Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding "alien" life in the cosmos

[Stephen C. Rose]

Has he conversed with anyone on this list or known to anyone here?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, May 19, 2018 at 3:56 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Yes. Abduction and retroduction through wormholes. Peirce has been
> abducted too, is still alive (telomers reconstruction), and has developed
> quantum semiotics and a traffic lead system for the crowded horsehead mist.
>
> 18. Mai 2018 um 23:43 Uhr
>  "Eugene Halton" 
>
> Helmut, would that be ...
>   ... alien ...
> ... abduction?
>  Gene Halton
>
> On Thu, May 17, 2018, 2:16 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> List,
>> I am not up to date with the thread, but about the aliens topic to me it
>> seems most likely, that there is a galactic confederation, which has
>> declared the earth for nature reserve. Visiting earth and giving us hints
>> of aliens (sending signals) is prohibited. They only take discrete actions,
>> when we are about to destroy ourselves, e.g. the (quite some) times we were
>> close to nuclear war. The few UFO and aliens sightings that weren´t hoaxes
>> were caused by alien outlaw teenagers on joyrides with stolen or from their
>> parents borrowed UFOs with disabled (neutrino or quantums entanglement)
>> transponders. And so on, I will write a scifi book some time.
>> Best, Helmut
>>
>>  17. Mai 2018 um 07:16 Uhr
>>  "Gary Richmond" 
>> wrote:
>> John S, list,
>>
>> And I think it's significant in the context of the several recent threads
>> that Peirce was one of the first scientists to imagine that there had to be
>> a cosmos beyond the Milky Way, our own galaxy.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690*
>>
>> On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 8:12 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 5/16/2018 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

 So, at very least, the jury is still out on this question.
>>>
>>>
>>> I certainly agree.  Ray K's predictions about AI have usually
>>> been unreliable or just wrong.
>>>
>>> The inverse square law implies that the energy of electromagnetic
>>> radiation falls off very rapidly *unless* the transmission is beamed
>>> directly at some intended target.
>>>
>>> The absence of any evidence of alien civilizations could just mean
>>> that nobody in our region of the Milky Way noticed, or nobody beamed
>>> any info at us, or that nobody on earth was listening if and when
>>> somebody did send a message our way.
>>>
>>> The likelihood that any civilization in another galaxy could have
>>> noticed our planet is vanishingly small.  If they had detected
>>> our planet, they must have detected billions of others that were
>>> closer or more interesting to them.  And if they had beamed a
>>> message our way, it's certain that we never beamed a response
>>> to them, and they probably gave up.
>>>
>>> John
>>>
>>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Reality and Theism (was Skepticism regarding)

[Stephen C. Rose]

THEN,
>> this means that 'something' is real. That would commit the error of
>> 'affirming the consequent'. We can't declare that something is real.
>> BECAUSE we think of it. Therefore - my view is that views of 'the divine'
>> or any name you want to call it - can only be beliefs. And this is what I
>> see as a key problem: definitions. Until we define what we mean by our
>> terms, such as 'God' , 'theism', ...then, our arguments for or against them
>> are empty and subjective.
>>
>> Peirce himself called this 'force' by many names, eg, Nature, as 'in 'Can
>> there be the slightest hesitation in saying, then, that the human intellect
>> is implanted in man, either by a creator or by a quasi-intentional effect
>> of the struggle for existence?...and "among the inscrutable purposes of God
>> or the virtual purposes of nature" [8.211] ..."Man seems to himself to have
>> some glimmer of co-understanding with God, or with Nature" [8.212]. And see
>> 6.502, where Peirce writes that 'the analogue of a mind...is what he means
>> by "God".
>>
>> In the scientific realm, which is built around the acceptance of the use
>> of reason, when we come up with a hypothesis - this must then be tested
>> within the existential world. As Peirce said, "deduction is certain but
>> relates only to ideal objects" [8.209] So, "induction gives us the only
>> approach to certainty concerning the real that we can have
>> [ibid] Therefore, my point is that claims based around only deduction
>> remain beliefs - held by tenacity or authority - but still, only beliefs.
>>
>> But are our beliefs only valid - and I mean valid as differentiated from
>> 'real' - if they can be empirically proven? I think that as a species,
>> almost unique in our requirement for social networking and our use of
>> symbolic language - then, beliefs are necessary for social stability and
>> even, our individual psychological health. Again, this does not make our
>> beliefs 'real'; it makes them socially valid - and, as such, open to change
>> when the societal need for them changes.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Thu 17/05/18 5:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> In Triadic Philosophy if something is a matter of supposition like theism
>> the definition will not be anything more than supposition. Wittgenstein
>> understood this. This is why TP calls this mystery. It is real but it is
>> also a mystery. We can talk about our experience of what we call the divine
>> or any other name you want to give it. The replies to my post about life
>> beyond this planet are similar to posts about theism. They reference
>> mystery. Since we have no proof we do not know. It is just as
>> significant that something is not present as that it is. The triadic maxim
>> says the substance is practical and ordinary and accessible. That is what I
>> drive at. Everything else to me is binary thinking that often shields
>> another purpose than arriving at truth and beauty which I take to be the
>> aim of al consideration. You can reply to this in the list if you think it
>> is worth noting. Otherwise no problem. Cheers, S
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding

[Stephen C. Rose]

As I read the Stanford piece one thing seems right to me. If a proposition
is found to be untrue, that does not make the proposition itself unreal.
Similarly, if Donald Trump says immigrants are animals which is a
falsehood, his contention is very real indeed. If I say to my wife I am
fine when I have a particular pain, the statement may be false but it is
real. When I say everything is real I mean everything and if there is a
deity that can do more things than Kurzweil says we'll be able to do in 100
years, the scope of everything as a field from which to glean what is real
(relatively speaking) is not an insurmountable challenge.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 10:19 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> A wonderful illumination of an unknown (to me) nook. I thought of O.R.
> when I was writing but did not have the knowledge whereof I spoke. But I am
> going to peruse further the excellent beginning and so forth. He joins my
> small pantheon of great unknowns. Whoever wrote the Stanford piece must
> join the group also Thank you. S
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 10:09 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>>
>>> My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and that
>>> to disclude things is to complexify.
>>>
>>
>> I agree.  And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who engaged
>> in years of debates with William of Ockham.  Both Chatton and Ockham
>> were students of John Duns Scotus.  Ockham was a nominalist who rejected
>> the realism of Scotus.  But Chatton was a realist who defended Scotus
>> in debates with Ockham.  (All three of them were Scots at Oxford.)
>>
>> See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/walter-chatton/
>>
>> Brief summary of the anti-razor:
>> If a proposition p is true and its truth depends on the existence
>> of something x, then the existence of x must be assumed.
>>
>> But Chatton stated his anti-razor in several different versions,
>> all of which imply my summary.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
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>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding

[Stephen C. Rose]

A wonderful illumination of an unknown (to me) nook. I thought of O.R. when
I was writing but did not have the knowledge whereof I spoke. But I am
going to peruse further the excellent beginning and so forth. He joins my
small pantheon of great unknowns. Whoever wrote the Stanford piece must
join the group also Thank you. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 10:09 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 5/17/2018 9:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
>> My point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and that to
>> disclude things is to complexify.
>>
>
> I agree.  And I recommend the anti-razor by Walter Chatton, who engaged
> in years of debates with William of Ockham.  Both Chatton and Ockham
> were students of John Duns Scotus.  Ockham was a nominalist who rejected
> the realism of Scotus.  But Chatton was a realist who defended Scotus
> in debates with Ockham.  (All three of them were Scots at Oxford.)
>
> See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/walter-chatton/
>
> Brief summary of the anti-razor:
> If a proposition p is true and its truth depends on the existence
> of something x, then the existence of x must be assumed.
>
> But Chatton stated his anti-razor in several different versions,
> all of which imply my summary.
>
> John
>
>
>
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding

[Stephen C. Rose]

Thanks for clarifying. I doubt I will gain any ground if I say all signs
are real and that al thought is in signs. But I do in fact maintain that
things as abstruse as suppositional theological words are real. Sings
themselves vary of course and cannot in my view be characterized. Here's an
example. Lee Harvey Oswald reads a squib of the supposition that only
exists because it is written somewhere and it sets off a train of thought
that eventuates in a scholar taking this account to be the most salient
possible reason for acts attributed to him by Mr. Posner and others. My
point is simply that reality has all sorts of permutations and that to
disclude things is to complexify. Everything is real and some things are
more real than other. Reality is a spectrum just as ethics is. Or so I
think.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, May 17, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Stephen, list:
>
> This refers to the 'reality' of belief - as outlined by Peirce in his
> Fixation of Belief.
>
> In my view, a belief is - as you say, supposition. It does not function in
> the realm of facts. However, since, as Peirce also pointed out, our
> universe operates within the mode of Reason [Thirdness], then - can we
> presume that all of our beliefs are not merely logical but also - real?
> That is - because we rationally THINK of something, does this make that
> belief a reality? The same kind of reality as, for instance, the reality of
> generals - which are the commonality of the instantiation?
>
> I don't think that we can conclude that IF we think of something, THEN,
> this means that 'something' is real. That would commit the error of
> 'affirming the consequent'. We can't declare that something is real.
> BECAUSE we think of it. Therefore - my view is that views of 'the divine'
> or any name you want to call it - can only be beliefs. And this is what I
> see as a key problem: definitions. Until we define what we mean by our
> terms, such as 'God' , 'theism', ...then, our arguments for or against them
> are empty and subjective.
>
>  Peirce himself called this 'force' by many names, eg, Nature, as 'in 'Can
> there be the slightest hesitation in saying, then, that the human intellect
> is implanted in man, either by a creator or by a quasi-intentional effect
> of the struggle for existence?...and "among the inscrutable purposes of God
> or the virtual purposes of nature" [8.211] ..."Man seems to himself to have
> some glimmer of co-understanding with God, or with Nature" [8.212]. And see
> 6.502, where Peirce writes that 'the analogue of a mind...is what he means
> by "God".
>
> In the scientific realm, which is built around the acceptance of the use
> of reason, when we come up with a hypothesis - this must then be tested
> within the existential world. As Peirce said, "deduction is certain but
> relates only to ideal objects" [8.209] So, "induction gives us the only
> approach to certainty concerning the real that we can have
> [ibid] Therefore, my point is that claims based around only deduction
> remain beliefs - held by tenacity or authority - but still, only beliefs.
>
> But are our beliefs only valid - and I mean valid as differentiated from
> 'real' - if they can be empirically proven? I think that as a species,
> almost unique in our requirement for social networking and our use of
> symbolic language - then, beliefs are necessary for social stability and
> even, our individual psychological health. Again, this does not make our
> beliefs 'real'; it makes them socially valid - and, as such, open to change
> when the societal need for them changes.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu 17/05/18 5:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>
> In Triadic Philosophy if something is a matter of supposition like theism
> the definition will not be anything more than supposition. Wittgenstein
> understood this. This is why TP calls this mystery. It is real but it is
> also a mystery. We can talk about our experience of what we call the divine
> or any other name you want to give it. The replies to my post about life
> beyond this planet are similar to posts about theism. They reference
> mystery. Since we have no proof we do not know. It is just as
> significant that something is not present as that it is. The triadic maxim
> says the substance is practical and ordinary and accessible. That is what I
> drive at. Everything else to me is binary thinking that often shields
> another purpose than arriving at truth and beauty which I take to be the
> aim of al consideration. You can reply to this in the list if you think it
> is wort

[PEIRCE-L] Skepticism regarding "alien" life in the cosmos

[Stephen C. Rose]

The discussion that has touched Peirce's "anthropomorphism" is interesting
in light of Ray Kurzweil's noting the unlikelihood of other human-type life
in the universe. https://youtu.be/cBVUdEQXvmc

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce’s insufficient religious conservatism (was Reconciling science and religion...)

[Stephen C. Rose]

I demur from any attempt to locate Peirce by the various efforts I have
seen stated here. I must assume he was not joking when he chose the word
agape to modify his philosophy and suggest its direction. Maybe he
qualified it. Maybe I have missed mention of it in this discussion. His
emphasis on memorial maxims, musing and achieving action based on ethics
and aesthetics seems to me to modify any orthodoxy he might be assumed to
possess. His references to exemplars are in the direction of the sort of
Universalism that was championed by James Relly and John Murray.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, May 15, 2018 at 4:58 PM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> 5/15/18Peirce’s insufficient religious conservatism
>
> I agree with you Gary R concerning Peirce’s direct explicit
> statements on his belief in God, many cited by Jon Schmidt. You provide
> some quotations from Peirce on a rapprochement between religion and science
> (Peirce: "religion, so true to itself, that it becomes animated by the
> scientific spirit..."), and I also agree with Peirce’s statements there
> as regarding the attitude in which such a rapprochement can take place. But
> there is something missing. Peirce seems to hold, and I assume virtually
> everyone on this list would agree, that such a rapprochement would be
> unprecedented. I do not agree with that outlook. In my view both religion
> and the scientific spirit bodied into being together in the evolutionary
> course of human development. It was only in a later development that the
> split occurred, especially with the emergent religions of transcendence
> roughly 2500 years ago, the religions of what John Stuart-Glennie called
> “the moral revolution,” and Karl Jaspers 75 years later called “the axial
> age.”
>
> The religions of the book, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam,
> exemplify “the moral revolution,” the greater reflective consciousness that
> broke out in philosophy as well (I take this theme up in my book *From
> the Axial Age to the Moral Revolution*). Jaspers and many scholars of the
> axial age take this in a triumphalist progressive sense, but it came with
> many costs. Elevating the moral element of religion came with a relative
> devaluing of religion involving perceptive relations to wild habitat, and
> even religion as an “uncontrollable sensual experience… an experience deep
> down in the senses, inexplicable and inscrutable,” as D. H. Lawrence put
> it. And further, through the “renouncers” of the moral revolution, morality
> became constricted largely to the human realm (albeit less so in East Asian
> variants); wild nature stopped being a great teacher and source of
> spiritual wisdom in numerous subtle practices from wayfinding and tracking
> to what we now call field biology. Wild nature was desacralized as human
> prophets, cities, and books became sacrilized. Religion parted ways with
> the wisdom of the wild earth. Nevertheless that wisdom remained as tempered
> capacities of our bodies, of our capacities for common sense, for abductive
> inference, for seeing *il lume naturale*.
>
> A few months back I criticized Peirce for racist and imperialist
> conservative views he held. But here I would have to say that *Peirce was
> simply not conservative enough* in turning to religions of, and stemming
> from, the moral revolution/axial age of roughly 2500 years ago, such as
> Christianity and Buddhism, instead of entrusting to the long-term tempered
> sentiments and religious mind sets forged in the past few hundred thousand
> years as hunter gatherers at the least. No wonder Peirce was so restless in
> seeking to articulate his religious views. He remained stifled by his
> civilizational constraints and prejudices.
>
> For me, the legacy of hunter-gatherer outlooks, characterized by John
> Stuart-Glennie as *Panzooinism*, more easily align with Peirce's
> religious and scientific views, especially “heurospudism.”
>
> Peirce: “the heurospudists look upon discovery as making acquaintance with
> God and as the very purpose for which the human race was created. Indeed as
> the very purpose of God in creating the world at all. [...] when I say
> that God is, I mean that the conception of a God is the highest flight
> toward an understanding of the original of the whole physico-psychical
> universe that we can make. It has the advantage over the agnostics and
> other views of offering to our apprehension an object to be loved. Now
> the heurospudist has an imperative need of finding in nature an object to
> love. His science cannot subsist without it. For science to him must be
> worship in order not to fall down before the feet of some idol of human
> workmanship. Remember that the human race is but an ephemeral thing. In a
> little while it will be altogether done with and cast aside. Even now is
> merely dominant on one small planet of one insignificant star, while all
> that our sight embraces on a starry night is to the universe fa

Re: : [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Stephen C. Rose]

Edwina's point is highly relevant. There is a major distinction between
theist as a designation -- it implies essential orthodoxy and the
acknowledgment of not only someone supreme but someone who is actively in
charge. The notion of mystery (vagueness) or of a sort of coterminous and
integrated Mind can accommodate a theistic perspective minus the orthodox,
interventionist baggage which has hobbled theology immensely -- as Barth
notably suggests. Theism may have been used by Peirce but he was not a
believer in conventional theism.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, May 15, 2018 at 8:25 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Gary R, list
>
> And this is the crux of the debate - the meaning of the terms we use.
>
> First, I agree with Stephen J's concern about the 'certainty that
> participants in the debate use in their comments'. This certainty ignores -
> as you point out -  that our definitions are diverse. They are not only
> diverse but are vague and therefore - we are not talking about the same
> thing - even though we may use the same terms.
>
> My point is that the term 'God' as used by Peirce actually refers, as he
> himself points out,  to the nature and operation of Mind. This Mind is very
> different in nature from the 'normal' definitions of the term of 'God' -
> and we can find these definitions in many theological tracts.
>
> Therefore, I reject calling Peirce a 'theist'. I frankly have never seen,
> in any of these analyses on 'God' - any description that uses the term
> 'Mind' to describe god. Then, when I read through Peirce's outline of the
> function of this Mind - and that includes both cosmological and in daily
> life -  it is a process within three modal categories [1ns, 2ns, 3ns] -
> this further deviates from 'normal' descriptions of the term of God - and
> of his reality.
>
> Without a specific definition of terms - then, our argumentation is empty.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 15/05/18 7:31 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Stephen J, List,
>
> Neither Jon S nor I have been arguing for or against our own personal
> religious views in this discussion, but only affirming Peirce's own
> stated views. We are, it would seem, in agreement as to what those views
> are since Peirce was quite explicit about them.
>
> Our own personal views regarding God and religion, at least as I
> understand them, are similar to Peirce's principally in that we are
> theists, but different from his in many regards. And I know from off-list
> discussions with Jon that his and my beliefs are very different from each
> other's. Meanwhile, all that Jon has said on list about his own personal
> beliefs is that he is a theist and a Lutheran, while I have commented
> (although not in the present discussion) that some of my views are, as I
> see them, similar to Peirce's while some are quite different. For example,
> regarding one difference, like you I especially struggle with the notion of
> a personal God.
>
> But, again, our personal religious views in this discussion have never
> even once been the issue. We, like many--perhaps virtually all--who have
> studied Peirce's religious views, simply affirm that Peirce held a belief
> in the Reality of God, that is, that he was a theist.
>
> CSP: The word "God," so "capitalised" (as we Americans say), is the definable
> proper name, signifying  Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator of
> all three Universes of Experience.
>
>
> That is all. One can agree or disagree with his religious views, his
> theism, but he was most definitely a theist, not an atheist, not an
> agnostic. And, again, we are not arguing pro nor con regarding theism.
>
> As for whether any individual in this forum or, for that matter, anywhere
> is a theist or an atheist, that matters not a whit to me. I am married to
> an agnostic, and the most beloved living member of my family, my sister, is
> an atheist, her husband a Buddhist. The agnostics and atheists whom I know
> personally and call friends are all very good and ethical people in my
> opinion. The theists I know personally and call friends are all very good
> and ethical people. And I should add that I have friends, colleagues, and
> students who are Christian, Buddhist, Jewish, Baha'i, and Muslim, one of
> the delights of living in as culturally rich a city as New York City is.
> Perhaps the greatest teacher in my life, Da Liu, was Taoist.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 718 482-5690
>
> On Tue, May 15, 2018 at 6:28 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary, list
>>
>> I find the certainty with which positions are taken here, and asserted,
>> rather disconcerting. I am not an expert on Peirce at all, so I cannot
>> comment on the verity of what he had said or intended.
>>
>> My own position on the nature of God? I keep out of that conversation. I
>> can no more know God than I can know 

Re: : [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Stephen C. Rose]

I wrote a song based on the myth of Demeter and Persephone -- Persephone
stays out after abduction and Demeter is left with the four seasons. The
deities above and below colluded in the matter.

I never knew that my child would soon be taken
To the reaches of the world without once saying her goodbye
And to this day it could be I was mistaken
Never knowing if she said her yes or whether it was I.

Appropriate for (estranged) Mothers Day. Best, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 5:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 5/13/2018 2:48 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
>> You forgot Persephone. :)
>>
>
> She was the one who was abducted (not retroducted) by the Turk.
>
> The farmers of Eleusis want the statue of St. Dimitra back.
> Every spring, they would honor her by heaping manure around
> the statue to ensure the fertility of their crops.
>
> And it worked!  (That's retroduction.)
>
> And by the way, whether or not the Turk actually abducted Persephone,
> a Turkish official was complicit in the abduction of the statue.  He
> was bribed by a gift of a telescope to authorize the removal of the
> statue.
>
> John
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: : [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Stephen C. Rose]

You forgot Persephone. :)

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 2:38 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 5/13/2018 10:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
>> Hey, John -  you forgot: Happy Mother's Day.
>>
>> [mutter, mutter, seethe, fume...if my kids ever did that..mutter, mutter].
>>
>
> Given the theme of this thread, I suspect that the ones who might
> feel the most slighted would be Mary, Gaia, Hera, Demeter...
>
> And you have to be careful not to offend them.  The statue of Demeter
> at Eleusis became the statue of St. Dimitra.  According to a legend,
> her daughter was abducted by a Turk.  But the statue itself was
> abducted by a British archaeologist -- and the boat sank.  However,
> the statue was recovered and sent to England, where it is now mostly
> ignored in a dusty corner of a museum.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: : [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Stephen C. Rose]

Reality is real and the real ultimately is reality and we know it only in
part as Paul inferred but perhaps then face to face. The amount of ink
explaining this sans understanding is prodigious.  Peirce got religion in a
Manhattan Episcopal Church a few blocks from where I sit. He also wandered
in despair up and down Fifth Avenue nursing multiple rejections and other
humiliations. But he kept on keeping on as do we all.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 10:16 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Hey, John -  you forgot: Happy Mother's Day.
>
> [mutter, mutter, seethe, fume...if my kids ever did that..mutter, mutter].
>
> By the way - I fully agree with your comments. I think it is bordering on
> the ridiculous to declare that because someone says:
>
> "I believe in God'..that this means that 'God is Real'..and that this
> person is also a theist...[That's a reverse and invalid Argument]...\\
>
> ..and then, when asked to define the term. people.come up with a multitude
> of descriptions which differ from those of other people - So, we cannot
> conclude, as some would like to conclude: That God is Real. Nor can we
> conclude that these people are all 'theists'.
>
> That's what the 'Five Ways' was meant to deal with; the different
> subjective descriptions of the term 'God'. It certainly set up the
> Authoritative definition of the Church,  but as purely rhetorical it
> doesn't, in my view, have any validity as an Argument.
>
> So- I think it remains; belief in God is subjective and the definition of
> God is equally subjective. Therefore - to move from the subjective to the
> objective [ie to declare that God is Real]...can't be done.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sun 13/05/18 9:41 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 5/13/2018 8:50 AM, John Collier wrote:
> > I am afraid I do not find these arguments coherent with anything
> > I was taught to be God.
>
> I recall a survey some years ago in which the interviewers asked
> people two questions: (1) Do you believe in God? (2) How would
> you describe God?
>
> What they found: No two people described God in the same way.
> The descriptions by believers and non-believers showed the same
> amount of variation. And from the way God was described, they
> couldn't reliably distinguish believers from non-believers.
>
> This was not a statistically reliable survey. And very few
> of the people they surveyed had studied any philosophical
> or theological arguments.
>
> But from my own experience, I find it convincing. And from hearing
> or reading what people who have studied philosophy or theology say,
> I suspect that the results would have been the same, independently
> of how much they had thought, read, or studied.
>
> Happy Sunday, Sabbath, Meditation Day, or Picnic Day to all,
>
> John
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and theism

[Stephen C. Rose]

I meant alien to science. Sorry. And agree Jerry.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, May 12, 2018 at 6:20 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Fox certainly gives us some clues. He approved of divorce -- he left
> Unitarianism on that basis. He held there is no need to see faith as alien
> to metaphysics. Interesting that Peirce chose him to mention. S
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sat, May 12, 2018 at 6:10 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Gary R, list,
>>
>> After Gary’s post I did a quick search to see what Peirce might have to
>> say about “theism” (the word). To the Century Dictionary he didn’t
>> contribute a definition of it, but he did define an “atheist” as “One who
>> denies the existence of God, or of a supreme intelligent being” (CD 1.362).
>> Since Peirce consistently denied the existence (as opposed to the reality)
>> of God, that would seem to make him an “atheist,” but I’m sure he never
>> self-applied that term. I doubt that he self-applied the term “theist”
>> either, though. Nor did I find him applying it to anyone else. I did find a
>> 1905 letter to William James where he wrote, “I have lately been writing
>> out the application of my philosophy to religion. On the theistic question
>> my attitude has some resemblance to that of Wm. Johnson Fox.” Not very
>> helpful, given the dearth of information about Fox I was able to did up on
>> the Net.
>>
>> So as Gary said, the “Peirce on God” page on my website probably tells us
>> more about Peirce’s “theology” (he would not call it that!) than any other
>> source I know of. The first sentence of the NA pretty well sums it up:
>>
>> “The word “God,” … is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens
>> necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
>> Experience.” (I wish I knew more about *Ens necessarium* … )
>>
>> Gary F.
>>
>> } A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention. [Herbert Simon]
>> {
>>
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Gary Richmond 
>> *Sent:* 12-May-18 15:56
>> *To:* Peirce-L 
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design
>>
>>
>>
>> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> In my view the central question here is not whether JAS is a theist and
>> that he is interpreting Peirce in that light, but whether Peirce was a
>> theist and that his remarks on God and Mind *ought* to be interpreted in
>> light of his theism. I would maintain that there there can be little, if
>> any, doubt that he was a theist. Just a cursory glance at this page from
>> Gary Furhman's blog should at least suggest as much.
>> https://www.gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm But the literature is now packed
>> with analyses of his theism.
>>
>>
>>
>> So, contrary to your atheistic interpretation of, for example, Mind as
>> not referring to God, I would say that Mind most certainly ought be
>> interpreted in Peirce's work in light of his theism such that Mind (so
>> capitalized) in Peirce's thinking *is* the Mind of God. I do not see a
>> moment in his comments from his youth through the more extended arguments
>> near the end of his life, notably in his writing "A Neglected Argument for
>> the Reality of God," where he ever--even once--expresses doubts regarding
>> that Reality. If anyone knows of such an expressed doubt, I would be most
>> eager to read it.
>>
>>
>>
>> On the other hand, his view of God seems to me to be essentially a
>> non-standard and decidedly scientific one (Peirce was, for example, notably
>> critical of theology and theologians). There are, however, other moments
>> when he seems to align himself with the Judeo-Christian religious
>> traditions, say, in the interest of participating in a larger community of
>> faith (see, for example, his comments on why he says the Apostle's Creed
>> with his fellow congregates in which he seems to suggest that he does so in
>> the spirit of Christian brotherhood and community).
>>
>>
>>
>> As for Jon's remarks to which you responded, I do not see that he speaks
>> of or even hints at "the Five Ways" or "a First Cause." Where'd that come
>> from?
>>
>>
>>
>> So, in a word, it seems to me much more natural to interpret Mind as
>> Peirce employs it, as well as his arguments relating to the earliest
>> cosmology --which, btw, are *not* definitively stated in the passage you
>> most frequently quote regarding this matter, viz., CP

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and theism

[Stephen C. Rose]

Fox certainly gives us some clues. He approved of divorce -- he left
Unitarianism on that basis. He held there is no need to see faith as alien
to metaphysics. Interesting that Peirce chose him to mention. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, May 12, 2018 at 6:10 PM,  wrote:

> Gary R, list,
>
> After Gary’s post I did a quick search to see what Peirce might have to
> say about “theism” (the word). To the Century Dictionary he didn’t
> contribute a definition of it, but he did define an “atheist” as “One who
> denies the existence of God, or of a supreme intelligent being” (CD 1.362).
> Since Peirce consistently denied the existence (as opposed to the reality)
> of God, that would seem to make him an “atheist,” but I’m sure he never
> self-applied that term. I doubt that he self-applied the term “theist”
> either, though. Nor did I find him applying it to anyone else. I did find a
> 1905 letter to William James where he wrote, “I have lately been writing
> out the application of my philosophy to religion. On the theistic question
> my attitude has some resemblance to that of Wm. Johnson Fox.” Not very
> helpful, given the dearth of information about Fox I was able to did up on
> the Net.
>
> So as Gary said, the “Peirce on God” page on my website probably tells us
> more about Peirce’s “theology” (he would not call it that!) than any other
> source I know of. The first sentence of the NA pretty well sums it up:
>
> “The word “God,” … is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens
> necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
> Experience.” (I wish I knew more about *Ens necessarium* … )
>
> Gary F.
>
> } A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention. [Herbert Simon] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* 12-May-18 15:56
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design
>
>
>
> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>
>
>
> In my view the central question here is not whether JAS is a theist and
> that he is interpreting Peirce in that light, but whether Peirce was a
> theist and that his remarks on God and Mind *ought* to be interpreted in
> light of his theism. I would maintain that there there can be little, if
> any, doubt that he was a theist. Just a cursory glance at this page from
> Gary Furhman's blog should at least suggest as much.
> https://www.gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm But the literature is now packed
> with analyses of his theism.
>
>
>
> So, contrary to your atheistic interpretation of, for example, Mind as not
> referring to God, I would say that Mind most certainly ought be interpreted
> in Peirce's work in light of his theism such that Mind (so capitalized) in
> Peirce's thinking *is* the Mind of God. I do not see a moment in his
> comments from his youth through the more extended arguments near the end of
> his life, notably in his writing "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of
> God," where he ever--even once--expresses doubts regarding that Reality. If
> anyone knows of such an expressed doubt, I would be most eager to read it.
>
>
>
> On the other hand, his view of God seems to me to be essentially a
> non-standard and decidedly scientific one (Peirce was, for example, notably
> critical of theology and theologians). There are, however, other moments
> when he seems to align himself with the Judeo-Christian religious
> traditions, say, in the interest of participating in a larger community of
> faith (see, for example, his comments on why he says the Apostle's Creed
> with his fellow congregates in which he seems to suggest that he does so in
> the spirit of Christian brotherhood and community).
>
>
>
> As for Jon's remarks to which you responded, I do not see that he speaks
> of or even hints at "the Five Ways" or "a First Cause." Where'd that come
> from?
>
>
>
> So, in a word, it seems to me much more natural to interpret Mind as
> Peirce employs it, as well as his arguments relating to the earliest
> cosmology --which, btw, are *not* definitively stated in the passage you
> most frequently quote regarding this matter, viz., CP 1.411-412, and which
> early cosmological views are, in fact, modified dramatically categorially
> in the last of the 1898 lectures (I'm thinking of the famous "Blackboard"
> analogy: see Jon Alan Schmidt's excellent paper which includes a discussion
> of this, "A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the
> Reality of God," in which, btw way, he acknowledges your help, through
> discussions on Peirce-L, in honing his argumentation)--again, it is natural
> to interpret Mind and his Early Cosmological discussions through Peirce's
> theism.
>
>
>
> As an atheist you will no doubt continue to disavow theism; but there have
> been not only many articles and papers, but now also a number of books
> analyzing Peirce's theism. This has always been a contentious matter for
> some Peirce scholars (I mean especially the ones who are atheists or
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Stephen C. Rose]

I agree that Peirce though influenced by religious experience would
probably refrain from a detailed argument. He says more than once I think
that there should be a synthesis of what has been called metaphysics with
science as he understands it. Peirce's influence on theology has not been
great as yet but I would argue that he, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche are the
precursors of a universal spirituality that will gradually overtake
moribund religions. His conclusion is simple and even somewhat childlike.
But that is not at odds with Jesus.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, May 12, 2018 at 4:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary, list:
>
> 1] The 'Five Ways' or Quinque viae,  refers to the very famous purely
> logical arguments by the scholastics [ Aquinas Summa Theologiciae but see
> also Anselm's Proslogian] for the reality of God. I know that JAS didn't
> refer to these arguments but I am very sure as a theist himself that he
> would have to know of them; after all - they form the analytic backbone of
> theistic Arguments for the Reality of God. It isn't enough to say:
> I believe God exists'; that's not an argument but a Fixation of Belief from
> ...a priori, Authority..whatever. There has to be an Argument - and the
> Five Ways is The Argument. I consider each one actually illogical and
> thus inadequate, but...many accept them...and there have been over the
> years, many volumes devoted to both support and rejection of the Five Ways.
>
> 2] I disagree with you that Peirce was a theist. His references to 'Mind',
> do not, in my reading, outline it or even examine it as the Mind of God.
> After all- to do so, would require an analysis of God himself - and Peirce
> doesn't do this. His cosmological arguments, his evolutionary arguments do
> not outline this 'Reality', this metaphysical Being. Instead - what he
> outlines in his analysis of What is Matter/Life.are the three basic
> categories of MIND:  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. He sees them as
> 'ens necessarium' in themselves and I see no correlation of these
> operations with any specific Mind of God'.
>
> 3] As for Judeo-Christian traditions, I consider these societal rather
> than religious traditions. All religions, after all, besides their
> metaphysical outlines, are methods of forming and continuing a sense of
> 'community'. Our species is a social species - and this sense of belonging
> to a community is vital for our rational and psychological health. Anyone
> who lacks this - is a psychopath.
>
> So- we'll have to disagree on this issue.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat 12/05/18 3:56 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, Jon S, list,
>
> In my view the central question here is not whether JAS is a theist and
> that he is interpreting Peirce in that light, but whether Peirce was a
> theist and that his remarks on God and Mind ought to be interpreted in
> light of his theism. I would maintain that there there can be little, if
> any, doubt that he was a theist. Just a cursory glance at this page from
> Gary Furhman's blog should at least suggest as much.
> https://www.gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm But the literature is now packed
> with analyses of his theism.
>
> So, contrary to your atheistic interpretation of, for example, Mind as not
> referring to God, I would say that Mind most certainly ought be interpreted
> in Peirce's work in light of his theism such that Mind (so capitalized) in
> Peirce's thinking is the Mind of God. I do not see a moment in his
> comments from his youth through the more extended arguments near the end of
> his life, notably in his writing "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of
> God," where he ever--even once--expresses doubts regarding that Reality. If
> anyone knows of such an expressed doubt, I would be most eager to read it.
>
> On the other hand, his view of God seems to me to be essentially a
> non-standard and decidedly scientific one (Peirce was, for example, notably
> critical of theology and theologians). There are, however, other moments
> when he seems to align himself with the Judeo-Christian religious
> traditions, say, in the interest of participating in a larger community of
> faith (see, for example, his comments on why he says the Apostle's Creed
> with his fellow congregates in which he seems to suggest that he does so in
> the spirit of Christian brotherhood and community).
>
> As for Jon's remarks to which you responded, I do not see that he speaks
> of or even hints at "the Five Ways" or "a First Cause." Where'd that come
> from?
>
> So, in a word, it seems to me much more natural to interpret Mind as
> Peirce employs it, as well as his arguments relating to the earliest
> cosmology --which, btw, are not definitively stated in the passage you
> most frequently quote regarding this matter, viz., CP 1.411-412, and which
> early cosmological views are, in fact, modified dramatically categorially
> in the last of the 1898 lectures (I'm thinking of the famous "Blac

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [Sadhu Sanga] The failure of Intelligent Design

[Stephen C. Rose]

There is no necessity to use traditional metaphysical language to
substantiate what Jon has suggested. Stephen asks interesting questions. I
submit that we render to Mystery the inference that there is a reason for
all that is and that we are not wrong to assume that intelligence is
involved. In other words, it makes sense to let go of a notion of
metaphysics as separate from everything else and to let go of the premise
that we need to give a wider berth to mystery in our representations than
we have been willing to do.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 1:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Stephen J., List:
>
> I have no desire (and no time these days) to engage in a debate here, but
> ...
>
> SJ:  I don’t understand what insights a creator/designer provides as to
> the nature of existence.
>
>
> Why is there existence at all?  Why is there something, rather than
> nothing?  Peirce's answer was the Reality of God as *Ens necessarium*.
>
> SJ:  What phenomenology explains His motivation to be? Why should He care
> to create life? Where is His workshop? What tools does He use? Does He have
> hands with which to wield a hammer or use a soldering iron? Does he have
> eyes with which to read a blueprint? ... I’m not big fan of Richard
> Dawkins, but he does have a point when he asks, sarcastically, who created
> god? A god-god? Then who created god-god? A god-god-god? God as a creator
> makes no sense and explains nothing.
>
>
> These kinds of questions reveal a profound misunderstanding, or perhaps
> willful ignorance, of what classical theists actually believe about the
> nature of God.
>
> SJ:  Here’s my prediction… whatever the right theory is, it MUST make
> sense… and we will know it when we see it. A godly designer does not make
> sense.
>
>
> Your faith in human reason is impressive, but sadly misplaced.  Why would
> anyone expect an infinite God, if Real, to be entirely comprehensible to
> finite beings like us?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 7:15 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Colin,
>>
>> I don’t understand what insights a creator/designer provides as to the
>> nature of existence. What phenomenology explains His motivation to be? Why
>> should He care to create life? Where is His workshop? What tools does He
>> use? Does He have hands with which to wield a hammer or use a soldering
>> iron? Does he have eyes with which to read a blueprint?
>>
>> Many of us might be receptive to a God as a unity, as Kashyap suggests,
>> in the laws of nature around us. It would make more sense for God’s
>> emergence to be bootstrapped with the emergence of the universe as a unity,
>> not as a meddler in a workshop working to a blueprint. God and the universe
>> as one. Or maybe a systems-theory view of nested hierarchies, where
>> autopoiesis (self-organisation) can be considered a form of
>> creation/design. But not god as a visitor in some kind of workspace.
>>
>> I’m not big fan of Richard Dawkins, but he does have a point when he
>> asks, sarcastically, who created god? A god-god? Then who created god-god?
>> A god-god-god? God as a creator makes no sense and explains nothing.
>>
>> Isaac Newton provided the axiomatic framework for a physics that did not
>> make sense at the time. Now it makes perfect sense, and we bear witness to
>> its relevance in our engineering and technological achievements. We need a
>> similar awakening with the life sciences. What axiomatic framework does God
>> the Creator/Designer relate to? Here’s my prediction… whatever the right
>> theory is, it MUST make sense… and we will know it when we see it. A godly
>> designer does not make sense. There is no phenomenology that explains his
>> motivations or existence.
>>
>> And you raise the topic of mutations again. Natural selection based on
>> mutations violates the principles of entropy, as the tendency to disorder.
>> Nobody’s proven the relevance of mutations to evolution. Pure,
>> unsubstantiated conjecture. Calvin Beisner, with reference to the work of
>> RH Byles, dispenses tidily with the mutation mumbo jumbo:
>>
>> https://www.icr.org/article/270
>>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>
>
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[PEIRCE-L] The Stillest Hour Three #abbasway

[Stephen C. Rose]

Religion is a partial artifact

Philosophy is academy bound

Truth and beauty must be found outside

Dancing to a universal sound



Monism – one – will do for unity

Dualism does for writing code

Triadic is tuned to reality

A silent good its method and its mode

May 10, 2018

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[PEIRCE-L] Roses are red

[Stephen C. Rose]

I find this uplifting.


Peirce: CP 8.194 Cross-Ref:††

“A questioner to whom pragmaticism comes as a novelty will naturally ask,
"Do you mean to say that you do not believe there has been any past?" To
which the pragmaticist will reply, -- and note well his answer, because it
is analogous to the answer he will give to a host of questions to which no
further allusion will be made, -- "Why, I believe in the reality of the
past just as completely as you do, and just in the way that you do, except
that either you or I perhaps do not describe correctly the intellectual
side of [its] real meaning. To any memory [of] the past, there attaches a
certain color, -- a certain quality of feeling, -- just as there does to
the sight of a Jacqueminot rose.†5 Ontological metaphysicians usually say
that 'secondary sensations,' such as colors, are delusive and false; but
not so the Pragmaticist. He insists that the rose really is red; for red
is, by the meaning of the word, an appearance; and to say that a
Jacqueminot rose really is red means, and can mean, nothing but that if
such a rose is put before a normal eye, in the daylight, it will look red.
Just so, the feeling qualities attaching to memories are entirely true and
real, though obviously relative, as pastness itself obviously is relative."


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on the semiotic of music

[Stephen C. Rose]

Songwriting is a way of understanding texts. I spent more than a decade
proving this out and published more than 150 examples of Biblical passages
turned into songs. This process was a source of Triadic Philosophy, I
inferred the values that emerged among the teenagers who learned these
songs and sang them over time during the 70s. Songs universalize things as
the first article notes. None of the music I did rests on a capacity to
understand or employ the systems of notation. Music is done by all. The
clarifying function of songwriting is a valid means of exegesis.aka
deconstruction.Its capacities are largely unexplored.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Apr 19, 2018 at 10:39 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> If you google "Peirce" and any topic of any kind, it's likely
> to lead to something interesting.  I came across some articles
> and an expensive book.  This is just FYI.  I don't want to
> start another long thread.
>
> The Semiotics of Music: From Peirce to AI
> https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/cctp-711-fall2016/2016/
> 12/06/jiessies-draft-contact-a-case-study-of-the-semiotics-of-music/
>
> The Semiotics of Music
> https://thinkingonmusic.wordpress.com/tag/c-s-peirce/
>
> A Peircean Model for Music and Sound-Based Art:
> a Pragmatist Approach to Experiences in the Artistic Use of Sound
> http://www.ems-network.org/IMG/pdf_EMS12_enriquez.pdf
>
> C.S. Peirce, mechanicalism, and music
> https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/ttu-ir/handle/2346/12099
>
> A keynote presentation by David Huron for the 12th International Congress
> on Musical Semiotics:  The Other Semiotic Legacy of Charles
> Sanders Peirce: Ethology and Music-related Emotion
> https://vimeo.com/62980699
>
> And for anybody who happens to have an extra $1999 to spend,
> A Semiotics of Opera by Arjan van Baest
> https://www.amazon.com/Arjan-van-Baest/e/B001JXMP6O/ref=ntt_dp_epwbk_0
>
> John
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

John, my reply to Jerry sort of thoughts on the idea of two logics.
Unfortunately, I replied first to Jerry and managed to lose your note to
which I was going to reply. I have been online forever but have no idea
what happened.

Here is a bit that may explain what I am about.

Reality is all.

All is the case.

The world is a case.

A case is a sign.

+

Facts are claims as well as true.

Things are what they are.

Ultimately, what is good is what is true.

+

Sometime is time to come.

Future is here in

The world is determined as we go.

Things change and remain the same.

+

There is no end to all.

 Continuity and movement reign.

 Days are units of progress.

+

The case is what is true.

The totality is true and false – ambient but moving toward truth.

Totality is an aggregate within the all which is mixed, depending on the
disposition of choices.

Our world is where we are in reality.

+

Logic tends toward good.

The world tends toward good.

+

The world is not divided by any mental gyration.

The world is what it is.

+

Everything is in and beyond us. As is mystery. As is knowing and not
knowing.

No one has a final answer.

Most mystery we cannot fathom.



amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:00 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Stephen,
>
> ET
>
>> what's the difference between a 'language game' and
>> a 'grammatical sentence'?
>>
>
> A sentence is just one move in a language game.
>
> For more about Wittgenstein's language games and their relationship
> to logic and computer programs, see the article "Language Games,
> Natural and Artificial":  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/lgames.pdf
>
> See page 3 of lgames.pdf, which quotes some examples of language
> games from his later book _Logical Investigations_.
>
> And by the way, Wittgenstein's original term was 'Sprachspiel'.
> The word 'Spiel' in German is somewhat broader than the English
> 'game'.  It would include noncompetitive play as well as games
> that involve competition.
>
> It's closer to Peirce's word 'musement', which he defined as
> "pure play":  http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/musement
>
> SCR
>
>> I claim logic is good.
>>
>
> Oh.  Now I realize that you were talking about logic as one of
> the normative sciences, since it defines the criteria for truth.
>
> But note that Peirce classifies logic in two places. Formal logic
> is a subset of mathematics, which is prior to all versions of
> philosophy.  But logic is also one of the normative sciences.
> As such, it depends on mathematics, phenomenology, and the two
> prior normative sciences, aesthetics and ethics.
>
> When I said that NLs are prior to logic, I meant that as a
> historical observation:  All versions of formal logic have
> been designed as disciplined subsets of natural languages.
>
> I was talking about language and logic as semiotic systems.
> In that sense, Peirce discussed logic in the broad sense as the
> study of criteria of truth for any system of signs, which include
> natural languages as well as all kinds of notations and diagrams.
>
> Formal logics are rigidly disciplined versions of logic.  That
> makes them useful for enabling precise definitions of the rules
> of inference, which preserve truth.
>
> Peirce also said that discipline is purely negative.  It puts
> constraints on what can be said.  By itself, formal logic is
> a deductive system that cannot find or create anything new.
>
> To introduce anything new, you need the methods of induction
> (generalization from particular instances) and abduction
> (forming hypotheses by guessing or phenomenological insight).
> Neither method is guaranteed to preserve truth.
>
> If you introduce new axioms by induction and abduction,
> they must be tested by an unending cycle of deduction and
> further observation.  But you can never be certain that the
> cycle has finally converged to absolute truth.
>
> John
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

There's a lot beyond what you have said that is suggestive. But I will say
just two things. If I was starting from scratch I would recognize a
division between any contrived or explicit or mathematical or scientific
language that is logically consistent and what I would call normal language
or some such phrase. This is all the stuff that goes on between us all. It
is imprecise, vague, comprehended, doomed to miss and otherwise as slippery
as a handful of minnows. Even here when not dealing or referring to some
specific logical unity within the whole of language we talk past one
another and as often as not are saying something entirely different than
what is set down. As Isaiah (poet one) said: "See and see but do not
perceive". Now I am probably close to being a musical prodigy but I could
never master the lingo so when I was commissioned to do choral work I sang
into a tape recorder and passed words and tape on to a fellow who knew how
to finish the job. My inabilities in the entire area of what I would call
contrived or explicit languages amount to much more of a disability than
Peirce's lamented left-handedness. My entire project has to do with how we
can communicate better in normal language to the point that we achieve a
slight tilt in our inherited modes of communication which I see as binary.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 11:06 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Stephen, John:
>
> On Apr 14, 2018, at 11:57 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
>
> Words, as noted, are often a frail reed but they have a purpose.
>
>
> This is a very clever phrase; I like it very much.
>
> Do you think that all of academic philosophy (not just the ones that post
> here) uses all words in this sense?
>
> That being said (with a bit of sarcasm :-) ), I think you missed the
> intent of my message so I would ask that you broaden the scope of your
> considerations.
> I start from my lifelong experience that human communication is an
> extraordinarily difficult topic to discuss, in part because the huge
> variety of experiences of individuals with different educational
> backgrounds.
>
> The point is that human cultures have constructed *many many many* symbol
> systems.
> Semiotics applies to BOTH natural external signs and to symbols
> externalized by purposeful human intent.
>
> Consider the notation for music.
> This symbol system is a very important to many individuals in our cultural.
> One reference system for a musical notation is often an mathematical
> object, an octave and repetitions of octaves.
> Another reference system is a measure. Compositions into phrases, etc.
> *Both* reference systems invoke the notion of time.
> I think that most would agree that this is a very effective symbol systems
> for communicating information.
> It is pragmatically successful despite the linguistic ambiguity of the two
> temporal reference systems in the notation.
> Are Inferences from the musical notation to mathematics, physics, sound
> perception and emotions logical?  If so, how is the temporal ambiguity
> interpreted?
>
> Since so many different symbol systems are used in so many different
> disciplines, an interpreter of a symbolic message must have some knowledge
> of the symbol system before one can make propositions or sorites that are
> consistent within the symbol system.
>
> In other words, the notation for a particular symbol system is internally
> logically consistent as a whole, not merely a few strings of symbols (that
> is, parts of whole.)  A symphonic score makes sense *to the composer* as
> whole, even though it may be gibberish to an engineer or philosopher or
> theologian!
>
> Numerous other examples of the part-whole (mereological) relationships in
> symbolic meanings are readily apparent.
> But, part-whole relationships are only meaningful *IF the interpreter is
> competent in that species of symbols (language*.)
>
> I hope this has some meaning to you…
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

To speak of good as prior to logic is perhaps wrong. I claim logic is good.
Good is only prior to logic in the sense that it represents what
metaphysics used to see as the end of things. I see dualisms as eliminated
by triadic thought. So, for example, metaphysics and logic coexist
triadically. Deridda was not shy about saying our century requires the
unprecedented to avoid repeating the past. Everyone is metaphysical I
sense. Reality is all. Good being prior to logic in that context probably
does deserve a no!

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 12:05 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jerry, Stephen, and Helmut,
>
> In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein defined a natural language
> as the totality of all the language games that can be played with
> a given syntax and vocabulary.
>
> He did not state that point in those terms because he died several
> years before Chomsky made an outrageous and hopelessly misguided
> claim:  A natural language is the totality of all the grammatical
> sentences that can be expressed with a given syntax and vocabulary.
>
> If Wittgenstein had heard that claim, he would have been livid with
> rage.  I believe that the linguist Michael Halliday, whose career
> spans the same extent as Chomsky's, had a much more accurate view:
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf )
>
> JFS:  every artificial language, which includes all the artificial
>>> notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming...
>>>
>>
>> JLRC: I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.  In today’s
>> terminology, Symbol systems are not the same as “artificial notations”,
>> but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by humans to
>> express human thought or intent or meaning.
>>
>
> Every symbol system or formal notation begins as a language game
> that the developers or designers use to discuss the subject matter
> among themselves.  When designing that notation, they discuss every
> definition in some NL, and they use exactly the same definitions
> for the corresponding words in their preferred NL.
>
> JRLC
>
>> Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate
>> within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or
>> incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise.
>> A PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”.
>>
>
> DNA is an excellent example. The language game *originated* with the
> first use of the term 'desoxyribonucleic acid' and its abbreviation.
> The scientists who study DNA and talk with their colleagues about it
> express every word, symbol, and phrase in their preferred NL with
> exactly the same precision as they do when they use the symbols and
> notations of chemistry.
>
> Very few authors choose to use common spoken language formally.
>>
>
> There is no such thing as "common spoken language".  Every sentence
> anybody says from infancy to death is in some language game, which is
> as vague or precise as appropriate for their purpose at the moment.
>
> It's true that people who don't understand the science may pick up
> and repeat parts of the scientists' precise language game and use it
> in very loose analogies.  I believe that's what you mean by "flow
> into the spoken language with time".  But the scientists themselves
> still talk about DNA with exactly the same precision as ever.
>
> JLRC
>
>> Units must be defined!  The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies
>> with the purpose of author and the logical notation (sybol system)
>> the author is communicating with.
>>
>
> Yes.  When precision is required for some language game, the speakers
> express exactly the same precision in their NL and in other notations.
> And the symbol '+' varies with different language games for different
> kinds of numbers.  See Figure 2 of "What is the source of fuzziness?":
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/fuzzy.pdf
>
> SCR
>
>> Logic is in my view good...  Words are a sort of utility by which we
>> can perform everything from mundane to exalted feats. But to give them
>> more than their due is an error.
>>
>
> When a logician, mathematician, or scientist in any field uses special
> symbols in any formal notation, those symbols have *exactly* the same
> meaning as the NL words that they use in talking with their colleagues
> or students when they're explaining those symbols.
>
> SCR
>
>> Logic is definitely prior to words through words are the instruments
>> for expressing it.
>>
>
> No!  Every version of logic or any other artificial notation is
> nothing more nor less than some NL language game expressed in
> a notation that is specially designed just for that purpose.
>
> HR
>
>> graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize
>> time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by
>> inventing symbols for time and its flow?
>>
>
> Scientists use the symbol 't' and predicates spelled T-I-M-E in
> mathematics.  They also use equivalent words when they talk about
> the same subjects in their p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

Logic is in my view good -- the good toward which things tend when logic is
understood and followed. Words are a sort of utility by which we can
perform everything from mundane to exalted feats. But to give them more
than their due is an error I think even world-class philosophers like LW
make though in Wittgenstein's case it was substantially modified. Logic is
definitely prior to words through words are the instruments for expressing
it. I am speaking of course of logic as a universal that is devalued
whenever it is limited in its employment, Yet another argument for making
ethics a central term in a triadic approach to thinking.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Apr 15, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> John F, Steven,List
>
> On Apr 14, 2018, at 3:19 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine a
> fallible but consequential truth.
>
>
> I very strongly agree.
>
> The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic.
>
>
> JLRC
>
> This may true if the author decides not to a logical language. The choice
> here at the discretion of  the author.
> Very few author’s choose to use common spoken language formally.  Thus,
> Tarsi’s notion of meta-languages which was used by Malatesta to specify the
> meanings of terms in different disciplines.  (I have written on this
> subject recently in the online journal, Information.)
>
>  Instead,
> every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
> of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming…
>
>
> JLRC
> I find this phrase to be very confusing, John.
> In today’s terminology, Symbol systems  are not the same as “artificial
> notations”, but most formal notations are artificial symbols created by
> humans to express human thought or intent or meaning.
>
> Secondly, a critical distinction is whether or not the terms originate
> within a discipline and flow into the spoken language with time, or
> incorporated into a different technical language or otherwise. A
> PARTICULARLY INTERESTING CASE IS “DNA”.
>
>
> is based on
> a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.
>
> JLRC:
> This is a tricky statement in that the creation of new terms is often from
> outside of the standard spoken language OF THE PUBLIC.  The meaning of new
> terms is often first acquired in the meta-language and slowly abused until
> it acquires some sort of public face.  (One of the regular posters to this
> List-serve is particular keen on abusing technical terminology, re-shaping
> it beyond recognition or reason.)
>
> For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
> The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.
>
> JLRC
> Yes, one can use the notation of standard arithmetic such that this
> deployment of the symbol “+” is logically exact.
> BUT, THIS IS ONLY ONE POSSIBILITY, as you are well aware.  Units must be
> defined!
> The meaning of the “+” sign / symbol varies with the purpose of author and
> the logical notation (system system) the author is communicating with.
> Take genetic symbols as examples
>
> Secondly, the same term have different meanings in different
> meta-languages. This problem is particularly acute when the meta-languages
> are concatenated together with syzygies / sublations.  This is often
> necessary in relational meta-languages, such as physics and geology or
> molecular biology and medicine.
>
> Or, viewed from Tarski’s theory, the number of possible signatures for a
> meta-language is very large.
> I have sought passages in CSP communications that could possibly represent
> the notion of “signature” without success.
> I wonder if anyone else has explored this topic?
>
> Just some thoughts of possible interest to some readers.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

I appreciate your reply and will parse it out a bit. I certainly do not
defend words and language as final in any sense. My feeling words are sort
of like pincers that vastly limit whatever the sign may be. Democracy, for
example, is an impossible term minus all manner of elaboration yet it would
hardly profit from being collapsed into D and having its aspects denoted by
other symbols or abbreviations. The struggle is to take such a term and
make it resonate with those meanings which together suggests its
ontological merit. I am very interested in the Wittgenstein connection
because I feel he and Peirce are peas on a pod, both captives as we all are
of their time, but equally monumental in breaking open the horizon so that
something unprecedented and evolutionary can occur. Thanks again, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Apr 14, 2018 at 4:19 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
>> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking
>> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
>> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
>> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine a
>> fallible but consequential truth.
>>
>
> I very strongly agree.
>
> The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic.  Instead,
> every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations
> of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on
> a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.
>
> For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."
> The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.
>
> the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even
>> Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may
>> have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs
>> that made them interchangeable
>>
>
> See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce
> and Wittgenstein: http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/m
> enu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM
>
> Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting
> Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something
> that was much closer to Peirce.  Following is a paper I wrote
> after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime
> was also an invited speaker:  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
>
> If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position
>> of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of
>> the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.
>>
>
> He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,
> but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs.  That means
> they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity.  His
> search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never
> completely satisfied with any one of them.
>
> That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including
> arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area
> of an EG.  Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that
> an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing
> finger or a name) could state a proposition.  If so, such a
> combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of
> inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
>
> John
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

[Stephen C. Rose]

Words, as noted, are often a frail reed but they have a purpose. If logic
it actually universal its universality is not served by locking its
meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is
achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by
scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine a
fallible but consequential truth.. If one seeks as I do to show that a
value such as tolerance or helpfulness or democracy is logical I can only
do so in words. It is my problem to determine universal statements that
have a scientific basis. I would add an ontological basis. I do not claim
success but words are the medium. The terms used for the logic of graphs
and other forms of representation that are not verbal may have interest but
they hardly are relevant to what I am suggesting. Of course, the notions I
have, built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even Nietzsche, are hardly
Peircean because my impression is that he may have felt there was a
correspondence between words and his graphs that made them interchangeable
or even above words in ontological relevance. If he elevated graphs of his
or any other sort to the exalted position of qualifying as a viable
conclusion to any practical iteration of the pragmatic maxim, I think he is
possibly wrong. Words have to do, and I make that as a logical statement
based on fallibility and history. Graphs and such are a language game and
they may have use, but then again they may be ethically neutral or a
temptation to play god.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Apr 14, 2018 at 11:32 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> In 1992, the book _Semantic Networks in Artificial Intelligence_
> contained about 25 chapters on graph notations for logic.
> It was also published as a collection of related articles in
> the journal _Computers and Mathematics with Applications_.
>
> After 20 years (2002), the articles became available for free
> download, but I just discovered them today.  Three of them
> discuss existential graphs:
>
> Don D. Roberts, The existential graphs
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0898122192901274
>
> Robert W. Burch, Valental aspects of Peircean algebraic logic
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0898122192901285
>
> John F. Sowa, Conceptual graphs as a universal knowledge representation
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0898122192901377
>
> But the following article from 2014 is much better than the above:
> From existential graphs to conceptual graphs
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/eg2cg.pdf
>
> To view or download any of the other articles, see
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/computers-and-mathemat
> ics-with-applications/vol/23/issue/2
>
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/computers-and-mathemat
> ics-with-applications/vol/23/issue/6
>
>
>
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>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Stephen C. Rose]

It would be interesting to see what seems to me a convincing response
applied to the most ordinary of situations -- something all could relate
to. That's not a challenge but a genuine concern. If Semiotics (and Peirce
for that matter) is to have the currency that I believe is warranted, we
are going to need to see how this understanding changes the dominant binary
character of most ordinary discourse. Because things move as they move as
Peirce understood (realism), I think the world is indeed on the cusp of
triadic understandings, but I feel the academic realm needs a bit of a push
to move it into some sort of universal comprehension. A simple narrative
examplle of semiosis involving 123 would be illuminating to say the least.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Mike, list
>
> Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting on
> Gary R's post.
>
> I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories. I
> don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define my
> perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
> transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This matter
> can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the conceptual,
> the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which is, in my view, a
> purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images. I'm focused on
> morphology, and view this transformation as taking place within the
> semiosic triad and the three categories.
>
> So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological primitive
> form into a more complex form via the habit formations [Thirdness]...But
> Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] and this enables
> information exchange with the environment [via 3-2] rather than simple
> repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is involved to enable adaptation,
> and Secondness is involved to enable direct contact with the local
> environmental realities. The result - is an adapted insect.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
>
> Hi Gary R, List,
>
> I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current response. I
> have read your points multiple times and tried to think clearly about what
> you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement' with all that you have
> written in this response. As a result, I changed the subject line from 'Re:
> Order of Determination' to reflect my view. We have found at least one
> overlap in the Venn diagram.
>
> What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal
> categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality,
> continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a
> medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently use it,
> namely categorization of things for knowledge representation, this is the
> same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of particulars
> (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness).
> I frankly do not see why we need to use language such as
> "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see where habit or any of
> the other senses of Thirdness may occur without Secondness and Firstness.
>
> I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look at these
> questions. One observation I would make is that there is a community of
> Peirce researchers who see their investigations primarily through the lens
> of signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself in this group.
> That is well and good and in the sense of sign use and making and
> representation may indeed be the best perspective. But, for me, I see the
> universal categories as the governing primitives. (I believe Peirce did as
> well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the reality of
> Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the process of semiosis. Once
> we try to signify Firstness, a reification of sorts, we make it actual,
> which places it as a monadic idea in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from
> quantum effects.) We can talk about it and describe it, but it remains
> removed from the essence of Firstness. One can take these viewpoints based
> on Peirce's own statements about the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353)
> I guess put another way, for me, the universal categories are the
> adjudicators in how I try to think about Peirce, not semiosis, which is a
> process of representation. However, of course, from the vantage of
> representation, semiosis naturally holds sway.
>
> Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my perspective, you did an
> admirable job.
>
> Mike
> On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken me a
> couple of days to reply, but this weekend happened to be especially busy.
>
> In the spirit of trying to see if it's possible to come to agreem

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perplexing

[Stephen C. Rose]

I agree as well.  As important may be observations of Deely and others who
have already taken large steps in liberating Peirce's thought. I think
there is some urgency in establishing a triadic perspective about which
there should be little debate.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 2:07 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> I strongly agree with Mike B and Gary R.
>
> MB
>
>> I humbly suggest that intersection of interests is a more practical
>> domain of inquiry than trying to find where your interpretations differ.
>>
>
> GR
> I have always thought... that those who want to promote Peirce's
> philosophy in the world at large ought attempt to find what is most
>
> powerful, potentially productive and heuristic in Peirce that we can
> more or less come to tentatively and fallibly agree on. Perhaps then
> we can explore ways to send his profound insights into the world,
> agreeing that some of these are considerable, perhaps inestimable
> potential value.
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] "What is the main challenge for contemporary semiotics?"

[Stephen C. Rose]

Here is my take: From something I am working on.

Philosophy is universal and communicable. It belongs to all. It lives in
all. Philosophy is what everyone lives by. It is what we believe, what
causes us to speak and act. It is not a system. It is an understanding. It
is a perception. It exists and is the most powerful force there is.

It is the force of freedom, of choice. It is the force of love. It is the
force that insists on justice, on the good.

It is what we all know. It is what we all believe. It is true of everyone.
Philosophy is in us. It is our consolation. It is our will to live. It is
our pathway to the good. It is our door to the truth. It is our vision of
the beautiful. We all know it. We are all philosophers.

It accepts all, embraces all, sees past all, sees to the end of things. It
is our lifeblood, our destiny, our being.


+

A revised version at Commaful. <https://commaful.com/?r=stephencrose> To
move forward click the right hand side of the image, backward the left. The
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[PEIRCE-L] Semiotics followup

[Stephen C. Rose]

Semiotics is the only inherently interdisciplinary perspective there
is...John Deely

PS I think the current discussions have exhibited what might be called a
series of dissonant meta-languages.

Deely is absolutely right that Semiotics and therefore Peirce should be
communicated to the whole world for ideas that are as plain as day if you
do not become preoccupied on the basis that we are missing something.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuine triadic relations

[Stephen C. Rose]

Sounds interesting -- a far piece from NYC but I am hoping you will
summarize the argument. It seems to me that one can represent a
relationship as triadic without if one can represent a relationship as
binary. Icon-index-symbol works as a model for the consideration of a sign.
I will be interested in your POV.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 5:49 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On Saturday, I'll be commenting on a paper by Bill McCurdy at
> a logic colloquium of the American Philosophical Association in
> San Diego.  See below for a description of the session, the abstract
> and URL for a preprint of Bill's paper, and the URL for my slides.
>
> Will anyone be attending that conference?
>
> John
> _
>
> 2:00-3:00 PM, 31 March 2018
>
> Chair:  Damien Barnes (University of California, Santa Barbara)
>
> Speaker:  William James McCurdy (Idaho State University)
> “The Necessity of Genuine Triadic Relations”
>
> Abstract:  A genuine triadic relation is a three-relata relation which
> cannot be analyzed into combinations of relations of any smaller adicity.
> Although one of the major pioneers of the algebra of logic, C.S. Peirce,
> contended that there are genuine triadic relations, contemporary logicians
> almost universally disagree. The grounds for this denial will be shown to
> be the consequence of an inadequate conception of relations in general and
> of triadic relations in particular. The poison well-spring is the
> Kuratowskian definitions of both n-adic relations and n-tuples. The
> Kuratowskian account will be critiqued and Peirce’s contention defended.
>
> Preprint: http://apa-pacific.org/framed/download.php?file=281.pdf
>
> Commentator: John F. Sowa, "Triads or Triadic Relations"
> Slides:  http://jfsowa.com/talks/triads.pdf
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

I take it you agree with Pierce in this instance. I made what I think is a
substantive point and was thankful for being prompted for saying it. I am
now to conclude that the point I made which has massive implications for
philosophy is to be subordinated to what you suggest are nuances to subtle
to be grasped. I have no doubt they are but the import of what you say is
that there is indeed a door that is closed. Sorry about that. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 24, 2018 at 12:04 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Stephen wrote: I do not regard tolerance, helpfulness, democracy,
> freedom. love and justice as matters of "sentiment"
>
> I didn't say that *you* did, but that Peirce did. But his notion of
> sentiment is subtle and nuanced, and I won't get into it in this post.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Mar 24, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I do not regard tolerance, helpfulness, democracy, freedom. love and
>> justice as matters of "sentiment" any more than I regard Wittgensteins
>> notion of such talk as unspeakable or nonsensical. I was drawn to Peirce
>> precisely because he opened for me a way of seeing that looking at matters
>> as sentiment versus scientific was a binary way such as he seemed to
>> condemn. I thought then and continue to think that we are close to having
>> the means to define and quantify these unspeakables so that they are
>> subject to and enhanced by scientific research. Thinking these are matters
>> of sentiment is a convenient way of suggesting that anything that matters
>> is just floating out there and not amenable to the triadic maxim which
>> considers things and arrives at a conclusion which is the substance of
>> philosophy. Thank you for prompting me to express what I think.
>>
>>>
>>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

I do not regard tolerance, helpfulness, democracy, freedom. love and
justice as matters of "sentiment" any more than I regard Wittgensteins
notion of such talk as unspeakable or nonsensical. I was drawn to Peirce
precisely because he opened for me a way of seeing that looking at matters
as sentiment versus scientific was a binary way such as he seemed to
condemn. I thought then and continue to think that we are close to having
the means to define and quantify these unspeakables so that they are
subject to and enhanced by scientific research. Thinking these are matters
of sentiment is a convenient way of suggesting that anything that matters
is just floating out there and not amenable to the triadic maxim which
considers things and arrives at a conclusion which is the substance of
philosophy. Thank you for prompting me to express what I think.

>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

I don't post that often. I study as best I can and when I react it is
mainly to Peirce himself. I do not lack interest in Peirce or boast about
such. I do not express or feel contempt for anyone. I certainly do not see
“triadic philosophy” as meriting more interest, care or attention than
Peirce. In fact, I lament the absence of Peirce from general awareness.

I do not have a habit of behaving "that way" on the list. My involvement is
not habitual and do not accept your description of "that way".  "Genuine
inquirer" sounds to me exclusionary.

Contempt is not what I feel. Sad is more accurate.

I have no idea who "the rest of us" is. The rest of us has no limits and I
suspect on a happier day you agree. Best, S


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 24, 2018 at 10:58 AM,  wrote:

> Stephen, you’ve already and repeatedly expressed your lack of interest in
> a careful study of Peirce’s philosophy and semiotics. What I don’t
> understand is why you feel compelled to remind the Peirce list of your lack
> of interest in Peirce, and even to boast about it, while expressing
> contempt for those who do care more about Peirce’s philosophy than your
> “triadic philosophy.”
>
> You’re not the only one who has a habit of behaving that way on the list,
> or I wouldn’t bother to respond. The habit such behavior encourages genuine
> inquirers to reach for the delete key at sight of your byline. I don’t
> question your right to express such contempt on the list, but you’re
> mistaken if you expect the rest of us to pay any attention to it, or to
> apologize for being deeply interested in what Peirce has to say.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

Not worth getting into a long to do about. If understanding Peirce wins
brownie points count me out. I will ever know as much as the next. After
reading this I feel just as I did when I made the initial comment. If that
clouds my real understanding of Peirce so be it.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 24, 2018 at 10:31 AM,  wrote:

> List,
>
>
>
> Apparently some on the list find Peirce’s distinction between the genuine
> and the degenerate inconvenient. But it’s not that elusive for those who
> really want to know what Peirce is talking about. You could, for instance,
> consult the index of EP2, or the Commens Dictionary:
>
>
>
> 1903 | CSP's Lowell Lectures of 1903. 2nd Part of 3rd Draught of Lecture
> III | CP 1.535
>
> Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms of Secondness by considering
> the full ideas of first and second. Then the genuine Secondness was found
> to be reaction, where first and second are both true seconds and the
> Secondness is something distinct from them, while in degenerate Secondness,
> or mere reference, the first is a mere first never attaining full
> Secondness.
>
>
>
> 1905 | Letters to Mario Calderoni | MS [R] L67:32-33
>
> …that Secundanity which consists in one man’s having a stature of 6 feet
> and another man’s having a stature of 5 feet is a degenerate Secundanity,
> since each would be just what he is if the other were not there, and would
> be Second in the same way to a merely possible but non-existent man.
>
>
>
> *Citation*
>
> ‘Degenerate Secondness’. Term in M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), *The
> Commens Dictionary: Peirce's Terms in His Own Words. New Edition.* Retrieved
> from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/degenerate-secondness,
> 24.03.2018.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry LR Chandler 
> *Sent:* 23-Mar-18 20:19
> *To:* Stephen C. Rose ; Peirce List <
> Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants
>
>
>
> List:
>
>
>
> On Mar 23, 2018, at 6:20 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
>
>
>
> The degenerate notions elude me.
>
>
>
> Me, too.
>
>
>
> This term has a crisp meaning in physics/chemistry terminology.
>
>
>
> Cheers
>
>
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

Bogus is a strong term. I think Edwina is suggesting that we observe the
pragmatic maxim. What is the practical effect or substance of a
consideration? What is the whole of the matter?   What is the end of this
particular effort to parse a particular sign? Triadic philosophy asks how
what we are considering is tolerant, helpful and democratic. It considers
how it relates to freedom. love and justice. The end result is an
expression or action that can be noted and described.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:07 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, list,
>
> You wrote:
>
>  "I think that the various comments and concerns by others on the
> list, that attempts to set up an analytic and abstract model of the
> semiosic process, with each part defined within an exact and singular term
> and providing an exact and singular action - actually deny the real nature
> of semiosis."
>
>
> Who here is presenting a model "with each part defined within an exact and
> singular term and providing an exact and singular action"?
>
> Besides the fact that Peirce himself made many  "analytic and abstract
> model [s] of the semiosic process," noting time and again that *Logic as
> Semeiotic* is a *theoretical* science (this is especially evident in its
> first two branches, theoretical grammar and critic), many Peirce scholars
> and other semioticians have found that analytical and abstract analyses and
> models can assist them in understanding certain underlying structures and
> processes. And so the pages of many journals--and not just *Transactions*--are
> filled with such analyses, models, diagrams, etc.
>
> And this is the case for science more generally: not only does it occur in
> virtually all sciences that I know of, but most scientists--at least those
> that I know in person (and I know quite a few) or by reputation--hold that
> models and abstract analysis do not necessarily deny reality whatsoever.
> Quite the contrary. They are but another *tool* to help understand
> reality.
>
> And your own work, including one of your more recent papers, takes an
> "analytical and abstract" approach to semeiotic involving models and
> diagrams and the like. See: "The Nature of the Sign as a *WFF* - A
> Well-Formed Formula" (in WORD format)
> 
>
> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/taborsky/
> taborsky-sign-wff.doc
>
> ET: "The morphological form is a well-formed formula (*wff*), a Sign, an
> organized process of information. The Sign is formed within a triadic set
> of relations, which are encoded spatial and temporal measurements. Using a
> Cartesian quadrant, the six possible relational modes are examined to show
> how reality is moulded within both symmetrical and asymmetrical functions."
>
>
> *Many approaches* to inquiry are, as I see it, quasi-necessary in the
> sense that "getting at" reality requires these varied approaches, including
> (but not limited to) more abstract and analytical ones. I do not see why
> both more or less abstract inquiries ought not be undertaken.
>
> And given some of your own inquiry--for example the paper above, not to
> mention much that you've done on this list--I consider your critique bogus.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> List
>>
>> I think that the various comments and concerns by others on the
>> list, that attempts to set up an analytic and abstract model of the
>> semiosic process, with each part defined within an exact and singular term
>> and providing an exact and singular action - actually deny the real nature
>> of semiosis.
>>
>> As Peirce noted, his pragmatacism was rooted in reality, a reality that
>> is necessarily dynamic - and not in models, not in closed abstractions of
>> thought. The fact that his semiosis includes not merely three basic modal
>> categories - but- if you include the degenerate modes - there are 6 modal
>> categories - as well as two objects and three interpretants suggests a
>> complex system.
>>
>> No complex system operates deductively, but as has been pointed out - it
>> operates inductively. And - abductively. An abstract technical model has no
>> capacity to show or even allow such actions.
>>
>> In addition, each semiosic triad is networked with other triads - each
>> with their own categorical modes - adding to the complex nature of the
>> process.
>>
>> That is, semiosis is a so-called 'far-from-equilibrium' complex adaptive
>> system - and can't be outlined within an abstract analytical deductive
>> model.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

What is all experience if not the experience of semiosis (encounter with
signs) and how can these be  "studied" (semiotics) without words of some
other interpretive means? As I parse things, reality (which I insist is
all) communicates with us via signs. We, as part of reality, refine signs
into words which inevitably limit the import of the signs but serve us all
the same if we think well. Reality>signs>language

The degenerate notions elude me.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 7:00 PM,  wrote:

> John, Gary R, Jon A.S., Mary et al.,
>
> I too have been reflecting on the last few sentences of Peirce’s 1909
> letter to James, but my thoughts have been tending in a somewhat different
> direction.
>
> When Peirce says that his attempt to distinguish clearly among the three
> interpretants “relates to a real and important three-way distinction,” he
> is reminding us that semiotics, including its taxonomic side (“speculative
> grammar”), is a *positive science*. This implies that it must involve
> some inductive reasoning, which draws *fallible* conclusions from actual
> experience (in this case, experience of semiosis). The semiotic theorist
> has to find some way of directing attention to this subject matter in such
> a way as to facilitate “carving it at its joints,” i.e. observing what its 
> *real
> parts* are. This is a problem that cannot be solved deductively, as a
> mathematical problem can.
>
> In practice, Peirce (like the rest of us) mostly uses *words* for the
> indexical function of directing our attention to the semiotic phenomena.
> But this inevitably involves *reference*, i.e. use of signs whose
> relation to their objects is only a *degenerate Secondness*. And when it
> comes to *naming* the real parts (such as the three interpretants), we
> end up using common nouns, which are *inevitably* inexact in their
> reference function. And on top of that, the problem is compounded by the
> fact that so much of the experience which constitutes the subject matter of
> semiotics is *itself* linguistic. The problem in a nutshell is that
> names, even proper names, have zero indexical value, except for the
> interpreter who is already acquainted with *both the name and its real
> object*.
>
> What I’ve said here so far can be taken as an explanation of why Jon’s
> enterprise strikes me now as a wild goose chase. I think the reasons are
> virtually implied by what Peirce says about that “real and important
> three-way distinction”:
>
> [[ it is quite hazy and needs a vast deal of study before it is rendered
> perfect. Lady Welby has got hold of the same real distinction in her
> “Sense, Meaning, Significance,” but conceives it as imperfectly as I do,
> but imperfectly in other ways. Her *Sense* is the *Impression* made or
> normally to be made. Her *Meaning* is what is intended, its purpose. Her
> *Significance* is the real upshot. ]]
>
> How does Peirce know that Lady Welby has “got hold of *the same* real
> distinction”? He could only know that (or even think that) by using both
> his terms *and* Welby’s terms, *in their respective contexts*, to direct
> his own attention to *the same real object*. Peirce does not say, or
> imply, that any *definition* of his terms (or hers) could be “rendered
> perfect.” Indeed, the only kind of definition that would be indexically
> useful would be like Peirce’s famous definition of lithium (CP2:330), a
> pragmatic one which “denotes by prescribing what you are to *do* in order
> to gain a perceptual acquaintance with the object of the word.”
>
> It is the *distinction* itself that “is quite hazy and needs a vast deal
> of study.” This *distinction* is, in effect, a kind of speech act, a
> semiosic one as well as a semiotic one; and I think the “study” would
> amount to a lot of *practice* in making the distinction in various cases
> and circumstances. Peirce has already begun this “study” by distinguishing
> between the haziness of his concept of the distinction and the haziness of
> Welby’s concept: both conceptions are imperfect, but in different ways. So
> we *practice* the act of making the distinction by trying out *various*
> terms in various cases and contexts and gradually inform ourselves about
> how the various terms differ in their indexical functions — guided all the
> time by some sort of faith that the distinction is “real and important” and
> thus *independent of our conceptions of it*. There is no way to render a
> concept “more perfect” by finding a perfect term for it or a perfect
> definition of the chosen term.
>
> I could ramble on about this but I guess that’s quite enough for one day.
>
> Gary f.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa 
> Sent: 22-Mar-18 21:38
>
> On 3/21/2018 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> > Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and
>
> > important three-way distinction." It may yet have been--at that point
>
> > in time--"quite hazy," but since Peirce saw it as "a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

This goes far toward substantiating a general observation about discussion
or communication in a forum such as this. To be Peircean should not be seen
as having the right slant on what he means as having a general relationship
to a zeitgeist that is not that difficult to define. It exists on several
of the main sites as the initial text you encounter. Here I often get the
sense that seeing things the right way is the game. I would say that if
inquiry is about what is the case that is one thing, but if it means hewing
to a line of interpretation that becomes a sort of sectarianism which in
practical terms can smother inquiry.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 9:38 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 3/21/2018 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
>> Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and
>> important three-way distinction." It may yet have been--at that point in
>> time--"quite hazy," but since Peirce saw it as "a real and important
>> three-way distinction" there would seem to be very good reason to continue
>> to study it in the interests of rendering it at least a bit less imperfect.
>>
>
> I agree that the issues are important.  And I am not objecting to people
> continuing to study the issues.
>
> I was trying to state a point about Peirce's ethics of terminology.
> Note that he did not approve of people who took his word 'pragmatics'
> and used it in a very different way.
>
> For the issues in this thread, Peirce himself said that he was unable
> to state a precise definition in terms of his own system and that
> Lady Welby was unable to state a precise definition of a related
> concept in terms of her system.
>
> It's conceivable that somebody someday may define a related notion
> more precisely in terms of some other system.  But if that definition
> were truly precise, it could not be exactly the same as any "hazy"
> notion -- by Peirce, by Lady Welby, or by anyone else.
>
> In browsing through this thread, I see people claiming that their
> definition is better or that they don't understand someone else's
> definition.
>
> I won't make any judgments about any of those claims.  My only point
> is that if any of those definitions are precise, then they cannot be
> the same as the hazy notion that Peirce was trying to define.  If so,
> Peirce's ethics of terminology implies they should not use Peirce's
> term -- they should choose a different word or phrase of their own.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

If semiosis is real, a general, true regardless what one thinks or does not
think, how can any theory of it be more than an inadequate effort to make
sense of the reality it embodies. This is one reason that examples are
relevant. If my sign is today's news i can proceed to tell you how I might
parse it according to mu lights. But I would also be going on the premise
that today's news sits in an infinite (from my POV) sea of potential views.
My analysis would not depend on the veracity of my theory or way of looking
at today's news. I might explain it which is what I mean by always
suggesting there be an example. But when we get to that point we have left
the fundamental truth of semiosis (its universality and reality) and gotten
to how we think. That is interesting but it has litte interest to someone
who has a different way of looking at what is the case. It is more a case
study I think. Even Peirce whom we concede to have studied more deeply than
most is only, implicitly by sharing his philosophy, offering us a view of
how he gets where he is going. Each of us, if reading him, will concede
that these theories and modes are subject to his general and repeated
affirmation of realism and his rejection of nominalism.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 9:34 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> As I said, if you are unwilling, for the sake of this discussion, to set
> aside your own model of semiosis--and (especially) your own peculiar
> terminology, which is very different from mine--then further dialogue
> between us will almost certainly be fruitless.  I fully expect you to
> disagree with me on just about every single one of the following points.
>
>1. I chose a particular abstract example very intentionally.
>2. The Sign is not a "triad," although the IO and II are indeed *within
>*it.
>3. There is no "Representamen" as you define it; for me, that word is
>just a synonym for "Sign."
>4. The DI *can *be a feeling (1ns/Sympathetic) or exertion
>(2ns/Percussive), but my example happens to be a case where it is *always
>*another Sign (3ns/Usual), which is why a shout of STOP is not an
>equivalent scenario.
>5. Peirce explicitly differentiated between Signs whose "Manner of
>Appeal" is Imperative (urged or asserted) vs. Suggestive (merely presented
>for contemplation); this proposal is of the latter kind.
>6. Signs absolutely can be, and often are, transmitted externally;
>this e-mail message is precisely such a Sign, or more accurately, a Replica
>of a Sign.
>7. My current working definitions are that the DO is the Matter that
>the Sign denotes, the IO is the Form that the Sign signifies, the II is the
>Form that the Sign communicates, the DI is the Matter that the Sign
>determines, and the FI is the Entelechy that the Sign intends.
>8. The diagram was attached to my last message, and is now
>downloadable from the List archive (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/
>arc/peirce-l/2018-03/msg00191/Semiosis.jpg
>
>).
>
> Finally, your allegation, "You are claiming that there is only one valid
> model - yours!!! Do you want a debate and dialogue or merely subservient
> following?" is baseless, absurd, and offensive, and I frankly think that
> you owe me a retraction and apology.  What part of "This thread is intended
> to be an inquiry for which I am seeking the assistance of the List
> community" and "I am still very much open to being persuaded" did you not
> understand?
>
> Cheers,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 4:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>> 1: Of course I know that the Quasi-Mind need not be a person but can be a
>> group of crystals and etc.! I am trying to provide an EXAMPLE of such
>> and its interaction. There is no need to complicate a simple example!
>>
>> 2. So- your use of the Sign is in its function as mediation - and not as
>> the Triad of [IO-R-II]. I think that readers need this clarified.
>>
>> 3. So wait - you are saying that a DI becomes ...what. I'm unsure. Are
>> you saying that a DI becomes..a Representamen? It sounds like you are
>> confining the term of Representamen to Thirdness...when you say it is "not
>> feelings or exertions" [which are in 1ns and 2ns]. But..I disagree on both
>> counts. A Representamen [and I use the term to differentiate it from the
>> TRIAD [IO-R-II]...can be in any categorical mode.
>>
>> And - I don't see that a DI becomes a Representamen. Its informational
>> content can be generalized and added to the knowledge base/habits of the
>> Representamen, but I don't see that the DI becomes 'a further Sign'.
>>
>> 4. And now, you are confusing me again, with your statement:
>>
>> "Furthermore, each IO and II is internal to a Sign, not internal to a
>> person (or Quasi-mind); and "existence" is not coextensive with "objective
>> reality," sinc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

[Stephen C. Rose]

Any talk of signs would benefit from the use of examples. Otherwise, you
are constructing hypotheticals with no possibility of arriving at an
expressive or actionable result. There's a big world out there. Semiosis
has to do with all, everything, as I understand it.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 5:50 PM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> OK, I think I can follow your reasoning, though I don’t find it
> persuasive. It implies that there is no such thing as an *intended
> interpretant* of any given sign, if that means an interpretant intended
> by the utterer. This makes me wonder what Peirce could possibly be
> referring to as “the Influence the Sign is *intended* to exert" (R
> 339:424[285r]” (quoted in your earlier message), if neither Seme nor Pheme
> nor Delome can have an intended interpretant.
>
> Are you assuming (or are you convinced) that the 
> *Intentional/Effectual/Communicational
> *trichotomy of interpretants differs *in name only* from the 
> *Immediate/Dynamical/Final
> *trichotomy? Are there really only three interpretants, not six or more?
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* 20-Mar-18 16:33
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants
>
>
>
> Garys, List:
>
>
>
> GR:  When you say that the Dynamic Object determines the Sign, what part
> does the Immediate Object play in that determination? I am for now assuming
> that it is the Form which the Sign will represent. Can one say that the
> Dynamic Object determines the Immediate Object which determines the Sign?
> That, at least, has been my understanding.
>
>
>
> Peirce consistently held that the Object determines the Sign, which
> determines the Interpretant.  When he expanded his analysis to two Objects
> (and three Interpretants), he indeed indicated that the Dynamic Object
> determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign; but keep in
> mind that the Immediate Object is *internal *to the Sign.  My current
> proposal is that the Dynamic Object is the Matter that the Sign denotes,
> while the Immediate Object is the Form that the Sign signifies--as I have
> put it previously, a partial combination of attributes of the Dynamic
> Object that render it recognizable to an interpreting Quasi-mind with the
> appropriate Collateral Experience.  Does that answer your questions?
>
>
>
> GF:  Jon, one question re your statement: “… he had defined the
> Intentional Interpretant as "a determination of the mind of the utterer"
> (SS 196, EP 2:478).  Apparently he realized that, as such, it obviously 
> *cannot
> *be an Interpretant of the Sign that the utterer is *currently *uttering
> …”  Why not?
>
>
>
> Because any Interpretant is always a determination of the Quasi-mind that 
> *interprets
> *a given Sign, never the Quasi-mind that *utters *it--even when these are
> temporally successive versions of the *same *Quasi-mind.  Again, the
> essential ingredient of the utterer is the Object, while the essential
> ingredient of the interpreter is the Interpretant; and in Peirce's words ...
>
>
>
> CSP:  In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to
> say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon
> the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its
> relation to the Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the
> Interpretant without being itself thereby affected. (EP 2:544n22; 1906)
>
>
>
> A Sign cannot affect its utterer, since it cannot affect its Object; but
> it can and does affect its interpreter, precisely by determining its
> Interpretant *in that Quasi-mind*.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 1:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> Jon, list,
>
>
>
> Thanks for this very helpful analysis of the three interpretants of
> Peirce's late semeiotic. My first impression is, from what I can grasp of
> it, that it seems correct and complete, a succinct and subtle analysis. But
> I'll want to study it further as there are some points which are still a
> bit unclear to me, for example:
>
>
>
> JA: The essential ingredient of the utterer is the Dynamic Object, which
> determines the Sign; that of the interpreter is the Dynamic Interpretant,
> which the Sign determines; and that of the Commens is the Sign itself,
> which welds the utterer and interpreter into one Quasi-mind (cf. CP
> 4.551).
>
>
>
> When you say that the Dynamic Object determines the Sign, what part does
> the Immediate Object play in that determination? I am for now assuming that
> it is the Form which the Sign *will *represent. Can one say that the
> Dynamic Object determines the Immediate Object which determines the Sign?
> That, at least, has been my understanding.
>
>
>
> In any event, your analysis should allow semioticians interested in this
> aspect of Peirce's late sem

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Perfect Sign Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

The notion of aesthetics as a significant conclusion to ethical reflection,
assuming we are talking about finite decisions that will inevitably have
some fallibility, is to me revolutionary. Why? Ask yourself how far we have
gotten assuming that power alone can bring about good. It was the Bush (W)
presupposition that shock and awe was compatible with the evolving of
democracy. Mao also thought that revolution could be won by force. That is
binary thought that is still rife. But what we think and its relation to
Peirce is at best tangental.  To say what we think he thought different
than saying what we think independently of Peirce.

On Sat, Mar 17, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> OK, I had misunderstood it in a way as if for Peirce "an ultimate end of
> action" was his esthetic ideal, that would the end of life too, an
> apocalypse. But he meant it specific, i.e. only if deliberately adopted.
> But still there is the conclusion "the only moral evil is not to have an
> ultimate aim". I donot have an ultimate aim, and donot want to have one,
> because I think that would be apocalyptic fundamentalism. This makes me
> moralically evil in Peirce´s view. I in return think, that this view is
> evil. It is the crassest form of naturalistic fallacy, and the opposite of
> the constructivist imperative, that identifies a good aim not with the end
> of thoughts, but with enlarging the number of possible thoughts.
> But still, maybe, and I hope that it is so, I too strictly and biasedly
> suppose biophoby to the pursuit of an "ultimate end of action"?
> Best, Helmut
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

Disregarding the pejorative tone of your note the creators of CP certainly
did not see their work as exhaustive though they hoped for a complete
display of Peirce online. Blocking the road of inquiry is to Peirce one of
the major evils and if I have committed it I apologize. The substance of
your note I leave to wiser heads to determine the weight of.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Stephen, Jon S, list,
>
> Stephen wrote:
>
> SR: I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of
> matters Peirce himself did not see as important.
>
>
> I completely disagree that Jon's inquiry "is a needless and unproductive
> complexification of matters Peirce himself did not see as important." In
> fact, Jon is raising the curtain on an aspect of Peirce's late semeiotic
> which several members of this forum find of considerable interest, while it
> is certainly deepening my understanding of these topics. I see no reason
> whatsoever to support your comment that "Peirce himself did not see" this
> as an important inquiry and quite the contrary.
>
> SR: The term perfect sign does not appear in CP. The term perfect is used
> in all manner of contexts but less than 100 times. There are over 1000
> references to signs but none is preceded by the word perfect.
>
>
> Two points. First, the CP is but a sampling of Peirce's work, so your
> stats hold little, if any, weight. Were one able to sample the frequency of
> certain terms and expressions in all the published work (including, for
> example, NEM and the PEP's chronological edition, but others as well; and
> never forgetting that much of Peirce's work has not yet been published) one
> might come up with a *very* different frequency rate.
>
> Second, the frequency of a term or expression says almost nothing about
> it's importance, especially when one considers that Peirce introduced a
> great deal of new terminology into his late semeiotic researches, only a
> fraction of which has, to my knowledge, been published. Take any number of
> terms and expressions from that late work and you will find few instances
> of these terms, some of which are considered of great importance to a
> number of established semioticians. Now had Peirce lived another ten years,
> say. . .
>
> SR:  I think it inhibits philosophy itself to regard a term not
> fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth extended
> treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
>
>
> What *I* think "inhibits philosophy" is the tendency to "block the road
> of inquiry" because one  doesn't find it of personal interest or personal
> value. You have no idea, in my opinion, whether or not this late move by
> Peirce is "fundamental" to his understanding, and even less how further
> research into it will or will not "somehow advance" our understanding of
> the topics under consideration.
>
> SR: Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
> lexicon
>
>
> First, again your estimate of the "prominence" of "subjects" in "Peirce's
> own lexicon" seems based on a string search of the CP, hardly likely to
> give an accurate account of what was important for Peirce and which may
> warrant further inquiry by those, like JAS, who seem likely to contribute
> to it.
>
> Besides, as mentioned above, there being much more published Peirce beyond
> the CP (which edition has significant limitations), as John Sowa recently
> noted a vast amount of manuscript material hasn't yet been published, and
> this is particularly so, I believe, as regards his late work, especially
> his late work in semeiotics, his letters, marginalia, contributions to
> dictionaries, etc.
>
> Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order
> to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with
> what you already incline to think, there follows one corollary which itself
> deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy:
>
> Do not block the way of inquiry.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
>> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
>> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

The main problem with this is that one can be a realist without assuming we
have reached a point at which reality as a state of actual existence is
realized. It is a paradox admittedly, but I believe fundamental to Peirce
to assume things as real that are not fully realized and to see continuity
as the slow and fallible process of moving toward realization. We are part
of moving reality.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 12:20 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> ‘man is a sign.’
>
>
>
> *The purpose of every sign is* to express "fact," and by being joined
> with other signs, *to approach as nearly as possible* to determining an
> interpretant which would be *the perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and
> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.
>
>
>
> *Absolute truth* “is the *agreement* of the content of cognition with the
> actuality.” Uberweg.
>
>
>
> *Absolute horizon*.  “The *congruence* of the limits of human cognition
> with the limits of collective human perfection in general.”  Kant, Logik,
> Einleitung VI, p. 207.
>
>
>
> Indeed all propositions refer to one and the same determinately singular
> subject, well understood *between all utterers and interpreters*, namely,
> to the Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is assumed on all
> hands to be real.
>
>
>
> .. we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us.
>
>
> For our aim is not to know what truth is but to *be* truthful..
>
>
>
> There is but one individual, or completely determinate, state of things,
> namely, the all of reality.
>
>
>
> “Eschenmayer asserts that God is infinitely higher than the absolute,
> which is only the last object of knowledge, while God is only an object of
> faith, which is infinitely higher than knowledge.”
>
>
>
> Absolute philosophy.  A philosophy which is absolute knowledge, if true.
> (Selections mostly from Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological
> Edition, Volume 2)
>
>
>
> My final words are about my title. Why *contrite* fallibilism? As far as
> I know *Peirce used that expression, *“contrite fallibilism”,* only once*,
> in the quotation I gave earlier where he said that it was “out of a
> contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality
> of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out”, that all of his
> philosophy had grown (CP 1.13-14). ~Nathan Houser
> Hth and Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
>> Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
>> appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
>> than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
>> preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
>> regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
>> extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
>> Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
>> lexicon.
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>>
>>> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we
>>> can now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign"
>>> in EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
>>>
>>>- It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
>>>occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no 
>>> other
>>>Sign except those that are its ingredients.
>>>- It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that
>>>acts; and whatever acts, changes.
>>>- Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the
>>>Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its
>>>outlines are becoming more indefinite.
>>>- It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from
>>>it the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the
>>>energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant.
>>>- It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by
>>>its will, but are phenomena of growth.
>>>- It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential
>>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perfect Sign Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

I think this is a needless and unproductive complexification of matters
Peirce himself did not see as important. The term perfect sign does not
appear in CP. The term perfect is used in all manner of contexts but less
than 100 times. There are over 1000 references to signs but none is
preceded by the word perfect. I think it inhibits philosophy itself to
regard a term not fundamental to an author's understanding as somehow worth
extended treatment as something that will somehow advance u thinking.
Perhaps we should rate subjects by their prominence in Peirce's own
lexicon.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 10, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
>
> Having gotten a better handle on Peirce's concept of a Quasi-mind, we can
> now make another attempt at sorting out what he meant by "perfect sign" in
> EP 2:545n25.  Here is a summary of what that text tells us about it.
>
>- It is the aggregate formed by a Sign and all the Signs that its
>occurrence carries with it, and involves the present existence of no other
>Sign except those that are its ingredients.
>- It is not in a statical condition, because it is an existent that
>acts; and whatever acts, changes.
>- Its every real ingredient is aging, its energy of action upon the
>Interpretant is running low, its sharp edges are wearing down, and its
>outlines are becoming more indefinite.
>- It is perpetually being acted upon by its Object, receiving from it
>the accretions of new Signs that bring it fresh energy and kindle the
>energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant.
>- It constantly undergoes spontaneous changes that do not happen by
>its will, but are phenomena of growth.
>- It is a Quasi-mind and the Sheet of Assertion of Existential Graphs.
>
>
>
> The Perfect Sign involves the *present *existence (2ns) of *only* those
> Signs that comprise it, which are aging and wearing down; yet it continues
> receiving accretions of *new *Signs (3ns) from its Object and undergoing
> *spontaneous *changes (1ns).  After further contemplation, I now believe
> that Peirce was describing *the same thing* here as in the passage about
> "the ideal sign" that I have mentioned previously, which he wrote a couple
> of years earlier.
>
>
> CSP:  What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
> proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself.
> The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with
> other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
> interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and
> as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.
> Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he
> never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very
> fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so
> identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter
> denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the
> Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe
> in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that
> is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.
> (EP 2:304; 1904)
>
>
>
> Contrary to my previous hypothesis, "Perfect Sign" is *not* synonymous
> with "Quasi-mind"; instead, it designates the Truth that corresponds to the
> Universe.  As such, it also satisfies the last bullet above, since the
> Sheet of Assertion or Phemic Sheet is not only a Quasi-mind, but also "a
> Seme of *The Truth*, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality" (CP
> 4.553; 1906).  Of course, this does not at all entail that a Quasi-mind
> and the Universe are the same thing.
>
>
>
> CSP:  … one and the same construction may be, when regarded in two
> different ways, two altogether different diagrams; and that to which it
> testifies in the one capacity, it must not be considered as testifying to
> in the other capacity. For example, the Entire Existential Graph of a
> Phemic Sheet, in any state of it, is a Diagram of the logical Universe, as
> it is also a Diagram of a Quasi-mind; but it must not, on *that* account,
> be considered as testifying to the identity of those two. It is like a
> telescope eye piece which at one focus exhibits a star at which the
> instrument is pointed, and at another exhibits all the faults of the
> objective lens. (NEM 4:324; 1906)
>
> Any comments?  I am guessing that these topics must simply not be of much
> interest, or people are just very busy these days, since I find it hard to
> believe that everyone agrees with everything I have been posting. :-)
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L su

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

Glad to see this discussion. I noted in something Gene wrote elsewhere a
representation of one of P's earliest triadic formulations as I, It and
Thou which made me think of Peirce as a predecessor of Martin Buber. In any
case, I think this discussion casts light on recent discussions which
center on somewhat technical terminology.  It might be interesting to
regard the triad descriptively, in terms of what each element contributes
to the actual achievement implicit in the triadic maxim. I have to assume
that this maxim is meant to have actual "real world" results and that the
triad is meant to illuminate these. I find Edwina's remarks helpful in
noting the real if mixed blessings of whatever we call the last few
centuries. And also in describing firstness, secondness, and thirdness.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Mar 5, 2018 at 4:36 PM,  wrote:

> Gene,
>
> It’s questionable whether Political Economy is a science at all in the
> Peircean sense of that word; maybe to him it was no more genuinely
> scientific than, well, the Gospel. But if we consider 21st-century
> Economics as a science, then we should look for self-criticism, and
> criticism of “classical” economic theories, within the profession, as
> symptomatic of the science being genuine in that Peircean sense. And that
> is not hard to find if we do look. To give the one example I’m most
> familiar with, Kate Raworth in *Doughnut Economics* gives a critique of
> the “dismal science” which is not much different from (though more specific
> than) yours or Peirce’s. And she presents an alternative economics which is
> much more consistent with current ecological sciences (and, I might add,
> with social justice).
>
> If science in general is so congenial to the political powers that
> currently be in the U.S., why are they so eager to muzzle scientists, take
> down climate change websites, etc.?
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } What is now proved was once only imagined. [Blake] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Eugene Halton 
> *Sent:* 5-Mar-18 16:01
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital
> importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason
>
>
>
> Dear Gary R.
>
> You mention the problem of greed, Gary, denying that it is a
> problem of science and claiming that it is a misuse of science by “the
> world’s power players,” ie., outsiders to science. You say, “Peirce himself
> almost certainly did find the essential “wicked problems” to be a
> consequence of the political-economic system, not science itself.” I
> disagree. Peirce actually did severly criticise the science of political
> economy itself as a philosophy of greed:
>
> “The nineteenth century is now fast sinking into the grave, and we all
> begin to review its doings and to think what character it is destined to
> bear as compared with other centuries in the minds of future historians. It
> will be called, I guess, the Economical Century; for political economy has
> more direct relations with all the branches of its activity than has any
> other science. Well, political economy has its formula of redemption, too.
> It is this: Intelligence in the service of greed ensures the justest
> prices, the fairest contracts, the most enlightened conduct of all the
> dealings between men, and leads to the *summum bonum*, food in plenty and
> perfect comfort. Food for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence.
> I do not mean to say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of
> political economy, the scientific character of which I fully acknowledge.
> But the study of doctrines, themselves true, will often temporarily
> encourage generalizations extremely false, as the study of physics has
> encouraged necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that the great attention
> paid to economical questions during our century has induced an exaggeration
> of the beneficial effects of greed and of the unfortunate results of
> sentiment, until there has resulted a philosophy which comes unwittingly to
> this, that greed is the great agent in the elevation of the human race and
> in the evolution of the universe.” 6.290:
>
>
>
> Peirce was criticizing the science of political economy of his
> time as reaching what Peirce held to be a false generalization. But it was
> the science itself that held this false generalization, not simply
> outsiders. And Peirce’s criticism extended to Darwin’s scientific theory of
> natural selection:
>
>
>
> “The Origin of Species of Darwin merely extends
> politico-economical views of progress to the entire realm of animal and
> vegetable life. The vast majority of our contemporary naturalists hold the
> opinion that the true cause of those exquisite and marvelous adaptations of
> nature for which, when I was a boy, men used to extol the divine wisdom, is
> that creatures are so crowded together that those of them that happen to
> have the slightest 

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

Would a one who thinks universally not be a world spectator who agrees with
Pinker and others that things actually are improving? No conspiracy there.
Peirce might have been in the camp derisively called globalist if it aimed
at a world where greed is reined in and agapaic things are not scoffed at.


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 7:02 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> "world spectator"?
>
> I've never heard such a thing. That sounds crazy.
> Does anyone else know what it is and why it would even belongs on this
> list?
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 5:58 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry,
>>
>> Since you message is posted both to the list and to me and seemingly in
>> response to my last post, I'd like to know what in the world this
>> "conspiracy" you allude to is? And what do you mean by "world spectator"?
>> You haven't contextualize your strange remarks whatsoever, so I have no
>> idea what this has to do with anything, let alone my last post. On the face
>> of it, it isn't Peirce-related at all. Conspiracy? Really? World-spectator?
>> Really?
>>
>> Certainly "conspiracy" sounds offensive and, as such, has no place on the
>> list.
>>
>> Gary Richmond (writing also as list moderator)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 6:28 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>>> Dear list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That sounds like conspiracy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Surely there is a better story to be told..
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "world spectator." It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole,
>>> whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 4:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Gene, list,

 You concluded:

 EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for
 deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science
 and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many
 admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
 technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world
 with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and
 technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem.


 I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been
 emphasizing.

 I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call
 "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our
 very existence on the earth, but I locate these *more* within the
 political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently
 locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and
 technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the
 scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and
 "deus-ex-machina goals" are "*essential *features" of that system. I
 disagree.

 Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on
 a number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are
 causing global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and
 studies that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch
  (1999). "Climate
 Science: An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science
 
 (PDF). *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*. *80* (3):
 439–455.

 In my view the global climate change deniers are *not* for the most
 part scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and
 greedy and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to
 support policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the
 detriment of the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind,
 water, etc.) The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of
 scientists who deny human caused global warming in service to their greed,
 power, and "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."

 But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and
 scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain
 unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather
 the *misuse* of science and technology by the world's power players.
 That they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising
 for our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of
 science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly
 did find the essential "wicked problems"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] F.E. Abbot

[Stephen C. Rose]

Sounds like we are pretty much agreed, John. I have posited that we have
about a century to get things right and that would include leeching science
of nominalism and I would add binary proclivities. Peirce and Abbot were
staunch realists who are one in moving metaphysics into a configuration
that would have made it amenable to the stringent demands of the
pragmaticist maxim. My background is on the liberal side of American
religion and I can suggest that Peirce and Abbot would have felt just as
alienated as I have by what has passed for liberalism even in its
Niebuhrian garb. The theological makeover desired by both men would have
led them inexorably toward both universalism and nonviolence and away from
the creedal messianism that continues to hold sway. The late Gene Sharp
would have appealed to both men.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 5:30 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Stephen and Helmut,
>
> SCR
>
>> I completely disagree that we live in a time of breakdown.
>>
>
> I did not say 'breakdown'.  I said 'fragmentation'.
>
> SCR
>
>> The civilization the two men aimed at philosophically is an
>> integration of the best of inherited metaphysics with science,
>> arriving at a post-religious spirituality. Of course it builds
>> on the past, but not all of it.
>>
>
> That is certainly what Peirce was aiming at.  From your citation
> of Abbot's defense, he seems to have similar hopes.
>
> But the "Unified Science" that Carnap & Co. were trying to achieve
> in the 1930s was nominalism at its most pernicious.  He used the
> phrase "That's poetry!" to denounce any kind of value judgments
> -- or any concept that resembled Thirdness.
>
> I recall one anecdote about a student who came to the first lecture
> of a philosophy class taught by a highly regarded logician.  At the
> end of the lecture, the student raised his hand and timidly asked
> a question:  "Professor, when will we get to the meaning of life?"
> The professor glared at him, pointed to the door, and shouted "OUT!"
>
> For evidence of fragmentation, the political sphere is the worst,
> and it's affecting every aspect of our daily lives.
>
> I would not agree that [Abbot] had wide influence or even that
>> he could have had.
>>
>
> I did not say that he had.  I said that he had a position as pastor,
> which gave him a weekly opportunity to preach to his congregation.
> I don't know his personal style, but I suspect it was more preachy
> than sympathetic.  Any teacher who listens to the students could
> get an excellent education in how to communicate.
>
> From reading Peirce's writings chronologically, one can see that much
> of his best writings came after his travels abroad, his occasional
> lecture series, and the few years he taught at Johns Hopkins.  I also
> believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby was a very important
> influence on getting him to clarify and systematize his insights.
>
> Since I don't know much about Abbot, I can't say anything certain.
> But I do know colleagues who started with an abysmal teaching style,
> listened to feedback from their students, and revised their methods
> to the point where they became very popular as teachers.  One extreme
> example is James Martin, who made a fortune as a lecturer and author:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Martin_(author)
>
> Martin was no genius.  But he listened to students and colleagues.
> After ten years of teaching IBM employees, he developed his style,
> published some popular textbooks, and took a leave of absence from
> IBM to go on a world-wide tour -- from which he earned more money
> than he ever got from IBM.  So he never went back.
>
> HR
>
>> I like Abbot very much, especially for showing progressive or
>> enlightened people a way to worship god and divinity, instead
>> of having to become atheists like Dawkins. Abbot is literally
>> a soul-saver, I think.
>>
>
> Perhaps so.  But I think he could have been more successful in saving
> souls and himself if he had listened to the people in his congregation.
> Like the people who heard him preach, Abbot started with a Christian
> background.  Instead of alienating people, he could have listened
> sympathetically.  As Unitarians, they would have been happy to hear
> how their Judeo-Christian background was related to other religions.
>
> If Abbot had listened to their complaints, he could have included
> more Christian and Jewish stories and proverbs in his sermons without
> in any way compromising his own beliefs.  He could have gradually
> broadened his perspective while increasing his audience instead of
> losing it -- and falling into the despair that led to suicide.
>
> John
>
>
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Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

o out and
>>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>>> admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
>>>> tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! __Peirce: CP 1.627
>>>> _
>>>>
>>>
>>> In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.
>>>
>>> But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that
>>> of a jury, now is it?
>>>
>>> Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator
>>> ask contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this
>>> off-list). The quotation above appears in the first lecture of the
>>> 1998 lectures published as _Reasoning and the Logic of Things_.
>>>
>>> When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of
>>> lectures in Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then
>>> speaking on logic and science as he was wont to do, that instead
>>> Peirce ought speak on "topics of vital importance" (which phrase
>>> appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626 and .636). Peirce, of
>>> course, chose to speak on what interested him at the time, including
>>> logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.
>>>
>>> In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he
>>> hadn't taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins
>>> by arguing that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a
>>> "theory of reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But
>>> they _do_ have their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . .
>>> in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy
>>> to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination" and in such matters
>>> Peirce will offer as alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It
>>> is this snippet just quoted that introduces the paragraph which
>>> concludes the quotation which Stephen offered. However, ". . . in
>>> theoretical matters I refuse to allow sentiment any weight whatsoever"
>>> (CP 1.634).
>>>
>>> Science, by which he means here, "pure theoretic knowledge," ". . .
>>> has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters" (CP 1.637),
>>> and it is best "to leave [cenoscopic] philosophy to follow perfectly
>>> untrammeled a scientific method" (CP 1.644).  Thus, once he's
>>> concluded this discussion of topics of vital importance being little
>>> aided by our vain power of reason (witness the jury illustration!), he
>>> moves on in the lectures to follow to discussions of topics of
>>> scientific importance.
>>>
>>> Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive results
>>> of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be applied
>>> to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> GARY RICHMOND
>>> PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
>>> COMMUNICATION STUDIES
>>> LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
>>> 718 482-5690
>>>
>>> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
>>>> facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
>>>> reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
>>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>>> admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
>>>> tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory!_
>>>>
>>>> _Peirce: CP 1.627 Cross-Ref:††_
>>>>
>>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
>>>>
>>>> -
>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
>>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Links:
>>> --
>>> [1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>> [2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
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>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

There is ambivalence running through Peirce which is vitiated by an
academic exegetical approach which ignores such passages. It has all sorts
of ramifications including the present political divide between what we
call populism and establishment. Peirce was genuinely not liked by his own
ilk and for good reason. He had their number. Brant picked up on the pathos
of having to live as he did. but if we just deal with the problems related
to words alone there is indeed a fertile field for reevaluation.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:11 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R.
>
> I do think you have mistaken CSP's exclamation of dispair for his true
> views on science and vitally important matters.
>
> The issue should be rethougth, I believe.
>
> Kirsti
>
> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 2.3.2018 22:41:
>
>> Stephen quoted Peirce:
>>
>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
>>> facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
>>> reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>> admitted that the parties to the suit might almost as well have
>>> tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's glory! __Peirce: CP 1.627
>>> _
>>>
>>
>> In point of fact this quote is not from CP 1.627 but .626.
>>
>> But first consider that the method of scientific inquiry is not that
>> of a jury, now is it?
>>
>> Indeed, the quotation exemplifies the reason why I as list moderator
>> ask contributors to contextualize quotations (I usually do this
>> off-list). The quotation above appears in the first lecture of the
>> 1998 lectures published as _Reasoning and the Logic of Things_.
>>
>> When William James first proposed that Peirce give a series of
>> lectures in Cambridge, he suggested in a letter that, rather then
>> speaking on logic and science as he was wont to do, that instead
>> Peirce ought speak on "topics of vital importance" (which phrase
>> appears in 1.622,.623 and variants at .626 and .636). Peirce, of
>> course, chose to speak on what interested him at the time, including
>> logic, inquiry and reasoning, and cosmology.
>>
>> In the first lecture, no doubt in part to explain to James why he
>> hadn't taken his advice for a theme for the lecture series, he begins
>> by arguing that "topics of vital importance" have nothing to do with a
>> "theory of reasoning," which is a principal topic in his lectures. But
>> they _do_ have their place, although not in scientific inquiry: ". . .
>> in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy
>> to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination" and in such matters
>> Peirce will offer as alternatives 'instinct' and 'the sentiments'. It
>> is this snippet just quoted that introduces the paragraph which
>> concludes the quotation which Stephen offered. However, ". . . in
>> theoretical matters I refuse to allow sentiment any weight whatsoever"
>> (CP 1.634).
>>
>> Science, by which he means here, "pure theoretic knowledge," ". . .
>> has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters" (CP 1.637),
>> and it is best "to leave [cenoscopic] philosophy to follow perfectly
>> untrammeled a scientific method" (CP 1.644).  Thus, once he's
>> concluded this discussion of topics of vital importance being little
>> aided by our vain power of reason (witness the jury illustration!), he
>> moves on in the lectures to follow to discussions of topics of
>> scientific importance.
>>
>> Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the positive results
>> of scientific inquiry, for example, new technologies, may be applied
>> to matters of vital importance (for example, in medicine, etc.)
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> GARY RICHMOND
>> PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
>> COMMUNICATION STUDIES
>> LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
>> 718 482-5690
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 2:29 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
>> wrote:
>>
>> _We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the
>>> facts before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human
>>> reason" presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and
>>> deliberate, they come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally
>>> admitted that the parties to

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

Sorry. I should have said practical reasoning. It seemed obvious enough. I
shall write context twenty times, :) Here is the entire section with the
proper designation.

*   626. But in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it
is very easy to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination. Man is so vain
of his power of reason! It seems impossible for him to see himself in this
respect, as he himself would see himself if he could duplicate himself and
observe himself with a critical eye. Those whom we are so fond of referring
to as the "lower animals" reason very little. Now I beg you to observe that
those beings very rarely commit a mistake, while we ---! We employ twelve
good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts before them with
the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason" presides over the
presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they come to a
unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties to the
suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is man's
glory!*


*It would appear that our problems lie in the multiplicity of choices.*

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[PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Stephen C. Rose]

*We employ twelve good men and true to decide a question, we lay the facts
before them with the greatest care, the "perfection of human reason"
presides over the presentment, they hear, they go out and deliberate, they
come to a unanimous opinion, and it is generally admitted that the parties
to the suit might almost as well have tossed up a penny to decide! Such is
man's glory!*

*Peirce: CP 1.627 Cross-Ref:††*

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] F.E. Abbot

[Stephen C. Rose]

Hi John. First I added this to my trove on Abbot on Medium.
https://medium.com/everything-comes/f-e-abbots-libel-case-against-josiah-royce-7e8dd3012457
The complete text of Abbott's defense against Josiah Royce for what appears
to have been a rather complete misunderstanding of him on Royce's part.
Peirce took Abbot's side in this dispute with predictably muted
support from the usual suspects. I was being somewhat flippant in noting
Abbot's suicide. But he was unified with his wife in a rare and important
way it seems and he had reached the end of a long and productive time. I
would not agree that he had wide influence or even that he could have had.
He was closer to Pierce in that respect though he did publish books. He was
booted by Unitarians which is wondrous when you think about it, but
completely sensible. Unitarianism is not Peirce or Abbot.

I completely disagree that we live in a time of breakdown. The breakdown we
experience is a necessary trauma as the world emerges from the vale of
violence, patriarchy, exclusivism, and hierarchy that is part and parcel of
what Peirce and Abbot were against. The civilization the two men aimed at
philosophically is an integration of the best of inherited metaphysics with
science, arriving at a post-religious spirituality. Of course it builds on
the past, but not all of it.

I do not look at suicide as negatively as I might, given my own stance
which is nonviolent. But that is a long discussion.

You mention Merton who managed to electrocute himself by accident. Then
there was the former President of Union Seminary Henry Pitney Van Dusen who
had a suicide pact with his wife and shot her and failed to finish himself
off.

Part of my reaction to Abbot was that he waited ten years exactly after his
wife died and then succeeded. This was not ill-considered. That, and being
more than a century ahead of where my alma mater Union was when I left in
1961 after an amusing meeting with the President, Dr. Van Dusen, seems a
success of sorts.

On the whole, the future belongs to Peirce and Abbot and the signs of the
times are in their favor. Or so I think.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:31 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 3/2/2018 8:25 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:> Entirely delightful with a
> salutary flourish at the end.
>
>> The most salutary suicide I have ever encountered.
>>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Ellingwood_Abbot
>
> That provides some good background about F. E. Abbot, and it's
> significant that Peirce took his side.  But I do not find anything
> salutary about suicide, and certainly not by someone who might
> have contributed much more if he had continued to write and preach.
>
> On a related point, I have a great deal of sympathy for religions
> that have flourished for thousands of years.  They integrate
> metaphysics, normative science, a worldview, a social conscience,
> and a way of life that appeals to people at every level of society.
>
> You can't say that about the currently fragmented "mainstream"
> of philosophy, science, sociology, political thought, and life.
>
> In fact, that's one reason why I was attracted to Peirce's views,
> because he did manage to integrate those fields.  Unfortunately,
> he wasn't able to communicate effectively to a wider audience.
>
> Abbot was able to preach to a large audience.  If he had been
> more circumspect in his choice of metaphors, he might have been
> able to lead them where he wanted to go.  Thomas Merton, for
> example, was a Trappist Monk who managed to remain in good
> standing with the Catholic Church while writing books about
> Buddhism and Taoism.
>
> Following is a note that I recently sent to Ontolog Forum, which
> includes a longer note from last July.  It addresses some similar
> issues.
>
> John
>
>  Forwarded Message 
> Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] Concepts, properties, views, events
> Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 09:44:53 -0500
> From: John F Sowa 
> To: ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com
>
> On 3/1/2018 7:26 AM, KI wrote:
>
>> Are the terms Language and Logic synonyms then?
>>
>
> In a broad sense, you could say that.  But to avoid confusion,
> it's important to distinguish natural languages from artificial
> languages -- and informal or natural logic from formal logics.
>
> With that distinction, every artificial language is a specialized
> notation that could be translated to and from a subset of any
> natural language.  Wittgenstein would call that subset a
> "language game".  But a natural language is the potentially
> infinite set of all possible language games that could be played
> with a given syntax and vocabulary.
>
> Then every formal logic is an artificial language that is used
&g

[PEIRCE-L] F.E. Abbot

[Stephen C. Rose]

Triadic Philosophy gets a good boost from this Wikipedia entry about
someone to whom Peirce refers in CP at a key point and whose side Peirce
took when he did a latterday bout with Royce. Entirely delightful with a
salutary flourish at the end. The most salutary suicide I have ever
encountered. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Ellingwood_Abbot

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

I make no claims. My aims are modest. The highest value I hold is
non-idolatry which means that I tend toward a certain iconoclasm. Toward
everything. I understand what you are saying as an effort to see if I
conform to an understanding of Peirce. Or at least to some standard of
authority like reason.  I assume that like Peirce I can travel where I
like. I like Reason when I have a deep conversation with my daughter who Is
the only one I know who understands me. Otherwise, I see it as a utility
like mathematics and will.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

Logos has lots of meanings and associations but to me, it suggests truth
that might take some time to realize fully but which exists already in an
ontological sense. I assume that history is a movement toward greater
realization. Because logos also carries a good deal of theological freight
I do not employ it as a key term. My key terms are reality, ethics, and
aesthetics. If one senses continuity as an actual movement and if one
experiences conscious reflection as a matter of commitment, I find it hard
to believe there is any sense of logos that is in conflict with the
dynamism and forward movement I associate with Peirce. I have no idea what
Peirce means by the term from the four references to it in CP -- the
content of a thought?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 7:04 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Stephen,
>
>
>
> You said:
>
>
>
> Your final sentence eludes me..
>
> I think Peirce is the most important of the three because of his
> insistence on a pragmaticist understanding of practical outcomes.
>
> Were he better known the world would benefit.
>
> If the implication of your final sentence is a sort of binary splitting of
> logos from a process of popularization I hardly agree.
>
>
>
> My final sentence has two stable parts.
>
> The first part is:
>
> .. an incomplex thought
>
>
>
> The third part is:
>
> .. a *techne* without logos is not a craft.
>
>
>
> If what you say is what you believe to be true, for instance, that Peirce
> is most important because of his insistence on a pragmaticist understanding
> of practical outcomes, then I recommend starting with the first part but
> moving on to the next part.  That is, from the first part to the third
> part.
>
>
>
> For, I am of the opinion that you do not have a clear understanding of
> what *logos* is, since you have already asserted that transformation goes
> on all the time.
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:18 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> Your final sentence eludes me. I would assume all on this list would like
>> Peirce to be better known. If I parse You Tube correctly, he is not sought
>> out as much as Wittgenstein and Nietzsche who I see as influential. I think
>> Peirce is the most important of the three because of his insistence on a
>> pragmaticist understanding of practical outcomes. He paves the way for a
>> universal and holistic way of living based on his key understandings. Were
>> he better known the world would benefit. If the implication of your final
>> sentence is a sort of binary splitting of logos from a process of
>> popularization I hardly agree.
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:37 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Stephen, list,
>>>
>>> When you say that transformation goes on all the time and that Peirce is
>>> right about so many things and that you regret he is not better known and
>>> that he needs help in the interpretation department and you encourage
>>> understanding by interpreting,
>>>
>>> I take that to be products of an incomplex thought, for a *techne*
>>> without logos is not a craft.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:22 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> The transformation goes on all the time. Sometimes many times a
>>>> day.That's why Peirce is right about so many things. Too bad he is no
>>>> better known. He needs some help in the interpretation dept. Understand by
>>>> interpreting!
>>>>
>>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:16 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Dear Edwina, Stephen, list,
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you for this conversation.  I do not feel transformed but I find
>>>>> it valuable in at least exposing to the reader, who I imagine to be my
>>>>> friend, the incompetence of and behind our actions.
>>>>>
>>>>> With best wishes,
>>>>> Jerry R
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jerry - genuine science is open.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 6.86." It is a truth well worthy of rumination that all the
>>>>>> intellectual development of man rests upon the circumstance that all our
>>>>>> action is subject to error...Inanimate things do not err at all; an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

Your final sentence eludes me. I would assume all on this list would like
Peirce to be better known. If I parse You Tube correctly, he is not sought
out as much as Wittgenstein and Nietzsche who I see as influential. I think
Peirce is the most important of the three because of his insistence on a
pragmaticist understanding of practical outcomes. He paves the way for a
universal and holistic way of living based on his key understandings. Were
he better known the world would benefit. If the implication of your final
sentence is a sort of binary splitting of logos from a process of
popularization I hardly agree.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:37 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Stephen, list,
>
> When you say that transformation goes on all the time and that Peirce is
> right about so many things and that you regret he is not better known and
> that he needs help in the interpretation department and you encourage
> understanding by interpreting,
>
> I take that to be products of an incomplex thought, for a *techne*
> without logos is not a craft.
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:22 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> The transformation goes on all the time. Sometimes many times a
>> day.That's why Peirce is right about so many things. Too bad he is no
>> better known. He needs some help in the interpretation dept. Understand by
>> interpreting!
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:16 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Edwina, Stephen, list,
>>>
>>> Thank you for this conversation.  I do not feel transformed but I find
>>> it valuable in at least exposing to the reader, who I imagine to be my
>>> friend, the incompetence of and behind our actions.
>>>
>>> With best wishes,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jerry - genuine science is open.
>>>>
>>>> 6.86." It is a truth well worthy of rumination that all the
>>>> intellectual development of man rests upon the circumstance that all our
>>>> action is subject to error...Inanimate things do not err at all; and the
>>>> lower animals very little. Instinct is all but unerring; but reason in all
>>>> vitally important matters is a treacherous guide. this tendency to error,
>>>> when you put it under the microscope of reflection, is seen to consist of
>>>> fortuitous variations of our actions in time. but it is apt to escape our
>>>> attention that on such fortuitous variations our intellect is nourished and
>>>> grows. Fopr without such fortuitous variation, habit-taking would be
>>>> impossible; and intellect consists in a plasticity of habit".
>>>>
>>>> 1.615..."the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have
>>>> been completel yperfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of
>>>> growth"
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu 01/03/18 4:53 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>>
>>>> Stephen, Edwina, list:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You said:
>>>>
>>>> ..  .
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps you are right.  This all seems to be stating the obvious, which
>>>> serves simply as a lot of unpublished fodder for endless speculation.
>>>>
>>>> For isn’t it enough that we see ourselves as good human beings and act
>>>> accordingly?  But then, why do we go on with the skepticism and dogmatism?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So then, why can we not agree where there is genuine doubt, and that
>>>> thing that is so chilling as a scientific explanation?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>> Jerry R
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jerry, list - in reply to your comments:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 5.65 "All nature abounds in proofs of other  influences than merely
>>>>> mechanical action"
>>>>>
>>>>> 6.13 Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature
>>>>> and for uniformity in general is to suppose the results of evolution. this
>>>>> supposes them not to be absolute  not to be obeyed pre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

The transformation goes on all the time. Sometimes many times a day.That's
why Peirce is right about so many things. Too bad he is no better known. He
needs some help in the interpretation dept. Understand by interpreting!

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 5:16 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Edwina, Stephen, list,
>
> Thank you for this conversation.  I do not feel transformed but I find it
> valuable in at least exposing to the reader, who I imagine to be my friend,
> the incompetence of and behind our actions.
>
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry - genuine science is open.
>>
>> 6.86." It is a truth well worthy of rumination that all the intellectual
>> development of man rests upon the circumstance that all our action is
>> subject to error...Inanimate things do not err at all; and the lower
>> animals very little. Instinct is all but unerring; but reason in all
>> vitally important matters is a treacherous guide. this tendency to error,
>> when you put it under the microscope of reflection, is seen to consist of
>> fortuitous variations of our actions in time. but it is apt to escape our
>> attention that on such fortuitous variations our intellect is nourished and
>> grows. Fopr without such fortuitous variation, habit-taking would be
>> impossible; and intellect consists in a plasticity of habit".
>>
>> 1.615..."the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been
>> completel yperfected. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of
>> growth"
>>
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>> On Thu 01/03/18 4:53 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Stephen, Edwina, list:
>>
>>
>>
>> You said:
>>
>> ..  .
>>
>>
>>
>> Perhaps you are right.  This all seems to be stating the obvious, which
>> serves simply as a lot of unpublished fodder for endless speculation.
>>
>> For isn’t it enough that we see ourselves as good human beings and act
>> accordingly?  But then, why do we go on with the skepticism and dogmatism?
>>
>>
>>
>> So then, why can we not agree where there is genuine doubt, and that
>> thing that is so chilling as a scientific explanation?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry, list - in reply to your comments:
>>>
>>>
>>> 5.65 "All nature abounds in proofs of other  influences than merely
>>> mechanical action"
>>>
>>> 6.13 Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and
>>> for uniformity in general is to suppose the results of evolution. this
>>> supposes them not to be absolute  not to be obeyed precisely. It makes an
>>> element of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute chance in nature.
>>>
>>> 6.14 "exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of
>>> homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the universe the
>>> most manifest and characteristic.
>>>
>>> 6.21 "The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in s
>>> tendency to generalization. Feeling tends to spread; connections between
>>> feelings awaken feelings; neighouring feelings become assimilated; ideas
>>> are apt to reproduce themselves" [NOTE: I use this to refer to 'networking
>>> of relations]
>>>
>>> 6.23 "The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws
>>> in the  character of its commands. A physical law is absolute. What it
>>> requires is an exact relationOn the other hand, no exact conformity is
>>> required by the mental law. Nay, exact conformity would be in downright
>>> conflict with the law; since it would instantly crystallize thought and
>>> prevent all further formation of ha bit. The law of mind only makes a given
>>> feeling more likely to arise" {NOTE:  the point of Thirdness is its
>>> tendency to generalize, to reduce specificity and thus enable networked
>>> commonality and enable connections with diverse objects]
>>>
>>> 6.59 "By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the
>>> universe, acting always and everywhere thought restrained within narrow
>>> bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and
>>> great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and
>>> diversity of the universe...[NOTE: FIrstness or chance/ spontaneity is a
>>> basic component of the university, just as the tendency to generalize or
>>> take habits is yet another basic component]
>>>
>>> 6.64 "I point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing
>>> complexity, which appears to be universal, and which, though it may
>>> possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps, certainly presents all the
>>> appearance of increasing diversification. Then, there is variety itself,
>>> beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the universe; no
>>> mechanism can account for this"
>>>
>>> Peirce writes of how the 'necessitarian' will reject chance, will focus
>>> instead on the 'regularity of the universe' - which Peirce writes, i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

No state is fixed and where there is genuine doubt it's back to the
conscious drawing board. The small edge goes to goodness but fallibility
exists, while never trumping continuity in any final (binary) sense. That's
how it has been and will be.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 4:53 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Stephen, Edwina, list:
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> ..  .
>
>
>
> Perhaps you are right.  This all seems to be stating the obvious, which
> serves simply as a lot of unpublished fodder for endless speculation.
>
> For isn’t it enough that we see ourselves as good human beings and act
> accordingly?  But then, why do we go on with the skepticism and dogmatism?
>
>
>
>
> So then, why can we not agree where there is genuine doubt, and that thing
> that is so chilling as a scientific explanation?
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:42 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry, list - in reply to your comments:
>>
>>
>> 5.65 "All nature abounds in proofs of other  influences than merely
>> mechanical action"
>>
>> 6.13 Now the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and
>> for uniformity in general is to suppose the results of evolution. this
>> supposes them not to be absolute  not to be obeyed precisely. It makes an
>> element of indeterminacy, spontaneity, or absolute chance in nature.
>>
>> 6.14 "exact law obviously never can produce heterogeneity out of
>> homogeneity; and arbitrary heterogeneity is the feature of the universe the
>> most manifest and characteristic.
>>
>> 6.21 "The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in s
>> tendency to generalization. Feeling tends to spread; connections between
>> feelings awaken feelings; neighouring feelings become assimilated; ideas
>> are apt to reproduce themselves" [NOTE: I use this to refer to 'networking
>> of relations]
>>
>> 6.23 "The law of habit exhibits a striking contrast to all physical laws
>> in the  character of its commands. A physical law is absolute. What it
>> requires is an exact relationOn the other hand, no exact conformity is
>> required by the mental law. Nay, exact conformity would be in downright
>> conflict with the law; since it would instantly crystallize thought and
>> prevent all further formation of ha bit. The law of mind only makes a given
>> feeling more likely to arise" {NOTE:  the point of Thirdness is its
>> tendency to generalize, to reduce specificity and thus enable networked
>> commonality and enable connections with diverse objects]
>>
>> 6.59 "By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the
>> universe, acting always and everywhere thought restrained within narrow
>> bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and
>> great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and
>> diversity of the universe...[NOTE: FIrstness or chance/ spontaneity is a
>> basic component of the university, just as the tendency to generalize or
>> take habits is yet another basic component]
>>
>> 6.64 "I point first to the phenomenon of growth and developing
>> complexity, which appears to be universal, and which, though it may
>> possibly be an affair of mechanism perhaps, certainly presents all the
>> appearance of increasing diversification. Then, there is variety itself,
>> beyond comparison the most obtrusive character of the universe; no
>> mechanism can account for this"
>>
>> Peirce writes of how the 'necessitarian' will reject chance, will focus
>> instead on the 'regularity of the universe' - which Peirce writes, is a
>> focus that severs "only to block the road of inquiry'
>>
>> [NOTE: I consider that the focus on specific and closed definitions is an
>> aspect of Secondness - and such a focus ignores the two other modes, both
>> of which enable the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis].
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu 01/03/18 3:56 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Dear Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> I support you and appreciate you for saying what you believe in earnest,
>>
>> but it seems to me that when you say
>>
>>
>>
>> “My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its
>> capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system”,
>>
>>
>>
>> and you continually run up against the following of which you divest
>> yourself:
>>
>> “focus on singular definitions of terms as a clarification of Peircean
>> semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it”,
>>
>>
>>
>> then either we’re being absurd by thinking your interpretation somehow
>> allows such dynamic transformation or we’re missing something critical.
>>
>>
>>
>> Surely, there must be a way out and Peirce has given us this somewhere.
>>
>> So, where is it and how shall we know it?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
>>> clarification of Peircean semiosis but i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

I shall reply to my own note. This seems to me to be saying what of
obvious. We carry on an inner conversation. Thoughtful. Mindful. Conscious.
The sign is somewhat amorphous and vague no matter what it may be
signifying. It gets processed into language. Language is subordinate to
signs. Biblically signs are the deep.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:54 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> Peirce, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein had more than one thing in common -- a
> lot of unpublished fodder for endless speculation.
>
> *Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a
> Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
> in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they
> are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human
> Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of
> thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I
> admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. 4.551*
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
>> clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.
>>
>> My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its
>> capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system. This
>> capacity requires [1]  a triadic semiosic relational systems and [2]
>>  requires a modal nature of three types ; and [3] requires a constant
>> interactional and relational networking of Signs. I see nothing of this in
>> the mechanical outline of 'nodes' on a linear path that seems to be the
>> model now being discussed.
>>
>> In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind that
>> enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself.
>>
>> Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects the
>> semiosic action from the relations with a larger network.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu 01/03/18 2:04 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Dear Jon, Garys, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> I am confused by your exact treatment.
>>
>> It appears to me that you have a clear and correct view but I don’t yet
>> see it.
>>
>>
>>
>> Since it is determined, at least by you and Gary R, that you have a grasp
>> of what Quasi-mind entails, please go a little bit further and say out loud
>> the answer to this:
>>
>> Is Quasi-mind the general standpoint of the spectator?
>>
>>
>>
>> That is, if quasi-minds are either of the quasi-utterer and
>> quasi-interpreter or somehow of both, then where, in accordance with your
>> view, is the spectator?
>>
>>
>>
>> I feel as though an understanding of this question and answer can help me
>> to be a better critical thinker; a better citizen of the world, even.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks and with best wishes,
>> Jerry R
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary F., List:
>>>
>>> GF:  Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs
>>> in a Quasi-mind?
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an individual
>>> Sign that is also a complex of Signs," and (in his words) "something
>>> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication."  There is nothing
>>> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion
>>> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a perfect sign" as "the
>>> aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries
>>> with it."  I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter
>>> passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and
>>> metaphysical ground first.
>>>
>>> JAS:  The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate
>>> Object of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to
>>> reproducing the entire effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have
>>> on the Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
>>>
>>>
>>> GF:  Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
>>> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Stephen C. Rose]

Peirce, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein had more than one thing in common -- a
lot of unpublished fodder for endless speculation.

*Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a
Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they
are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human
Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of
thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I
admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. 4.551*

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 3:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I don't see the current focus on singular definitions of terms as a
> clarification of Peircean semiosis but instead, as an obscuring of it.
>
> My view of Peircean semiosis is its dynamic transformic nature; its
> capacity to enable the world to operate as a complex adaptive system. This
> capacity requires [1]  a triadic semiosic relational systems and [2]
>  requires a modal nature of three types ; and [3] requires a constant
> interactional and relational networking of Signs. I see nothing of this in
> the mechanical outline of 'nodes' on a linear path that seems to be the
> model now being discussed.
>
> In addition, I see the Quasi-Mind as a LOCAL articulation of Mind that
> enables all three points above - and not as a Sign in itself.
>
> Yes, as Jerry points out - this linearity [as I call it] disconnects the
> semiosic action from the relations with a larger network.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu 01/03/18 2:04 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Dear Jon, Garys, list,
>
>
>
> I am confused by your exact treatment.
>
> It appears to me that you have a clear and correct view but I don’t yet
> see it.
>
>
>
> Since it is determined, at least by you and Gary R, that you have a grasp
> of what Quasi-mind entails, please go a little bit further and say out loud
> the answer to this:
>
> Is Quasi-mind the general standpoint of the spectator?
>
>
>
> That is, if quasi-minds are either of the quasi-utterer and
> quasi-interpreter or somehow of both, then where, in accordance with your
> view, is the spectator?
>
>
>
> I feel as though an understanding of this question and answer can help me
> to be a better critical thinker; a better citizen of the world, even.
>
>
>
> Thanks and with best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2018 at 10:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>> GF:  Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs
>> in a Quasi-mind?
>>
>>
>> Gary R. and I now agree that a Quasi-mind is (in my words) "an individual
>> Sign that is also a complex of Signs," and (in his words) "something
>> like the prerequisite of all semiosis and communication."  There is nothing
>> in EP 2:304 to indicate that "the ideal or perfect sign" is "an accretion
>> of Signs," although EP 2:545n25 does refer to "a perfect sign" as "the
>> aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries
>> with it."  I am not quite ready to say anything further about the latter
>> passage just yet; I would prefer to cover a bit more semiotic and
>> metaphysical ground first.
>>
>> JAS:  The more attributes of the Dynamic Object that the Immediate Object
>> of the Sign includes, the closer the Interpretant comes to reproducing the 
>> entire
>> effect that the Dynamic Object itself would have on the
>> Quasi-interpreter (cf. EP 2:391; 1906).
>>
>>
>> GF:  Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
>> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
>> Object sounds like a concept — as, for example, your concept of a woman
>> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you
>> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?
>>
>>
>> In the 1906 passage that I cited but did not quote, Peirce stated that a
>> Sign "is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to
>> enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly
>> it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that
>> quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had
>> acted upon it."  I have posited that this "respect" is precisely the
>> Immediate Object, and stated that determination "must always occur with
>> respect to a character or quality; i.e., a Form."  Hence the Dynamic
>> Object determines the Sign with respect to some, but not all, of its
>> characters or qualities; and that partial combination of attributes is
>> the Immediate Object, the Form that the Sign communicates.  Only the Sign
>> itself--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites
>> Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
>> (determination).
>>
>> GF:  By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an ex

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Peircean linguistic view of the Second Amendment

[Stephen C. Rose]

These arguments are clear and obvious to all but certain political leaders
and their legal supporters. I am glad to see them understood as
pragmaticist. There is also an argument against violence per se which
relates in my view to a distinction between binary conflict and triadic
accommodation -- based on continuity and evolutionary love. It seems to me
that these matters deserve a wide hearing and should command the attention
of the global community of pragmaticists. Philosophy, in general, has been
deficient in dealing with the fundamental issues of survival.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 7:38 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> The conclusion of the Peircean linguist Michael Shapiro's blog post of
> 2014 on the Second Amendment. First, the Amendment.
>
>  "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
> State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
> infringed."
>
> "The word militia of the first clause governs—is hierarchically
> superordinate to—the phrase the right of the people to keep and bear arms.
> The framers of the Constitution had the grammatical option to invert the
> two clauses but did not. The element order speaks for itself, rendering
> militia the pragmatistic scope (i. e., in the Peircean sense of the
> philosophical doctrine of pragmatism) under which right to keep and bear
> arms is restricted. " Michael Shapiro
>
> His complete argumentation is, of course, longer; for which see his blog.
> http://languagelore.net Included in Shapiro's post was this:
>
> From Dennis Baron, “Guns and Grammar: the Linguistics of the Second
> Amendment” (www.english.illinois.edu/-people/faculty/debaron/essays/gun
> s.pdf):
>
> “In our amicus brief in the Heller case we attempted to demonstrate,
> • that the Second Amendment must be read in its entirety, and that its
> initial absolute functions as a subordinate adverbial that establishes a
> cause-and-effect connection with the amendment’s main clause; connection
> with the amendment’s main clause;
> • that the vast preponderance of examples show that the phrase bear arms
> refers specifically to carrying weapons in the context of a well-regulated
> militia;
> • that the word militia itself refers to a federally-authorized,
> collective fighting force, drawn only from the subgroup of citizens
> eligible for service in such a body;
> • and that as the linguistic evidence makes clear, the militia clause is
> inextricably bound to the right to bear arms clause. 18th-century readers,
> grammarians, and lexicographers understood the Second Amendment in this
> way, and it is how linguists have understood it as well.”
>
> Professor Joseph Dauben of the CUNY Graduate Center commented on Shapiro's
> blog post in an email today: "It's clear from what you say that the
> amendment means "the people" collectively, in their joint defense, not
> every NRA member out there who may on his own want to keep a weapon handy,
> whether there is a militia anywhere in sight or not."
>
> I should note that this post is meant only to demonstrate one way in which
> Peircean thought is being effectively employed in consideration of
> contemporary issues.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
>
> -
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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[Stephen C. Rose]

Nice response -- here's mine

Do not pretend to know my name

The words I use are weak and lame

They cannot tell from whence they came

They don’t pretend to know my name

+

There is no reason to say more

I do not know what this is for

There is no why there’s no wherefore

Why is there reason to say more

+

I have an inkling that is all

Our weather changes spring to fall

Still no one know’s what’s past time’s wall

save for an inkling that is all


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 5:38 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Helmut,
>
>
>
> You said,
>
> All that is a reflection in another mirror, a bit further away. Solipsism
> is assuming an endless series of mirrors behind mirrors. Sounds like hell.
> Can you show a way out..
>
>
>
> I would presume based on our past experiences that you wouldn’t care for
> me to show you a way out, but rather, for me to say how Peirce would show a
> way out.
>
>
>
> I am not sure what the following means but it is in *Some Consequences*,
> and many scholars, pragmatists, pragamticists, have already spoken on its
> connected themes.
>
>
> I suppose one could argue that whether they had anything relevant to say
> would depend on whether the reader makes any effort to follow their
> argument, rather than being satisfied that he can work it out on his own by
> reflecting on the issues, himself, in isolation.  To help matters, though,
> Peirce did follow up with *Man's Glassy Essence, *'tho it adds to the
> amount of things one has to think about..
>
> In any case, here it is:
>
>
> The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by
> ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and
> from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man,
>
>
> ". . . proud man,
> Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
> His glassy essence."
>
>
>
> As for Peirce, he also says this, of course:
>
>
>
> The apostle of Humanism says that professional philosophists “have
> rendered philosophy like unto themselves, abstruse, arid, abstract, and
> abhorrent.” But I conceive that some branches of science are *not* in a
> healthy state if they are not abstruse, arid, and abstract, in which
> case, like the Aristotelianism which is this gentleman’s particular bête
> noire, it will be as Shakespeare said (*of it*, remember)
>
>
>
> “Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
>
> But musical as is Apollo’s lute,” etc.
>
>
>
> I hope I have led you to a way out,
>
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 4:10 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Jerry,
>> when a mirror appears in the field of sight, then the eye can see itself.
>> Its owner may ask him/herself: What is behind that mirror? But the mirror
>> is there, so behind it is also what is behind the eye. But the world too.
>> So it is the (eye-owner´s) world, and the owner of the world, being a part
>> of it. All that is a reflection in another mirror, a bit further away.
>> Solipsism is assuming an endless series of mirrors behind mirrors. Sounds
>> like hell. Can you show a way out, for Quasimodo of Notre-Dame, and us all?
>> Something like transcendence or what ever?
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>> 21. Februar 2018 um 20:53 Uhr
>> *Von:* "Jerry Rhee" 
>>
>>
>> Dear list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Speaking of the person who sees the vase, who happens to be a Quasi-mind:
>>
>>
>>
>> *5.6  *
>>
>> *The limits of my language** mean the limits of my world.*
>>
>>
>>
>> *5.61*
>>
>> Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
>>
>> We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world,
>> *that* there is not.
>>
>>
>>
>> For *that* would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain
>> possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get
>> outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits
>> from the other side also.
>>
>>
>>
>> What we cannot think, *that* we cannot think: we cannot therefore *say* what
>> we cannot think.
>>
>>
>>
>> *5.62*
>>
>> *This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is
>> a truth.*
>>
>> In fact what solipsism *means*, is quite correct, only it cannot be
>> *said*, but it shows itself.
>>
>> That the world is *my* world, shows itself in the fact that the limits
>> of the language (*the* language which I understand) mean the limits of
>> *my* world.
>>
>>
>>
>> *5.63*
>>
>> I am the world. (The microcosm.)
>>
>>
>>
>> *5.633*
>>
>> *Where in* the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?
>>
>> You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field
>> of sight. But you do *not* really see the eye.
>>
>> And from nothing *in the field of sight* can it be concluded that it is
>> seen from an eye.
>>
>>
>>
>> *5.6331*
>>
>> For the field of sight has not a form like this:
>>
>> http://www.kfs.org/jonathan/witt/f56331.gif
>>
>>
>>
>> *5.64*
>>
>> *Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure
>> realism*. The I in s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[Stephen C. Rose]

Jon -- Our interpretations are a frail reed to expect others to embrace.
If we have something to add to what we take Peirce to mean, that makes
sense. But why argue over taking something he said is quasi aka vague and
saying it is meant to be specific. Peirce is not here to demur. Agreeing is
a stretch. What else is there to say?

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The concept of system is just a human abstraction

[Stephen C. Rose]

>
> A system is a system regardless whether it is a human abstraction or not.
> A system could be real in the Peirce sense that what it does is independent
> of what we think. I am tempted to say nothing is just anything. Everything
> is something. A weather system is real. A system for determining wins and
> losses is real. This post is real. One could say everything is an
> abstraction and that would not affect all that occurs regardless.
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Systems and Semiosis

[Stephen C. Rose]

I  have no idea where consciousness ends. Nor of the boundaries of mind. If
everything is signs, then a substantial part of everything may be mystery,
awaiting our understanding. This is one reason why I think words themselves
are frail vessels. To set their parameters or even their utility is not
easy.  Isn't that one reason why semiotics exists -- so we can be
appropriately vague, even about terms that border on the ontological?

On Sun, Feb 18, 2018 at 12:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

>
>
>
> Stephen, list:
>
> 'Mind' is not the same as consciousness. Therefore, to suggest, as Peirce
> does, that Mind is functional within non-organic systems, does not mean
> that these systems are conscious.
>
> Complex adaptive systems are not grounded in a 'materialist' ideology, but
> fit in well with the Mind processing that is Peircean semiosis. The nature
> of a CAS is that it is self-organized, with perimeters, with a network of
> relations with other systems, and, working within an ongoing dynamic and
> adaptive informational processing. That obviously refers to Mind - and not
> just mechanical interactions - which are unable to adapt and are not
> self-organizing.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The concept of system is just a human abstraction

[Stephen C. Rose]

I think that anywhere that choice can be said to exist there freedom also
exists and from our point of view and perhaps all others chance as well. I
think we are on the threshold of learning more and more about the reality
of which we are all part. In the song "Idiot Wind" Dylan says 'it's a
wonder we can even feed ourselves'. I think by the end of the century we
will have evolved more than in the last 2000 years as to how we see
reality. Peirce seems to me the fount of wisdom here having,
virtually insisted on the foundational truths of that movement.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Feb 18, 2018 at 11:53 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
wrote:

> John, Edwina
>
> Even though I am not a chemist, I chose my words very carefully! My choice
> of the two words "silicon molecule" specifically precludes the word "atom".
> What you are saying, with regards to how a silicon atom combines with other
> atoms into molecules is fine.
>
> And then there is the question of the role of silicon-based molecules in
> forming into crystals... or glass (which strictly speaking is a liquid)… or
> mica. Looked at in this way, I definitely see your point. For example,
> silicon-based crystals forming in a lump of granite. I just find talk of
> consciousness in rocks kinda cringey, prone to category errors, and am
> inclined to keep my distance from it.
>
> As for other complex systems, like weather patterns, tornadoes and such...
> little evidence of holon behavior... a tornado is not a holon (mind-body)
> making choices from its Umwelt, and so the Peircean categories cannot
> apply. They can only apply to the individual molecules that comprise the
> tornado.
>
> If I read you correctly, I interpret what you’re saying in the context of
> emergence theory (along the lines of complex adaptive systems, mathematical
> order from material chaos). It's a materialist position that I am no longer
> comfortable with. At issue for me, wrt emergence theory, is the apparent
> absence of holonic (mind-body) behavior, choice-making and Umwelts that can
> be expressed in a semiotic narrative.
>
> Regards
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca ]
> *Sent:* Sunday, February 18, 2018 4:32 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L; John F Sowa
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The concept of system is just a human
> abstraction
>
>
>
>
> John - exactly, I fully agree - and nicely said. AND in addition, all
> these processes are semiosic and involve Mind.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> *On Sun 18/02/18 10:24 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net
>  sent:*
>
> On 2/18/2018 7:40 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
> > As far as the silicon molecule is concerned, the stone has no context
> > that is relevant to it. The silicon molecule receives no cue from the
> > stone as to what its properties should be.
>
> That is not true. A silicon atom behaves in very different ways in
> different molecules. In minerals, it is in some molecule, such as
> silicon dioxide. But SiO2 may combine in more complex molecules,
> such as aluminum silicate. And those molecules are affected by the
> crystals, glasses, and surface interactions that affect the rock as
> a whole. Heat, pressure, tension, torsion, and chemical processes
> are transmitted to, from, and through every molecule in the rock.
>
> > The stone is not a system, but an agglomeration of disconnected
> minerals.
>
> No!!! The concept of a system is just an abstraction from artifacts
> that humans design. For inorganic matter, even a single rock is a
> complex system. Weather, volcanoes, earthquakes, stars, galaxies,
> supernovas, black holes, and the Big Bang are far more complex.
> For organic matter, the processes are even complex and organized than
> any human can conceive.
>
> And there is a continuum: Some inorganic processes somehow evolved
> into those organic processes. The inorganic processes that generate
> the earth's weather are extremely complex. And the weather affects
> and is affected by all the organic processes on earth. And the earth
> is just one insignificant rocky planet in a run-of-the-mill galaxy
> in one corner of an immensely complex cosmos.
>
> John
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[Stephen C. Rose]

I have never in any forum seen more quibbling over terms which either
cannot be clarified or need not be clarified. I think this is not great for
this forum. I see little here that convinces me that what is truly
revolutionary in Peirce -- his convincing attacks on nominalism and
dualism,  the things he clearly identifies as general or universal, his
insistence on an ultimate union of what was called metaphysical with what
is called empirical or simply science, etc, etc. will ever get a hearing if
this is a conduit to a wider world.

I personally feel that Peirce by standing for the triadic as against the
binary is more than significant. But I see little effort to apply that to
practical matters. Maybe we do not want to acknowledge what that might mean
in terms of what we most deeply believe. Peirce didn't go there either in
any prescriptive sense.

Reading here I must confess I feel less drawn to Peirce. Maybe we should
blame Peirce for leaving things in a jumble. But we should not perpetuate
it.

I am not complaining because things cannot be said elsewhere. They can and
will be. I am just tired of reading the first parts of posts whose
remaining parts can be easily inferred and appear to repeat mainly
bilateral conversations. I am sure inclusion is among the dominant values
here. Maybe I am just harping away. Forgive me.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Hi Soren... Interesting. Peirce uses the word flummery in ref. to Hegel.
Who has examined Peirce in relation to logical positivism? He missed it
didn't he? As to finding a basis for empirically showing the impact of
ontological terms, it seems to me that the Symbol in the triad Icon(Sign)
Index Symbol amounts to a sort of laboratory for the testing of such
things. I would love to design such a study based on Peirce's understanding
of the power and ubiquity of memorial maxims.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 7:29 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> I think all three categories are framed in the phenomenological view of
> experience as the primary reality, where he also seems to place qualitative
> mathematic. But he opens for the possibility of an outer word behind
> experience through Secondness and therefore opens for an empirical realism,
> which is what he criticize Hegel for not doing. It seem to me that when we
> get to Thirdness we already have established an inner and an outer world. I
> think that is his trick to make empirical quantitative research possible
> from a phenomenological and hermeneutical basis. Thereby he goes beyond
> logical positivism. No one else has done this*.* But I do not have quotes
> to support this. So if anybody have it I would be grateful. . More might be
> found in C. Misak’s *Verificationism.*
>
>
>
>   Best
>
>  Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 16:33
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Thanks, Soren -- I think that clears it up.  Does phenomenology apply as a
> sort of catch-all for the various attributes of the three elements of the
> triad? Does Peirce's phenomenology deal with the ontological. I assume that
> while ontology deals with words that words themselves refer to what lies
> behind them. I find it convenient to see the words that are key grouped
> either as ontotogy (truth, beauty, freedom and so forth) or as utilities
> (will, reason, etc) I guess that is a point at which people's philosophy
> becomes individualized, almost necessarily.
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:
>
> Dear Stephen and Edwina
>
>
>
> I think the entropy is a natural scientific conceptualization of
> evolutionary processes in natural science, further developed by Prigogine
> into a non-equilibrium thermodynamics but is unable to encompass
> experiential mind as it is created in a materialist-energetic ontology (not
> even an informational one) where Peirce in his philosophy includes
> phenomenology.
>
>
>
> Best
>
>Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 15:18
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>  sent:*
>
> Gary R., List:
>
>
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
&g

Re: : Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Interesting Edwina -- I would see the formation of a habit as what we are
looking at. And indeed a continual adjustment even when habits exist in
relatively stable form. A while back I took entropy to mean the dispersion
of everything with no reference to Peirce or habits or the eventual
attainment of order which I take to be an objective of CSP. Wittgenstein is
of interest I believe because he regarded most of what matters as
unspeakable. I am interested in what seems to me almost a Peirce goal to
make metaphysics a science. That would be a good move.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:37 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Stephen - I can't answer all your questions, but, to my understanding, the
> fact of Firstness - which introduces deviations from the norm, is a key
> 'cause' of the dissipation of a habit. To me - that is entropy.
>
> I have no knowledge of Wittgenstein.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 13/02/18 9:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, Jon, list:
>>
>> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
>> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
>> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
>> Matter and vice versa.
>>
>> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
>> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
>> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
>> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
>> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
>> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
>> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>>
>> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>>
>> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
>> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
>> is a State and has no structure.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Thanks, Soren -- I think that clears it up.  Does phenomenology apply as a
sort of catch-all for the various attributes of the three elements of the
triad? Does Peirce's phenomenology deal with the ontological. I assume that
while ontology deals with words that words themselves refer to what lies
behind them. I find it convenient to see the words that are key grouped
either as ontotogy (truth, beauty, freedom and so forth) or as utilities
(will, reason, etc) I guess that is a point at which people's philosophy
becomes individualized, almost necessarily.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Dear Stephen and Edwina
>
>
>
> I think the entropy is a natural scientific conceptualization of
> evolutionary processes in natural science, further developed by Prigogine
> into a non-equilibrium thermodynamics but is unable to encompass
> experiential mind as it is created in a materialist-energetic ontology (not
> even an informational one) where Peirce in his philosophy includes
> phenomenology.
>
>
>
> Best
>
>Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 15:18
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>  sent:*
>
> Gary R., List:
>
>
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
> of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
>
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant;  and every Sign determines its Interpretant to
> stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself
> does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are 
> *Indices
> *of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.
>
>
>
> 3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
> current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of dyadic action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly triadic action of
> semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant;  and every Sign determines its Interpretant to
> stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself
> does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are 
> Indices
> of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.
>
> 3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
> current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
> Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that
> retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and
> thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires a
> purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any Sign.
>
> 4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>>
>> For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points.
>> In response to Edwina, Jon wrote:
>>
>> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
>> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
>> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
>> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
>> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
>> hoped that when we jointly recognized the  internal triad of [IO-R-II]
>> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call this (and only 
>> this)
>> the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign without a DO.
>>
>>
>> My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
>> created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
>> less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
>> analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
>> longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).
>>
>> John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue for
>> a,

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Jon A, I assume you were responding to the Peirce quote and disagreeing. My
own feeling is that violence and doing harm are addressed by Peirce and
accepted by Aristotle and that binary thinking is more inclined to violence
than triadic.

Note to Gary R. If you can provide instruction on how to delete items in a
series that are not germane I will gladly do so.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Stephen,
>
> I know not what course others may take but
> I count Aristotle as the first pragmatist.
> Whatever he may owe to Plato, he exerted
> himself to maintain a connection between
> forms (ideas) and practical matters in
> real-life experience.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 2/12/2018 10:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>> significancy until evolution has been considered.  This is what the world
>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years — though old enough is
>> the general idea itself.  Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts
>> of butchers and bakers that never heard of him — is but a metaphysical
>> evolutionism.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>>
>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
>> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
>> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
>> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
> --
>
> inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Excellent piece. And excellent quote which I think I had better paste in. I
created the triad Reality Ethics Aesthetics as a suggested post-Peirce
basis for philosophy. It fits in with previous quotes in this thread and
explicitly so with the following:
“Esthetics and logic seem at first blush to belong to different universes .
. . . [But] that seeming is illusory; on the contrary, logic needs the help
of esthetics.” Just as it needs the help of ethics: “Logical goodness and
badness, which we shall find is simply the distinction of *Truth *and
*Falsity*in general, amounts in the last analysis to nothing but a peculiar
application of the more general distinction of Moral Goodness and Badness,
or Righteousness and Wickedness.” Peirce does not mean to equate these
three realms, of course, for that would lead to the conclusion that every
fallacy is a sin, which is absurd. But he does insist, in a manner
reminiscent of Cardinal Newman, that “good morals and good reasoning are
closely allied.”

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Ben Novak  wrote:

> Dear All:
>
> A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of
> this discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were
> rather eloquently addressed in an article in *First Things*, "Discovering
> the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:
>
> https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-
> aristotle
>
>
> *Ben Novak*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> <https://maps.google.com/?q=5129+Taylor+Drive,+Ave+Maria,+FL+34142&entry=gmail&source=g>
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
>> dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
>> that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
>> first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
>> which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
>> superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
>> sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
>> marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>> As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was
>>> the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
>>> February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
>>> enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
>>> the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
>>> directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.
>>>
>>> I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
>>> excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
>>> Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.
>>>
>>> CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
>>> experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls
>>> *entelechy*, which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a
>>> third element which I find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the
>>> most overt of the three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it
>>> ... Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be
>>> described as a nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors
>>> to express the universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be
>>> remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and
>>> Entelechy, then there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that
>>> which recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone,
>>> that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of
>>> nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which
>>> recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consist

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
> As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was the
> sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
> February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
> enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
> the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
> directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.
>
> I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
> excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
> Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.
>
> CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
> experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy*,
> which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
> find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the
> three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so
> far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be described as a
> nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors to express the
> universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if,
> as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
> there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes
> Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which
> recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that
> which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes
> Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism
> would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last
> three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true
> philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
> 1903?, emphasis added)
>
>
> This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other
> recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or
> suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns
> (that which brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
>> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
>> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
>> evolutionism.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>>
>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
>> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
>> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
>> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Yes, I had that in mind in sending the CP quote and it seems relevant to
recent discussions. Then there is this: "IN an article published in The
Monist for January 1891, I endeavored to show what ideas ought to form the
warp of a system of philosophy, and particularly emphasised that of absolute
chance." Is that an exaggeration? Or is it God's notion of correcting
errors that would otherwise occur? Or?


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 11:20 AM, Ben Novak  wrote:

> Dear Stephen:
>
> As I have read, Peirce desired nothing more than to accede to the title of
> "Second Aristotle"
>
> From the first paragraph of  first volume of CP:
>
> "[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say,
> to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the
> entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in
> mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology,
> and in whatever other departments may be, shall appear as the filling up of
> its details."
> http://paulhague.net/kindred-spirits/peirce/
>
>
>
>
> *Ben Novak*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> <https://maps.google.com/?q=5129+Taylor+Drive,+Ave+Maria,+FL+34142&entry=gmail&source=g>
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
>> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
>> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
>> evolutionism.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>>
>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
>> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
>> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
>> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
evolutionism.

Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††


Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Is this an effort to agree on something that exists and is real, or to
design something, or to identify what Peirce thought. If it exists then
there can only be one right interpretation.  If is it a matter of coming to
an agreement with each other well and good.  If it has to do with what
Peirce thought and there is no agreement, to what might that be ascribed --
a communication problem or that Peirce was not clear, or something else?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 1:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> I don't see the Representamen as the individual site for storage. That
> would make it 'existential' in itself. I see it as a site for a mediation
> process that accesses knowledge/information and inputs it/uses it...to deal
> with the information provided from the DO/IO.
>
>  The FULL Sign of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI is the existential FORM of Matter and
> thus, as this FULL SIGN is the site for the storage of knowledge. That is,
> a molecule, as itself, as a form of matter, stores information. That same
> molecule is functioning within a full Sign format: DO-[IO-R-II]-DI.  It is
> in interaction with other molecules [DO] and forms its own nature [DI]
> which will interact as a DO with other molecules.
>
> However, I do not agree that Form is 1stness; I maintain that Form is
> Thirdness. Firstness functions within vagueness and possibility.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat 10/02/18 1:07 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> Well, I still see the Quasi-mind as "the [individual] site for storage,"
> rather than the Sign/Representamen.  However, I do see the latter as the
> means "for the introduction of novelty and diversity," since it always adds
> new Collateral Experience to a particular Quasi-mind as its Immediate
> Object, and also always has the potential for adding a new Habit of
> Interpretation to it as its Final Interpretant.
>
> We might also still disagree about exactly how form and matter come into
> play.  In accordance with NEM 4:292-300 (1902) and EP 2:303-304 (1904), I
> see Signs as bringing about the entelechy of Being (3ns, "the perfect
> Truth, the absolute Truth ... the ultimate interpretant of every sign")
> by uniting Form (1ns, "signifies characters, or qualities") and Matter
> (2ns, "denoting objects"); i.e., "the attribution of a predicate to a
> subject" (CP 6.341; 1909).  This is another way of expressing the telos of
> all Sign-action, the  summum bonum, which is "the ultimate
> representation" (EP 2:324; 1904).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 11:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - OK - I have no problem with your outline.
>>
>> I'd also say that a Sign [which I understand as the full set of
>> DO-[IO-R-II]...serves not only as the site for storage but also for the
>> introduction of novelty and diversity. Novelty can be introduced at various
>> stages: at the IO, the II, the DI...and this would be taken up by the R in
>> the next individual.
>>
>> I'd also say that this Sign serves as the FORM of matter; i.e., not
>> merely for communication between individuals, but as the actual method of
>> forming matter.
>>
>> Otherwise - I'd say that our views are becoming, unbelievably, more in
>> line with each other!
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Sat 10/02/18 11:18 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>> sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> Given how Peirce used the term "Quasi-mind" in CP 4.551, I take it to be
>> inclusive of both symbolic and non-symbolic thought, rather than limited
>> to the latter.  It is most easily understood as a substitute for a human 
>> mind,
>> but also applies to bees, crystals, etc.  Each individual Quasi-mind
>> serves as a "site" for "storage" of an "accumulated knowledge base" that
>> includes acquaintance with various systems of Signs, Collateral Experience
>> (previous Immediate Objects), and Habits of Interpretation (previous Final
>> Interpretants).  A Sign serves as a medium for communication of ideas/forms
>> between individual Quasi-minds, and successful Sign-action--which can only
>> take place within the Commens, where multiple Quasi-minds overlap--"welds"
>> them together in the Sign.  Every Sign adds to a Quasi-mind's Collateral
>> Experience, and some Signs produce Final Interpretants that constitute
>> Habit-change--i.e., learning from experience--when they supplement or
>> alter the Quasi-mind's Habits of Interpretation.  The telos of this
>> process is the summum bonum--the "welding" of all Quasi-minds into a
>> continuum.
>>
>> At least, that is how I see it right now.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list - I like your outline of a syllogistic format - I consider
>>> that the semiosic triad of DO-[IO-R-II]..and possi

[PEIRCE-L] Pulling a name out of the ontology mixi

[Stephen C. Rose]

http://us.blastingnews.com/opinion/2018/02/triadic-solutions-pulling-a-name-out-of-the-ontology-mix-002352577.html

A reaction.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

[Stephen C. Rose]

I saw vase but vas was enough to trigger vasectomy of which I am a proud
possessor. I found the fact that you were writing with an expectation that
data could be inferred from such a process a bit of a stretch. But I guess
you were right because of everyone dove into the impossible terminologies
and circumlocutions of Mr. Peirce. I love the man but all the to do about
what he meant I find intensely boring and irrelevant to shall we say
practical results.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Stephen R., List:
>
> Interesting, indeed.  The attempt to eliminate context, or at least put it
> out of view, was quite intentional.  Do you always read words one letter at
> a time, or somehow stop only part of the way through?  I cannot seem to
> help reading entire words, except on the rare occasion when an unfamiliar
> one appears.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 10:58 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I did not get past the first three letters and I took it to be an email
>> cold start no context -- Interesting to see how tenacious the context was.
>> No one thinks the same.
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion

[Stephen C. Rose]

I did not get past the first three letters and I took it to be an email
cold start no context -- Interesting to see how tenacious the context was.
No one thinks the same.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 11:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> No- my instant reaction was that it was: A Dynamic Object.
>
> I did not go through a semiosic triadic process...which would be to move
> that DO..into an IO/Representamen/...and then II and DI.
>
> The Representamen as a 'subject' is a mediative agent. It has an active
> role in mediating from the raw data of the Dynamic Object into the
> subjective understanding of that raw data as an Immediate and Dynamic
> Interpretant. That's why it is a 'subject'; but it is not, in itself, a
> separate free-standing 'thing'.
>
> Yes - I'm aware of your reading of the Peircean triad and I disagree with
> it. You have no relational process at all. All you have is that the
> Representamen, akin to the Saussurian signified, re-presents the Dynamic
> Object. But it doesn't.
>
> Again, my reading of Peirce, which, I think maintains the semiosic process
> as a set of triadic relations, is that the Representamen is MIND; it, using
> its laws, its habits, takes that sensate data from the Dynamic Object and
> 'understands it'.to present that data as an Interpretant. In this case,
> the DO is the actual vase [word or object]. The Representamen takes that
> input data...and using its memory/habits/laws'understands it to
> 're-present it' [if using those terms enables you to better understand how
> I see it].within the Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants.
>
> But the Representamen is not a stand-alone agent. It is MIND and functions
> only within the semiosic process, within the triad. It acts as the
> mediation transforming the raw hard sensate data of the DO...to the
> 'understanding of it'...within the DI.
>
> That's my explanation. So very very different from yours!
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 06/02/18 10:48 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> As an English-speaker, did you not instantly recognize that sequence of
> four letters as a word?  Did you not proceed to associate it right away
> with various kinds of containers for flowers?  If you did, then there was a
> semiosic process/action that took place in that moment of time.
>
> In order for us to experience a relation, there must be Subjects to serve
> as the Correlates within that relation.  According to Peirce's
>  straightforward definition that I quoted below from EP 2:290, the
> Representamen is not (necessarily) a "thing," but it certainly is a Subject
> or Correlate.
>
> In other words, on my reading of Peirce, the Representamen is not the
> semiosic process/action, and it is not the triadic Sign-relation, and it
> is not "the embodiment of the Interpretant" (whatever that means);
> rather, the Representamen is anything that stands for something else (its
> Object) to something else (its Interpretant) within a triadic
> Sign-relation.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 9:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list
>>
>> The four letters that you provided were just that: four letters. There
>> was no semiosic process/action. Jon Awbrey correctly pointed this out to
>> you.
>>
>> The semiosic process is triadic - and the Repesentamen is not a 'thing';
>> it is an integral part of a semiosic process which is one of RELATIONS.
>>
>> You seem to see the Repesentamen as the embodiment of the Interpretant.
>> No, it's the relation of mediation between the Object and Interpretant.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Tue 06/02/18 9:55 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> List:
>>
>> Although I anticipated Edwina's answer in light of our past exchanges, I
>> am sincerely astonished that no one else (so far) considers the bare word
>> "vase" to be a Representamen, because it seems obvious to me that Peirce
>> would have done so without hesitation.  Surely any English-speaker familiar
>> with it recognizes it instantly and associates it with its  general meaning;
>> i.e., there is an Interpretant, contrary to Gary R.'s analysis.
>>
>> The fact that someone who does not speak English would not recognize it
>> is irrelevant.  For something to be a Representamen, it is sufficient that
>> an Interpretant is  possible; i.e., every Sign has an  Immediate Interpretant
>> as its "peculiar interpretability" (SS 111; 1909), but need not  actually
>>  produce a Dynamic  Interpretant.
>>
>> CSP:  A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
>> Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
>> Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the
>> possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the
>> same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some  possible 
>> Interpretant.
>> (EP 2:290; 1903, emphases added)
>>
>>
>> The lack of a semiotic context is precisel

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Stephen C. Rose]

Semiotics seems to me almost a meta thing. A means of making academic what
would be clear if not meta-ed up with interpretive elaboration and
complexity. We live day by day and our time is necessarily limited. We
encounter things and think about them and then act or express. If one
wants to analyze this process fine but that is secondary to the actual
process. If we are talking about pragmaticism are we not concerned mainly
with the personal and public questions of the day? Most are. I think I have
been unfair if this has been a discussion of semiotics and semiotics is a
sort of in depth consideration which might be of interest to academics or
people on vacation. Or is there a use for it, and of so what does it
consist in? If we want to consider something like abortion today we cannot
take lots of time and then come back to it. I that what the pragmatic maxim
is about? I assume it is about a method of arriving at expressions and
actions and that it is stages of a thought process. That it is explicable
and works. But nobody except a few have honored my capacity for salient
thought.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 10:08 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Mike, List:
>
> In one sense, I agree that it is simple--the Immediate Object is the
> Object as it is represented in the Sign, while the Dynamic Object is the
> Object as it really is.  On the other hand, once we start trying to
> identify these and other constituents within a concrete example of
> semiosis--whether actual or imagined--it tends to get quite complicated, as
> this thread amply illustrates.  Consequently, my engagement with Peirce's
> writings on speculative grammar usually involves formulating what I think
> might be a viable framework, then testing it out with some examples, then
> getting frustrated at the complexity that this eventually uncovers, then
> giving up and moving on to something else.  The cycle usually repeats a few
> months later, perhaps focusing on a different aspect.  One positive outcome
> was my agreement with Edwina to use the term "Sign" for the *triad *of
> Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant, which is in an
> irreducibly triadic *relation *with the Dynamic Object and Dynamic
> Interpretant.  I also wrestled with the three different Interpretants a few
> times before settling on my current working hypothesis--the Immediate
> Interpretant is the range of *possible* feelings/actions/thoughts that
> the Sign *may *produce, the Dynamic Interpretant is any *actual 
> *feeling/action/thought
> that the Sign *does *produce, and the Final Interpretant is the *habit *of
> feeling/action/thought that the Sign *would *produce with sufficient
> repetition.  This has held up well so far, but I have yet to achieve
> comparable clarity regarding the Dynamic Object and (especially) the
> Immediate Object.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 10:52 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
>
>> Hi Jon, List,
>>
>> I know this thread has been going on for a while, and I have not followed
>> every blow closely. So I apologize if I try to make something simple that
>> in fact is not. But I guess I'm having a hard time seeing what is so
>> confusing here.
>>
>> The immediate object is the object of a sign; it applies to all signs. It
>> is what the sign is representing. If we are talking about the object being
>> a flower, humans can see red; bees can see UV. Likely all representations
>> we see of the flower (as humans) will render red, not UV. The red flower
>> (plus many other aspects) is the immediate object.
>>
>> The dynamic object (also called real by Peirce, but he uses dynamic to
>> capture the fictive case), is what the object actually is, UV, red,
>> whatever. What it is is comprised of its entire breadth and depth of
>> information, all of its extensions and its comprehension. Because it is
>> real, this information of the dynamic object is independent of how I might
>> perceive or signify it. The immediate object can never capture the complete
>> information of the dynamic object, no matter how represented or signified.
>> The analogy here is really no different than an information loss in
>> Shannon's formulation.
>>
>> Having said what I said above, we now may have a better, bit more clearer
>> understanding of the object. Our immediate object may change as a result,
>> resulting in the occurrence of a new sign, part of the continuation of
>> thought, but the dynamic object remains the same.
>>
>> At any rate, that is how I see it.
>>
>> Mike
>>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

[Stephen C. Rose]

What is the general value of Peirce's technical terms or our glosses on
them in relation to signs? Is there anything that is not a sign? Is there
any thinking that does not reduce a sign to a word? If a sign becomes a
word is the word an object of the sign? Why not simply the expression of a
sign? Whatever this is all about it cannot be relevant to explaining Peirce
to the woman or man on the street?  How does one apply the pragmatic maxim
to a consideration of signs? Seems to me signs are anything we think about
that were once not words but now are. And that the maxim suggests that our
consideration concludes with something that is of a tangible, practical
nature. Is that process however it is described not something that can be
understood and expressed without the painful and laborious exegesis of
these technical terms? Peirce clearly thought what he was coming up with
was of general applicability. I think he loses us as he moves almost
obsessively into categories. It's obscurantism. If we respond no we're
getting to the heart of what he had in mind then how does this translate
into something understandable? This discussion seems to me an almost binary
exercise -- my way or highway. Can we not agree that that is not what
Peirce wanted to propagate?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> I apologize for giving the impression that I think I have all of this
> figured out; that is certainly not the case.  In fact, coincidentally, the
> very questions that you posed below occurred to me while I was driving home
> earlier this evening.  Taken in isolation, the Sign "Immediate Object" is a
> Type (Legisign), which entails that both of its Objects are general; i.e.,
> it is a Collective and a Copulant, like any other common noun.  My initial
> hypothesis is that its Dynamic Object is the real continuum of all
> potential Immediate Objects, while its Immediate Object is the law (habit)
> that renders its replica Sinsigns (Tokens) significant (cf. EP 2:291).
> However, this is quite tentative, and I am very much open to other
> suggestions.  What are your answers?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 5:50 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> As far as the debate is concerned, I concede. You win.
>>
>> Now I’d like to ask you a few questions about the sign “immediate object”:
>>
>> Does it have a dynamic object?
>>
>> Does it have an immediate object?
>>
>> (If yes to both) How do you distinguish between those two objects?
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
>>
>> *Sent:* 31-Jan-18 14:11
>> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell
>> Lecture 3.14)
>>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>>
>>
>> I am afraid that I continue to be baffled by your response.  Peirce
>> explicitly stated, more than once, that *all *Signs have Immediate
>> Objects; i.e., something that *does not* have an Immediate Object *cannot
>> *be a Sign at all.  Anyone who claims otherwise is evidently using
>> "Sign," "Immediate Object," or both in a way that is different from Peirce,
>> which you said you feel obligated *not *to do.  Adapting your example ...
>>
>>- Person A wrote, "All animals have souls."
>>- Person B says, a century later, "Only humans have souls."
>>- You say, "Person A invented and defined the term 'soul,' so I feel
>>obligated to make my usage of it conform to his as much as possible."
>>- Person B says, "Person A's actual view was that only humans have
>>souls."
>>
>> The burden of proof is now very much on Person B to demonstrate that what
>> Person A explicitly stated was somehow not his actual view.  You can still
>> ask your question, "What is this thing you're calling a 'soul'?" and the
>> repetitive responses are indeed still largely unhelpful, other than
>> providing different boundaries for where you should be looking for souls.
>> Nevertheless, you have already committed yourself to using Person A's
>> terminology, and should proceed accordingly; whatever a "soul" is,
>> according to Person A's own words, it is something that all animals have,
>> not just humans.  Likewise, whatever an "Immediate Object" is, according
>> to Peirce's own words, it is something that all Signs have, not just
>> propositions; or at least, that is how I see it right now.  Furthermore, it
>> would require only a single counterexample--a non-human animal that has a
>> soul, or a non-Dicent Sign that has an Immediate Object--to refute Person
>> B, and I believe that I have provided one with my analysis of the statue.
>> Do you disagree?
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>>
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 12:37 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> Jon,
>>
>> As I said before, I’m not interested in arguing for or against the
>> proposition that “all signs have immediate objects.” Moreover, I don’t see
>> that the “burden of proof” is on anybody engaged 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and function

[Stephen C. Rose]

ignore them
>>> anyway ] - I consider that Peirce's semiosis applies to all Mind as Matter,
>>> and that includes not merely the physical-chemical and biological realms -
>>> but the human conceptual as well. There is no differentiation in
>>> theoretical content or semiosic function between them. It's the same
>>> semiosis - whether you call Firstness: quality, feeling, or possibility.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> On Thu 25/01/18 8:29 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>> sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> At this point, I suspect that the issue is not so much that we disagree,
>>> but that we are talking about two different things--unfortunately, using
>>> the same terminology but assigning two different sets of definitions.  This
>>> is precisely why I respectfully suggested in the "Biosemiosis" thread that
>>> when addressing these matters, we should try to be clear about the specific
>>> level of Peirce's architectonic classification of the sciences in which we
>>> are operating.
>>>
>>> When I invoke 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, I am never referring to "modes of
>>> organization of matter/concepts"; I posted a few weeks ago what I generally
>>> have in mind instead.
>>>
>>>- In phaneroscopy, we discover the three Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns
>>>as divisions of Phenomena according to the elements of experience:
>>>quality/reaction/mediation.
>>>- In normative science, we discover the three Ideals of
>>>esthetic/ethical/logical goodness as divisions of Ends according to the
>>>constituents of consciousness:  feeling/volition/thought.
>>>- In metaphysics, we discover the three Universes of
>>>Ideas/Facts/Habits as divisions of Reality according to the modes of
>>>Being:  possibility/actuality/regularity.
>>>
>>> In other words, I am almost always discussing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns from the
>>> standpoint of philosophy, while my sense is that you are almost always
>>> discussing them as you apply them within the physical, chemical, and
>>> biological realms.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 6:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Stephen - no, I don't think that we think in a 'linear categorical
>>>> fashion ' [123].
>>>>
>>>> The categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are, as I
>>>> understand them, modes of organization of matter/concepts. When you check
>>>> out the ten classes [2.227] - you will see that some experiences are
>>>> operating only within one mode; or two modes; or three modes.
>>>>
>>>> Firstness [see Peirce's discussion of it in, for example, 1.310 and on]
>>>> as 'immediate consciousness' or a 'feeling'..which we are, however, not
>>>> aware of or conscious of - because it is a state; a pure 'instant' of
>>>> experience with no finite beginning or end. It is a quality - a 'mere
>>>> possibility'..which is NOT the same as a potentiality'... It is outside of
>>>> our being cognitively aware of it - but - physically- we are most certainly
>>>> aware of Firstness. That is, matter does not exist only within the closures
>>>> of Secondness nor the general rules of Thirdness. It functions within the
>>>> openness and 'abductive' novelty that is Firstness. I would say that
>>>> Firstness is an input of energy within matter. So - the insertion of
>>>> the fire of a torch into a piece of wood - that 'energy' is Firstness. The
>>>> interaction between the fire of the torch and the wood is an interaction of
>>>> Secondness and Thirdness [that wood burns at a certain temperature].  But
>>>> that 'energy-input' - that is Firstness. I consider it a vital component of
>>>> the 'thermodynamic world' so to speak.the movement of energy from site
>>>> to site.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> On Thu 25/01/18 6:36 PM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>>>>
>>>> I hope you are right Edwina! I agree. We live in what some have called
>>>> an immanent frame. Actually, we do not know everything about lies beyond.
>>>> But regardless of what we believed if you are reflecting Peirce that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and function

[Stephen C. Rose]

We can will how we do our thinking. I find it transparently clear that if I
want to bring up a sign I can and settle for what it is and name it. I can
then think of an index of terms which I call ethics. I can then engage in
willed musing on them. I can comprehend that as step two if I like. That is
what it is. Because there is a third area which I call aesthetics. And by a
series of mantras and such, I get there and engage in what I call a
colloquy. I arrive at acts and deeds which I perform. That is the substance
of the discipline I advocate. This may not be a repeatable mental process
but I think it most likely is and therefore I can think in a 123 manner. It
is not how I think unless I will it.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Jan 26, 2018 at 8:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, I'll continue to disagree. I know that you'd like to label me and
> assign a specific unique term and location...such that my various musings
> could safely be ignored - but [and of course you are free to ignore them
> anyway ] - I consider that Peirce's semiosis applies to all Mind as Matter,
> and that includes not merely the physical-chemical and biological realms -
> but the human conceptual as well. There is no differentiation in
> theoretical content or semiosic function between them. It's the same
> semiosis - whether you call Firstness: quality, feeling, or possibility.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 25/01/18 8:29 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> At this point, I suspect that the issue is not so much that we disagree,
> but that we are talking about two different things--unfortunately, using
> the same terminology but assigning two different sets of definitions.  This
> is precisely why I respectfully suggested in the "Biosemiosis" thread that
> when addressing these matters, we should try to be clear about the specific
> level of Peirce's architectonic classification of the sciences in which we
> are operating.
>
> When I invoke 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, I am never referring to "modes of
> organization of matter/concepts"; I posted a few weeks ago what I generally
> have in mind instead.
>
>- In phaneroscopy, we discover the three Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns as
>divisions of Phenomena according to the elements of experience:
>quality/reaction/mediation.
>- In normative science, we discover the three Ideals of
>esthetic/ethical/logical goodness as divisions of Ends according to the
>constituents of consciousness:  feeling/volition/thought.
>- In metaphysics, we discover the three Universes of
>Ideas/Facts/Habits as divisions of Reality according to the modes of
>Being:  possibility/actuality/regularity.
>
> In other words, I am almost always discussing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns from the
> standpoint of philosophy, while my sense is that you are almost always
> discussing them as you apply them within the physical, chemical, and
> biological realms.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 6:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Stephen - no, I don't think that we think in a 'linear categorical
>> fashion ' [123].
>>
>> The categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are, as I
>> understand them, modes of organization of matter/concepts. When you check
>> out the ten classes [2.227] - you will see that some experiences are
>> operating only within one mode; or two modes; or three modes.
>>
>> Firstness [see Peirce's discussion of it in, for example, 1.310 and on]
>> as 'immediate consciousness' or a 'feeling'..which we are, however, not
>> aware of or conscious of - because it is a state; a pure 'instant' of
>> experience with no finite beginning or end. It is a quality - a 'mere
>> possibility'..which is NOT the same as a potentiality'... It is outside of
>> our being cognitively aware of it - but - physically- we are most certainly
>> aware of Firstness. That is, matter does not exist only within the closures
>> of Secondness nor the general rules of Thirdness. It functions within the
>> openness and 'abductive' novelty that is Firstness. I would say that
>> Firstness is an input of energy within matter. So - the insertion of
>> the fire of a torch into a piece of wood - that 'energy' is Firstness. The
>> interaction between the fire of the torch and the wood is an interaction of
>> Secondness and Thirdness [that wood burns at a certain temperature].  But
>> that 'energy-input' - that is Firstness. I consider it a vital component of
>> the 'thermodynamic world' so to speak.the movement of e

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

[Stephen C. Rose]

let's say
>>>> that 'feeling of redness' or how about 'a feeling of heat' [I just spilled
>>>> hot oil on myself]. No other categorical mode, in this semiosic event, is
>>>> operative other than Firstness.
>>>>
>>>> Now - if I am becoming aware of this triad - then, I am adding both
>>>> Secondness [my physical reaction to that feeling]..and possibly later on in
>>>> the next few seconds, my thoughts [My god, I have burned myself].
>>>>
>>>> But isn't it possible that one never moves beyond that first feeling?
>>>> Or moves beyond that reaction - i.e., never moves into analysis or even
>>>> awareness beyond the muscular reaction?
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> On Thu 25/01/18 1:14 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>>>>
>>>> Stephen, list,
>>>>
>>>> In reference to this passage:
>>>>
>>>> CSP: Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds
>>>> of elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
>>>> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
>>>> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can  possibly think
>>>> involves three kinds of elements​
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You commented: SR: ". . . the notion that thinking can be limited to
>>>> ** things that themselves must somehow be three elements by some sort f
>>>> default ** seems to be out of order or maybe just plain wrong."
>>>>
>>>> I don't understand your confusion here, Stephen, as this passage simply
>>>> points to the fundamental tenet of Peircean phenomenology, namely, that in
>>>> the phanerson--i.e.,whatsover is before some mind--there will always
>>>> be the three categorial elements of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns even if one (or two)
>>>> may be dominant in any given phaneronic experience. Given the context,
>>>> these three may be given different names, for example:
>>>>
>>>> 1896 [c.]  | Logic of Mathematics: An attempt to develop my categories
>>>> from within  | CP 1.423 We have already seen clearly that the elements
>>>> of phenomena are of three categories, quality, fact, and thought.
>>>>
>>>> Or:
>>>>
>>>> 1885  | One, Two, Three: Fundamental Categories of Thought and of
>>>> Nature  | CP 1.377
>>>>
>>>> It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first,
>>>> feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time,
>>>> passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second,
>>>> consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of
>>>> resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic
>>>> consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought (both in
>>>> Commens).
>>>>
>>>> Again, this triad of universal categories is so basic to Peirce's
>>>> thinking throughout cenoscopic philosophy (but, perhaps, especially in
>>>> phenomenology and logic as semiotics) that I wonder what prompted your
>>>> question.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Gary R
>>>>
>>>> [image: Blocked image]
>>>>
>>>> Gary Richmond
>>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>>>> Communication Studies
>>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>>>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 11:18 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I don't know what the context of this discussion is exactly but the
>>>>> notion that thinking can be limited to ** things that themselves must
>>>>> somehow be three elements by some sort f default ** seems to be out of
>>>>> order or maybe just plain wrong. For example, I am thinking now as I 
>>>>> write.
>>>>> No numerical sense intrudes. To get to this stage I did not have three
>>>>> anythings that I am aware of. If I am simply skirting a context that
>>>>> explains this, fine. Par for my course. I miss lots. But if the text 
>>>>> stands
>>>>> as is, how can thinking which is us puzzling as we go be involved in
>>>>> anything but

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

[Stephen C. Rose]

I must be crazy, But what prompted my question is that I suspect I identify
thinking about what goes on when I am consciously seeking to understand
something from the trivial and passing to the problematic and absorbing. I
concede a failure to communicate because I cannot for the life of me
understand that description as a mode of thinking unless it is sort of a
plan in front of me that I am following. I really don't want to belabor
this because it seems to me like an impasse and I do not want to trouble
anyone.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 1:14 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Stephen, list,
>
> In reference to this passage:
>
> CSP: Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
> elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can possibly think involves
> three kinds of elements​
>
>
> You commented: SR: ". . . the notion that thinking can be limited to **
> things that themselves must somehow be three elements by some sort f
> default ** seems to be out of order or maybe just plain wrong."
>
> I don't understand your confusion here, Stephen, as this passage simply
> points to the fundamental tenet of Peircean phenomenology, namely, that in
> the phanerson--i.e.,whatsover is before some mind--there will *always* be
> the three categorial elements of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns even if one (or two) may
> be dominant in any given phaneronic experience. Given the context, these
> three may be given different names, for example:
>
> 1896 [c.] | Logic of Mathematics: An attempt to develop my categories
> from within | CP 1.423 We have already seen clearly that the elements of
> phenomena are of three categories, quality, fact, and thought.
>
> Or:
>
> 1885 | One, Two, Three: Fundamental Categories of Thought and of Nature | CP
> 1.377
>
> It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first,
> feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time,
> passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second,
> consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of
> resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic
> consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought (both in
> *Commens*).
>
>
> Again, this triad of universal categories is so basic to Peirce's thinking
> throughout cenoscopic philosophy (but, perhaps, especially in phenomenology
> and logic as semiotics) that I wonder what prompted your question.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 11:18 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> I don't know what the context of this discussion is exactly but the
>> notion that thinking can be limited to ** things that themselves must
>> somehow be three elements by some sort f default ** seems to be out of
>> order or maybe just plain wrong. For example, I am thinking now as I write.
>> No numerical sense intrudes. To get to this stage I did not have three
>> anythings that I am aware of. If I am simply skirting a context that
>> explains this, fine. Par for my course. I miss lots. But if the text stands
>> as is, how can thinking which is us puzzling as we go be involved in
>> anything but a process that ** cannot ** be characterized as the text
>> characterizes it. The only time I know when three enters into thinking is
>> when I consciously will it in terms of an actual process that has definable
>> stages.
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 8:40 AM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> ​Jeff, Gary f, List,
>>>
>>>
>>> Jeff wrote: "​
>>> Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying emphasis
>>> on the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion that only
>>> those "things" that are actually before the mind should be counted as
>>> phenomena.
>>>
>>>
>>> Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
>>> elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
>>> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
>>> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can *possibly* think
>>> involves three kinds of elements​ CSP​
>>>
>>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

[Stephen C. Rose]

I don't know what the context of this discussion is exactly but the notion
that thinking can be limited to ** things that themselves must somehow be
three elements by some sort f default ** seems to be out of order or maybe
just plain wrong. For example, I am thinking now as I write. No
numerical sense intrudes. To get to this stage I did not have three
anythings that I am aware of. If I am simply skirting a context that
explains this, fine. Par for my course. I miss lots. But if the text stands
as is, how can thinking which is us puzzling as we go be involved in
anything but a process that ** cannot ** be characterized as the text
characterizes it. The only time I know when three enters into thinking is
when I consciously will it in terms of an actual process that has definable
stages.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 8:40 AM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> ​Jeff, Gary f, List,
>
>
> Jeff wrote: "​
> Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying emphasis on
> the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion that only those
> "things" that are actually before the mind should be counted as phenomena.
>
>
> Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
> elements that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the
> Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or
> cognition of any kind. Everything that you can *possibly* think involves
> three kinds of elements​ CSP​
>
> ​ (Jeff's emphasis)​
>
>
>
> ​JD: ​
> The reason I'm taking time to lay emphasis on this point is that I think
> there is a confusion--at least in my own mind--about the way the term
> "possible" is being applied in the classification of signs generally, and
> this is coming to the fore in a number of discussions that are currently
> taking place on the Peirce-L.
>
>
> ​Jeff, your comment is problematic for me for two reasons. 1) In the
> Peirce quote, "Everything that you can *possibly* think" refers, in my
> understanding of phenomenology, to everything thing you may* actually*
> think. This is to say that for the phenomenologist the phenomenon must be
> before the mind, not *possibly* before the mind (i.e., Peirce is saying
> that all possible thought when thought will involve 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns).
>
>
> ​2) It seems to me that your leaping to "the classification of signs
> generally" in you comment quoted just above, you are seemingly conflating
> logic as semiotics and phenomenology, a dangerous mixing in my opinion. and
> your following comments on descriptives, designatives, and copulatives
> clearly moves this notion of "possible" into the semiotic realm (that is,
> into a different cenoscopic science).​
>
> ​
>
> You also wrote: "
> In addition to the public character of the phenomena
> ​. . . " But for the science of phenomenology, what is 'public' seems to
> me but the invitation of the individual phenomenologist to suggest to
> another person that she make the same (or similar) observation of the
> phenomena. But then that would be another individual having the
> phenomenological experience for herself. What is public is what together we
> can same about the phenomena we both experienced.
>
>
> This is quite different from the usual scientific experiment which,
> potentially--and, not infrequently, actually--many could experience at the
> same time.
>
>
> So to summarize my points above: 1) In the Peirce snippet above that "
> Everything that you can *possibly* think involves three kinds of elements
> ​" 'possibility' there points, in my opinion, to future actual
> phenomenological appearances for an individual. to some "is" a phenomenon
> rather than to some "could be" or "may be" phenomena. In short, for
> phenomenology itself the phenomenon *must *be before the mind. That one
> can later discuss it with others is dependent on their having themselves
> experienced the same or similar phenomena.
>
>
> And, 2) your argument, if I understand it, seemingly for some sort of
> *public* phenomenological experience, appears to me (in consideration of
> your examples) to conflate two different cenoscopic sciences, viz.
> phenomenology and semiotic. Semiotic will most certainly employ the
> discoveries of phenomenology, but that's an entirely different matter.
>
>
> Best,
>
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 11:53 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Gary F, Gary R, List,
>>
>>
>> Consider the first part of the passage you quote. I am laying emphasis on
>> the term "possible" and cautioning against the suggestion that only those
>> "things" that are actually before the mind should be counted as phenomena.
>>
>>
>> Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of
>> elements that are alway

Re: Logic as semeiotic in relation to theoretical and practical psychology, was [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

Maybe we can make a triad of the two logics you note --  the one I sense is
foundational lodged in the mystery with rules we have yet to fully learn I
see so much flux that terminology itself becomes somewhat liquid. BTW I
wore coca-cola classes from childhood and was liberated from all need for
them by miraculous surgeries a few years back. I hope whatever you went
through was OK.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 6:33 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Stephen, list,
>
> 'Logic' has many meanings for Peirce as for all of us. In the *Commens*
> dictionary of Peirce's terms there are about 25 entries having 'logic' or
> 'logical' in them, many--but not all--concerned with formal logic. The
> distinction between two of these terms is of the greatest importance, I
> think, in responding to your doubt as to whether or not logic is a science
> (it is, and a very large percentage of Peirce's writings deal with it) or a
> "dynamic force" (I might not express it in those terms, but I think I see
> what you mean).
>
> So, Peirce distinguishes between *Logica Utens*, the logic all reflective
> people use and, for the most part, use quite effectively, thank you), and 
> *Logica
> Docens*, the scientific study of logic. And, it's important to keep in
> mind, "
> ​
> The *logica docens* is nothing but the perfectionment of [the] *logica
> utens*." 1901-1902 [c.] | Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R] | MS
> [R] 1147
>
>
> *Logica Utens*
>
> 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Section II. Why Study Logic? | CP 2.186
>
> Now a person cannot perform the least reasoning without some general ideal
> of good reasoning; for reasoning involves deliberate approval of one’s
> reasoning; and approval cannot be deliberate unless it is based upon the
> comparison of the thing approved with some idea of how such a thing ought
> to appear. Every reasoner, then, has some general idea of what good
> reasoning is. This constitutes a theory of logic: the scholastics called it
> the reasoner’s *logica utens*. Every reasoner whose attention has been
> considerably drawn to his inner life must soon become aware of this.
>
> *Logica Docens*
>
> 902 | Logic | DPP 2:21; CP 2.204-205
>
> . . . the result of the scientific study. . . is called *logica docens*
> . [—]
>
> That part of logic. . . *logica docens*, which, setting out with such
> assumptions as that every assertion is either true or false, and not both,
> and that some propositions may be recognized to be true, studies the
> constituent parts of arguments and produces a classification of arguments
> such as is above described, is often considered to embrace the whole of
> logic; but a more correct designation is Critic (Greek {kritiké}.
>
>
> And as earlier noted, as Peirce developed it logic is a very much broader
> field than critical logic (as central as he always maintains that* that*
> critical branch of formal logic is). Still, logic as semeiotic (that is, 
> *logica
> docens*) has three branches, theoretical (speculative) grammar, critic
> (just mentioned in the quotation above), and theoretical rhetoric. As
> Peirce suggests, many equate critical logic (critic) with the whole of
> logic, while for Peirce, theoretical rhetoric (methodeutic, esp. in its
> including a pragmatistic theory of inquiry) is the final branch for which
> the other two prepare.
>
>
> Best,
>
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 5:08 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> Progress. Anyway I have been radically influenced by Roberto Assagioli
>> who was a contemporary of Jung and Freud. Indeed Triadic Philosophy
>> advocates what emerged from his work -- psychosynthesis -- which is as
>> close as anything I know to a triadic form of psychology since it includes
>> as fundamental a  higher self which is what I take a  triadic thinker to be
>> in touch with. We all hit bumps in life that require skilled others to help
>> iron out. Psychosynthesis spawns practitioners who know how to help and how
>> to back off in the face of things too serious to deal with. I am reflecting
>> on a lifetime of involvement which began when I worked at Riggs in
>> Stockbridge when Erik Erikson and David Rappaport were both there. I think
>> Pierce is right to reject psychologism as a basis for logic but I am
>> inclined to think logic is a term that should be used more and shorn of its
>> seemingly specialized provenance. It seem

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

I find the issue remote from what I sense. Sorry. It seems almost a
supposition which is my term for something different than what can be
proved. To speak of logic seems t me to speak of what tends to good. Did
Peirce believe this? I think he did. I think his explanation about
inkstands reverts to abstract discussions which are remote. At least to me.
Bear in mind I have gaps in my apparatus more portentous than Peirce's
lefthandedness.I would say that when psychology functions triadically it
has made strides in the direction of logic.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:22 AM,  wrote:

> Stephen, here’s a Peirce quote that illustrates the point Peter is making:
>
>
>
> [[ A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (*nihil animale me alienum
> puto*) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, “You see
> your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.” No doubt it was; and
> so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to continue
> my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not
> come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my
> inkstand. It is localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two
> places at once. On the theory that the distinction between psychical and
> physical phenomena is the distinction between final and efficient
> causation, it is plain enough that the inkstand and the brain-lobe have the
> same general relation to the functions of the mind. ] CP 7.366, 1902]
>
>
>
> What I referred to as his “anti-psychologism” is his frequent insistence
> that the science of logic has nothing to learn from the science of
> psychology (which was generally understood at the time to be about how
> *human* minds work (although it did include some experiments on other
> animals). Frederik Stjernfelt takes a close look at the anti-psychologism
> of Peirce and other logicians in his book *Natural Propositions*.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Peter Skagestad [mailto:skagest...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 21-Jan-18 16:15
> *To:* Stephen C. Rose ; Gary Fuhrman <
> g...@gnusystems.ca>; Peirce List 
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> Stephen, list,
>
>
>
> Two comments. First, I think this is a big deal and have written
> extensively about it, most recently in the Peirce Quote Book, but also in
> earlier writings found on the Arisbe website.
>
>
>
> Second, I see no actual contradiction between what you are saying and what
> Gary said. Peirce nowhere puts down the brain or denies that it is the
> locus of conscious activity; he simply does not restrict *reasoning* to
> this conscious activity in the brain, but includes activities that involve
> arms, hands, pencils, and paper, most famously the activity of creating and
> manipulating diagrams. So yes, in Peirce’s view as I understand it, brains
> are indeed wonderful, but so are pencils and paper, which vastly augment
> the reasoning power of the brain.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Peter
>
>
>
> Sent from Mail <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> for
> Windows 10
>
>
>
> *From: *Stephen C. Rose 
> *Sent: *Sunday, January 21, 2018 3:52 PM
> *To: *Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce List
> 
> *Subject: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> Is Peirce's anti-psychologism really putting down the brain as a source of
> conscious thinking? I thought he was simply flagging the limits of
> psychology as a basis for explaining things. Not a big deal but I do think
> the brain or whatever we take to be our inner thinking mechanism is quite a
> precious piece of work and that we can combat psychologist just the same.
> We can question Cartesianism without throwing out thinking.
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

Peirce may have avoided the term biowhatever and more than likely quantum
also. But Peirce certainly did say things that were not merely intuitive
about how things develop but which may also have enabled thngs to
develop.Things for which he had no name because they did not exist. That is
one way progress works. Words are frail and fallible things that are
preceded by signs. Words radically limit what is meant. We are meant by our
logical apparatus to see connections and implications. Thus I have n
problem when I watch videos from any discipline including biology. Our
disciplines are so sliced and diced that the only charitable way to deal
with them is to assume that things overcome the fences we build and even
the economies that create the fences.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 10:55 AM,  wrote:

> John,
>
>
>
> OK, I didn’t realize that you were looking for *advocacy *of biosemiotics
> in Peirce’s writings. I don’t think he ever used the term, and I’m not sure
> how Peirce would go about advocating it, if that would take something more
> specific than affirmation of the continuity of biological evolution. I
> don’t think Peirce had much to say about biological matters, so I wouldn’t
> really expect to find him saying much specifically about biosemiotics
> either.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 21-Jan-18 12:24
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> On 1/21/2018 9:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> > His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently maintained
>
> > from the 1860s on, is essentially a refusal to limit the application
>
> > of logical principles to what goes on in /human/ minds or brains.
>
>
>
> But advocating anti-psychologism is independent of advocating
> biosemiotics.  In discussing logic, he was emphasizing the point that the
> definitions are purely formal.  They are independent of any limitation to
> biological processes.
>
>
>
> > But his logic/semiotic was always generalized from the human
>
> > experience of sign use, as he says in CP 1.540. And necessarily so,
>
> > because “experience is our only teacher”
>
>
>
> In CP 1.540, he was also talking about math and logic.  The fact that he
> generalized his definition from human use does not imply any limitation to
> just human use.  Such an assumption would "block the way of inquiry".
>
>
>
> > I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here, unless it’s the
>
> > change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred after 1903. The
>
> > terminological change was that Peirce gave up using the term “sign”
>
> > in a way that limited it to the human realm.
>
>
>
> What I'd like to know is when Peirce generalized his views about semiosis
> to animals.  I'll restate the question:  How and when did Peirce's thoughts
> on biosemiosis (as implied by his MSS) develop?
>
>
>
> In 1887, he published an article about logical machines.  Among other
> things, he cited Jacquard looms (early 1800s) and Babbage's machines.  Ada
> Lovelace wrote her memoirs about programming them in 1843.  If machines
> could use signs, there would be no logical objection to claiming that
> animals could use signs.
>
>
>
> He talked about the use of signs by any "scientific intelligence"
>
> -- for which the only criterion is the ability to learn from experience.
> His anecdotes about dogs and parrots showed how they learn from
> experience.  He also mentioned other kinds of animals in various writings.
> His principle of continuity and his knowledge of Darwin's studies (1859)
> would lead him to extend at least some subset of semiosis to animals.
>
>
>
> He must have been thinking about generalizing semiosis long before 1903.
> Where can we find the evidence?
>
>
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>
>
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

The only rule I follow after being duly notified is that I try to relate
things to Peirce. Otherwise equality reigns.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 9:48 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I never have and never would set myself up as gatekeeper to Peirce or some
> kind of authoritative interpreter of his writings.  What I have argued in
> the past, but have no desire to rehash now, is that some readings of Peirce
> (or any other author) are more legitimate than others.  Instead, I
> respectfully would like to suggest that when we discuss semeiotic concepts
> and terminology, we should be clear about the specific level of Peirce's
> architectonic classification of the sciences in which we are operating.
> There are at least three that seem to come up regularly.
>
>1. The normative science of logic as semeiotic.
>2. The metaphysical doctrine of semeiotic realism.
>3. The special science of biology, which includes biosemiotics.
>
> This order corresponds not only to how they are arranged in Peirce's
> scheme, but also to how much he had to say directly about them during his
> lifetime.  As such, I acknowledge that there is more freedom in
> biosemiotics--the topic of this particular thread--than in the
> philosophical aspects of semeiotic (logic and metaphysics) to go well
> beyond anything that Peirce explicitly stated, while still remaining within
> the scope of broadly Peircean views.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this list
>> [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set ourselves up as
>> gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list seem to think that
>> way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my views are 'UnPeircean'.  My
>> response is that we are all equal; I, for example, am as smart and as dumb
>> as any other person. I don't think that anyone can tell another person that
>> their views are 'unPeircean' or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the
>> Authoritative Gatekeepers of What is Peirce.  All one can say is: 'I
>> disagree with your view'.and outline your own view. That's it.
>>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

Is Peirce's anti-psychologism really putting down the brain as a source of
conscious thinking? I thought he was simply flagging the limits of
psychology as a basis for explaining things. Not a big deal but I do think
the brain or whatever we take to be our inner thinking mechanism is quite a
precious piece of work and that we can combat psychologist just the same.
We can question Cartesianism without throwing out thinking.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 9:46 AM,  wrote:

> John,
>
>
>
> Yes, there are plenty of “earlier thoughts along those lines” of a
> semiotic generalized beyond the human experience of signs. In fact they are
> “as plenty as blackberries,” if you read Peirce chronologically looking for
> them. His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently maintained
> from the 1860s on, is essentially a refusal to limit the application of
> logical principles to what goes on in *human* minds or brains. But his
> logic/semiotic was always generalized *from* the human experience of sign
> use, as he says in CP 1.540. And necessarily so, because “experience is our
> only teacher” and we humans can only learn from *our* experience.
>
>
>
> I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here, *unless *it’s the
> change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred *after *1903. The
> *terminological* change was that Peirce gave up using the term “sign” in
> a way that limited it to the human realm. In Lowell 3.13 he distinguished
> between “sign” and “representamen”; after 1905 the distinction disappears
> and “sign” means the same thing as “representamen.” But that change was
> *only* terminological, in my view; there was no change in the *object* to
> which Peirce used those words to direct our attention. So I don’t see what
> it is that you think needs more explanation.
>
>
>
> By the way, this is one of the areas where the unPeircean use of the word
> “sign” to refer to a triadic relation (rather than a *subject* of a
> triadic relation) tends to cause confusion. Peirce’s 1903 distinction
> between “sign” and “representamen” was *not* a distinction between the
> whole triadic relation and one component of it. *This* terminological
> issue is perfectly clear if you read what Peirce actually wrote instead of
> someone else’s revised version of semiotics — and if it’s *Peircean*
> semiotics that you’re trying to understand.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:11
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> On 1/20/2018 4:54 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> > What change in terminology are you referring to?
>
>
>
> I was thinking about the following point:
>
>
>
> Gary F
>
> > Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign”
>
> > which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures
>
> > may represent his first clear move in that direction.
>
>
>
> I was asking about signs "not limited to human use".
>
>
>
> If the Lowell lectures show the "first clear move", are there earlier
> unclear moves?  Hints?  Suggestions?  Musements?
>
>
>
> The clearest MSS were the most likely to be selected for publication in CP
> and EP.  But there may be fragmentary MSS with passages that are crossed
> out.  Perhaps he had earlier thoughts along those lines, but he didn't have
> a "sop for Cerberus".
>
>
>
> John
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

Here's something
http://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-peirce/

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 12:33 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> John, Edwina, list,
>
> I've nothing to add at the moment,  I too completely agree with the thrust
> of John's post. Let's hope that some of those untranscribed manuscripts
> will one day yield more relevant material on this topic.
>
> In reading Whitehead years ago I too noted many similarities to Peirce's
> thinking. Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing
> the thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on
> this. But I'm wondering if there has been any more extensive work in this
> area?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> John, list
>>
>> Thank you so much for your perceptive and articulate post. Of course - I
>> strongly agree.
>>
>> And I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex
>> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro
>> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world. And yes, even in the
>> complex adaptive multi-unit systems such as human societies.
>>
>>  I keep saying that 'plants talk to each other' and we are certainly
>> finding out, by research, that they do just that.
>>
>> However, semiosis is not equivalent to communication - a view that many
>> become, I think, entrapped in. My view is that semiosis is morphological;
>> that is, it forms matter ...transforming matter from one finite form to
>> another finite form - within that semiosic triad.
>>
>> And of course, this includes the physico-chemical realm where semiosic
>> transformation also takes place, albeit at a, [thankfully] slower pace
>> - which slow pace maintains the stability of this realm. The biological is
>> a dynamic, active, constantly transformative and thus, is a ' productive of
>> diversity'  realm.
>>
>> Again - thanks so much for your post.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat 20/01/18 11:19 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>>
>> Edwina and Gary R,
>>
>> I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize that
>> Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living
>> things. Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby:
>>
>> CSP, MS 463 (1908)
>> > I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else,
>> > called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which
>> > effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately
>> > determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop
>> > to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception
>> > understood.
>>
>> I believe that "despair" is the primary reason why he didn't say more.
>> His insistence on continuity implied that the faculties of the human
>> mind must be continuous with the minds (or quasi-minds) of all living
>> things anywhere in the universe. But if he had said that, he would
>> have been denounced by a huge number of critics from philosophy,
>> psychology, science, religion, and politics.
>>
>> Edwina
>> > I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual
>> > realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis... I won't repeat my
>> > constant reference to 4.551.
>>
>> Gary
>> > I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as much as you have
>> > (there are a very few other suggestions scattered through his work,
>> > but none of them are much developed).
>>
>> The reason why there are so few is that Peirce felt a need to
>> throw a "sop to Cerberus" in order to get people to take his ideas
>> seriously. I'm sure that he would gladly have written much more
>> if they were ready to listen.
>>
>> For a very important and carefully worded quotation, see CP 2.227:
>> > all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say,
>> > by an intelligence capable of learning by experience.
>>
>> That comment certainly includes all large animals. In addition
>> to explicit statements about signs, it's important to note his
>> anecdotes about dogs and parrots. He observed some remarkable
>> performances, which implied "scientific intelligence". Although
>> he didn't say so explicitly, he wouldn't have made the effort
>> to write those anecdotes if he didn't think so.
>>
>> Since Peirce talked about "crystals and bees" in CP 4.551, he must
>> have been thinking about the continuity to zoosemiosis, and from that
>> to the intermediate stages of phytosemiosis, biosemiosis by microbes,
>> crystal formation, and eventually to all of chemistry and physics.
>> He would have been delighted to learn about the signs called DNA
>> and the semiosis that interprets those signs in all aspects of life.
>>
>> Many people have observed stron

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God

[Stephen C. Rose]

Best thing I have seen in ages! Duly tweeted.

*Stephen C. Rose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>*
‏ @stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>

A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God
| Schmidt | Signs - International Journal of Semiotics https://
buff.ly/2mMjdXj  <https://t.co/M2xJBLUn1h>

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 9:36 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> A couple of months ago, Gary Richmond posted a call for papers from *Signs
> - International Journal of Semiotics*.  In response, I submitted a
> somewhat lengthy essay that I derived from a series of List discussions
> that took place in the late summer and early autumn of 2016 under such
> subject headings as "Peirce's Theory of Thinking" and "Peirce's
> Cosmology."  I am pleased and honored to report that it has now been
> published, and since *Signs* is open-source, it is available to anyone
> online.
>
> https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187/152244
>
>
> Feedback is welcome!
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> -
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.13

[Stephen C. Rose]

Peirce, I thought said all thought is in signs. In CP signs appear many
more times than thought or thinking. In between with over 700 mentions is
consciousness which seems to me significant. I wonder if he believed
consciousness was a condition of active thought and of signs as those
vaguenesses and images that became words and thereby enabled reflection and
representation. I know there are math things too but I have no sense of
them.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 12:17 PM,  wrote:

> List,
>
>
>
> As I remarked in the other thread, this part of Lowell 3 illustrates
> several significant points about definitions and terminological matters.
>
>
>
> As we all know, Peirce in his various writings provided dozens of
> definitions of the word “sign,” and no two of them are exactly alike. Why
> couldn’t he make do with one complete and exact definition, and simply
> repeat it every time he needed to insert one?
>
>
>
> First of all, “sign” is a word in common use, which entails that it gets
> used in a range of senses, some of them quite vague. For purposes of exact
> logic or semiotics, Peirce needs to narrow that range. The same goes for
> the term “representation”; and he gives rough-and-ready definitions of both
> terms in Lowell 3.13, both of which achieve that purpose to some extent.
>
>
>
> Second, the contexts in which Peirce gives a definition of “sign” vary,
> and I think this accounts for much of the variation in the definitions.
> This variation gives us no reason to doubt that all Peirce’s definitions of
> “sign” are consistent with one another, or that they all express exactly
> the same *concept* (to the extent that a concept *can* be exact).
>
>
>
> But for his semiotic (i.e. scientific) purposes, Peirce also needs to make
> an *analytical* definition of the concept, one that will identify its
> *essential* elements. For that purpose he creates the technical term
> “representamen,” which is *not* in common use — in fact there’s no entry
> for it in most English dictionaries. That makes it much more suitable than
> “sign” for analytic purposes, although its extension is supposed to match
> that of “sign” as closely as possible. As a technical term, it can be
> defined *exactly* by Peirce in the act of introducing it. Then, by
> defining a “sign” as a representamen or a kind of representamen, he can
> provide an exact definition of “sign” while also retaining the
> ordinary-language signification of the word, which is more vague and more
> familiar.
>
>
>
> There is a more detailed version of this double definition, with an
> interesting example of the difference between “sign” and “representamen,”
> in the “Speculative Grammar” section of the Syllabus, EP2:272-3. I devoted
> some commentary to that passage in *Turning Signs*,
> http://gnusystems.ca/TS/cls.htm#sunflow, which interested readers can
> have a look at.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
> *Sent:* 13-Jan-18 15:09
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.13
>
>
>
> Continuing from Lowell 3.12, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-
> manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13937:
>
>
>
> [540] The analysis which I have just used to give you some notion of
> Genuine Thirdness and its two forms of degeneracy is the merest rough
> blackboard sketch of the true state of things; and I must begin the
> examination of representations by defining representation a *little* more
> accurately. In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word
> *Representation* to the *operation* of a sign or its *relation to* the
> object *for* the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject
> that represents I call a *sign* or a *representamen.* I use these two
> words, *sign* and *representamen,* differently. By a *sign* I mean
> anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such
> conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this
> familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a
> sign, and I define a *representamen* as being whatever that analysis
> applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of
> what I say about *signs* will be false. For in that case a *sign* may not
> be a *representamen.* The analysis is certainly true of the
> representamen, since that is all that word means. Even if my analysis is
> correct, something may happen to be true of all *signs,* that is of
> everything that, antecedently to any analysis, we should be willing to
> regard as conveying a notion of anything, while there might be something
> which my analysis describes of which the same thing is not true. In
> particular, all signs convey notions to *human minds;* but I know no
> reason why every representamen should do so.
>
>
>
> [541] My definition of a representamen is as follows:
>
> A representamen is a subject of a triadi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Stephen C. Rose]

Gary:

I wonder what it could mean to be “bound by” a symbol introduced
> by somebody else, if (as you wrote) “the purpose of the person who
> coins a word should not constrain the way that others may use it.”
>

John:

To avoid confusion, anyone who uses a word should be consistent
with its definition.  My use was consistent with your definition:

Confusion is probably a given and consistency may be too much to expect.
Almost no one coins a word anymore. When I thought I had coined "benign
genocide", I received a note from Australia stating the term had been used
there in a different connection.

Comprehension is grace, in other words unsayable.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 10:33 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary,
>
> I wonder what it could mean to be “bound by” a symbol introduced
>> by somebody else, if (as you wrote) “the purpose of the person who
>> coins a word should not constrain the way that others may use it.”
>>
>
> To avoid confusion, anyone who uses a word should be consistent
> with its definition.  My use was consistent with your definition:
>
>> I dealt with polysemy ... by coining the word “polyversity” to
>> include not only polysemy (the tendency of a word to have various
>> meanings) but also the tendency of a meaning to be expressible
>> in various linguistic signs.
>>
>
> You may have coined that word for some specific purpose.  But that
> definition does not constrain the word to any specific purpose.
> If the definition is incomplete, don't blame me.
>
> your last sentence, which makes me doubt your acceptance (or your
>> interpretation) of Peirce’s 6^th rule in his Ethics of Terminology:
>>
>> [[ Sixth. For philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth
>> from those for which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due
>> regard for the usages of philosophical terminology and those of the English
>> language but yet with a distinctly technical appearance. Before proposing a
>> term, notation, or other symbol, to consider maturely whether it perfectly
>> suits the conception and will lend itself to every occasion, whether it
>> interferes with any existing term, and whether it may not create an
>> inconvenience by interfering with the expression of some conception that
>> may hereafter be introduced into philosophy. Having once introduced a
>> symbol, to consider myself almost as much bound by it as if it had been
>> introduced by somebody else; and after others have accepted it, to consider
>> myself more bound to it than anybody else.  ] EP2:266 ]
>>
>
> Rule #6 states obligations for anyone who coins a term, not for
> people who may use it.  As a user, I was bound by the definition,
> not by some purpose that was not included in the definition.
>
> John
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

I was rereading Brent and found that James had zapped publication of the
Lowell Lectures because he could not follow them. That eases my mind a bit.
Brent also notes that Peirce himself said he has evolved a way of thinking
that almost anyone could employ. I find that suggestive.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:04 AM,  wrote:

> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.11, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13934:
>
>
>
> [CP 1.538] Every sign stands for an Object independent of itself; but it
> can only be a sign of that Object in so far as that object is itself of the
> nature of a Sign or Thought. For the Sign does not affect the Object but is
> affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey Thought, that is,
> must be of the nature of Thought or of a Sign. Every Thought is a Sign. But
> in the First Degree of Degeneracy the Thirdness affects the Object, so that
> this is not of the nature of a Thirdness,— not so, at least, as far as this
> Operation of Degenerate Thirdness is concerned. It is that the Third brings
> about a Secondness but does not regard that Secondness as anything more
> than a Fact. In short it is the Operation of executing an *Intention.* In
> the last degree of degeneracy of Thirdness, there is Thought, but no
> conveyance or embodiment of thought at all. It is merely that a Fact of
> which there must be, I suppose, something like knowledge is *apprehended*
> according to a possible idea. There is an *instigation* without any
> *prompting.* For example, you look at something and say, “It is red.”
> Well, I ask you what justification you have for such a judgment. You reply,
> “I *saw* it was red.” Not at all. You saw nothing in the least like that.
> You saw an image. There was no subject or predicate in it. It was just one
> unseparated image, not resembling a proposition in the smallest particular.
> It instigated you to your judgment, owing to a possibility of thought; but
> it never told you so. Now in all imagination and perception there is such
> an operation by which thought springs up; and its only justification is
> that it subsequently turns out to be useful.
>
> [539] Now it may be that *logic* ought to be the science of Thirdness in
> general. But as I have studied it, it is simply the science of what must be
> and ought to be true representation, so far as representation can be known
> without any gathering of special facts beyond our ordinary daily life. It
> is, in short, the Philosophy of Representation.
>
>
>
>
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Stephen C. Rose]

I concede your understanding of my drift but I would wonder, then, what
Peirce understands by continuity and for that matter how he would apply the
pragmatic maxim to ordinary decision making and understanding. The
allure of triadic to me is precisely its application to what seems to me to
be everything or reality.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 1:42 PM,  wrote:

> Stephen,
>
>
>
> You don’t understand the purpose of these designations because you are
> trying to map them onto the temporal order of a process. In your triadic
> thinking, First, Second and Third are stages in the process, which follow
> one another in that order. Peirce’s phenomenology is very different, as I
> keep trying to tell you. He introduces it in Lowell 3 as “the science
> which describes the different kinds of elements that are always present in
> the Phenomenon, meaning by the Phenomenon whatever is before the mind in
> any kind of thought, fancy, or cognition of any kind.”
>
>
>
> As Peirce keeps on telling us, this phenomenology is not easy. You make it
> much harder when you try to map Peirce’s descriptions onto a different sort
> of object, for a purpose different from his. I’d suggest that if you want
> to understand what Peirce is talking about, you start again at the sentence
> I quoted above and read Lowell 3 again, but this time set aside your
> preconceptions instead of assuming that Peirce’s phenomenology is just
> another expression of your triadic thinking. And this time pay close
> attention to Peirce’s preliminary descriptions of Secondness, Firstness and
> Thirdness (he takes them in that order). That’s what I do when I don’t see
> the point of what Peirce has written: go back and read it again, setting
> aside my preconceptions enough to leave room for some new (to me)
> conceptions.
>
>
>
> It doesn’t always work, but it works often enough that I’m still learning
> new things from Peirce papers that I’ve read before. Anyway that’s my only
> suggestion, and *only* my suggestion.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 3-Jan-18 12:47
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11
>
>
>
> I do not understand how these designations have any fixed or even useful
> purpose apart from whatever the First may be. It seems to me that the First
> determines what follows just as the sum of First and Second impacts and is
> changed by the Third. The designation of three aspects of the third seems
> superfluous as the
>
>
>
> If the Sign is something pending and very much in need of a resolution --
> suggesting an action -- it will be modified or enhanced or amplified by its
> encounter with the Index (2) and when it is at 3 whatever it becomes is not
> a matter of fitting it to one of three modes or conditions. If it was
> germane to say what might be the outcomes of the triadic process I suppose
> Plan Purpose Intent might work but such terms would merely describe
> something already arrived at not something ordained or fixed.
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 12:28 PM,  wrote:
>
> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13928 :
>
> [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
> color of mediation, we have no really good word. *Mentality* is, perhaps,
> as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is.
>
> Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
> Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
> categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
> Tertiality.
>
> [534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
> somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
> idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
> long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
> thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest.
>
> [535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
> wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
> that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and
> to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of
> logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what
> are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms
> of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the
> genuine Secondness was found to be Action, w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

[Stephen C. Rose]

I do not understand how these designations have any fixed or even useful
purpose apart from whatever the First may be. It seems to me that the First
determines what follows just as the sum of First and Second impacts and is
changed by the Third. The designation of three aspects of the third seems
superfluous as the

If the Sign is something pending and very much in need of a resolution --
suggesting an action -- it will be modified or enhanced or amplified by its
encounter with the Index (2) and when it is at 3 whatever it becomes is not
a matter of fitting it to one of three modes or conditions. If it was
germane to say what might be the outcomes of the triadic process I suppose
Plan Purpose Intent might work but such terms would merely describe
something already arrived at not something ordained or fixed.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 12:28 PM,  wrote:

> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13928 :
>
>
>
>
>
> [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or
> color of mediation, we have no really good word. *Mentality* is, perhaps,
> as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is.
>
>
>
> Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility,
> Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three
> categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity,
> Tertiality.
>
>
>
> [534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a
> somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the
> idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being “an inch
> long”; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is
> thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest.
>
>
>
> [535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only
> wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions
> that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and
> to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of
> logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what
> are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms
> of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the
> genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both
> true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in
> Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never
> attaining full Secondness.
>
>
>
> [536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a
> First, a Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive Qualitative
> Possibility, in itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent thing
> without any mode of being less than existence, but determined by that
> First. A *Third* has a mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses
> that it determines, the mode of being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound
> this with the ideal being of a quality in itself. A quality is something
> capable of being completely embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its
> character as a law except by determining a habit. A quality is how
> something may or might have been. A law is how an endless future must
> continue to be.
>
>
>
> [537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are
> all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one
> another they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its
> capacity as mere Possibility; that is, mere *Mind* capable of thinking,
> or a mere vague idea. The *Second* is Thought playing the rôle of a
> Secondness, or Event. That is, it is of the general nature of *Experience*
> or *Information.* The Third is Thought in its rôle as governing
> Secondness. It brings the Information into the Mind, or determines the Idea
> and gives it body. It is informing thought, or *Cognition.* But take away
> the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine
> Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign.
>
>
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10

[Stephen C. Rose]

I find the complexification due to the plurals (universes) not clarifying
but I understand why they may exist. To me if we admit everything
conceivable from whatever universe into 1 and every possible index of
utility, interpretation or itemization into 2 and every possible outcome of
encounter that has some aesthetic heft, that might conceivably lead to
truth and beauty, even if only possibility, as 3 I am a happy camper for
two reasons -- one is what I think may be meant by Occam's Razor and the
other is my sense that Peirce held the world of the ordinary in high esteem
and would be happy if his relatively complex ideas could be stated in a
generally understandable way.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 12:02 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Stephen, List:
>
> Perhaps Gary R.'s vectorial analysis of Peirce's Categories can be helpful
> here.  I have written an essay--based largely on some List discussions from
> over a year ago--that will hopefully be published soon, which includes the
> following paragraph.
>
> God as *Ens necessarium*, eternal pure mind, creative of thought (third
> Universe), imagines an inexhaustible continuum of real possibilities and
> their combinations (first Universe), and exercises perfect freedom in
> choosing which of these to actualize (second Universe). This is the *hierarchy
> of Being* in terms of Peirce's three Categories (3ns→1ns→2ns). The *sequence
> of events* in each case consists of spontaneity followed by reaction and
> then habit-taking (1ns→2ns→3ns). The *evolution of states* within our
> existing universe (CP 1.409, EP 1.277; 1887-1888) is from complete chaos in
> the infinite past, through this ongoing process at any assignable date, to
> complete regularity in the infinite future (1ns→3ns→2ns).
>
>
> It is accompanied by the following footnote.
>
> Nicholas Lee Guardiano, "The Categorial Logic of Peirce's Metaphysical
> Cosmogony," *The Pluralist* 10.3 (2015):313-334, also discerned three
> distinct but complementary interpretations of Peirce's cosmological
> writings by adopting each individual Category's point of view when
> analyzing them. As arranged in this paragraph of the essay, they align with
> the perspectives that Guardiano associated with 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns,
> respectively. Because of this "trichotomic logic" and other "unique
> theoretical merits," he argued that "Peirce's theory amounts to a
> reasonable abduction" (313). Gary Richmond, "Outline of trikonic:
> Diagrammatic Trichotomic," in Frithjof Dau, Marie-Laure Mugnier, and Gerd
> Stumme, ed., *Conceptual Structures: Common Semantics for Sharing
> Knowledge *(Berlin: Springer, 2005):453-466, labeled the corresponding
> vectors as "representation," "order," and "process," respectively (460).
>
>
> Like evolution, inquiry as retroduction(1ns)→deduction(3ns)→induction(2ns) 
> follows
> the vector of process; but because of our fallibility, the outcome is
> always provisional to some degree, hence its cyclical nature within human
> experience.  Furthermore, as I believe Gary R. has argued elsewhere (I hope
> he will correct me if I am misremembering), viable hypotheses (1ns)
> generally come only from minds (3ns) well-prepared by experience (2ns) in
> accordance with the vector of aspiration (2ns→3ns→1ns).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 10:04 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Gary... I do not see 3 as the end of the process any more than I see
>> today as the end of time. If triadic thinking is truly different in sum
>> from nominalistic and binary thinking it is because of 2 -- the index is
>> the crucial modifying or standardizing or conditional element. The third
>> may as you say not be the end. But it is most certainly not merely
>> something that goes back into the index - 2. It represents an effort at
>> continuity -- it is continuity. It is destined to be fallible of course.
>> Nothing is final. It's hypothetical until tested. But the intention of all
>> thought is to achieve something. To solve something. To create a habit or
>> refine it or alter it. I cannot believe that in all of Peirce there is an
>> explicit denial of the notion that some practical conclusion is the aim of
>> thought. How else is triadic to be understood? Most certainly not as a
>> circle. That is why eternal return is an alluring but ultimately wrong. Or
>> at least premature like amor fati.
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>&

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10

[Stephen C. Rose]

Hi Gary... I do not see 3 as the end of the process any more than I see
today as the end of time. If triadic thinking is truly different in sum
from nominalistic and binary thinking it is because of 2 -- the index is
the crucial modifying or standardizing or conditional element. The third
may as you say not be the end. But it is most certainly not merely
something that goes back into the index - 2. It represents an effort at
continuity -- it is continuity. It is destined to be fallible of course.
Nothing is final. It's hypothetical until tested. But the intention of all
thought is to achieve something. To solve something. To create a habit or
refine it or alter it. I cannot believe that in all of Peirce there is an
explicit denial of the notion that some practical conclusion is the aim of
thought. How else is triadic to be understood? Most certainly not as a
circle. That is why eternal return is an alluring but ultimately wrong. Or
at least premature like amor fati.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 10:47 AM,  wrote:

> Stephen,
>
>
>
> This brings out one difference between your triadic thinking and Peirce’s.
> For him, Thirdness is not the end of the process but the means (as he says
> in 3.10) or mediation between First and Second, sometimes pictured as the
> beginning and end of a line (or linear process). That’s why he sometimes
> even defines Thirdness as “that whose being consists in its bringing about
> a secondness” (EP2:267).
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 2-Jan-18 08:12
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10
>
>
>
> I think there are myriad ways that things move from 1 to 2 to 3 -- each
> thought process is one of trillions. Sometimes the primal 1 wrestles with
> brutal 2 and the willed decision is a no -- all in seconds. Other times the
> process might emerge as a 1 topic and be amplified by 2 an index and then
> emerge as 3 a creative solution -- or at least as something to try. Triadic
> thinking insists that between 1 and 3 there is an index 2 of some sort,
> enabling a process of refinement, enlargement, or criticism.
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10

[Stephen C. Rose]

I think there are myriad ways that things move from 1 to 2 to 3 -- each
thought process is one of trillions. Sometimes the primal 1 wrestles with
brutal 2 and the willed decision is a no -- all in seconds. Other times the
process might emerge as a 1 topic and be amplified by 2 an index and then
emerge as 3 a creative solution -- or at least as something to try. Triadic
thinking insists that between 1 and 3 there is an index 2 of some sort,
enabling a process of refinement, enlargement, or criticism.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Jan 2, 2018 at 7:57 AM,  wrote:

> List,
>
>
>
> Peirce’s attempt to render the ‘Firstness of Secondness’ (i.e. pure
> Secondness) comprehensible deals mostly with the difficulty of prescinding
> it from the experience of willing, separating it from the Thirdness
> involved in that experience. I think Peirce may be overstating the case
> when he says that “he who wills is conscious of doing so, in the sense of
> *representing* to himself that he does so”: when a cat is hunting a
> mouse, for instance, I would attribute to the cat a *will* or even
> *intention* to catch the mouse, but doubt that the cat is representing to
> himself that he does so. But perhaps that’s a psychological point of view
> which would not apply to a strictly *logical* view of the experience,
> since logic is a matter of self-control, which indeed must imply some kind
> of self-representation.
>
>
>
> Somewhat more difficult to follow is Peirce’s attempt to contrast
> actuality (as Secondness) with *quality* (as Firstness). His remarks on
> Hegel’s “neglect of Secondness” seem paradoxical, based as they are on the
> premiss that “the word “existence” names, as if it were an abstract
> possibility, that which is precisely the not having any being in abstract
> possibility.” However, I think this does follow from Peirce’s earlier
> statement (CP 1.527) that *matter* “has no being at all except the being
> a subject of qualities. This relation of really having qualities
> constitutes its *existence.*” Certainly it’s difficult to draw the line
> here between logic and metaphysics. Anyway, this whole paragraph
> demonstrates how hard it is to make “brute” Secondness intelligible. Maybe
> that’s why Zen masters used to get it across to their students by shouting
> at them or whacking them with a stick.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
> *Sent:* 30-Dec-17 10:35
> *To:* 'Peirce List' 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10
>
>
>
> Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.9, https://fromthepage.com/
> jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-
> draught/display/13922 (cf CP 1.532):
>
>
>
> As to Secondness, I have said that our only direct knowledge of it is in
> Willing and in the experience of a Perception. It is in Willing that the
> Secondness comes out most strongly. But it is not pure Secondness. For, in
> the first place, he who wills has a Purpose; and that idea of purpose makes
> the act appear as a *Means* to an end. Now the word *Means* is almost an
> exact synonym to the word *third.* It certainly involves Thirdness.
> Moreover, he who wills is conscious of doing so, in the sense of
> *representing* to himself that he does so. But representation is
> precisely genuine Thirdness. You must conceive an instantaneous
> Consciousness that is instantly and totally forgotten and an effort without
>  purpose. It is a hopeless undertaking to try to realize what
> consciousness would be without the element of representation. It would be
> like unexpectedly hearing a great explosion of nitroglycerine before one
> had recovered oneself and merely had the sense of the breaking off of the
> quiet. Perhaps it might not be far from what ordinary common sense
> conceives to take place when one billiard ball caroms on another. One ball
> “acts” on the other; that is, it makes an exertion *minus* the element of
> representation. We may say with some approach to accuracy that the general
> Firstness of all true Secondness is *Existence,* though this term more
> particularly applies to Secondness in so far as it is an element of the
> reacting First and Second. If we mean Secondness as it is an element of the
> occurrence, the Firstness of it is *Actuality.* But actuality and
> existence are words expressing the same idea in different applications.
> Secondness, strictly speaking, is just when and where it takes place, and
> has no other being; and therefore different Secondnesses, strictly
> speaking, have in themselves no quality in common. Accordingly existence,
> or the universal Firstness of all Secondness, is really not a quality at
> all. An actual dollar to your credit in the bank does not differ in any
> respect from a possible imaginary dollar. For if it did, the imaginary
> dollar could be imagined to be changed in that respect, so as to agree with
> the actual dollar. We thus see that actuality is not a *quality,* or mere
> mode of