On 16 Mar 2015, at 23:33, LizR wrote:
My apologies obviously you did mean finite.
This is very interesting although probably too much for my brain at
the moment.
What is all the stuff about S(S(0)) and {}, {{}}, etc? Doesn't that
define finite numbers?
That gives example of
WAtch out, Liz! you are getting close to ask about PRIME NUMBERS, what
may mean a totally different trap!
John M
On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 6:33 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
My apologies obviously you did mean finite.
This is very interesting although probably too much for my brain at the
My apologies obviously you did mean finite.
This is very interesting although probably too much for my brain at the
moment.
What is all the stuff about S(S(0)) and {}, {{}}, etc? Doesn't that define
finite numbers?
On 17 March 2015 at 05:39, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 15 Mar
On 15 Mar 2015, at 21:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/15/2015 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We cannot define the notion of finite number
This will make it very difficult to interpret the output of your
computer.
I guess you are joking.
In case you are serious, you really should study a good
On 3/15/2015 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We cannot define the notion of finite number
This will make it very difficult to interpret the output of your computer.
Brent
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On 22 Jan 2015, at 17:14, David Nyman wrote:
On 22 January 2015 at 08:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Because with sufficiently big infinity in both mind and matter, you
can a priori singularize the experience and the body in a way
Did you actually mean that Bruno or should it be infinite - I thought you
defined the notion.
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On 20 Jan 2015, at 18:18, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 January 2015 at 17:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
At this point, I'm somewhat persuaded that this broader sense of
truth, in approximately Descartes' sense, is in fact highly
relevant to what is special and, so to speak,
On 22 January 2015 at 08:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Because with sufficiently big infinity in both mind and matter, you can a
priori singularize the experience and the body in a way such that
duplication is no more possible, and there is no more FPI, and we can use
the old
On 20 January 2015 at 19:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
For the very reason that it is necessarily private I think the 'hard'
problem will be regarded as solved, as solved as it can be, when one can
read off veridical emotions, thoughts, perceptions from brain scans.
I know you do
On 20 January 2015 at 05:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
What would that mean? If neuroscientists of the future develop brain
monitoring instrumentation and software such that they scan watch processes
in your brain and then say correctly, You were seeing red and it reminded
you of a
On 19 Jan 2015, at 21:09, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/19/2015 6:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:
There's an effective riposte to this, I believe, but it might be a
bit subtle, so I ask you to bear with me. I think, in the first
place,
On 20 January 2015 at 17:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
At this point, I'm somewhat persuaded that this broader sense of truth, in
approximately Descartes' sense, is in fact highly relevant to what is
special and, so to speak, non-negotiable about consciousness. It has the
virtue
On 19 January 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
conceptually disconnected from a base ontology that has no knowledge or
need of them. If we can accept consciousness as the model (in the
mathematicians sense) of such a truth level,
What does truth level mean? I don't see
On 1/20/2015 4:25 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 January 2015 at 05:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
What would that mean? If neuroscientists of the future develop brain
monitoring
instrumentation and software such that they scan watch processes in
On 1/19/2015 1:21 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 20:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/19/2015 9:31 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com
mailto:da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 23:11, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/19/2015 1:21 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 20:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/19/2015 9:31 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 1/19/2015 4:53 PM, David Nyman wrote:
Consciousness may be one of the things caused.
Then it should be entirely observable, at least in principle. That's Dennett's position,
essentially. He's actually gone out of his way to deny that thoughts are any more
'private' than anything
On 19 January 2015 at 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 18 January 2015 at 23:28, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 18 Jan 2015, at 00:39, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/17/2015 2:36 PM, David Nyman wrote:
I'm assuming it because he states it explicitly. He specifically
distinguishes what can be observed from the outside from
additional internal properties. He specifically brackets qualia
with the extreme
On 18 Jan 2015, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 January 2015 at 23:39, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I agree, with such a constraining definition of internal it would
seem that no interaction with the world or other people is
possible. It would only be consistent with a brain
On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
But if zombies were *logically* impossible, as I believe Dennett for
example claims, then it would be analytically true, not a contingent fact.
I'd like to amplify here a little in light of my longer response to you
about
On 1/19/2015 6:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:
There's an effective riposte to this, I believe, but it might be a bit subtle, so I ask
you to bear with me. I think, in the first place, that it's beside the point to get hung
up on the 'concreteness' or otherwise of arithmetic. Bruno's intent is rather
On 19 January 2015 at 20:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/19/2015 9:31 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
But if zombies were *logically* impossible, as I believe Dennett for
example claims, then it would be analytically
On 19 January 2015 at 18:37, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/19/2015 6:01 AM, David Nyman wrote:
There's an effective riposte to this, I believe, but it might be a bit
subtle, so I ask you to bear with me. I think, in the first place, that
it's beside the point to get hung up on the
On 1/19/2015 9:31 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 January 2015 at 14:01, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com
mailto:da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
But if zombies were *logically* impossible, as I believe Dennett for
example claims,
then it would be analytically true, not a contingent fact.
On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com
javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','da...@davidnyman.com'); wrote:
On 18 January 2015 at 23:28, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 18 January 2015 at
On 18 January 2015 at 23:28, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 18 January 2015 at 14:42, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
wrote:
What's wrong with merely adventitious parallelism, on the lines of
On 18 January 2015 at 04:25, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
I've been reading some of the responses to the Edge 2015 question What do
you think about machines that think?:
http://edge.org/contributors/q2015
Lee Smolin's contribution contains the following statement:
So let us
On 18 January 2015 at 14:42, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
What's wrong with merely adventitious parallelism, on the lines of
epiphenomenalism? If it seems to leave the mystery untouched, that is
because there is no logically possible solution to the hard problem of
On Monday, January 19, 2015, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 18 January 2015 at 14:42, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
wrote:
What's wrong with merely adventitious parallelism, on the lines of
epiphenomenalism? If it seems to leave the mystery untouched, that is
because
I've been reading some of the responses to the Edge 2015 question What do
you think about machines that think?:
http://edge.org/contributors/q2015
Lee Smolin's contribution contains the following statement:
So let us hypothesize that qualia are internal properties of some brain
processes. When
I'm assuming it because he states it explicitly. He specifically
distinguishes what can be observed from the outside from additional
internal properties. He specifically brackets qualia with the extreme
case of the latter as paradigmatic examples of the unobservable. I
suggest you read the whole
On 1/17/2015 2:36 PM, David Nyman wrote:
I'm assuming it because he states it explicitly. He specifically distinguishes what can
be observed from the outside from additional internal properties. He specifically
brackets qualia with the extreme case of the latter as paradigmatic examples of
On 1/17/2015 9:25 AM, David Nyman wrote:
I've been reading some of the responses to the Edge 2015 question What do you think
about machines that think?:
http://edge.org/contributors/q2015
Lee Smolin's contribution contains the following statement:
So let us hypothesize that qualia are
On 17 January 2015 at 23:39, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I agree, with such a constraining definition of internal it would seem
that no interaction with the world or other people is possible. It would
only be consistent with a brain in a vat, dreaming the world.
I don't see what
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