Voting could be much worse. What happens if many
altruistic voters tend to try to vote sincerely and selfish voters tend
to use the optimal strategy of extremizing to the limits of the range? Ugh.
--Steve Eppley
-
Michael Ossipoff wrote:
-snip-
On Jul 21, 2007
Hi,
Alex Small's definition of monotonicity (below) matches one that's
commonly used. (It's the one I use in my website about the Maximize
Affirmed Majorities voting method. MAM happens to be monotonic.)
A couple of years ago someone posted here in EM the web addresses of
two papers by
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:38 PM 5/12/2006, Simmons, Forest wrote:
-snip-
So most of the time, in the context of Candidate Published Orderings,
Concorcet will
yield an unambiguous social ordering of the candidates, with no cycles to
resolve.
-snip-
I would say that's amazing, and
Here's another simple voting method:
Prior to the election, each candidate publishes
a list of approved candidates.
On election day, each voter selects a candidate.
Each vote is tallied as if the voter had approved
each candidate listed by the selected candidate.
The
Ralph Suter wrote:
On May 4, Steve Eppley wrote:
Could Article I. Section 10 of the US Constitution interfere with that
scheme?
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty
of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
enter into any Agreement or Compact
Hi,
Forest S wrote:
Steve E. wrote:
-snip-
Now... can we please go back to discussing whether candidates would have
sufficiently
strong incentives to rank compromise candidates over worse candidates, when
publishing their orderings before election day, assuming the voting method I
Dave K wrote:
On Wed, 26 Apr 2006 07:06:00 -0700 Steve Eppley wrote:
Dave K wrote:
On Sun, 23 Apr 2006 16:18:06 -0700 Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
Third, I'm curious how one can distinguish between these two cases:
1.1 A candidate has a safe lock on some state, and therefore
does
Hi,
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Sun, 23 Apr 2006 16:18:06 -0700 Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
Some people don't consider the Electoral College winner-take-all
within most states to be messed up. Here are 2 reasons to prefer
winner-take-all:
1. If states allocate their Electoral College delegates
Hi,
This message isn't about a new idea, but I believe the idea is important enough
to repeat.
It's a way to simplify voting, to sharply reduce the campaign costs for good
compromise
candidates, and to guard against the risk that a significant number of voters
will neglect
to rank some
Much of the work on strategy-proofness and equilibria is only
about *individuals* not having an incentive to change their own
vote, given an assumption that no one else' vote will change.
That neglects the incentive for a (coordinated) group to change
their votes, as in Jan Kok's example
Briefly replying to two people's comments:
Rob Brown wrote:
-snip-
I believe that condorcet elections intentionally ignore strength
of opinion information for the exact same practical reason. Since
there is no way to avoid collecting some strength of opinion
information (while still
Hi,
James G-A wrote:
Russ,
-snip-
I don't think that there are too many details to know.
The basic idea is that after the initial tally, a candidate
can withdraw and order a re-tally as if they had not
participated.
-snip-
What is the time limit for withdrawal? Is it hours, days,
Hi,
The Smith set certainly has lots of names. It´s the Smith set,
the minimal dominant set, and now the GeTCha set too.
I usually call it the top cycle. The disadvantage of this name
is that when there's a Condorcet Winner, the top cycle is
not a cycle.
--Steve
Election-methods
CWO is much more urgent as a patch for IRV
or Plurality Rule than as an improvement to Condorcet.
The rest of this e-mail is my reply to Mike.
I believe that it was Steve Eppley who pointed out that the CWO, for
Plurality, would be very helpful for getting rid of strategy problems,
without
James G-A asked about supermajority methods.
What to do when we want to use a method that offers the benefits
of Condorcet but where a supermajority requirement is appropriate,
e.g. where 70% of the electorate should consent to a new course of
action before the status quo is changed?
Hi,
Eric G wrote:
-snip-
Unless I am mistaken, Approval Voting does satisfy IIA and
I find AV to be a reasonable system. :-)
This nuance is missing on the page
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoiler_effect) as well
when it is stated:
A voting system which satisfies the independence
Hi,
Eric G wrote:
On the current wikipedia page for the Spoiler Effect, it says:
A voting system which satisfies the independence of irrelevant
alternatives criterion is immune to the spoiler effect,
Now, considering people use the term Spoiler Effect in
the context of Independence
Hi,
Jure asked:
Probably this has been discussed on the list before.
unfortunately i cant find the answer:
If Borda count in, let's say, 4-candidate election,
uses sequence 4-3-2-1 or 3-2-1-0, does it make
any difference?
No, the result will be the same. All the candidate totals
Hi,
Andrew M replied to Ernie P:
The major difference between CIVS Ranked Pairs and MAM is the rule on
when to keep a preference. A preference is kept exactly when it does
not create any new cycles when considered in conjunction with strictly
stronger, kept preferences. Thus, preferences
Hi,
Stephane R wrote:
To the possible exception of how one counts truncated ballots...
If you assume all ballots are full rankings Steve is right.
However, some treatments proposed on this list for truncated
ballots could produce different winners in case of equal
ranks or partial
Hi,
Mike (R?) asked:
Here's a similar question: Does it matter if we use
a Borda count of 3-2-1-0 (Highest score wins) or 0-1-2-3
(lowest score wins)? I thought I read somewhere they
weren't necessarily symmetric, but I can't think of
any counterexamples so I might be mistaken.
Again, as
Hi,
Paul K wrote, in part:
James Gilmour wrote, in part:
But I agree with Steve's comment in his second message
of today. Why on earth would anyone want to discuss Borda?
It is fundamentally flawed and should be consigned to
the museum of electoral science, no matter what
Don Saari may
Hi,
Markus S wrote about Paul Crowley's proposed voting method:
your Condorcet/RP variant sounds like Steve Eppley's
minimize thwarted majorities (MTM) method.
I think of the name MTM as an old name for MAM, which stands
for maximize affirmed majorities. To my ear, maximize
affirmed
Hi,
Paul C asked:
Does Eppley still read this list?
Yes, sometimes. By the way, I prefer that my friends
call me Steve.
I'd be interested to know why he now favours MAM over MTM.
I changed the name from MTM to MAM to sound more positive.
I chose the tiebreaker for complete
Hi,
In the discussion of Jobst's proposed voting method
that's a compromise between Condorcet and Approval,
I mentioned the Sincere Defense criterion and alluded
to voting methods that satisfy it...
I wrote:
There's another compromise method that may be worth
comparing to Jobst's, which I
Hi,
[I'm sorry it took so many days before I finished
this reply to Jobst's message. I'm also sorry there
are a lot of other messages to which I've wanted
to reply but haven't found time...]
Jobst H wrote:
Steve E wrote:
Jobst's immunity is weaker than the immunity from
majority
Hi,
James G-A wrote:
I suggest that ordinary winning votes methods (beatpath,
ranked pairs, river, etc.) fails Mike Ossipoff's strong
defensive strategy criterion, according to what I think
is the most reasonable interpretation of that criterion,
whereas cardinal pairwise passes the
Hi,
Gervase L asked:
Just a quick question that should clear up my understanding
of MAM. Is it the same as Copeland (i.e. count each
candidate's number of wins) except that any pairwise wins
that are inconsistent with the Rank Pairs ranking are
dropped before the Copeland score is tallied
Hi,
Adam asked:
P.S. Steve, maybe it's just me but I can't link to your
webpage at the moment. I was hoping to re-read your
Immunity from Majority Complaints criterion.
Try it again; it seems to be working. Let me know
again privately if not, and maybe together we can
figure out why.
Hi,
Paul K wrote:
I merely observe from the original ballots that 5 of 9
voters prefer C over A. So those are the ones who will
be unhappy if A is elected.
It's a stretch to call them unhappy since all we know
is that they ranked C over A. Perhaps they'll be much much
happier if any of
Hi,
Paul K wrote:
Any argument that begins with perhaps they... is a
speculation, not an argument. From the ballots, 55.56
percent of the voters preferred a candidate that was not
elected.
But that's what I'd pointed out: All we know is that
they _preferred_ a defeated candidate.
Hi,
Ted S wrote:
Paul K wrote:
I merely observe from the original ballots that
5 of 9 voters prefer C over A. So those are the ones
who will be unhappy if A is elected.
But how unhappy will they be? Only 3 of those voters
strongly disapproved A.
It's a leap to assume that ranking a
Hi,
Adam H wrote:
The point of the example was to show the way the method
performed in an election where each and every person was
pairwise beaten by one of the others.
I hate to quibble, but I merely wanted a simple example
to demonstrate how MAM works.
But yes, I basically agree with
Hi,
Ted S asked:
Can anybody provide an example of a 5 candidate election that has
- 4 candidates (say A, B, C D) in the Schulze set
...
Schwartz set?
--Steve
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi,
Ralph S wrote:
I agree with Jan Kok's suggestion that IRRV
(Instant Round Robin Voting) be used as
a popular name for Condorcet voting.
-snip-
Why not drop the 'V'? Three-letter acronyms
are better than 4, I think, and the 'V' is
redundant given the context.
I do have some concern
Hi,
Paul K wrote about my suggestion to drop the V from IRRV:
I had something of the same notion (and being more nearly
an average voter than a voting methods scholar, I agree
with this).
But... for the same reason there shouldn't be a V on
the end of IRV. It should be IRO for instant
Hi,
James G-A wrote:
Steve E writes:
I assume James is using the name consistency to
refer to the criterion also called reinforcement.
Um, yeah. I meant that if one group of ballots,
processed by the given method, gives A as the winner,
and another group of ballots gives A as the
Mike R wrote:
Michel Truchon gives the following description of XCC
(the Extended Condorcet Criterion):
The usual Condorcet Criterion says that if an
alternative is ranked ahead of all other
alternatives by an absolute majority of voters,
I'm sorry to quibble over wording, but
Hi,
James G-A wrote about a way to make the Electoral College
moot without a Constitutional amendment:
-snip-
What if California (or Texas, or any other state)
wrote it into law that they would award all 55
electoral votes to the winner of the popular vote??
-snip-
For example,
Hi,
James G-A replied to Rob B:
-snip-
If I lived in a swing state, I would be all for
a proportional allocation. It's just more fair,
less unstable. Who really wants to be in the middle
of the kind of craziness that they have in Florida
these days?
There's another way besides
Hi,
Chris B wrote:
-snip-
Does any problem arise with RP, River etc. if a line
is simply added at the front Eliminate non-members
of the Schwartz set?
One could also postpone that rule, making it the
first tie-breaker, depending on the voting method.
Why should we care about ensuring the
Hi,
Rob B asked:
Steve Eppley writes:
Suppose instead it were winner-takes-all except when
the vote is really close:
-snip-
I've exaggerated because of the limitations of the
text font. When I say really close I'm thinking
about within 1%, or maybe 1/2%.
This would make recounts
Hi again,
I think my diagram illustrating my proposal to tweak the
Electoral College winner-takes-all system could be made
clearer. I wrote:
-snip-
Suppose instead it were winner-takes-all except when
the vote is really close:
-
Rob B wrote:
Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu writes:
Rob B asked:
Steve Eppley writes:
But recounts could still be important, you've just
moved the linewhat if it was a difference
0.4% and the election hung on whether it
was possibly really 0.5%?
I'm afraid I don't
Mike R wrote:
Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
The obvious question is, why prefer Kemeny's method?
What criteria does it satisfy that other methods fail
that are more important than the criteria other methods
satisfy that Kemeny fails?
I like Kemeny-Young is because it has many of what I
Hi,
James G-A wrote:
I've often heard that ranked pairs is Schwartz consistent,
-snip-
No, but it elects within the top cycle, which is nearly
the same.
As far as I can tell, the GOCHA set in this example is
only {A}. A is surely undominated, and I cannot find any
other
Mike R wrote:
Steven B wrote:
Does this group, or anyone here,
advocate Kemeny's method?
I personally like it the best of all the methods
I've seen, except for the NP-hard part. I'll
advocate it without reservation when quantum
computers become available. :)
The obvious question is,
Hi,
Stephanie R a écrit :
Maybe I am wrong, the two diagram sets I saw
are not equivalent in my eye.
-snip-
Stephanie's eyes are fine. I didn't mean the diagram
on the right is equivalent to the diagram on the left.
I meant that the diagram on the right illustrates
a voter who believes that A
Hi again,
I wrote:
Stephanie R a écrit :
Oops, my eyes are not fine. There's no 'i' in Stephane.
Maybe I should increase the font size in my email client...
--Steve
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi,
Stephane R a écrit :
First I am a man: Stephane is the french equivalent
to Steve. Second, I never meant that the diagram
on the right is equivalent to the diagram on the left.
I say that your left diagram is not equivalent
to Jobst's left diagram.
First, I apologize again for my
Hi,
Jobst wrote:
Steve wrote:
-snip-
Jobst, does a person behave differently when forced
to choose between
two alternatives about which he is
undecided than when forced to
choose between two he
believes are equivalent? Why should the distinction
affect the design of the voting method?
Hi,
I haven't had time to read all the messages on the topic
of utilities and cyclic preferences, so I apologize if
anything I write here is redundant. But I think it's
important to clarify the misimpression I may have left
regarding Rod Kiwiet's poll that *may* have revealed
some voters had
Alex S wrote:
Steve Eppley wrote:
Aren't all the voting methods we've been promoting
both anonymous and neutral? Doesn't that mean
none of them are entirely non-random?
My understanding is that anonymous and neutral methods only
need a non-deterministic component to break ties. When I
Warren S wrote:
-snip-
To avoid this ambiguity, I suggest we use a different
term for describing algorithms that use chance,
such as randomized.
Aren't all the voting methods we've been promoting
both anonymous and neutral? Doesn't that mean
none of them are entirely non-random?
50%:
Paul K wrote:
Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
Aren't all the voting methods we've been promoting
both anonymous and neutral? Doesn't that mean
none of them are entirely non-random?
No.
If none of them are non-random then all of them are random.
That's definitely not true
James G-A wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Aren't all the voting methods we've been promoting
both anonymous and neutral? Doesn't that mean
none of them are entirely non-random?
50%: A B
50%: B A
Actually, I might prefer voting methods which report
a tie in this
Anthony Duff asked:
I am interested in the question of the frequency
of non-existence of a sincere CW. I personally
do not know that it is probable.
Here's another reason to occasionally expect
sincere cycles at the top, when we're electing
candidates to offices: Candidates want to win!
Bart I asked:
Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
Steven Brams, I presume. But it's such an unimportant
property, since it's laughably unrealistic to assume
voters' sincere preferences are dichotomous when there
are more than two candidates. It's a product of the
publish or perish syndrome, most
Adam T wrote:
Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
Right, we're defining Condorcet as a family of voting
procedures that accept preference orders from the voters
and elect the Condorcet winner, if there is one, given
those votes.
So... really, this is Condorcet. Condorcet just means
a voting
James G-A wrote:
Adam wrote:
James, this argument has been advanced before.
Look up Nash Equilibria in the archives.
Okay, I did a quick search.
-snip-
Mike wrote:
As we on EM have been using the term for voting systems,
a Nash equilibrium is an outcome, and the votes
James G-A asked:
Steve, you wrote:
-snip-
And Myerson-Weber equilibria have been
written about many times in this maillist.
Correct me if I'm wrong... These have to do with the
probability that a given vote will have such-and-such
an effect, times the marginal utility of that
Hi,
Check out the definition of preferential voting in
the Scott, Foresman book on Robert's Rules of Order.
I don't have a copy but my recollection is that it
defines preferential voting as any voting method in
which the voters express their orders of preference--
my words, not theirs--and it
Hi,
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Robert's likes repeated balloting much better,
but concedes that is not always practical.
They offer IRV (by description, not by name)
as an example, and say nothing against other
preferential methods such as Condorcet.
-snip-
Yes. They do point out problems
Hi,
Dave Ketchum suggested:
Condorcet (ignoring cycles):
Count ranked ballots as in a tournament among all candidates.
That's getting pretty good. I'd like to tweak it a little:
Tally the round-robin pairings using
the voters' orders of preference.
--Steve
Election-methods
Hi,
Warren Schudy asked:
Does anyone know of a multiple-seat election method
that yields proportional representation if the number
of seats is large and the Condorcet winner if there's
only one seat? Such a method would likely be better
than STV for small (10) numbers of seats since IRV's
Hi,
There is a possible compromise between margins and
majorities (but I prefer straight majorities, not
this compromise):
If the voter leaves two candidates unranked,
don't count that as a half vote for each, count it
as zero for each. But if the voter explicitly ranks
two
Hi,
Mike O wrote:
Of course I don't speak for Steve, but it's my understanding
that MAM is used in 2 ways: As a synonym for Ranked
Pairs(wv). And, more specifically, as Ranked-Pairs(wv),
with equal-defeats dealt with by considering them in
random order.
I believe that the 2nd
Hi,
Sorry I don't have time to read the replies to Curt's comments
about the Electoral College. I just want to point out a couple
of possibilities that leave the EC as is, yet could break up
the two party, one candidate per party presidential system:
1. Suppose each state uses a good
Ken Johnson wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
-snip-
A more fundamental goal might be to go with the choice that
would be acceptable to the greatest number of voters.
That sounds like Approval. The method follows directly and
obviously from the statement of the goal, no formal proof
required.
the second
advantage is implemented, with a large reward going to the most
preferred party, the voters' relative preferences regarding the
plausible compromises on important issues that lay ahead would
be elicited.
---Steve (Steve Eppley[EMAIL PROTECTED])
Election-methods mailing
if they can rank their favorites over compromise
alternatives, which I believe will be useful for reducing
the bias against people who are too busy on election day
to vote, at least for the people who are only slightly too
busy.
---Steve (Steve Eppley[EMAIL PROTECTED])
Election-methods
criteria.)
---Steve (Steve Eppley[EMAIL PROTECTED])
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
James Gilmore wrote:
Steve Eppley wrote:
The third explanation is a hold-over from elections that
tally Instant Runoff (or the proportional representation
version, Single Transferable Vote) by hand. To quickly
tally Instant Runoff by hand:
Distribute the ballots into piles
James Gilmour asked:
Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
Well, that's all I know about arguments against allowing
truncation. Perhaps others will be able to add more.
Are you suggesting voters should be forced to express
preferences they do not have? James
No, I was answering Augustin's
Hi,
Eric Gorr wrote:
Through my efforts to get out there an advocate for both Approval
and good Condorcet Methods (MAM, etc.), I am currently in
communication with a dedicated IRV supporter who may be claiming
that they would move away from IRV if a real example could be
given where IRV
never been
done before.
---Steve (Steve Eppley[EMAIL PROTECTED])
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
no higher than tied for bottom.
Steve Eppley wrote (http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley):
Any ordering of the alternatives must be an admissible vote,
and if more than half of the voters rank y over x and x no
higher than tied for bottom, then x must not be elected.
Markus has taken
Eric Gorr wrote:
At 10:59 AM -0800 2/11/04, Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
It also expects to be given a list of the alternatives, but
sometime in the near future I intend to post a version that
constructs the list of alternatives by examining the votes.
Will will not work if all voters leave
) and replacing margins with
ssc-soc (size of supporting coalition minus size of
opposing coalition)?
---Steve (Steve Eppley[EMAIL PROTECTED])
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
in the family to elect a
candidate who beats pairwise the approval winner.
Steve Eppley wrote:
2. For all pairs of candidates, say x y, y is
socially ordered over x if the number of votes that
rank y over x exceeds the number of votes that
rank x over y and the number of votes that rank y
over
On 10 Mar 2003 at 12:27, Markus Schulze wrote:
-snip-
However, according to Steve Eppley, there is a merit
difference. Steve, who uses the term MAM for Ranked Pairs
It is more reasonable to use the term MAM as a variation of
Ranked Pairs than as a synonym for Ranked Pairs. MAM is
monotonic
81 matches
Mail list logo
