Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement:

Edwina, List,

Now I have an easier explanation of what I was meaning, based on topology and temporality regarding "internal" and "external".

If sign A is the spatiotemporal supersign, sign B the spatiotemporal subsign, meaning: Sign B is located inside sign A or spatially identical, and B is temporally a part of the slower A, then the connection from A to B is via A´s immediate interpretant being B´s dynamical object, because the immediate interpretant is also inside of A, as B is. While A´s Dyn.Int. is outside of A, and thus not available for B. Dyn.Obj.s like that are typically concepts, but think of others.

If sign A is the only-temporal supersign, sign B is the only-temporal subsign, meaning: Sign A is lasting for a longer time, while sign B takes place (within a classical temporal semiotic chain B1-B2-B3, connected in time by interpretants becoming representamens) at the same time, but B is located outside A, then the connection from A to B is via A´s dynamical interpretant being B´s dynamical object. It can only be A´s Dyn.Int, because this one is located outside A, just like B. For travelling from A to B, to cross space, the connection requires a manifestation of the Dyn.Int. in the form of matter or/and energy. Thus this kind of dyn.obj. is a material thing or a package of energy.

If A is spatially B´s supersign, because A´s influence, story, or set of results have spread and cover B, but not temporally, as B is temporally after A, and A´s interpreter no longer exists, then the connection is via A´s final interpretant being B´s dynamical object. It can only be the final interpretant, because this is the interpretant´s only part that is temporally outside A, that still can last if A´s interpreting system does not exist anymore, because it is that part of the interpretant that does not change anymore. Dynamical objects (for a "B", a subsign) like that are anything which has happened or been in the past.

Best,

Helmut

 




Edwina,

ok, but a concept which has been formed by the individual who thinks about it, or by the two people who are talking about this concept, is even more a work in progress, or, as you wrote, anticipatory, like an immediate interpretant. But it is a funny thing, self referentiality, a creative loop.

 

 31. März 2017 um 23:12 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut - a concept can be formed by an individual. It doesn't have to be formed by a group. The concept that the  two people are using is a dynamic object. Yes, their interaction, if there are two people discussing a common concept,  connects them to the wider community.

Edwina

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On Fri 31/03/17 4:26 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina,

The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is formed by a society, which the individuals are parts of. So perhaps they have access to what is internal of the society? I mean, when eg. two individuals talk about a common concept, this talk automatically makes them parts of the community, so the sign that is taking place in the community is sort of partially transparent for them, so  their two-persons-sign can be connected with the bigger and slower community-sign it is part of?

Best,

Helmut

 

 31. März 2017 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 



Helmut - you asked:

Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus, cannot become a dynamic object, which is external.  I don't see that an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a general.

Edwina
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On Fri 31/03/17 2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




List,

Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

ok, but a concept which has been formed by the individual who thinks about it, or by the two people who are talking about this concept, is even more a work in progress, or, as you wrote, anticipatory, like an immediate interpretant. But it is a funny thing, self referentiality, a creative loop.

 

 31. März 2017 um 23:12 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut - a concept can be formed by an individual. It doesn't have to be formed by a group. The concept that the  two people are using is a dynamic object. Yes, their interaction, if there are two people discussing a common concept,  connects them to the wider community.

Edwina

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On Fri 31/03/17 4:26 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina,

The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is formed by a society, which the individuals are parts of. So perhaps they have access to what is internal of the society? I mean, when eg. two individuals talk about a common concept, this talk automatically makes them parts of the community, so the sign that is taking place in the community is sort of partially transparent for them, so  their two-persons-sign can be connected with the bigger and slower community-sign it is part of?

Best,

Helmut

 

 31. März 2017 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 



Helmut - you asked:

Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus, cannot become a dynamic object, which is external.  I don't see that an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a general.

Edwina
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On Fri 31/03/17 2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




List,

Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also may be saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess.

"Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as condensed or precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.

 

Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as a dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 

 31. März 2017 um 17:45 Uhr
Von: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"

Edwina, Clark, List,

 

Better,  I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote from Peirce a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better reflection of what Peirce is doing in introducing these grand explanatory principles into the special sciences from his work in metaphysics, it will also help to avoid the confusion that might be caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that are beyond doubt.

 

--Jeff
 

 

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


 



From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM
To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 



Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so.

 

Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions.

 


	
	The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The point 

Re: RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, John C., List:

As I already pointed out, according to that quotation, every
Sign/Representamen *has *an Object and *determines* an Interpretant; hence
these are three *distinct *subjects, not three *parts *(or "nodes") of the
Sign *itself*.  Here is a passage that makes this even clearer.

CSP:  A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A
*Sign* is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of
mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (EP
2:290-291, emphases in original; 1903)


A Sign indeed *functions*, and does so triadically (EP 2:429; 1907).  We
might even say that it *has *the function of standing *for *its Object *to *its
Interpretant (CP 2.228; c. 1897).  However, neither of these expressions is
the same thing as saying that it *is *a function; i.e., the kind of thing
that simply processes input to generate output.  Notice also that Peirce
twice characterized the Interpretant as "possible," which bears on
something that Clark Goble and I were discussing in another thread; here is
a second passage that touches on that.

CSP:  Namely, while no Representamen *actually *functions as such until it
*actually *determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen as
soon as it is fully *capable *of doing this; and its Representative Quality
is not necessarily dependent upon its ever *actually *determining an
Interpretant, nor even upon its *actually *having an Object. (CP 2.275,
emphases added; c. 1902)


My understanding is thus that every Sign/Representamen has an
*Immediate *Object
and determines an *Immediate *Interpretant, because those are
real possibilities that are *internal *to it; but evidently there might be
such a thing as a Sign/Representamen that has no *Dynamic *Object and/or
(especially) determines no *Dynamic *Interpretant, because those are
*external *to it.  I wonder if recognizing these distinctions
(possible/actual and internal/external) could be a way to reconcile "the
Sign as triad" (with Immediate Object/Interpretant) and "the Sign as one
correlate of a triadic relation" (with Dynamic Object/Interpretant).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 3:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Yes, agreed, there are many places where Peirce is using the term 'sign'
> to refer to the 'representamen'. And the Interpretant can become a
> sign/representamen with the original sign as its object. Yes -  in that
> case, the triad would be the object. In my reading of Peirce - that is
> exactly what happens: a full triad becomes an Object. That is how things
> develop, adapt and evolve in the Peircean framework.
>
> That is, there is no such thing as an existentially separate Dynamic
> Object, or an existentially separate Representamen or an existentially
> separate Interpretant. They are, in their definitions and functions of
> DO/R/DI, operating as such only in that triadic interaction. And that is
> the case even if they are each in a mode of Secondness.
>
> Something that is existentially separate in the sense that it is
> observationally differentiated from an Other - does not mean that it
> is semiosically separate. I can't think of a single thing that would be
> semiosically separate - and that includes even a grain of sand.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 30/03/17 4:10 PM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent:
>
> That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly
> many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of
> the problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the
> interpretant can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way
> I have been able to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe
> that is just my lack of imagination.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
> To: John Collier
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
> John - thanks for the quotation.
>
> I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he
> writes, "Every sign has an object" and it 

Re: RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Yes, agreed, there are many places where Peirce is using the term
'sign' to refer to the 'representamen'. And the Interpretant can
become a sign/representamen with the original sign as its object. Yes
-  in that case, the triad would be the object. In my reading of
Peirce - that is exactly what happens: a full triad becomes an
Object. That is how things develop, adapt and evolve in the Peircean
framework. 

That is, there is no such thing as an existentially separate Dynamic
Object, or an existentially separate Representamen or an existentially
separate Interpretant. They are, in their definitions and functions of
DO/R/DI, operating as such only in that triadic interaction. And that
is the case even if they are each in a mode of Secondness. 

Something that is existentially separate in the sense that it is
observationally differentiated from an Other - does not mean that it
is semiosically separate. I can't think of a single thing that would
be semiosically separate - and that includes even a grain of sand.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 30/03/17  4:10 PM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent:
That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are
certainly many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for
representamen.  One of the problems I have with sign used this way in
all cases is that the interpretant can be a sign with the original
sign its object. The only way I have been able to diagram this is
with the triad as the object. But maybe that is just my lack of
imagination. 
John 
John Collier 

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate 

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal 

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] 
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
 To: John Collier 
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term  

John - thanks for the quotation.  

I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he
writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the
function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant". 
Therefore - the  sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must
have that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - does a sign
FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a
sign, even all by itself. 
That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] -
because none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only
within the FUNCTION of the triad.  
Edwina 
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za [3]
sent:  

I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit
different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is
just talk. 
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com [4]] 
 Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
 To: John Collier 
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [5]
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   
John C., List:  
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing. 
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where
Peirce used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that
consists of the representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there
are such passages, I would be grateful for the citations so that I
can take a look at them.  Would you at least agree that Peirce
predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am advocating? 
[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is
hard to understand if the sign meant here is the representamen 
alone. It is essential to being a sign that it have an object and
interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part of their nature
to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the
iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list  some time
ago. 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness
[R] | MS [R] 914:5-6 

 The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it
is shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign
has an object, which may be regarded either as it is immediately
represented  in the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It
is equally essential to the function of a sign that it should
determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to the object
of the sign as the s

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Jerry Rhee]

The very word *means *signifies something which is in the middle between
two others. Moreover, this third state of mind, or Thought, is a sense of
learning, and learning is the means by which we pass from ignorance to
knowledge.



There are three kinds of signs.



Firstly, there are *likenesses,* or *icons*

Secondly, there are *indications,* or *indices*

Thirdly, there are* symbols,* or general signs


*Let us consider the various uses of these three kinds of signs more
closely.*



Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs,
particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of
likenesses and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of
mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts.

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm



1) *Symbols* which directly determine only their *grounds* or imputed
qualities, and *are* thus but sums of marks or *terms*;


2) *Symbols* which also independently determine their *objects* by means of
other term or terms, and thus, expressing their own objective validity,
become capable of truth or falsehood, that is, *are* *propositions*; and,


3) *Symbols* which also independently determine their *interpretants*, and
thus the minds to which they appeal, by premissing a proposition or
propositions which such a mind is to admit. These *are* *arguments*.

http://www.peirce.org/writings/p32.html


Of course, a Peircean who knew of what Peirce meant would already know this
and everyone else would be a fool.



Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 3:10 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly
> many places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of
> the problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the
> interpretant can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way
> I have been able to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe
> that is just my lack of imagination.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
> *To:* John Collier 
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John - thanks for the quotation.
>
> I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he
> writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the function
> of a sign that it should determine an *Interpretant".*  Therefore - the
> sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must *have* that object. And,
> to *function as a sign* [gosh - does a sign FUNCTION?]...it must have an
> Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a sign, even all by itself.
>
>
>
> That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] - because
> none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only within the
> FUNCTION of the triad.
>
>
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> *On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
>  sent:*
>
> I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different
> metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> ]
> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John C., List:
>
>
>
> *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.*
>
>
>
> Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce
> used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of*
> the representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I
> would be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.
> Would you at least agree that Peirce *predominantly *used "sign" in the
> way that I am advocating?
>
>
>
> *[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
> refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to
> understand if the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is
> essential to being a sign that it have an object and interpretant. I take
> this as meaning that it is part of th

RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[John Collier]

That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly many 
places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of the 
problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the interpretant 
can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way I have been able 
to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe that is just my lack 
of imagination.

John

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term


John - thanks for the quotation.

I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he writes, 
"Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the function of a sign that 
it should determine an Interpretant".  Therefore - the sign is, even to exist 
as such, triadic. It must have that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - 
does a sign FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a 
sign, even all by itself.



That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] - because none 
of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only within the FUNCTION of 
the triad.





Edwina






--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier 
colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za> sent:
I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different 
metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

John C., List:

[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.

Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used 
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that consists of the 
representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I would 
be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.  Would you at 
least agree that Peirce predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am 
advocating?

[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce refers to 
the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to understand if 
the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is essential to being a sign 
that it have an object and interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part 
of their nature to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean 
the iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list some time ago.

Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] | MS 
[R] 914:5-6
The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is shown 
that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an object, 
which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in the sign to be 
[or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential to the function of a 
sign that it should determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to 
the object of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this 
interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its 
pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own firstness. Upon these 
considerations are founded six trichotomic divisions of signs…


John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier


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Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

John - thanks for the quotation. 

I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he
writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the
function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant". 
Therefore - the sign is, even to exist as such, triadic. It must have
that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - does a sign
FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a
sign, even all by itself.
That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] -
because none of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only
within the FUNCTION of the triad. 
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent:
I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit
different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference 
is just talk. 
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
 Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
 To: John Collier 
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   
John C., List:  
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing. 
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where
Peirce used "sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that
consists of the representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there
are such passages, I would be grateful for the citations so that I
can take a look at them.  Would you at least agree that Peirce
predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am advocating? 
[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce
refers to the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is
hard to understand  if the sign meant here is the representamen
alone. It is essential to being a sign that it have an object and
interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part of their nature
to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean the
iconic representamen.  This issue was discussed on the list some time
ago. 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness
[R] | MS  [R] 914:5-6 

 The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it
is shown that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign
has an object,  which may be regarded either as it is immediately
represented in the sign to be [or] as it is in it own firstness. It
is equally essential to the function of a sign that it should
determine an Interpretant, or second  correlate related to the object
of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this
interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it
is in its pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own
firstness. Upon these  considerations are founded six trichotomic
divisions of signs… 
John Collier 

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate 

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal 

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] 


Links:
--
[1] http://web.ncf.ca/collier

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Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

Thanks for once again giving all of us this important reminder.  It
probably goes without saying that my focus tends to be on #1; after all,
how can we claim that something we advocate is genuinely Peircean, without
first carefully ascertaining what Peirce's own considered views were?  Of
course, this is not always an easy task, due to the voluminous and
fragmented nature of his compiled writings.  On the other hand, my recent
series of articles about "The Logic of Ingenuity" falls under #4; that
label and some of the associated ideas are my own, but I still try to stick
with Peirce's definitions of the underlying concepts like "retroduction"
and "diagrams."  As I have said before, I find it inappropriate--Peirce
went so far as to call it unethical--to adopt his terminology while
assigning different meanings to it, such that the result might *appear* to
be Peircean, but really is not (per #1).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 11:19 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Edwina, Jon S., List, All,
>
> As I have suggested on other occasions, it will likely improve the quality
> of our discussions if we make our aims clearer when we make a remark
> or engage in a line of inquiry. That way, we'll have some assurance that
> different people aren't working at cross purposes or talking past each
> other. Here are some of the purposes I see guiding our various discussions:
>
> 1.  We want to understand some conclusion that Peirce has drawn and
> determine whether or not it really was the position that he adopted at some
> point in his inquiries, or perhaps was his considered view all things
> considered.
>
> 2. We seek to reconstruct some of the arguments found in one or another
> text to see we might gain a better understanding of how the arguments
> work--and how they fit with other arguments Peirce made.
>
> 3. We want to better understanding Peirce's own aims and methods. He says
> that one of his major aims was to develop a method of methods. As such,
> we're trying to learn better how to employ these methods in our own
> inquiries.
>
> 4. We are guided by a hunch that Peirce had some useful ideas, and we want
> to borrow some of those ideas, modify as needed for our own purposes, and
> then engage in our own inquiries.
>
> 5. We are pursuing our own inquiries using our own methods and, for the
> sake of curiosity, we want to see how our own methods and
> conclusions  compare to some of Peirce's. At times, when the views diverge,
> some might want to suggest that Peirce was likely wrong or
> seriously misguided--at least when viewed in from the perspective of our
> own methods and conclusions.
>
> 6. We have our own views and methods and we don't care much about what
> Peirce really thought--except to point out that some things he said appear,
> on their face, to be entirely crazy.
>
> Posts that fit the description under (6) seem out of place on the list.
> They are distracting and tend to undermine the health of the discussion of
> those pursuing the other aims. The aims expressed in 1-3 have, I take it,
> been guiding much of the discussion on the list since its inception when
> Joe expressed the guidelines for engaging in the dialogue. Personally, I have
> found myself doing the things listed in 4-5 at various times in my own
> reading thinking, but much of my work is guided by the aims expressed in
> 1-3. Having said that, each of us needs to make a decision about when it is
> appropriate to make posts to the list when our aims fall under (4) or
> (5)--especially when we are jumping into a conversation between people who
> are really guided by aims (1-3). For those who do think it is reasonable to
> jump into such conversations and make remarks that are really guided by
> such different purposes, it will help to spell out the purposes so others
> don't waste their time trying to respond by showing, based on textual
> evidence, that such a view does not reasonably reflect what is found in the
> texts.
>
> Finally, to respond to your remark about those who spend time focusing on
> the way Peirce defined key terms--such work is essential to doing 1-3 well.
> It certainly isn't the only thing that needs to be done, but for such
> purposes, it is an important starting point.
>
> I fully recognize that there is a considerable difference between the aim
> of seeking to find the truth about Peirce's own views and how he arrived at
> such conclusions, and the aim of pushing inquiry further and seeking the
> truth, all things considered. Both are admirable goals, and those of us who
> seek to engage in the more scholarly task usually do so with a longer term
> goal of drawing on the arguments and methods for the sake of finding the
> truth about the questions at hand.
>
> My hope in making these points is to remind

Aw: Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

Thank you. So this was another semantic problem, this time with the term "would"!

 

 30. März 2017 um 20:04 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 


Helmut, List:
 


HR:  Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final study would show it to be.


 

I think that the key word here is would.  The idea is that the real is that which would come to be known by an infinite community after indefinite inquiry, not just what will or even can be discovered in the future.  As you say, some information is now lost to history; but it could have been known at some point in the past, and would be known today and in the future if it had thus been preserved.  Therefore, it is real, even though no one will ever actually come to know it.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jeffrey, List,

I like you 6 points for orientation how to discuss. I can find an argument of mine from this thread in points 5 and 1. The subject was, that Peirce believed in completely satisfying results due to final study. This applies eg. to dynamical object and final interpretant.

Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final study would show it to be.

From the position of your point Nr.5, I argued, that an object which is something that happened or had been in the past (a finished event or a snapshot of a past constellation or situation) can never be reconstructed, because very likely the documentation about it is not complete, information is missing. No study, how final ever, can retrieve it.

So, from point Nr.5, I would say, Peirce was wrong at this point.

But, because I rather wanted to argue from point Nr.1, I had suggested, that perhaps Peirce believed in Bayesianism, but this approach was not correct, I rather should have asked:

Did he believe in a kind of information-conservation-law?

This would mean, that any past event and situation can theoretically be reconstructed by looking at everything that is influenced by this event or situation.

There are theories, which claim something like that, eg. QBism, and hidden variables, if I haven´t gotten it wrongly.

Well, this topic sort of bothers me, because I (at the moment) do not believe in information conservation, because it contradicts the concept of entropy increase and Heisenbergean uncertainty, both of which I am more or less certain.

On the other hand, I often had thought: "Peirce must be wrong at this point", but later I had seen, that he was not, but I.

 

But perhaps this example like you wrote in point Nr1, was not "his considered view all things considered".

But the problem is, that there are dynamical objects, which change, and others, that don´t. If they change, they cannot be reached by a final study, because a study takes time, and maybe they change faster than the study approaches them. Apart from the type above (past things), there is only one type of dynamical objects that, I guess, does not change, that is metaphysical laws, but Peirce did not believe in their unchangeability.

So I am sort of drawn to point Nr.5, Peirce was wrong, so convince me that he was not.

Best,

Helmut












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Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

ch conclusions, and the aim of pushing inquiry further
and seeking the truth, all things considered. Both  are admirable
goals, and those of us who seek to engage in the more scholarly task
usually do so with a longer term goal of drawing on the arguments and
methods for the sake of finding the truth about the questions at hand.

My hope in making these points is to  remind myself that my purposes
may not always match the purposes of others, and I want to avoid the
confusion and conflicts that arise when people work at cross
purposes. My hope is that others, too, will make their purposes
clearer--especially when they say  things that, on their face, do not
fit well with the arguments and explanations Peirce gives. As Jon S.
has pointed out, your remarks about definitions do not fit with
Peirce's methods--both with respect to doing the history of
philosophy and also with respect  to doing philosophy. 
Yours, 
Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
 Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term  
  Edwina, List: 
  Just one (hopefully last) comment here. 
   ET:  But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this
list is its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that.  
  Peirce was certainly not only focused on words and definitions--I
agree that his interests and contributions were far broader than
that--but he was often focused on them.  After all, he wrote reams of
definitions for the  Century Dictionary and Baldwin's Dictionary of
Philosophy and Psychology.  More to the point, he advocated a
scrupulous ethics of terminology (EP 2:263-266; 1903) and diligently
sought to adhere to it himself, resulting in the plethora of
neologisms  that he invented in an effort to avoid misunderstanding
or confusion with the ideas of others. 
   CSP:  ... the woof and warp of all thought and all research is
symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in
symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important
to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it. 
   CSP:  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning
inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones.
But the effort of all should be to keep the essence of every
scientific term unchanged and exact; although absolute exactitude is
not so much as conceivable.
 CSP:  ... when a man has introduced a conception into science, it
naturally becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that
conception suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has
been conferred upon a conception by him to whose labors  science is
indebted for that conception, it becomes the duty of all,—a duty to
the discoverer, and a duty to science,—to accept his name ...
whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense
than that which was conferred upon it by its sole  rightful creator
commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and
against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the
act with contempt and indignation.
 CSP:  Having thus given some idea of the nature of the reasons which
weigh with me, I proceed to state the rules which I find to be binding
upon me in this field ... Seventh, to regard it as needful to
introduce new systems of expression when new connections  of
importance between conceptions come to be made out, or when such
systems can, in any way, positively subserve the purposes of
philosophical study. 
  Regards, 
  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  
   
 On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky   wrote:
John, list - yes, I agree with your comments. 

But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out,
he used his terms in a variety of ways;  - and his focus  was on the
pragmatism of semiosis. That is - what is the pragmatic function of
Peircean semiosis? 

In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within
crystals, within the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind].
None of this deals with terminology but with the pragmatic function
of semiosis - which Peirce sees, as far as I can understand,  as the
gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is NOT a synonym of the human mind or
consciousness but of the natural world. And we see this dynamic
flexible action within the ten classes - which, as triads, enable
this adaptive evolving capacity of Mind into M

Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

HR:  Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is
the object as a final study would show it to be.


I think that the key word here is *would*.  The idea is that the real is
that which *would *come to be known by an infinite community after
indefinite inquiry, not just what *will* or even *can *be discovered in the
future.  As you say, some information is now lost to history; but it *could
*have been known at some point in the past, and *would *be known today and
in the future *if *it had thus been preserved.  Therefore, it is real, even
though no one will ever *actually *come to know it.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jeffrey, List,
> I like you 6 points for orientation how to discuss. I can find an argument
> of mine from this thread in points 5 and 1. The subject was, that Peirce
> believed in completely satisfying results due to final study. This applies
> eg. to dynamical object and final interpretant.
> Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the
> object as a final study would show it to be.
> From the position of your point Nr.5, I argued, that an object which is
> something that happened or had been in the past (a finished event or a
> snapshot of a past constellation or situation) can never be reconstructed,
> because very likely the documentation about it is not complete, information
> is missing. No study, how final ever, can retrieve it.
> So, from point Nr.5, I would say, Peirce was wrong at this point.
> But, because I rather wanted to argue from point Nr.1, I had suggested,
> that perhaps Peirce believed in Bayesianism, but this approach was not
> correct, I rather should have asked:
> Did he believe in a kind of information-conservation-law?
> This would mean, that any past event and situation can theoretically be
> reconstructed by looking at everything that is influenced by this event or
> situation.
> There are theories, which claim something like that, eg. QBism, and hidden
> variables, if I haven´t gotten it wrongly.
> Well, this topic sort of bothers me, because I (at the moment) do not
> believe in information conservation, because it contradicts the concept of
> entropy increase and Heisenbergean uncertainty, both of which I am more or
> less certain.
> On the other hand, I often had thought: "Peirce must be wrong at this
> point", but later I had seen, that he was not, but I.
>
> But perhaps this example like you wrote in point Nr1, was not "his
> considered view all things considered".
> But the problem is, that there are dynamical objects, which change, and
> others, that don´t. If they change, they cannot be reached by a final
> study, because a study takes time, and maybe they change faster than the
> study approaches them. Apart from the type above (past things), there is
> only one type of dynamical objects that, I guess, does not change, that is
> metaphysical laws, but Peirce did not believe in their unchangeability.
> So I am sort of drawn to point Nr.5, Peirce was wrong, so convince me that
> he was not.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Aw: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

nversation between people who are really guided by aims (1-3). For those who do think it is reasonable to jump into such conversations and make remarks that are really guided by such different purposes, it will help to spell out the purposes so others don't waste their time trying to respond by showing, based on textual evidence, that such a view does not reasonably reflect what is found in the texts.

 

Finally, to respond to your remark about those who spend time focusing on the way Peirce defined key terms--such work is essential to doing 1-3 well. It certainly isn't the only thing that needs to be done, but for such purposes, it is an important starting point.

 

I fully recognize that there is a considerable difference between the aim of seeking to find the truth about Peirce's own views and how he arrived at such conclusions, and the aim of pushing inquiry further and seeking the truth, all things considered. Both are admirable goals, and those of us who seek to engage in the more scholarly task usually do so with a longer term goal of drawing on the arguments and methods for the sake of finding the truth about the questions at hand.

 

My hope in making these points is to remind myself that my purposes may not always match the purposes of others, and I want to avoid the confusion and conflicts that arise when people work at cross purposes. My hope is that others, too, will make their purposes clearer--especially when they say things that, on their face, do not fit well with the arguments and explanations Peirce gives. As Jon S. has pointed out, your remarks about definitions do not fit with Peirce's methods--both with respect to doing the history of philosophy and also with respect to doing philosophy.

 

Yours,

 

Jeff

 

 

 

 

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


 



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

 



Edwina, List:
 

Just one (hopefully last) comment here.

 


ET:  But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that.


 

Peirce was certainly not only focused on words and definitions--I agree that his interests and contributions were far broader than that--but he was often focused on them.  After all, he wrote reams of definitions for the  Century Dictionary and Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.  More to the point, he advocated a scrupulous ethics of terminology (EP 2:263-266; 1903) and diligently sought to adhere to it himself, resulting in the plethora of neologisms that he invented in an effort to avoid misunderstanding or confusion with the ideas of others.

 


CSP:  ... the woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it is wrong to say that a good language is important to good thought, merely; for it is of the essence of it.

 


CSP:  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones. But the effort of all should be to keep the essence of every scientific term unchanged and exact; although absolute exactitude is not so much as conceivable.

CSP:  ... when a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred upon a conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that conception, it becomes the duty of all,—a duty to the discoverer, and a duty to science,—to accept his name ... whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation.

CSP:  Having thus given some idea of the nature of the reasons which weigh with me, I proceed to state the rules which I find to be binding upon me in this field ... Seventh, to regard it as needful to introduce new systems of _expression_ when new connections of importance between conceptions come to be made out, or when such systems can, in any way, positively subserve the purposes of philosophical study.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


John, list - yes, I agree with your comments.

But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, Jon S., List, All,


As I have suggested on other occasions, it will likely improve the quality of 
our discussions if we make our aims clearer when we make a remark or engage in 
a line of inquiry. That way, we'll have some assurance that different people 
aren't working at cross purposes or talking past each other. Here are some of 
the purposes I see guiding our various discussions:


1.  We want to understand some conclusion that Peirce has drawn and determine 
whether or not it really was the position that he adopted at some point in his 
inquiries, or perhaps was his considered view all things considered.


2. We seek to reconstruct some of the arguments found in one or another text to 
see we might gain a better understanding of how the arguments work--and how 
they fit with other arguments Peirce made.


3. We want to better understanding Peirce's own aims and methods. He says that 
one of his major aims was to develop a method of methods. As such, we're trying 
to learn better how to employ these methods in our own inquiries.


4. We are guided by a hunch that Peirce had some useful ideas, and we want to 
borrow some of those ideas, modify as needed for our own purposes, and then 
engage in our own inquiries.


5. We are pursuing our own inquiries using our own methods and, for the sake of 
curiosity, we want to see how our own methods and conclusions  compare to some 
of Peirce's. At times, when the views diverge, some might want to suggest that 
Peirce was likely wrong or seriously misguided--at least when viewed in from 
the perspective of our own methods and conclusions.


6. We have our own views and methods and we don't care much about what Peirce 
really thought--except to point out that some things he said appear, on their 
face, to be entirely crazy.


Posts that fit the description under (6) seem out of place on the list. They 
are distracting and tend to undermine the health of the discussion of those 
pursuing the other aims. The aims expressed in 1-3 have, I take it, been 
guiding much of the discussion on the list since its inception when Joe 
expressed the guidelines for engaging in the dialogue. Personally, I have found 
myself doing the things listed in 4-5 at various times in my own reading 
thinking, but much of my work is guided by the aims expressed in 1-3. Having 
said that, each of us needs to make a decision about when it is appropriate to 
make posts to the list when our aims fall under (4) or (5)--especially when we 
are jumping into a conversation between people who are really guided by aims 
(1-3). For those who do think it is reasonable to jump into such conversations 
and make remarks that are really guided by such different purposes, it will 
help to spell out the purposes so others don't waste their time trying to 
respond by showing, based on textual evidence, that such a view does not 
reasonably reflect what is found in the texts.


Finally, to respond to your remark about those who spend time focusing on the 
way Peirce defined key terms--such work is essential to doing 1-3 well. It 
certainly isn't the only thing that needs to be done, but for such purposes, it 
is an important starting point.


I fully recognize that there is a considerable difference between the aim of 
seeking to find the truth about Peirce's own views and how he arrived at such 
conclusions, and the aim of pushing inquiry further and seeking the truth, all 
things considered. Both are admirable goals, and those of us who seek to engage 
in the more scholarly task usually do so with a longer term goal of drawing on 
the arguments and methods for the sake of finding the truth about the questions 
at hand.


My hope in making these points is to remind myself that my purposes may not 
always match the purposes of others, and I want to avoid the confusion and 
conflicts that arise when people work at cross purposes. My hope is that 
others, too, will make their purposes clearer--especially when they say things 
that, on their face, do not fit well with the arguments and explanations Peirce 
gives. As Jon S. has pointed out, your remarks about definitions do not fit 
with Peirce's methods--both with respect to doing the history of philosophy and 
also with respect to doing philosophy.


Yours,


Jeff






Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List:

Just one (hopefully last) comment here.

ET:  But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its 
isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But 
Peirce wasn't focused on that.

Peirce was certainly not only focused on words and definitions--I 

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Just one (hopefully last) comment here.

ET:  But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions.
But Peirce wasn't focused on that.


Peirce was certainly not *only *focused on words and definitions--I agree
that his interests and contributions were far broader than that--but
he was *often
*focused on them.  After all, he wrote reams of definitions for the *Century
Dictionary* and Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.  More
to the point, he advocated a scrupulous ethics of terminology (EP
2:263-266; 1903) and diligently sought to adhere to it himself, resulting
in the plethora of neologisms that he invented in an effort to avoid
misunderstanding or confusion with the ideas of others.

CSP:  ... the woof and warp of all thought and all research is symbols, and
the life of thought and science is the life inherent in symbols; so that it
is wrong to say that a good language is *important *to good thought,
merely; for it is of the essence of it.

CSP:  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably
grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones. But the effort of
all should be to keep the *essence *of every scientific term unchanged and
exact; although absolute exactitude is not so much as conceivable.

CSP:  ... when a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally
becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception
suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred
upon a conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that
conception, it becomes the duty of all,—a duty to the discoverer, and a
duty to science,—to accept his name ... whoever deliberately uses a word or
other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by
its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor
of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to
treat the act with contempt and indignation.

CSP:  Having thus given some idea of the nature of the reasons which weigh
with me, I proceed to state the rules which I find to be binding upon me in
this field ... Seventh, to regard it as needful to introduce new systems of
expression when new connections of importance between conceptions come to
be made out, or when such systems can, in any way, positively subserve the
purposes of philosophical study.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list - yes, I agree with your comments.
>
> But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its
> isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But
> Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out, he used his terms in a
> variety of ways;  - and his focus was on the pragmatism of semiosis. That
> is - what is the pragmatic function of Peircean semiosis?
>
> In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within crystals,
> within the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind]. None of this deals
> with terminology but with the pragmatic function of semiosis - which Peirce
> sees, as far as I can understand, as the gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is
> NOT a synonym of the human mind or consciousness but of the natural world.
> And we see this dynamic flexible action within the ten classes - which, as
> triads, enable this adaptive evolving capacity of Mind into Matter.
>
> If one focuses only on words and terms, then, it is just as easy, indeed
> easier,  to use the semiotics of such as Saussure or Morris ..for these are
> all about 'this' means 'that' - and one can get readily into the seeming
> joy of 'hidden meanings'. But Peirce doesn't deal with this; his semiotics
> is an active, adaptive and evolving  process of generation of
> Mind-into-Matter - a much more difficult analysis.
>
> Matter, to exist, obviously has a form. A form obviously must have
> continuity of type; therefore, to consider that Peirce didn't 'say these
> words' is to ignore the basic focus of his work. ..which is a vast, vast
> exploration of the nature of and the function of, this universe.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

John, list - yes, I agree with your comments.

But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out,
he used his terms in a variety of ways;  - and his focus was on the
pragmatism of semiosis. That is - what is the pragmatic function of
Peircean semiosis?

In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within
crystals, within the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind].
None of this deals with terminology but with the pragmatic function
of semiosis - which Peirce sees, as far as I can understand, as the
gradual evolution of Mind. Mind is NOT a synonym of the human mind or
consciousness but of the natural world. And we see this dynamic
flexible action within the ten classes - which, as triads, enable
this adaptive evolving capacity of Mind into Matter. 

If one focuses only on words and terms, then, it is just as easy,
indeed easier,  to use the semiotics of such as Saussure or Morris
..for these are all about 'this' means 'that' - and one can get
readily into the seeming joy of 'hidden meanings'. But Peirce doesn't
deal with this; his semiotics is an active, adaptive and evolving 
process of generation of Mind-into-Matter - a much more difficult
analysis.

Matter, to exist, obviously has a form. A form obviously must have
continuity of type; therefore, to consider that Peirce didn't 'say
these words' is to ignore the basic focus of his work. ..which is a
vast, vast exploration of the nature of and the function of, this
universe.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 30/03/17  4:12 AM , John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za sent:
Some points interspersed. 
John Collier 

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate 

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal 

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] 
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
 Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   
Edwina, List:  
It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never
resorted to name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply
expressed my considered opinion that your model of sign-action is
significantly different from Peirce's, and I  have provided the
reasons why I take that position.  I wish that we could have a
friendly discussion about this, rather than a debate--and that others
would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we cannot seem to get
past our directly opposing convictions.   
ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to
acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative
function/action in the triadic set - and to differentiate it from the
WHOLE Sign, the triad.
Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a triad (or a triadic
function) that includes the Representamen; rather, he defines it  as
the Representamen, the first correlate of a triadic relation.  The
Object and Interpretant are not additional parts of the Sign, they
are the other two correlates  in that triadic relation.  To me, this
is absolutely fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any model that
denies it is by definition non-Peircean. 

[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing.   
ET:  As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per
se' on their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and
I disagree that each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't
consider that the three modal  categories are 'universes'.
Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of
2ns.  Peirce explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object,
and Interpretant as "subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called
the three modal categories "Universes"  (EP 2:478-479); and he
explicitly stated that the Sign, both Objects, all three
Interpretants, and their relations are all constituents of one or
another Universe (EP 2:480-490).  Hence your disagreement on these
matters is with him, not just with me. 

[John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse,
which is quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say,
Popper). Peirce uses “subject”  in a rather strange way in which
predicates can be subjects. Stjernfelt,  Natural Propositions, 6.10
Hypostatic abstraction. 
I have no objections to raise to your further points. 
John   
ET:  There is nothing wrong with using different terms.
I agree!  My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did,
but then assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using
different terms, but then clai

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is
dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation.
This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean
semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from
Object to Representamen to Interpretant. This view negates the
dynamic power of the Peircean framework.

Instead, a Dynamic Object - which is only a Dynamic Object because
it is currently functioning within a semiosic process where it IS the
Dynamic Object..well, this same Dynamic Object could be at the same
time operating in another semiosic process...where it is functioning
as the Dynamic Interpretant. And both processes are developing that
mediation process of the Representamen.

If you think of it, Peirce used this dynamic functionalism right
from the start; that is - in his cosmology, [1.412] where he outlines
the beginning of the universe as a Process of the emergence of
instantiations of matter, and then, the development of habits of
formation of this matter; and the outline of how these particular
'bits' interact with each other; how Thirdness functions to stabilize
these processes...and so on. How Firstness functions to introduce
novelty and diversity.

All other outlines of semiotics and semiology, i.e., non-Peircean,
ignore this complex dynamism of the Peircean framework. They operate
almost completely within the linguistic or within the human
conceptual framework and focus on that linear movement from 'this' to
'that'. As such, they are used to suggest 'hidden meanings' and 'the
unconscious'. But they have nothing to do with the actual morphology
of matter as an action of Mind and can't be used within the
biological and physic-chemical realms. The Peircean framework is
basic, in my view, to these realms...and I admit that I'm not much
interested in using Peirce within the linguistic or human conceptual
analysis.  

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 29/03/17  3:35 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt
mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical
object is a dynamical object. Best, Helmut 29. März 2017 um
01:57 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky"  

Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is
external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since
'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic
set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant. 

The Dynamic Object is, when it is named as such, is already in a
semiosic interaction with another Object. So- it could be one
molecule in interaction with another molecule. Of an insect in
interaction with a flower. The interaction sets up, within each of
them [each Dynamic Object] an Immediate Object. This is transformed
by the habits-of-mediation in each of them [the Representamen]and
both 'produce' an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant. 

So- the two molecules are both transformed - and might become one
larger molecule. Both are transformed. 

And the insect interprets the nectar of the flower as food. The
flower interprets the contact of the insect as pollination. Both are
transformed.  

Edwina
 --
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
 largest alternative telecommunications provider.
 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Tue 28/03/17 7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Jon, Edwina, List, I think, the dynamical object must be external from
the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken,
aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be
external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other
signs and be idiosyncratic. I guess, that the dyn. object is an
external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an
interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign. Which kind of
interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it
provides:   A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to
the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or
been in the past, a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object
which is a material thing, an immediate interpretant forms a d.o.
which is a concept.   About the fourth kind of dynamical objects,
metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that
there are different theories. The supersign, as any sign, has all
three kinds of interpretant, but only one of them provides the
dynamical object for the subsign, is my guess. Best, Helmut 28.
März 2017 um 21:45 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just
for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that
you speak for all and 'anyone else'.  I h

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical object is a dynamical object.

Best,

Helmut

 


 29. März 2017 um 01:57 Uhr

Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 


 


Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since 'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.

The Dynamic Object is, when it is named as such, is already in a semiosic interaction with another Object. So- it could be one molecule in interaction with another molecule. Of an insect in interaction with a flower. The interaction sets up, within each of them [each Dynamic Object] an Immediate Object. This is transformed by the habits-of-mediation in each of them [the Representamen]and both 'produce' an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant.

So- the two molecules are both transformed - and might become one larger molecule. Both are transformed.

And the insect interprets the nectar of the flower as food. The flower interprets the contact of the insect as pollination. Both are transformed. 

Edwina

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This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Tue 28/03/17 7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Jon, Edwina, List,

I think, the dynamical object must be external from the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken, aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other signs and be idiosyncratic.

I guess, that the dyn. object is an external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign.

Which kind of interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it provides:

 

A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or been in the past,

a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object which is a material thing,

an immediate interpretant forms a d.o. which is a concept.

 

About the fourth kind of dynamical objects, metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that there are different theories.

The supersign, as any sign, has all three kinds of interpretant, but only one of them provides the dynamical object for the subsign, is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 28. März 2017 um 21:45 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 





That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that you speak for all and 'anyone else'.  I have backed up my views of Peirce repeatedly and won't do it again.

Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Tue 28/03/17 3:41 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:


Edwina, List:
 

I knew that I could count on you!  As usual, you offer no evidence to back up your assertions, so I have no reason to take them seriously--and neither does anyone else.

 

Cheers,

 

Jon S.






 




 

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my view, absorb the full concepts of Peirce. You don't seem to be able to appreciate the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis. And I don't think that you actually DO 'adhere carefully' to what Peirce wrote.

Of course I take exception to your writing 'as if' your outline IS the correct replication of Peirce. You don't have the humility to insert a phrase such as 'In MY [JAS] interpretation of Peirce, this isblah blah'. Instead, you write 'as if' you WERE Peirce. But you aren't. And I totally reject your linear and yes, nominalistic and mechanical outline.

Instead of saying "In MY [JAS} interpretation of Peirce, it makes no senseetc. ..You instead just say: 'It makes no sense'. You never have the humility to acknowledge that your views - are your views - and may, or may not, be 'valid' interpretations of Peirce.

And the Representamen in Peircean outlines does not exist 'per se' but within matter or within concepts. It is the set of habits of formation. Do you seriously think that these habits exist 'per se' -out in the external world,  all on their own? What are you - a Platonist? The Representamen, as I've said before, is not a separate entity. In my view, you misunderstand the 'correlates'; the fact that the Representamen is the 'first correlate' doesn't mean that it is singularly agential but that it, as holding the habits of formation, is the primal force in transforming t

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is
external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since
'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic
set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant. 

The Dynamic Object is, when it is named as such, is already in a
semiosic interaction with another Object. So- it could be one
molecule in interaction with another molecule. Of an insect in
interaction with a flower. The interaction sets up, within each of
them [each Dynamic Object] an Immediate Object. This is transformed
by the habits-of-mediation in each of them [the Representamen]and
both 'produce' an Immediate and Dynamic Interpretant.

So- the two molecules are both transformed - and might become one
larger molecule. Both are transformed.

And the insect interprets the nectar of the flower as food. The
flower interprets the contact of the insect as pollination. Both are
transformed. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Tue 28/03/17  7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Jon, Edwina, List, I think, the dynamical object must be external
from the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly
spoken, aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all
would be external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to
other signs and be idiosyncratic. I guess, that the dyn. object is an
external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an
interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign. Which kind of
interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it
provides:   A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to
the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or
been in the past, a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object
which is a material thing, an immediate interpretant forms a d.o.
which is a concept.   About the fourth kind of dynamical objects,
metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that
there are different theories. The supersign, as any sign, has all
three kinds of interpretant, but only one of them provides the
dynamical object for the subsign, is my guess. Best, Helmut 28.
März 2017 um 21:45 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just
for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that
you speak for all and 'anyone else'.  I have backed up my views of
Peirce repeatedly and won't do it again. 

Edwina
 --
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
 largest alternative telecommunications provider.
 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Tue 28/03/17 3:41 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:  Edwina, List:   I knew that I could count on you!  As usual,
you offer no evidence to back up your assertions, so I have no reason
to take them seriously--and neither does anyone else.   Cheers,   Jon
S.  On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:  

Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence
that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be
unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my
view, absorb the full concepts of Peirce. You don't seem to be able
to appreciate the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis.
And I don't think that you actually DO 'adhere carefully' to what
Peirce wrote. 

Of course I take exception to your writing 'as if' your outline IS
the correct replication of Peirce. You don't have the humility to
insert a phrase such as 'In MY [JAS] interpretation of Peirce, this
isblah blah'. Instead, you write 'as if' you WERE Peirce. But you
aren't. And I totally reject your linear and yes, nominalistic and
mechanical outline. 

Instead of saying "In MY [JAS} interpretation of Peirce, it makes no
senseetc. ..You instead just say: 'It makes no sense'. You never
have the humility to acknowledge that your views - are your views -
and may, or may not, be 'valid' interpretations of Peirce. 

And the Representamen in Peircean outlines does not exist 'per se'
but within matter or within concepts. It is the set of habits of
formation. Do you seriously think that these habits exist 'per se'
-out in the external world,  all on their own? What are you - a
Platonist? The Representamen, as I've said before, is not a separate
entity. In my view, you misunderstand the 'correlates'; the fact that
the Representamen is the 'first correlate' doesn't mean that it is
singularly agential but that it, as holding the habits of formation,
is the primal force in transforming the input data from the
interaction with the external Dynamic Object...into the various
Interpretants. I don't think that you really understand the power of
this Representamen and the role 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, Edwina, List,

I think, the dynamical object must be external from the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken, aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other signs and be idiosyncratic.

I guess, that the dyn. object is an external entity from the perspective of the sign (a fact), but an interpretant of another, usually slower, supersign.

Which kind of interpretant, I guess, refers to which kind of dynamical object it provides:

 

A final interpretant of the slower supersign provides to the subsign a dyn. object which is something that has happened or been in the past,

a dynamical interpretant forms eg. a dyn. object which is a material thing,

an immediate interpretant forms a d.o. which is a concept.

 

About the fourth kind of dynamical objects, metaphysical laws and axioms, I cannot say or guess anything but that there are different theories.

The supersign, as any sign, has all three kinds of interpretant, but only one of them provides the dynamical object for the subsign, is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 28. März 2017 um 21:45 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 





That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that you speak for all and 'anyone else'.  I have backed up my views of Peirce repeatedly and won't do it again.

Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Tue 28/03/17 3:41 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:


Edwina, List:
 

I knew that I could count on you!  As usual, you offer no evidence to back up your assertions, so I have no reason to take them seriously--and neither does anyone else.

 

Cheers,

 

Jon S.






 




 

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my view, absorb the full concepts of Peirce. You don't seem to be able to appreciate the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis. And I don't think that you actually DO 'adhere carefully' to what Peirce wrote.

Of course I take exception to your writing 'as if' your outline IS the correct replication of Peirce. You don't have the humility to insert a phrase such as 'In MY [JAS] interpretation of Peirce, this isblah blah'. Instead, you write 'as if' you WERE Peirce. But you aren't. And I totally reject your linear and yes, nominalistic and mechanical outline.

Instead of saying "In MY [JAS} interpretation of Peirce, it makes no senseetc. ..You instead just say: 'It makes no sense'. You never have the humility to acknowledge that your views - are your views - and may, or may not, be 'valid' interpretations of Peirce.

And the Representamen in Peircean outlines does not exist 'per se' but within matter or within concepts. It is the set of habits of formation. Do you seriously think that these habits exist 'per se' -out in the external world,  all on their own? What are you - a Platonist? The Representamen, as I've said before, is not a separate entity. In my view, you misunderstand the 'correlates'; the fact that the Representamen is the 'first correlate' doesn't mean that it is singularly agential but that it, as holding the habits of formation, is the primal force in transforming the input data from the interaction with the external Dynamic Object...into the various Interpretants. I don't think that you really understand the power of this Representamen and the role it plays in the triadic sign; your view - as I've said before, seems to me to reduce Peirce to mechanics.

I've said before that I won't debate with you. I am sure that there are many who will - and I'll leave that to you and them.

Edwina

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This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca 

On Tue 28/03/17 1:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:




Helmut, List:
 


Actually, your first quote below does not corroborate what Edwina wrote.  Rather, in context Peirce was saying there that the Dynamic Object is not necessarily something that is outside the mind; it might be another thought, or a fictional character, or a command, as just a few examples.  Elsewhere, including the other three quotes, he makes it quite clear that the Dynamic Object is always  external to the Sign that represents it.


 

As I have pointed out before, Edwina has a unique "reading" of Peirce that redefines many (perhaps most) of his semeiotic terms in a way that--to me, anyway--renders her approach unrecognizable as Peircean.  For Edwina, the Sign is a triadic function that transforms data from the Object (input) via the Repre

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just
for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that
you speak for all and 'anyone else'.  I have backed up my views of
Peirce repeatedly and won't do it again. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Tue 28/03/17  3:41 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I knew that I could count on you!  As usual, you offer no evidence
to back up your assertions, so I have no reason to take them
seriously--and neither does anyone else.
 Cheers,
 Jon S. 
 On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence
that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be
unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my
view, absorb the full concepts of Peirce. You don't seem to be able
to appreciate the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis.
And I don't think that you actually DO 'adhere carefully' to what
Peirce wrote. 

Of course I take exception to your writing 'as if' your outline IS
the correct replication of Peirce. You don't have the humility to
insert a phrase such as 'In MY [JAS] interpretation of Peirce, this
isblah blah'. Instead, you write 'as if' you WERE Peirce. But you
aren't. And I totally reject your linear and yes, nominalistic and
mechanical outline. 

Instead of saying "In MY [JAS} interpretation of Peirce, it makes no
senseetc. ..You instead just say: 'It makes no sense'. You never
have the humility to acknowledge that your views - are your views -
and may, or may not, be 'valid' interpretations of Peirce.

And the Representamen in Peircean outlines does not exist 'per se'
but within matter or within concepts. It is the set of habits of
formation. Do you seriously think that these habits exist 'per se'
-out in the external world,  all on their own? What are you - a
Platonist? The Representamen, as I've said before, is not a separate
entity. In my view, you misunderstand the 'correlates'; the fact that
the Representamen is the 'first correlate' doesn't mean that it is
singularly agential but that it, as holding the habits of formation,
is the primal force in transforming the input data from the
interaction with the external Dynamic Object...into the various
Interpretants. I don't think that you really understand the power of
this Representamen and the role it plays in the triadic sign; your
view - as I've said before, seems to me to reduce Peirce to
mechanics. 

I've said before that I won't debate with you. I am sure that there
are many who will - and I'll leave that to you and them.

Edwina

-- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Tue 28/03/17  1:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[3] sent:
 Helmut, List:
 Actually, your first quote below does not corroborate what Edwina
wrote.  Rather, in context Peirce was saying there that the Dynamic
Object is not necessarily something that is outside the mind; it
might be another thought, or a fictional character, or a command, as
just a few examples.  Elsewhere, including the other three quotes, he
makes it quite clear that the Dynamic Object is always  external to
the Sign that represents it. 
 As I have pointed out before, Edwina has a unique "reading" of
Peirce that redefines many (perhaps most) of his semeiotic terms in a
way that--to me, anyway--renders her approach unrecognizable as
Peircean.  For Edwina, the Sign is a triadic function that transforms
data from the Object (input) via the Representamen (mediation) to the
Interpretant (output); for Peirce, on the other hand, the Sign or
Representamen is the first correlate of a triadic  relation, the
Object is the second correlate, and the Interpretant is the third
correlate.  Edwina thus defines the Object, Representamen, and
Interpretant as relations within the Sign; whereas Peirce defines
them as subjects, one of which (Representamen) is the Sign, and the
other two of which (Object and Interpretant) have relations with the
Sign.  This is evident from his division of each correlate  and
relation into Possibles (1ns), Existents (2ns), and Necessitants
(3ns) based on the Universe or Modality of Being to which they
belong.  In Peirce's framework, it makes no sense at all to claim--as
Edwina did below--that the Representamen exists  within the Dynamic
Object; rather, it stands for the Object to the Interpretant.
 I predict that Edwina will now scold me for arrogantly treating "my"
interpretation of Peirce as the only correct one, and/or allege that I
am being Saussurean/nominalistic/"literal-bound" by adher

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I knew that I could count on you!  As usual, you offer no evidence to back
up your assertions, so I have no reason to take them seriously--and neither
does anyone else.

Cheers,

Jon S.

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence that
> yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be unscientific
> and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my view, absorb the
> full concepts of Peirce. You don't seem to be able to appreciate the
> dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis. And I don't think that
> you actually DO 'adhere carefully' to what Peirce wrote.
>
> Of course I take exception to your writing 'as if' your outline IS the
> correct replication of Peirce. You don't have the humility to insert a
> phrase such as 'In MY [JAS] interpretation of Peirce, this isblah
> blah'. Instead, you write 'as if' you WERE Peirce. But you aren't. And I
> totally reject your linear and yes, nominalistic and mechanical outline.
>
> Instead of saying "In MY [JAS} interpretation of Peirce, it makes no
> senseetc. ..You instead just say: 'It makes no sense'. You never have
> the humility to acknowledge that your views - are your views - and may, or
> may not, be 'valid' interpretations of Peirce.
>
> And the Representamen in Peircean outlines does not exist 'per se' but
> within matter or within concepts. It is the set of habits of formation. Do
> you seriously think that these habits exist 'per se' -out in the external
> world,  all on their own? What are you - a Platonist? The Representamen, as
> I've said before, is not a separate entity. In my view, you misunderstand
> the 'correlates'; the fact that the Representamen is the 'first correlate'
> doesn't mean that it is singularly agential but that it, as holding the
> habits of formation, is the primal force in transforming the input data
> from the interaction with the external Dynamic Object...into the various
> Interpretants. I don't think that you really understand the power of this
> Representamen and the role it plays in the triadic sign; your view - as
> I've said before, seems to me to reduce Peirce to mechanics.
>
> I've said before that I won't debate with you. I am sure that there are
> many who will - and I'll leave that to you and them.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
>
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Tue 28/03/17 1:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> Actually, your first quote below does not corroborate what Edwina wrote.
> Rather, in context Peirce was saying there that the Dynamic Object is not 
> necessarily
> something that is outside the mind; it might be another thought, or a
> fictional character, or a command, as just a few examples.  Elsewhere,
> including the other three quotes, he makes it quite clear that the Dynamic
> Object is always external to the Sign that represents it.
>
> As I have pointed out before, Edwina has a unique "reading" of Peirce that
> redefines many (perhaps most) of his semeiotic terms in a way that--to me,
> anyway--renders her approach unrecognizable as Peircean.  For Edwina, the
> Sign is a triadic function that transforms data from the Object (input)
> via the Representamen (mediation) to the Interpretant (output); for Peirce,
> on the other hand, the Sign or Representamen is the first correlate of a
> triadic relation, the Object is the second correlate, and the
> Interpretant is the third correlate.  Edwina thus defines the Object,
> Representamen, and Interpretant as relations within the Sign; whereas
> Peirce defines them as subjects, one of which (Representamen) is the
> Sign, and the other two of which (Object and Interpretant) have relations
> with the Sign.  This is evident from his division of each correlate and 
> relation
> into Possibles (1ns), Existents (2ns), and Necessitants (3ns) based on the
> Universe or Modality of Being to which they belong.  In Peirce's framework,
> it makes no sense at all to claim--as Edwina did below--that the
> Representamen exists within the Dynamic Object; rather, it stands for the
> Object to the Interpretant.
>
> I predict that Edwina will now scold me for arrogantly treating "my"
> interpretation of Peirce as the only correct one, and/or allege that I am
> being Saussurean/nominalistic/"literal-bound" by adhering carefully to
> what Peirce actually wrote about these matters.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Edwina,
>> Here are four quotes from the Commens Dictionary. The first corrobates
>> what you wrote, that the d.o. is not outside of the mind and its
>> experience, the second quote say

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence
that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be
unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my
view, absorb the full concepts of Peirce. You don't seem to be able
to appreciate the dynamic and adaptive nature of Peircean semiosis.
And I don't think that you actually DO 'adhere carefully' to what
Peirce wrote. 

Of course I take exception to your writing 'as if' your outline IS
the correct replication of Peirce. You don't have the humility to
insert a phrase such as 'In MY [JAS] interpretation of Peirce, this
isblah blah'. Instead, you write 'as if' you WERE Peirce. But you
aren't. And I totally reject your linear and yes, nominalistic and
mechanical outline.

Instead of saying "In MY [JAS} interpretation of Peirce, it makes no
senseetc. ..You instead just say: 'It makes no sense'. You never
have the humility to acknowledge that your views - are your views -
and may, or may not, be 'valid' interpretations of Peirce.

And the Representamen in Peircean outlines does not exist 'per se'
but within matter or within concepts. It is the set of habits of
formation. Do you seriously think that these habits exist 'per se'
-out in the external world,  all on their own? What are you - a
Platonist? The Representamen, as I've said before, is not a separate
entity. In my view, you misunderstand the 'correlates'; the fact that
the Representamen is the 'first correlate' doesn't mean that it is
singularly agential but that it, as holding the habits of formation,
is the primal force in transforming the input data from the
interaction with the external Dynamic Object...into the various
Interpretants. I don't think that you really understand the power of
this Representamen and the role it plays in the triadic sign; your
view - as I've said before, seems to me to reduce Peirce to
mechanics.

I've said before that I won't debate with you. I am sure that there
are many who will - and I'll leave that to you and them.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Tue 28/03/17  1:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Helmut, List:
 Actually, your first quote below does not corroborate what Edwina
wrote.  Rather, in context Peirce was saying there that the Dynamic
Object is not necessarily something that is outside the mind; it
might be another thought, or a fictional character, or a command, as
just a few examples.  Elsewhere, including the other three quotes, he
makes it quite clear that the Dynamic Object is always external to the
Sign that represents it. 
 As I have pointed out before, Edwina has a unique "reading" of
Peirce that redefines many (perhaps most) of his semeiotic terms in a
way that--to me, anyway--renders her approach unrecognizable as
Peircean.  For Edwina, the Sign is a triadic function that transforms
data from the Object (input) via the Representamen (mediation) to the
Interpretant (output); for Peirce, on the other hand, the Sign or
Representamen is the first correlate of a triadic  relation, the
Object is the second correlate, and the Interpretant is the third
correlate.  Edwina thus defines the Object, Representamen, and
Interpretant as relations within the Sign; whereas Peirce defines
them as subjects, one of which (Representamen) is the Sign, and the
other two of which (Object and Interpretant) have relations with the
Sign.  This is evident from his division of each correlate and
relation into Possibles (1ns), Existents (2ns), and Necessitants
(3ns) based on the Universe or Modality of Being to which they
belong.  In Peirce's framework, it makes no sense at all to claim--as
Edwina did below--that the Representamen exists  within the Dynamic
Object; rather, it stands for the Object to the Interpretant.
 I predict that Edwina will now scold me for arrogantly treating "my"
interpretation of Peirce as the only correct one, and/or allege that I
am being Saussurean/nominalistic/"literal-bound" by adhering carefully
to what Peirce actually wrote about these matters.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
  Edwina, Here are four quotes from the Commens Dictionary. The first
corrobates what you wrote, that the d.o. is not outside of the mind
and its experience, the second quote says that it is a part of
reality, the third says, it is in itself, and the fourth says it is
what final study would show it to be. Maybe when I will think about
it, sometime I might be able to combine these aspects, but now they
still seem contradictive to me. Best, Helmut   ---1---1906 |
L

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

Actually, your first quote below *does not* corroborate what Edwina wrote.
Rather, in context Peirce was saying there that the Dynamic Object is
not *necessarily
*something that is outside the mind; it might be another thought, or a
fictional character, or a command, as just a few examples.  Elsewhere,
including the other three quotes, he makes it quite clear that the Dynamic
Object is always *external *to the Sign that represents it.

As I have pointed out before, Edwina has a unique "reading" of Peirce that
redefines many (perhaps most) of his semeiotic terms in a way that--to me,
anyway--renders her approach unrecognizable as Peircean.  For Edwina, the
Sign is a triadic *function *that transforms data from the Object (input)
via the Representamen (mediation) to the Interpretant (output); for Peirce,
on the other hand, the Sign or Representamen is the first correlate of a
triadic *relation*, the Object is the second correlate, and the
Interpretant is the third correlate.  Edwina thus defines the Object,
Representamen, and Interpretant *as *relations *within *the Sign; whereas
Peirce defines them as subjects, one of which (Representamen) *is* the
Sign, and the other two of which (Object and Interpretant) *have *relations
with the Sign.  This is evident from his division of each correlate
*and *relation
into Possibles (1ns), Existents (2ns), and Necessitants (3ns) based on the
Universe or Modality of Being to which they belong.  In Peirce's framework,
it makes no sense at all to claim--as Edwina did below--that the
Representamen exists *within *the Dynamic Object; rather, it stands *for *the
Object *to *the Interpretant.

I predict that Edwina will now scold me for arrogantly treating "my"
interpretation of Peirce as the only correct one, and/or allege that I am
being Saussurean/nominalistic/"literal-bound" by adhering carefully to what
Peirce actually wrote about these matters.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina,
> Here are four quotes from the Commens Dictionary. The first corrobates
> what you wrote, that the d.o. is not outside of the mind and its
> experience, the second quote says that it is a part of reality, the third
> says, it is in itself, and the fourth says it is what final study would
> show it to be. Maybe when I will think about it, sometime I might be able
> to combine these aspects, but now they still seem contradictive to me.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> ---1---
> 1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 197
>
> … the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means
> something forced upon the mind in perception, but including more than
> perception reveals. It is an object of actual Experience.
>
> ---2---
> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.536
>
> … we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the
> Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the
> Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the
> Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its
> Representation.
>
> ---3---
> 1906 [c.] | On Signs [R] | MS [R] 793:14
>
> [O]ne must distinguish the Object as it is represented, which is called
> the Immediate Object, from the Object as it is in itself.
>
> ---4---
> 1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:495
>
> As to the Object, that may mean the Object as cognized in the Sign and
> therefore an Idea, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any
> particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and
> final study would show it to be. The former I call the *Immediate*
> Object, the latter the *Dynamical* Object. For the latter is the Object
> that Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called “Objective”
> science) can investigate.
>  27. März 2017 um 21:36 Uhr
> *Von:* "Edwina Taborsky" 
>
>
> Helmut - in my view, ALL material and conceptual existences are Signs.
> They ALL function within the triadic set of Relations:
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
>
> Therefore, there is no such thing as a Dynamic Object 'in itself', i.e.,
> which exists outside of this interactive process. Certainly, the laws of
> physics, held within the Representamen, change SLOWLY. As Peirce pointed
> out, in 1.412 [A Guess at the Riddle] in the development of habits - these
> habits will emerge and strengthen themselves. So, I'd suggest that early
> physical laws developed rather than emerged 'intact and final'. And for all
> we know, these physical laws might change, slowly, in the future. Their
> stability is, of course, vital as the biological realm with its less stable
> laws, is therefore enabled to develop diversity.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by 'events and constellations of the past'.
>
> Again, the Sign, in my view, is a triad. Th

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina,

Here are four quotes from the Commens Dictionary. The first corrobates what you wrote, that the d.o. is not outside of the mind and its experience, the second quote says that it is a part of reality, the third says, it is in itself, and the fourth says it is what final study would show it to be. Maybe when I will think about it, sometime I might be able to combine these aspects, but now they still seem contradictive to me.

Best,

Helmut

 

---1---




1906 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 197


… the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but including more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual Experience.

---2---








1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.536


… we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation.

---3---


1906 [c.] | On Signs [R] | MS [R] 793:14


[O]ne must distinguish the Object as it is represented, which is called the Immediate Object, from the Object as it is in itself.

---4---


1909 | Letters to William James | EP 2:495


As to the Object, that may mean the Object as cognized in the Sign and therefore an Idea, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and final study would show it to be. The former I call the Immediate Object, the latter the Dynamical Object. For the latter is the Object that Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called “Objective” science) can investigate.



 









 

 27. März 2017 um 21:36 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut - in my view, ALL material and conceptual existences are Signs. They ALL function within the triadic set of Relations: Object-Representamen-Interpretant.

Therefore, there is no such thing as a Dynamic Object 'in itself', i.e., which exists outside of this interactive process. Certainly, the laws of physics, held within the Representamen, change SLOWLY. As Peirce pointed out, in 1.412 [A Guess at the Riddle] in the development of habits - these habits will emerge and strengthen themselves. So, I'd suggest that early physical laws developed rather than emerged 'intact and final'. And for all we know, these physical laws might change, slowly, in the future. Their stability is, of course, vital as the biological realm with its less stable laws, is therefore enabled to develop diversity.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'events and constellations of the past'.

Again, the Sign, in my view, is a triad. The Representamen, also called the sign [lower case] is a set of habits of formation and exists WITHIN the Sign and therefore, WITHIN the dynamic object. There is no such thing as a Dynamic Object which does not also have its Representamen or set of habits that enable it to exist as such.

I do not agree with viewing the parts of the Sign [the Dynamic Object, the Immediate Object, the Representamen, the Immediate, Dynamic and Final Interpretants] as separate 'stand-alone' entities.

Edwina



--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Mon 27/03/17 3:22 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




List,

Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist) do not change, events and constellations from the past do not either, persisting objects may, common concepts do for sure.

Now, given I am right with this, is it so, that the final interpretant of a sign with a changing dyn. object is not only the theoretical approximation of the immediate object towards the dynamical one, but the approximation of immediate and dynamical objects towards each other?

Or is it so, that, as the dynamical object never changes at the time of the sign (because then it is independent from it), only later, and the final interpretant is part of this sign and not of one of the following, it (the final interpretant) also is the theoretical approximation of the immediate object towards the dynamical, theoretically frozen in time, object? Uh, I dont understand myself anymore, so nevermind if you dont either.

Best,

Helmut

 

27. März 2017 um 20:05 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 


Claudio - I'm not sure if I would agree that we can never change the Dynamic Object. Since semiosis is an interactive and continuous process, then I would say that our semiosic interactions are continuously changing 'that with which we interact'.

As an example, if I take a spring crocus as the Dynamic Object. It is, in itself, also a Dynamic In

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - in my view, ALL material and conceptual existences are
Signs. They ALL function within the triadic set of Relations:
Object-Representamen-Interpretant.

Therefore, there is no such thing as a Dynamic Object 'in itself',
i.e., which exists outside of this interactive process. Certainly,
the laws of physics, held within the Representamen, change SLOWLY. As
Peirce pointed out, in 1.412 [A Guess at the Riddle] in the
development of habits - these habits will emerge and strengthen
themselves. So, I'd suggest that early physical laws developed rather
than emerged 'intact and final'. And for all we know, these physical
laws might change, slowly, in the future. Their stability is, of
course, vital as the biological realm with its less stable laws, is
therefore enabled to develop diversity.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'events and constellations of the
past'.

Again, the Sign, in my view, is a triad. The Representamen, also
called the sign [lower case] is a set of habits of formation and
exists WITHIN the Sign and therefore, WITHIN the dynamic object.
There is no such thing as a Dynamic Object which does not also have
its Representamen or set of habits that enable it to exist as such.

I do not agree with viewing the parts of the Sign [the Dynamic
Object, the Immediate Object, the Representamen, the Immediate,
Dynamic and Final Interpretants] as separate 'stand-alone' entities.

Edwina
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 On Mon 27/03/17  3:22 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  List, Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical
objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to
the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it
for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist)
do not change, events and constellations from the past do not either,
persisting objects may, common concepts do for sure. Now, given I am
right with this, is it so, that the final interpretant of a sign with
a changing dyn. object is not only the theoretical approximation of
the immediate object towards the dynamical one, but the approximation
of immediate and dynamical objects towards each other? Or is it so,
that, as the dynamical object never changes at the time of the sign
(because then it is independent from it), only later, and the final
interpretant is part of this sign and not of one of the following, it
(the final interpretant) also is the theoretical approximation of the
immediate object towards the dynamical, theoretically frozen in time,
object? Uh, I dont understand myself anymore, so nevermind if you dont
either. Best, Helmut27. März 2017 um 20:05 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Claudio - I'm not sure if I would agree that we can never change the
Dynamic Object. Since semiosis is an interactive and continuous
process, then I would say that our semiosic interactions are
continuously changing 'that with which we interact'. 

As an example, if I take a spring crocus as the Dynamic Object. It
is, in itself, also a Dynamic Interpretant of a semiosic process made
up of the triad of multiple Dynamic Objects with which it interacts
[earth, sun, water.which are also ALL triadic Signs .]...operating
within the Representamen habits of both itself [the bulb] and of the
other triadic Signs [earth, sun..].  And my interaction with it, as a
Dynamic Object, and an Immediate Object...mediated by my own
Representamen knowledge...to result in that Immediate and Dynamic
Interpretants of acknowledging it as a flower to be observed and not
garbage to be thrown out. 

My point is that everything exists within a triadic Set
[Object-Representamen-Interpretant] and so we cannot say that the
Dynamic Interpretant exists 'per se' on its own. It exists only
within interactions, not necessarily with we humans, but with other
forms of matter [in this case, earth, sun, water, insects, birds]..
and all these interactions - which are also carried out within
triadic Signs, will 'change' that Dynamic Interpretant. It will grow;
it will produce more, it will supply food for another Sign [an insect,
a bird]... 

Edwina 
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 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Mon 27/03/17 8:11 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com
sent: Edwina, Helmut, List,
 I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that there
is no 'THE TRUTH' anymore.
 Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.),
perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).
 But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very good
for us: humans!!!
 So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything is
only a little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered the
'Dynamic O

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist) do not change, events and constellations from the past do not either, persisting objects may, common concepts do for sure.

Now, given I am right with this, is it so, that the final interpretant of a sign with a changing dyn. object is not only the theoretical approximation of the immediate object towards the dynamical one, but the approximation of immediate and dynamical objects towards each other?

Or is it so, that, as the dynamical object never changes at the time of the sign (because then it is independent from it), only later, and the final interpretant is part of this sign and not of one of the following, it (the final interpretant) also is the theoretical approximation of the immediate object towards the dynamical, theoretically frozen in time, object? Uh, I dont understand myself anymore, so nevermind if you dont either.

Best,

Helmut

 

27. März 2017 um 20:05 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Claudio - I'm not sure if I would agree that we can never change the Dynamic Object. Since semiosis is an interactive and continuous process, then I would say that our semiosic interactions are continuously changing 'that with which we interact'.

As an example, if I take a spring crocus as the Dynamic Object. It is, in itself, also a Dynamic Interpretant of a semiosic process made up of the triad of multiple Dynamic Objects with which it interacts [earth, sun, water.which are also ALL triadic Signs .]...operating within the Representamen habits of both itself [the bulb] and of the other triadic Signs [earth, sun..].  And my interaction with it, as a Dynamic Object, and an Immediate Object...mediated by my own Representamen knowledge...to result in that Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants of acknowledging it as a flower to be observed and not garbage to be thrown out.

My point is that everything exists within a triadic Set [Object-Representamen-Interpretant] and so we cannot say that the Dynamic Interpretant exists 'per se' on its own. It exists only within interactions, not necessarily with we humans, but with other forms of matter [in this case, earth, sun, water, insects, birds].. and all these interactions - which are also carried out within triadic Signs, will 'change' that Dynamic Interpretant. It will grow; it will produce more, it will supply food for another Sign [an insect, a bird]...

Edwina



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On Mon 27/03/17 8:11 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, Helmut, List,
I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that there is no 'THE TRUTH' anymore.
Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.), perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).
But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very good for us: humans!!!
So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything is only a little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered the 'Dynamic Object'.
We don't need to "achieve a true representation of a fact", because it IS "changing all the time".
It is enough if we can figure out a good explanation for our time, hoping that we will enlarge the concept tomorrow.
Art, Architecture, Design in general is only possible because of that fact: we can only construct an Immediate Object, one after an other... endlessly...
and that is exactly the chance to exist, and to be artists, architects, designers, composers, poets, etc., etc...
if the inquiry don't need anymore to be endless... then, we will be also definitively out of work.

To Edwina: "We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object or our interactions with it." (quote)
You will probably agree that we can only change the Immediate Object
we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without transforming it at the same time in an Immediate Object
the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey" (I don't know if this is also an English _expression_), we will never reach it... happily...

All the best
Claudio

 
Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a las 15:12:




Claudio, Edwina, List,

I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the truth-as-the-fact. Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the common concept exists and is like it is.

The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.

So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is changing all the time. I guess, th