Auke, List, All: AvB: For him [Peirce], as far as I understood his thought, the formal structure is not everything. It only is "the formal structure as it operates in a living intelligence". It did not prevent him from focussing exclusively on the formal structure, as his formal work shows. But he was aware of the limitations. You [JFS] seem to be less so.
Indeed, John seems to view all these matters almost exclusively through the lens of mathematical/formal logic. I brought up the necessary role of "a living intelligence" myself a few weeks ago because those are Peirce's last three words in R 669. CSP: The few examples that shall forthwith be given might tempt a lively mind to exclaim: Why, this syntax draws conclusions of itself, automatically. This would be extravagant; but one may say that the Syntax together with the application of the two illative permissions does so, provided it be not overlooked that such application can only be made by a living intelligence. (R 669:23-24[21-22], LF 1:584, 1911) According to his own testimony below, John has a strong interest in *artificial *intelligence, which helps to explain his personal opinion that "the 1911 version" of EGs is "best"--it facilitates more efficient proof procedures in classical logic, thus lending itself to "automated reasoning." That is presumably why he dismisses R 669, along with anything else that Peirce wrote about EGs before June 1911, where over and over he makes it clear that this was *not *his primary purpose in developing them. AvB: I think that this quote [CP 1.384, 1887-8] backs up Jon's approach from a systematic perspective. Systematic here to be taken in the philosophical sense, not the logical. I agree; again, my own purposes are primarily philosophical, so *everything *that Peirce wrote about logic and EGs is potentially relevant. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jan 29, 2021 at 3:36 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@upcmail.nl> wrote: > John, > > During your repeated debates with Jon an experience I had as a freshman > philosophy kept knocking at my doors of perception. It was the first > meeting in which each of the students had to read a passage of Hegels > logic. I was the first to read and started with the first alinea in which > logic is defined as being concerned with the idea in the formal element. > Just having had my first course in logic, I relied on what I learned and > started talking about that, i.e. as logic trying to lay down the rules of > formal thought, the formal element. And met with serious opposition from > the teachers present. I recall that it took them some time to get me to > realize that the emphazis is on "'idea' in the formal element" and not on > the formal element severed from any actuality. It is a line of thought I > can see leading to what Jon wrote. > > Jon A. wrote: > > In this particular case, my purpose is the same as Peirce's--analyzing > reasoning into its most fundamental and irreducible elements. Even more > specifically, I am currently exploring > intuitionistic/constructive/synechistic logic using EGs, consistent with > Peirce's own skepticism of excluded middle. John can speak for himself, but > it is clear by now that he does not share these same objectives. > > -- > > Logical positivism could restrict itself to logic regarded sub species > eternitate (Tractatus), we know for certain that Peirce was not of like > opinion. His view on logic is multi-facetted. > > He is not just concerned with, I cite: > > John wrote: > > For mathematicians and logicians, clarity and precision are essential. The > formal structure is everything, and the words are of minor interest. The > fewer, the better. > > -- > > For him, as far as I understood his thought, the formal structure is not > everything. It only is "the formal structure as it operates in a living > intelligence". It did not prevent him from focussing exclusively on the > formal structure, as his formal work shows. But he was aware of the > limitations. You seem to be less so. > > It is in this light that I find the negation - ilation debate of interest. > > Kant gives the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated and then > thought together by the mind. This is his doctrine that a mental synthesis > precedes every analysis. What really happens is that something is presented > which in itself has no parts, but which nevertheless is analyzed by the > mind, that is to say, its having parts consists in this that the mind > afterward recognizes those parts in it. Those partial ideas are really not > in the 1rst idea, in itself, though they are separated out from it. It is a > case of destructive distillation. CP 1.384 > > I think that this quote backs up Jon's approach from a systematic > perspective. Systematic here to be taken in the philosophical sense, not > the logical. > > Best, > > Auke > > Op 29 januari 2021 om 5:51 schreef "John F. Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>: > > Auke> I was thinking in terms of goals, i.e. what is the object you try to > understand, not credentials. I can connect Jon's answer to my question > with his line of reasoning and I did like that. There might be differences > in the goals and then it is always better to asses and value the > differences, instead of fighting about who is right. > > I have been doing research and teaching in logic, computer science, > computational linguistics, and artificial intelligence for many years. In > 1976, I had published an article on Conceptual Graphs in the IBM Journal of > Research and Development. > > Then in 1978, I came across Don Roberts' book on EGs, and it was exactly > what I was looking for. Peirce's EGs were far more elegant and powerful > than the AI research in the 1970s. (including my own). I immediatetly > adopted it as the foundation for the book I published in 1984. I continued > reading Peirce's other writings and various publications about Peirce since > then. > > Then in 2001, I came across Michel Balat's transcription of a first draft > of L231 (mistakenly classified as R514). I realized that it was an > excellent introduction to EGs, and I posted a copy with commentary on my > web site: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm . > > I also realized that this version was far superior to Peirce's earlier > versions. In particular, I used it to solve a previously unsolved research > problem from 1988. I published the solution in Semiotca in 2011: > http://jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf . > > In April 2015, I presented a lecture on related issues at a Peirce Session > at the APA conference in Vancouver. In December of 2015, I presented an > extended version at a workshop that Zalamea sponsored in Bogota. And in > 2018, I publishted a 76-page version that spelled out all the details. > > The following slides are minor revisions of the 2015 version: > http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf . Slide 2 has a link to the 2018 > publication in the Journal of Applied Logics. > > The workshop in Bogota included leading experts in existential graphs. > Nobody raised any objection or even any comment about my use of the 1911 > version of EGs. For mathematicians and logicians, clarity and precision > are essential. The formal structure is everything, and the words are of > minor interest. The fewer, the better. > > As for Jon's comments about earlier versions, any quotations prior to June > 1911 are irrelevant. But I found Jon's comments useful for pointing out > issues that I decided to restate more clearly. > > John > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
