At 04:30 AM 10/3/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
90 voters: A=7, B=6
10 voters: A=0, B=10
It has been proposed that Range votes be normalized, otherwise voters
who honestly recognize that no candidate is perfect and thus does not
rank at least one as a 10 will suffer vote dilution. It is possible
At 08:08 PM 9/27/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
In the recent message quted below there are two questions.
1. What should we call the Approval method that allows an extra
mark to identfy the favorite candidate, thus satisfying the Approval
voter's urge to give more moal support to Favorite than
At 10:08 PM 9/30/2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
I won't ask for or accept anything from anybody who offers to steal
proprietary material.
Yes, but. Read the information on the web site in question.
Essentially, personal use is permitted without a subscription. But
it's a little more complex than
At 10:53 PM 9/30/2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
All of this notwithstanding, no one has ever explained to me how including
an extraneous "+" is different from
my_preferred>all_others_could_live_with>>those I think would save me some
problems by having a heart attack.
It's not different. Why wou
At 06:46 PM 9/30/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
Approval is unacceptable to voter psychology because once you
approve Compromise, you erase the ballot distinction between
Favorite and Compromise. That's why ordinary Approval is not a
viable ballot proposal.
This is the main objection I have s
At 04:45 PM 9/21/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> It is unclear why Mr. Venzke's presence would alter the result
> unfavorably, unless he opens his mouth and nastiness comes out in
> such a way as to alter people's perception of the otherwise-winner.
Let's say I'm candidate B and I receive 33 votes,
At 01:07 AM 9/20/2005, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Well, for such voters, Approval is ideal (if it were only more
publicly acceptable). But maybe people insist on a rank method.
As to the public acceptability of Approval, it may depend on how it
is presented. While Approval could have major implicati
At 05:05 PM 9/19/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
Kevin responded with:
I don't share the view that this is closer to satisfying strong FBC. You have
no confidence that your candidate will be able to (or willing to) help cement
the best result you could have gotten. There is little reason to believe
note:
From: "Jeff Fisher" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Abd ulRahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Message not approved: Asset voting (was:Approval versus
Ranked methods)
Asset voting is off topic, and one of our primary objectives is to
eliminate primaries. If I misse
At 05:15 AM 9/19/2005, Jan Kok wrote:
On 9/18/05, Abd ulRahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Please don't normalize the Range ballots. There are several reasons
why people might not vote the full range:
Indeed. However, we can't have it both ways. If we don't normalize
At 02:07 AM 9/18/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
For voters, "approving" a candidate is cheap, and in the context of an
election, has little to do with any sort of absolute
approval/disapproval of the candidate, and much more to do with
increasing/decreasing the relative strength of that candidate to t
At 08:36 PM 9/17/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
My understanding of the argument made to Condorcet
advocates is that Range has a much higher probability of picking the
Condorcet winner than other methods of equal simplicity (e.g. Cumulative
voting, Plurality, Borda). However, it's difficult to explai
I wrote:
And then (or perhaps as we see this approaching) we could proceed
with further reform. As I've stated before, there are better
methods; but when I have described one of them, it has happened that
my posts have been rejected as not being relevant to "Condorcet."
We'll see if this one
At 12:43 AM 9/16/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
It's a matter of degrees. Under Approval, the voter is saying that both
Kerry and Nader are equally acceptable. For that matter, they may even
have to say McCain or Giuliani is just as acceptable if it means beating
Bush.
Something like this is often
At 01:34 AM 9/15/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
My main goal is to correctly find the candidate who would beat every
other candidate in a head-to-head election, because I believe that
candidate is likely the best candidate for the position.
As I have written, there seems to be two distinct philosoph
At 07:11 PM 9/14/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course, among the things that would happen should an accurate polling be
sufficient to successfully strategically vote would be the creation
of voters who would no longer supply accurate information to the poll takers.
Many of those discussing
At 05:17 PM 9/14/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
(1) Pick 400 registered voters at random. Give them time off work,
and have them study the candidates carefully and decide a tentative
winner by some reputable method (like DMC, Shulze, Approval, Asset
Voting, etc.) It will definitely be worth the
I now see the source of the confusion. It was a simple error; I was
then confused because the error was not noticed, instead it was compounded.
Mr. Venke had posted:
> > > >49 A
> > > >24 B
> > > >27 C>B
And I translated these truncated results to
> > > 49: A>B=C
> > > 24: B>C>A
> > > 27: C>B>
My original post was bounced by the moderator
because he thought I had made a mistake in my
numbers. I don't think so, but, of course, I do
make mistakes and my knowledge is less than
perfect. He invited me to resubmit if I thought
it was correct, which may create some confusion
since I think
At 12:24 AM 9/10/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Approval gets mentioned so often that I comment up front:
Approval as the method. Simple, but a loser because I too
often come up with something like: I WANT Nader, but I cannot
tolerate Bush - so far, so good - But, Nader is not a likely winner
At 08:18 PM 9/2/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Fri, 2005-09-02 at 15:17 -0400, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> At 04:07 PM 9/1/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
>
> >[...] I'd just as soon not favor a system that favors those prone
> >to hyperbole. [...]
> This is the core probl
At 09:47 PM 9/5/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
So. from the point of view of US third parties,
1. all Condorcet methods plausibly lead
to 2-party domination, though we cannot be sure,
2. all are more complicated
than range voting, and
3. range voting apparently does NOT lead to 2-party domination.
T
At 06:36 PM 9/5/2005, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
I just asked if DMC was effective against order reversal, so if it is,
please let me read about DMC !
You should know about
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Special:Allpages
which is a complete list of pages on the Electorama wiki.
It includes
http
At 07:59 PM 9/2/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
I have dabbled with the idea of using some of the moderation features on
the EM list. Specifically, I would hope to weed out the following:
* Blatant personal attacks
* Off-topic posts (such as the post below)
* Other violations of policy (see http:
At 04:28 PM 9/3/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
I think the ER list was discontinued (and unfortunately,
the official archive nuked) when Topica went under/was acquired,
somewhere around the 2001/2002 timeframe.
Some people keep every e-mail they receive, excepting stuff that they
delete immediately
At 03:19 PM 9/2/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I am addressing this to both Condorcet and EM.
This disagreement needs serious response. According to Jobst:
Jobst's posts to Condorcet are being suppressed by Jeff.
Jeff, apparently, is suppressing for disagreeing opinions
rather than for un
At 11:24 PM 9/1/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
It is very odd to behold the inhabitant[s] of the EM list, I must say.
In some ways they seem well in advnace of the "official" political science
community in their investigations (at least, at the high points).
In other ways they seem not to have reache
At 04:07 PM 9/1/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Range voting methods tend to give strategic advantage to those that are
prone to hyperbole, i.e. those people that declare "candidates A, B, and
C are PERFECT, while candidates D and E MIGHT AS WELL BE HITLER". Your
strategic incentive will be to give th
At 03:36 PM 9/1/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
Since I am not a believer in conducting unethical massive
experiments, I would be
happy to change the terms of the election to one which would only
affect Heitzig
and no other human beings. For example, make 1,2,3 be various
extremely painful
forms of
At 02:01 AM 9/1/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Abd ulRahman!
You wrote:
> I'll disagree that "only randomized methods can do so," since there are
> other alternatives that are neither deterministic or randomized,
> beginning with the simple one of holding some kind of runoff.
Assume there is n
At 06:12 PM 8/31/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Re your DFC wiki page, I hate it.
Thanks again. You're a very emotional man it seems. I hope you have your
pills in reach since I heard that hating is not very healthy.
Warren, it seems to me, doesn't actually "hate," the kind of hate
that would i
At 04:54 PM 8/31/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
For
evidence about Duverger law see
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/Duverger.html
and if anybody wants to supply me with some more datapoints (e.g.
from 2002-2005 elections)
then I can add them to the picture there.
Duverger's law isn't a law. Fro
It came back to me yesterday what I -- and some others -- have seen
as the biggest problem with Range voting, and also a solution that I
think I also expressed somewhere. But I tend to write way too much
and sometimes I think good ideas have been buried in fluff.
Range rewards those who exagge
At 04:51 PM 8/17/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
Abd ulRahman Lomax proposed:
The proposal is that the ballots might be counted first as ordinary
approval. If a majority appears from this process for a given candidate in
a single-winner election, the candidate would be elected. If not, then the
At 05:28 PM 8/16/2005, Alex Small wrote:
First, as Paul Kislanko pointed out, with asset voting it wouldn't just be
about a handful of candidates. Any idiot with a following could (and
undoubtedly would) declare himself a candidate for
President. Evangelists, talk show hosts, actors, self-hel
At 04:12 PM 8/16/2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
I want a solid "chain of evidence" from how my vote was ultimately counted
back to what I wrote on my ballot.
Yes. In true delegable proxy, you'd have that. But in secret-ballot Asset
Voting, you would not be able to prove that *your* ballot was act
At 03:13 PM 8/16/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
Asset voting (in its lone mark version) is one of the few methods simple
enough to have a decent chance among lazy U.S. voters, and it would be the
greatest possible improvement consistent with the simple lone mark ballot.
Absolutely, and it is gra
At 04:01 AM 8/16/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
It has heard of NY and lever machines - exactly what I vote on and think
about. Says they are able to handle elections with up to 300 candidates.
With range chewing up slots 10 times as fast as plurality, capacity
shrinks to 30 candidates.
This ass
At 05:05 PM 8/15/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
Unsophisticated voters might have to rely on the advice of their favorite
candidate or some other trusted advisor when they don't have a strong
feeling for approval and disapproval.
So, in 1992, had the voting method been Approval, Ross Perot might
At 12:54 PM 8/15/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
Also range is TACTICALLY THE BEST in terms of the PLAN of
appealing to US 3rd parties
Convince me that, say, the Libertarian party would not be interested in
being able to receive votes for its candidate which the candidate could
then distribute
At 05:54 PM 8/14/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Sadly, it appears as though there's a proposal to change the Wikipedia
Arbitration Committee election method from Approval to First Past The
Post:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration_Committee_Elections_December_2005/Proposed_modification
At 12:22 PM 8/14/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
I disagree with the claim they are. Democracy is about
choice by the voters.
Actually, voting is only one device used in a democracy, and not the most
important factor. The most important factor is the consent of the governed.
Elections can actuall
At 11:24 AM 8/14/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
Well, in our real-world-voter study of range & approval: USA voters
by statistically clear margins, told us they wanted to stay with plurality and
NOT switch to either range or approval voting.
I'd suggest that the answers may have depended on how the
At 04:07 PM 8/13/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
As an example of strategic campaigning, Ralph Nader could have
used a strategy in either 2000 or 2004 involving campaigning
strongly up to and through the fall TV debates but promising to
withdraw after the debates if polls had shown that he had no
At 08:25 PM 8/11/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
However, the Condorcet winner criterion is quite easily and
unambiguously applied to Range Voting ballots, since a ranked ballot can
be easily derived from a Range Voting ballot.
What do you do with candidates with equal ratings?
In fact, the Condorc
At 07:38 PM 8/11/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
More generally could consider, say, "asset voting" an unconventional
voting method I invented
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html #77
which also was similar to an idea of Forrest Simmons.
It was designed to be a multiwinner method but can
At 01:17 PM 8/11/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Regarding the example: 59 people out of 100 prefer B to A. Under the
principle of "one person, one vote", it's extremely difficult to argue
that A should win.
"Should" is undefined.
Giving it a definition, that candidate should win who will best uni
At 10:56 PM 8/5/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[...] since amending RONR requires
not only familiarity with it but understanding it "well enough,"
Suter doesn't have the qualifications needed to propose
revisions and be taken seriously. He should shut up until
he has acquired an adequate understa
At 06:03 PM 8/5/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
You can also help advertise the group and/or invite others to join
the group. Please do! To make this a credible force that politicians
have to pay some attention to, we would like to get at least 1000 members!
I certainly wish Mr. Smith well in his e
At 09:58 PM 8/2/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>There is an assumption here, which is that there is no chair who
>understands the rules and considers it his or her duty to help
>members to use the rules to get what they want.
I made no such assumption. In fact, one of the things Cannon
emphasiz
At 10:01 AM 7/27/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Dave,
> Please give an example, but:
> No IRV - let that be a separate project.
> No cycles - likewise, unless you state that there is no problem
> without cycles being involved.
When no cycles are involved, Condorcet is 100% perfect. So I
At 03:45 PM 7/21/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
This now sounds like a primary and general election. That might be
one way to spin it. Consider, for example, that Washington State's
top-two runoff was declared unconstitutional last Sunday:
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/20023
At 03:47 PM 7/20/2005, Dan Bishop wrote:
[...]I think a good solution would be for elections to have two rounds:
1. A qualifying primary, done entirely with write-in ballots, and counted
using Approval. Candidates with a sufficient number of votes would
advance to...
2. A runoff election, u
At 12:52 PM 7/15/2005, Stephen Turner wrote:
Mostly, but not only about Diebold. I wonder how
these companies stay in business. Stephen
Like all businesses, they stay in business by serving their customers,
i.e., those who pay them or, what amounts to the same thing, those who
control those
At 05:53 PM 6/25/2005, Russ Paielli wrote:
Also by the way, I'd like to take this opportunity to introduce a
foolproof new election method. I'll call it the Saddam system. Here's
how it works: you vote for Saddam or you watch your children tortured
and mutilated (and I mean tortured in the orig
At 10:54 AM 6/26/2005, Bill Clark wrote:
Agreed. Mail filters work great for excluding posts by particular
individuals, but the problem is that other people then reply to such
posts (even though there seems to be an epidemic of "I'm not going to
reply to so-and-so anymore" and then replying anyw
At 06:49 PM 6/17/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I have been subscribing to the digest in order to reduce
the quantity of emails.
Obviously, it's up to each reader, but I've tried digests and they are more
trouble than they are worth. Sure, you get fewer mails. But then you can't
see the subje
At 10:36 AM 6/15/2005, Chris Benham wrote:
Why stop at only two elections?". I don't know any good answer to that.
One of my general points is that elections, especially elections for
representatives, are inherently unfair, for they almost guarantee that some
voters will end up unrepresent
At 06:12 PM 6/14/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
What I meant was this: When a voter expressed that s/he prefers A to B, we
interpret this to mean that if s/he could choose between A and B, she would
choose A. Now what do we think the voter would choose when s/he put A and B
at equal ranks? Do we assu
In a context where the norm is simple plurality, with overvotes resulting
in the ballot being discarded (for the race with extra votes), the simplest
reform is repealing the rule that discards such ballots. This simple change
implements Approval voting, which is potentially a strong reform.
Fu
At 03:38 PM 6/10/2005, Chris Benham wrote:
Abd,
You wrote:
Now, I wonder if there is anyone on this list who thinks that overvotes
should not be counted?
Let me first make it clear that I agree that FPP is awful and that
Approval would be a huge improvement. However, simply counting all
ove
At 07:10 AM 6/11/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Abd ulRahman has suggested recently to put up a wiki in which we
could try to reach consensus about elementary aspects of voting
systems.
On the Approval Voting yahoogroups list, I offered to put up an Approval
wiki if anyone asked me to. Since I was
At 11:04 AM 6/11/2005, Bart Ingles wrote:
There are four candidates, and the voters are in two groups:
Group I: a=b>c=d
Group II: c=d>a=b
If the two groups differ in size by more than one vote, an additional
voter cannot determine which group wins. If this voter's preference order
is a>b>c>d
At 10:05 PM 6/8/2005, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
No one can guess what would happen in a public election if we used a
better voting system, or if we had the fair media coverage that I
described. So I won't debate with you how Nader would do. But I will say
that one rarely meets a Democrat voter who t
At 12:53 PM 6/8/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
They might also trust a uniform voting method science community telling
them that some certain method is the best one. This is however maybe the
biggest problem of the Condorcet community - no agreement on which method
is the best.
The problem, of cours
At 02:34 PM 6/8/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
Let me summarize two sides of the main argument.
On one side, we have those who say,
Let everyone have their say, even if they choose more than one
candidate. Every voice should be heard.
[with mumbled grumblings about overly stringent
At 04:54 AM 6/8/2005, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ulRahman Lomax Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 5:01 AM
> Let me make sure I understand. If we had a face-to-face meeting, and an
> election was held by show of hands, which is not an uncommon thing, I've
> never seen a rule that pre
At 02:09 AM 6/8/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
[I had written:]
> So promoting Approval voting might be as simple as pointing out the
> injustice of it. I can't see any reason for *preventing* a person from
> voting for more than one candidate. Allowing it merely adds to the
> freedom of the voter wi
At 01:11 AM 6/8/2005, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Russ's notion of free speech is based on the legal theory that money talks.
That's why Russ opposes campaign spending reforms in general.
Without accepting Mr. Ossipof's right to tell us how Russ thinks, I'll note
that I support Ossipof's pointing ou
At 10:28 AM 6/7/2005, Chris Benham wrote:
So I don't agree that MMPO has a grave problem with indecisiveness.
Take this often-discussed example:
49: A
24: B
27: C>B
MMPO scores: A52, B49, C49.
The result is a tie between B and C. Which "one vote" would you change
(and how) to change this
At 01:25 PM 6/7/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
On 6 Jun 2005 at 21:20 UTC-0700, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> What if we had IRV with Approval? What is that called?
ERIRV(whole):
Equal-Rank [allowed], Instant Runoff Voting, whole [votes counted for
equal rank].
In other words, each round
At 04:39 AM 6/6/2005, Markus Schulze wrote:
the final report on the voting systems study of the
League of Women Voters of Minnesota has been published [...]
Here is what is in the newsletter referenced by Mr. Schulze, interspersed
with my comments:
... Last
month, after looking at feedback
At 12:43 AM 5/27/2005, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
Criterias and electoral methods [...] are not meant to
cope for a fractionated electorate. An electoral system
goal is to get the electorate will, whatever it is.
Actually, the goal of electoral systems is to reduce the electorate will to
a decis
At 04:02 AM 5/23/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This time I see "variable voting" introduced as if it is a new concept to
be added.
Going back to the beginning of this thread, I had specified "Each
proxy has as many votes as they represent, directly or indirectly; a
voter with no proxy would ha
At 07:30 AM 5/20/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
We are pulling against each other too much.
I'm not pulling. I'm discussing. Given the very high level of apparent
agreement on some pretty important and unusual aspects of our postings, I'm
a bit puzzled by Mr. Ketchum's remarks. However, perhaps I can
At 03:52 AM 5/19/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I have two targets here:
Keep presidential elections separate from others.
Propose a useful, doable change here.
I hope it is understood that my remarks indicated complete agreement on
this...
... What I say here is:
I DO promote Condorcet as
At 04:42 PM 5/19/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
If (in order to share costs) all the participants were to contribute (to a
transportation pool) the average cost of getting to the winning city, then
it would be to their economic advantage to choose the city minimizing the
average voter distance (as
At 05:48 PM 5/18/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Another post suggested use of proxies instead of electing. I thank John
B. Hodges for waking me up on this, but offer my own approach.
Classifying kinds of elections:
Presidential: In their own world, and I say little - keep the
Electoral Colle
At 09:51 AM 5/18/2005, Sean Harris wrote:
Has anyone ever combined IRV with approval voting in order to eliminate
some of the problems associated with traditional IRV?
I have been searching but I haven't found anything quite like it yet.
There are methods described on the electorama site, I believe
At 05:46 AM 5/18/2005, Markus Schulze wrote:
Russ Paielli proposed "Ranked Approval Voting" (RAV). Then he was
pointed to the fact that presumably this method had already been
proposed by Kevin Venzke. Russ Paielli immediately stopped claiming
that he had invented RAV. Russ Paielli didn't say somet
At 11:31 PM 5/17/2005, Russ Paielli wrote:
If I am not mistaken, Arrow's theorem says that you can't satisfy both the
Condorcet criterion *and* the independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). Should that bother us? I think it should bother us at least a bit.
I am bothered by the fact that eli
At 01:25 PM 5/12/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Abd ulRahman!
Welcome to the list from me, too.
Thanks.
What do you think about the following story (leading to a group decision
method somewhat similar to DMC):
Consider a group of people having to decide for one out of a number of
options.
At fi
At 08:58 PM 5/12/2005, Curt Siffert wrote:
I recently posted this addendum to the Arrow's Theorem page on
wikipedia: It was immediately deleted for "bias". [...]
Was I out in left field for writing this?
Have you asked in the comment page attached to the article? Another writer
here pointed out
At 01:30 PM 5/12/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
In both my post and my writings on the DMC web page, I was trying to
explain the method, not the motivation behind it.
Note that good explanation for a complex proposal will include motivation
because motivation for an aspect of the proposal allows
At 12:02 PM 5/12/2005, Andrew Myers wrote:
I have another suggestion: ostracism.
There are a wide range of options. "Ostracism" takes many forms. The most
harmless is that other members of the list set filters so they don't have
to see the mail, or just skip it. But a raging flame war can harm th
Having been the moderator of a highly contentious newsgroup, where
arguments were rooted in differences which have stood for centuries and
where, offline, they can and do lead to serious and major violence, I have
a suggestion.
First of all, there are two basic forms of organization, oligarchic
At 01:19 PM 5/11/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
On 10 May 2005 at 19:56 UTC-0700, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> [re wikis] I
> don't know why Mr. Araucana got the idea that I didn't understand
> this basic concept.
Please, call me Q (see sig). And please don't take offense
At 01:25 PM 5/10/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
It appears that you are reading my comments out of context, and are
also misunderstand the intent of a wiki -- it is a *collaborative*
site. See these links: [deleted]
Perhaps it doesn't matter, but I operate several wikis, and I've
contributed to
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