> On Dec 1, 2015, at 7:16 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> (1) I agree with you on the definition of these categories of Peirce.
> We seem to disagree on how to assign these categories to the three worlds of
> Burgin and the three roses of Scotus.
I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness
List, Clark:
On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote:
> I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where
> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in
> itself without relations.
>
>From my perspective, this argument, ignores the natur
Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to
explain. See interspersed comments.
John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Cla
> On Dec 2, 2015, at 9:56 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
> wrote:
>
> From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is,
> of part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and
> as "scaling" in physics.
>
> A noun is what? a part of a sentence? an obje
Hi Clark, lists,
You wrote:
"I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where
structures (120215-1)
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself
without relations."
(*1*) It seems that everybody, including you, John (and
I guess I must be 'nobody', since I don't see any way at all to 'distribute the
Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three
worlds of Burgin".
Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - and
neither, in my view, have anything to do with
Edwina, Clark, John, lists
You wrote:
"Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds -
and neither, (120215-1)
in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories."
If Statement (120215-1) is right, then Peirce (as represneted by
Sung, List,
"Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds -
and neither, (120215-1)
in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories."
If Statement (120215-1) is right, then Peirce (as represneted by E.
Taborsky) would have not
Sung, your comment doesn't make any sense. Because Peirce's three categories
don't correlate to the three worlds of Burgin and Popper [both of whom are
excellent scholars] , doesn't mean that Peircean theory doesn't have anything
to do with modern natural sciences or with information science
Peircers,
As I wrote before, I used the phrase "relations proper"
merely to emphasize that I was talking about relations
in the technical sense. Another common idiom to the
same purpose would be "relations, strictly speaking".
As for "elementary relatives", Peirce uses
this term in the 1870 Log
Sung,
I assume no such thing. Where did you get this idea from? You are unreasonably
adept at setting up straw men to try to justify yourself. You did it recently
with Edwina as well. This is not only bad reasoning, but it is rather rude as
well.
Your claims overall make no sense, since there
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