Re: Clarification request: ECC subCAs under RSA Root

On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 12:01 AM pfuen...--- via dev-security-policy wrote: > > In summary, my understanding is that we can ignore that illustrative control > of the Webtrust Criteria and that the community is cool with these > subordinations of CAs with stronger keys (same or different

Re: Intermediate common name ambiguous naming

On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 9:54 AM Matthew Thompson via dev-security-policy wrote: > > It's not ideal that Google Chrome now states "The connection to this site is > using a valid, trusted server certificate issued by R3" (desktop) and "Google > Chrome verified that R3 issued this website's

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

On Sat, Jul 4, 2020 at 7:12 PM Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy wrote: > > On Sat, Jul 04, 2020 at 08:42:03AM -0700, Mark Arnott via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > I was informed yesterday that I would have to replace just over 300 > > certificates in 5 days because my CA is required by

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

On Sat, Jul 4, 2020 at 11:06 AM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: > > On Sat, Jul 4, 2020 at 12:52 PM mark.arnott1--- via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > > This is insane! > > Those 300 certificates are used to secure healthcare information

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 9:18 AM Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 10:57 AM Peter Bowen wrote: >> >> While it may be viewed as best practice to have short lived responder >> certificates, it must not be viewed as a hard requirement for the BRs >>

Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

Ryan, I have read through this thread and am also somewhat perplexed. I want to be clear, I'm posting only for myself, as an individual, not on behalf of any current or former employers. On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 4:26 AM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 3:24 AM

Re: Digicert issued certificate with let's encrypts public key

On Sat, May 16, 2020 at 8:18 PM Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy > writes: > > >Browsing crt.sh, I found this: https://crt.sh/?id=1902422627 > > > >It's a certificate for api.pillowz.kz with the public key

Re: Audit Letter Validation (ALV) on intermediate certs in CCADB

On Thu, Dec 19, 2019 at 9:23 AM Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 6:10 PM Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > > On Mon, 25 Nov 2019 14:12:46 -0800 > > Kathleen Wilson

Re: How Certificates are Verified by Firefox

Why not use OCSP? On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 3:52 PM Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Not that anyone is presently doing or would do such a thing, but... > > Imagine a CA that wanted to offer up a user/browser tracking service to > their

Re: INC8119596 Other | Entrust Certs and DHS

ice Operations - Infrastructure Operations > > VA Office of Information and Technology, IT Operations and Services > > Mobile (571) 235-5277 > > > > > > > > *From:* Eric Mill > *Sent:* Tuesday, November 26, 2019 4:28 PM > *To:* Peter Bowen > *Cc:* Bowen,

Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: INC8119596 Other | Entrust Certs and DHS

a trusted CA, then the certificate is trusted. If you provide the full issuer name for the certificate you are referring to, then it might be possible to determine if you are actually on a government-only certificate or if you have some other issue. Thanks, Peter > > > > > *Fr

Re: INC8119596 Other | Entrust Certs and DHS

On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 1:08 PM O'Donnell, Derek via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > We have a customer at the VA who uses an Entrust root: > Issuer Entrust > > AIA: > http://nfitestweb.managed.entrust.com/AIA/CertsIssuedToNFIMediumSSPCA.p7c > > They are

Re: [FORGED] Re: Germany's cyber-security agency [BSI] recommends Firefox as most secure browser

On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 6:31 PM Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Paul Walsh via dev-security-policy > writes: > > >I have no evidence to prove what I’m about to say, but I *suspect* that > the > >people at BSI specified “EV” over the use of

Re: Intent to Ship: Move Extended Validation Information out of the URL bar

On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 10:22 AM Kirk Hall via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > I'll just reiterate my point and then drop the subject. EV certificate > subject information is used by anti-phishing services and browser phishing > filters, and it would be a

Representing one's employer

(forking this to a new subject) On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 5:54 PM Kirk Hall via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > What the heck does it mean when sometimes you say you are posting "in a > personal capacity" and sometimes you don't? To me, it always appears that

Re: DigiCert OCSP services returns 1 byte

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 10:38 AM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 1:15 PM Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > > Thanks for posting this Curt. We investigated and

Re: Intent to Ship: Move Extended Validation Information out of the URL bar

On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:44 PM kirkhalloregon--- via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Some have responded there is no research saying EV sites have > significantly less phishing (and are therefore safer) than DV sites – Tim > has listed two studies that say

Re: Fwd: Intent to Ship: Move Extended Validation Information out of the URL bar

On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 10:16 AM Jakob Bohm wrote: > On 14/08/2019 18:18, Peter Bowen wrote: > > On thing I've found really useful in working on user experience is to > > discuss things using problem & solution statements that show the before > and > > after. For

Re: Fwd: Intent to Ship: Move Extended Validation Information out of the URL bar

On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 4:24 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > A policy of switching from positive to negative indicators of security > differences is no justification to switch to NO indication. And it > certainly doesn't help user

Re: Disclosure and CP/CPS for Cross-Signed Roots

On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 11:40 AM Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Andrew Ayer filed two bugs yesterday that might be worthy of a bit > of discussion. They both appear to be in reference to root certificates > included in the Mozilla program

Re: Policy 2.7 Proposal: Exclude Policy Certification Authorities from EKU Requirement

I support this, as long as Policy CAs meet the same operations standards and have the same issuance restrictions as root CAs. This would result in no real change to policy, as I assume roots not directly included in the Mozilla root store were already considered “roots” for this part of the

Re: Applicability of SHA-1 Policy to Timestamping CAs

On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 11:51 AM Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > I've been asked if the section 5.1.1 restrictions on SHA-1 issuance apply > to timestamping CAs. Specifically, does Mozilla policy apply to the > issuance of a SHA-1 CA

Re: Pre-Incident Report - GoDaddy Serial Number Entropy

On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 4:33 AM Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On 14/03/2019 01:09, Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy wrote: > > > I'd already asked previously whether any CA wanted to indicate publicly > that > > they were compliant

Re: EJBCA defaulting to 63 bit serial numbers

On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 10:00 AM Daymion Reynolds via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Glad you agree 64bit serial numbers can have no fixed bits, as a fixed bit > in a 64 bit serial number would result in less than 64 bits of entropy. If > you are going to

Re: EJBCA defaulting to 63 bit serial numbers

On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 7:55 PM Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 9:49 PM Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > > I consider that only a single CA has represented any ambiguity as being > > their explanation as to why the

Re: The current and future role of national CAs in the root program

On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 11:45 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Currently the Mozilla root program contains a large number of roots that > are apparently single-nation CA programs serving their local community > almost exclusively, including by

Re: DarkMatter Concerns

On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 12:09 AM Benjamin Gabriel via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > A fair and transparent public discussion requires full disclosure of each > participant's motivations and ultimate agenda. Whether in CABForum, or >

Re: AW: Incident Report DFN-PKI: Non-IDNA2003 encoded international domain names

On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 10:40 AM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > I mean, it's using an ACE label. That's where Ballot 202 would have > clarified and required more explicit validation of the ACE labels to > address the SHOULD NOT from

Re: AW: Incident Report DFN-PKI: Non-IDNA2003 encoded international domain names

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 7:36 AM Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On 2019-01-24 15:41, Rob Stradling wrote: > > > > Here's an example cert containing the A-label in the SAN:dNSName and the > > U-label in the CN. (It was issued by Sectigo, known

Re: Incident Report DFN-PKI: Non-IDNA2003 encoded international domain names

On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 4:17 AM Buschart, Rufus via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Hello > > > -Ursprüngliche Nachricht- > > Von: Hanno Böck > > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 24. Januar 2019 12:36 > > > > On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 11:14:11 + Buschart, Rufus

Re: When should honest subscribers expect sudden (24 hours / 120 hours) revocations?

On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 8:43 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > So absent a bad CA, I wonder where there is a rule that subscribers > should be ready to quickly replace certificates due to actions far > outside their own control. Consider

Re: Use cases of publicly-trusted certificates

On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 9:04 AM Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Thu, 27 Dec 2018 15:30:01 +0100 > Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > > The problem here is that the prohibition lies in a complex legal > > reading of multiple

Re: Underscore characters

On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 12:53 PM thomas.gh.horn--- via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > As to why these certificates have to be revoked, you should see this the > other way round: as a very generous service of the community to you and > your customers! > >

Re: Use cases of publicly-trusted certificates

On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 12:12 PM Wayne Thayer wrote: > On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 2:42 PM Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> In the discussion of how to handle certain certificates that no longer >> meet &

Re: Use cases of publicly-trusted certificates

On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 8:34 AM Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Thu, Dec 27, 2018 at 11:12 AM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > > Yes, you are consistently mischaracterizing everything

Use cases of publicly-trusted certificates

In the discussion of how to handle certain certificates that no longer meet CA/Browser Forum baseline requirements, Wayne asked for the "Reason that publicly-trusted certificates are in use" by the customers. This seems to imply that Mozilla has an opinion that the default should not be to use

Re: Underscore characters

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:52 PM Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Ballot 202 failed. I’m not sure how it’s relevant other than to indicate > there was definite disagreement about whether underscores were permitted or > not. As previously

Re: Re: Google Trust Services Root Inclusion Request

Richard, Unfortunately Gerv is no longer with us, so he cannot respond to this accusation. Having been involved in many discussions on m.d.s.p and with Gerv directly, I am very sure Gerv deeply owned the decisions on StartCom and WoSign. It was by no means Ryan telling Gerv or Mozilla what to

Re: GoDaddy Revocations Due to a Variety of Issues

On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 2:08 PM Joanna Fox via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Friday, July 20, 2018 at 9:39:04 PM UTC-7, Peter Bowen wrote: > > > *Total of 17 certificates issued in 2018 were revoked due to invalid > > >

Re: GoDaddy Revocations Due to a Variety of Issues

On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 6:39 PM Daymion Reynolds via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > The certificates were identified by analyzing results from both zlint and > certlint. We also verified all lint findings against current and past BRs. > We discovered

Re: [FORGED] TeletexString

On Sun, Jul 8, 2018 at 2:34 PM Kurt Roeckx wrote: > On Sun, Jul 08, 2018 at 04:41:27PM -0400, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > > > Is that because you believe it forbidden by spec, or simply unwise? > > It's because nobody implements the spec. Those the claim some > support for it are just broken. I have

TeletexString

In reviewing a recent CA application, the question came up of what is allowed in a certificate in data encoded as "TeletexString" (which is also sometimes called T61String). Specifically, certlint will report an error if a TeletexString contains any characters not in the "Teletex Primary Set of

Re: Bit encoding (AW: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Add prohibition on CA key generation to policy)

I don't think that is true. Remember for OV/IV/EV certificates, the Subscriber is the natural person or Legal Entity identified in the certificate Subject. If the Subscriber is using the certificate on a CDN, it is probably better to have the CDN generate the key rather than the Subscriber. The

Re: c=US policy layer in development

As far as I know, this has nothing to do with Mozilla policy. On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 10:28 PM westmail24--- via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > If Mozilla develops an open product, then why are some discussions > unavailable to users even for reading? (I'm

Re: Audits for new subCAs

On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 4:36 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> >> While Entrust happens to do this, as a relying party, I

Re: Audits for new subCAs

t for CCADB disclosure? > > On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 6:18 PM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy >> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >> > Recently I've received a fe

Re: Audits for new subCAs

On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy wrote: > Recently I've received a few questions about audit requirements for > subordinate CAs newly issued from roots in our program. Mozilla policy > section 5.3.2 requires these to be

Re: Mozilla Security Blog re Symantec TLS Certs

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 7:55 AM, Kai Engert via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 13.03.2018 15:35, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: >> >>> Are the DigiCert transition CAs, which are part of the exclusion list, >>> and which you say are used for

Re: Mozilla Security Blog re Symantec TLS Certs

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 7:19 AM, Kai Engert via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 13.03.2018 14:59, Ryan Sleevi wrote: >> the blog post says, the subCAs controlled by Apple and Google are the >> ONLY exceptions. >> >> However, the Mozilla Firefox

Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?

On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 11:29 AM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:13 PM, timx84039--- via dev-security-policy > wrote: > >> >> Regarding to our investigation they were only

Re: How do you handle mass revocation requests?

On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 9:37 AM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy wrote: > Once we were alerted, the team kicked > off a debate that I wanted to bring to the CAB Forum. Basically, our > position is that resellers do not constitute subscribers under the

Re: TLS everywhere has a major flaw and needs refining to the page level.

On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 3:34 AM, Kevin Chadwick via dev-security-policy wrote: > > On that subject I think the chromium reported plan to label sites as > insecure should perhaps be revised to page insecured or something more > accurate? Given this group

Re: Retirement of RSA-2048

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 8:31 AM, James Burton via dev-security-policy wrote: > Approximate date of retirement of RSA-2048? This is a very broad question, as you don't specify the usage. If you look at the US National Institute of Standards and Technology's

Re: TLS-SNI-01 and compliance with BRs

> On Jan 19, 2018, at 7:22 AM, Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > Many CA’s haven’t complied with the Mozilla requirement to list the methods > they use (including Google btw), so it’s hard to tell which CAs are using > method 10. Of

Re: Updating Root Inclusion Criteria (organizations)

On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 11:49 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > 4. Selected company CAs for a handful of too-bit-to-ignore companies > that refuse to use a true public CA. This would currently probably > be Microsoft, Amazon and Google.

Re: Updating Root Inclusion Criteria

On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 3:45 PM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy wrote: > I would like to open a discussion about the criteria by which Mozilla > decides which CAs we should allow to apply for inclusion in our root store. > > Section 2.1 of Mozilla’s

Re: Serial number length

On Thu, Dec 28, 2017 at 10:24 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > After looking at some real certificates both in the browser and on crt.sh, I > have some followup questions on certificate serial numbers: > > 4. If the answers are yes, no, yes,

Re: Certificates with shared private keys by gaming software (EA origin, Blizzard battle.net)

On Mon, Dec 25, 2017 at 7:10 AM, Adrian R. via dev-security-policy wrote: > since it's a webserver running on the local machine and is using that > certificate key/pair, i think that someone more capable than me can easily > extract the key from it. > >

Re: Verisign signed speedport.ip ?

On Sat, Dec 9, 2017 at 11:42 AM, Lewis Resmond via dev-security-policy wrote: > I was researching about some older routers by Telekom, and I found out that > some of them had SSL certificates for their (LAN) configuration interface, > issued by Verisign

Re: Mozilla’s Plan for Symantec Roots

On Tue, Oct 17, 2017 at 2:06 AM, Gervase Markham <g...@mozilla.org> wrote: > On 16/10/17 20:22, Peter Bowen wrote: >> Will the new managed CAs, which will operated by DigiCert under >> CP/CPS/Audit independent from the current Symantec ones, also be >> inc

Re: Mozilla’s Plan for Symantec Roots

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 10:32 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: > As per previous discussions and > https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Symantec_Issues, a consensus proposal[0] was > reached among multiple browser makers for a graduated distrust of

Re: New Version Notification for draft-belyavskiy-certificate-limitation-policy-04.txt

On Tue, Sep 12, 2017 at 5:59 AM, Dmitry Belyavsky via dev-security-policy wrote: > Here is the new version of the draft updated according to the discussion on > mozilla-dev-security list. Given that RFC 5914 already defines a TrustAnchorList and

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 6:22 AM, Nick Lamb via dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > On Friday, 22 September 2017 05:01:03 UTC+1, Peter Bowen wrote: >> I realize this is somewhat more complex than what you, Ryan, or Jeremy >> proposed, but it th

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: > I think we can divide the discussion into two parts, similar to the > previous mail: How to effectively transition Symantec customers with > minimum disruption, whether acting as

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 8:39 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy wrote: > > The current end-state plan for root cross-signing is provided at > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1401384. The diagrams there show > all of the existing sub CAs

Re: Public trust of VISA's CA

On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 12:37 AM, Martin Rublik via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 5:22 PM, Alex Gaynor via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >>

Re: CAA Certificate Problem Report

On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 1:59 PM, Andrew Ayer <a...@andrewayer.name> wrote: > On Sat, 9 Sep 2017 13:53:52 -0700 > Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy > <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 1:50 PM, Andrew Ayer <a...@andrewaye

Re: CAA Certificate Problem Report

On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 1:50 PM, Andrew Ayer wrote: > > drill is buggy and insecure. Obviously, such implementations can > be found. Note that drill is just a "debugging/query" tool, not a > resolver you would actually use in production. You'll find that the >

Re: CAA Certificate Problem Report

On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 11:50 AM, Andrew Ayer <a...@andrewayer.name> wrote: > On Sat, 9 Sep 2017 08:49:01 -0700 > Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy > <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 3:57 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg &g

Re: CAA Certificate Problem Report

On Sat, Sep 9, 2017 at 3:57 AM, Jonathan Rudenberg <jonat...@titanous.com> wrote: > >> On Sep 9, 2017, at 06:19, Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy >> <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >> >> In all three of these cases, the "domain's zon

Re: CAA Certificate Problem Report

> Certificate 3 contains a single DNS identifier for > refused.caatestsuite-dnssec.com > Attempts to query the CAA record for this DNS name result in a REFUSED DNS > response. Since there is a DNSSEC validation chain from this zone to the > ICANN root, CAs are not permitted to treat the lookup

Re: CAs not compliant with CAA CP/CPS requirement

On Fri, Sep 8, 2017 at 12:24 PM, Andrew Ayer via dev-security-policy wrote: > The BRs state: > > "Effective as of 8 September 2017, section 4.2 of a CA's Certificate > Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement (section 4.1 for CAs > still conforming to

Re: BR compliance of legacy certs at root inclusion time

On Fri, Aug 18, 2017 at 8:47 AM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Fri, Aug 18, 2017 at 11:02 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > >> Sometimes, CAs apply for inclusion with new, clean

Re: SRVNames in name constraints

On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 8:01 AM, Jeremy Rowley wrote: > I realize use of underscore characters was been debated and explained at the > CAB Forum, but I think it's pretty evident (based on the certs issued and > responses to Ballot 202) that not all CAs believe certs

Re: SRVNames in name constraints

On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 4:20 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 06/07/17 16:56, Ryan Sleevi wrote: >> Relevant to this group, id-kp-serverAuth (and perhaps id-kp-clientAuth) > > So what do we do? There are loads of "name-constrained"

Re: 2017.08.10 Let's Encrypt Unicode Normalization Compliance Incident

On Sun, Aug 13, 2017 at 5:59 PM, Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 06:32:11PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy > wrote: >> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 11:48:50AM -0400, Ryan Sleevi via >> dev-security-policy wrote:

Re: Certificates with reserved IP addresses

Congratulations on finding something not caught by certlint. It turns out that cabtlint does zero checks for reserved IPs. Something else for my TODO list. On Sat, Aug 12, 2017 at 6:52 PM, Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy wrote: > Baseline

Re: Certificates with improperly normalized IDNs

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 1:22 PM, Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy wrote: > RFC 5280 section 7.2 and the associated IDNA RFC requires that > Internationalized Domain Names are normalized before encoding to punycode. > > Let’s Encrypt appears to

Re: Certificates with improperly normalized IDNs

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 2:31 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 10/08/2017 22:22, Jonathan Rudenberg wrote: >> >> RFC 5280 section 7.2 and the associated IDNA RFC requires that >> Internationalized Domain Names are normalized before encoding

Re: Certificates with metadata-only subject fields

The point of certlint was to help identify issues. While I appreciate it getting broad usage, I don't think pushing for revocation of every certificate that trips any of the Error level checks is productive. This reminds of me of people trawling a database of known vulnerabilities then reporting

Re: Certificates with invalidly long serial numbers

(inserted missed word; off to get coffee now) On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Peter Bowen <pzbo...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Franck Leroy via dev-security-policy > <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >> Hello >> >> I check

Re: Certificates with invalidly long serial numbers

On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Franck Leroy via dev-security-policy wrote: > Hello > > I checked only one but I think they are all the same. > > The integer value of the serial number is 20 octets, but when encoded into > DER a starting 00 may be

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 8:10 PM, Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy wrote: > Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy > writes: > >>Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the >>Symantec CA

Re: DigiCert-Symantec Announcement

On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 2:12 PM, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy wrote: > Today, DigiCert and Symantec announced that DigiCert is acquiring the > Symantec CA assets, including the infrastructure, personnel, roots, and > platforms. At the same time,

Re: Final Decision by Google on Symantec

On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 7:17 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 31/07/2017 16:06, Gervase Markham wrote: >> >> On 31/07/17 15:00, Jakob Bohm wrote: >>> >>> - Due to current Mozilla implementation bugs, >> >> >> Reference, please? >> > > I am

Re: Final Decision by Google on Symantec

On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:14 PM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: > Google have made a final decision on the various dates they plan to > implement as part of the consensus plan in the Symantec matter. The > message from blink-dev is included

Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal

Steve, I think this level of public detail is very helpful when it comes to understanding the proposal. On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 8:00 AM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy wrote: > 1) December 1, 2017 is the earliest credible date that any RFP >

Re: WoSign new system passed Cure 53 system security audit

Richard, I can only guess what Ryan is talking about as the report wasn't sent to this group, but it is possible that the system described could not meet the Baseline Requirements, as the BRs do require certain system designs. For example, two requirements are: "Require that each individual in

Re: SRVNames in name constraints

> On Jul 5, 2017, at 4:23 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy > <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > > On 03/07/17 17:44, Peter Bowen wrote: >> We still need to get the policy changed, even with the ballot. As >> written right now, all

Re: SRVNames in name constraints

he review period now, it'll be > passed by the time the Mozilla policy is updated. > > -Original Message- > From: dev-security-policy > [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla > .org] On Behalf Of Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy >

SRVNames in name constraints

In reviewing the Mozilla CA policy, I noticed one bug that is probably my fault. It says: "name constraints which do not allow Subject Alternative Names (SANs) of any of the following types: dNSName, iPAddress, SRVName, rfc822Name" SRVName is not yet allowed by the CA/Browser Forum Baseline

Re: Unknown Intermediates

On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 6:17 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 23/06/17 14:10, Kurt Roeckx via dev-security-policy wrote: >> >> On 2017-06-23 14:59, Rob Stradling wrote: >>> >>> Reasons: >>>- Some are only trusted by the old Adobe CDS

Re: Root Store Policy 2.5: Call For Review and Phase-In Periods

On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 7:15 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 21/06/17 13:13, Doug Beattie wrote: >>> Do they have audits of any sort? >> >> There had not been any audit requirements for EKU technically >> constrained CAs, so no, there

Re: ETSI auditors still not performing full annual audits?

On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:14 PM, Kathleen Wilson via dev-security-policy wrote: > I just filed https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1374381 about an > audit statement that I received for SwissSign. I have copied the bug > description below,

Re: New undisclosed intermediates

On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 9:11 AM, Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy wrote: > For these self-signed roots which have a certificate subject and key which > match to a different certificate which is in a trusted path (like an > intermediate to a trusted

Re: New undisclosed intermediates

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 7:09 PM, Jonathan Rudenberg via dev-security-policy wrote: > >> On Jun 8, 2017, at 20:43, Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy >> wrote: >> >> I don't believe that disclosure of root certificates

Re: New undisclosed intermediates

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 7:02 PM, Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Thursday, June 8, 2017 at 7:44:08 PM UTC-5, Ben Wilson wrote: >> I don't believe that disclosure of root certificates is the responsibility >> of a CA that has

Re: Mozilla requirements of Symantec

On Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 9:38 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > > As the linked proposal was worded (I am not on Blink mailing lists), it > seemed obvious that the original timeline was: > > Later: Once the new roots are generally accepted,

Re: Policy 2.5 Proposal: Add definition of "mis-issuance"

On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 8:12 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 10:09 AM Jakob Bohm wrote: > >> On 02/06/2017 15:54, Ryan Sleevi wrote: >> > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Peter Bowen wrote: >> > >> >> Yes, my concern is that thi

Re: Policy 2.5 Proposal: Make it clear that Mozilla policy has wider scope than the BRs

On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy wrote: > On 02/06/17 12:24, Kurt Roeckx wrote: >> Should that be "all certificates" instead of "all SSL certificates"? > > No; the Baseline Requirements apply only to SSL certificates.

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