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As
a representamen, the qualisign stands for *single* reference to a ground,
where this reference is to the possession of an internal quality. "

It may be that "This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign.' But I
don't think that this is necessarily so: *every sign* is a 1ns, for it was
a mere possibility of being represented, but now *is* represented in *ths*
paticular sign (a quali-/sin-/ or legisgin) and in the course of time (I
disagree with Jon A here--*time is essential* in semeiosis,although much
 less so in pure logic) the representamen *will* help bring us closer to
the *truth* of the sign as it is--in time--self-correcdting as semeiosis is.

Jeff continued: "ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two
things (i.e., brute reaction), stands as *double* reference to the
correlate and ground. "
GR: The second correlate *is* the objecti, but part of it's "double
reference" is outside the sign (the DO) while the "ground" (the 'form'
abstracted from that DO) is implicated in the IO (is the IO?).

JD: "iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of
interpreting thought, stands as *triple* reference to ground, correlate and
interpretant."

GR: I'm not sure what you mean by writing this. The third correlate *is*
the interpretant; so while the DO determines the ground (IO) which
determines the Representamen (is that what you meant by "correlate"
above?), what* is **determined* (in a non-dyadic sense discussed at length
on this list) IS the Intreprentant. (What might be conceived as 'triple'
are the three kinds of Interpretants.)

Jeff continued: "If this suitably modified version of the distinction
between single, double and triple reference--or something similar--is still
part of his understanding of how signs stand in relations to objects and
interpretants, then I think it is quite apparent that the order of
complexity goes from the sign, as the simplest to the object and
interpretant as the more complex correlates."

GR: I can't say I see a "modified version" here as the Representamen IS
always a 1ns in Peirce's theory (even when it mediates between the Object
and the Interpretant), the Object IS a 2ns, and the Interprentant IS a 3ns.

Still (and given that there are 6 vectors, or possible paths, through a
triadic relation), it is the case that a 2ns (Object) can determine a 1ns
(Representament) for an Interpretant (3ns). I call this the "vector of
determination" (in Peirce's sense of semiotic determination). *But*, it
goes without saying that the representament may be any of the 10 (or, I
suppose, 660 classes of signs.

Question: Isn't this kind of analysis rather 'standard'? Or am I kidding
myself?
.

Jeff concluded: "Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested
that Peirce has largely dropped this early and immature understanding of
single, double and triple reference by the time he is developing the
semiotic theory in his more mature writings such as NDTR. I, on the other
hand, take him at face value when he says that the essay was remarkably
prescient, and that he hasn't rejected any of he major points made in this
earlier works."


GR: I think Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy are wrong (what is their textual
support?) and I agree with you that there are single, double, and triple
references in his semiotic theory from the get go all the way to its
maturist expression; that is, as you wrote, "that he hasn't rejected any of
he major points made in this earlier works." I guess I ought to drop my mic
here. . .


Best,


Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 10:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List,
>
>
> Given how much Peirce seems to be presupposing in the first few pages of
> NDTR, I want to suggest that try to draw from prior essays for the sake of
> filling in some of the picture. Consider what he says, for example, in the
> Lowell Lectures of 1866 and "On a New List of the Categories." Looking back
> on this published essay later in life, Peirce says that it was an error on
> his part to treat the second category as relation and the third category as
> representation. Otherwise, the argument is one that he still largely
> accepts at about 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

I wish to point out just how ridiculously clear this statement is:

"...Peirce says that it was an error on his part to treat the second
category as relation and the third category as representation."

Best,
J

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 9:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List,
>
>
> Given how much Peirce seems to be presupposing in the first few pages of
> NDTR, I want to suggest that try to draw from prior essays for the sake of
> filling in some of the picture. Consider what he says, for example, in the
> Lowell Lectures of 1866 and "On a New List of the Categories." Looking back
> on this published essay later in life, Peirce says that it was an error on
> his part to treat the second category as relation and the third category as
> representation. Otherwise, the argument is one that he still largely
> accepts at about the time  he wrote NDTR. So, if we reinterpret what he says
> in these early works in light of the modifications he later made--such that
> the first category is monadic quality, the second category is dyadic brute
> reaction, and the third category is triadic thought, then we can draw on
> what he says there to understand a number of points on those first three
> pages.
>
>
> Let's start with this question:  why is the sign (or representamen), which
> is the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the
> simplest of the three?
>
>
> Looking at Lecture IX of the Lowell Lectures and what he later says in the
> "On a New List", we see the following kind of answer to the question emerge
> in three parts:
>
>
> i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As a
> representamen, the qualisign stands for *single* reference to a ground,
> where this reference is to the possession of an internal quality.
>
>
> ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two things (i.e., brute
> reaction), stands as *double* reference to the correlate and ground.
>
>
> iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of
> interpreting thought, stands as *triple* reference to ground, correlate
> and interpretant.
>
>
> If this suitably modified version of the distinction between single,
> double and triple reference--or something similar--is still part of his
> understanding of how signs stand in relations to objects and interpretants,
> then I think it is quite apparent that the order of complexity goes
> from the sign, as the simplest to the object and interpretant as the more
> complex correlates.
>
>
> Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested that Peirce has
> largely dropped this early and immature understanding of single, double and
> triple reference by the time he is developing the semiotic theory in his
> more mature writings such as NDTR. I, on the other hand, take him at face
> value when he says that the essay was remarkably prescient, and that
> he hasn't rejected any of he major points made in this earlier works.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Sunday, April 16, 2017 5:16 PM
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> Consider these two passages.
>
> CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
> the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
> that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
> Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
> complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
> a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236;
> 1903)
>
>
> CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible;
> it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
> Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the
> Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
> itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the
> Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six
> trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
> they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)
>
>
> If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with
> "Necessitant," and define "determines" in accordance with the second
> passage, then the first passage entails that the Third Correlate determines
> the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate.  This is the
> only way that the same procedure that yields 28 classes from six correlate
> trichotomies will yield ten classes from three correlate trichotomies *such
> that* the First Correlate is a law only if 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List,


Given how much Peirce seems to be presupposing in the first few pages of NDTR, 
I want to suggest that try to draw from prior essays for the sake of filling in 
some of the picture. Consider what he says, for example, in the Lowell Lectures 
of 1866 and "On a New List of the Categories." Looking back on this published 
essay later in life, Peirce says that it was an error on his part to treat the 
second category as relation and the third category as representation. 
Otherwise, the argument is one that he still largely accepts at about the time  
he wrote NDTR. So, if we reinterpret what he says in these early works in light 
of the modifications he later made--such that the first category is monadic 
quality, the second category is dyadic brute reaction, and the third category 
is triadic thought, then we can draw on what he says there to understand a 
number of points on those first three pages.


Let's start with this question:  why is the sign (or representamen), which is 
the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the simplest of 
the three?


Looking at Lecture IX of the Lowell Lectures and what he later says in the "On 
a New List", we see the following kind of answer to the question emerge in 
three parts:


i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As a representamen, the 
qualisign stands for single reference to a ground, where this reference is to 
the possession of an internal quality.


ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two things (i.e., brute 
reaction), stands as double reference to the correlate and ground.


iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of interpreting thought, 
stands as triple reference to ground, correlate and interpretant.


If this suitably modified version of the distinction between single, double and 
triple reference--or something similar--is still part of his understanding of 
how signs stand in relations to objects and interpretants, then I think it is 
quite apparent that the order of complexity goes from the sign, as the simplest 
to the object and interpretant as the more complex correlates.


Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested that Peirce has largely 
dropped this early and immature understanding of single, double and triple 
reference by the time he is developing the semiotic theory in his more mature 
writings such as NDTR. I, on the other hand, take him at face value when he 
says that the essay was remarkably prescient, and that he hasn't rejected any 
of he major points made in this earlier works.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Sunday, April 16, 2017 5:16 PM
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

Consider these two passages.

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Third 
Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236; 1903)

CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is 
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. 
Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object 
determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which 
determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the Effective 
Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, 
instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were 
independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)

If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with "Necessitant," 
and define "determines" in accordance with the second passage, then the first 
passage entails that the Third Correlate determines the Second Correlate, which 
determines the First Correlate.  This is the only way that the same procedure 
that yields 28 classes from six correlate trichotomies will yield ten classes 
from three correlate trichotomies such that the First Correlate is a law only 
if all three are laws, and the Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if 
all three are mere possibilities.  Please note, I am well aware that these are 
not the ten Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it 
formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me 
than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t 
understand.

I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how interpretants can be 
signs in a cascade of interpretation if signs are limited to representamens. 
This seems to me to be a similar problem.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 5:22 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice.

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Consider these two passages.

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236;
1903)


CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible;
it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the
Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six
trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)


If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with
"Necessitant," and define "determines" in accordance with the second
passage, then the first passage entails that the Third Correlate determines
the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate.  This is the
only way that the same procedure that yields 28 classes from six correlate
trichotomies will yield ten classes from three correlate trichotomies *such
that* the First Correlate is a law only if all three are laws, and the
Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if all three are mere
possibilities.  Please note, I am well aware that these are not the ten
Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:49 PM,  wrote:

> Jon S, see insert below …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 17:40
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> GR:  But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that
> Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant
> ...
>
>  Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me.  That
> passage requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to determine the Second
> Correlate (Object), and the Second Correlate (Object) to determine the
> First Correlate (Sign).
>
> [GF: ] That “requirement” is something you have read into it, I think by
> mistaking Peirce’s order of presentation for the order of determination.
> Try fixing your understanding of the order of determination in your mind,
> and then read the passage again carefully and test whether it is consistent
> with your understanding. I think you’ll see that it is. It certainly is
> consistent with the understanding I’ve expressed, which you’ve said you
> agree with.
>
>
>
> It’s also possible that you’ve been distracted by Peirce’s statement that
> “These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations
> into ten classes.” They would indeed, but since they are not the three
> trichotomies *of sign types*, they would not divide *signs* into the same
> ten classes that Peirce gives us later in NDTR.
>
>
>
> I wonder if part of the problem here is that there are differences in what
> each of us means by "determine"; again, I am using it as synonymous with
> "constrain the mode of."
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon S, List,

I'm afraid your post did *not* make me feel any less queasy. My comments
are interleaved below preceeded by GR:

When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I
mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the
first *constrains *the mode of the second.

[GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness,
Secondness, Thirdness?)


GR: Where is the language of 'mode' coming from? I don't find it helpful.
Why call 1ns/2ns/3ns modes? Did Peirce?



Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the
Sign-Object relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow
from this that the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a
symbolic Dicisign (proposition) or a Rheme (term).


GR: Huh? Dicisigns and Rhemes are both Legisigns.



The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the
Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.

[GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy …


GR: But doesn't the Interpretant stand in the same (or similar, that is,
slightly more developed) relation to the Object to which the Representamen
stands?



That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27.
That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an
Argument must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.

[GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination
that accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine
simpler, but not the reverse).


GR: Queasiness again. . .



GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.



Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying
that whether the Sign *is *an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the
Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast, my
understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign
in respect to the Object determines whether the Sign *is classified *as an
Argument, Dicent, or Rheme.

[GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way
because it *really is* that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s *definition* of
that Sign type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other
words, I’m speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. g\


GR: Signs are qualisigns/sinsigns/or legisigns (marks/tokens/or types).
They are argumenta*tive*, dicent*ic*, rhema*tic* icon*ic*, indexi*cal*,
symbol*ic*, etc.



The Sign *in itself* is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign.
No Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument *in itself*; it is only
*classified *as such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in
respect to the Object.  Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol *in
itself*; it is only *classified *as such by virtue of its relation to its
Object.

[GF: ] OK, that’s true. As long as we agree that all nine of these Sign
types are classifications of *Signs*, i.e. of First Correlates in the
various triadic relations that make up this universe of semiotic discourse.
Sometimes I think that the kind of confusion we’ve been experiencing is
sown by the habit of referring to the Sign as the “whole triad” rather than
the First Correlate of a triadic relation, which is how Peirce defines the
term “Sign” in the Syllabus. That’s why I consider it a bad habit, at least
for any reader trying to understand*Peircean* semiotic.


GR: I agree with JS here. See what I just wrote just above. It is my
understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of Signs," rather,
they are *parametric* in the sense that Ben Udell and I introduced in my
first paper on the topic over a decade ago and, as Peirce said, together
(given certain constraints) lead to the Classification of Signs into 10
classes. I think that the whole notion of 'Corrlate' has not been clarified
in this discussion, and may be the source of much of what I see as some
considerable confusion in what I though was fairly well settled grammatical
theory. Now for some gingerale.


Best,


Gary R






[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S, see insert below …

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 17:40



Gary R., List:

 

GR:  But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce 
always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant ...

 

Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me.  That passage 
requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to determine the Second Correlate 
(Object), and the Second Correlate (Object) to determine the First Correlate 
(Sign). 

[GF: ] That “requirement” is something you have read into it, I think by 
mistaking Peirce’s order of presentation for the order of determination. Try 
fixing your understanding of the order of determination in your mind, and then 
read the passage again carefully and test whether it is consistent with your 
understanding. I think you’ll see that it is. It certainly is consistent with 
the understanding I’ve expressed, which you’ve said you agree with.

 

It’s also possible that you’ve been distracted by Peirce’s statement that 
“These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations into 
ten classes.” They would indeed, but since they are not the three trichotomies 
of sign types, they would not divide signs into the same ten classes that 
Peirce gives us later in NDTR.

 

I wonder if part of the problem here is that there are differences in what each 
of us means by "determine"; again, I am using it as synonymous with "constrain 
the mode of."

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F.:

Responses to your responses below.

Jon S.

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 5:47 PM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
>
>
> I think i’m beginning to catch on to what you’re driving at, so I’ll
> insert my responses below. I hope this doesn’t make you any queasier, Gary
> R, as I have no desire to evoke that kind of feeling!
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 17:31
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I
> mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the
> first *constrains *the mode of the second.
>
> [GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness,
> Secondness, Thirdness?)
>
JAS:  Yes.

>
>
> The Sign determines the Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in
> itself is a possibility, then the Sign-Object relation must be a
> possibility; and if the Sign-Object relation is a law, then the Sign in
> itself must be a law.
>
> [GF: ] Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the
> Sign-Object relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow
> from this that the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a
> symbolic Dicisign (proposition) or a Rheme (term).
>
JAS:  It follows from the order of determination (in my sense) that only a
Legisign can be a Symbol, because the mode of the Sign in itself constrains
the possible modes of its relation to its Object.  A Legisign can also be
an Index or an Icon, and a Sinsign must be either an Index or an Icon,
while a Qualisign can only be an Icon.  Likewise, a Symbol can be a Rheme
(term), Dicent (proposition), or Argument; an Index must be either a Rheme
or a Dicent; and an Icon can only be a Rheme.

>
>
> The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.
>
> [GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy …
>
JAS:  It was easier to talk about all this when I thought that the third
trichotomy was the dyadic Sign-Interpretant relation.  There is no obvious
shorthand for "how the Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the
Object."

>
>
> That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than
> 27.  That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an
> Argument must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.
>
> [GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination
> that accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine
> simpler, but not the reverse).
>
JAS:  Right, but when I say "order of determination," I mean (in this case)
Sign first, Sign-Object relation second, and how Interpretant represents
Sign in respect to Object third.  What I think you mean by "order of
determination" also comes into play, but only once we put the three
trichotomies in the proper sequence to apply that constraint as I outlined
above.

> GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation
> determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is
> determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.
>
> Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying
> that whether the Sign *is *an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how
> the Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast,
> my understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the
> Sign in respect to the Object determines whether the Sign *is classified *as
> an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme.
>
> [GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way
> because it *really is* that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s *definition* of
> that Sign type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other
> words, I’m speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. All of
> Peirce’s definitions of the nine sign types in the three trichotomies are
> consistent with the order of determination as stated above, as far as I can
> see, but they *are* definitions, so they do determine what *names* are
> applied to the signs which fit them.
>
JAS:  I seem to recall that there have been List debates in the past about
what to call the nine names that come from the three trichotomies.  I am
not a fan of "sign types" personally, but I am not sure what else would be
better; Jappy uses "subdivisions," which makes some sense.  In any case, I
still suspect that we are coming at this from opposite directions.  Is a
Sign classified as a Rheme because its Interpretant represents it as a sign
of possibility, or does a Sign represent its Interpretant as a sign of
possibility because it is a Rheme?

>
>
> The Sign *in itself* is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or
> Legisign.  No Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument *in itself*; it
> is only *classified *as such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents
> it in respect to the Object.  Likewise, no Sign is 

Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction, was [PEIRCE-L] The object of reasoning is to find out ...

[Gary Richmond]

Jon A, List,

Jon A wrote:

People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.


I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have
argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my
understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination
which does not capture triadic 'determination'.

So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking
the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are
not captured by S-R chains."

Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context
of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new
concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind
around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that certain
'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as
important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in
consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried discussing
some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at the
time, for reasons just noted.)

This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and
scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of this
thread.

Best,

Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> | “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
> |
> | — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3)
> |
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio
> n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/
>
> | The object of reasoning is to find out,
> | from the consideration of what we already know,
> | something else which we do not know.
> |
> http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html
>
> If the object of an investigation is
> to find out something we did not know
> then the clues and evidence discovered
> are the signs that determine that object.
>
> We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ...
> but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ...
>
> People will continue to be confused about determination
> so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
> behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
> sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
> biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
> but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
> interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
> A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
> and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
> of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
> stripes, or pockets.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> --
>
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

John C,

 

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice. 

 

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

 

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

 

Gary f.

 

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally. 

 

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

 

Cheers,

John

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon,

 

I think i’m beginning to catch on to what you’re driving at, so I’ll insert my 
responses below. I hope this doesn’t make you any queasier, Gary R, as I have 
no desire to evoke that kind of feeling!

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 17:31



Gary F., List:

 

When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I 
mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the first 
constrains the mode of the second.

[GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness?)

 

The Sign determines the Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in itself is 
a possibility, then the Sign-Object relation must be a possibility; and if the 
Sign-Object relation is a law, then the Sign in itself must be a law.

[GF: ] Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the 
Sign-Object relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow 
from this that the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a 
symbolic Dicisign (proposition) or a Rheme (term).

 

The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the 
Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.

[GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy …

 

That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27.  
That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an Argument 
must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.

[GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination that 
accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine simpler, but 
not the reverse).

 

GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.

 

Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying that 
whether the Sign is an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the 
Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast, my 
understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign in 
respect to the Object determines whether the Sign is classified as an Argument, 
Dicent, or Rheme.

[GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way 
because it really is that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s definition of that Sign 
type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other words, I’m 
speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. All of Peirce’s 
definitions of the nine sign types in the three trichotomies are consistent 
with the order of determination as stated above, as far as I can see, but they 
are definitions, so they do determine what names are applied to the signs which 
fit them.  

 

The Sign in itself is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign.  No 
Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument in itself; it is only classified as 
such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in respect to the Object.  
Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol in itself; it is only 
classified as such by virtue of its relation to its Object.

[GF: ] OK, that’s true. As long as we agree that all nine of these Sign types 
are classifications of Signs, i.e. of First Correlates in the various triadic 
relations that make up this universe of semiotic discourse. Sometimes I think 
that the kind of confusion we’ve been experiencing is sown by the habit of 
referring to the Sign as the “whole triad” rather than the First Correlate of a 
triadic relation, which is how Peirce defines the term “Sign” in the Syllabus. 
That’s why I consider it a bad habit, at least for any reader trying to 
understand Peircean semiotic.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


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[PEIRCE-L] The object of reasoning is to find out ...

[Jon Awbrey]

| “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
|
| — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3)
|
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/

| The object of reasoning is to find out,
| from the consideration of what we already know,
| something else which we do not know.
|
http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html

If the object of an investigation is
to find out something we did not know
then the clues and evidence discovered
are the signs that determine that object.

We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ...
but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ...

People will continue to be confused about determination
so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the
behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and
sign-as-response variety.  It is true that ordinary language
biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination,
but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and
interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order.
A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about,
and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds
of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids,
stripes, or pockets.

Regards,

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

By purely iconic, I meant iconic sign. Both the object and the representamen 
and the interpretant are the same thing as each other, at least as I understand 
it. Hence a trivial case.

John

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 3:17 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C, List,

Would you explain this remark: "The only time [the] sign (I am assuming you 
mean representamen) might determine the objects is when it is purely iconic. I 
take it that this is a trivial case."?

Even in the case of the three classes of iconic signs in the classification 
into 10 classes it would seem to me that the Object determines the 
Representamen for the Interpretant. I don't see any exceptions.

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 4:37 PM, John Collier 
> wrote:
This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
[mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 2:07 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' >
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” 
and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his 
definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the 
Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the dichotomy 
between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is not mentioned in NDTR.)

There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” 
(EP2:272), where he says that “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.” 
But I have yet to see anyplace where Peirce says or implies that the Sign 
determines the Sign-Object relation. If you can cite such a place, please do 
so. And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But 
again, I’m happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a 
Peirce text.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 15:34
To: Gary Fuhrman >
Cc: Peirce-L >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has 
nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and 
if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make 
absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.

... because to me, it contradicts #7.

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so 
that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument.

The order of determination does not apply only to correlates, it applies to all 
of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign determines the 
Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant represents the 
Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the three trichotomies in 
CP 2.243 is not random or inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to 
your order, an Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an 
Icon; but these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce 
went on to identify.

As for #12 ...

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant 
trichotomy” in NDTR.

This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have been 
Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908, the order 
of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR:  But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that
Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant
...


Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me.  That
passage requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to determine the Second
Correlate (Object), and the Second Correlate (Object) to determine the
First Correlate (Sign).  I wonder if part of the problem here is that there
are differences in what each of us means by "determine"; again, I am using
it as synonymous with "constrain the mode of."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 3:35 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon S, List,
>
> Maybe I should stay out of this discussion at this point, this suggested
> by the fact that I'm getting confused by the dialague Gary F and Jon S are
> currently having. I hope it's just some terminological confusion, since
> these issues under discussion once seemed fairly simple and, even, obvious
> to me.
>
> But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce
> *always* says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant
> and, as I see it, this is so even when Peirce notes that the Object stands
> in the same relation to the Interpretant as the Sign does.
>
> Indeed, I don't at all think that this changes even when Peirce introduces
> the IO/DO dichotomy, for the DO, he notes (in a diagram I can't quickly
> locate), determines the IO, which determines the R, which determins the I.
>
> I found that I couldn't contradict any of the several points Gary F
> enumerated. So, I am hoping that this gets cleared up quickly as the
> present confusion is making me feel queasy.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I
mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the
first *constrains *the mode of the second.  The Sign determines the
Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in itself is a possibility, then
the Sign-Object relation must be a possibility; and if the Sign-Object
relation is a law, then the Sign in itself must be a law.  The same is true
for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the Interpretant
represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  That is why three
trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27.  That is why a
Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an Argument must also
be a Symbol and a Legisign.

GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.


Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying
that whether the Sign *is *an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the
Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast, my
understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign
in respect to the Object determines whether the Sign *is classified *as an
Argument, Dicent, or Rheme.

The Sign *in itself* is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign.
No Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument *in itself*; it is only
*classified
*as such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in respect to the
Object.  Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol *in itself*;
it is only *classified *as such by virtue of its relation to its Object.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 3:06 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object
> relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce
> usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to
> determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he
> introduces the dichotomy between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is
> not mentioned in NDTR.)
>
>
>
> There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar”
> (EP2:272), where he says that “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First
> which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its
> *Object,* as to be capable of determining a Third, called its
> *Interpretant,* to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in
> which it stands itself to the same Object.” But I have yet to see anyplace
> where Peirce says or implies that the Sign *determines the Sign-Object
> relation*. If you can cite such a place, please do so. And that goes
> double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by
> whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But again, I’m
> happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a Peirce
> text.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

John C, List,

Would you explain this remark: "The only time [the] sign (I am assuming you
mean representamen) might determine the objects is when it is purely
iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case."?

Even in the case of the three classes of iconic signs in the classification
into 10 classes it would seem to me that the Object determines the
Representamen for the Interpretant. I don't see any exceptions.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 4:37 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you
> quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.
>
>
>
> The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might
> determine the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a
> trivial case.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
> *Sent:* Sunday, 16 April 2017 2:07 PM
> *To:* 'Peirce-L' 
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
>
>
> Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object
> relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce
> usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to
> determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he
> introduces the dichotomy between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is
> not mentioned in NDTR.)
>
>
>
> There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar”
> (EP2:272), where he says that “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First
> which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its
> *Object,* as to be capable of determining a Third, called its
> *Interpretant,* to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in
> which it stands itself to the same Object.” But I have yet to see anyplace
> where Peirce says or implies that the Sign *determines the Sign-Object
> relation*. If you can cite such a place, please do so. And that goes
> double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by
> whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But again, I’m
> happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a Peirce
> text.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> ]
> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 15:34
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...
>
>
>
> GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed
> has nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to
> correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this
> would make absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.
>
>
>
> ... because to me, it contradicts #7.
>
>
>
> GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination,
> so that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an
> argument.
>
>
>
> The order of determination does not apply *only *to correlates, it
> applies to *all *of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular,
> the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation, which determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the
> order of the three trichotomies in CP 2.243 is *not *random or
> inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to your order, an
> Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an Icon; but
> these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce went on
> to identify.
>
>
>
> As for #12 ...
>
>
>
> GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant
> trichotomy” in NDTR.
>
>
>
> This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have
> been Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908,
> the order of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three)
> Interpretants.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon S, List,

Maybe I should stay out of this discussion at this point, this suggested by
the fact that I'm getting confused by the dialague Gary F and Jon S are
currently having. I hope it's just some terminological confusion, since
these issues under discussion once seemed fairly simple and, even, obvious
to me.

But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce
*always* says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant and,
as I see it, this is so even when Peirce notes that the Object stands in
the same relation to the Interpretant as the Sign does.

Indeed, I don't at all think that this changes even when Peirce introduces
the IO/DO dichotomy, for the DO, he notes (in a diagram I can't quickly
locate), determines the IO, which determines the R, which determins the I.

I found that I couldn't contradict any of the several points Gary F
enumerated. So, I am hoping that this gets cleared up quickly as the
present confusion is making me feel queasy.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 4:06 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object
> relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce
> usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to
> determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he
> introduces the dichotomy between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is
> not mentioned in NDTR.)
>
>
>
> There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar”
> (EP2:272), where he says that “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First
> which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its
> *Object,* as to be capable of determining a Third, called its
> *Interpretant,* to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in
> which it stands itself to the same Object.” But I have yet to see anyplace
> where Peirce says or implies that the Sign *determines the Sign-Object
> relation*. If you can cite such a place, please do so. And that goes
> double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by
> whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But again, I’m
> happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a Peirce
> text.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 15:34
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...
>
>
>
> GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed
> has nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to
> correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this
> would make absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.
>
>
>
> ... because to me, it contradicts #7.
>
>
>
> GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination,
> so that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an
> argument.
>
>
>
> The order of determination does not apply *only *to correlates, it
> applies to *all *of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular,
> the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation, which determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the
> order of the three trichotomies in CP 2.243 is *not *random or
> inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to your order, an
> Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an Icon; but
> these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce went on
> to identify.
>
>
>
> As for #12 ...
>
>
>
> GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant
> trichotomy” in NDTR.
>
>
>
> This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have
> been Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908,
> the order of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three)
> Interpretants.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 2:07 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” 
and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his 
definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the 
Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the dichotomy 
between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is not mentioned in NDTR.)

There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” 
(EP2:272), where he says that “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.” 
But I have yet to see anyplace where Peirce says or implies that the Sign 
determines the Sign-Object relation. If you can cite such a place, please do 
so. And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But 
again, I’m happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a 
Peirce text.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 15:34
To: Gary Fuhrman >
Cc: Peirce-L >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has 
nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and 
if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make 
absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.

... because to me, it contradicts #7.

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so 
that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument.

The order of determination does not apply only to correlates, it applies to all 
of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign determines the 
Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant represents the 
Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the three trichotomies in 
CP 2.243 is not random or inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to 
your order, an Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an 
Icon; but these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce 
went on to identify.

As for #12 ...

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant 
trichotomy” in NDTR.

This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have been 
Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908, the order 
of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

-
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” 
and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his 
definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the 
Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the dichotomy 
between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is not mentioned in NDTR.)

 

There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” 
(EP2:272), where he says that “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.” 
But I have yet to see anyplace where Peirce says or implies that the Sign 
determines the Sign-Object relation. If you can cite such a place, please do 
so. And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But 
again, I’m happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a 
Peirce text.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 15:34
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F., List:

 

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

 

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has 
nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and 
if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make 
absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.

 

... because to me, it contradicts #7.

 

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so 
that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument.

 

The order of determination does not apply only to correlates, it applies to all 
of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign determines the 
Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant represents the 
Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the three trichotomies in 
CP 2.243 is not random or inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to 
your order, an Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an 
Icon; but these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce 
went on to identify.

 

As for #12 ...

 

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant 
trichotomy” in NDTR.

 

This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have been 
Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908, the order 
of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) Interpretants.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed
has nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to
correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this
would make absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.


... because to me, it contradicts #7.

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination,
so that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an
argument.


The order of determination does not apply *only *to correlates, it applies
to *all *of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign
determines the Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant
represents the Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the
three trichotomies in CP 2.243 is *not *random or inconsequential.  For
example, if it were switched to your order, an Argument could be a
Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an Icon; but these conclusions are
inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce went on to identify.

As for #12 ...

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant
trichotomy” in NDTR.


This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have
been Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908,
the order of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three)
Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 1:26 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, Gary, list,
>
>
>
> I just noticed that a point got somehow dropped out between those numbered
> 9 and 10 below. That point was about the *rheme/dicisign/argument
> trichotomy*, which of course is Peirce’s third division of signs, “according
> as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of
> fact or a sign of reason.” If we need to refer to this point, let’s call it
> “point X.” Anyway, it’s absence does not not affect the main argument of
> the post.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
> _
>
> Jon S, Gary R,
>
>
>
> Evidently you are both making some inference that to me appears
> unwarranted and unmotivated. The issue may be terminological, or it may be
> grounded in a much deeper conceptual difference regarding the nature of
> signs. Perhaps if I break the whole matter into smaller steps as I see
> them, and lay them out one at a time, you will be able to identify the step
> where my thinking diverges from yours. Since the crux of the matter appears
> to be CP 2.238 in NDTR, all of my direct references will be to NDTR. Maybe
> after that I can comment on Jon’s remarks about Peirce’s 1908
> classification.
>
>
>
> The question for you is: Which of the following assertions would you deny?
>
>
>
>1. A *trichotomy* is a *division* of something into three, such that
>each of the three resulting terms denotes a subtype of the original
>something.
>2. NDTR as a whole — and CP 2.238 in particular — is about division of 
> *triadic
>relations* into types.
>3. All triadic relations have three *correlates*, generically labelled
>First, Second and Third correlates.
>4. Any of the three correlates of a given triadic relation may be
>regarded as simpler or more complex than the others. If they are not all of
>the same complexity, then the simplest is called First and the most complex
>is called Third correlate.
>5. All of NDTR from CP 2.243 on (pp. 291-299 in EP2) is about one type
>of triadic relation, of which a Sign is First Correlate, an Object is
>Second Correlate, and a (possible) Interpretant is Third Correlate.
>6. In NDTR there are three trichotomies in which the three divisions
>have specific names. These are *icon/index/symbol*,
>*rheme/dicisign/argument*, and *qualisign/sinsign/legisign*. Each of
>these nine terms names a type of *Sign* (not a type of triadic
>relation, but the type of First Correlate which characterizes such a
>triadic relation).
>7. The extensions of these names are obviously overlapping, as the
>same sign can be (for instance) a symbol *and* an argument *and* a
>legisign. However the overlapping is constrained by the order of
>determination, so that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a
>sinsign and an argument. [We have already agreed on this.]
>8. In each of these three trichotomies in NDTR, the three sign types
>are distinguished according to different criteria, which criteria are
>logically independent of one another.
>9. The icon/index/symbol trichotomy, introduced by Peirce in 1867
>(though with slightly different names), is made according to the (dyadic)
>relation between Sign and Object, i.e. between the first and second
>

[PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon, Gary, list,

 

I just noticed that a point got somehow dropped out between those numbered 9 
and 10 below. That point was about the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, 
which of course is Peirce’s third division of signs, “according as its 
Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a 
sign of reason.” If we need to refer to this point, let’s call it “point X.” 
Anyway, it’s absence does not not affect the main argument of the post.

 

Gary f.

 

_

Jon S, Gary R,

 

Evidently you are both making some inference that to me appears unwarranted and 
unmotivated. The issue may be terminological, or it may be grounded in a much 
deeper conceptual difference regarding the nature of signs. Perhaps if I break 
the whole matter into smaller steps as I see them, and lay them out one at a 
time, you will be able to identify the step where my thinking diverges from 
yours. Since the crux of the matter appears to be CP 2.238 in NDTR, all of my 
direct references will be to NDTR. Maybe after that I can comment on Jon’s 
remarks about Peirce’s 1908 classification.

 

The question for you is: Which of the following assertions would you deny?

 

1.  A trichotomy is a division of something into three, such that each of 
the three resulting terms denotes a subtype of the original something.
2.  NDTR as a whole — and CP 2.238 in particular — is about division of 
triadic relations into types.
3.  All triadic relations have three correlates, generically labelled 
First, Second and Third correlates.
4.  Any of the three correlates of a given triadic relation may be regarded 
as simpler or more complex than the others. If they are not all of the same 
complexity, then the simplest is called First and the most complex is called 
Third correlate.
5.  All of NDTR from CP 2.243 on (pp. 291-299 in EP2) is about one type of 
triadic relation, of which a Sign is First Correlate, an Object is Second 
Correlate, and a (possible) Interpretant is Third Correlate.
6.  In NDTR there are three trichotomies in which the three divisions have 
specific names. These are icon/index/symbol, rheme/dicisign/argument, and 
qualisign/sinsign/legisign. Each of these nine terms names a type of Sign (not 
a type of triadic relation, but the type of First Correlate which characterizes 
such a triadic relation).
7.  The extensions of these names are obviously overlapping, as the same 
sign can be (for instance) a symbol and an argument and a legisign. However the 
overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so that (for 
instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument. [We have 
already agreed on this.]
8.  In each of these three trichotomies in NDTR, the three sign types are 
distinguished according to different criteria, which criteria are logically 
independent of one another.
9.  The icon/index/symbol trichotomy, introduced by Peirce in 1867 (though 
with slightly different names), is made according to the (dyadic) relation 
between Sign and Object, i.e. between the first and second correlates of the 
triadic relation.
10. The qualisign/sinsign/legisign trichotomy, introduced by Peirce in 
1903, is made according to the nature of the sign itself without regard to its 
relation to the other correlates in the triadic relation; or as Peirce puts it, 
“according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or 
is a general law.” For this reason, it would be fair enough to call it “the 
Sign trichotomy,” although Peirce simply refers to it as “the first division.” 
However, I don’t call it “the Sign trichotomy” because all three trichotomies, 
and not only this one, are divisions of Signs. There is no “Object trichotomy” 
or “Interpretant trichotomy” in NDTR. (Peirce does introduce in 2.238 the 
possibility of dividing triadic relations according to the nature of the Second 
or the Third Correlate, but he never actualizes that possibility, and if he 
did, they would not be divisions of Sign types. (If they were applied to the 
kind of triadic relation of which a Sign is First Correlate, they would be 
divisions of Object types and Interpretant types, respectively.)
11. You will have noticed that I have listed the three trichotomies in a 
different order from that of Peirce’s list in 2.243 (EP2:291, quoted below by 
Jon). Jon appears to be claiming that if the three trichotomies are listed in 
the order I have given, or in any order differing from 2.243, they could not 
“generate the ten specific classes of Signs that Peirce subsequently 
identified, in accordance with the rule that a possibility can only determine a 
possibility and a law can only be determined by a law.” My contrary claim is 
that the order in which trichotomies are listed has nothing to do with the 
order of determination that applies to correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to 
list them in the order I did, this would make absolutely 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

First, Happy Easter to all our Christian friends!

 

Jon S, Gary R,

 

Evidently you are both making some inference that to me appears unwarranted and 
unmotivated. The issue may be terminological, or it may be grounded in a much 
deeper conceptual difference regarding the nature of signs. Perhaps if I break 
the whole matter into smaller steps as I see them, and lay them out one at a 
time, you will be able to identify the step where my thinking diverges from 
yours. Since the crux of the matter appears to be CP 2.238 in NDTR, all of my 
direct references will be to NDTR. Maybe after that I can comment on Jon’s 
remarks about Peirce’s 1908 classification.

 

The question for you is: Which of the following assertions would you deny?

 

1.  A trichotomy is a division of something into three, such that each of 
the three resulting terms denotes a subtype of the original something.
2.  NDTR as a whole — and CP 2.238 in particular — is about division of 
triadic relations into types.
3.  All triadic relations have three correlates, generically labelled 
First, Second and Third correlates.
4.  Any of the three correlates of a given triadic relation may be regarded 
as simpler or more complex than the others. If they are not all of the same 
complexity, then the simplest is called First and the most complex is called 
Third correlate.
5.  All of NDTR from CP 2.243 on (pp. 291-299 in EP2) is about one type of 
triadic relation, of which a Sign is First Correlate, an Object is Second 
Correlate, and a (possible) Interpretant is Third Correlate.
6.  In NDTR there are three trichotomies in which the three divisions have 
specific names. These are icon/index/symbol, rheme/dicisign/argument, and 
qualisign/sinsign/legisign. Each of these nine terms names a type of Sign (not 
a type of triadic relation, but the type of First Correlate which characterizes 
such a triadic relation).
7.  The extensions of these names are obviously overlapping, as the same 
sign can be (for instance) a symbol and an argument and a legisign. However the 
overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so that (for 
instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument. [We have 
already agreed on this.]
8.  In each of these three trichotomies in NDTR, the three sign types are 
distinguished according to different criteria, which criteria are logically 
independent of one another.
9.  The icon/index/symbol trichotomy, introduced by Peirce in 1867 (though 
with slightly different names), is made according to the (dyadic) relation 
between Sign and Object, i.e. between the first and second correlates of the 
triadic relation.
10. The qualisign/sinsign/legisign trichotomy, introduced by Peirce in 
1903, is made according to the nature of the sign itself without regard to its 
relation to the other correlates in the triadic relation; or as Peirce puts it, 
“according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or 
is a general law.” For this reason, it would be fair enough to call it “the 
Sign trichotomy,” although Peirce simply refers to it as “the first division.” 
However, I don’t call it “the Sign trichotomy” because all three trichotomies, 
and not only this one, are divisions of Signs. There is no “Object trichotomy” 
or “Interpretant trichotomy” in NDTR. (Peirce does introduce in 2.238 the 
possibility of dividing triadic relations according to the nature of the Second 
or the Third Correlate, but he never actualizes that possibility, and if he 
did, they would not be divisions of Sign types. (If they were applied to the 
kind of triadic relation of which a Sign is First Correlate, they would be 
divisions of Object types and Interpretant types, respectively.)
11. You will have noticed that I have listed the three trichotomies in a 
different order from that of Peirce’s list in 2.243 (EP2:291, quoted below by 
Jon). Jon appears to be claiming that if the three trichotomies are listed in 
the order I have given, or in any order differing from 2.243, they could not 
“generate the ten specific classes of Signs that Peirce subsequently 
identified, in accordance with the rule that a possibility can only determine a 
possibility and a law can only be determined by a law.” My contrary claim is 
that the order in which trichotomies are listed has nothing to do with the 
order of determination that applies to correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to 
list them in the order I did, this would make absolutely no difference to the 
tenfold classification of signs. What does make a difference is the criteria 
according to which the trichotomies are defined … which are not the criteria 
listed in CP 2.238. 
12. I still can see no basis for your assertion, Jon, unless it be a 
confusion of trichotomies with correlates. Indeed, a similar confusion that 
would seem to be behind your assertion that “Each of the correlates in that 
1908 passage is divided by a