Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jeff, Jon S, Gary F, List, Jeff wrote: "Let's start with this question: why is the sign (or representamen), which is the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the simplest of the three? " GR: The sign is simplest, is first, is a 1ns, *because* it is a mere possibility. Of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Dear list: I wish to point out just how ridiculously clear this statement is: "...Peirce says that it was an error on his part to treat the second category as relation and the third category as representation." Best, J On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 9:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List, Given how much Peirce seems to be presupposing in the first few pages of NDTR, I want to suggest that try to draw from prior essays for the sake of filling in some of the picture. Consider what he says, for example, in the Lowell Lectures of 1866 and "On a New

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t understand. I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List: Consider these two passages. CSP: The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Third Correlate is that one

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F, Jon S, List, I'm afraid your post did *not* make me feel any less queasy. My comments are interleaved below preceeded by GR: When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the first *constrains *the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, see insert below … Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 16-Apr-17 17:40 Gary R., List: GR: But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant ...

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F.: Responses to your responses below. Jon S. On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 5:47 PM, wrote: > Jon, > > > > I think i’m beginning to catch on to what you’re driving at, so I’ll > insert my responses below. I hope this doesn’t make you any queasier, Gary > R, as I have no

Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction, was [PEIRCE-L] The object of reasoning is to find out ...

Jon A, List, Jon A wrote: People will continue to be confused about determination so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language biases us toward billiard-ball

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C, You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything specific about representamens which are not signs (though

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, I think i’m beginning to catch on to what you’re driving at, so I’ll insert my responses below. I hope this doesn’t make you any queasier, Gary R, as I have no desire to evoke that kind of feeling! Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 16-Apr-17

[PEIRCE-L] The object of reasoning is to find out ...

| “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.” | | — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3) | https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deduction-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/ | The object of reasoning is to find out, | from the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

By purely iconic, I meant iconic sign. Both the object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each other, at least as I understand it. Hence a trivial case. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 3:17 PM To: Peirce-L

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary R., List: GR: But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant ... Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me. That passage requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List: When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the first *constrains *the mode of the second. The Sign determines the Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in itself is a possibility,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C, List, Would you explain this remark: "The only time [the] sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case."? Even in the case of the three classes of iconic signs in the classification into 10

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F, Jon S, List, Maybe I should stay out of this discussion at this point, this suggested by the fact that I'm getting confused by the dialague Gary F and Jon S are currently having. I hope it's just some terminological confusion, since these issues under discussion once seemed fairly simple

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally. The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List: As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ... GF: My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make

[PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, Gary, list, I just noticed that a point got somehow dropped out between those numbered 9 and 10 below. That point was about the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, which of course is Peirce’s third division of signs, “according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

First, Happy Easter to all our Christian friends! Jon S, Gary R, Evidently you are both making some inference that to me appears unwarranted and unmotivated. The issue may be terminological, or it may be grounded in a much deeper conceptual difference regarding the nature of signs.