Robert,
Thanks for finding that quotation:
> Thought is
a thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations (CP
5.395)
Now that you mention it, I recall reading that some
time ago. It must have been lurking somewhere in my mind, but well
beneath the conscious level.
In any cas
Bill,
Your comment is very close to what I was trying to
say.
> I have been a musician for seventy years, and I was a
serious
mathematician until age twenty. (I graduated with a double degree.) I
can assure you that I dont think only in terms of the patterns . . .
In fact, in my most treasur
Helmut, Edwina, List:
There are at least three different ways of translating the natural-language
sentence, "a human is a featherless biped," into a proposition in formal
logic.
1. Some human is a featherless biped.
2. Every human is a featherless biped = if something is a human then it
Bill, List:
WB: There seems to be a lot of crossfire here. Perhaps I can create a
diversionary skirmish . . .
I for one appreciate the attempt!
WB: Okay, well, first-person accounts are suspect, one can’t generalise,
etc., etc.
This is a good reminder for all of us not to get entrenched in ou
John, Auke, List, All:
JFS: He [Peirce] insisted that metaphysics should be based on mathematics,
not on Hegel-style verbiage.
Actually, he insisted that *all *other sciences are ultimately based on
mathematics, while metaphysics in particular should be based on logic--the
entire normative scien
John, List, All:
JFS: Any logician can "hear" an exciting new melody in R670 and L231 that
was not present in R669 or the Monist article of 1906. Peirce didn't have
to write a "note to self" about the change. He just did it. And any
logician can "hear" it.
But I realize that many people can't f
Auke, List, All:
AvB: For him [Peirce], as far as I understood his thought, the formal
structure is not everything. It only is "the formal structure as it
operates in a living intelligence". It did not prevent him from focussing
exclusively on the formal structure, as his formal work shows. But he
Hmm. You seem to be defining 'thinking' as only an act of abstract
intellectual analysis.
But Peircean 'thinking' includes non-analytic feeling [Firstness] as
well as direct physical experience [Secondness] and also, that
abstract analytic process [Thirdness].
Edwina
O
Hello, everyone,
There seems to be a lot of crossfire here. Perhaps I can create a diversionary
skirmish . . .
"A mathematician or a musician thinks only in terms of the patterns, the
operations on those patterns, and their relationship to whatever notation is
used to represent them.”
Okay, w
John,
Let's take the sequence from the architecture of science: math. logic,
phenomenology, semiotics, critical logic, ... , methaphysics. You assume that
my remarks concern the interval logic ... methaphysics. That however was not
the object of my remarks. My remarks concerned the interval ph
Peirce often uses the musical metaphor ...
Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our
sensations” (CP 5.395)
Le sam. 30 janv. 2021 à 04:39, John F. Sowa a écrit :
> Gary R,
>
> My remarks were ad rem, not ad hominem. Mathematics is like music. A
> mathematician or
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