Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

At 03:24 PM 2014-09-30, Howard Pattee wrote: At 08:58 PM 9/29/2014, Clark Goble wrote: HP: To get a fairer picture of how physicists think, please peruse this survey. CG: I'd seen that before. While it's a great guide to interpretations of quantum mechanics it really doesn't address the nominali

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Clark, list, sorry, a few corrections/additions in *bold red*. - Best, Ben On 9/30/2014 1:58 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Clark, list, You wrote, > [CG] It’s a subtle issue that’s hard to get terminology for. (Probably one should do a literature search and see how others have solved it

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Clark, list, You wrote, > [CG] It’s a subtle issue that’s hard to get terminology for. (Probably one should do a literature search and see how others have solved it - but I don’t have time for that unfortunately) I’m not sure I like more or less general either since the more or less

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 30, 2014, at 9:21 AM, Benjamin Udell > wrote: > > If one is a realist _only_ about things that one doesn't know, then one > implies that the real is not cognizable. I suppose that one could say in a > loose sense that one is partly an instrumentalist about si

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 30, 2014, at 7:24 AM, Howard Pattee wrote: > > At 08:58 PM 9/29/2014, Clark Goble wrote: >>> HP: To get a fairer picture of how physicists think, please peruse this >>> survey . >> >> CG: I'd seen that before. While it's a great guide to interpret

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Clark, list, You wrote, >[CG] The line of thinking I was following was that generals, as used by Peirce, simply has much narrower application possible than universals like colors. It’s true that the universal yellow can be instantiated by a limited number of objects but is treated a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

At 08:58 PM 9/29/2014, Clark Goble wrote: HP: To get a fairer picture of how physicists think, please peruse this survey. CG: I'd seen that before. While it's a great guide to interpretations of quantum mechanics it really doesn't address the nominalism i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 29, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Howard Pattee wrote: > >> Goble: I think the ultimately problem is that most physicists (like most >> scientists) are nominalists and thus to make a realist claim requires >> knowing what the singulars are. Yet most physicists don’t think they know >> the sing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 29, 2014, at 10:38 AM, Benjamin wrote: By the way, I think that we should remind or inform readers that many physicists, when they speak of 'realism', mean ideas such as that a particle has an objective, determinate state, even when unmeasured. Goble: I think the ultimately problem i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 29, 2014, at 10:38 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > By the way, I think that we should remind or inform readers that many > physicists, when they speak of 'realism', mean ideas such as that a particle > has an objective, determinate state, even when unmeasured. Peirce's realism > does n

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Clark, list, By the way, I think that we should remind or inform readers that many physicists, when they speak of 'realism', mean ideas such as that a particle has an objective, determinate state, even when unmeasured. Peirce's realism does not imply that, so far as I can see, and his realism

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 27, 2014, at 6:05 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > Have you read The God Problem by Harold Bloom. I have no science but it seems > he is out to contradict every theory out there. He has one of his own about > origins. Best, S I confess I’ve not read that one, although I’ve read some of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 28, 2014, at 2:29 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > On 9/28/2014 11:22 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > >> > [JC] List, Ben, Clark: >> >> > I am surprised by the search for such a fine -scale parsing of the concept >> > of "formal" causality (telos). >> > [BU] I'd regard formal causation

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Jerry, Clark, list, Responses interleaved. On 9/28/2014 11:22 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > [JC] List, Ben, Clark: > I am surprised by the search for such a fine -scale parsing of the concept of "formal" causality (telos). [BU] I'd regard formal causation generally as entelechiac causatio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

List, Ben, Clark: I am surprised by the search for such a fine -scale parsing of the concept of "formal" causality (telos). CSP used the triad - "thing, representation, form". Mathematics uses the concept of formula generate forms, usually geometric forms. As physics uses mathematics to genera

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Clark, list, Responses interleaved. On 9/27/2014 7:41 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > On Sep 26, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:>/p> >> Clark, list, >>I've also noticed a difficulty of finding usefulness for the formal cause in physics, though I came at it from other directions, simpler

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 26, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Clark, list, > > > I've also noticed a difficulty of finding usefulness for the formal cause in > physics, though I came at it from other directions, simpler ones for me since > I'm not a physicist, but also I'd like to add a clarific

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Clark, list, I've also noticed a difficulty of finding usefulness for the formal cause in physics, though I came at it from other directions, simpler ones for me since I'm not a physicist, but also I'd like to add a clarification of the idea of formal causation. A thing's form is its formal c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 25, 2014, at 7:36 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > > But aren't formal and material causes just re-baptized in physics as > constants (of laws), as types of forces or particles, or as boundary > conditions? > Again I think it gets complex due to the different but mathematically iso

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Dear Clark, lists - But aren't formal and material causes just re-baptized in physics as constants (of laws), as types of forces or particles, or as boundary conditions? Best F Den 22/09/2014 kl. 15.59 skrev Clark Goble mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> : On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:13 PM, Clark Goble

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:13 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > On Sep 18, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Gary Fuhrman > wrote: > > Clark, in reference to the Peirce passage you quoted about the “community of > quasi-minds”, you said that “While we could obviously and perhaps should > discu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Dear Ben, lists, I think you are right in proposing that quasi-inferences are inferences with less than full self-control. But self-control comes in many degrees ( I address this a bit in ch. 6 I think). A very low degree of self-control may be the slow change over evolutionary adaption - with

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

To: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2 On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:09 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: In regard to the Peirce quote from 1907 that you provided, it's also pertinent to the discussion of biosemiosis, physiosemiosis

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Clark, list, You wrote, 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2-29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 16, 2014, at 10:32 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Yes, analytic philosophy seems tepid next to Peirce. I hardly know what > analytic philosophers mean by 'analysis' or, more importantly, by > 'philosophy'. Decades ago I got a similar vagueness from continental > philosophy. I think

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:09 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote: > > In regard to the Peirce quote from 1907 that you provided, it's also > pertinent to the discussion of biosemiosis, physiosemiosis, etc., taking > place lately here. It was in the 1906 "Prolegomena to an Apolo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Clark, list, In regard to the Peirce quote from 1907 that you provided, it's also pertinent to the discussion of biosemiosis, physiosemiosis, etc., taking place lately here. It was in the 1906 "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" that he discusses quasi-mind, quasi-utterer, quasi-inte

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Maybe there is a mental Higgs Boson that no one can quite describe. *@stephencrose * On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:23 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > (He came to regard philosophy as consisting of "so-called" logic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:23 AM, Benjamin Udell > wrote: > > (He came to regard philosophy as consisting of "so-called" logical analysis > (intellectual autobiography, 1904, Ketner editor), and to regarding such > logical analysis as really being phaneroscopic analysis